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Note on chronology 
It has been agreed to adopt the following method for writing dates. With 
regard to prehistory, dates m a y be written in two different ways. 
O n e way is by reference to the present era, that is, dates B P (before 
present), the reference year being + 1950; all dates are negative in relation 
to +1950 . 
T h e other way is by reference to the beginning of the Christian era. 
Dates are represented in relation to the Christian era by a simple + or — 
sign before the date. W h e n referring to centuries, the terms B C and A D are 
replaced by 'before the Christian era' and 'of the Christian era'. 
S o m e examples are as follows: 
(i) 2300 B P = - 3 5 0 
(Ü) 29OO BC = — 29OO 
AD l800= + 180O 
(iii) 5th century B C = 5th century before the Christian era 
3rd century A D = 3rd century of the Christian era 
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A M A D O U - M A H T A R M ' B O W 
Director-General of Unesco (ig/4—iç8/) 
For a long time, all kinds of myths and prejudices concealed the true 
history of Africa from the world at large. African societies were looked 
upon as societies that could have no history. In spite of important work 
done by such pioneers as L e o Frobenius, Maurice Delafosse and Arturo 
Labriola, as early as the first decades of this century, a great m a n y non-
African experts could not rid themselves of certain preconceptions and 
argued that the lack of written sources and documents m a d e it impossible 
to engage in any scientific study of such societies. 
Although the Iliad and Odyssey were rightly regarded as essential sources 
for the history of ancient Greece, African oral tradition, the collective 
m e m o r y of peoples which holds the thread of m a n y events marking their 
lives, was rejected as worthless. In writing the history of a large part of 
Africa, the only sources used were from outside the continent, and the final 
product gave a picture not so m u c h of the paths actually taken by the 
African peoples as of those that the authors thought they must have taken. 
Since the European Middle Ages were often used as a yardstick, modes of 
production, social relations and political institutions were visualized only 
by reference to the European past. 
In fact, there was a refusal to see Africans as the creators of original 
cultures which flowered and survived over the centuries in patterns of their 
o w n making and which historians are unable to grasp unless they forgo 
their prejudices and rethink their approach. 
Furthermore, the continent of Africa was hardly ever looked upon as a 
historical entity. O n the contrary, emphasis was laid on everything likely 
to lend credence to the idea that a split had existed, from time immemorial, 
between a 'white Africa' and a 'black Africa', each unaware of the other's 
existence. T h e Sahara was often presented as an impenetrable space pre-
venting any intermingling of ethnic groups and peoples or any exchange 
of goods, beliefs, customs and ideas between the societies that had grown 
up on either side of the desert. Hermetic frontiers were drawn between the 
civilizations and Ancient Egypt and Nubia and those of the peoples south 
of the Sahara. 
It is true that the history of Africa north of the Sahara has been more 
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closely linked with that of the Mediterranean basin than has the history of 
sub-Saharan Africa, but it is n o w widely recognized that the various 
civilizations of the African continent, for all their differing languages and 
cultures, represent, to a greater or lesser degree, the historical offshoots of 
a set of peoples and societies united by bonds centuries old. 
Another phenomenon which did great disservice to the objective study 
of the African past was the appearance, with the slave trade and colon-
ization, of racial stereotypes which bred contempt and lack of understanding 
and became so deep-rooted that they distorted even the basic concepts of 
historiography. F r o m the time w h e n the notions of'white' and 'black' were 
used as generic labels by the colonialists, w h o were regarded as superior, the 
colonized Africans had to struggle against both economic and psychological 
enslavement. Africans were identifiable by the colour of their skin, they 
had become a kind of merchandise, they were earmarked for hard labour 
and eventually, in the minds of those dominating them, they came to 
symbolize an imaginary and allegedly inferior Negro race. This pattern of 
spurious identification relegated the history of the African peoples in m a n y 
minds to the rank of ethno-history, in which appreciation of the historical 
and cultural facts was bound to be warped. 
T h e situation has changed significantly since the end of the Second 
World W a r and in particular since the African countries became inde-
pendent and began to take an active part in the life of the international 
community and in the mutual exchanges that are its raison d'être. A n 
increasing number of historians has endeavoured to tackle the study of 
Africa with a more rigorous, objective and open-minded outlook by using -
with all due precautions — actual African sources. In exercising their right 
to take the historical initiative, Africans themselves have felt a deep-seated 
need to re-establish the historical authenticity of their societies on solid 
foundations. 
In this context, the importance of the eight-volume General History of 
Africa, which Unesco is publishing, speaks for itself. 
T h e experts from m a n y countries working on this project began by 
laying d o w n the theoretical and methodological basis for the History. T h e y 
have been at pains to call in question the over-simplifications arising from 
a linear and restrictive conception of world history and to re-establish the 
true facts wherever necessary and possible. T h e y have endeavoured to 
highlight the historical data that give a clearer picture of the evolution of 
the different peoples of Africa in their specific socio-cultural setting. 
T o tackle this huge task, m a d e all the more complex and difficult by the 
vast range of sources and the fact that documents were widely scattered, 
Unesco has had to proceed by stages. T h e first stage, from 1965 to 
1969, was devoted to gathering documentation and planning the work. 
Operational assignments were conducted in the field and included c a m -
paigns to collect oral traditions, the creation of regional documentation 
centres for oral traditions, the collection of unpublished manuscripts in 
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Arabic and Ajami (African languages written in Arabic script), the c o m -
pilation of archival inventories and the preparation of a Guide to the Sources 
of the History of Africa, culled from the archives and libraries of the 
countries of Europe and later published in eleven volumes. In addition, 
meetings were organized to enable experts from Africa and other continents 
to discuss questions of methodology and lay d o w n the broad lines for the 
project after careful examination of the available sources. 
T h e second stage, which lasted from 1969 to 1971, was devoted to 
shaping the History and linking its different parts. T h e purpose of the 
international meetings of experts held in Paris in 1969 and Addia Ababa 
in 1970 was to study and define the problems involved in drafting and 
publishing the History; presentation in eight volumes, the principal edition 
in English, French and Arabic, translation into African languages such as 
Kiswahili, Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba or Lingala, prospective versions in 
G e r m a n , Russian, Portuguese, Spanish and Chinese, as well as abridged 
editions designed for a wide African and international public.1 
T h e third stage has involved actual drafting and publication. This 
began with the appointment of the 3 9 - m e m b e r International Scientific 
Committee, two-thirds African and one-third non-African, which assumes 
intellectual responsibility for the History. 
T h e method used is interdisciplinary and is based on a multi-faceted 
approach and a wide variety of sources. T h e first a m o n g these is archae-
ology, which holds m a n y of the keys to the history of African cultures and 
civilizations. Thanks to archeology, it is n o w acknowledged that Africa was 
very probably the cradle of mankind and the scene - in the neolithic 
period - of one of the first technological revolutions in history. Archaeology 
has also shown that Egypt was the setting for one of the most brilliant 
ancient civilizations of the world. But another very important source is 
oral tradition, which, after being long despised, has n o w emerged as an 
invaluable instrument for discovering the history of Africa, making it 
possible to follow the movements of its different peoples in both space and 
time, to understand the African vision of the world from the inside and to 
grasp the original features of the values on which the cultures and insti-
tutions of the continent are based. 
W e are indebted to the International Scientific Committee in charge of 
this General History of Africa, and to its Rapporteur and the editors and 
authors of the various volumes and chapters, for having shed a new light 
on the African past in its authentic and all-encompassing form and for 
having avoided any dogmatism in the study of essential issues. A m o n g 
these issues w e might cite: the slave trade, that 'endlessly bleeding wound' , 
which was responsible for one of the cruellest mass deportations in the 
history of mankind, which sapped the African continent of its life-blood 
1. Volumes I and II have been published in Arabic, Spanish, Korean, Portuguese, 




while contributing significantly to the economic and commerical expansion 
of Europe; colonization, with all the effects it had on population, economics, 
psychology and culture; relations between Africa south of the Sahara and 
the Arab world; and, finally, the process of decolonization and nation-
building which mobilized the intelligence and passion of people still alive 
and sometimes still active today. All these issues have been broached with 
a concern for honesty and rigour which is not the least of the History's 
merits. B y taking stock of our knowledge of Africa, putting forward a 
variety of viewpoints on African cultures and offering a n e w reading of 
history, the History has the signal advantage of showing up the light and 
shade and of openly portraying the differences of opinion that m a y exist 
between scholars. 
B y demonstrating the inadequacy of the methodological approaches 
which have long been used in research on Africa, this History calls for a 
n e w and careful study of the twofold problem areas of historiography and 
cultural identity, which are united by links of reciprocity. Like any historical 
work of value, the History paves the way for a great deal of further research 
on a variety of topics. 
It is for this reason that the International Scientific Committee, in close 
collaboration with Unesco, decided to embark on additional studies in an 
attempt to go deeper into a number of issues which will permit a clearer 
understanding of certain aspects of the African past. T h e findings being 
published in the series 'Unesco Studies and Documents — General History 
of Africa'2 will prove a useful supplement to the History, as will the works 
planned on aspects of national or subregional history. 
T h e General History sheds light both on the historical unity of Africa 
and also its relations with the other continents, particularly the Americas 
and the Caribbean. For a long time, the creative manifestations of the 
descendants of Africans in the Americas were lumped together by some 
historians as a heterogeneous collection of Africanisms. Needless to say, 
this is not the attitude of the authors of the History, in which the resistance 
of the slaves shipped to America, the constant and massive participation 
of the descendants of Africans in the struggles for the initial indepedence 
of America and in national liberation movements , are rightly perceived for 
what they were: vigorous assertions of identity, which helped forge the 
universal concept of mankind. Although the phenomenon m a y vary in 
different places, it is n o w quite clear that ways of feeling, thinking, dreaming 
2 . T h e following eleven volumes have already been published in this series: The peopling 
of ancient Egypt and the deciphering of Meroitic script; The African slave trade from the 
fifteenth to the nineteenth century; Historial relations across the Indian Ocean; The his-
toriography of Southern Africa; The decolonization of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn 
of Africa; African ethnonyms and toponyms; Historical and socio-cultural relations between 
black Africa and the Arab world from ig3S to the present; The methodology of contemporary 
African History; The Educational Process and Historiography in Africa; Africa and the 
Second World War; Libya Antiqua. 
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and acting in certain nations of the western hemisphere have been marked 
by their African heritage. T h e cultural inheritance of Africa is visible 
everywhere, from the southern United States to northern Brazil, across the 
Caribbean and on the Pacific seaboard. In certain places it even underpins 
the cultural identity of some of the most important elements of the popu-
lation. 
T h e History also clearly brings out Africa's relations with southern Asia 
across the Indian Ocean and the African contributions to other civilizations 
through mutual exchanges. 
I a m convinced that the efforts of the peoples of Africa to conquer or 
strengthen their independence, secure their development and assert their 
cultural characteristics, must be rooted in historical awareness renewed, 
keenly felt and taken up by each succeeding generation. 
M y o w n background, the experience I gained as a teacher and as 
chairman, from the early days of independence, of the first commission set 
up to reform history and geography curricula in some of the countries of 
West and Central Africa, taught m e h o w necessary it was for the education 
of young people and for the information of the public at large to have a 
history book produced by scholars with inside knowledge of the problems 
and hopes of Africa and with the ability to apprehend the continent in its 
entirety. 
For all these reasons, Unesco's goal will be to ensure that this General 
History of Africa is widely disseminated in a large number of languages 
and is used as a basis for producing children's books, school textbooks and 
radio and television programmes. Y o u n g people, whether schoolchildren 
or students, and adults in Africa and elsewhere will thus be able to form a 
truer picture of the African continent's past and the factors that explain it, 
as well as a fairer understanding of its cultural heritage and its contribution 
to the general progress of mankind. T h e History should thus contribute to 
improved international cooperation and stronger solidarity among peoples 
in their aspirations to justice, progress and peace. This is, at least, m y most 
cherished hope. 
It remains for m e to express m y deep gratitude to the members of the 
International Scientific Committee, the Rapporteur, the different volume 
editors, the authors and all those w h o have collaborated in this tremendous 
undertaking. T h e work they have accomplished and the contribution they 
have m a d e plainly go to show h o w people from different backgrounds but 
all imbued with the same spirit of goodwill and enthusiasm in the service 
of universal truth can, within the international framework provided by 
Unesco, bring to fruition a project of considerable scientific and cultural 
import. M y thanks also go to the organizations and governments whose 
generosity has m a d e it possible for Unesco to publish this History in 
different languages and thus ensure that it will have the worldwide impact 
it deserves and thereby serve the international community as a whole. 
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B. A. O G O T * 
President, International Scientific Committee 
for the Drafting of a General History of Africa (igj8-ig8f) 
T h e General Conference of Unesco at its 16th Session instructed the 
Director-General to undertake the drafting of a General History of Africa. 
T h e enormous task of implementing the project was entrusted to an 
International Scientific Committee which was established by the Executive 
Board in 1970. This Committee, under the Statutes adopted by the Execu-
tive Board of Unesco in 1971, is composed of thirty-nine m e m b e r s (two-
thirds of w h o m are African and one-third non-African) serving in their 
personal capacity and appointed by the Director-General of Unesco for 
the duration of the Committee's mandate. 
T h e first task of the Committee was to define the principal characteristics 
of the work. These were defined at the first session of the Committee as 
follows: 
(a) Although aiming at the highest possible scientific level, the history does 
not seek to be exhaustive and is a work of synthesis avoiding dogmatism. 
In m a n y respects, it is a statement of problems showing the present state 
of knowledge and the main trends in research, and it does not hesitate to 
show divergencies of views where these exist. In this way , it prepares the 
ground for future work. 
(b) Africa is considered in this work as a totality. T h e aim is to show the 
historical relationships between the various parts of the continent, too 
frequently subdivided in works published to date. Africa's historical con-
nections with the other continents receive due attention, these connections 
being analysed in terms of mutual exchanges and multilateral influences, 
bringing out, in its appropriate light, Africa's contribution to the history 
of mankind. 
(c) The General History of Africa is, in particular, a history of ideas and 
civilizations, societies and institutions. It is based on a wide variety of 
sources, including oral tradition and art forms. 
(d) T h e History is viewed essentially from the inside. Although a scholarly 
* During the Sixth Plenary Session of the International Scientific Committee for the 
Drafting of a General History of Africa (Brazzaville, 1983), an election of the new Bureau 
was held and Professor Ogot was replaced by Professor Albert A d u Boahen. 
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work, it is also, in large measure, a faithful reflection of the way in 
which African authors view their o w n civilization. While prepared in an 
international framework and drawing to the full on the present stock of 
scientific knowledge, it should also be a vitally important element in the 
recognition of the African heritage and should bring out the factors making 
for unity in the continent. This effort to view things from within is the 
novel feature of the project and should, in addition to its scientific quality, 
give it great topical significance. B y showing the true face of Africa, the 
History could, in an era absorbed in economic and technical struggles, offer 
a particular conception of h u m a n values. 
T h e Committee has decided to present the work covering over three 
million years of African history in eight volumes, each containing about 
eight hundred pages of text with illustrations, photographs, m a p s and line 
drawings. 
A chief editor, assisted if necessary by one or two co-editors, is respon-
sible for the preparation of each volume. T h e editors are elected by the 
Committee either from among its m e m b e r s or from outside by a two-thirds 
majority. They are responsible for preparing the volumes in accordance 
with the decisions and plans adopted by the Committee. O n scientific 
matters, they are accountable to the Committee or, between two sessions 
of the Committee, to its Bureau for the contents of the volumes, the final 
version of the texts, the illustrations and, in general, for all scientific and 
technical aspects of the History. T h e Bureau ultimately approves the final 
manuscript. W h e n it considers the manuscript ready for publication, it 
transmits it to the Director-General of Unesco. T h u s the Committee, or 
the Bureau between committee sessions, remains fully in charge of the 
project. 
Each volume consists of some thirty chapters. Each chapter is the work 
of a principal author assisted, if necessary, by one or two collaborators. 
T h e authors are selected by the Committee on the basis of their curricula 
vitae. Preference is given to African authors, provided they have requisite 
qualifications. Special effort is also m a d e to ensure, as far as possible, that 
all regions of the continent, as well as other regions having historical or 
cultural ties with Africa, are equitably represented a m o n g the authors. 
W h e n the editor of a volume has approved texts of chapters, they are 
then sent to all m e m b e r s of the Committee for criticism. In addition, the 
text of the volume editor is submitted for examination to a Reading 
Committee, set up within the International Scientific Committee on the 
basis of the m e m b e r s ' fields of competence. T h e Reading Committee 
analyses the chapters from the standpoint of both substance and form. T h e 
Bureau then gives final approval to the manuscripts. 
Such a seemingly long and involved procedure has proved necessary, 
since it provides the best possible guarantee of the scientific objectivity of 
the General History of Africa. There have, in fact, been instances w h e n the 
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Bureau has rejected manuscripts or insisted on major revisions or even 
reassigned the drafting of a chapter to another author. Occasionally, special-
ists in a particular period of history or in a particular question are consulted 
to put the finishing touches to a volume. 
T h e work will be published first in a hard-cover edition in English, 
French and Arabic, and later in paperback editions in the same languages. 
A n abridged version in English and French will serve as a basis for 
translation into African languages. T h e Committee has chosen Kiswahili 
and Hausa as the first African languages into which the work will be 
translated. 
Also, every effort will be m a d e to ensure publication of the General 
History of Africa in other languages of wide international currency such as 
Chinese, Portuguese, Russian, G e r m a n , Italian, Spanish, Japanese, etc. 
It is thus evident that this is a gigantic task which constitutes an immense 
challenge to African historians and to the scholarly community at large, as 
well as to Unesco under whose auspices the work is being done. For the 
writing of a continental history of Africa, covering the last three million 
years, using the highest canons of scholarship and involving, as it must do, 
scholars drawn from diverse countries, cultures, ideologies and historical 
traditions, is surely a complex undertaking. It constitutes a continental, 
international and interdisciplinary project of great proportions. 
In conclusion, I would like to underline the significance of this work for 
Africa and for the world. At a time w h e n the peoples of Africa are striving 
towards unity and greater cooperation in shaping their individual destinies, 
a proper understanding of Africa's past, with an awareness of c o m m o n ties 
a m o n g Africans and between Africa and other continents, should not only 
be a major contribution towards mutual understanding among the people 
of the earth, but also a source of knowledge of a cultural heritage that 
belongs to all mankind. 
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Africa at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century: 
issues and prospects 
J .F .A. AJAYI 
Perspective 
This volume attempts a survey of African history in the nineteenth century 
before the European Scramble and the establishment of colonial rule. This 
'precolonial century',1 as it has been called, has loomed rather large in the 
post-Second World W a r effort to reinterpret African history, of which 
effort the Unesco General History of Africa m a y be regarded as a climax. 
O n c e it was accepted that change in African history did not originate with 
the colonial period, considerable attention began to be paid to the preceding 
century. Major events and changes with revolutionary import during the 
century, such as the reforms of M u h a m m a d 'AIT in Egypt, the reunification 
of Ethiopia under the emperors Téwodros and Menelik, the Mfecane 
of the Sotho-Nguni states in Southern and Central Africa, the djihâd 
movements in West Africa, have been the subject of various scholarly 
works and are all dealt with in the following chapters. Nevertheless, the 
general characteristics of the nineteenth century, and the significance of 
the century as a whole in the historiography of Africa, remain controversial. 
In the first place, because of the relative abundance of reliable oral 
material and the n e w written sources produced by the expanding scale of 
European activities in Africa in the period - such as accounts of European 
travellers, missionaries, traders, and government consular and other agents 
penetrating into the interior of the continent, often for the first time - the 
nineteenth century in m a n y parts of Africa is better k n o w n and better 
researched than earlier periods. There has been a tendency, similar to what 
happens in oral tradition, to telescope all significant change in the whole 
precolonial history of Africa into the favoured period of the nineteenth 
century. Fortunately, other volumes of the Unesco General History have 
already dealt with the dynamics of change in Africa in the earlier periods. 
T h e 'myth' of static Africa has thus already been exploded. Unfortunately, 
the corollary has persisted in the assumption that change in the nineteenth 
century was necessarily different from change in earlier periods and can 
i. P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L. Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 362. 
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only be explained by reference to factors that did not previously exist. It 
is therefore important here to examine the extent to which the changes 
taking place in the nineteenth century were a continuation of changes 
already taking place in the eighteenth century, and to what extent they 
were due to ne w factors associated with the expanding scale of European 
activities and increasing integration of African economies into the world 
system. 
T h e tendency to explain change in Africa in the 'precolonial century' 
unduly, if not exclusively, in terms of the expanding scale of European 
activities constitutes the second issue in the historiography of the period. 
T h e increasing integration of African economies into the world system is 
often treated not merely as a major factor leading to change but in fact as 
the dominant theme of African history in the period. T h e nineteenth 
century is discussed not only as the prelude to the colonial period but 
essentially as its beginning. In accordance with the late D r K . O . Dike's 
dictum of 'trade and politics' - that 'the history of modern West Africa is 
largely the history of five centuries of trade with European nations'2 -
changes in the overseas trade and trade routes, and the internal network 
of markets and long-distance trading that fed the overseas trade have for 
too long been perceived as the major, if not the sole, dynamic factor in 
African history in the nineteenth century. Thus , the changes in Egypt are 
explained by the impact of Napoleon Bonaparte, rather than by the complex 
of internal factors dating back to the eighteenth century that produced a 
national movement that rallied round the Albanian M u h a m m a d 'All's 
efforts to set Egyptian renaissance against Ottoman attempts to reimpose 
direct rule. Similarly, the Mfecane is explained vaguely as a reaction to the 
European presence, either in terms of pressure on the eastern frontier of 
the Cape Colony or a desire to profit from the Portuguese trade in Delagoa 
Bay, rather than in terms of the internal dynamics of northern Nguni 
society. T h e conjuncture of these remarkable events at the beginning of 
the century with the djihad movements in West Africa and new stirrings 
in Ethiopia is considered remarkable, and seems to require a global expla-
nation.3 But rather than seek for such explanation in the dynamics of 
2. K . O . Dike, 1956, p. 1. This dictum was of course an exaggeration, even in terms of 
Dike's o w n analysis of the Niger Delta in the nineteenth century, which emphasized the 
internal factors of change. For a critique of the 'trade and politics' thesis, see S. I. M u d e n g e , 
1974, p. 373 - 'Once the presence of external trade has been established, its consequences 
are then assumed: analysis of its actual impact on the political system and its relationship 
to internal production and consumption in the given polity becomes unnecessary, and all 
effort is expended in explaining the organization of trade routes and marketing and the 
types of goods involved.' 
3. Cf. the tentative view of I. Hrbek in 1965 (published in 1968): 'It is surprising h o w 
m a n y far-reaching events took place in Africa between 1805 and 1820; though they were 
unrelated to each other, they form a distinct trend in African history'. H e listed the 'Fulbe 
revolutions' of West Africa; 'the rise of the Zulu'; 'the rise of Buganda'; 'the foundation of 
M o d e r n Egypt by M u h a m m a d 'All's; 'the unification of Imerina on Madagascar'; 'the rise 
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African societies, the industrialization of Europe and the impact of 
the world economy on Africa has provided too facile an alternative hypoth-
esis. 
It is therefore necessary in this introductory chapter to focus attention 
on Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to survey the general 
characteristics and tendencies of the period, the nature and extent of 
continuities with the past, the innovations and n e w departures, and the 
tendencies for the future. It is only by tackling this problem at the beginning 
of the volume that w e can hope at the end to be in a position to consider 
the nature of African development during the century and the extent to 
which the European factor is to be regarded as 'a necessary precondition 
of the development of African societies, technical, cultural and moral',4 or 
the predominant cause of African underdevelopment. 
Demography and population movements 
B y 1800, the main linguistic and cultural divisions of the African population 
had long been established in their various locations, claiming rights over 
their o w n portions of the land mass.5 Indeed, for most parts of Africa, the 
process was complete by the sixteenth century and, by the nineteenth 
century, varying degrees of consolidation had taken place and stability had 
been established. Only in the H o r n of Africa, East Africa (outside the 
central highlands of the Great Lakes region) and in Madagascar were major 
migrations into relatively underpopulated areas still continuing into the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and even in those places stability in 
the sense of mastery over the land space had been achieved by the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. 
This is to use the term migration in the sense of extraordinary movements 
of significant numbers of people over wide areas of time and space. 
However, in another sense mobility of people in the process of earning 
their livelihood continued, either as pastoralists involved in transhumance; 
or crop farmers alternating between land under cultivation and land left 
fallow; or hunters and gatherers roaming over defined areas for animals or 
honey or even palm fruits; or fishermen following the m o v e m e n t of fish 
according to different seasons; or specialist craftsmen such as blacksmiths 
or traders pursuing their occupation in enclave colonies in distant places. 
Movements of this sort should, however, be regarded as regular flows of 
population that usually did not involve permanent abandonment of 
of O m a n i hegemony on the East African coast'; and 'the abolition of the slave trade'. See 
I. Hrbek, 1968, pp. 47-8. Historians n o w reaching for a continental synthesis too easily 
find a c o m m o n explanation in the progressive integration of Africa into the world-economy. 
4. T . Hodgkin, 1976, p. 11, referring to the point of view of what he calls 'imperialist 
administrator-scholars'. 
5. This section draws heavily on Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. V , ch. 3 and 
Vol. VII, ch. 18. 
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locations or displacement of people and the movement of significant 
numbers over long distances or long periods of time. However, population 
pressure relative to the pattern of land use, perhaps arising from normal 
increase over a period of relative prosperity, or immigration due to war and 
the collapse of existing state systems, or to prolonged drought, pestilence or 
other ecological disaster in a neighbouring area could set off a process of 
expansion by drift. T h e nineteenth century was to witness several such 
movements. S o m e were triggered off by movements that began before 
1800, as in the case of the Fang in the forest belt of Equatorial Africa; 
others developed as a result of nineteenth-century changes in trading 
opportunities and patterns as a m o n g the C h o k w e of Angola. T h e most 
spectacular movements were associated with the decline or rise of state 
systems, and could be either on a local basis as in the case of the aftermath 
of the collapse of Old O y o in the Yoruba area of western Nigeria, or on a 
subcontinental basis as in the aftermath of the Mfecane a m o n g the northern 
Nguni of Natal in Southern Africa. Such movements often necessitated 
the occupation and cultivation of areas hitherto regarded as relatively 
inferior land, and the development of techniques and n e w crops suitable 
for such n e w environments. 
T h e figure of 100 million is usually given as an estimate of the total 
population of Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This is 
partly an arbitrary figure and partly based on projections back from the 
meagre demographic data of the post-1950 period. T h e actual figure m a y 
have been very different. However, the crucial historical issues concern the 
demographic trends and the interaction between the trends and the systems 
of political economy, the regional distribution of population relative to land 
resources and agricultural practice. 
T h e general assumption of demographers is that, given existing agri-
cultural systems, technologies and patterns of health care and diseases 
causing excessive infant mortality, the overall population could not have 
been expanding m u c h . Normally, a rise of 0.5 per cent per a n n u m (com-
pared with the current 2.5 to 3.5), that is to say 50 more births than deaths 
per thousand annually, could have been expected. That would have doubled 
the population within a millennium. Given the stability of the population 
in North Africa, and the intensive agriculture and irrigation in the fertile 
areas and oases, there was a steady increase of population in periods of 
prosperity, but this seems to have been balanced by periods of drought 
and plague, and the population barely remained stable. In the grasslands 
of the Sudanic zone of West Africa, Central and Southern Africa, the 
populations were constantly adapting their techniques and achieving a 
symbiosis between pastoralists and agriculturists, or developing systems of 
mixed agriculture capable of sustaining a rising population. Similarly, in 
the more forested areas, systems of agriculture were developed which 
sustained increases in the population, and by the eighteenth century high 
densities were achieved in some areas such as the Lower Casamance, the 
4 
Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
Igbo country in south-eastern Nigeria, the Cameroon grasslands and the 
Great Lakes region of East Africa. 
However , in addition to the occasional natural disasters, the loss of 
population through the slave trade and the devastating wars associated with 
it, especially the loss of w o m e n of childbearing age over such a long period, 
was such that the overall population of Africa declined in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, though the loss was unevenly distributed, falling 
most harshly on those less able to defend themselves, and being con-
centrated in that period in West and West-Central Africa. 
T h e effects of this loss of population are still to be fully explored, and 
remain a subject of speculation and of active controversy.6 Although the 
rapid expansion of population against the background of inelastic resources 
and stagnant, or diminishing, productivity is today regarded as one of the 
most prominent features of underdevelopment,7 that is so in the context 
of a structurally dependent economy. In the freer economies of the early 
nineteenth century, underpopulation was definitely a factor of under-
development. It is true that some economies appear to have gained some-
thing from the slave trade when compared with their neighbours: they 
managed to remain resilient by exploiting the weakness of their neighbours, 
thus sustaining their relative prosperity long enough to build up stable 
systems of political economy in which the challenge of rising population 
generated increased productivity and further development. But even such 
communities must have suffered from the impoverishment of their neigh-
bours and the instability on their borders. N o one could have escaped the 
overall depressive and traumatic social and economic effects of the massive 
loss of population through the slave trade and the attendant wars.8 T h e 
slave trade seems to provide the best explanation of w h y in most of Africa, 
of all continents, the political and economic structures at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century seem to have remained unstable and fragile. There 
appears to have been a perpetual ebb and flow in the frontiers of state 
systems, and in the rise and fall of administrative centres. M u c h of the 
land appears not to have been put to opt imum use even by the standards 
of available technology and land use. 
T h e nineteenth century brought no sudden change in the overall d e m o -
graphic situation. T h e campaign against the slave trade was slow to m a k e 
its mark. T h e initial effect was more to concentrate the export of slaves on 
fewer ports than to reduce the total output significantly, but the reduction 
did eventually come, slowly at first and fairly dramatically after 1850. 
However, as the numbers involved in the trans-Atlantic trade diminished, 
the export to Zanzibar and the Indian Ocean increased. W h a t is more, the 
rise of alternative export trade vastly increased the demand for domestic 
6. See J. E . Inikori (ed.), 1982a, especially pp. 29-36 of J. E . Inikori, 1982b. 
7. L . Valensi, 1977, p. 286. 
8. J. E . Inikori, 1982b, pp. 51-60. 
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slaves for use as labour in the procurement and transportation of ivory, 
palm oil, groundnuts, beeswax, cloves and, later, wild rubber and cotton. 
T h u s the nineteenth century saw a significant increase in the internal slave 
trade and the demand for slave labour, with the ruinous effects of the 
processes of procurement. It is argued that before 1830 in Angola, and for 
some time after 1880 in Central and East Africa, the population was 
declining in some places by as m u c h as half within a generation. However, 
abolition eventually stopped the massive exportation of Africans abroad 
and it would appear that for the first time since the seventeenth century, 
the overall demographic trend for the continent as a whole in the early 
nineteenth century was a rising one,9 with the curve steepening between 
1850 and 1880, then declining somewhat on the initial impact of colonial 
rule, before resuming the upward curve, at first gently and then more 
dramatically from the 1930s onwards. This population increase in the early 
nineteenth century, a result of both internal and external factors, became 
a significant factor of change, especially in areas like Southern and East 
Africa that had experienced little or no slave trade in the eighteenth century. 
Increased European interest 
Whatever doubts there m a y be about the actual population of Africa in 
1800 and the effects of a possible upward turn in the demographic curve 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there can be no such doubt 
about the increase in European interest, though the effects of this increasing 
interest as a factor of change in African history m a y have been exaggerated. 
T h e interest first manifested itself towards the end of the eighteenth 
century in expeditions to obtain more accurate information about the main 
geographical features such as the sources of the principal rivers, the location 
of mountains and lakes, distribution of population, leading states and 
markets, and the main agricultural and industrial products. Next, the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in Europe and the efforts, 
notably of Britain as the leading maritime power to contain the expan-
sionism of France, spilled over to Africa. T h e French occupied Alexandria 
and Cairo in Egypt as the gateway to the Far East. T h e British seized the 
Dutch colony at the Cape of G o o d H o p e . Thereafter, the increasingly 
triumphant British naval power found in the growing abolitionist m o v e -
ment a mission providing all necessary opportunities for intervention in 
Africa. In 1807 the British government prohibited the slave trade to British 
traders and converted the freed-slave settlement in Freetown into a C r o w n 
Colony and a base for a West Africa-wide naval campaign against the slave 
trade. T h e French were expelled from Egypt, but continued to seek 
commercial advantages and in other ways to profit from the weakness of 
the tottering Ottoman empire in North Africa, using the campaign against 
9. Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. VII, ch. 18; also J. C . Caldwell, 1977, p. 9. 
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piracy in the Maghrib as an excuse. Following their defeat, the French 
were obliged to join the abolitionist movement and this too provided a 
reason for showing more interest in the coastal bases and trading stations 
in West Africa. T h u s the abolitionist and missionary factors, and the search 
for alternative items of trade in place of the discredited trade in slaves were 
introduced into the politics of nineteenth-century Africa. 
It is important not to exaggerate the extent of European power in Africa 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, or the rate at which Europeans 
acquired 'possessions' or penetrated inland before 1850. T h e Portuguese 
m a d e extensive claims both in Angola and in Mozambique . T h e y had 
established military outposts and prazos (agricultural estates) in the interior, 
and from time to time they controlled the area from Loje, south of Cuanza, 
as far east as Kassanje, apart from trading posts on the coast between 
Ambriz and Moçâmedes . In M o z a m b i q u e their effective control was by 
1800 limited to Mozambique Island; elsewhere they depended more on 
Brazilian and mulatto merchants than on Portuguese officials. T h e 
increased demand for slaves in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century had shifted attention from the prazo system, and the security 
of the trade routes depended more on the pombeiros (barefoot mulatto 
merchants), bearing Brazilian trade-goods and surviving only on the good 
will of African rulers and merchants.10 T h e French had revived their 
trading posts in Senegambia after 1815, notably Saint-Louis and Gorée. 
Their venture to establish an agricultural farm in Waalo with a military 
post in Bakel to protect it had been a failure. In North Africa, they seized 
Algiers in 1830. T h e y spent the next twenty years overcoming the resistance 
of the Algerians, notably the movement led by Amir ' A b d al-Kädir. T h e 
British had established Freetown and the agricultural villages on the 
neighbouring peninsula as centres for the acculturation of freed slaves into 
a Creole culture. With the increasing prosperity and expansion of the 
Creoles to Bathurst (now Banjul), Badagry, Lagos and beyond, British 
commercial and missionary influence was spreading along the coast and at 
one or two points like Abeokuta began to penetrate into the interior around 
1850. O n the Gold Coast (now Ghana) , the British still shared the trade 
with the Danes and the Dutch, and took measures to resist Asante (Ashanti) 
efforts to dominate the coast, notably by exploiting the Fante fear of 
Asante domination and encouraging the Fante to act together under British 
tutelage. In Southern Africa, though the attempt to settle British farmers 
in Natal was not successful, the Cape Colony was expanding largely through 
the rebellious trekboers w h o seceded into the interior and obliged the British 
rulers to follow after them, if only to save the trekboers from extermination 
by the n e w African states, while appearing to act as mediators or effective 
rulers. But, up to 1850, South Africa remained a colony of poor farmers, 
10. A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 8-11. 
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divided internally and often at the mercy of their African neighbours w h o 
were no less divided. 
Various attempts to imitate the British success in Freetown ranged from 
the American settlement in Liberia, the French settlement of Libreville in 
what is n o w G a b o n , and the other British settlement, Freretown, in East 
Africa. Increasing British and French interests in India and the Indian 
Ocean - in A d e n , Mauritius, Madagascar and the n e w sultanate of Zan-
zibar — were soon to have their repercussions on East Africa. It needs to 
be emphasized, however, that the Euro/American presence was waterborne 
and coast-centred. It m a d e no appreciable penetration into the interior of 
the continent before 1850, whereas the major events in Africa in the early 
nineteenth century - the Ethiopian revival, the Mfecane, the West African 
djihads - were initiated from the interior of the continent, although 
M u h a m m a d 'Alfs reforms in Egypt were a notable exception. 
T h e missionary factor m a d e a substantial contribution to the spectacular 
British success in Freetown. Responding to the challenge of the new 
opportunities, G e r m a n missionaries, mostly from the Basel Mission but 
with a few from the Bremen Mission, overcame their pietist hesitation and 
became involved in the politics of development in a British colony. They 
and their British colleagues found more opportunities as farm managers, 
linguists, teachers, builders, and promoters of commercial enterprises than 
as preachers. A number of mission stations were established, and leading 
individual missionaries became deeply involved in local political and racial 
conflicts; nevertheless, nothing like the Freetown success was achieved. 
Elsewhere, missionary organizations were being founded, and a few pioneer 
mission stations established in which preliminary educational efforts and 
linguistic studies were being undertaken that would yield fruit later. 
However, as a significant factor of change in Africa, Christian missions 
belonged to the second rather than the first half of the nineteenth century. 
In 1850, David Livingstone was still on his first missionary journey. 
T h e Holy Ghost Fathers were founded in 1847, and the White Fathers in 
1863. 
European trading influence spread m u c h more quickly and more widely 
than missionary influence in the first half of the nineteenth century. This 
was largely because the n e w European trade was an outgrowth of the pre-
nineteenth-century slave trade. T h e legitimate trade was pioneered by 
former slave-traders and often even by practising slave-traders. It is import-
ant to emphasize this because the structure of the new trade was very 
similar to that of the old. There was to be an increasing monetization of 
the trade in the latter part of the century but, in the first half, the trade in 
palm oil, groundnuts (peanuts), ivory and cloves depended on the internal 
slave trade and the trust system: that is, the advance of trade goods on 
credit to the bigger African traders, thus necessitating measures to protect 
the investment and to guarantee delivery of goods. A s long as European 
traders remained on the coast and African traders brought goods to them 
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there, or coastal African middlemen took goods on credit to the interior to 
negotiate for and bring produce back to the coast, or pombeiros and Arab 
and Swahili traders did the same, the n e w trade was conducted within the 
existing pre-nineteenth-century structure. M o r e Africans were involved in 
the collection of palm fruits, g u m arabic, honey, and even ivory than had 
been in the procurement and sale of slaves to Europeans. Increasingly, 
also, in the major trading areas on the coast and along the trade routes, 
there were subtle changes in the composition and method of recruiting 
the political elite a m o n g the African populations. Notably, events of the 
nineteenth century favoured the rise to prominence of warrior groups 
seeking to share political power. S o m e of the creóles also became substantial 
traders and their numbers and importance were to increase into the 1870s. 
But the rapidity and the extent of social mobility should not be exaggerated. 
T h e traditional rulers and chiefs did not easily surrender their privileges. 
Rather, wherever possible, they brought in a few warriors to strengthen 
their position, and occasionally relied on the odd European or creóle 
traders. T h e warrior or creóle merchant seeking a share in chiefly privileges 
had to compete for it within the existing structures. T h e y recruited a large 
following of slaves and clients, acquired wealth and tried to use it to buy 
their way into positions of influence and power. T h u s , the diversification 
of the items of trade without : substantial modification of the pattern of 
trade did not produce the economic and social revolution expected, at least 
not in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
T h e European trade was expanding rapidly.11 However, this expansion 
was m a d e possible by and was dependent upon the pre-existing patterns 
of local and regional trade. A n u m b e r of issues arise from this that should 
be emphasized. O n e was that the pattern of local and regional trade was 
of course far m o r e dependent on the internal dynamics of the African 
communities - particularly the systems of production in agriculture, crafts 
and manufacture - than on the stimulation coming from outside. T h e 
second was that, compared with the internal trade, the external trade - at 
least initially - was secondary in the life of the majority of African peoples. 
It was nevertheless important because it brought in the critical factor from 
outside that might have m a d e the difference in the fortunes of those w h o 
controlled it and those w h o did not. It is not easy to draw up a sliding 
scale of its growth in relative importance as a source of revenue to the 
African rulers, or as a source of essential commodities that could not be 
obtained elsewhere. T h e most important of such essential commodities 
was, for most African states, firearms. T h e European policy of seeking to 
control the trade in firearms in their o w n self-interest tended to m a k e trade 
as a possible source of firearms far more important in the estimation of 
11. A useful summary but with a focus on the whole precolonial century can be found 
in P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, especially pp. 369-76, 419-
43-
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m a n y a ruler than it actually was , since the possession of guns did not 
everywhere confer military superiority. 
A third issue arising from the growth of the external trade is its import-
ance, on the sliding scale, not only relative to internal local and regional 
trade, but also relative to agriculture. Whatever importance particular 
rulers might have attached to the external trade, there can be no doubt 
that throughout the early nineteenth century it remained peripheral to 
agriculture in terms of the total activity of African peoples. A s employers 
of labour, providers of basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter and 
as the sources of raw materials for crafts and manufactures, etc., it is 
inexplicable that the agricultural systems should be treated as if they were 
less important than trade generally, and, more specifically, external trade. 
Agricultural systems 
It should be emphasized that at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
the basis of the economy of all African communities was food production, 
through a variety of systems of crop farming, rearing of animals, fishing, 
hunting, or combinations of these. All other activities, including trade, 
politics, religion, crafts, building, mining, or manufacturing, were sec-
ondary to and could not have been carried on without agriculture.12 Not 
only were agricultural systems central to the economic lives of the masses 
of African peoples; to a large extent they also provide a basis for under-
standing the structure of social relations within the communities, the 
pattern of authority, the relations with their neighbours and their response 
to external factors of trade and other interactions. It is therefore surprising 
that historians have tended to take the agricultural base of African societies 
for granted while concentrating on the factor of external trade.13 
M o s t of the available studies of nineteenth-century agricultural systems 
in Africa look at them from the standpoint of colonial economies. T h e y 
tend to be theoretical and ideological, contributing more to the debate 
about underdevelopment than to an understanding of the historical 
development of African agriculture in the early nineteenth century. T h e y 
view African agricultural systems uniformly as sustaining 'natural econ-
omies', witnessing the penetration of capital in the mercantilist period, as 
a prelude to the development of peripheral capitalism in the colonial period. 
There are only a handful of studies based on empirical data that show h o w 
particular agricultural communities in different parts of Africa functioned 
and developed in the early nineteenth century. T h e y do not yet provide a 
basis for regional surveys of African agriculture, let alone a continental 
synthesis. However , they do provide necessary insights for re-examining 
12. D . Beach, 1977, p. 40, referring specifically to the Shona. 
13. See P.J. Shea, 1978, p.94: 'Trade and production are obviously interrelated, but I 
would argue that production must receive priority attention.' 
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the main characteristics of the agricultural base of African societies and the 
factors of historical change operating within them. 
A study of some village communities in Tunisia from the mid-eighteenth 
to the mid-nineteenth century14 highlights features primarily of the areas 
under Ottoman influence in the first instance, but also with Africa-wide 
significance — features such as land tenure, family patterns of production 
and exchange, pressures from central government with demands for taxes 
in return for protection but few social services, and the constant health 
hazards, including periodic epidemics of plague, cholera and smallpox. 
T h e study deliberately focuses on the period between 1750 and 1850 in 
order to emphasize continuity and to stress that the roots of the weaknesses 
of Tunisian political economy lay in the eighteenth rather than in the 
nineteenth century, w h e n they could have been attributed to the factor of 
European intervention. Leaving aside the controversy over the effects of 
outside interference for the m o m e n t , and the fact that there were a variety 
of forms and patterns even in the Maghrib and Egypt, not to mention the 
whole of Africa, the main features of the Tunisian experience deserve to 
be discussed in the wider continental context. 
Land tenure in the Tunisian villages in the early nineteenth century was 
governed by Islamic law, but capable of a variety of interpretations both 
in theory and in practice at the different levels of the central government, 
local kâHds, and the individual families concerned. Because of the intensive 
nature of the 'oasis' agriculture practised, land, even in the rural areas, had 
a potential economic value greater than in other parts of Africa where a 
less intensive form of agriculture was practised. There was consequently 
greater pressure for a recurrent realization of the commercial value of 
landholdings. Nevertheless, the essential fact was that at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century private property rights in land were generally 
not recognized. This was the basic difference compared with European 
feudalism. In Tunisia, as in other parts of Africa, land belonged to the 
community or to the king as trustee of the community. At the local level, 
the ka'id or the relevant chief allocated it for use. There was sometimes 
competition for the control of the right to allocate. Neighbouring c o m -
munities, even those paying tax or tribute to the same overlord, could 
struggle over the use or the right to allocate the use of particular pieces of 
land, but the basic assumption was that land could not be bought or sold. 
T h e nineteenth century was to accelerate the pace of change, especially with 
European intervention, and the growth of enclosure and estate agriculture, 
which encouraged the pressure for making the commercialization of land 
general. T h e central government, while upholding the theory of the legal 
basis of land tenure, sometimes tried to convert the commercial value of 
land to profit; just as families in financial difficulty were sometimes anxious 
to offer land, at least temporarily, as security for loans. But such adaptations 
14. L . Valensi, 1977. 
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of the eighteenth-century system of agriculture came slowly, and rarely 
challenged the basic theory of land tenure. 
Again, while w e hardly need to emphasize the variety of patterns of 
production in different ecological zones of Africa — in the details of land-
holding and inheritance, the basic tools of farming, the crops planted, the 
land use, division of labour between m e n and w o m e n , specialization 
between one community and another in terms of crops, crop-farming and 
animal husbandry, etc. - there is another feature of the Tunisian experience 
relevant to Africa as a whole. This is the extent to which it is misleading 
to persist in describing African agricultural systems as 'subsistence', or 
sustaining 'natural economies'. These terms were initially justified on the 
mistaken notion that African rural communities were static, 'tribal', 'self-
contained' or 'almost self-contained.'15 A s empirical evidence has been 
gathered to disprove this view of isolated communities, it appears that 
some protagonists of the view that African agriculture had a subsistence 
character, while conceding the prevalence of the circulation of goods and 
services, are n o w defining subsistence in ideological terms. T h e y claim that 
African farmers were subsistence farmers, not peasants, on the grounds 
that though they might have bought and sold, their predominant motive 
was not profit. T h e y define peasants as 'small agricultural producers w h o 
intend to m a k e a living by selling part of their crops and herds', and they 
consider that peasantization is necessarily the result of 'the impact of n e w 
markets' and the profit motive.16 W h a t the Tunisian experience highlights 
is that African agricultural systems in the early nineteenth century were 
such that the different communities could not be regarded as self-contained. 
There was a variety of crops according to the variety of soils, family 
traditions and individual preferences and specialized skills. Crop farming, 
crafts and animal husbandry went together in a variety of patterns that 
encouraged exchange as the means by which families m a d e up their essential 
needs. Each family gave up part of its surplus in return for what it needed 
but did not produce, and saved the remainder of its produce for years of 
drought and other calamities. 
There was no region of Africa so remote that the rural communities in 
the early nineteenth century could have been described as completely self-
sufficient and self-contained. In his study of W o m u n a f u ' s career in Bunafu, 
D . W . Cohen has shown h o w even such 'a small and isolated community 
could be supplied with goods and services that only specialists offered or 
that derived only from remote centers of extraction and manufacture'.17 
This was a remote part of northern Busoga described by Cohen as hitherto 
an 'unadministered zone' into which migrated a number of individual 
15. E . P . Scott, 1978, especially pp. 449-53, where the footnotes review the lengthy 
debate on subsistence agriculture versus exchange, and 'formal' versus 'substantive' forms 
of exchange. 
16. R . Palmer and N . Parsons, 1977b, pp. 2-5. 
17. D . W . Cohen, 1977, p. 48; see also Fig. 11.2, below. 
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leaders and their followers and lineage groups at the end of the eighteenth 
century and in the early nineteenth century. This migration was part of 
the final stages of the drift of the L u o migrations from the headwaters of 
the Nile, joined by groups displaced from the northern shores of Lake 
Victoria and from small states like Luuka as a result of the pressures of the 
expanding kingdom of Buganda. T h e y sought relatively underpopulated 
areas away from existing power structures and they lived in dispersed 
homesteads, not in nucleated villages. Formal markets for regular exchange 
did not exist. Through intermarriage, ritual and other forms of interaction, 
a sense of community emerged. After a period of rivalry, some overall 
authority also began to be recognized, but the family homestead remained 
the centre of their lives. In the words of Cohen: 
the dispersal of compounds . . . provides a context for the emergence 
and maintenance of heroic traditions centered on the clearing of the 
land, and this in turn constitutes the basis for maintaining, within the 
lineage of the clearer of the land, eternal rights to, and control over, 
the land. There is an enduring ideal that each m a n is master of his 
compound in the same sense that a king is master of his domain. T h e 
c o m m o n man's estate is an enclosed world, with or without fence; 
and within the boundary marking off his land, he is lord.18 
W e need not go into detail here about the evolution of some form ofsupra-
lineage authority out of the rival traditions of the different antecedents of 
the lineages that settled in Bunafu. W h a t needs to be emphasized is that 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century the individual household there 
was the unit of production and unit of land holding. But, however remote 
and enclosed, the household even in Bunafu was not self-sufficient. Within 
two generations, there developed a network of social and cultural relation-
ships through which goods and services circulated with remarkable 
efficiency. N e w migrants like the mukama W o m u n a f u and his entourage 
brought a stock of goods, skills and n e w technologies; the demand for 
specialized goods like ironware, especially farming implements, pottery 
and salt led to occasional fairs to which people brought their surplus 
produce such as barkcloth, skins and live animals in exchange; others 
took their produce to the locations of k n o w n specialist craftsmen like 
blacksmiths, fishermen and potters. Similarly, goods and services circulated 
through payments for rituals and worship, or in payment of bride price 
and other social dues, and even in raiding, stealing and kidnapping. A s 
Cohen has put it, his study 'offers a series of images of a regional economy 
of the unadministered zone in the early nineteenth century structured not 
upon the "channeled effect" associated with international and interregional 
trade but structured, rather, upon a remarkably extensive and thickly knit 
network of circulation, distribution and redistribution."9 
18. D . W . Cohen, 1977, p.43. 
19. ibid, p. 47-8. 
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T h e nineteenth century brought changes, n e w pressures and oppor-
tunities even for the people in Bunafu, as in other places. A s the family 
expanded, land hitherto regarded as marginal began to be cultivated. N e w 
crops hitherto regarded with caution were experimented with and some 
became n e w staples. T h e 'economic horizon' of the villagers expanded as 
the trame strengthened the links that stretched from the villages to the 
coastal ports and overseas markets. Expansion of trade brought social and 
political changes. Initially, it tended to strengthen the position of chiefs 
w h o found it easier to accumulate wealth from taxing trade in salt, iron 
and copper, not to mention ivory, beeswax and palm oil, than from tribute 
in agricultural produce and customary labour. At the same time the profits 
of trade could not be so easily monopolized. Several individuals moved 
away from their customary locations to seek their fortunes, and social 
mobility was thus facilitated. But these changes were slow and represented 
not so m u c h innovation as expansion of tendencies and patterns already 
evident by the eighteenth century. Thus the causal effect of the external 
trade should not be exaggerated. As J. L . Vellut has emphasized, the 
nineteenth century was not just 'the history of the ebb and flow of the 
world economy as experienced by . . . Africa', but also 'the slow-moving 
. . . history of diversification in making use of natural resources.'20 It is 
essential to emphasize this internal factor on which the external came to 
impinge and which shaped the response of African peoples to the external 
factors. A s Cohen has shown in his chapter on the Great Lakes region -
hitherto studied only as a collection of centralized states responding to 
external forces - 'the nineteenth century was not simply a world of states, 
large and small. It was also a world in which individuals and households 
were in innumerable small, sometimes undramatic ways, altering their 
orientations to state authority, to service, to production, and to the 
market.'21 
T h e agricultural system around the ancient city of K a n o in northern 
Nigeria at the beginning of the nineteenth century provides interesting 
similarities and contrasts with the world of Bunafu in the 'unadministered 
zone' of northern Busoga. For one thing, the market played a stronger role 
in the economy, since K a n o was a well-established centre of local, regional 
and international trade based in part on major and highly successful 
industrial activity in the manufacture, dyeing and distribution of textiles, 
and the tanning of leather. Yet it would be misleading to concentrate on 
the channel effects of the markets and trade routes and to ignore the 
network of social and cultural relations on which the markets and the trade 
routes depended. Similarly, in K a n o , there was the influence of Islam, and 
the m u c h greater role of the ruler and the ruling class and merchants of 
the walled city in the management of the economy. A n d yet in K a n o , as 
20. See p. 295 below. 
21. See p. 292 below. 
H 
Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
in Bunafu and the village communities of Tunisia, the bulk of agricultural 
production not only of basic essentials but also of a variety of cottons and 
dyes was in the hands of commoners in the rural areas among w h o m the 
household was the unit of production. As Abdulahi Mahadi has observed 
in a recent study, the head of a household in the K a n o area, the maigida, 
was 'like a ruler of a town'. H e fed, clothed and met social obligations of 
members; he determined the size of land and the type of crops to be 
cultivated each year; h o w m u c h time to spend on the collective household 
farm (gandu; plur., gandaye), and h o w m u c h on individual private farms 
(gayauni; sing., gayauna). There was no clear division of labour between 
m e n and w o m e n , all members participated in planting: while m e n m a d e 
the holes and inserted the seeds, w o m e n and children filled them up; while 
both m e n and w o m e n took part in weeding, children minded sheep, goats 
and other domestic animals; while m e n harvested, w o m e n gathered the 
bundles to central depots. Apart from the network of social and cultural 
relationships, some of which involved sharing labour and exchanging 
produce, there was the institution of gay y a (communal work) - organized 
at the village level on a voluntary basis, but with conscientious participation 
a mark of good citizenship - to provide additional labour at the time of 
planting, harvesting, housebuilding, and other major enterprises.22 
A s mentioned above, compared with Bunafu, the state in K a n o in the 
person of the aniir and his delegated officials played a more active role in 
the management of the economy and in the life of the rural communities. 
In this, K a n o was more like Tunisia. T h e aniir was recognized as the owner 
of the land. H e could regulate the acquisition, use and disposal of land. H e 
could deprive people of the use of their land for wilful disobedience, failure 
to pay prescribed taxes, or habitual anti-social behaviour like stealing. At 
the same time, it was part of his responsibilities to guarantee security of 
tenure to subjects in good standing, with the result that heads of households 
generally believed that they 'owned' their land. It was realized, however, 
that such security of tenure did not include the right to alienate the land, 
though leasing and subletting were generally allowed. Based on the concept 
of the aniir as owner of the land, enterprising rulers had actively encouraged 
immigration of groups with a variety of agricultural and industrial skills 
from Borno, Azben, N u p e and other places, settling them in different parts, 
offering inducements to resettle the original population. T h e ruler, as well 
as leading officials and merchants, were granted estates where they used 
the labour of slaves and clients for crop farming, breeding livestock and 
industrial production. Additional labour was recruited through the gayya 
system of voluntary labour. 
T h e success of the djihad at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
brought important changes to the political economy of K a n o . In particular, 
it brought the application of the sharTa (the Islamic legal system) to land 
22. A . Mahadi , 1982, especially ch. 6. 
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tenure, and under the caliphate the state intensified various measures to 
promote industrial and commercial prosperity. W h a t needs to be e m p h a -
sized here is that the eighteenth-century agricultural system remained the 
basis of the n e w political economy. In the words of Mahadi , 'there was no 
fundamental departure from the pre-nineteenth century land tenure 
system. T h e elements of continuity predominated over those of change.'23 
T h e sharTa allowed the amir to give out land, thus permitting c o m -
mercialization of land but ' K a n o still regarded commercialization as illegal.' 
It seems that the most noticeable effect of the sharVa on land tenure was to 
encourage fragmentation of the gandaye into individual family holdings on 
inheritance, thus reducing the size of agricultural units among commoners. 
At the same time, there was remarkable expansion of estate agriculture by 
the ruling and commercial elite, thus increasing land shortage, especially 
around K a n o and other urban centres. This encouraged farming in more 
distant places, and more commoners abandoned agriculture to concentrate 
on crafts and industrial production or became clients dependent on the 
ruling and commercial elite for earning their living. 
Patterns of authority 
K a n o and Bunafu thus represented two different models of the way in 
which the power structure affected agricultural development in Africa in 
the early nineteenth century, one where authority was centralized and 
structured, the other where it was diffuse and informal. This is not a 
distinction between 'state' and 'stateless' societies as anthropologists have 
earlier suggested. In Bunafu, not only was there a sense of government 
and authority, some of the migrants came with traditions of structured 
hierarchical political systems from which they were fleeing, but which they 
still drew upon in the rivalries that accompanied the emergence of a new 
authority system in Bunafu. Others also carried with them belief in the 
power of a the mukama, a charismatic prince chosen and possessed by the 
god, or the efficacy of ritual firelighting from royal hearths, to affect fertility 
and harvests. A s Vellut has argued, instead of the state-stateless dichotomy, 
w e should think of two modes of power structures: 
the hierarchical, well-defined order based on the payment of tribute 
which was that of the kingdoms; and, at the other extreme, the more 
egalitarian and informal type of government by councils of elders and 
notables. 
These two models were complementary, and in practice there were 
m a n y kinds of intermediate situations, waverings and compromises. 
T h e realities of the environment and of economic activity, as well as 
historical circumstances and even personal considerations, determined 
whether the prevailing type of organization tended towards the m o n -
23. A . Mahadi, 1982, pp. 566-^7. 
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archical model, with its qualities of order and security, or towards the 
more flexible, less authoritarian democratic ideal.24 
It should be added that the state system was not always the most effective 
framework of order. Cutting across the lineage system of non-centralized 
societies, a variety of integrative institutions developed in the religious, 
judicial and economic fields which could function as an overall framework 
of order or replace a disintegrating state-system.25 T h e poro and similar 
associations in Upper Guinea, or various so-called 'secret societies' in the 
Cross river and equatorial forest areas of the Cameroons and G a b o n are 
examples. In the case of the Aro, it was the widespread influence of a set 
of oracles, managed through a network of Aro colonies and local 'secret 
societies', that provided a judicial and economic basis of integration over 
a wide section of Igboland. Economic changes in the nineteenth century 
affected the pattern of authority not only in terms of the structures of 
the state systems, but often in strengthening such existing non-political 
integrative structures as well. 
T h e events of the early nineteenth century indicate a tendency towards 
centralized power structures, with the authority of the king becoming more 
effective than ever before. While the sprawling empires such as the Lunda 
complexes of states, or Old O y o or the Mossi empire of the M o g h o - N a a b a 
were disintegrating, new, smaller, and more authoritarian states emerged 
in their place. While M u h a m m a d 'All succeeded in making his power in 
Egypt stronger, and thus further weakened the Ottoman empire, his vision 
and his son's effort to build an Afro-Arab empire in its place did not 
succeed. ' U t h m a n dan Fodio (Usman dan Fodio) succeeded in making the 
Sokoto caliphate a sprawling empire, but effective political power was 
devolved to the amirs. M o r e than any of these, the Mfecane set off" a chain 
of events that encouraged the formation of a series of compact centralized 
kingdoms not only in Southern but also in Central and even East Africa. 
In probing the causes of Mfecane, L . D . Ngcongco has shown the centrality 
of the system of agriculture in the political economy of the northern Nguni, 
and the role of the state in adapting society to respond to the changing 
needs of the agricultural system. 
Over the years, the northern Nguni had developed a system of mixed 
farming. They lived in dispersed settlements, different from the nucleated 
villages of the Sotho-Tswana. In their family homesteads, the patrilineal 
head lived usually with two or three wives, each wife and her children in 
a separate house. T h e m e n looked after cattle and did some hunting; the 
w o m e n planted crops. T h e pattern of land use allowed for the cattle to 
have access both to sweet and sour pastures: 
24. See pp. 316-20 below. 
25. J. Oriji, 1982. 
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in the spring and early s u m m e r , Nguni herders could drive their herds 
to graze on the upland sourveld pastures, and from the middle of the 
summer season they would m o v e their stock d o w n to the sweet grasses 
at the bottom of the river valleys. Climatic variations had also m a d e 
it possible for these farmers to select the environment most suitable 
for the cultivation of either sorghum, millet or maize.26 
Maize, which was introduced sometime in the eighteenth century, had by 
the early nineteenth century replaced other traditional crops as the staple 
diet. These factors seem to have brought in relative prosperity and a rising 
population. This, in turn, sharpened competition for land and created 
social and political tension. There was a hierarchy of rulers, paramount and 
tributary kings. T h e royal homestead was larger, providing for communal 
activities whether ritual, cultural or military. It would appear that the 
paramount rulers of the northern Nguni took over the Sotho-Tswana 
practice of centralized initiation rites. They went further to use initiation 
rites to recruit young m e n and w o m e n for communal labour, and later also 
to recruit into military brigades; the brigades of young m e n being camped 
at the royal homestead, sometimes for as long as ten years before being 
released to go and marry and farm. This also served as a method of family 
planning and population control. A s the competition for land grew into 
all-out wars, these age regiments were deployed more and more for military 
purposes. 
Internal initiatives 
T h u s the Mfecane, which is recognized as one of the major factors of 
revolutionary change in nineteenth-century Africa, can best be explained 
in terms of pre-nineteenth-century social and economic development 
adapted to changing situations. Efforts to find a blanket explanation for 
the Mfecane in terms of the European presence at the Cape, or the 
approaching capitalist pastoralism of the trekboers, or the mercantilist force 
of Portuguese trade in Delagoa Bay have not stood the test of close 
scrutiny in the light of available evidence. T h e main initiatives in the 
Mfecane came from within Africa. This is also true of the other major 
events of the early nineteenth century, such as M u h a m m a d 'Alfs reforms 
in Egypt, and the djibiäd movements in West Africa. 
T h e national movement which brought M u h a m m a d 'All to power, and 
which he shrewdly manoeuvred in order to lead and inspire it, has often 
been attributed to the galvanizing effect of Napoleon and his 'Egyptian 
Mission'. However, as A . Abdel-Malek has shown below,27 this is a mis-
taken view: 'Eighteenth-century Egypt is n o w seen as the laboratory from 
which the new Egypt emerged.' It was the national feeling nurtured among 
26. See p. 94 below. 
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the Egyptian elite in the major towns, especially Cairo and Alexandria, and 
among the shaykhs and 'ulamä* at Islamic centres like al-Azhar which 
provoked the revolts of October 1798 and April 1800 against the French, 
weakened their position and forced their withdrawal. It was also this 
movement that frustrated the attempt of the pro-Ottoman M a m l u k s to re-
establish their power over Egypt. It was this national feeling that provided 
the context for M u h a m m a d c All's reforms, and his ambition and that of his 
son to make the Egyptian government truly national, independent both of 
the Ottoman and the Europeans, and at the head of an Afro-Arab empire. 
This groping for renewal and reform is just as discernible in the activities 
of various rulers w h o faced the challenges of the Mfecane, of those seeking 
to re-establish imperial order in Ethiopia, or those of the shaykhs of the 
Western and Central Sudan looking to the traditions of Islam for ideas of 
a new social and political order. Largely because of the writings of the 
djihad leaders and European travellers, w e know enough about the complex 
of forces and ideas that produced the series of revolutionary movements 
starting from Futa Toro, Futa Jallon and Bondu in the eighteenth century 
and stretching to the Sokoto, Massina and Dinguiraye djihäds in the 
nineteenth. W e therefore do not need to speculate about the possible 
contribution to that complex of forces and ideas of European mercantilist 
influence in the days of the slave trade or capitalist influence in the days 
of abolition and journeys of discovery. T h e initiative for the djihäd 
movements came from within. T h e djihäd states took a great interest in 
promoting agriculture, partly through traditional household production, 
partly also through estates worked by slave or client labour. T h e y also 
promoted industrial manufacture and trade. T h e y improved trade routes 
and offered protection to traders and merchants. B y far the greatest portion 
of the traffic on the routes was for local and regional exchange. But the 
djihad leaders also promoted trans-Saharan trade routes and the pilgrimage 
route to the Eastern Sudan, the Nile Valley and Mecca. Evidence is 
building up that these internal trading initiatives had developed trade 
routes that permitted trans-continental traffic before the new European 
trade of the nineteenth century.28 T h e Europeans, of course, were quick 
to note the results of these internal initiatives and were attracted to the 
possibility of profiting from them. 
Because w e do not have the advantage of similar writings on the areas 
further south, the temptation has been greater to speculate on the possible 
or probable effects of Old Qyo's participation in the slave trade through 
the Egbado country and Porto N o v o in the eighteenth century.29 But such 
speculation, and other hypotheses on the possible effects of abolition have 
28. See, for example, P . Curtin, S. Feierman, L . T h o m p s o n and J. Vansina, 1978, 
ch. 14. 
29. R . L a w , 1977, especially pp. 217-36, has reviewed the evidence thoroughly but 
seems predisposed to exaggerate the influence of trade generally, especially the slave trade, 
in the economy of Old Q y o , e.g. p. 255: 'The collapse of the volume of slave exports in the 
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so far failed to explain the collapse of the empire structurally in its economic, 
political, religious and social bases, and the widespread experimentation 
with various political and religious ideas for n e w structures and systems in 
the nineteenth century. It is more likely that, as in the djikàd states, the 
seeds of collapse came from internal discontent and yearning for reform, 
and the actual collapse owed more to the penetration of Islamic ideas and 
the direct impact of the Sokoto djihad than to the slave trade and/or 
abolition. T h e consequent wars, population movements, colonization of 
new areas hitherto regarded as marginal such as the coastal swamps , the 
rise of new towns and markets, and the spirit of reform and experimentation, 
created n e w opportunities that the Europeans came to exploit rather than 
to set in motion. 
This groping for renewal, then, will explain w h y so m a n y African 
rulers in the course of the nineteenth century from Egypt and Tunisia to 
Madagascar and Lesotho, Abeokuta and Fanteland, suspicious as they were 
of European intentions, nevertheless risked cautious collaboration with 
European traders, adventurers or missionaries as a way of importing 
European technology to assist their work of development. It was not only 
Egypt that experienced a sense of renaissance. T h e nineteenth century m a y 
well be called the 'African Age of Improvement',30 in which the urge for 
improvement dominated the scene, but the urge came from within. T h e 
rulers tried to exploit increased European activities to achieve improvement 
but were to end up being exploited and frustrated in the search for 
renaissance. 
Conclusion 
T h e early nineteenth century introduced n e w factors of change into African 
history, notably the new interest of Europeans not merely in trade but also 
in intervening directly in the social and economic life of African peoples. 
This brought with it a campaign to learn more about the peoples of and 
resources available in the interior of the continent, a campaign to stop the 
slave trade, to encourage the export of certain crops, with missionaries 
seeking to convert to Christian ways of living, and traders pressing to go 
into the interior to trade. All these brought n e w economic opportunities 
and challenges. T h e centres of the n e w trade did not always coincide with 
the centres of the pre-nineteenth-century trade. T h e n e w sources of trade 
and wealth, and essential commodities such as firearms, became objects of 
competition between different states or interest groups within states. This 
n e w trade greatly expanded commercial activity, not only through its o w n 
1790s is likely to have cut deep into the Alafin's revenues, and Awole m a y have responded 
by stepping u p demands for taxes from within the kingdom.' 
30. A . G . Hopkins, 1980, used this phrase as the title of his Inaugural Lecture, with a 
focus on the objective of African economic history generally, rather than trends in the 
nineteenth century specifically. 
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traffic, but even more in stimulating existing traffic. However, the extent 
to which the new trade was a continuation of pre-nineteenth-century trade 
should be emphasized, as should the extent to which it was pioneered and 
sustained by the same peoples and structures that sustained the slave trade; 
h o w m u c h it depended on internal slave trade and slave labour; and thus 
h o w m u c h it was based on the existing power structures and internal 
network of social and economic relations, trade routes and, above all, 
agricultural systems. 
In view of this, w e should not distort the pattern of development in the 
early nineteenth century by antedating the predominance of European 
power and influence to control initiatives for change in African history. In 
the early nineteenth century, the factors of continuity with the eighteenth 
century and the factors of change internal to the continent far exceeded in 
importance the factors of change coming from outside. 
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I. W A L L E R S T E I N 
F r o m 'luxury' to 'essential' trading patterns 
T h e great transformation of Africa's economic relations with the wider 
world did not occur with the late nineteenth-century partition by European 
powers. Rather, conversely, the partition of Africa was a consequence of 
the transformation of Africa's economic relations with the wider world, 
and in particular with Europe, a transformation that took place in a period 
beginning approximately in 1750 and culminated in the extensive European 
direct colonization of the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
There had long been trading networks in various parts of Africa, and 
m a n y of these networks had extended beyond the frontiers of the African 
continent - across the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic.1 
B y and large, these extra-continental trading links constituted the same 
kind of iong-distance trade' as that which had been well known for 
millennia in Asia and Europe as well. Such long-distance trade involved 
the exchange of so-called luxury products, that is products that were usually 
small in bulk and high in profit per unit of size. T h e production of such 
items for exchange tended to involve a small proportion of the manpower 
of the originating zones and probably a small proportion of the total value 
produced in these zones. In these senses, 'luxury' trade was 'non-essential' 
trade in that its interruption or cessation did not require any basic reor-
ganization of productive processes in the originating zones. T h e two zones 
whose products were thus exchanged could not therefore be said to have 
been located in a single social division of labour.2 
T h e modes of trade in the Indian Ocean arena did not seem to change 
very m u c h in the period between 1500 and 1800. T h e intrusion first of the 
Portuguese and later of other Europeans into this maritime zone changed 
the personnel somewhat, but hardly the nature or extent of this trade. Even 
1. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. vi, notes the existence of'clusters of inter-connected econ-
omies in which trade was widespread, regular, and of great antiquity.' 
2. I have previously elaborated on the sense in which Africa's external trade prior to 
1750 could be considered such a 'luxury' trade. See I. Wallerstein, 1973, 1976. 
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the personnel was less changed than is often thought. A s late as the 1750s 
in Mozambique , whose littoral had been colonized by the Portuguese, 
there seemed to be more Gujerati/Indian merchants than Portuguese in 
residence. Important changes seem to have occurred only in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, with the collapse of the Mughal empire and 
the rise of British India, as well as with the rise of the O m a n i Arabs on the 
Swahili coast.3 
T h e traditional compartmentalization between largely non-com-
mercialized agricultural production and the long-distance trade in non-
agricultural (luxury) products remained the rule even in those cases where 
there were small European agricultural settler communities, such as the 
prazeros in the Zambezi valley or the Boers on the Cape coast. 
T h e one zone in which the economic situation was somewhat different 
was those parts of West and Central Africa where communities had begun 
to participate in the slave trade. T h e slave trade was of course a product 
of, and a key element in, the construction of the European-centred capitalist 
world-economy that had c o m e into existence c. 1450. B y the seventeenth 
century this capitalist world-economy included as part of its peripheral 
production areas the 'extended' Caribbean zone of the Americas. In this 
zone, the expanding plantation systems (especially sugar, but also tobacco, 
cotton, and other products) came to depend increasingly for their manpower 
on slaves w h o were 'captured' in West and Central Africa and transported 
across the Atlantic. 
Should this long-distance trade in slaves be classified as 'luxury' trade 
or as trade in 'essentials'? C a n it be said to have involved the 'production' 
of manpower for the capitalist world-economy? A n d should therefore the 
'producing' zones be seen as peripheral areas of this capitalist world-
economy? There is no simple answer to these queries. In terms of numbers 
exported there was an upward curve in the slave trade from 1450 to 1800, 
with a significant increase c. 1650. T h e numbers by 1750 were about triple 
those of 1650.4 
It is clear that, at some point, the slave-dealers were no longer 'foraging' 
for persons to be enslaved but had begun to be engaged in systematic 
3. See E . A . Alpers, 1975. 
4. For some figures, see P . D . Curtin, 1969, Tables 33, 34, 65, 67 and Figure 26. While 
Curtin's figures in absolute terms have been the subject of m u c h vigorous debate, there 
has been less controversy about the shape of his growth curve. See the debate between J. E . 
Inikori, 1976a, 1976b and P. D . Curtin, 1976; see also the summary of the scholarly evidence 
plus the new synthesis by P . E . Lovejoy, 1982. Lovejoy alters the curve slightly, but not 
fundamentally. 
It should also be noted that the total curve for Africa masks a geographic shift. T h e 
Angolan coast was involved in a major way as of the sixteenth century, the Bight of Benin 
only as off. 1650, the Gold Coast as of c. 1700, the Bight of Biafra as off. 1740. T h e Sierra 
Leone coast, involved early, was a significant exporter only as of the middle of the eighteenth 
century. South-east Africa became a major source only in the nineteenth century. 
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procedures for obtaining their quarry. At some point, therefore, production 
and political systems in West and Central Africa began to be adjusted as 
a function of these n o w continuing economic ties. W h e n such 'adjustment' 
could be said to have occurred to a significant degree - 1650, 1700, 1750 -
is hard to say, although I tend to feel a later date is more plausible than 
an earlier one.5 W h a t is true, as w e shall argue, is that the very shift of 
slave-trading from a 'luxury' to an 'essential' trade undermined its economic 
viability, since it meant that the costs of reproduction had thereupon to be 
included in the overall profitability calculations of the remuneration of 
labour services in the capitalist world-economy, since, in all 'essential' 
trade, production costs include 'opportunity costs'. 
A s long as Africa was 'outside' the world-economy, the 'cost' of a slave 
to the slave-owner was the expense of procurement plus maintenance plus 
supervision (prorated for his/her life as a slave) divided by total work 
output during his/her life as a slave. T h e 'benefit' to the world-economy 
was essentially the surplus value produced by the slave minus the 'cost'. 
O n c e Africa was 'inside' the world-economy, that is, was producing on its 
soil commodities that were part of the division of labour of the world-
economy, then someone w h o was a slave was not something else, for 
example a free peasant producer or a wage-labourer. Therefore, although 
the 'cost' of the slave remained the same perhaps for the slave-owner, the 
'benefit' had to be recalculated from the point of view of the world-economy 
as a whole. T h e numerator of the equation had to take into account the 
'alternative' accumulation from some other use of the individual. It m a y 
be that he/she would have produced still more net surplus value if not 
enslaved. Furthermore, and crucially, the denominator changed since the 
years of reproduction, formerly usually outside these calculations, were 
n o w part of them. Therefore, the net accumulation from the slave years 
was reduced while the net accumulation if not enslaved remained the same. 
Ergo, the calculus was less favourable to slavery, from the point of view of 
the accumulation process in the world-economy as a whole. 
Nonetheless, it was not these changing economic implications of the 
slave trade that would have the greatest impact on Africa's future develop-
ment but a m o r e fundamental process that was occurring within the 
capitalist world-economy. T h e first long economic and geographic expan-
sion of the capitalist world-economy had occurred between 1450 and 1600-
50. In that period, no part of Africa could be said to have been part of this 
historical system. T h e period 1600/50-1730/50 was, for the capitalist world-
economy, a period of relative stagnation, of taking a breath, of consolidation, 
primarily within the geographic zones that had already been included in 
the sixteenth century. It was still largely true at this time that no part of 
5. For an argument that the 'slave trade era' involved, as off. 1650, the 'production' of 
slaves, and that therefore the period 1650-1800 marked something different from and in-
between luxury trade and the later trade in essentials, see S. Daget, 1980. 
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Africa could be said to have been incorporated into this system (with the 
reservations noted about the changing structure of the slave trade).6 
Capitalist expansion 
However, about 1730-50, for reasons internal to the functioning of the 
capitalist world-economy, Africa resumed its economic and geographical 
expansion. In the next hundred years, it would incorporate into its pro-
duction network five n e w major geographical areas hitherto external to the 
capitalist world-economy: Russia, the Ottoman empire, India, the 'further' 
zones of the Americas (Canada, western North America, the southern cone 
of South America), as well as (northern, western, and southern) Africa. It 
is the story of the incorporation of this fifth zone that is our subject. 
F r o m the point of view of the Europe-based capitalist world-economy, 
all five zones of expansion shared certain features. T h e y were all at the 
geographic perimeters of the previous boundaries. T h e y were all zones 
with which Europe was already in contact via long-distance 'luxury' trade. 
T h e y were all potential production zones of primary products that could 
utilize low-cost labour. 
But of course these five zones were also disparate in m a n y ways. Their 
ecologies were quite different and therefore the nature of their products 
and the costs of production from the point of view of the incorporating 
world-economy were different. T h e political systems in place were also 
quite varied. At one extreme there were the world-empires, like the Russian 
empire and the Ottoman empire; extensive economies with a single, bureau-
cratized political superstructure. At the other extreme were the 'further' 
zones of the Americas, thinly populated, non-agricultural economies, not 
linked one to the other, with multiple, often acephalous, political structures. 
In the first case, incorporation into the world-economy involved the 
'incorporators' coming to terms with existing political systems and 
s o m e h o w transforming them into state-structures contained within and 
constrained by the interstate system. In the second case, incoporation 
involved for the 'incorporators' creating n e w (often colonial) political 
structures that were capable of organizing production and participating in 
the interstate system. Crudely speaking, in the first case, existing state 
structures were 'weakened'; in the second case, n e w 'stronger' ones were 
created. In both cases, the resulting political structures were those of 
peripheral zones, 'weak' in relation to the 'strong' state-structures of the 
core zones of the capitalist world-economy. 
T h e process of incorporation in Africa stood in between these two 
extremes. There were multiple existing political structures. S o m e of them 
were relatively strong and bureaucratized; others were virtually acephalous. 
6. For a detailed analysis of the capitalist world-economy in the period 1450-1750, see 
I. Wallerstein, 1974, 1980. 
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Africa in no sense constituted a single 'economy'. However, in m a n y 
particular areas, there did exist regional 'economies' that transcended single 
political units. F r o m the point of view of the 'incorporators', some of the 
existing political structures had to be 'weakened' (as was true for the 
Russian, Ottoman, and Mughal empires). But in other places, n e w political 
authorities had to be created, ones that were strong enough to ensure the 
smooth functioning of transformed economic processes. Eventually, as w e 
k n o w , totally n e w , colonial political systems were created almost every-
where, but not for the most part immediately. 
'Incorporation' into the world-economy involves essentially two 
processes. T h e first and primary one is the transformation of some sig-
nificant segment of production processes such that they become part of the 
integrated set of production processes that constitute the social division of 
labour in the world-economy. T h e second is the transformation of the 
political structures such that they become 'states' which are part of and 
constrained by the rules and workings of the interstate system, these states 
then being strong enough to facilitate the relatively free flow of the factors 
of production within the world-economy but not strong enough to interfere 
with them, at least to interfere with them more than for limited periods 
and in limited ways. It is our contention that such incorporation occurred 
for northern, western, and southern Africa in the period after 1750 (and 
ending c. 1900), but that eastern Africa did not begin to be incorporated 
until c. 1850 or even 1875.7 
Incorporation was a slow, steady process; it did not occur dramatically 
overnight. At any point within the incorporation process an observer would 
note the continuity of older patterns of agricultural production, their 
statistical dominance. T h e older norms and values would seem relatively 
intact. It is easy therefore to play d o w n the significance of what was 
occurring. W h a t changed, however, were four things: some production was 
beginning to be oriented systematically to a market which was that of the 
capitalist world-economy; this production was that of 'essentials' from the 
point of view of the world-economy; for this production one needed to 
recruit (or impress) a workforce, which therefore led to n e w labour-supply 
structures; and this production was generally profitable to those w h o 
controlled it locally, and therefore attracted still others to participate in it. 
Incorporation merely began this process, but if the quadruple combination 
of production oriented to a world market, production of essentials, restruc-
7. 'Incorporation' is to be distinguished from 'peripheralization'. O n e involves the 
broadening of capitalist development; the other its deepening. In any given zone, incor-
poration precedes peripheralization. T h e latter started c. 1875/1900 for most of northern, 
western, southern Africa; perhaps c. 1920 for eastern Africa. T h e process is still going on. 
Often w h e n it is argued that Africa was not part of the world-economy until the twentieth 
century, what is meant is that peripheralization had not yet occurred. For a brief discussion 
of the distinction and the relation between the two processes, see T . K . Hopkins and 
I. Wallerstein, 1982. 
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turing of the labour-force, and profitability exist, then w e have the economic 
base of incorporation with its political consequences. It should be under-
lined that Africa did not choose to be incorporated into the world-economy. 
N o region ever did. Incorporation was an exogenously originated process, 
which was resisted. African resistance was not inefficacious; it delayed the 
onset of incorporation and slowed it d o w n . But at some point the balance 
of force was against the resisters. Local 'agency' did not cease at that point. 
T h e local struggles for power continued, more or less along the paths 
already laid d o w n . They merely operated within new and usually different 
systemic constraints than prior to incorporation. Local agency never ceased 
in Africa, or anywhere else for that matter. 
Since m u c h of Africa's 'international' commerce prior to this point was 
in the slave-trade, and incorporation was accompanied by the abolition of 
the slave trade, incorporation has often been discussed as the shift from 
the slave trade to 'legitimate' commerce. T o use this ideological language 
of the period is however to be somewhat misleading, as can be seen if w e 
look at northern or southern Africa, not to speak of those non-African parts 
of the world which were incorporated at the same time into the capitalist 
world-economy. T h e decline of the slave trade, important as it was, was 
secondary to the generalized need of the capitalist world-economy for n e w 
areas of low-cost production, as part of the general expansion of its level of 
economic activity and rate of accumulation. 
Incorporation of Egypt and the Maghrib 
This process can be seen most clearly if w e do not start the discussion, as 
is usually done, with the case of the western coast of Africa. W e shall begin 
rather with the case of Egypt. Prior to 1730, Egypt's production was part 
of the division of labour in the Ottoman world-empire. Egypt served as 
one of the granaries of this historical system as well as a major transit point 
in long-distance intercontinental luxury trade. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the internal contradictions of the Egyptian system, 
combined with a decline in demand for prior exports, had led to a fiscal 
crisis of the Egyptian state structure, and consequently to an increase in 
taxation, which thereupon led to peasant resistance through abandonment 
of lands. At the very same time, the expanding capitalist world-economy 
was seeking to include Egyptian production within its network. This effort 
was made concrete in the active military competition of France and England 
at the end of the eighteenth century to control the region. T h e Egyptian 
response took the form of the coming to power of M u h a m m a d 'All and his 
attempt to 'modernize' Egypt. 
In economic terms, this 'modernization' involved the establishment of 
a stable export of an agricultural good. For various reasons having to do 
with the comparative ecology and political structures of the capitalist world-
economy, long-staple cotton was a better option for Egypt than wheat. But 
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the large-scale production of cotton required a change not only in the 
irrigation system but also in the social relations of production. M u h a m m a d 
'All installed a state monopoly of trade with direct collection of taxes by 
salaried bureaucrats. This led to increasingly regulated control over peasant 
production practices, and impressment for work on infrastructure and for 
military service. Eventually this was converted into corvée labour on private 
large estates, whose extent grew from about 10 per cent of the arable land 
in 1818 to about 45 per cent by 1844. This process was further intensified 
after the death of M u h a m m a d 'Alï, continuing the expropriation of the 
peasantry, and culminating in the major peasant-supported 'Urabist revolt 
in 1881-2, itself one of the factors leading to the establishment of British 
colonial rule. T h e entire transformation of the productive process resulted 
in the creation of a sizeable stratum of landless rural workers, direct 
supervision of agricultural work, and a significant increase in total work 
time required of the peasantry.8 
T h e process was different in the Maghrib. O n the one hand, it can be 
argued that there was a continuous attempt to incorporate the Maghrib 
(and particularly Morocco) into the capitalist world-economy from its very 
origins in the late fifteenth century.9 O n the other hand, there seems to be 
little evidence of a significant change in production relations in this region 
until the mid-nineteenth century or even later. Between 1450 and 1830 a 
good deal of the trans-Mediterranean links of the Maghrib and Europe 
(but not all) were mediated by the phenomenon of privateering, which in 
some ways can be assimilated economically to long-distance luxury trade, 
with the same ambiguities that the eighteenth-century West African slave 
trade exhibited. Unlike the latter, however, privateering declined in the 
eighteenth century and a more commercial form of interchange came, 
somewhat spasmodically, to dominate the Mediterranean trade, especially 
in Morocco and Tunisia.10 Already in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, Morocco was producing industrial and food crops, animal 
products, and even mineral ore for export to Europe, and this increased 
significantly after 1820.11 It is probably because Algeria was most resistant 
to this economic incorporation that it was subjected so early to conquest 
at a period of time when the expansion of European political rule in Africa 
was not yet the norm. 
8. For more details, see A . R . Richards, 1977. 
9. See A . Laroui, 1975, pp. 29-33; D . Seddon, 1978, p. 66. 
10. A . Laroui says of eighteenth-century Tunisia that its evolution was in some ways 
parallel to that later undertaken by Egypt. 'Tunisia was the pathbreaker, but in the next 
century drew inspiration from the enlightened despotism of M u h a m m a d 'AIT. A . Laroui, 
1975, P-43-
11. See D . Seddon, 1978, pp. 69-71. 
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T h e West African pattern 
O n e of the factors that enabled the Maghrib to maintain for so long this 
ambiguous relationship with the capitalist world-economy (half in, half 
out) was the large role the trans-Saharan trade played in North Africa's 
economic life. Precisely because the Maghrib served as the transit and 
transfer nexus of what was in effect an indirect long-distance trade between 
the Sahelian zones and Europe, there was less pressure on it to create n e w 
loci of export-oriented production on its o w n territory. There are conflicting 
views on the degree to which the trans-Saharan trade continued to be 
important in the period 1750-1880.12 It is clear, however, that late nine-
teenth-century colonization eliminated the economic significance of these 
ancient trade routes, and simultaneously therefore withdrew the 'protective 
cover' for the Maghrib of its entrepôt role. 
T h e rise of so-called legitimate trade in West Africa in the nineteenth 
century has been a central theme of historiography for some time n o w . 
W h a t was important was not, however, the increase in the quantity of 
trade or even its changing content in terms of the items traded, but the 
transformation of productive structures that followed therefrom and the 
political consequences of such changes in the relations of production. This 
was a process that started before the British efforts to abolish the slave trade, 
since these efforts were themselves a parallel outcome of the expansion of 
the capitalist world-economy; to be sure the transformation of productive 
structures in West Africa was accelerated by abolition.13 
T h e 'classic' and in some ways the most successful of the n e w products, 
n o w amply documented, was that of palm oil in the Niger delta area. This 
production at first co-existed with the slave trade,14 and later flourished on 
its o w n , until the b o o m came to an end in 1861, and finally declined at the 
end of the century.15 T h e palm-oil trade similarly expanded in the Gold 
12. A . A . Boahen, 1964, p. 131, says that nineteenth-century trade was 'but a fraction 
of its former value', while, C . W . Newbury, 1966, argues that, far from declining, the trade 
actually increased, reaching a peak in 1875. 
13. C . Chamberlin, 1979, pp. 420-1, in criticizing the term 'legitimate trade', says that 
in addition to its Eurocentrism, it 'suggests that abolition caused the changeover from slave 
to non-slave exports, when in fact the transition pre-dated and post-dated the key British 
[abolition] measure of 1807.' 
H e finds the relevant consideration to be Europe's need of raw materials and points out 
the 'extraordinary demands on production' involved in the new amounts of palm oil, 
timber, and rubber exported. ' M a n y producers became involved in the harvest of the n e w 
commodities over wide areas.' 
14. See A . J . H . Latham, 1978. See also C . Coquery-Vidrovitch and H . Moniot, 1974, 
p. 108: 'Unlike for European nations, the slave trade and legitimate commerce were not 
two contradictory activities for Africans. O n the contrary, their complementarity up to the 
1860s facilitated the evolution.' 
15. See A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 133. 
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Coast (now Ghana) , though to a lesser degree,16 and in D a h o m e y (now the 
Republic of Benin) where the slave trade had been of such great importance 
that the local population might be said to have been effectively incorporated 
already via the slave trade.17 
A second major new product was groundnuts (peanuts), whose export-
oriented production began on the Upper Guinea coast in the 1830s, and 
spread out westward to Senegambia.18 Rubber was a third major product, 
although trade in it started m u c h later and in part to compensate for the 
decline in the demand for palm oil.19 T h e late slave-trade period and the 
subsequent expansion of cash-crop production in coastal or near-coastal 
zones in turn stimulated an economic expansion in the Central Sudanic zone 
of West Africa (livestock, potash, agricultural products, leather goods).20 
T o be sure, not all attempts at creating n e w forms of cash-crop pro-
duction succeeded. In particular it seems that direct European involvement 
was counterproductive, as in the failed efforts at agricultural colonization 
in Waalo between 1819 and 1831,21 and in the various efforts in Senegal, 
the southern Gold Coast, and Nigeria later on.22 It was not that European 
personnel began to loom larger on the African scene; rather, the important 
change was that Europeans were largely displacing African merchants from 
16. See A . A . Boahen, 1975, p . 9 1 . O n Nigeria's advantages over the Gold Coast as a 
palm-oil producer, see S . D . N e u m a r k , 1954, p. 60. 
17. See I .A. Akinjogbin, 1967, p. 141: 'From 1767 onwards the long-term implications 
of Tegbesu's economic settlement became the dominant issues in the national life of 
Dahomey . By making the slave trade the basis of the economy of D a h o m e y , Tegbesu had 
placed the kingdom at the mercy of external factors which the Dahomeans could neither 
control nor even influence.' See also D . Ronen, 1971 and J. E . Inikori, 1977. 
T h e shift from the slave trade to palm oil strengthened the hand of private as against 
royal merchants (R. L a w , 1977) and increased the importance of the northern savanna 
trade, as it did for Asante (Ashanti). See J. F . M u n r o , 1976, p. 46. But most of all, it caused 
fundamental changes more in the production than in the commercial arena. 'The bulking 
up, transporting and storage of commodities like palm oil and groundnuts, and the breaking 
down of imported goods into the quantities needed for m a n y small producers, required 
more manpower than the trade in slaves'. See J. F . M u n r o , 1976, 47. 
18. See G . E . Brooks, 1975, w h o emphasizes the quickness with which African cultivators 
responded to the high European (especially French) demand. See also B . Mouser, 1973, 
1975-
19. See R . E . Dumett, 1971. 
20. See P . E . Lovejoy, 1974, pp. 571-2: 'Economic growth which had begun after 1750 
continued through the nineteenth century . . . [T]he century before colonial rule was a time 
of relative prosperity.' Lovejoy emphasizes the fact that far more bulk products were 
flowing between the coastal zone (including European re-exports) and the Central Sudan 
than has been hitherto recognized. 
21. See B . Barry, 1972, pp. 237-58. 
22. See J . F . A . Ajayi and B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1976, p. 211. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, 
p. 138, argues: ' T h e promoters [of these experiments] found that they were unable to 
compete in international markets, partly, it is interesting to note, because of the high cost 
of free African labour.' 
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the role of those in the port areas w h o purchased bulk items from traders 
w h o went into the interior and shipped them overseas, and vice-versa.23 
N e w export-oriented production necessarily implied n e w imports. T h e 
import of various European manufactures, particularly from Great Britain, 
multiplied throughout the nineteenth century. For example, cotton-goods 
imports, already the leading import in the eighteenth century, went up 
fifty times between 1815 and 1850, and seven times more by 1891.24 West 
African manufacturers adjusted to this massive inflow as had other peoples 
of other regions being incorporated into the world-economy. In part the 
local manufactures were displaced; in part they resisted the competition 
by design specialization and retreated into production for more limited 
markets.25 
Southern Africa 
In southern Africa the process of incorporation was once again somewhat 
different, both because there was no slave-exporting and because of the 
presence of a white-settler community. Despite the fact that the Boers in 
the Cape Colony in the eighteenth century were Europeans living in a 
European colony, it is hard to argue that they were in a meaningful sense 
an integrated segment of the capitalist world-economy.26 
T h e change of regime that occurred as a result of the Napoleonic W a r s 
was of course the local consequence of Britain's n e w hegemony in the 
23. See C . Chamberlin, 1979, p.423. As for the internal trading roles, as G . I . Jones, 
1963, p. 82, says of the Niger delta region, 'whether they liked it or not the European 
traders had . . . to conform to the African trading organization'. 
24. See C . W . Newbury, 1972. See also A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 129. 
25. See J. E . Flint, 1974, pp. 388-9 and E . Reynolds, 1974a, p. 70. 
26. M . F . Katzen, 1969, p. 193, observes that despite the multiple efforts of the Dutch 
authorities from Van Riebeeck on to create export-oriented production, 'the only Cape 
exports before 1778 were a trickle of hunting products (ivory, pelts, ostrich feathers, and 
so on), and wheat, wine and brandy in the eighteenth century'. Even the latter was very 
limited: 'Wine was produced for sale only two or three days' journey from Cape T o w n , 
grain somewhat further afield . . . T h e V O C regarded the Cape essentially as a refreshment 
station, to be run as economically as possible' (p. 202). J. F . M u n r o , 1975, p-s6, for the 
period prior to 1806, distinguishes between the zone in a radius of 50-60 miles from 
Cape T o w n , 'where wheat and wine were produced for the maritime market', and other 
subsistence-oriented agrarian zones plus the settlement frontier of the pastoral eastern 
Cape, which maintained 'tenuous links with Cape T o w n ' s maritime commerce . . . ' 
A . Atmore and S. Marks, 1974, p. n o , indeed asserted even of nineteenth-century 
southern Africa that 'without the continuous injection of technological skills from the 
metropolis itself or from the metropolitan enclave at the Cape', it is possible that the 
Afrikaners 'would have become merged with the majority population of [the] various 
[African] societies, as did the Portuguese prazeros in the Zambesi valley, or the half-caste 
Griqua on the Orange river'. But, of course, that is just the point. In the nineteenth century, 
they were willy-nilly incorporated into the world-economy, and their behaviour was a 
function of this reality. 
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world-economy. This political shift, however, itself reflected the long 
upturn and expansion of the world-economy. T h e British basically lost little 
time in beginning to restructure production processes so as to incorporate 
effectively the region. They increased shipping markedly, brought in new 
British colonists, and developed commercial sheep-rearing such that by 
the mid-1840s the Cape Colony had become a significant locus of pro-
duction for the world-economy.27 Later, Natal became a locus of sugar 
production on plantations using indentured Indian labour. 
In the eighteenth century the white farmers utilized the labour of Khoi-
Khoi and the so-called Coloureds, largely in the form of slave labour. 
T h e British brought formal emancipation. T h e expanding and changing 
economy led to the Great Trek of the Boers, with the British essentially 
following from the rear, and with active movement of Zulu and other 
Nguni peoples.28 T h e outcome was an acute struggle for control of the land 
and of labour in production that was oriented to the world market. In the 
Cape Colony, an African peasant agriculture came into existence alongside 
white-owned farms using African tenant-labourers.29 
Nothing similar to this occurred in the Angola region in this period 
despite the even longer history of European links. Rather, the slave trade 
and the ivory trade continued apace, the process of acquisition reaching 
further and further into the interior, eroding various existing political 
structures.30 T h e abolition of the slave trade led to attempts to create a 
white-settler plantation sector, which prospered briefly during the cotton 
b o o m of the 1860s, but ultimately failed, as had similar attempts in West 
Africa.31 N o significant African cash-crop production was initiated. 
Delayed incorporation of eastern Africa 
T h e eastern coast of Africa was also still relatively outside the capitalist 
world-economy. Its primary external links had been across the Indian 
Ocean. Still, India and to a lesser extent south-western Asia were n o w 
themselves being incorporated into the capitalist world-economy. T h e slave 
trade expanded in this region in the nineteenth century, however, precisely 
because eastern Africa was still an external arena. Nonetheless, it served 
there, as it had in west-central Africa, as a dynamic disruptive and recon-
structing force. T h e island of Zanzibar was incorporated into the world-
27. See J. F. M u n r o , 1976, pp. 56-60. 
28. Previously, it had only been in Zuurveld in the 1780s and 1790s that 'substantial 
political and economic pressures were put upon Nguni societies by white colonists' 
(C. Bundy, 1979, p. 29). 
29. See ibid., pp. 44 if. 
30. See D . Birmingham, 1976, pp. 267-9 a n d J--L- Vellut, 1975, pp. 134-5. Vellut 
believes this increased the interior's dependence on the world-economy. See also W . G . 
Clarence-Smith and R . Moorsom, 1975. 
31. See J. F. M u n r o , 1976, pp. 51-2; W . G . Clarence-Smith, 1979, pp. 14-15. 
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economy via its dominant role in the world market for cloves by the 
mid-nineteenth century, which involved the establishment of a plantation 
system.32 Sugar plantations were created on Mauritius, and Madagascar 
developed rice and beef production for export to Mauritius.33 It was, 
however, the Scramble for Africa which later spilled over into eastern 
Africa and precipitated the kind of change of which it was the result 
elsewhere in Africa. 
T h e transformation of production structures could not have occurred in 
isolation from a transformation of the political structures that facilitated 
the economic changes and sought to legitimize them. But what precisely 
was the link? I. Hrbek remarked some time ago on the importance of the 
years 1805-20 in African history. H e observed the simultaneity of the 
following events: the Western Sudanese djihad of ' U t h m a n dan Fodio 
(Usman dan Fodio) (and other Islamic revolutions), the rise of the Zulu 
under Shaka, the eclipse of Bunyoro and the rise of Buganda in the 
interlacustrine region, the Fulbe (Fulani, Peul) revolutions in the Western 
Sudan, the modernizing regime of M u h a m m a d 'AIT in Egypt, the unification 
of the Imerina on Madagascar under R a d a m a I, and the rise of O m a n i 
hegemony under Sayyid Said. H e observed that 'all these processes were 
going on in "contact" zones and were due to some extent to external impact 
and influence.'34 
Implications of incorporation 
There is no need to exaggerate the role of external forces in African state-
building. T h e internal forces were the primary mechanism of political 
evolution and the existing logics of development account for most of the 
particular details. Furthermore states were constructed in this same era 
which were quite remote from the world-economy as, for example, the 
Rozvi.35 Also it is quite obvious, by looking at the West African states, that 
there is an imperfect connection between participation in the slave-trade 
and state-formation. If the two went hand to hand for D a h o m e y and O y o , 
in Benin w e had the formation of a strong state without such participation, 
and the inverse was true for the Niger delta.36 
T h e point, however, is a different one. It is that involvement in the 
world-economy required political structures that ensured the functioning 
of the economy; its commerce, its production, its labour-force supply. 
32. See F . Cooper, 1977, pp. 47-79. 
33. Indeed, it was British interest in securing this production for Mauritian demand 
that led to British support, via the Treaty of 1817, for Madagascan independence against 
the French designs. See P. M . Mutibwa, 1972, p. 39. 
34. I. Hrbek, 1968, p. 48. See also A . Wilson, 1972, on the expansion of the Luba 
Lomani empire in this period. 
35. See S. I. Mudenge , 1974. 
36. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, pp. 105-6, discusses this. 
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T h e outside pressure was to have such structures.37 W h e r e the existing 
structures performed the necessary functions, for whatever reason, there 
was little pressure to change them. But, of course, the involvement in 
the world-economy increased the economic importance to given internal 
producers of sympathetic political structures. It is the internal producers 
w h o pressed to change the structures.38 This led to various kinds of turmoil, 
which were of limited benefit to other participants in the world-economy. 
T h e latter in turn pressed for political stabilization, which took the form 
of creating states which participated in and were therefore constrained by 
the interstate system.39 Ultimately, as w e k n o w , this led in most of Africa 
to the creation of colonial states. T h e abolition of the slave trade was a 
crucial political and economic event in this process. A s plantation slavery 
and the slave trade were phenomena deriving from the operation of the 
capitalist world-economy, so was the abolition of the slave trade and of 
plantation slavery. I do not wish here to re-open the question of the 
importance of the abolitionists as a pressure group in this process. T h e y 
of course existed and were part of the process. But the fact that such a 
pressure group existed and played a role in the process is not an explanation 
of the process but one of the aspects of it that needs to be explained. 
Plantation slavery depended for its economic viability on reducing its 
total costs below a certain level, which depended heavily on the fact 
that recruitment to slave status was principally by means other than 
demographic reproduction. W e have already suggested that the very process 
of expanding the quantity of slaves 'recruited' began to transform the 
economic character of the slave trade in western Africa, increasing the 
'opportunity costs' of slave-trading and thereby affecting the rate of world 
accumulation. 
This general phenomenon combined with a more narrow British concern. 
37. W . K . Hancock, 1942, p. 163, expressed this view, with the eyes of an external 
participant wishing to involve Africans in the world-economy. H e noted that mere economic 
pressures were insufficient: '[T]he political problem proved itself a stubborn one. European 
traders in West Africa discovered very early that their business - even though Africans 
participated eagerly in it — demanded the shelter of a pax which African society was too 
weak to build.' T o o weak to build, sometimes, perhaps; but also too strong to allow to be 
built, at other times. 
38. This is the essential message of K . O . Dike's classic work. H e notes (1956, p. 11): 
'With abolition the radical change in the economic sphere soon wrought corresponding 
changes in the social and political planes'; cf. C . Chamberlin, 1979, 430. See also the 
analysis of Dahomey' s internal politics in J . C . Yoder, 1974. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 143 
speaks of a 'crisis of the aristocracy in nineteenth-century West Africa . . . stemming from 
a contradiction between past and present relations of production'; that is, from the shift 
from slave-trading to cash-cropping. H e indicates the variation in the ability of particular 
political structures to weather the crisis intact. 
39. P . Ehrensaft, 1972, traces successive British interventions in West Africa; A . S . 
Kanya-Forster, 1969, ch. 2, does the same for France. B . M . Magubane , 1979, ch. 2, traces 
the picture in South Africa. 
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T h e comparative productivity of sugar plantations in British West Indian 
territories declined throughout the eighteenth century.40 A major zone of 
alternative production available was in British India.41 This zone, however, 
was an area of existing dense agricultural production, where true slavery 
would have been economically too costly (if one wished to enslave the 
indigenous population) or politically too difficult (if one wished to import 
others). Hence the slave trade seemed to be less immediately useful for the 
production of sugar and other plantation crops in British zones while being 
counter-indicated if one wished to encourage cash-crop production in 
western Africa. Britain was at this point the hegemonic power in the 
world-system and was therefore in a politico-military position to carry out 
abolition.42 
Hence the interests of all accumulators in the capitalist world-economy 
as a collective class combined with the more specific interest of British 
accumulators as a sub-class in creating a political climate in which abolition 
could become public policy.43 It was of course opposed by the subset of 
40. See W . A . Green, 1974, p. 247: 'British action in West Africa in the decades 
before 1850 was dictated largely by West Indian requirements.' O n the argument that 
'overproduction' in sugar was a crucial element behind abolition of the slave trade, see E . 
Williams, 1966, pp. 149-50 and D . H . Porter, 1970, pp. 142-3. Per contra, see R . Anstey, 
1975, P-386. 
41. O n the link between abolitionists and East India sugar production, see E . Williams, 
1966, pp. 183-8. 
Indian sugar became a major item on the British scene in 1791, following the crisis 
caused by the revolution in Santo Domingo. A considerable amount was sold between 1794 
and 1800, see J. P. Marshall, 1968, pp. 88-9. T h e West India sugar lobby then succeeded 
in restoring the high tariff and imports from India declined. Still it was felt that, barring 
the tariff, 'despite the higher freight, the East Indies could undersell the West' ( C . N . 
Parkinson, 1937, p. 85). W h a t happened then? Given the fact that 'the bigger financiers 
clearly had a foot in both camps' (ibid., p. 86), the resulting Parliamentary decisions might 
be seen as a compromise: the West Indian lobby lost on abolition but w o n on the East 
Indian tariff. W h e n the duties were finally equalized in 1836, Bengal sugar plantation 
exports showed a phenomenal rise; see K . N . Chaudhuri, 1966, Table 1, p. 347. 
A word should be added about one more sugar-producing area, this one in Africa: 
Mauritius. T h e British duty was lifted in 1826 and sugar rapidly dominated all island 
production. Slavery was in theory abolished in 1835 and slaves were replaced by Indian 
contract labourers. Nonetheless an illegal slave trade continued to flourish. These slaves, 
however, came from the external arena, East Africa. See B . Benedict, 1965, pp. 12-19; 
E . A . Alpers, 1975, p. 214. 
42. That is not to say that British efforts were instantaneously successful or pursued 
with vehemence from the outset. S . Daget, 1979, p. 436, notes that 'English repression [of 
the slave trade] did not seriously hamper the economics of the French slave trade' before 
1831. J. F . M u n r o , 1976, p. 43, argues that it was not until the 1850s that the Atlantic slave 
trade dwindled to 'insignificance'. 
43. See B . K . Drake, 1976, pp. 86-7. Finally, one should not leave out of the equation 
the 'cooperation' of the African end of the slave-trading operation, as C . Coquery-Vidrovitch 
and H . Moniot, 1974, p.311, remind us: '"Legitimate" trade triumphed, to be sure, 
because Europe found in it a more solid basis [for trade], but also because the merchant 
structures of a number of African states lent themselves to it readily. In other words, the 
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accumulators w h o were negatively affected by this change. It was also, it 
should be added, a policy that was enforced in a flexible manner. W h e r e 
the plantations were non-British but direct supply zones for British m a n u -
facturing interests, Great Britain tended to 'condone' slavery. O n e instance 
was the American South. A second was C u b a and Brazil, which continued 
through most of the nineteenth century to obtain slaves from the still 
permitted trade 'south of the line', where the economies of the slave trade 
remained different, as w e indicated above.44 
T h e nineteenth century up to Partition was, it has been argued, the era 
of 'informal empire' or the 'imperialism of free trade'. J. Gallagher and R.-
Robinson s u m m e d up this analysis: 'By informal means if possible, or by 
formal annexations w h e n necessary, British paramountcy was steadily 
upheld.'45 Free trade is a term too easily thrown around. W e should be 
clear that traders tend to favour free trade if they have a competitive 
advantage in the market and tend to see ways of restraining free trade if 
and w h e n they do not. Hence the fact that the role of the chartered 
companies in eighteenth-century West Africa was less than in the seven-
teenth century has led some historians to speak of the rise of free trade. 
T h e very process of dismantling of the monopoly powers of chartered 
companies was however 'a gradual one', w e are told; the shift to free trade 
'was therefore somewhat limited'; and the explanation of the shift resided 
primarily in 'practical business reasons', to wit, the lower overhead costs 
and greater flexibility of response to an expanding slave-trade market.46 A s 
for the nineteenth-century era of even freer trade, it has been argued that 
it rather represented a serious restriction of free trade under the ideology 
of 'legitimate commerce'.4 7 
Britain's championship of the doctrine of free trade in Africa was the 
ideological reflection of her worldwide hegemony, of those 'halcyon days' 
in which Britain's manufactures outcompeted those of all her rivals and 
her navy could enforce 'a freedom of access to the markets of the world 
unparalleled before or since.'48 Britain's traders triumphed over all their 
competitors: over the Boers in southern Africa,49 over the African merchants 
in West Africa,50 over the French.51 
second partner in Atlantic trade, the African, if he did not play a decisive role, was 
nonetheless an actor in it, adapted himself, and extracted profit from the market, in short, 
behaved like a responsible party in the affair.' 
44. See A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 113; D . Eltis, 1979, p. 297. P . D . Curtin's figures, 1969, 
pp. 240, 247, for Brazil show that the bulk of the slaves came from Mozambique and 
Angola. T h e same seems to be true for Cuba. Abolition also did not affect the essentially 
'luxury' trans-Saharan slave trade. See R . A . Austen, 1979. 
45. J. Gallagher and R . Robinson, 1953. 
46. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, pp. 93-4. 
47. See D . D . Laitin, 1982. 
48. J. S. Galbraith, 1970, pp. 34-5. 
49. A . Atmore and S. Marks, 1974, p. 120, note of nineteenth-century southern Africa: 
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T h e ultimate decline of Britain's advantage had nothing to do with 
developments in the periphery of the world-economy. It was simply the 
consequence of the rise of the competitive qualities of manufactures 
elsewhere: in France, in G e r m a n y , in the U S A . T h e depression of 1873 
detonated the active political challenge to British hegemony; in Africa as 
all over the world.52 By 1879 the structure of African informal empire was 
crumbling; by 1900 most of Africa was colonized.53 
Conclusion 
W e have thus argued that the period from 1750 on should be seen as one 
involving the incorporation of (at least northern, western, and southern) 
Africa into a particular historical system, that of the capitalist world-
economy, and that Partition represented not the beginning but the cul-
mination of this process. W h a t , however, of the view that 'the role of 
trade generally and the slave trade in particular . . . has been grossly 
'So long as Britain maintained its monopoly of the area - and by the mid-century 
there was little evidence of other contestants - and so long as the territories remained 
underdeveloped and controllable by informal means, there seemed little need of formal 
empire'. 
J. Gallagher (and R . Robinson, 1953, p. 3) remind us that the absence of formal empire 
was in fact far from total. There was the British annexation of Natal in 1843, keeping the 
Boers out of Delagoa Bay in i860 and 1868 and out of St Lucia Bay in 1861 and 1866, as 
well as British blocking of the union of the two Boer republics in i860. These various 
efforts maintained the Boer republics in a state of'dependence on British ports' in the mid-
century period. 
50. At first in this period it is true that West Africa's 'merchant groups served as 
Europe's [largely Britain's] economic and political intermediaries.' (S. B . Kaplow, 1978, 
p. 20). But their position as large-scale intermediaries was steadily undermined, see, for 
example, E . Reynolds, 1974b and 1975. Even the collapse of the cowrie currency should 
be read as the collapse of an independent financial base for the West African merchant 
class, see O . A . N w a n i , 1975; A . G . Hopkins, 1970. 
51. ' T h e history of the Exclusif [France's attempt to maintain mercantilist constraints 
on West African trade] was the history of its long agony': B . Schnapper, 1959, p. 151. 
Britain had two simple advantages over France, says Schnapper: more capital, and cheaper 
textiles to sell. 
52. It is no mere coincidence that French protectionism in Senegal dates from 1873. 
See C . W . N e w b u r y , 1968, p. 345. 
53. I have previously analyzed this in I. Wallerstein, 1970, p. 403, where I argued: ' T o 
challenge effectively the British economic hegemony in the world, the other industrializing 
powers needed, or felt they needed, larger markets for their industries and access to raw 
materials. T h u s started the scramble for Africa; and once it had started, Britain had no 
choice but to join in or be the loser.' 
It is not that Britain faced no previous losses from its policies before the 1880s. Indeed 
R . Olaniyan, 1974, p. 37, talking of the 1860s, speaks of h o w Britain's 'half-hearted 
protection yielded humiliating harvests', but its previous 'losses' were not sufficiently heavy 
to lead to a massive shift in policy. 
38 
Africa and the world-economy 
exaggerated'?54 O r the linked argument that the increase in cash-cropping 
in West Africa did not constitute a social revolution because it occurred 
initially within the existing African political, economic, and social systems, 
which 'proved able to meet the changing demands of the coastal trade 
[in the period of 'legitimate' commerce] through adaptation rather than 
revolution'?55 
It is not wrong to say that m a n y , even perhaps most, African systems 
'adapted' to the n e w exigencies. S o m e of course were broken, and ultimately 
virtually all were placed under colonial rule. But adaptation is the point, 
not the counterpoint. Adaptation was usually all that was required; nothing 
more , but nothing less. T h e adaptation to a n e w social framework of action 
was the consequence of Africa's incorporation into a particular historical 
system, the capitalist world-economy, at a particular m o m e n t in time. 
54. J. F . A . Ajayi and R . S. Smith, 1971, p. 124. See also R . A . Austen, 1970; per contra, 
A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 124. 
55. J . F . A . Ajayi and B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1976, p. 214. This argument that we had 
economic change but not social change is curiously the inverse of that of A . C . U n o m a h 
and J . B . Webster, 1976, p. 298, in the same volume w h o stress the change in the 'social 
life of East African peoples'. See also C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1971, p. 121, w h o stresses 
that the key transformations in D a h o m e y - wage-labour and private property - did not 
date simply from the period of colonial rule. 
39 
N e w trends and processes 
in Africa in the 
nineteenth century 
A . A . B O A H E N 
Not necessarily in terms of originality but rather in those of tempo, scale 
and impact, the first eight decades of the nineteenth century witnessed 
m a n y new trends and processes. Indeed, it is the combination of these 
three features that makes the period in question so revolutionary and marks 
it out as the end of old Africa and the beginning of modern Africa. This 
chapter will attempt to analyse these new trends and processes, assess their 
impact and consider what would have happened had there not been 
European colonial intervention during the last two decades ofthat century. 
N e w demographic trends 
T h e first of the n e w trends was demographic. T h e nineteenth century 
saw the most revolutionary socio-economic change in Africa, namely, the 
abolition and suppression of the slave trade. By the end of the period under 
review and for reasons that are discussed elsewhere in this volume, the 
slave trade was a thing of the past. While abolition did not cause any 
sudden change in the rate of population growth, there is no doubt that the 
general tendency was one of gradual increase rather than, as hitherto, 
decline, especially during the last three decades of the period under review. 
But growth was not the only change affecting population. W h a t was 
even more dramatic was its redistribution, which took the form of internal 
migrations and movements. Typical examples of these dramatic internal 
migrations of the period were those of the Nguni in Southern and Central 
Africa, the C h o k w e in Central Africa, the Azande in East Africa, the Fang 
in Equatorial Africa and the Yoruba in West Africa. T h e Nguni migrations, 
as will be seen later, resulted in the spread of the Nguni section of the 
Bantu peoples from the Natal region into different parts of South, Central 
and East Africa. T h o u g h the Nguni incursions caused a great deal of 
devastation, destruction and untold suffering, there were also some positive 
results. T h e Nguni conquered and absorbed new peoples to form new 
nations such as the Ndebele and the Sotho. B y using the military and 
political systems and ideas developed by the Zulu, the Nguni also formed 
new kingdoms such as Gaza, Swazi, Ndebele, Sotho and Pedi. These 
kingdoms, were, in the words of J. D . Omer-Cooper , 'militarist, highly 
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centralized and administered under the king by commoner indunas rather 
than royal relatives.'1 Moreover, the presence of the Nguni inspired state-
building activities among some of the peoples w h o m they invaded. For 
instance, the Holoholo living on the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika 
adopted the Nguni military tactics to build a strong kingdom. T h e H e h e 
of southern Tanganyika, w h o were divided into over thirty independent 
chiefdoms, also came together as a result of the Nguni incursions, and, 
using Nguni military regiments, weapons and field tactics, succeeded in 
conquering the neighbouring peoples such as the Sangu and the Bena and 
in forming a large Hehe kingdom. 
In West Africa, mainly for political reasons, the Yoruba migrated vir-
tually en masse from the open grassland areas of northern Yorubaland into 
the forest areas to the south. These movements resulted in the formation 
of new communities such as Ibadan, Abeokuta, O y o , I w o , Modakeke and 
Sagamu. Like the Nguni, the Yoruba also embarked on various political 
and constitutional experiments in answer to the political and ecological 
challenges posed by their n e w environment. These experiments resulted 
in 'Ijaye's military dictatorship, Ibadan's republicanism, Abeokuta's fed-
eralism and the confederalism of the Ekiti Parapo'.2 T h e population m a p 
of south-western Nigeria as w e know it today dates from these movements. 
It was also in the nineteenth century that the great migrations of the Fang 
and their relatives, the Bulu, Beti and Pahoain occurred from the savanna 
regions of the southern part of modern Cameroon into the forest areas as 
far as the hinterland and coastal areas of G a b o n . 3 
Islamic revolutions 
Far more revolutionary were the new trends in the social fields, and in no 
sphere was this more so than in that of religion. As is well known, the 
diffusion of Islam from Arabia into Africa began as early as the seventh 
century. However, outside North Africa and the Nile Valley, until about 
the very end of the eighteenth century, this diffusion had been on the 
whole rather spasmodic and, with a few exceptions such as the Almoravids, 
peaceful and mainly through trading activities. Right from the very first 
decade of the nineteenth century, however, this diffusion took on a very 
militant and dynamic form especially in north-western Africa. Nothing 
shows the tempo and scale of this better than the fact that in the savanna 
belt of West Africa, k n o w n as the Western Sudan, whereas there were only 
two major dfihâds throughout the eighteenth century, one in Futa Jallon 
in the 1720s and the other in Futa Toro in the 1770s, as m a n y as four 
major djjhäds, and several minor ones, broke out during the period under 
1. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1976a, pp. 350-1. 
2. O . Ikime, (ed.), 1980, p. 307. 
3. P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, pp. 423-4. 
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review. T h e major ones were the djihad of 'Uthmän dan Fodio (Usman 
dan Fodio) in Hausaland in 1804, that of SekiTÄhmadu (Ahmad Lobbo) 
in Massina in 1818, that of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r in the Bambara area from 1852 
and that of Samori Ture in the 1870s.4 
O n e fascinating feature of these Islamic revolutions apart from that of 
Samori was that they were led by the Torodbe (the clerical wing of the 
Fulbe [Fulani, Peul] people) w h o were found living across the whole of 
the Western Sudan. T h e revolutions were thus the answer of the Torodbe 
or Fulani Muslim clerics to the crisis created in the Western Sudan by 
political oppression, social injustice and illegal taxation on the one hand 
and the decline and weakening of Islam on the other. T h e aims of the 
leaders of these revolutions were 'to convert Islam from the level of personal 
beliefs to one of communal law . . . to shake off the remnants of traditional 
customs and to create a theocratic empire where Islamic laws and practices 
would prevail.'5 T h e revolution of Samori in the 1870s was the most 
successful and the most important of the m a n y rebellions organized from 
the 1840s onwards by the Joola (Dyula), that Islamized and educated 
trading section of the Soninke. Details of the activities of Samori Ture are 
given in Chapter 24 below. Suffice it to state here that though Samori was 
far less educated and less fanatical than the earlier djiKäd leaders, there is 
no doubt that until the mid-i88os he aimed at converting people to Islam 
and using it as an integrating force. 
These Islamic revolutions or djihads had very far-reaching political and 
social consequences. Politically, they resulted in the creation of huge 
empires such as the Sokoto caliphate which, by the 1820s, covered almost 
the whole of the former Northern Region and parts of the former Western 
Region of Nigeria; the Massina empire which dominated the area of the 
Niger bend until its incorporation into al-Hadjdj 'Umar's empire, which 
stretched from the headwaters of the Senegal and Gambia rivers to T i m -
buktu; and the huge empire of Samori Ture which extended from the 
northern parts of modern Sierra Leone and Guinea to Bamako, and 
included the important Joola trading and Islamic centre of Kankan.6 These 
revolutions also resulted in the replacement of the old Hausa and Soninke 
ruling elites by a new elite of predominantly Fulbe and Joola clerics. It 
thus signified a fundamental shift in the focus of political authority in the 
Western Sudan. 'Uthmän dan Fodio's djihäd also resulted in the revival 
and strengthening of the old kingdom of Borno thanks mainly to the 
activities of Shaykh M u h a m m a d al-Kanëmi, a devout K a n ë m b u Musl im 
4. M . Hiskett, 1976; see also Chapters 20, 21 and 24 below. 
5. J. F . A . Ajayi, 1965, p. 1. See also M . Last, 1974. 
6. See Chapter 24 below and also P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 
1978, pp. 388-90. 
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called in by the rulers of Borno to assist them against the forces o f 'Uthman 
dan Fodio and his son M u h a m m a d Bello. 
But even m o r e far-reaching were the social consequences of these rev-
olutions. In the first place, as a result of the educational and proselytizing 
activities of these djihäd leaders and their supporters and military leaders, 
most of w h o m were good Mus l im scholars, Islam was not only purified 
but also transformed from a religion of the towns into that of the rural 
areas also. Moreover, while the first two leaders belonged to the Kâdirïyya 
order, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r belonged to the relatively n e w Tijäniyya, which 
appealed more to the ordinary people. Al -Hadjdj 'Umar therefore succeeded 
in winning a huge following and it is significant that there are more 
Tijäniyya followers in West Africa today than those of the Kâdirïyya order. 
Thirdly, with the emphasis of all the three djihäd leaders on education and 
learning, the level of Islamic scholarship and literacy was greatly raised 
during the nineteenth century. Finally, as a result of these djihäds, a 
c o m m o n feeling of Islamic solidarity grew right across the Sudanic belt 
which has remained to this day. 
It should be added in conclusion that the djihäd leaders and their flag-
bearers did not entirely succeed in establishing the true caliphate ruled in 
accordance with the sjmrVa in the Western Sudan. Rather, they had to 
compromise with some of the existing socio-political institutions and realit-
ies. W h a t therefore emerged in the end was not uniform and unadulterated 
Islamic culture and society but rather a Fulbe-Hausa culture in Hausaland 
and a F u l b e - M a n d e culture in the area of the Niger bend, though both 
were heavily impregnated with the tenets of Islam and the teachings of the 
founding fathers. 
Islam also gained ground in other parts of Africa, especially in Cyrenaica 
and the eastern Sahara in present-day Libya and, later, in the northern 
parts of modern Sudan thanks to the activities of the SanüsT and M a h d ï 
respectively, and finally in the interior parts of eastern Africa and especially 
in Ouganda following the activities of Arab and Swahili traders.7 
Christian missionary activities 
N o less revolutionary and lasting in its impact was the other con-
temporaneous religious revolution that was taking place elsewhere in Africa, 
namely, the Christian missionary revolution. T h o u g h attempts at the 
planting of Christianity in the areas to the south of the Western Sudan 
reach as far back as the era of the Portuguese explorations in the fifteenth 
century, there was hardly any trace of the Christian religion left by the 
turn of the eighteenth century. However, from about the last decade of 
that century and especially during the first five decades of the nineteenth 
century, the situation underwent a revolutionary change. Primarily because 
7. R . O . Collins and R . L . Tignor, 1967, pp. 16-18; A . A . Boahen, 1964, pp. 110-17. 
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of the evangelical revival in Europe associated with John Wesley, and 
the anti-slavery and humanitarian spirit of the age, born out of radical 
philosophies typified by the American and French revolutions, the attempt 
to plant and spread Christianity assumed the same dynamic if not militant 
form that characterized Islamic expansion in the Western Sudan. Here, 
initially, instead of the Ku'ran and the Sword, the Bible, the plough and 
commerce were the means resorted to, and the active agents were not djikâd 
leaders, clerics and their flag-bearers but a host of missionary societies, 
formed and based in Europe and America, and their African agents in 
Africa. Thus , whereas by 1800 there were only three missionary societies 
operating in the whole of West Africa, namely, the Society for the Propa-
gation of the Gospel ( S P G ) , the Wesleyan Missionary Society ( W M S ) and 
the Glasgow and Scottish Missionary Society, by 1840 only four decades 
later, there were more than fifteen such societies at work. These societies 
included the Church Missionary Society ( C M S ) , the North G e r m a n or 
Bremen Missionary Society, the Basel Evangelical Missionary Society of 
Switzerland, the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the Society 
of African Missions from France. During the next three decades, more 
than ten other societies joined from the U S A . 
In East and Central Africa, by as late as 1850 only a single society, 
the Church Missionary Society, was operating. B y the time of David 
Livingstone's death in 1873 there were two others, namely, the Universities 
Mission to Central Africa ( U M C A ) formed in 1857 to establish 'centres of 
Christianity and civilization for the promotion of true religion, agriculture 
and lawful commerce' in response to a passionate appeal to the British 
public in a speech delivered at Cambridge University by Livingstone in 
that year, and the Society of the Holy Ghost, a Catholic order formed in 
France in 1868.8 It was the travels, publicity and manner of death of 
Livingstone that precipitated the religious revolution in East and Central 
Africa. Within four years as m a n y as five missions entered the field. These 
were the Livingstone Mission formed by the Free Church of Scotland in 
1875; the Blantyre Mission formed by the established Church of Scotland 
in 1876 to work in modern Malawi; the London Missionary Society ( L M S ) 
which, in response to a letter from the explorer and journalist, H . M . 
Stanley to the Daily Telegraph inviting missions to reach for Buganda, 
extended its work from South Africa to present-day Tanzania; and the 
Catholic White Fathers, w h o followed the C M S into Buganda two years 
later.9 Thus , by the end of our period, the missionary revolution was well 
under way also in East and Central Africa. 
But even more widespread and successful were missionary activities in 
Southern Africa. B y the end of the Napoleonic Wars , there were only two 
8. R . Oliver, 1965, p. 13. 
9. A .J . Wills, 1964, pp. 82-97; R- Oliver, 1965, pp. 1-48; N . R . Bennett, 1968, pp. 
23I-5-
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CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND ISLAM
1800-1860
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FIG. 3.1 Christian missions and Islam, 1800-60 (Source: J. F. Ade Ajayi and M. Cromder
(eds) Historical Atlas of Africa, Longman, London, ¡985)
missionary societies operating in the whole area. These were the Moravian
Mission, which entered the Cape for the first time in 1737, withdrew only
six years later and did not return until 1792; and the London Missionary
Society, which appeared at the Cape for the first ime in 1799. 10 But from
1816, many societies from Britain, Europe and the USA, Protestant as well
as Catholic, entered not only the Cape, but also Natal and the Transvaal.
By the 1860s, they had penetrated as far north as the areas of modern
10. E. Roux, 1964, pp. 25-6; E. A. Walker, 1957, pp. 92-3, 144-6, 173-5.
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Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Zambia. These societies included the 
Wesleyan Missionary Society, the Glasgow Missionary Society, the Church 
Missionary Society, the Norwegian Missionary Society, the United 
Presbyterian Mission, the Berlin Society, the Rhenish Society, the Paris 
Evangelicals, the U S A Mission to Zululand and Mosega, the H a m b u r g 
Missionary Society and the Swiss Free Church.11 
O n e of the interesting differences between the missionary enterprise in 
Southern Africa and that in, say, West Africa was the direct and active 
way in which European missionaries became involved in political affairs in 
the former area and, above all, the close relationship that came to exist 
between some of the missionaries and some of the African kings. Right 
from the beginning, missionaries like J. T . V a n der K e m p and John Philip 
actively participated in politics while Lobengula, Lewanika and Cetshwayo 
became the great friends of Robert Moffat, François Coillard and Bishop 
John Colenso respectively.12 
At first, it used to be believed that the missionaries in South Africa were 
always on the side of the Africans and always championed their cause. 
Recent work has, however, emphasized that they were 'frequently employed 
as negotiators between colonial and African authorities, as diplomats rather 
than evangelists', and that though the colonists regarded them as danger-
ously pro-African, m a n y African leaders (with greater justification) 
regarded them as dangerously pro-settler and pro-imperialist.13 
These missionary societies did not restrict their activities to building 
churches, winning converts and translating the Bible into African langu-
ages. They also devoted a great deal of time to promoting agriculture 
through the establishment of experimental farms and plantations, teaching 
skills such as masonry, carpentry, printing and tailoring, raising the stan-
dard of living of the people, and, above all, promoting trade, literacy and 
Western education. All of them set up elementary schools, training colleges 
and even secondary schools. In West Africa, the Church Missionary Society 
established Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone in 1827. B y 1841 the 
Society had twenty-one elementary schools in Sierra Leone and in 1842 
founded two secondary schools, one for boys and the other for girls.14 B y 
1846, the Wesleyans had also established four girls' schools and twenty 
boys' schools in the Gold Coast and in 1876 opened their first secondary 
school, the Wesleyan High School, n o w known as Mfantsipim School. T h e 
C M S also established a G r a m m a r School in Lagos in 1859, while the 
11. E . A . Walker, 1957, pp. 133, 144-6, 178; E . Roux, 1964, pp. 24-31. C . P . Groves, 
1954, Vol. 2, pp. 118-61; D . Denoon, 1973, pp. 26-9, 67-81, 80-90; H . W . Langworthy, 
1972, pp. 82-115. 
12. D . Denoon, 1973, pp. 96-7; C . P . Groves, 1954, Vol. 2, pp. 252, 274; E . Roux, 1964, 
pp. 25-32. 
13. D . Denoon, 1973, p. 65. 
14. A . A . Boahen, 1966, pp. 118-23. 
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Wesleyans opened the Methodist Boys' High School in 1879. 15 It should
be emphasized that schools were not founded only on the coast, but also
in some of the inland towns.
plate 3.1 The Church ofScotland Mission's church at Blantyre (Malawi)
In East and Central Africa, at Livingstone there was a school with an
enrolment of 400 students by 1890 as well as a workshop and a printing
press 'which was perpetually turning out primers and translations of the
Scriptures, tales and easy lessons in geography and natural history in
Nyanja, Tonga, Nguni, Nyakyusa and Nkonde'.16 By 1835, the LMS
reported that it had 4000 children in its schools in Madagascar, and by
1894, 137000 of the population of the Merina highlands of Madagascar
were estimated as registered in Protestant schools. This proportion was
'similar to that of Western Europe at the same time'.17
In Southern Africa, even greater attention was paid to education than
in other parts of Africa, thanks partly to the grants-in-aid that were given
by the governments of the Cape and Natal during the period. It would
appear that the educational activities of the missionaries had been far more
15. J.F.A. Ajayi, 1965, pp. 152-6.
16. R. Oliver, 1965, p. 62.
17. P. Curtin, S. Feierman, L. Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, p. 414.
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successful than their evangelical activities by 1870.18 Not only had m a n y 
elementary or village schools been established but, from as early as the 
1840s, teacher-training and secondary institutions were founded. T h e 
Glasgow Missionary Society, for instance, established a seminary at Love-
dale in Natal in July 1841 to which an industrial department was attached. 
This taught masonry, carpentry, waggon-making and smithing, and from 
1861 on, printing and book-binding.19 T h e R o m a n Catholics had also 
established a convent of the Sisters of the Holy Family with a boarding 
school, primary school and h o m e of refuge in Natal and another one in the 
Orange Free State by 1877. In 1868, the French missionaries established 
a teacher training institute at Amanzimtote and a seminary for girls at 
Inanda in Natal in the mid-i86os, and in 1880 the Anglicans established 
the St Albans College a m o n g the Zulu.20 
Probably even more far-reaching than that of the Islamic revolution was 
the impact of this Christian religious revolution on African societies. This 
was most obvious in the manner of life of the converted Africans. Apart 
from acquiring various technical skills, the Africans gained access to Euro-
pean medical ideas, however rudimentary, while the traditional styles of 
architecture were improved upon and the wearing of Western-type clothing 
became more c o m m o n . 2 1 Also, by condemning polygamy, belief in ances-
tors, traditional gods and witchcraft, the missionaries weakened the tra-
ditional basis of African societies as well as family relationships. 
Another effect of the introduction of the new religion was religious 
pluralism and, with it, the division of African societies into rival and 
competing factions. First, African societies became divided into converts 
and non-converts or what in South Africa became k n o w n as the 'red' 
people and the 'school' people.22 Furthermore, just as Islam caused the 
division of its converts and adherents into Kädiriyya and Tijäniyya factions, 
so Christianity crystallized the 'school' people into Catholic, Methodist, 
Anglican, Lutheran, Congregational and Presbyterian groups. Whereas in 
m a n y areas in Africa, this polarization did not cause any serious social 
tensions and animosities, in other areas, particularly Buganda and M a d a -
gascar, it did, as will be seen in subsequent chapters. 
Emergence of the Western-educated elite 
T h e greatest social impact of the missionary revolution, however, was the 
emergence of an educated elite in Africa. F r o m the 1850s onwards, as a 
result largely of the educational activities of the missionary societies already 
18. L . Thompson, 1969a, pp. 335, 385. 
19. C . P. Groves, 1954, Vol. 2, pp. 135-6; M . Wilson, 1969b, pp. 261-2; L . Thompson, 
1969a, p. 335. 
20. C . P . Groves, 1954, Vol. 2, pp. 261-5. 
21. M . Wilson, 1969b, pp. 266-7. 
22. ibid., p. 265; M . Wilson, 1971, pp. 74-5. 
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discussed, a class of Africans educated mainly in English and French began 
to appear first on the coast and then steadily inland. T h e regions that saw 
the greatest development of this phenomenon were undoubtedly South 
Africa and West Africa. 
According to Leo Kuper, as m a n y as 3448 African students passed 
through the Lovedale Missionary Institution alone between 1841 when it 
was opened and December 1896. O f these, 'over seven hundred were in 
professional occupations, mostly teachers but including also eight law 
agents, two law clerks, one physician, and two editors or journalists; almost 
one hundred were clerks and interpreters, about one hundred and seventy 
artisans and over six hundred labourers and farmers.'23 It should not be 
forgotten that Lovedale was not the only such institution; there were others 
in the Cape and Natal. M a n y of the products of these institutions, as will 
be seen later, were to play a leading role in the mass religious movement 
among the Bantu in the 1880s and especially the 1890s. A m o n g them were 
Tiyo Soga, in 1856 the first Xhosa to be ordained a minister of the 
Free Church of Scotland; Nehemiah Tile, w h o studied theology at the 
Healdtown Institution; Reverend K a n y o m e , a Cape Bantu clergyman; 
James M . D w a n e , born in 1841 and ordained in 1881; and Mangena M . 
M o k o n e . 2 4 Probably the most influential was to be John Tengo Javabu, 
w h o was born in 1859, attended the Healdtown Institution (like Nehemiah 
Tile), gained the teacher's certificate in 1875, and in 1883 became the first 
African to pass the matriculation examination. In 1884, he founded the 
first Bantu newspaper (Imv0 Zabantsundu) and was to play a prominent 
role in Cape politics between the 1890s and 1910s.25 
Viewed in relation to the entire black population in South Africa, the 
number of the Western-educated elite that had emerged by 1880 was 
exceedingly small. Even smaller was the elite in East and Central Africa 
by that date. In Tanganyika, for instance, the first African priest of the 
Universities Mission to Central Africa, Cecil Majaliwa, was not ordained 
until as late as 1890, the second not until 1894 and the third not until 
1898.26 In Kenya, it was not until the early decades of this century that a 
significant elite which played an active part in local politics - m e n like 
John Owale, R . O m u l o , J. Okwiri, Harry T h u k u , James Beauttah, Hesse 
Kariuku, John M u c h u c h u , not to mention J o m o Kenyatta - emerged.27 
This was undoubtedly because the educational activities of the missionary 
societies did not really get going until after the period under review. 
It was in West Africa that a relatively large number of members of an 
educated elite had emerged by 1880 and the country that produced the 
23. L . Kuper, 1971, pp. 433-4. 
24. E . Roux, 1964, pp. 78-80; E . A . Walker, 1957, pp. 521-2. 
25. E . Roux, 1964, pp. 53-77; E . A . Walker, 1957, pp. 394-5, 536. 
26. J. Iliffe, 1979, pp. 216-19. 
27. B . A . Ogot, 1968, pp. 266-70. 
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first significant number was Sierra Leone. Indeed, it was the Creoles, as
the educated people of Sierra Leone came to be called, who pioneered most
of the missionary and educational activities in the other parts of West
Africa. Three typical examples were James Africanus Horton who was
born in 1835 in Sierra Leone, trained in Britain as a doctor from 1853 to
1859 and entered the West African Medical Service as a Staff Assistant
Surgeon; Samuel Ajayi Crowther who was one of the first products of
Fourah Bay College and the first African to be ordained as a Bishop of the
Anglican Church; and James Johnson, that fiery intellectual and evangel¬
ist.28 Others included Broughton Davies, who qualified as a doctor in 1859,
and Samuel Lewis, the lawyer, the first African to receive a knighthood.29
Liberia also produced a few intellectuals, among whom was Edward Wilmot
Blyden, who was born in the West Indies. Slightly larger were the numbers
in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. In Nigeria, the elite included people like
Essien Ukpabio, D. B. Vincent (later known as Mojóla Agbebi), H. E.
Macaulay, G. W. Johnson, R. B. Blaize and J. A. Otunba Payne.30 The
Gold Coast elite of the 1870s and 1880s included J. A. Solomon, E.J.
Fynn, J. P. Brown, J. de Graft Hayford, A. W. Parker, T. Laing, J. H.
Brew and John Mensah Sarbah.31
28. E. A. Ayandele, 1966, pp. 185-96; J. F. A. Ajayi, 1965.
29. CM. Fyle, 1981, pp. 74-6.
30. E. A. Ayandele, 1966, pp. 58-9, 192-200.
31. F. L. Bartels, 1965, pp. 72-100.
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plate 3.3 Charlotte Village School, Sierra Leone, c. 1885
Moreover, in West Africa as to some extent in the Portuguese areas of
Mozambique and Angola, while some members of the educated elite
entered the professions as civil servants, teachers, catechists, ministers and
church agents - by 1885 according to the latest account, the Wesleyans
had 15 African ministers, 43 catechists, 259 preachers and 79 teachers in
the Gold Coast32 - the majority entered the commercial field as independent
traders and operated on credit provided by the foreign companies and
resident traders. It was the latter, described as the 'aspirant bourgeoisie'
by Susan Kaplow,33 who, as will be seen later, pushed the frontiers of retail
trade in the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Nigeria further and further
inland during the period under review. As one report from the Gold Coast
put it, by 1850, the young men had gone to reside in the interior as traders
and clerks and it was they who were 'causing a great increase in the
consumption of the manufactures ofGreat Britain and are widely extending
commerce and civilisation amongst the native population'.34 Similar social
developments took place in Madagascar and in Central and East Africa.
Thus, by the end of the period under review a new rung had been added
to the social ladder in Africa, an educated elite which had become divided
32. M. McCarthy, 1983, pp. 110-11.
33. S.B. Kaplow, 1977, pp. 313-33.
34. Quoted in M. McCarthy, 1983, p. 126.
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into a professional class of doctors, ministers, teachers, catechists and 
agents and an aspirant bourgeoisie or entrepreneur group, as some would 
prefer to call them, of educated traders and merchants. 
Ethiopianism 
There were two unique and interesting consequences of the emergence of 
this educated elite in Africa. First was the rise of Ethiopianism, an African 
religious and political nationalist movement . This, secondly, embodied an 
intellectual revolution, especially in South and West Africa. It should be 
emphasized that until as late as the 1850s those educated Africans w h o 
entered the professions were treated as equals by the whites and were 
given appointments commensurate with their educational qualifications and 
experience. M a n y of the African educated elite sincerely believed that 
Africa could only be civilized by the application of European learning, 
technology and religion. But the decades after the 1850s saw 'the emergence 
of pseudo-scientific thought in Europe and America which interpreted 
society in terms of fixed racial categories in which the Negro was assigned 
a very lowly place'.35 These racist ideas were given very wide publicity 
during the second half of the century by the writings of people like Arthur 
de Gobineau, Sir Richard Burton and W i n w o o d Reade. These ideas 
came to be accepted by the generality of European missionaries and 
administrators in Africa, w h o began to discriminate against the educated 
Africans in favour of whites, both in Church and government. It was 
principally this racial discrimination practised against the educated Africans 
by the white missionaries and the consequent sense of humiliation and 
indignation that gave rise to the religious and political nationalist movement 
that became known as Ethiopianism, a term coined from the Biblical verse, 
'Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto G o d ' . 3 6 Following similar 
movements of independency shown by Nova Scotians in Sierra Leone at 
the beginning of the century, this movement aimed at establishing Christian 
churches under the control of Africans themselves and in tune with African 
cultures and traditions. It began in South Africa probably early in the 
1860s. It reached its maturity in the 1880s with the formation of the first 
break-away Ethiopian or African independent Church in South Africa in 
1884 by the T e m b u Wesleyan minister, Nehemiah Tile, and in West Africa 
by a group of Nigerian church leaders of the Southern Baptist Mission 
(American) in 1888.37 It is significant that while Tile expressed his wish 
'to adapt the message of the Church to the Heritage of the T e m b u ' he also 
added that 'as the Queen of England was the Head of the English Church, 
35. J . A . Horton, 1969, p. xvii (Introduction by G . Shepperson); P . D . Curtin, 1964, 
pp. 28-57; R - July, 1967. PP- 212-13. 
36. G . Shepperson and T . Price, 1958, pp. 72-4. 
37. ibid., pp. 72-4; G . Shepperson, 1968; E . Roux, 1964, pp. 77-80; B . G . Sundkler, 
1961, pp. 38-47; D . B . Barrett, 1968, pp. 18-24; T . Hodgkin, 1956, pp. 98-114. 
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so the Paramount Chief of the T e m b u should be the summus episcopus of 
the n e w religious organization'.38 T . B . Vincent, later k n o w n as Mojóla 
Agbebi, one of the leaders of the first secessionist movement in Nigeria, 
declared in 1889 that 'to render Christianity indigenous to Africa, it must 
be watered by native hands, pruned with the native hatchet, and tended 
with native earth . . . It is a curse if w e intend for ever to hold at the apron 
strings of foreign teachers, doing the baby for aye.' H e also talked of infusing 
into his converts 'individuality of Race, congregational independence, self-
support and self-government . . . the retention of Native names, native 
dress, healthful Native customs and habits, and the use of the native 
language in worship'.39 F r o m South Africa, Ethiopianism spread through-
out East and Central Africa and became an extremely powerful p h e n o m -
enon during the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the first 
two of the twentieth. 
In West Africa, however, the educated elite did not stop short at political 
action. T h e y also set themselves the task of refuting and disproving racist 
ideas and practices in a series of articles, pamphlets, books and speeches, 
and it was this that gave rise to the second of the unique processes of the 
period, namely, the intellectual revolution and the accompanying birth of 
African racial consciousness, pan-Africanism and the concept of the African 
personality. T h e pioneers of this revolution in West Africa were undoubt-
edly James Africanus Horton (1835-83) and Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832-
1912). A m o n g the works of Horton on the themes in question were Political 
Economy of British Western Africa, with the requirements of the several 
colonies and settlements: An African view of the Negro place in Nature (1865); 
West African Countries and Peoples: A Vindication of the African Race 
(1868); and Letters on the Political Condition of the Gold Coast (1870). In 
West African Countries and Peoples, Horton refuted the idea of inherent 
racial inferiority of the black m a n by arguing that the difference in the 
stages of civilization between whites and blacks arose 'entirely from the 
influence of external circumstances'. T o those w h o moved from the assump-
tion of racial inferiority of the black to the assumption that he would 
ultimately disappear from the face of the earth in the face of white power, 
Horton argued: 
w e find that wherever the African race has been carried to . . . they 
increase, no matter under what depressing and burdensome yoke they 
m a y suffer; from which it m a y be safely inferred that the African 
people is a permanent and enduring people, and the fancies of those 
w h o had determined their destruction will go in the same limbo as 
the n o w almost defunct American slavery.40 
38. Quoted by T . Hodgkin, 1956, p. 100. 
39. Quoted by E . A . Ayandele, 1966, p. 200. 
40. J. A . Horton, 1969, p. 69; see also R . July, 1967, pp. 110-29; for a more detailed 
biography of J. A . Horton, see C . Fyfe, 1972. 
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Finally, in answer to the proposition that the black was incapable of 
improvement, he argued: 'Africans are not incapable of improvement, but 
that by the assistance of good and able m e n they are destined to figure in 
the course of time, and to take a prominent part in the history of the 
civilized world'.41 Again in his Letters on the Political Condition of the Gold 
Coast, Horton wrote in the Preface: 
' R o m e was not built in a day;' the proudest kingdom in Europe was 
once in a state of barbarism perhaps worse than n o w exists amongst 
the tribes chiefly inhabiting the West Coast of Africa; and it is an 
incontrovertible axiom that what has been done can again be done. If 
Europe, therefore, has been raised to her present pitch of civilization 
by progressive advancement, Africa too, with a guarantee of the 
civilization of the north, will rise into equal importance.42 
Horton not only condemned racism but was also one of the earliest 
advocates of pan-Africanism. A s George Shepperson has shown, this pan-
Africanist spirit was born during his studies in Britain in reaction to 
pseudo-scientific racist theories, for it was there that he added the n a m e 
Africanus to his two other names James Beale, and in most of his subsequent 
writings, he signed himself simply as Africanus Horton.43 Finally, it should 
be pointed out that Horton was not only interested in racial and cultural 
issues but also in political independence. Indeed, in writing his West 
African Countries and Peoples, his aims were not only to 'disprove m a n y of 
the fallacious doctrines and statements of anthropologists (detrimental to 
the interests of the African race)', but also to establish 'the requirements 
necessary for establishing that self-government recommended by the C o m -
mittee of the House of C o m m o n s , 1865'.44 
Even more prolific, more radical and perhaps better k n o w n was Horton's 
contemporary, Edward Wilmot Blyden.45 T h o u g h born in St T h o m a s in 
the West Indies, he migrated at an early age to Liberia where he studied, 
lived and worked as a lecturer and diplomat till his death at the age of 80. 
H e published numerous books and pamphlets and delivered m a n y speeches 
in Europe and America, all in condemnation of the racist theories of the 
day. A m o n g those published during the period under review were African 
Colonization (1862), Vindication of the Negro Race (1857), A Voice from 
Bleeding Africa on Behalf of Her Exiled Children (1856), Hope for Africa 
(1861), From West Africa to Palestine (1873), and Christianity, Islam and 
the Negro Race (1887). In these works he also advocated 'Africa for the 
Africans', pan-Africanism, the African personality, Islam and polygamy 
41. J. A . Horton, 1969, pp. ix-x. 
42. J. A . Horton, 1970, p. i. 
43. J. A . Horton, 1969, p. xvii (Introduction). 
44. ibid., p. vii (Preface). 
45. For further details, see H . L . Lynch, 1967; J. S. Coleman, 1958, pp. 106-7, '75~6> 
183-4; R . July, 1967, pp. 208-33. 
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which were to him more in keeping with African personality, insisted on 
the purity and integrity of the black race and therefore condemned mixed 
marriages, championed Ethiopianism and, above all, preached racial pride. 
In an article published in 1874, he praised the M a n d e and Fulbe peoples, 
w h o were Muslims and were developing the idea of a national and social 
order without the aid or hindrance of foreigners. Blyden concluded: 
During all the years which have elapsed since the commencement of 
modern progress, the African race has filled a very humble and 
subordinate part in the work of h u m a n civilization. But the march of 
events is developing the interesting fact that there is a career before 
this people which no other people can enter upon. There is a peculiar 
work for them to accomplish, both in the land of their bondage, and 
in the land of their fathers, which no other people can achieve. With 
the present prospects and privileges before his race - with the chances 
of arduous work, noble suffering, and magnificent achievement before 
them - I would rather be a m e m b e r of this race than a Greek in the 
time of Alexander, a R o m a n in the Augustin period, or an Anglo-
Saxon in the nineteenth century.46 
It was also Blyden w h o in his famous speech to the American Col-
onization Society in M a y 1880 gave great publicity to the phrase 'Ethiopia 
Stretching Out her Hands Unto G o d ' and equated Ethiopian with African; 
and it was he w h o first used the term 'African personality' in his lecture 
delivered on 19 M a y 1893 in Freetown when he described the African Race 
as 'a Great Race — great in its vitality, in its power of endurance and its 
prospect of perpetuity'. H e continued: 
It is sad to think that there are some Africans, especially among those 
w h o have enjoyed the advantages of foreign training, w h o are so blind 
to the radical facts of humanity as to say, 'Let us do away with the 
sentiment of Race. Let us do away with our African personality and 
be if possible in another Race . . . Preach this doctrine as m u c h as you 
like, no one will do it, for no one can do it, for when you have done 
away with your personality, you have done away with yourselves . . . 
the duty of every m a n , of every race is to contend for its individuality -
to keep and develop it . . . Therefore, honour and love your Race . . . 
If you are not yourself, if you surrender your personality, you have 
nothing left to give to the world . . .47 
Another great leader of the intellectual revolution of the time was 
undoubtedly that fiery Yoruba-Creole evangelist, James Johnson (c. 1836-
1917). Like Horton, he was born and educated in Sierra Leone at the 
Freetown G r a m m a r School and Fourah Bay College and taught in that 
institution from i860 to 1863. H e then joined the Church Missionary 
46. Quoted in H . S . Wilson, 1969, pp. 239-40. 
47. ibid., pp. 249-50. 
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Society which transferred him to Nigeria in 1874 where he was put in 
charge first of the famous Breadfruit Church in Lagos. In 1876, he was 
appointed as the Superintendent of all C M S stations in the interior of 
Yorubaland until 1880 when he was removed simply because he was 'a 
black m a n ' . 4 8 In his sermons, letters and articles, James Johnson not only 
advocated Nigerian nationalism but also Ethiopianism which, in West 
Africa, never became the anti-government and secessionist doctrine that it 
was in South and Central Africa but became identified with Africa, with 
the eulogization and romanticization of the achievements of the Negro race 
as well as a struggle for power and position not only in Church government 
but also in the civil service. 
Like Blyden, but unlike Samuel Ajayi Crowther, James Johnson advo-
cated 'Africa for the Africans', while he also popularized the concept of 
Ethiopianism in his sermons and writings.49 Unlike his contemporary 
Crowther, he also passionately believed in and advocated the evangelization 
of Africa by Africans and vigorously and vehemently condemned the 
doctrine of black racial inferiority then being advocated. H e believed that 
there should be an independent African Church that would abolish all 
sectarianism, embrace all African Christians 'and make of them all one 
African whole'.50 H e insisted that the African Church was to be staffed at 
all levels by Africans since 'European missionaries could not identify 
themselves with African racial ambitions and idiosyncracies'. Indeed, he 
argued that the European presence would prevent the full development of 
Africans by destroying such qualities as 'the superior physique, the manly 
independence, the courage and bravery, the daring and self-reliance, and 
the readiness to face difficulties' found among Africans w h o had not come 
into contact with Europeans." W h e n he was accused in 1881 of being anti-
white, Johnson replied: 
With the missionaries of the present day an independent thought in 
an African and a clear enunciation of his convictions are a great crime. 
H e has no right to them: he must always see with other people's eyes 
and swear by other people's opinions: he must not manifest any 
patriotic sentiments; he must denude himself of manhood and of 
every vestige of racial feeling and fling away his individuality and 
distinctiveness to make peaceable existence with them possible and 
secure favourable recommendations to the Society.52 
In the light of such views, is it surprising that the European missionaries 
became so scared of him and engineered his removal from the interior of 
Yorubaland in 1880. 
48. E . A . Ayandele, 1966, pp. 195-6; R . July, 1967, pp. 197-207. 
49. E . A . Ayandele, 1966, p. 187. 
50. ibid, p. 187. 
51. Quoted by E . A . Ayandele, 1966, p. 191. 
52. Quoted by E . A . Ayandele, 1966, p. 191. 
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Similar intellectual activities went on in other parts of Africa especially 
in Angola and, as will be seen below, in Egypt and the other Barbary states 
as is evident from the writings of Egyptian scholars, such as Shaykh Rifâ'a 
al-Tahtäwi (1801-73.)" 
F r o m the views of these educated Africans, the level of scholarship and 
learning displayed in their writings, the sophistication of their argu-
mentation, the bite of their logic and, finally, from the sheer volume of 
their articles, publications and correspondence, there is no doubt that a 
veritable intellectual revolution occurred in West Africa in particular and 
Africa in general. This resulted in the birth of Ethiopianism, pan-African-
ism and the ideology of African personality, the movement for religious 
and political independence, and the development of a n e w consciousness 
of pride and confidence in black peoples. 
N e w political trends 
Besides the demographic and religious revolutions, two other trends became 
discernible in Africa during the period under review. These were political 
and economic. T h e main n e w political trends that typified the period 
were ever-increasing centralization, modernization or renaissance, some 
constitutional initiatives and experimentation, the integration of some of 
the n e w educated elite into the old political structures and, finally, the 
confrontation between the Africans and the Europeans. 
T h o u g h it is a fact that some of the old empires such as Asante and O y o 
in West Africa and the L u b a empire in Central Africa broke up, there is 
no doubt that the more widespread political trend in Africa during the 
period was towards greater centralization. Certainly, the Sokoto empire, 
the Massina empire, the empire of al-Hadjd) ' U m a r and, above all, that of 
Samori were typical examples of the centralizing tendencies in nineteenth-
century African politics. T h e Nguni migrations had the same result, as has 
been pointed out already. Other typical examples of centralization can be 
found in Ethiopia, Madagascar and Buganda. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, both Ethiopia and M a d a -
gascar consisted of a series of independent rival states. However, as will be 
seen below,54 by the end of our period, the former had been united mainly 
through military conquest under the leadership of one of the central states 
of Shoa, whose king, Menelik II, assumed the title of Emperor of the 
united kingdom in 1889. At the same time, and using the same methods, 
the central Imerina kingdom under the inspired leadership of King Andri-
anaimpoinimerina (1782-1810) and his successors subdued and absorbed 
virtually all the states of the northern, eastern and central parts of that 
island. Both of these conquests were followed by attempts to impose the 
53. See Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. VII, ch. 21; and Chapter 13 below. 
54. See Chapters 15 and 16 below. 
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language and culture of those central states on the others with a view to 
building a truly national state, and these processes were continued in the 
decades after the close of our period. 
In West Africa, two completely n e w states, the products of the humani -
tarian, abolitionist and racist campaigns of the period, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, were also formed in 1787 and 1820 respectively, while Libreville 
was founded in Equatorial Africa. Here again, by the end of our period, 
the first two states had been able not only to absorb a number of inde-
pendent states inland, but had also succeeded in developing into nation-
states each with its o w n culture and language, Creole in one case and 
Americo-Liberian in the other. In this exercise, the Sierra Leoneans were 
undoubtedly m u c h more successful than the Liberians, since the culture 
that they evolved was not simply an importation from elsewhere but rather 
a synthesis of African, N o v a Scotian and British elements moulded by the 
environmental conditions of Freetown and its surrounding areas.55 It was 
the products of this dynamic culture, the Creoles, w h o played such a 
decisive role in the missionary and intellectual revolutions in West Africa. 
A similar process of expansion and centralization occurred in Egypt, as 
well as in the Great Lakes region where Buganda, Burundi and Bunyoro 
expanded the range of their power and influence, mainly in an attempt to 
control the means of production and exchange. 
Besides these centralizing trends, another interesting and in this case a 
completely n e w nineteenth-century phenomenon was that of modernization 
or, as some would call it, renaissance. Euro-African contacts, which until 
the beginning of our period had been confined largely to the coastal 
peripheries, were, in the period under review, steadily extended inland as 
a result of the Industrial Revolution, largely through the efforts first of 
explorers, then traders and, finally, missionaries. This steady extension of 
European contacts and influence inland included not only guns and powder, 
but also railways, telegraphs, agricultural and mining machinery, the print-
ing press, technical education and, above all, finance capital. These n e w 
developments created opportunities, but also challenges and dangers. 
A m o n g the most novel and interesting features of African history during 
the period were the initiatives and reactions of African rulers and advisers 
in the face of these opportunities and challenges. It would appear that in 
most cases the approach of the Africans was not simply one of blind 
imitation or wholesale substitution but rather one of adaptation and syn-
thesis. Instances of this process of modernization in Africa are legion.56 
Egypt built its first printing press at Büläk, Cairo, in 1822; the first printing 
press was established in Portuguese Luanda in 1841; the first modern mines 
were opened in Algeria in 1845 and in the Gold Coast in the 1870s. S o m e 
of the states, such as Ethiopia and Tunisia, embarked on public works; 
55. For further details, see L . Spitzer, 1974; A . Porter, 1963. 
56. See Chapters 13, 15, 16 and 17 below. 
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nearly all the Barbary states, as well as Egypt reformed their monetary 
systems. Other states, such as Egypt, set up textile and cotton mills, saw 
mills, glassworks and paper mills, all during the reign of M u h a m m a d 'AIL 
But more interesting and of far-reaching consequence was the moder-
nization process in the military sphere. In the face of steady European 
encroachment, m a n y African states, especially in North and West Africa, 
modernized the organization, training, equipment and recruitment of their 
armies. As will be seen in later chapters, Morocco, for instance, set up at 
Fez an engineering school to train artillery m e n , surveyors, and car-
tographers and sent soldiers abroad for training. Tunisia under A h m a d 
Bey not only reorganized its army on the lines of a Western army and 
adopted Western techniques and methods but also set up factories to 
produce modern guns and other military equipment. Ethiopia under 
Téwodros and Menelik also abolished its unpaid levies, replacing them 
with a well-equipped army of professional soldiers and set up factories to 
produce cannon and mortars. Finally, Samori Ture also reformed and 
modernized his army and equipped it with some of the latest weapons of 
the day. It was these reforms that enabled both Samori Ture and Menelik 
to hold out for so long against the imperial powers during the last two 
decades of the century. However, as some of the later chapters will show, 
this modernization process was undertaken through loans raised mainly in 
Europe at high interest rates, and this prepared the ground or provided 
the excuse for the imperialist takeover at the end of our. period. 
Modernization also took place in the constitutional field. There is no 
doubt that in m a n y states in Africa, partly as a result of the large increase 
in the number of the educated elite and the 'ulamay, w h o naturally began to 
demand a say in the administration of their countries, a number of political 
and constitutional experiments were embarked upon. In fact, the Fulbe 
djiKàd of the first half of the nineteenth century could also be described as 
the militant political answer to this confrontation between the new educated 
elite of the 'ulama* and the traditional ruling elite, while the Joola rebellions 
of the second half of the nineteenth century could be regarded, as indeed 
Yves Person has shown, as a revolt of the educated mercantile class against 
the conservative ruling elite.57 In other parts of Africa, especially on the 
west coast, this confrontation was not resolved in such a militant and 
violent way, but rather in more constitutional approaches. Indeed, during 
the period under review, the educated elite did not seek to replace the old 
aristocracy as the national leaders of the people as they were to do in the 
1920s and 1930s but rather sought accommodation within the system and 
co-operation with them. In this connection, w e have already referred 
to the constitutional experiments that followed the Yoruba migrations. 
However, nothing illustrates this trend better than the Constitution of the 
57. See Chapter 24. 
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Fante Confederation of the Gold Coast, drawn up in 1874. Articles 4, 5 
and 6 of that Constitution read:58 
That there shall be elected a president, vice-president, secretary, 
under-secretary, treasurer and assistant-treasurer. 
That the president be elected from the body of kings, and be pro-
claimed king-president of the Fan ti Confederation. 
That the vice-president, secretary and under-secretary, treasurer and 
assistant-treasurer, w h o shall constitute the ministry, be m e n of edu-
cation and position. 
T h e objects of the Fante Confederation as stated in this Constitution 
were no less interesting and significant. These were to promote friendly 
intercourse between and to unite all the kings and chiefs of Fante for 
offensive purposes against their c o m m o n enemy; to m a k e 'good and sub-
stantial roads throughout all the interior districts included in the C o n -
federation' which were to be 'fifteen feet broad, with good gutters on either 
side'; and establish schools for the education of all children within the 
Confederation and 'to obtain the service of efficient school-masters'. Others 
were to promote agricultural and industrial pursuits and introduce 'such 
n e w plants as m a y hereafter become sources of profitable commerce to the 
country' and, finally, to develop and facilitate the working of the mineral 
and other resources of the country. Particular emphasis was placed on the 
promotion of education of both sexes and on industrial training. A s Clause 
22 put it, 
That normal schools be attached to each national school for the express 
purpose of educating and instructing the scholars as carpenters, 
masons, sawyers, joiners, agriculturists, smiths, architects, builders, 
etc. 
T h e progressive and modern nature of the objectives of the C o n -
federation are truly astonishing while the spirit of harmonious co-operation 
between the educated elite and the traditional rulers pervading the C o n -
stitution was really revolutionary. H a d this bold co-operative effort, which 
was very m u c h inspired by the writings of Africanus Horton, been allowed 
to materialize and the plans implemented, the course not only of the history 
of the Gold Coast but probably the whole of British West Africa would 
have been different. But for reasons to be discussed later, the British had 
killed this bold and interesting initiative stone-dead by 1873.59 
A similar constitutional experiment was that of the Egba United Board 
of Management formed at Abeokuta. According to Africanus Horton, its 
express purpose was that 'of directing the native government, of forwarding 
civilization, and promoting the spread of Christianity, as well as of pro-
58. H . S. Wilson, 1969, p. 214; for the full text see pp. 213-18. 
59. See Chapter 25 below. 
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tecting the property of European merchants and British subjects'.60 A third 
example was the constitution for the kingdom of the Grebo, which, as 
Person points out, was set up in imitation of the Fante Confederation. 
It should be evident from all this that in the political as in the religious 
and demographic fields, really fundamental changes were taking place and 
the roots of m a n y of the basic issues of today - the relationship between 
the educated elite and the traditional rulers, the problems of socio-economic 
development, the idea of political independence, the concept and practice 
of pan-Africanism and the phenomenon of racial discrimination - can be 
found during the period under review. 
N e w economic trends 
In the economic as in the other fields, some new trends became discernible 
during our period. T h e most radical change was the well-known one of the 
abolition and suppression of the slave trade and its replacement by export 
agriculture which has wrongly, but in a typically Eurocentric manner, been 
termed legitimate trade. Radical in its impact as it was, this change was 
rather slow in coming. Indeed, in East and Central Africa, as will be 
seen below, the first six decades of the century saw the expansion and 
intensification of that inhuman traffic.61 It was not until the very end of 
the period under review that export agriculture completely replaced the 
slave trade. 
Very well-known as this change was, its real significance has been lost 
on m a n y scholars. It was not the change-over from the so-called illegitimate 
to the so-called legitimate trade but, rather, the fundamental shift in the 
distribution of incomes from the ruling aristocratic elite to the ordinary 
people that was significant. Since the slave trade, which constituted the 
principal source of income, was a monopoly of the kings and their military 
leaders and advisers, the bulk of the income went to them. But with its 
replacement by natural products such as palm oil, groundnuts, cotton, 
g u m , honey, beeswax, kola nuts, etc., which could be produced or collected 
by the ordinary people, and especially those living in the rural areas, a 
steady redistribution of income ensued, leading to the rise of a n e w set of 
rich people in not only the urban and market centres but also in the rural 
areas. T h e roots of the present-day phenomenon of rural capitalism can be 
traced to this period. 
Another consequence of the development of this export agriculture was 
the steady integration into the capitalist world-economy not only of the 
external economy of Africa, but also its internal or rural economy. Unfor-
tunately, nowhere in Africa was this fundamental change in the m o d e 
of production accompanied by a corresponding change in the means of 
60. J. A . Horton, 1969, pp. 151-3. 
61. See Chapter 4 below. 
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production. In other words, the change to export agriculture was not 
accompanied by a technological change in the means of production nor in 
the industrial processing of the products prior to exportation. Africa was 
therefore unable during the period to develop an economy that could stand 
up against the capitalist and industrialized economy of Europe, hence the 
tragedy that befell it in the following decades. 
Another interesting economic change in the nineteenth century, also 
often ignored by scholars, was the completion of the commercial unification 
of Africa. In spite of long-established trade routes across the Sahara and 
across Dârfûr to the Nile Valley, until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century there were hardly any transcontinental commercial routes linking 
Central and East Africa or linking Central and North Africa. It was only 
in the nineteenth century, and even then only from about the third decade 
onwards, that Central, East and North Africa became inextricably linked 
by great commercial highways. These were the result of the activities of 
the Arabs, Swahili, Yao, N y a m w e z i and K a m b a of East Africa, the Arabs 
of Egypt and Sudan, and the Tio, O v i m b u n d u and C h o k w e of Central 
Africa. T h e outcome of all this was not only the commercial unification of 
Africa and an increase in intra-African contacts, not only a tremendous 
increase in the number of African entrepreneurs, middlemen and traders, 
but above all the progressive opening up of the hinterland of Africa to 
European and Arab/Swahili influence and manufactured goods with the 
tragic consequences that have been referred to and that will be discussed 
in greater detail in Volume VII of the Unesco General History. 
Conclusion 
T h e last question to be considered very briefly, then, is what would have 
happened had there not been any colonial interlude? It needs no prophet 
or soothsayer to see that had there been no such interlude, most of the n e w 
trends would have continued. Politically, the trend towards greater and 
greater centralization would have continued, and this would have ultimately 
resulted in the evolution of more natural nation-states and political entities 
than those that resulted from the European scramble and partition of 
Africa. Constitutional experiments such as those of the Fante Confederation 
and the Egba United Board would probably have succeeded, and the co-
operation between the educated elite and the traditional ruling aristocracies, 
which in the colonial and neo-colonial contexts has still proved elusive, 
would probably by n o w have become an established practice. In the social 
field, the expansion of Christianity and Islam would have continued, as in 
fact it did during the colonial period. However, instead of slowing d o w n , 
the pace of the spread of Western education and the introduction of 
technical schools and polytechnics would have increased, as is evident from 
the programme of the Fante Confederation and the educational reforms in 
nineteenth-century Egypt. Furthermore, following the great continental 
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commercial highways, intra-African contacts and communication would 
have grown and Africa would have become more inward-looking and self-
reliant. Above all, the feeling of racial identity, pan-Africanism and the 
slogans of Ethiopianism and 'Africa for Africans' would have gained 
m o m e n t u m and brought about the ideological and spiritual, if not the 
political unity of the continent. But alas, the colonial interlude put an end 
to all these healthy and fascinating 'straws in the wind'. 
F r o m the above, it is quite evident that the nineteenth century was 
indeed a very dynamic and revolutionary century. It saw the development 
of m a n y n e w trends and processes whose impact clearly signifies the end 
of the old and the beginning of the modern Africa. T h e period also clearly 
demonstrates the ability of Africans to face up to new challenges, to show 
initiatives, to adopt and adapt n e w techniques and new ideas, and to cope 
with n e w environmental situations. It is equally evident that African 
achievements in the political and social fields, and especially in the intel-
lectual field, were far greater than in the economic field. B y the end of the 
period under review, most African states were enjoying autonomous and 
sovereign existence, while intellectually and academically Africans had 
proved that they were not unequal to their European critics. Unfortunately, 
these undoubted social, intellectual and political achievements were 
nowhere matched by a comparable achievement in the technological and 
economic fields. Africans could not therefore develop the economic and 
technological base that could have enabled them to stand up to the strong 
imperialist storm that swept through the continent from our period 
onwards. Herein lies the fundamental cause of the tragedy of partition, 
conquest and the establishment of colonial rule that became the fate of 
Africa from the end of our period onwards. 
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the slave trade 
S . D A G E T 
This chapter does not attempt to assess the magnitude of each of the 
changes that the nineteenth century brought to Africa. It makes no claim 
to be a survey of the entire slave-trade phenomenon and, for instance, 
refers only in passing to the trans-Saharan and the Arab trade, which 
merit analysis by specialists in those fields. It outlines in broad terms the 
difficulties encountered by the Western world in abolishing the trade in 
black slaves, mostly bound for plantations on the American side of the 
Atlantic, and briefly sets out the circumstances under which the trade came 
virtually to an end, indicating some of the consequences that this entailed. 
A great deal of research is still needed in order to obtain a clearer view of 
the whole phenomenon, and emphasis should be laid on the study of oral 
tradition as being the main source of information. 
African participation in the trade had never been general. S o m e of the 
hinterland peoples were quite unaware of it. S o m e coastal societies 
destroyed slave ships and held their crews to ransom. Others had their 
political and class structure overturned by it. Others again drew strength 
from the authoritarian and exclusivist nature of the system, and in those 
cases black and white interests coincided in a flourishing business. S o m e 
African producers and distributors of exportable m a n p o w e r did well out 
of this branch of the coastal economy and foreign trade. During the 
eighteenth century they bartered nearly 7 million h u m a n beings for 
approximately 300 million piastres-worth of merchandise specific to the 
'Guinea trade', including perhaps 80 million firearms. In the same period, 
the trans-Saharan trade accounted for the deportation of over 700000 
individuals and the Indian Ocean trade for about 200 000. At the end of 
the Middle Passage the slave-traders exchanged the 6 million Africans w h o 
had survived the voyage - 40 per cent of them w o m e n and children -
against the produce of slave labour, which sold increasingly well on the 
European side of the Atlantic. Nevertheless some European intellectuals, 
their principles and finer feelings outraged, condemned the eating of sugar 
dyed with the blood of the 'forgotten m e n of the universe', and called for 
the abolition of the trade. 
Abolitionist ideology was not African in inspiration. It was directed 
against the world of Atlantic slave-owners and slave-traders, before any 
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interest was shown in the effects of the trans-Saharan or Arab trade. T h e 
forms it took rested on a foundation of moral philosophy whose efficacy as 
a driving force was very limited. Yet, for half a century, the anti-slavery 
movement and 'civilized' Africa officially backed mounting Western pres-
sure on the West African coast. Around i860, the West began establishing 
for good a presence on the coast that had hitherto been sporadic, secondary 
and sometimes prohibited. Similar trends developed in North and East 
Africa from 1830 until the end of the century. 
T h e Western impetus for abolition 
Throughout the eighteenth century, as they polished up their definition 
of the universal h u m a n right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness, 
anthropologists, philosophers and theologians came up against the case of 
the African and his condition in the world. Their thinking led them to 
modify the ideas commonly accepted until then about the African black 
and the American slave, and they transformed the brute beast of burden 
into a moral and social being. Their slogan, ' T h e Negro is a m a n ' , implicitly 
impugned the generally held view about the propriety, legality and use-
fulness of selling black Africans. Their humanitarian arguments led to a 
demand for abolition, since the balance sheet of the trade consisted, as they 
saw it, entirely of debits. 
It bled the states that encouraged and subsidized it; it killed tens of 
thousands of whites and hundreds of thousands of blacks; and it took 
people w h o were both producers and consumers away from their lands and 
reduced them to slavery in America, i.e. to ciphers. It prevented the 
diversification of trade on the African coast. It perpetuated barbarism in 
the black continent - this being the view of the only Westerners credited 
with knowing about Africa, the slave-traders. While denouncing the 
scourge, abolitionists did not seek or expect to convert black traders or 
white pro-slavers straightaway. T h e y put forward a programme for the 
regeneration of Africa through Christianity, civilization, and normal trade, 
and proposed rational stages for its implementation: public opinion in the 
Christian world to be changed, the so-called 'civilized' governments to be 
persuaded to adopt official positions, and the Atlantic trade to be legally 
abolished. 
In France in the eighteenth century the Grande Encyclopédie and the 
works of the Abbé Raynal, with revisions by Diderot, taught bourgeois 
revolutionaries a disgust for slavery. This current of lofty secular thought 
supported from a distance the ideals of the Société des Amis des Noirs 
(Society of Friends of the Blacks), which was rumoured to be in the pay 
of the British. There, revolutionaries were sensitive neither to the realities 
of the slave trade nor to the need for popular support for their n e w ideology. 
In Britain, on the other hand, ordinary folk were educated in philanthropy 
through theological exposition based on a vigorous evangelical revival. T h e 
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American Quakers, having themselves forsworn dealing in slaves, had 
already persuaded British Quakers to join the British movement for abol-
ition.1 At the same time political circles were subjected to indoctrination. 
T h e Clapham Sect was the spearhead of this two-pronged attack, and 
spoke up for it year after year in the House of C o m m o n s through the 
mouth of William Wilberforce. T h e fight against the array of obstacles set 
up by slave-owners and traders lasted twenty years, but on 25 March 1807 
Britain abolished the trade. This was the second official abolition, following 
that of D e n m a r k in 1802. In 1808 the U S A gave general effect to the 
Quakers' individual decisions. This movement by governments to adopt 
the humanitarian cause was championed by Britain, whose slave-traders 
had shipped some 1 600 000 Africans to its American colonies during the 
previous century. 
T h e hagiography that portrays humanitarian revolution as opening 'one 
of the noblest pages in English history' received a severe blow in 1944 from 
an analysis written from the standpoint of historical materialism. According 
to Eric Williams, abolition represented primarily the working out of the 
economic imperatives of Britain as a budding industrial country.2 It is true 
that this seminal approach did not entirely deny the role played by moral 
philosophy and an idealistic and triumphant humanitarianism. Nonethe-
less, it drew attention to certain serious contradictions between the theories 
and the realities. A m o n g the most prominent leaders of the abolitionist 
movement there were m a n y bankers (the same was true of the French 
Société des A m i s des Noirs), which showed that the capitalist class had 
m u c h to gain from having the trade abolished. T h e theories of the abol-
itionists at the time proved powerless against the reality of the very strong 
current of trade to flourishing slave plantations in Cuba and Brazil. N o r 
were the so-called humanitarian forces capable of controlling the effects of 
the standardization of import duties on sugar, which ultimately led, as was 
to be expected at a time w h e n the mechanization of plantations was still 
far from complete, to an increase in the demand for black manpower . 
Perhaps the chief merit of Williams's stimulating thesis was to provoke 
further research, as the economic debate still continues. T h u s , Seymour 
Drescher has set about demonstrating that abolition was 'econocide', and 
Roger Anstey argued that British philanthropy was rooted in faith and 
benevolence.3 There is perhaps less disagreement a m o n g historians as to 
the political factors involved in abolition. 
Proposals for collective abolition, put forward by Britain in 1787 and 
again in 1807, came to nothing. In 1810 Portugal m a d e some vague promises 
in return for the entry of its goods to the British market. With the ending 
of the Napoleonic W a r s a world was crumbling in ruins. T h e peace of 1815 
1. R . Anstey, 1975, ch. 9 passim. 
2. E . Williams, 1944, passim. 
3. S. Drescher, 1976, p. 427; R . Anstey, 1975, chs 1 and 2 passim. 
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opened the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic to maritime 
trade; and to the transport of slaves. At the Congress of Vienna, British 
diplomacy sought an explicit condemnation of the trade, but all it obtained 
was an empty, procrastinatory declaration, reaffirmed at Verona. F r o m 
1841, this pretence of official abolitionist morality gave the British Foreign 
Office and the Admiralty all the authority they needed for their combined 
strategies in regard to the international slave trade. This was a radical 
three-point plan of action: domestic legislation making it illegal for nationals 
of the country concerned to engage in the traffic; bilateral treaties giving 
navies the reciprocal right to search and seize at sea merchant vessels of 
either contracting nation caught in the illegal trade; and collaboration 
through mixed commissions, empowered to adjudicate on captured slave 
ships and set free the slaves found on board. T h e same provisions were 
also applicable in the Indian Ocean, especially between Mauritius and 
Bourbon (the island n o w k n o w n as Réunion). 
This plan appealed to a section of the public with liberal-philanthropic 
leanings. Moreover, not every national economy could afford to ignore 
British customers or British goods. A n d for governments in difficulties 
requiring London's support, an abolitionist gesture was as good as genuine 
co-operation. O n the other hand, the English plan was bound to attract 
opposition from interests likely to be damaged by forcible suppression. 
States opposed it in the n a m e of their national sovereignty, for the right 
of search and joint commissions presupposed a partial surrender of that 
sovereignty. T h e y saw abolition as an aspect of the wicked machinations 
of the British in their bid for world hegemony, backed by the absolute 
superiority of the Royal Navy . They opposed it on the grounds of the 
damage that would be done to navies, colonies and national trading interests. 
Portugal, Spain, the U S A and France used and distributed cotton, sugar, 
coffee and tobacco produced on slave plantations dependent on the import 
of Africans into Brazil, C u b a , the Southern States of the U S A and the 
West Indies. Shipping agents were directly concerned: they also attracted 
investment, and provided employment for small local sectors of the 
economy that m a d e a profit out of the trade. 
D e n m a r k , the Netherlands and Sweden, which still practised slavery in 
some of their smaller colonies, subscribed to reciprocal suppression.4 In 
return for substantial indemnities, Spain and Portugal agreed to it in 1817. 
But Portugal reserved to herself the right to trade legally south of the 
Equator, and this only came to an end in 1842 under the threat of 
severe military sanctions from Britain. Spain strengthened her anti-slavery 
legislation and her agreements with L o n d o n , but Cuba continued the trade 
until 1866, the year of the third abolition law in Spain. T h e Cortes, the 
Council of State and the Treasury all gave w a y before the threat of secession 
4. S.E. Green-Pedersen, 1976; E . Ekman, 1976; P. C . Emmer, 1976. 
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by the island's planters.5 A conditional promise by the British of de jure 
recognition for Brazil induced the n e w empire to conclude the 1826 
suppression treaty; but even so the Brazilian trade increased until 1850. It 
stopped in the following year; but this was not simply because the Royal 
Navy violated Brazil's territorial waters to clear them of slave ships. 
Coffee depended on the British market, the fazendeiros were bankrupting 
themselves to pay their debts to the slave-dealers, and the white inhabitants 
were worried about an increase in the black population.6 
Politically stronger states reacted differently to British pressure. France, 
eager for prestige, maintained its freedom of action by a pretence at 
legislation and by naval suppression patrols which remained innocuous in 
h o m e waters for as long as they did on the coast. Between 1815 and 1830 
the French illicit trade fitted out 729 slaving expeditions for the west and 
east coasts of Africa. But w h e n it became clear that such operations no 
longer benefited French ports either financially or socially, the government 
signed a reciprocal search agreement. Another reason was that the m o n -
archy that emerged after the 1830 revolution felt it desirable to gain 
Britain's goodwill.7 This volte-face by the French resulted in several small 
countries acceding to the 1831-3 agreements. Britain took the opportunity 
to renew its attempts to internationalize the issue, and extended its naval 
suppression to cover the whole of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. A n 
'equipment' clause in the treaties allowed the seizure of ships obviously 
equipped for the slave traffic, even though not carrying h u m a n cargoes. 
But the slave ships of the U S A remained exempt. For forty years American 
diplomacy managed to evade any serious commitment. In 1820 the trade 
was legally equated with piracy; in 1842 came the compromise of'checking 
the flag', which protected the Americans from British suppressive action; 
and 80-gun suppression squadrons served to safeguard national pride whilst 
at the same time remaining mere formalities. In the 1840s the Southern 
planters called for the legal reopening of the trade, and meanwhile took to 
breeding slaves for the h o m e market on special ranches.8 During the Civil 
W a r the Lincoln administration committed itself to the right of search, 
which had been in abeyance since 1820. T h e American trade then stopped. 
T h u s for half a century the proliferation and accumulation of documents 
testify mainly to the emptiness of the undertakings entered into. Through-
out all this avalanche of words, Africa and the Africans were hardly ever 
mentioned, just as though they did not exist. Shipping agents benefited 
from the illicit trade, making bigger profits than during the period of legally 
protected trade,9 while the slave plantations stockpiled manpower . 
5. A . F. Corwin, 1967. 
6. L . Bethell, 1970, chs 11 and 12. 
7. S. Daget, 1983. 
8. E . D . Genovese, 1968, pp. 131-2. 
9. P . E . Leveen, 1971, p. 27, Table 3. Also R . Anstey, 1976, personal communication. 
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T h e planters resisted abolition for different reasons. Impervious to the 
doctrines put about by abolitionist bodies, they considered only racial 
stereotypes and assumptions: abolition would not help 'the brutish race of 
slaves to improve its lot'.10 T h e social prestige attaching to the ownership 
of slaves and the demographic habits brought about by the absence of 
white immigration helped to prolong the system. Above all, the planters' 
opposition was reinforced by the contradiction between the growing 
demand in the West for the products of slave labour and the prohibition 
on the import of the labour regarded as essential for increasing the supply 
of these products. Exports of Brazilian coffee grew tenfold between 1817 
and 1835, and tripled again by 1850. Exports of Cuban sugar quadrupled 
between 1830 and 1864.11 In 1846 Britain's free-trade measures, by stan-
dardizing import duties on sugar for the British market, seemingly sub-
sidized the produce of the slave estates. Historians differ as to the effects 
of this innovation in producing a recrudescence of the slave trade.12 But in 
C u b a , where the trade was on the decline, imports of n e w slaves in the 
decade 1851-60 were 67 per cent higher than in 1821-30. During the five 
years that the standardization of import duties continued in Britain, imports 
of slaves into Brazil increased by 84 per cent compared with the previous 
five years, 1841-5.13 It paid the American plantation owner to import fresh 
manpower so long as its purchase price was below $600 a head. This 
remained true until i860.14 
T h e process of suppression 
It was not only on the West African coast that warships operated. At the 
London conference in 1816, French proposals for measures to be taken 
against the so-called 'Barbary' slave-traders were rejected as an attempt to 
divert attention from the need for urgency in taking repressive military 
action in the Atlantic. But in 1823 France enacted an order prohibiting her 
ships from transporting slaves across the Mediterranean. This step was 
taken in a political context of little relevance to the slave-trade issue in 
itself: the war with Spain, the liberation of the Greeks, support for M u h a m -
m a d 'Alfs Egypt - in short, as part of an attempt to gain supremacy over 
the whole of the landlocked Mediterranean, which was under way even 
before France decided on direct intervention in Algeria. For the time being, 
10. Quoted in S. Daget, 1973. 
11. L . Bethell, 1970, p. 73, note 4 and p. 284; F . W . Knight, 1970, p. 44. 
12. F . W . Knight, 1970, p. 55 does not believe the measure made any difference. For a 
contrary view, see P . E . Leveen, 1971, pp. 78-80; H . Temperley, 1972, p. 164; D . R . 
Murray, 1971, p. 146. 
13. D . R . Murray, 1971, pp. 141^7. Cf. H . S. Klein, 1976, pp. 67-89; L . Bethell, 1970, 
Appendix pp. 388-95. 
14. P . E . Leveen, 1971, pp. 10, 72 and ff.; F . W . Knight, 1970, p. 29; cf. A . F . Corwin, 
1967, pp. 135-44. 
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Britain seemed to have lost the lead. However, the activities of the warships 
produced no visible results. Military efforts at suppression were more 
effective in some parts of the Indian Ocean, especially between Mauritius, 
Madagascar and Réunion where British ships succeeded in capturing 
French slave ships. It also seems that some British ships from Mauritius 
had mounted slaving expeditions to Madagascar where Tamatave was 
under the control of the chieftain Jean-René. In the event of the 'inter-
national' seizure of a ship, the matter was settled by returning the ship 
after confiscating the African slaves on board. W h e n a national vessel m a d e 
the seizure, the slave ship was brought to court for adjudication, but that 
does not mean that the slaves on board were freed. Usually, they simply 
disappeared - that is to say, they were dispersed on the plantations — for 
the customs authorities had long turned a blind eye to such activities. 
T h e French captured a number of their o w n slave ships in American 
waters, and brought them to court at Guadeloupe and Martinique. O n 
instructions from Paris, which was obsessed with the idea of colonizing 
Guyana, the confiscated slaves were escorted to Cayenne. W h e n sup-
pression was called for under bilateral treaties, it was the slave ships and 
not the slave-traders on w h o m sentence was pronounced by the Mixed 
Commissions. T h e effectiveness of the commissions on the American side 
of the Atlantic depended on the attitude prevailing in the slave plantations. 
In Cuba , out of 714 slave ships captured between 1819 and 1845, the 
Hispano-British Commission condemned only 45. W h e n bounties for ships 
seized were awarded to the sailors of the Spanish local squadron, fifty 
vessels were arrested during the last ten years of the trade. T h e results 
achieved by the commissions in Surinam and Brazil were no better.15 Only 
one out of every five slave-trading vessels was captured in American waters, 
despite the fact that around 1840 nearly seventy warships of different 
nationalities were assigned to suppression duties there. 
O n the West African coast the numbers were smaller. T h e Dutch, 
Portuguese and American naval squadrons operated spasmodically; the 
American squadron was often under the c o m m a n d of Southerners, and it 
was based on Cape Verde, a long way from the centre of the traffic. Such 
were the conditions at the time of the founding of Liberia and, so far 
as the fleeting appearance of cruisers was concerned, they remained so 
until 1842. T h e treaty with the British stipulated the presence of four 
or five warships, but that remained purely theoretical. Between 1839 
and 1859 t w 0 American slave ships were seized with their cargoes. In 
i860 there were seven arrests, the slaves from which helped to populate 
Liberia. 
T w o naval squadrons - those of Britain and France - were in continuous 
operation. France set up its squadron in 1818, and it remained independent 
15. D . R . Murray, 1971,passim; P . C . E m m e r , 1976, pp. 245-51; L . Bethell, 1970, pp. 
200-13. 
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until 1831. Based on Gorée, which had ceased since 1823-4 t 0 be a 
distribution centre for the slave trade, between three and seven warships 
would set out to search for slave ships, but they took no suppressive action 
for the first four years of operation. This was because there was uncertainty 
as to the government's real intentions. London accused the French of 
deserting their principles and their duty. French abolitionists accused the 
Navy Ministry of collusion with slave-owning interests. In 1825 the M i n -
istry reacted by offering a bounty of 100 francs a head for confiscated 
slaves. S o m e thirty slave ships were seized at sea and taken to court, 
bringing the number of those on which sentence was passed to the hundred 
mark. In theory this should have saved some thousands of Africans from 
slavery in the Americas but, in the event, when they were not shipped to 
Cayenne, Senegal took them as 'enlisted' labourers for public works in the 
colony. T h e agreements of 1831-3 were bedevilled by national pride and 
rivalry between the parties.16 T h e French Navy tried to increase the number 
of its anti-slave-trade cruisers comparable to that of the Royal Navy. B y 
1838 the number of French ships had risen from three to six, and in 1843-4 
there were fourteen on each side. In 1845, as an indirect consequence of 
Anglo-American agreement, the Anglo-French treaties were amended and 
the number of ships assigned to suppression duties was fixed at twenty-six 
for each party. F r o m then on, counting the five men-of-war of the American 
squadron and the six Portuguese ships off the Congo, a real naval task force 
seemed to be mobilized against the trade. In 1849 France waived certain 
obligations that it was unable to fulfil. For seven years the Second Empire 
promoted the 'free enlistment' of African manpower. This was a slave trade 
in disguise, such as some British and Dutch m e n practised on their o w n 
account. T h e French naval squadron had done no suppression to speak of; 
but it had shown the French flag along the coast, which was perhaps its 
main object. 
T h e British Admiralty shouldered the job of humanitarian policing, but 
without enthusiasm. Its material resources increased from three warships 
to twenty-six; but they were ill-adapted for this specialized task. They 
drew too m u c h water to sail up the rivers, and had to put off long-boats, 
which were vulnerable to attack from the slave-trading stations and boats 
lying in wait for them. They were so slow that they were outstripped at 
sea by the light brigs, and later by the Americans' clippers. For want of 
steamships, the colonial administration of Sierra Leone started by buying 
a few of the condemned ships, assigning them to suppression duties 
on account of their sea-going qualities. T h e squadron was based and vic-
tualled in the Sierra Leone and at the Gold Coast forts, and its leave 
station was Ascension Island. Offers to Spain to buy Fernando Po, in 
order the better to carry out suppression in the Bight of Biafra, came to 
nothing. 
16. S . Daget, 1981, passim. 
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fig. 4.1 Map of the west coast ofAfrica including all the territories where the slave trade is
still carried on, reproducedfrom recent documents for the information ofpatrols and blockades
to be mounted off slaving centres by Captain E. Bouët Willaumez (Source: Mémoires et
documents Afrique 30, p. 415)
Effective suppression depended on the human factor. The British sailors,
indoctrinated from London, were for abolition heart and soul. They also
had a power complex, which on occasion led the Royal Navy to disobey
Admiralty orders in the name ofhumanity and treat international maritime
law with contempt. The navy illegally searched and seized French and
American vessels in advance of the bilateral treaties, thus setting in train
a chain of protests and diplomatic reparations. The offering of a capture
bounty, initially at a very high figure, led to accusations that British sailors
were more interested in the reward for seizing a ship than in the condition
of the Africans packed tight on board. There was in fact high mortality
among the slaves between the seizure of a ship and their being freed at
Sierra Leone, St Helena or Mauritius. Deaths also occurred among the
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seamen, either from sickness or in the course of their duties: there were 
some murderous fights between cruisers and slave ships.17 
T h e slave ships took shrewd advantage of the confusion that prevailed 
in the international field so far as suppression was concerned. O n the coast 
their intelligence about the movements of cruisers was good, and they 
managed to evade them perhaps four times out of five. They behaved like 
pirates, flying false flags and using forged ships' papers bought in the West 
Indies. Notwithstanding the law, they often escaped punishment. Once 
the suppression treaties were strengthened they threw off their disguise: 
French papers were no protection after 1831, nor Portuguese after 1842. 
But the maintenance of American sovereignty effectively protected slave-
trading under the U S flag until 1862. 
T h e reaction to these subterfuges was an increase in violence. Cruiser 
captains and local governors of Western settlements spontaneously resorted 
to a particular type of armed action. T h e y mounted overland punitive 
expeditions,18 especially where African political power seemed to be unor-
ganized. In Liberia the Governor, the Reverend Jehudi A s h m u n , moved 
against the trading stations at Cape M o u n t . Near Sierra Leone, in 1825, a 
campaign by Governor Turner cleared the islands and the peninsula for a 
time; and above all it brought a long strip of the coast under permanent 
British tutelage. These were c o m m a n d o operations, and they were repeated 
against the Gallinas and then at Sherbro and Rio Pongos. South of the 
Equator, slave ships in the 'Portuguese' waters off Cabinda and Ambriz 
were systematically shelled. T h e expeditions were rounded off by setting 
fire to the barracoons and the African brokers' villages, which were very 
quickly rebuilt a short distance away. T h e impounded slaves were freed 
and sent to Sierra Leone, the Gambia or Mauritius, for the sake of the 
bounties. S o m e of them settled d o w n . M a n y joined the black colonial 
forces. Others were offered employment as freely enlisted workers in the 
West Indies.19 
O n the ground that they had eradicated the evil 'by the roots',20 in 
France and Britain these operations were regarded as decisive. They 
introduced two new techniques: the signing of 'treaties' with local rulers 
on the coast, w h o undertook to put d o w n the slave trade in the territories 
under their control (these treaties were in some cases imposed and their 
terms dictated rather than negotiated); and, secondly, suppression by means 
of a standing blockade of the main export centres, which was the beginning 
of a policy of diplomacy by armed intervention. T h e decade 1841-50 was 
crucial for the west coast of Africa, which until then remained the h o m e 
base of the slave trade. 
17. C . Lloyd, 1949, passim; S . Daget, 1975. 
18. C . Lloyd, 1949, pp. 93-100. 
19. C . Fyfe, 1962; J . U . J . Asiegbu, 1969. 
20. C . Lloyd, 1949; P.J. Staudenraus, 1961; C . Fyfe, 1962. 
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It was also an important decade for the trans-Saharan slave trade. In 
spite of the efforts of the abolitionist Consul Warrington, Britain was 
largely indifferent to the trade towards North Africa. In theory, all the 
participants in the trade, with the exception of Morocco, were under the 
control of the Turks of Constantinople. In practice, however, the provinces 
had long considered the suzerainty of the Kâramânlï to be of little conse-
quence and tended to act independently. T h e French military conquest of 
the Regency of Algiers in 1830 turned into colonization from 1842 onwards, 
and the white settlers had little desire to employ slave labour. Caught 
between French and British pressures, the neighbouring Regency of Tunis 
abolished the trade between 1840 and 1842. Further east, the Regency of 
Tripoli had more obstacles to overcome because it had to obtain the consent 
of chieftains in the hinterland, some of w h o m were powerful middlemen 
in the trade in slaves from Borno or Sokoto. In 1842, Shaykh 'Abd al-
Djalil, w h o dominated the Fezzân from his stronghold at M u r z u k , did 
agree to the abolition of the trade, but he was murdered. Turkey had re-
established direct rule over Tripoli and Cyrenaica in 1835 and it was 
thenceforth clear that the effective abolition of the trade depended on the 
Turkish attitude towards it. T h e Sultan of Constantinople banned the 
trade in 1857, but it was not really interrupted anywhere, not even in 
Egypt, in spite of the growing Western influence. In 1870, the G e r m a n 
traveller Georg Schweinfurth, w h o had arrived from 'the heart of Africa', 
wondered what kind of assistance abolition of the trade was likely to receive 
from the Khedive.21 Morocco was a case apart. It was the only country in 
the Maghrib regarded by the Europeans as a power to be reckoned with, 
and diplomatic initiatives and humanitarian coaxings were unavailing there 
until 1887. At a time when the Atlantic slave trade was beginning to show 
signs of waning, the trans-Saharan trade could still rely on secure routes 
for the export and distribution of slaves. They ran, on one hand, to 
Morocco, which was importing from 3500 to 4000 black Africans a year in 
the middle of the nineteenth century and 500 a year as late as the 1880s,22 
and, on the other, to the Red Sea and the Middle East, which w e shall 
consider in more detail later. T h e West had no means of suppressing the 
trans-Saharan slave trade, which was entirely in the hands of Africans, 
because it did not extend beyond the boundaries of Africa. 
Abolitionists argued that without buyers of slaves there would be no 
sellers. Supporters of slavery reversed the order of the terms, arguing that 
without a supply of slaves from Africa there would be no demand for them 
in the West: their consciences were clear, in the light of the tacit complicity 
of Africa itself. 
21. G . Schweinfurth, 1873, ch. IX; A . A . Boahen, 1964; J . L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 3; 
F . Renault, 1980. 
22. J . L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol 3; F . Renault, 1980. 
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African reactions 
Between 1787 and 1807, i.e. in the period immediately preceding abolition 
by the West, more than a million Africans were transported to the Americas. 
T o this figure must be added about 15 per cent w h o died during the 
Atlantic passage, and an u n k n o w n number of deaths caused by the journey 
to the coast and during local slave-producing operations by African 'fishers 
of m e n ' . 2 3 
Abolition certainly did not immediately disrupt the vitality of the export 
market on the coast. Indecisiveness by the abolitionists left Portugal and 
Brazil to carry on the illicit trade south of the Equator at their leisure, and 
exportation was sometimes as high as in the eighteenth century. T h o u g h 
seriously combated after 1842, the trade did not die out on the Loango 
Coast until the end of the century.24 North of the Equator, extension of 
the abolition order to the European settlements brought about the closure 
of traditional trading centres in Senegambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the 
Gold Coast. But the political authority of the settlements was weak, and 
abolition was not really effective beyond their boundaries. Sometimes 
Western slave-traders continued to operate in the vicinity. Gradually they 
disappeared, the production and distribution of exportable manpower was 
in the hands of Africans. 
O n the borders of Sierra Leone the configuration was an advantage to 
busy English, Spanish and mulatto-owned slave factories at Rio Nunez 
and Rio Pongos in the north-west and on the Gallinas river in the south-
east. T h e production areas, though sometimes 400-500 k m distant, were 
mostly near the coast. Transactions were personal between local chiefs, 
caravaneers, brokers and agents. In D a h o m e y , on the other hand, the slave 
trade was one of the mainstays of the ruling house, which delegated the 
running of it to its chief vassals. In 1818 King Gezo, w h o was in debt to 
the Brazilian mulatto Francisco Felix D a Souza, appointed D a Souza as 
chacha, a 'white-man's chief w h o acted as an economic adviser and 
administrator of the W h y d a h trade. This office survived the death of the first 
chacha in 1849 and was inherited by D a Souza's son. It was management on 
a grand scale: the chachas kept a stock of Western goods, offset bookkeeping 
debits and credits, prepared cargoes in advance to facilitate speedy loading, 
collected taxes, checked the movements of white foreigners, and provided 
entertainment for their customers. This economic apparatus was capable 
of being adapted to other types of produce. Produce for the slave trade, 
which was in the hands of the chiefs, was secured by annual military 
expeditions, not always victorious, against the neighbouring countries, 
principally the Yoruba. It also came from the Central Sudan - whence 
captives were distributed, moreover, to the north and to Egypt - by 
23. R . T h o m a s and R . Bean, 1974. 
24. G . Dupré and A . Massala, 1975, p. 1468. 
75 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
caravans, which split up their loads at the border: the blacks earmarked 
for export, w h o were strong, were kept aside and incorporated in the 
ordinary porterage teams.25 Further east, from Badagry to the borders of 
the kingdom of Benin, prolonged strife among the Yoruba people glutted 
the W h y d a h market. Local rulers and the black and white slave-traders of 
the lagoons supplied the heavy demand from the Portuguese and Brazilians, 
w h o m a d e the best part of their fortune out of it before turning their hands 
to other kinds of trade.26 
East of Cape Formosa, among the rivers of the Niger delta from the 
N u n to Old Calabar, the slave trade was still run by the remarkable 
machinery that came into play in the last third of the eighteenth century, 
though this was already being applied to other types of trade that were 
carried on simultaneously. Local priests and dignitaries, the Arochukwu 
oracle, the 'Canoe Houses' and the Ekpe society, ran a market which 
accounted for half the slave trade north of the Equator: about 200 000 
individuals. Produce came in from Sokoto, Benue, N u p e , north-western 
Cameroon and the inner delta area, procured by the traditional methods: 
warring, kidnapping, in settlement of debts, payment of protection tribute, 
community purges, straightforward purchase on the market, and straight-
forward gift. It was taken via chains of dealers, or the usual supply channels, 
to the distribution points.27 There again, transactions were governed by 
well-tried procedures. T h e price per slave had been fixed in advance in the 
local money of account, the copper bar, equivalent to a specific quantity 
of goods - the same as in earlier periods. In 1825 and 1829 m e n and w o m e n 
were worth 67 bars, and the price went down as low as 45 or 50. In terms 
of the value of the landed cargo, the price per slave was 33 Spanish dollars, 
of which 8-10 per cent went to the distributors by way of commission. At 
D u k e T o w n , D u k e Ephraim's city in Old Calabar, the heads of other more 
or less rival houses, Egbo Eyo, T o m Honesty and O g a n Henshaw, helped 
to make up cargoes with slaves or foodstuffs. Forty thousand yams cost 
2000 bars, the price of forty slaves. Around 1830 the biggest share of the 
trade was reputedly carried on at Bonny.2 8 
Estimates of the volume of the slave trade during the sixty years of the 
abolitionist period can only be in terms of orders of magnitude. F r o m 1807 
to 1867, between Senegal and Mozambique , 4000 European and American 
ships carried out perhaps 5000 slaving expeditions, representing a dis-
placement of 1000 000 metric tonnes. Goods to the value of roughly sixty 
million piastres or dollars were bartered for a total of 1 900000 Africans 
actually put on board at the export points. O f these, most probably 80 per 
25. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1971, pp. 109-11; P. Manning, 1979; M . A d a m u , 
1979-
26. P . Verger, 1968, chs 11, 12. 
27. K . O . Dike, 1956; P . Curtin, 1969, esp. pp. 254-5; M . A d a m u , 1979. 
28. S. Daget, 1983, see, inter alia, the ships Le Charles, 1825 and Le Jules, 1829. 
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cent were loaded south of the Equator.29 Between the beginning of the 
century and the 1880s, the trans-Saharan trade and the Arab trade exported 
i 200 ooo and 800 ooo30 black Africans respectively, individuals w h o had 
been captured in the vast belt stretching from the Bambara country in the 
west to southern M o z a m b i q u e . 
Cliometricians, sociologists and historians agree that the slave trade was 
a complete catastrophe for Africa. Their learned observation endorses the 
popular view. But the proposition needs explanation. Humanitarianism is 
a Western ideology, and it is unlikely to have found any place in the minds 
of African distributors of the time - with very rare exceptions. But this 
does not m e a n that they were constitutionally incapable of giving up the 
trade, as Western supporters of slavery maintained. T h e continuance of 
the supply of exportable m a n p o w e r from Africa can be logically explained 
in economic terms. That the distributors were black and the exporters 
white is irrelevant: it was a paying proposition, profitable to both trading 
partners, whose sole object was to m a k e money . That was the situation at 
the grass roots. T h e continuance of the supply is to be explained in terms 
of the efficient working of an integrated system: and what Africans were 
resisting was the disruption of this system. For one thing, it would have 
ruined the established business of the distributors,31 w h o had no other 
prospects, to say nothing of the chain of repercussions it would have set 
off on the social and political structure, both locally and further afield. In 
other words, so long as the barter system between the hinterland and the 
coast, and the coast's foreign trade, had no clear alternative to the slave 
trade, opposition by African slave-traders to its suppression was dictated 
strictly by the imperative needs to avoid commercial chaos.32 T h e supposed 
complicity of the African distributors was no more than a reflex reaction 
to the immediate economic situation. This also explains the fall in the 
selling price of exportable manpower: it was the market's defence against 
growing pressure from the forces of suppression. T h e latter thus helped to 
contribute to an unsatisfactory situation. This argument needs to be modi -
fied w h e n the exportation of Africans to the north or east is considered. 
While the economic interests of the slave hunters and distributors are self-
evident in this case too, it is hard to see what kind of economic compensa-
tion accrued to the countries that were plundered. Certain individuals 
with strong personalities were able to consolidate their power, m e n like 
Tippu Tip, for instance, or Rabeh. But any benefits that m a y have been 
conferred on the regions under their control still have to be identified by 
specialists. 
29. P . D . Curtin, 1969, Tables 76, 77. 
30. R . A . Austen, Tables 2.8, 2.9. 
31. G . N . Uzoigwe, 1973, p. 201. 
32. G . N . Uzoigwe, 1973; B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1972, p. 40, says 'a real crisis of ad-
justment'. 
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Sierra Leone and Liberia 
O n e cliometrician has indicated that suppression saved 657000 people 
from slavery in America.33 Another specialist considers this figure to be far 
too high and has reduced it to 40000 for the period from 1821 to 1843.34 
Estimates of the number of slave ships captured by the anti-slavery squad-
rons are not m u c h more precise. It m a y reasonably be put at somewhere 
between 1000 and 1200 men-of-war, about a quarter of the probable total 
of the number of expeditions carried out in the illegal trade.35 T h e courts 
of the British Vice-Admiralty, the French courts, the American squadrons 
and, above all, the Mixed Commissions (which, having served their 
purpose, were disbanded between 1867 and 1870) freed about 160000 
Africans. 
Being known to all as slaves, i.e. chattels, their freeing did not happen 
of its o w n accord: it required a decision by the naval or colonial authorities, 
or by the commissions, to relieve them of their slave status. Several 
thousand freed slaves, severed from their roots, led a precarious and 
threatened existence in the very heart of the Brazilian and C u b a n slave 
plantations, posing the problem of their social and economic integration.36 
A few hundred acquired a dubious status in the French settlements in 
Guyana, Senegal and Gabon. Others acquired a genuine political existence, 
as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. At Freetown, the 94 329 m e n , w o m e n and 
children registered on the books of the Liberated African Department37 
provided the first original, positive indications as to h o w the various 
questions arising in connection with the suppression of the slave trade 
could be answered. 
In 1808 the British C r o w n took over Sierra Leone, with the object of 
partly redeeming the failure of the philanthropic settlement founded twenty 
years earlier on the three principles of the anti-slavery movement , Chris-
tianity, civilization and trade. In three waves of voluntary settlement, 2089 
former slaves and fugitives from England, N o v a Scotia and Jamaica had 
colonized the north-east of the peninsula. These foreigners got on badly 
with their African neighbours. T h e French, in addition, ravaged their 
plantations. S o m e of the settlers intrigued for personal power. T h e climate 
and the unhealthy surroundings took a heavy toll of the settlers. Worst of 
all, the C o m p a n y entrusted with the administration declared itself unable 
to keep its promises in regard to landownership rights. By 1802 the pioneer 
stock had been reduced to 1406. T h e colony was saved by the humanitarian, 
abolitionist function which was given to it in 1808. B y 1811 the population 
33. P . E . Leveen, 1971, p. 75. 
34. D . Eltis, 1977. 
35. C . Lloyd, 1949, Appendix A ; S. Daget, 1983, passim. 
36. A . F . Corwin, 1967, p. 166; F . W . Knight, 1970, p. 29; L . Bethell, 1970, pp. 380-3. 
37. R . Meyer-Heiselberg, 1967,passim; J . U . J . Asiegbu, 1969, Appendix VII. 
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had risen to 4000. After twenty years of official existence as a colony there 
were 21 000 Africans living in the mountain villages and at Freetown. B y 
1850 the town had 16950 inhabitants and the interior nearly 40000. There 
were eighty-nine whites. B y that time n e w arrivals were finding themselves 
a m o n g the third generation of free citizens of a largely self-governing state. 
T h e first generation had coped with the problems of creating a viable 
new society from scratch. Between 1816 and 1823 the impetus came from 
the Governor, Sir Charles MacCarthy, an administrator and builder with 
the soul of a missionary. T h e continual growth of the population, and its 
eagerness to put d o w n roots, m a d e improvement of the amenities impera-
tive. A s the seat of the colonial government and the naval Vice-Admiralty, 
the victualling base for the naval patrol, and the official liberation centre 
for the Mixed Commissions, Freetown and the interior could count on a 
more or less regular injection of subsidies. MacCarthy improved the early 
villages and built n e w ones, where new arrivals were adopted and settled 
d o w n a m o n g brothers. Vague European notions of model communities 
contrasted with African values, ways of life and traditional activities. Land 
and property in the town appreciated in value, and craft industries and 
trade opened the way to personal prosperity. Around 1828 enterprising 
individuals secured the entrée to the coast's n e w type of economy. In 1831 
the colony was opened to foreign trade. T h e standard of British governors 
and the level of British subsidies fell. T h e Sierra Leoneans were to take 
charge of their o w n affairs, subject to remaining within the colonial frame-
work. Throughout this teething period Western influence, including that 
of the missionaries, was crucial. 
T h e British upper and ruling classes financed the churches and the 
smaller denominations, whose personnel had had no training whatsoever 
in anti-slavery or missionary work. Sierra Leone became their training 
ground. In addition to spreading Christianity and civilization the missions 
had to fight the slave trade, especially at Rio Pongos. But local slave-traders 
suspected these people of spying for the colonial government: they set fire 
to buildings of the Church Missionary Society w h o abandoned the field. In 
the colony itself, where political authority was conscious of its humanitarian 
mission, the missionaries were not unconscious of politics. MacCarthy put 
them in charge of the villages of freed slaves. In the civil administration, 
despite acute personal and doctrinal rivalries, the co-operation of powerful 
personalities with the government achieved sound long-term results. 
Schools were opened, and scores of different ethnic groups rubbed shoul-
ders in them, through the intermediary of English, from which a national 
language developed. T h o u g h religious syncretism was not achieved, at any 
rate Christianity, traditional African religions and Islam co-existed at close 
quarters. 
T h e second generation solved the problems of growth. Liberated 
Africans began to occupy high positions, first in competition with and 
then alongside the old founding stock. Initially there was neither perfect 
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harmony nor complete integration between the two groups: the earlier 
inhabitants tried to maintain a class distinction. During the peak twenty 
years of slave-trade suppression, the situation was further complicated by 
the arrival of 2000 people a year. Despite gaps caused by mortality, not all 
of them could be assimilated. S o m e of them were recruited into the British 
army. O n e in every ten emigrated to the G a m b i a under compulsion. A n 
official emigration scheme to the West Indies was set up, in theory offering 
freedom of decision and guaranteeing repatriation. But the planned nature 
of the scheme was too reminiscent of the horrors of the past. T h e liberated 
Africans preferred the hardships of the bush or the security of the traditional 
villages. O n the other hand, with the help of the missionaries several 
thousand returned to their original areas, mainly the Yoruba country, 
where they told of their experiences and the skills they had acquired. 
F r o m the economic point of view, a spectacular ' b o o m ' could not be 
expected. B y 1827, however, an embryonic development process had 
started. T h e main emphasis was laid, at first, on the production of food, 
and especially of rice, but efforts were also directed towards the cultivation 
of export crops and the exploitation of local natural resources: in the first 
category there were sugar, ginger and indigo, and in the second there 
were coffee and exotic timber. A n indigenous variety of coffee had been 
discovered in the early days of the settlement and was cultivated sys-
tematically. In 1835, this was beginning to provide an economic argument 
for allocating more funds for putting an end to the peripheral Rio N u n e z 
or Gallinas slave trade: in just eighteen months, a trading house in L o n d o n 
had received almost 65 000 kg of coffee, which confirmed the need to protect 
the people engaged in growing and marketing the crop. Sierra Leonean 
companies established for the purpose of exporting timber, especially a 
variety of teak, were beginning to prosper. Here again, the main interest 
lay in the creation of a reliable economic substitute for the slave trade: in 
1824 fifty Western ships loaded 200000 dollars' worth of timber in the 
Sierra Leone estuary.38 Favourable conditions combined to create a certain 
amount of wealth (it can hardly be described as capital) within the colony. 
Its ships began to ply the waters along the West African coast as far as the 
Bight of Biafra. Foreign ships were thenceforth able to put in safely to 
ports in the estuary for the purpose of the legitimate trade so earnestly 
desired by the abolitionists. However, the significance of this 'take-off' 
should not be exaggerated: it simply showed that the experiment was 
viable, with a m i n i m u m of administrative support from the European 
metropolis. 
All things considered, the British government's action in 1853 in making 
the Sierra Leoneans subjects of the C r o w n represented implicit recognition 
of the fact that a heterogeneous medley of cultures had been welded 
38. Public Records at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, and British Parliamentary Papers, 
Correspondence returns, West Africa, 1812-^74, pp. 135-46; C . Fyfe, 1962, see 'timber'. 
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together into a viable Creole society. A 'civilized' nation had been created 
not according to some Utopian European model but by the strength of its 
o w n genius.39 T h e part that was obviously played by the British anti-
slavery movement left intact the character of an African solution. 
T h e experience of Liberia was only slightly different. In law, the settle-
ment established by the American Colonization Society at Cape Mesurado 
in 1821 was a piece of private enterprise. T h e federal government of the 
U S A had no hand in it; but it did set up a temporary office there without 
any governmental functions, whose staff became members of the society. 
It handed over to the settlement the Africans freed by the naval patrol, 
thus helping to populate the country. T h e creation of Liberia was the result 
of philanthropic and civilizing aspirations, but also of a desire to mitigate 
the expansion of the black population in the U S A , which was regarded as 
dangerous. 
A mere handful of settlers defended their settlement against opposition 
from the local chiefs. T h e latter disputed that they had given up either 
their lands or their sovereignty, and also the black foreigners' aim of cutting 
d o w n the main overseas commercial activity carried on in the area, namely 
the slave trade. T h e Reverend Jehudi A s h m u n stood up to this opposition 
with 450 settlers, 200 of w h o m were liberated Africans. This defensive 
action proved the saving of the settlement; and in 1824 it was given the 
n a m e of Liberia, with Monrovia as its main centre. A political charter was 
drawn up in the U S A and administered by the local governor according 
to his o w n interpretation of it. W h e n ships arrived, whether American or 
not, A s h m u n set them to trading legally in ivory, timber, skins and oil in 
return for traditional Western goods. This trade is said to have begun to 
show a profit in 1826, but this is doubtful. B y 1830, in addition to 260 
liberated Africans, the settlement comprised 1160 settlers, mostly slaves 
from the Southern plantations manumitted by their owners for propaganda 
or pioneering reasons. There were few free-born American blacks: they 
were to arrive later. T h e Colonization Society's American policy was 
ambivalent: to Northerners it stressed the evangelical advantages of repatri-
ation, while to Southerners it held out the glowing prospect that in getting 
rid of blacks they were purifying their o w n society. 
T h e factors that made for the success of Liberia were of three kinds. In 
the first place, other colonization societies grew out of the original one and 
founded three more settlements, at Bassa Cove, Sinoe and Cape Palmas: 
the last, n a m e d Maryland, being incorporated in the country's territory 
only in 1856. There was self-government in the sense that the American 
societies were subordinated to the settlements and not the other way round. 
T h e inhabitants showed courage in an environment that was hostile both 
ecologically and politically. T h e land was not very fertile, and had been 
39. C . Fyfe, 1962; J. Peterson, 1969, passim; J. U . J. Asiegbu, 1969; J. F . A . Ajayi, 1965, 
ch. 2; S. Jakobsson, 1972. 
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worked by archaic methods. There was no business and no capital, and 
free men's labour was expensive. But there were engineers w h o knew h o w 
to build in concrete. T h e settlements on the coast drove out the slave-
traders and stopped the trade. T h e aim of philanthropists and colonizers 
was achieved. T h e second factor was the personal qualities of the people 
in charge. Their background was Anglican and English-speaking; they 
were well fitted for the life they had chosen, but they were realists; and 
they planted the seeds of a new nation. T h e constitution that T h o m a s 
Buchanan brought from the U S A in 1839 was remodelled to suit the 
specific case of Liberia. John B . Russwurm, the Governor of Maryland 
from 1836 to 1851, brought into being a land which racialism could not 
reach. J.J. Roberts, Governor of Liberia from 1841 and then President 
from 1847 to 1856, showed himself to be a statesman. T h e scene was set 
for de facto independence. 
It was a challenge by the British to the country's legal existence that led 
to de jure independence. British seamen and traders contested the attributes 
of sovereignty assumed by Monrovia, such as control of trade, taxation and 
a national flag. T h e dispute had arisen on the economic plane, but the 
reply came at international diplomatic level when the U S A enlightened 
Britain about the nature of its relationship with the settlements: Liberia 
was not an American colony, although it had U S support. It was Governor 
Roberts w h o persuaded the settlers to overcome their pusillanimity and 
demonstrate their political maturity. B y a simple but peremptory dec-
laration of independence, Liberia was enrolled among the sovereign powers 
on 26 July 1847, and the first African republic was born. Under the 
constitution establishing the legislature, executive and judiciary, nationality 
was open only to citizens of black race. Around i860, 6000 of them were 
manumitted slaves, 5700 were slaves freed by the American naval patrol, 
4500 had been born free in the U S A , and 1000 had purchased their 
freedom. T h e republic had still to assert its authority on its own soil, fight 
the French system of 'free enlistment', defend its frontiers and enlarge its 
territory.40 All that was still in the future. 
A s regards the period w e are considering, it cannot be said that Liberia 
was as well developed economically as Sierra Leone. T h e French naval 
officer, Edouard Bouët-Willaumez, w h o was in c o m m a n d of the anti-slave-
trade squadron, sailed along the Liberian coast on several occasions. H e 
was struck by the poverty of the inhabitants.41 This economic appraisal 
contrasted with the qualitative appraisal m a d e during the same period by 
the American Horatio Bridge, according to w h o m Liberia deserved to be 
known as the 'black man's paradise'.42 Each of these views is coloured, 
however, by the personality of the individual w h o expressed it: they are 
40. P.J. Staudenraus, 1961; J. C . Nardin, 1965. 
41. L . E . Bouët-Willaumez, 1845, ch. 4 , pp. 90-2. 
42. H . Bridge, 1845, ch. 20. 
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the views of white m e n imbued with the spreading of colonialist mentality. 
In terms of historical significance, it would probably be irrational and 
certainly anachronistic to present the experiments m a d e in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia in the nineteenth century as precursors of the independence 
movements of the twentieth century. But the birth of the idea that new 
African nations could be created on a coast ravaged by 250 years of 
unbridled slave-trading and the materialization of that idea, were pro-
digious events in themselves. 
While it pointed the way ahead, the experience of Sierra Leone and 
Liberia fell short of satisfying the new generations of abolitionists. T h e 
anti-slavery movement was divided as to the methods and priorities to be 
adopted for the purpose of dismantling American slavery and the African 
slave trade. T h e failure of a philanthropic settlement on the Niger, spon-
sored by T . F . Buxton in 1841, brought criticism of the lack of success of 
abolition and a denunciation of the total failure of suppression. However, 
these rearguard critics were fighting an uphill battle, for despite official 
reluctance, the idea of colonization societies was gaining ground in private 
circles. Above all, the coast north of the Equator was wide open to 
innovations. 
Protecting n e w trade 
T h e naval squadrons were less concerned about suppression than about 
their task of protecting the 'legitimate' trade of their o w n nationals. F r o m 
the first decades of the nineteenth century the coast met American, British 
and French d e m a n d for African natural products, and these purchases 
increased. In 1838, Bouët-Willaumez, later Governor of Senegal and the 
forerunner of colonization, ordered a systematic survey to be carried out 
of the possibilities for trade between Senegal and G a b o n . Although it gave 
poor returns, trade other than in slaves developed in parallel and not in 
competition with the slave trade. T h e competition was between the Western 
nations, and they eventually arrived at an informal apportionment of 
spheres of economic interest to which African rulers did not object. France 
was predominant north of Sierra Leone and at some points on the Ivory 
Coast and in G a b o n , where she set up Libreville in imitation of Freetown.43 
Americans and Europeans came to the coast and were tolerated in what 
was in effect a British economic enclave. Change was in the air. T h e 
industrial and technological revolutions in Britain and France were ush-
ering in the modern age, and it was also on the way in other countries. It 
created new needs, the most important of which, from the coast's point of 
view, was for oils, as lubricants for machinery and the raw material of soap 
43. B . Schnapper, 1961; H . Brunschwig, 1963, esp. ch. 7; H . Deschamps, 1965; 
E.M'Bokolo, 1981. 
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and lamp fuel. T h e products of African oil-bearing plants thus established 
themselves in Western markets. 
T h e coast had always exported palm oil, but in minute quantities. 
Imports into Britain rose from 982 metric tonnes in 1814 to 21 000 tonnes 
in 1844, levelled off for ten years or so, and then doubled by 1870. France 
imported an average of 4000 tonnes a year between 1847 and 1856 and 
2000 tons in the following decade. She compensated by importing an 
average of 8000 tonnes of groundnuts a year from Senegal and the Gambia 
plus 25 000 tonnes of 'tulucoona' nuts for the manufacture of household 
soap; these imports were worth 35 million gold francs in 1870. Something 
that had long been an abstract Utopian ideal - an alternative to the slave 
trade, a substitute for trade in m e n - had at last materialized. It remained 
to develop production on an industrial scale; and this took no longer than 
it had taken the Cuban and Brazilian plantations to reach full production 
of sugar and coffee. T h e main producing areas corresponded to the best 
slave-exporting areas, from D a h o m e y 4 4 to the rivers of the Niger delta 
and Cameroon. O n e of the essential features of the changeover was that 
manpower was mobilized on land that had been internally colonized. This 
admittedly meant that production was by means of a form of slavery, but 
within an African social and economic context. In fact the energetic 
development of this economic novelty did not immediately disrupt the 
traditional economy: slave trade and oil trade co-existed side by side. A 
more extensive system of barter began to radiate into the interior. O n the 
coast the same agents for the Western trade still kept their grip on the 
market: they understood purchasing, gave credit, circulated traditional 
currencies, and introduced metal coinage. T h e increase in the number of 
people competing for trade upset the internal balance and led to a realign-
ment of forces.4S These economic changes were accelerated by religious 
and cultural factors causing distortions, which were never very far removed 
from politics, which helped, however, to put an end to the trade. 
A small number of m e n and w o m e n from the Protestant and R o m a n 
Catholic missions became important agents of Western influence. In 
Senegal, an apostolic prefecture still managing to survive after the French 
reoccupation of 1817, Mother Javouhey defined the first task of the aposto-
late as the training of an African clergy. T h e education given to the children 
of Christians and some non-Christian Africans could not stand up against 
the Ku'rân schools. Islam grew in stature as the century progressed. 
In 1844 M g r . Bessieux, w h o had had experience in Liberia, set up the 
Saint-Cœur de Marie mission in G a b o n . Calling the local beliefs 'absurd 
inventions', he strove to convert and baptize, but did little in the way of 
teaching, being more concerned with conversions than with the converted. 
Success went to the American Mission under the Reverend Wilson. At 
44. C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1971. 
45. K . O . Dike, 1956; K . K . Nair, 1972, ch. 2 . 
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Dakar, in the Lebu Republic, personal friendships and respect for the local 
culture - the result of instructions to be 'Negroes a m o n g Negroes'46 did 
not m a k e up for the mission's rather feeble otherworldliness, which tended 
to cut it off from reality. With no practical solutions to offer, the missionary 
realized that he could avail little against a highly Africanized and keenly 
propagated Islam. H e set about training an elite, even if it meant alienating 
its m e m b e r s from their o w n culture and cutting them off from their roots. 
At Grand Bassam the African ruler refused to admit the mission. At 
W h y d a h the apostolic vicariate entrusted to the African missions of Lyons 
was set up in 1868. Its first school opened its doors in 1873, as did the one 
at Porto-Novo, which was already under French tutelage. 
Buxton's ideas were fermenting a m o n g the Protestant missions, and with 
the success of Sierra Leone and the liberated Africans they gained able 
apologists in the field. S o m e of these were professionals like Samuel Ajayi 
Crowther, w h o was enslaved at 15, liberated, and became a pastor, bishop 
and nation-builder. Others were engaged in legitimate trade. Most were 
emigrants returning to their areas of origin, where they helped the missions 
and prepared the ground for them. T h e missionaries themselves settled on 
the littoral between the Gold Coast and Cameroon, except in the kingdom 
of Benin and found themselves a m o n g peoples that were devoutly religious 
but faced with political 'crises of adjustment'. They arrived at Badagry in 
1842, at W h y d a h in 1843 and at Calabar in 1846. Their bridgehead in the 
interior was the large town of Abeokuta, in the n e w Egba country. 
Unlike the R o m a n Catholic ones, the Protestant missions sought tem-
poral influence. They conceived of the Christianity they were propagating 
as a whole that included education, culture, class affiliation and political 
choice. They spread arithmetic and spoken and written English a m o n g 
people w h o had long been self-taught. Specialists came from Sierra Leone 
to teach architecture, printing and medicine. Learning belonged to the 
people w h o attended the missions, and the advantages that came from 
taking part m a d e them into a privileged class. But they conformed to a 
pattern already familiar to the local chiefs, not all of w h o m approved. 
S o m e , however, paraded a superficial Westernization in their dress, their 
homes, their food and drink and their way of life. T h e missions' purpose 
was to create a middle class in order to cream off an elite, which would 
then be trained on Western lines, and would secure and expand the two-
way flow of trade to and from the coast. T h e spread of civilization would 
be an incidental by-product which the palm-oil trade, limited to coastal 
transactions, could not achieve on its o w n . 4 7 
T h u s the Protestant missions, very m u c h of this world, took on the role 
of reformers, which included interfering in political and military strategy. 
T h e Abeokuta missionaries suggested to England the making of a road to 
46. Quoted by P. Brasseur, 1975a, p. 264, note 22; 1975b. 
47. J. F . A . Ajayi, 1969; K . K . Nair, 1972. 
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the sea, in order to speed up the barter trade - and the delivery of 
war material. T h e y invoked the technical help of British troops against 
D a h o m e y . At Calabar their influence in the city-states secured by agree-
ment the ending of local customs that they considered objectionable. F r o m 
their position of strength, the missions did not object to the rival intrusion 
of Western administrations, but counterbalanced it by siding with or 
against the established trade. Around 1850 the missions, together with the 
traders and the political administration, became involved in an irreversible 
process leading to an early form of colonial rule. T h e appointment of 
consuls with expansionist views went hand in hand with armed blockades 
and the establishment of protectorates. T h e excuse given by international 
diplomacy was always that such actions were aimed at the radical and final 
suppression of the slave trade. Humanitarian methods had become the 
instruments of economic, military and political power. 
Conclusion 
At this point, w e can attempt to establish a kind of chronology of the 
decline in the slave trade, bearing in mind that it was nowhere completely 
extinguished in this period. 
T h e trade had ended in 1824 in Senegal and Gorée, the headquarters of 
the French anti-slave-trade naval station. T h e influence and progress of 
Sierra Leone began to have a beneficial effect in that region around 1830, 
but sporadic operations continued in the Rio Pongos and Rio N u n e z areas 
until 1866-7. Between 1848 and 1850 independent Liberia sought the 
assistance of French warships against the international slave ships and 
refused to continue provisioning the slaving system, which was disguised 
as a 'free enlistment' system. T h e Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast had 
remained relatively unscathed by the illegal trade throughout the abol-
itionist period: Ivory Coast researchers have shown that although some 
slaving activities persisted, they were not intended to supply the ships 
plying the coast but to meet regional or inter-regional domestic demand 
and there is evidence for this view in records preserved in the archives. 
Further east, from W h y d a h to Lagos, the situation was more confused. 
Slave-trade transactions or 'free enlistment' operations were still taking 
place in the years 1853-5 a°d went on even until i860. In some cases, the 
Africans were embarked on very large-capacity steamships; the Nordaqui, 
for instance, carried an unprecedented cargo of 1600 slaves. Nevertheless, 
the convergent diplomatic efforts and the coercive policies of France and 
Britain eventually succeeded in curbing the slave trade. Between Benin 
and Gabon a widely applied policy of concluding treaties and promoting 
land occupation projects had the effect of severely impeding the traffic in 
slaves. T h e Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1842, which at last enforced the 
right to search slave ships south of the Equator, had similar effects in the 
area stretching from the Congo as far as the Portuguese colony of Angola. 
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plate 4.1 A group ofOromo women on board HMS Daphne in 1867 after being liberated
from an East African slave-trading dhow
plate 4.2 Released slaves on the Universities' Mission estate at Mbweni near Zanzibar
paying wages
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It was only gradually, however, at different speeds in different sections of 
the coast, that the trade declined until it died out almost entirely between 
i860 and 1870. 
In 1867, the French admiral, Fleuriot de Langle stated after a voyage 
of inspection that he was favourably impressed by what he saw 'apart from 
a few exceptions'. His report serves, however, to underline the serious 
problem raised by the revival of slave-trading on the East coast of Africa. 
During the period 1860-70, between 30000 and 35000 slaves arrived in 
the ports controlled by Zanzibar: some were kept on the spot to work in 
the clove plantations. T h e remainder were sent as far as Somaliland and 
O m a n ; around 1870 O m a n was importing 13000 slaves a year, some 
of w h o m travelled on to the Persian Gulf and Persia, Mesopotamia or 
Baluchistan and India.48 In 1873, a treaty between Britain and the Sultan 
of Zanzibar introduced the right of search, including the authorization to 
seize Arab dhows, but it did not have m u c h impact, just as the Anglo-
Portuguese treaty of 1842 had had little effect on the Mozambique slave 
trade to the C o m o r o Islands and Madagascar. A s François Renault says, 
the slave trade really disappeared from these.endless coastlines and vast 
tracts of land only with the advent of the colonial administrations,49 
considerably later, therefore, than the termination of the Atlantic trade. 
This delay can probably be explained by the fact that the Western abol-
itionists had not been m a d e fully aware of the effects of the Arab trade 
until David Livingstone discovered them in the course of his explorations. 
Allowance must also be m a d e for the time it took, after that point, to rouse 
the conscience of the West. 
T h u s in contrast to the arguments put forward on national and individual 
grounds by Western supporters of slavery, the abolitionist doctrine intro-
duced the notions of treating African slaves as m e n and of opening Africa 
to the world. Around 1870 it achieved its aims: apart from rare exceptions, 
the Atlantic slave trade was at an end. This outcome was not the unilateral 
achievement of the West, which for a long time dragged its feet and even 
n o w was still not altogether convinced that the means expended in the 
cause of universal morality would pay off. In a way, an equal effort was 
m a d e by the Africans of the hinterland and the coast. In difficult domestic 
circumstances, they managed at one and the same time to resist economic 
disintegration and to adjust rapidly to innovation. T h e African reaction to 
the abolitionist hypothesis showed tremendous adaptability and speed. For 
the time being, this was as important a factor in achieving abolition as were 
Western decisions. As for the n e w approach by the West, it stemmed from 
the white man's inability to conceive of the existence of values other than 
his o w n . His interest in African civilization was that of a scientist in a 
laboratory specimen. After a century of the battle for abolition, the con-
48. F . Renault, and Daget, S . 1980; R . Coupland, 1939. 
49. F . Renault, and Daget, S . 1980, pp. 43-69. 
88 
The abolition of the slave trade 
science of the West was clear: and hence it felt free to impose its o w n 
values, by force if need be. Not everything was on the debit side. Changes 
did occur, and cracks appeared in the structure, so that it often crumbled 
away or was torn down, leaving clear the way ahead. 
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T h e Mfecane and the 
rise of new 
African states 
L . D . N G C O N G C O 
W e are already familiar with h o w iron-working and iron-using societies of 
Bantu-speaking migrants w h o also kept cattle and grew crops established 
themselves in several parts of Southern Africa south of the Limpopo from 
about the middle to the later centuries of the first Christian millennium.1 
O n entering the region south of the L i m p o p o the Sotho-Tswana branch 
of the southern Bantu tended to keep to the plateau west of the L e b o m b o -
Drakensberg line of mountain ranges, while the Nguni-speaking groups 
migrated into the narrow corridor between these mountain ranges and the 
Indian Ocean. 
For some ten to fifteen centuries before the end of the nineteenth 
century, these Bantu-speaking communities had developed in this region 
south of the L i m p o p o a flourishing Iron Age civilization characterized by 
a congeries of small states under the political control of established royal 
lineages and dynasties. Generally speaking these states were peopled by 
iron-smelting and iron-using farmers, w h o also produced crops - chiefly 
sorghum and millets - and engaged in some hunting as well as bartering 
and long-distance trade.2 
T h e first decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the eruption of a 
tremendous social and political revolution that tore apart as well as rebuilt 
the prevailing state system in Bantu-speaking Southern Africa and beyond, 
as well as transforming the nature and the quality of the lives of m a n y 
communities from as far afield as the vicinity of Zululand in Natal up to 
southern Tanzania. This revolution, referred to as the Mfecane (crushing) 
in Nguni languages, is also known as Difaqane (hammering) in Sotho-
Tswana. 
During the Mfecane, old states were defeated, conquered and annexed 
to others. S o m e states were uprooted from their traditional localities and 
forced to re-establish themselves in n e w areas. M a n y were weakened and 
impoverished in the process. In some cases traditional ruling dynasties 
were supplanted, while in other instances whole village populations were 
annihilated or taken into captivity. Yet this same revolution saw the rise 
i. D . W . Phillipson, 1969; R . R . Inskeep, 1969, pp.31-9. 
2. M . Wilson, 1969a; R.J. Mason, 1973; L . Ngcongco, 1982, pp. 23-9. 
The Mfecane and the rise of new African states 
of large-scale centralized kingdoms in several parts of Southern Africa. It 
also gave rise to n e w 'empires' and kingdoms served by new bureaucracies 
and military organizations.3 
T h e Mfecane resulted in the depopulation of substantial parts of 
Southern Africa, and thereby facilitated the subsequent dispossession of 
African land by white migrant settler communities. Not only did these 
Boer farmers establish themselves on the choicest portion of African land, 
they also embarked immediately on systematic campaigns of spoliation of 
African herds and the enslavement of Africans under the device euphe-
mistically referred to as 'apprenticeship'. 
Within the African states themselves the Mfecane had a profound impact. 
It taxed the ingenuity of African political leaders and forced them to adapt 
their military tactics as well as their skills in political organization and 
statecraft. In some ways the Mfecane appears undoubtedly to have been a 
cataclysmic event with negative results; but looked at differently it can be 
viewed as a development of a positive and creative nature that took 
generations to unfold. S o m e of the states it gave rise to have survived to 
the present and form part of today's international community of nations. 
Taking into account the overall scope of the Mfecane's wide-ranging span 
of activities, the variety of kingdoms and diversity of peoples whose 
destinies were touched by the ebb and flow of its sweeping drama, and the 
fundamental character and the quality of the changes wrought within the 
fabric of most of these polities, one must conclude that the Mfecane 
has until recently been the most neglected subject in Southern African 
historiography, and agree with J. D . O m e r - C o o p e r that it 'positively dwarfs 
the Great Trek'.4 
This chapter is concerned with the nature of the revolution that started 
among the northern Nguni and was m a d e famous by the military activities 
and socio-political transformations engineered by the Zulu king, Shaka, 
and continued in one way or another by some of his former generals or 
contemporaries over a wide terrain in Southern and even East Africa. In 
order to understand fully what lay behind this great revolution, it is 
essential to take a close look at the physical environment of the northern 
Nguni region and understand the adaptation of societies to changes in their 
physical environment as well as see h o w their o w n activities helped shape 
the environment in which they lived and to which they responded. At the 
same time it is important to note h o w rulers of some Nguni states contrived 
to control both production and reproduction processes in order to ensure 
the surplus labour on which depended the strength of the king and the 
independence of the state. 
3. T . R . H . Davenport, 1978, p. 56; D . Denoon, 1973, pp. 23-4, 32-3; J . D . O m e r -
Cooper, 1966, ch. 12. 
4. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p .4 . 
91 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
T h e country and farming practices of the northern Nguni 
Centuries of settlement and farming by the communities of the northern 
Nguni area led to considerable adaptation by these farmers to the physical 
environment in their area of settlement. 
T h e land of the northern Nguni or proto-Zulu can for convenience's 
sake be designated as the area lying south of the Phongolo (Pongolo) and 
north of the Thukela (Tugela) rivers and roughly bounded by the valley 
of the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) in the west.5 It is a region of high relief into 
which several rivers have cut deep valleys. T h e major river systems of the 
area are the Thukela, Mhlatuze, Mfolozi, M k u z e and Phongolo. These, 
together with their tributaries, cut deep into the surrounding high-lying 
ground. Between these major rivers the ground often rises to a height of 
about iooo m above the river valleys themselves.6 These river valleys extend 
westwards deep into the interior of the country. 
A s a result of this high relief the region experiences a considerable 
variation of rainfall and temperature over relatively short distances. Like-
wise the vegetation varies considerably, creating 'a number of different 
vegetation types interlacing through the country'.7 T h e entry into the 
region and settlement of crop-producing and stock-raising farmers of 
necessity brought h u m a n interference with the natural vegetation of the 
area. 
In a work focusing on the effects of h u m a n settlement on the physical 
environment in all of Southern Africa, the ecologist J. P . H . Acocks main-
tains that the vegetation of most of the area between the Drakensberg and 
the Indian Ocean was probably 'forest and scrub-forest', while low-lying 
valleys contained tracts of savanna.8 F r o m the earliest times of their 
settlement in the region, proto-Zulu Nguni farmers using slash-and-burn 
methods devastated, and in the process substantially changed, the natural 
patterns of the vegetation. Over one and a half centuries the fire, iron hoe 
and axe of the Nguni farmer had driven the forest back to the crests of the 
high ridges, and bush had been confined to the wettest slopes along the 
watercourses.9 Through these methods farmers increased the area of 
the savanna-type vegetation to their o w n advantage. 
G u y argues that where the scrub-forest had been removed it had given 
place to grasses spreading from the depth of the river valleys, with the 
wooded elements being reduced by regular burning, a process that favoured 
the grass understorey.10 Centuries-long manipulation of the vegetation 
eventually resulted in a complex pattern of vegetation changes that 
5. J. G u y , 1980. 
6. ibid. 
7. ibid. 
8. J. P. H . Acocks, 1953. 
9. J. G u y , 1977. 
10. ibid., p. 4. 
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produced an interlacing of 'sourveld' and 'sweetveld' grazing, determined 
largely by the amount of rainfall as well as the topography of the area.11 
In the higher-rainfall areas, the grass tends to be of the sourveld variety. 
This is a variety whose nutritive value and palatability is at its highest soon 
after the first spring rains and in the early months of the s u m m e r season. 
But the food value and palatability of sourveld grass decreases as it matures. 
Sourveld, therefore, tends to provide grazing for roughly four months of 
the year before it begins to lose both its food value and palatability. 
Sweetveld, on the other hand, tends to be rather more characteristic of the 
drier parts of the country, where it is usually found in association with 
scattered trees in savanna vegetation types of which it generally forms the 
understorey. Although sparse and easily damaged, sweetveld grass retains 
its palatability and food value throughout the dry season. Sweetveld is 
therefore particularly important as winter grazing. Between these two 
extremes of sweet and sourveld grazing can be found transitional belts of 
mixed veld capable of supporting grazing for some six to eight months in 
the year.12 
While other parts of Southern Africa such as the areas occupied by the 
Sotho-Tswana communities of what is n o w the Transvaal highveld did 
also have considerable tracts of sweetveld coverage, such areas nevertheless 
lacked the river system of the northern Nguni area, which ensured that the 
low rainfall parts of the region had the paradoxical feature of being dry, 
but well-watered.13 Also, on the highveld tracts of sweetveld, pasturage 
often occurred in association with tsetse fly, which causes sleeping sickness 
in m a n and animals alike. 
Further the pre-colonial farmers of the highveld did not have the 
advantage of similar patterns of interlacing tracts of sweet and sourveld 
such as characterized the rangelands of the northern Nguni region. T h e 
settlement patterns of the Sotho-Tswana with their separate villages, arable 
lands and cattle posts m a y be said to have reflected a form of spatial 
organization suited to the availability of m u c h more vast and open country 
by comparison with that of the northern Nguni . Sotho-Tswana societies, 
while cattle-keeping and crop-cultivating, did not appear to have been 
exposed to the pressure of dense settlement that ultimately came to face 
the leaders of the larger states in the region of the northern Nguni. Their 
close settlement (as opposed to the scattered settlement of the Nguni) had 
more to do with aggregation of whole communities near the few and sparse 
water sources than with pressure of population density. 
For as long as there was a careful balance maintained between the growth 
of both h u m a n and cattle populations on the one hand, and access to the 
various types of grazing on the other, there appeared to be no serious threat 
n . ibid. 
12. J. G u y , 1980, p. 7. 
13. ibid. 
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to the stability of the region. But towards the latter part of the eighteenth 
century a limit seems to have been reached to the capacity of h u m a n action 
to expand resources of land for cultivation and grazing. Population increase, 
influenced somewhat by the adoption of maize as one of the principal crops 
in the region, seems to have placed an enormous strain on the customary 
access to land and related resources.14 
Although the narrow corridor between the Drakensberg Mountains and 
the Indian Ocean always imposed definite physical limits to the expansion 
potential of communities living in that area, the northern Nguni chiefdoms 
did enjoy a number of advantages peculiar to the region. For generations, 
in fact centuries, they had enjoyed the advantages of a beneficent physical 
environment which they had learnt to exploit skilfully. In the spring and 
early s u m m e r , Nguni herders could drive their herds to graze on the upland 
sourveld pastures, and from the middle of the s u m m e r season they would 
m o v e their stock d o w n to the sweet grasses at the bottom of the river 
valleys. Climatic variations had also m a d e it possible for these farmers to 
select the environment most suitable for the cultivation of either sorghum, 
millet or maize. As w e n o w know maize was introduced in that region some 
time in the eighteenth century and it quickly replaced other traditional 
food crops as the staple diet. In an area of very good rainfall this substitution 
of maize as the basic food item m a y have given a boost to population and 
thereby increased pressure on the land. This could have contributed to 
increasing restlessness and violence as the numerous small states in the 
region began struggling and competing seriously for dwindling resources. 
These changing conditions in the area of the northern Nguni m a y have 
been exacerbated by a severe famine k n o w n as Madlathule, whose eruption 
is estimated to have occurred somewhere between the last decade of the 
eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth century.15 Inter alia this 
terrible famine is said to have been characterized by roving bands of 
starving people w h o pounced on food stores. While the chronology of the 
Madlathule famine is uncertain, it is significant that it is thought to have 
occurred close to another famine in the land of the Basotho that is said to 
have resulted in widespread cannibalism. 
T h e structure of northern Nguni society 
That Zulu modes of farming and production resulted in a steady increase 
of the population in that region can no longer be doubted. There is hardly 
any evidence suggesting that population increase might have been due to 
large-scale migration into the region. T h e increase must therefore have 
been a result of natural growth unrelieved by any increase in land and 
other important resources. A s communities found it increasingly difficult 
14. S . Marks, 1967a; M . Gluckman, 1963, p . 166. 
15. J. G u y , 1980, pp. 9, 15; A . T . Bryant, 1929, pp. 63-88. 
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to engage in time-worn practices of shifting their stock from one pasture 
to another or to convert more scrub-forest into savanna, some embarked 
on forceful appropriation of land and pasture previously claimed by others. 
S o m e of the rulers of these small states had begun to adopt strategies 
designed to control production as well as reproduction. In order to under-
stand this process, one has to take a close look at the structure of Nguni 
society in the pre-colonial period. T h e society was divided into thousands 
of commoner homesteads each under a patrilineal head. Generally speaking 
the head of each homestead had two to three wives, depending on his rank 
in society. Each of the wives and her children lived in her o w n house. Each 
wife and her children produced food for their o w n subsistence needs. 
Usually there was division of labour according to sex: the males handled 
cattle production and engaged in hunting, while the females were mainly 
responsible for crop production. 
T h e royal homesteads, of which there might be several in each state, 
were organized differently. In addition to the normal production activities 
performed by the members of each house, including their relatives and 
retainers, the various royal homesteads also developed, especially from the 
late eighteenth century onwards, into military barracks. Male regiments 
recruited from the different parts of the country lived at these barracks and 
there performed services for the king, including crop production. M e m b e r s 
of female regiments were not stationed at these military villages but 
remained in the homesteads of their o w n fathers. Until the king gave 
permission for them to do so, neither male nor female members of the 
regiments could marry. They could stay as long as ten years in a regiment 
before being released to marry. Apart from other things, this practice of 
the kings of the northern Nguni states controlled both the rate of production 
and reproduction. 
It is not clear w h e n this development started among the northern Nguni. 
It has n o w become usual to associate the start of such changes with the 
rule of Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa, and their perfection with the rule of 
Shaka of the Zulu.16 For centuries before the advent of these changes it 
had been more c o m m o n among the Sotho-Tswana than a m o n g the Nguni 
to handle initiation as a group and political affair. That this very signifi-
cant change m a y have been linked to important changes in Nguni socio-
economic life appears likely. It is also possible that w h e n the larger states 
began to expand, they incorporated pockets of Sotho communities whose 
form of organization of initiation m a y have been adopted by the northern 
Nguni rulers for purposes of political control. 
A careful consideration of both the ecological factors and the nature of 
social organization and production in the country of the northern Nguni 
suggests strongly that, from the last quarter of the eighteenth century to 
16. S. Marks, 1967b, p. 532, for the view that the state-construction process began 
earlier among the Hlubi, N g w a n e and Nolwande. 
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the first decades of the nineteenth century, population explosion had 
intensified a struggle for dwindling resources that had been building 
up over several generations. T h e population explosion factor was first 
articulated by M a x Gluckman and has since been supported by several 
other writers.17 It n o w appears indisputable that the growth of population 
and its accompanying feature of land shortage must have contributed 
significantly to the violence that was generated in the northern Nguni 
region during the early nineteenth century. 
Other explanations have been put forward for the revolution k n o w n as 
the Mfecane or Difaqane. While some of these explanations have struck 
the critical reader as fairly tenable or even plausible, others have sounded 
quite wild and patently fanciful. According to one view, for example, the 
internal reorganization and military reforms that laid the foundations for 
the large nation-states such as the Mthethwa and Zulu, were due to the 
founders imitating Europeans. Dingiswayo in particular was said to have 
consciously emulated Europeans he had observed during his wanderings 
before he became ruler.18 It is hardly necessary to pay any more attention 
to this blatantly racist opinion than simply to endorse the strictures of one 
critic w h o described such ideas as attempts by their propagators to 'derive 
reflected glory from Zulu achievement', and went on to assert that such 
claims cannot be substantiated on any evidence whatsoever.19 It has further 
been pointed out that there is hardly any similarity between the states 
organized by Dingiswayo and Shaka and the contemporary European 
polities of the region. 
T h e gradual but purposeful eastward thrust of the eighteenth-century 
Boer immigrant farmer (trekboer) from the western part of the Cape and 
the resultant barrier it placed before the opposite advance of southern 
Nguni pastoralists has been suggested as another factor to explain the 
origins of the Mfecane. It has been argued that this eighteenth-century 
migration of Boer pastoralists created pressure of land shortage by blocking 
the path for the natural expansion of the southern Nguni pastoralists and 
thereby created a crisis further back a m o n g the northern Nguni.2 0 While 
the factor of population pressure a m o n g the Nguni in general is without 
doubt an important one, and therefore tends to be quite persuasive, its 
linking to the eastward trekboer migration from the Cape Colony leaves 
unanswered the question w h y the social revolution sparked off by such 
17. M . Gluckman, 1963, p. 166; J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, chs 1 and 2. 
18. Henry Flynn in a paper written in about 1939 first aired the questionable notion 
that Dingiswayo's innovations were probably due to his association with white people, 
especially one D r Cowan (see J. Bird (ed.), 1888, Vol. 1, pp.62-3). Later A . J . Bryant, 
1929, p. 94, underlined this baseless speculation in a manner suggestive of the now 
thoroughly discredited 'Hamitic hypothesis'. These writers set the tone for a whole line of 
uncritical followers w h o subsequently repeated the false tradition as an established fact. 
19. D . Denoon, 1973, p. 19. 
20. R . Oliver and J. D . Fage, 1962, p. 163. 
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population pressure did not break out among the southern Nguni or 
Xhosa states immediately blocked by the trekboers. Posed in this form, the 
population pressure argument raises a further problem. It faces us with 
the need to demonstrate convincingly that until the trekboers migrated up 
to the Great Fish river towards the middle of the eighteenth century, 
overcrowding among the northern Nguni, that is those living north of the 
Thukela river, could or often was alleviated by displaced groups hiving off 
from that area and migrating southward through the settled communities 
of Xhosa-speaking Nguni in search of lebensraum, and settling among them 
or in lands further south. In this respect, it appears that the physical barrier 
presented by the Drakensberg m a y in fact have proven less of an obstacle 
than the mass of densely settled Xhosa-speaking communities living south 
of present-day Natal.21 
A n interesting and important explanation is related to a desire by the 
large states of the northern Nguni areas to control trade, mainly in ivory, 
with the Portuguese-controlled port of Delagoa Bay on the east coast. This 
hypothesis was first advanced by Monica Wilson and has received support 
from Allan Smith.22 Well before the end of the eighteenth century, states 
like those of the Hlubi N d w a n d w e and N g w a n e had been participating in 
trade with the Portuguese, mainly through Tsonga middlemen. O n his 
accession to the Mthethwa throne, Dingiswayo did open up an ivory trade 
route with Delagoa Bay, conquering in the process several clans to open 
up his access to the Indian Ocean port.23 Dingiswayo's efforts appear to 
have been matched by those of Zwide and Sobhuza, w h o also attempted 
to expand along the Phongolo river in order to establish a foothold on the 
trade with Delagoa Bay.2 4 Although some scholars have raised doubts about 
the importance of the trade factor as an incentive for transformation of 
small states into large states, the matter is still very m u c h in debate. 
It is, however, difficult to take very seriously explanations based on the 
characters or personal qualities of the leaders of the revolution. It is more 
instructive to attempt to understand w h y leaders like Dingiswayo, Shaka 
and Mzilikazi and others like them rose and flourished at the same time 
and around the same general area. This line of enquiry might help us to 
avoid the danger of mythologizing the role of some principal actors in this 
great h u m a n drama and more reasonably perceive them as products of a 
particular socio-economic environment. 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, therefore, and especially 
during the early years of the nineteenth century, a combination of factors 
centring largely on increasing shortage of land as a result of increased 
population brought about unrest that later erupted in violence in most of 
2i. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p . 169. 
22. M . Wilson, 1958, p. 172; A . Smith, 1969. 
23. A . T . Bryant, 1929, p. 97; A . Smith, 1969, pp. 182-3. 
24. A . T . Bryant, 1929; A . Smith, 1969, p. 185. 
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the northern Nguni states. Very crucial and revolutionary changes in the 
social and cultural fabric of whole societies there had been gradually taking 
place. Disturbed conditions in the war-infested region compelled one state 
after another to modify or abandon time-honoured practices like cattle-
herding on a loan basis and traditional ceremonies such as initiation along 
with circumcision, where it was felt that continued adherence to them 
would hinder appropriate and efficient responses to the exigencies of a 
rapidly changing situation. For instance, male initiation, which included 
circumcision and seclusion for long periods of up to six months, could at 
critical moments keep out of commission hundreds of youths w h o might 
be required for military service. Consequently, changes and adaptations to 
social customs and traditional practices led to innovations in military 
techniques and to modernization in military organization. A m o n g the great 
innovators and modernizers of this period were Zwide of the N d w a n d w e , 
Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa and Shaka of the Zulu.25 
In the series of wars that these numerous Nguni states engaged in, the 
forced migrations consequent upon them or the conquests, annexations 
and incorporations resulting from them, three powerful groups emerged 
dominant in the region. T h e first were the Ngwane-Dlamini (who later 
became the Swazi) under Sobhuza, living on the Phongolo river. Between 
the Phongolo river, the Mfolozi river and the Indian Ocean lived the second 
powerful group, namely the N d w a n d w e confederacy under King Zwide. 
T o their west were smaller chiefdoms such as the Khumalo . T o the south 
of this group lay the third powerful group, the Mthethwa confederacy 
ruled by Dingiswayo. They occupied roughly the triangle between the 
Indian Ocean, the lower Mfolozi and Mhlathuze rivers.26 
T h e rulers of these three large states were, in essence, paramount kings 
exacting tribute from a congeries of smaller states, chieftaincies and clans. 
Generally, the subordinate states enjoyed considerable autonomy in matters 
of day-to-day living, while recognizing the suzerain control of the para-
mount authority in such important issues as 'first fruits' rituals, initiation 
ceremonies, payment of tribute and the waging of war. 
T h e first round in the struggle for supremacy involved Sobhuza's 
Ngwane-Dlamini and Zwide's N d w a n d w e w h o were vying for control of 
the fertile Phongolo valley maize lands. T h e N d w a n d w e state, which came 
into prominence before the middle decades of the eighteenth century, had 
originally been part of a large cluster of E m b o - N g u n i chiefdoms that had 
been migrating southwards from the T h e m b e kingdom in the hinterland 
of Delagoa Bay towards the latter part of the seventeenth century. Together 
with other offshoots of E m b o - N g u n i , such as the N g w a n e , Dlamini and 
Hlubi, they finally settled in the valley of the Phongolo, at a time when 
they were ruled by either Langa II or his predecessor Xaba. T h e N d w a n d w e 
25. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p . 27; J. Bird, 1888, Vol. 1. 
26. A . T . Bryant, 1929, p . 160. 
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built their main settlement on the e m a - G u d u foothills overlooking the 
southern Phongolo valley. It was here in their new h o m e that the 
N d w a n d w e rulers embarked on a policy of gradually extending their 
political control through the subjugation of several smaller chiefdoms found 
in the neighbourhood. These small states included some N g w a n e and 
Ntungwa communities in the Phongolo valley as well as a collection of 
Khumalo clans under Mashobane. Here also, as their state flourished and 
prospered, they took the appellation of N d w a n d w e , in order to distinguish 
themselves from other E m b o - N g u n i , some of w h o m had settled on the 
northern bank of the Phongolo and others to the west of the N d w a n d w e 
chiefdom.27 
T h e political authority of the N d w a n d w e rulers increased enormously as 
they brought one small state after another under their suzerainty. Under 
the rulers Langa II and his son Zwide, the borders of the state extended 
to both sides of the Phongolo river in the north and southwards as far as 
the valley of the Black Mfolozi; and from near the N g o m e forest in the 
west towards St Lucia Bay in the Indian Ocean.28 T h e N d w a n d w e rulers 
were thus the first Nguni rulers to bring about the type of transformation 
that created a large state from the numerous petty chiefdoms of the region. 
Through the skilful exploitation of old customs and practices and the 
organization of these to serve n e w purposes, coupled with the ruthless use 
of military force where necessary, the N d w a n d w e rulers succeeded in 
building up a powerful confederacy around the Usuthu-Phongolo con-
fluence, collecting tribute from many smaller Nguni chiefdoms in the 
region. 
Zwide succeeded to the N d w a n d w e throne around 1790 and reached the 
peak of his rule about the same time as Dingiswayo of the neighbouring 
and rival Mthethwa confederacy.29 T h e greater share of building the 
powerful N d w a n d w e confederacy had fallen on his shoulders. But it is 
important to recognize that he built upon foundations laid by his father 
and grandfather, and that in doing so he exploited institutions, customs 
and practices already in vogue in m u c h of the region even among the 
Sotho-Tswana west of the Drakensberg. 
Like several other Nguni states in the region, the N d w a n d w e kingdom 
depended a great deal on the deployment of military regiments recruited 
through the traditional initiation of males and females of approximately 
the same age group. For males the age-set initiation was accompanied by 
circumcision. Indications are that Zwide and his predecessors m a y have 
been among the first Nguni rulers to perceive some political significance 
in the 'Sotho-Tswana' practice of co-ordinating and controlling cir-
cumcision and related initiation rites on a community or chiefdom-wide 
27. ibid., pp. 158-61. 
28. ibid, p. 160. 
29. ibid. 
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rather than an individual family basis. Thereafter it was easy to extend the 
principle. While subject chiefs could continue to rule their own people, 
they could no longer organize and preside over initiation ceremonies of 
their o w n as in the past. These ceremonies were henceforth to be organized 
from the centre, and youths from all parts of the Ndwandwe-ruled c o m -
munities would be m a d e members of national age-regiments.30 This of 
course would in future facilitate deployment of such age-regiments in 
military activities. 
Apart from the use of age-regiments to weld together the different parts 
of their 'national' state, the N d w a n d w e rulers appear also to have relied on 
the extensive use of magico-religious influence in order to enhance their 
o w n authority and to help create the mystique of an all-powerful and 
invincible monarch. In addition to the more traditional annual 'first fruits' 
ceremonies, Zwide, in particular, deployed the services of an impressive 
array of medicine m e n and royal magicians, news of w h o m helped to spread 
the fear of Zwide's power throughout m a n y of the surrounding chiefdoms. 
Zwide also used diplomatic marriages to build or temper his relationship 
with some of the states of the region. T h u s , he gave his sister Ntombazana 
as a bride to the Mthethwa ruler, Dingiswayo. Similar considerations m a y 
have induced him ultimately to agree to one of his daughters, Thandile, 
marrying Sobhuza of the N g w a n e (Swazi), among which people she became 
popularly known as Lazidze, the daughter of Zwide. 
That Zwide had no intention of allowing such diplomatic marriages to 
stand in the way of his expansionist policy became evident when Sobhuza 
revived his claim to the use of fertile arable lands in the Phongolo valley. 
Zwide responded by attacking Sobhuza's capital on the southern border 
of Swaziland.31 After several contests the N d w a n d w e army emerged vic-
torious, expelling Sobhuza's followers from the Phongolo valley and driving 
them in a northerly direction. There, among the mountains of what is n o w 
Swaziland, Sobhuza (also known as Somhlolo) laid the foundations of the 
Swazi nation. 
The Swazi 
T h e nuclear N g w a n e group comprised an aggregation of clans of E m b o -
Nguni as well as pockets of Ntungwa-Nguni stock plus some Tsonga clans 
under the leadership of Dlamini royal lineages. It was these clans, welded 
together as the first stratum of N g w a n e society in the Shiselweni district, 
that became known as bemdzabuko or true Swazi.32 In the central part of 
what is present-day Swaziland Sobhuza brought under his political control 
several other clans found in the vicinity. These were mainly of Sotho 
30. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966. 
31. J . S . M . Matsebula, 1972, pp. 15-16; H . Kuper, 1947, p . 13; J . D . Omer-Cooper, 
1966, pp. 29, 49; A . T . Bryant, 1964. 
32. J. S. M . Matsebula, 1972; H . Kuper, 1947, p . 14. 
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(Pedi) stock but had intermingled with small pockets of E m b o - N g u n i 
and Ntungwa-Nguni communities. T h e Sotho communities that Sobhuza 
integrated into his own kingdom had a fairly well-developed age-regiment 
system. T o distinguish these newer Swazi from those w h o migrated from 
the south they were generally referred to as ema-khandzambili (those found 
ahead).33 
Even before they were expelled from the Phongolo valley, Sobhuza's 
people had, like those of Dingiswayo, adopted the age-set system. This 
rendered the integration of the new communities of central Swaziland with 
the rest of his subjects m u c h easier than it would otherwise have been. 
Like the Sotho communities, the Swazi age-sets functioned as military 
regiments only in time of war. T h e youth of the conquered clans were 
incorporated into the N g w a n e initiation system and made to fight in the 
same regiments alongside their conquerors,34 while the chiefs of these Sotho 
communities were not destroyed but were, in fact, allowed a considerable 
degree of autonomy in local affairs. Although the Sotho clans at first 
occupied a somewhat inferior position in N g w a n e society, as time pro-
gressed and as they demonstrated their loyalty to the state beyond doubt, 
they were accorded the same treatment as the Nguni members of the Swazi 
state. 
Sobhuza did not only lighten the yoke of subjection on the conquered 
Sotho clans by allowing their chiefs m u c h local autonomy as well as 
providing for considerable room for mobility of Sotho youths in the Swazi 
army; he also sought to consolidate his o w n position and ensure the safety 
of his new kingdom by maintaining amicable relations with his neighbours. 
Although Zwide had expelled him from his former domicile and pursued 
him into the modern Swaziland, Sobhuza kept friendly relations with the 
N d w a n d w e and attempted to cement that friendship by marrying one of 
Zwide's daughters as his nkosikati (senior wife). T o placate Shaka of the 
Zulu, Sobhuza sent a tribute of young girls to him, including princesses 
of the royal blood. Even though Shaka killed some of these w o m e n when 
they became pregnant, Sobhuza continued his policy of conciliation.35 As 
a result, his kingdom enjoyed relative immunity from the depredations of 
Shaka's regiments. 
Sobhuza died in 1840 and was succeeded by his son Mswazi (Mswati) 
after w h o m the Ngwane-Dlamini people became known as Swazi. Like his 
father before him, Mswati had to defend the new state against successive 
invasions from the south, apart from revolts from within. First, Mswati 
w h o was comparatively young at the death of his father had to contend 
with several attempts calculated to frustrate his attempt to rule. T o start 
with, there was the rebellion of Fokoti, w h o mustered considerable support 
33. ibid. 
34. H . Kuper, 1947, pp. 15-17; H . Beemer, 1937. 
35. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p. 50. 
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in southern Swaziland, but Mswati was saved by Malunge's rallying of 
royal regiments in his favour. 
After Fokoti's rebellion, Mswati m a d e efforts to strengthen his position, 
such as in greater centralization of the age-regiments, the creation of a 
more extensive network of royal villages and the reorganization of the 
incwala (first-fruits) ceremony in the direction of increased royal absolution. 
However, these reforms did not prevent another son of Sobhuza, the regent 
Malambule, from rebelling in 1846 shortly after Mswati had graduated 
through the circumcision rite. T h e rebellion implicated white missionaries 
as well as agents of Zulu imperialism. In the end Mswati was obliged to 
ally with Transvaal Boers in order to quell the danger of invasion by the 
Zulu forces of M p a n d e . T h e treaty that helped to deliver the Swazi from 
the jaws of the Zulu dragon was signed on 26 July 1846.36 
A key figure in the defeat of the Malambule insurrection was another 
brother of Mswati, Somcuba (Somquba). T h e status he enjoyed as Sobhu-
za's first-born son was enhanced by the part he played in quelling the 
Malambule uprising as well as in negotiating the treaty of 1846 with the 
Boers of Ohrigstad. About 1849, however, Somcuba began his o w n 
rebellion against Mswati. This culminated in efforts to build a rival state 
through the 'amalgamation of Pai and Sotho clanlets in the Crocodile river 
region',37 and Somcuba's usurpation of royal prerogatives by practising his 
o w n incwala ceremonies. B y 1856 Mswati's campaigns against the rebel 
and the support of the Lydenburg Boers had resulted in the killing of 
Somcuba, a new treaty of cession with the Boers of Lydenburg,38 and the 
restoration of normal conditions in the region. 
Mswati's domestic policy was more successful than his foreign adven-
tures. H e embarked on a policy of diplomatic marriages with 'princesses' 
chosen from m a n y of the ruling lineages of communities recently integrated 
into Swazi society. At the same time he bestowed Swazi royal brides on 
chieftains of the various clans and lineages. Swazi commoners were also 
quick to emulate Mswati's practices thus bringing about great changes 
through extensive intermarriage. T h e effect was to wipe out the ethnic 
divisions between the various elements of Swazi society.39 
The Mthethwa 
T h e expulsion of the Ngwane-Dlamini from the Phongolo valley left Zwide 
of the N d w a n d w e and Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa to confront each other 
in the northern Nguni country. Zwide himself had become king of the 
N d w a n d w e around 1790. H e appears to have been responsible for building 
36. J. S . M . Matsebula, 1972; A . T . Bryant, 1929, pp. 325-8; H . Kuper, 1947, pp. 19-
20. 
37. J. A . I. Agar-Hamilton, 1928, pp. 60-1; H . Kuper, 1947, p. 20. 
38. H . Kuper, 1947; G . M . Theal, 1908-11, Vol. 4, p. 456. 
39. H . Beemer, 1937. 
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a powerful N d w a n d w e state based on the collection of tribute from subject 
polities, the use of an army based on age-regiments, the myth of a sacred 
kingship organized around the annual incwala first-fruits ceremonies and 
the control of trade routes with Delagoa Bay. 
T h e Mthethwa kingdom had become famous under Dingiswayo, son of 
Jobe and grandson of Kayi (who m a y generally be regarded as founder of 
the Mthethwa kingdom).40 Like the N d w a n d w e , N g w a n e , and later the 
Zulu states, the power of the Mthethwa was also built on tribute collecting, 
cattle-raiding and an army based on age-regiments. T h e Mthethwa also 
traded extensively with Delagoa Bay. 
As has already been pointed out, the age-regiments were being deployed 
generally throughout the major Nguni states of the region and most of the 
Nguni states appear to have been influenced by Pedi and other Sotho 
groups in the vicinity.41 But Dingiswayo seems to have brought his usual 
thoroughness and imagination to the reorganization of what was a fairly 
general practice in the area. H e terminated the circumcision rite that used 
to accompany the formation of age-grades in order to do away with the 
period of seclusion necessitated by such rites. H e adopted the chest-and-
horns formation for his army. Dingiswayo also formed an alliance with 
the Maputo kingdom at Delagoa Bay. In subsequently conquering and 
incorporating the Q w a b e state, Dingiswayo is said to have been assisted 
by soldiers armed with guns from his allied kingdom of Maputo, and not, as 
Fynn stated, a company of soldiers sent by the Portuguese.42 Dingiswayo's 
Mthethwa kingdom collected tribute from more than thirty chiefdoms in 
the region, including a small chiefdom under Senzangakhona, namely the 
Zulu state. Subsequently Shaka, a son of Senzangakhona, became a general 
in Dingiswayo's army. 
The Zulu 
Mthethwa expansion under Dingiswayo had been checked by Zwide and 
his N d w a n d w e regiments. Several wars had been fought by the rival armies. 
In 1818 Dingiswayo was captured by Zwide and killed. Because of the 
personal character of Dingiswayo's rule, his death created a vacuum in the 
leadership of the Mthethwa. Shaka, w h o had been rising fast in Ding-
iswayo's esteem (and had with his help become head of the small Zulu 
chiefdom) n o w quickly stepped into the breach. H e replaced Dingiswayo 
as head of the Mthethwa confederacy of chiefdoms. H e had, in effect, 
inherited the Mthethwa 'empire'. But in the same way that Bismarck was 
to ensure that Germany was absorbed into Prussia, Shaka 'incorporated' 
the Mthethwa empire into the Zulu state, thus making the Mthethwa part 
40. T . Shepstone in J. Bird, 1888, Vol. 1, pp. 160-4; A . T . Bryant, 1929, p. 95. 
41. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1969, pp.211-13. 
42. A . Smith, 1969, p. 184. 
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of the Zulu nation. H e did, however, allow the Mthethwa traditional system 
of government to continue under a minor son of Dingiswayo with a regent 
subservient to himself as the Zulu monarch.43 In dealing with other groups, 
however, Shaka appears to have insisted on total incorporation rather than 
mere suzerainty. 
Even while he was only head of the Zulu state and subservient to 
Dingiswayo, Shaka had already started reorganizing his army. This process 
of rationalizing social institutions for military purposes was n o w carried to 
a logical conclusion. Shaka also revolutionized the military techniques 
themselves. T h e long throwing spear was replaced by a short broad-bladed 
stabbing spear that was m u c h more effective in close-up fighting after 
the enemy had lost the long throwing spear or javelin. Zulu fighting m e n 
n o w carried long shields, discarded sandals and went barefoot for greater 
speed and mobility. Like Dingiswayo before him, Shaka kept a perman-
ent army of regiments drawn from m e n under 40 years of age. Unlike 
Dingiswayo, he kept these regiments in military barracks where they were 
maintained by the state and led a life of celibacy until they were dis-
charged from military service. Because they were maintained in barracks, 
Shaka's regiments were well drilled and efficient and always ready for 
emergencies.44 
Shaka's army was instructed in several military tactics of which the 'cow-
horns' formation was only the most spectacular. T h e army was trained to 
be hardy and ruthless in dealing with the enemy. Unlike Sobhuza or 
Dingiswayo, Shaka often wiped out the ruling elites of the conquered 
peoples and sought total incorporation of captured groups into the Zulu 
system with members of the Zulu royal family replacing the original rulers. 
Sometimes the chiefs of the larger groups were recognized by being allowed 
a free hand in the local control of their o w n peoples. 
It was while Shaka was involved in the critical wars for the domination 
of what later became Zululand that he developed and perfected some of 
the techniques and tactics referred to above. This drive to bring all groups 
in the region of northern Nguni under his o w n control brought Shaka 
into direct conflict with Zwide's N d w a n d w e , w h o m he defeated in two 
successive battles in 1819 and 1820.45 
Shaka's defeat of the N d w a n d w e army at Mhlatuze meant not only a 
disastrous military defeat for Zwide himself but also a collapse of the 
N d w a n d w e state, a loose confederacy that had been built up through 
systematic subordination of small states in the M k u z e and Phongolo valleys. 
Fragments of the N d w a n d w e state under the leadership of Zwide's erst-
while generals fled panic-stricken northwards into what is n o w M o z a m -
bique. T h e leaders of these splinter groups were Soshangane, Zwangendaba 
43. A . T . Bryant, 1929, pp. 158-67, 202-3; E . A - Ritter, 1955, pp. 113-16. 
44. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 35-7. 
45. L . Thompson, 1969a, p. 344; E . A . Ritter, 1955, pp. 129-49. 
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and Nqaba. The bulk of the N d w a n d w e , now effectively subjugated, 
remained under Sikunyane as a tributary state of the Zulu sovereign.46 
The Gaza 
Soshangane was the first of Zwide's generals to break away, taking with 
him a small following. H e established himself in Tsonga country not far 
from Delagoa Bay where he seems to have had little difficulty in defeating 
and placing under his rule several small groups like the Manyika, the 
N d a u and Chopi, w h o m he incorporated among his o w n followers. In 
Mozambique, Soshangane's followers were generally referred to as Shan-
gana after himself. There he began building his own kingdom, which he 
called Gaza. His regiments were sent on expeditions in all directions, 
capturing young m e n and w o m e n , cattle and grain. T h e economic power 
of the Gaza kingdom was based firmly upon the control of the trade 
between the interior and the Portuguese coastal settlements of Delagoa 
Bay.47 This trade had been going on since the time of the pre-Gaza states 
at a time when Delagoa Bay, though a Portuguese trading post, nevertheless 
attracted the trading vessels of other foreign nations such as the English 
and Austrians.48 Delagoa Bay served mainly as an outlet for ivory and other 
trade goods exported from Nyaka's kingdom, the T h e m b e and Maputo 
states.49 
T h e new Gaza kingdom thus took control of trade that touched m u c h 
of Natal and probably even the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony.50 But 
the Gaza kingdom put too heavy a reliance on military expeditions and 
warfare. F r o m his capital of Chaimaite on the middle Sabi, Soshangane's 
regiments fought the surrounding chiefdoms and harassed eastern Shona 
states. T h e brunt of these attacks fell on the peoples of southern M o z a m -
bique, especially the Tsonga.51 There was a strengthening of the Nguni 
element in Gaza society when in 1826 Soshangane's people were joined by 
N d w a n d w e remnants from northern Zululand after Shaka had defeated 
Sikunyane, the son of Zwide.52 
It was into the familiar Zulu-type state that the conquered Tsonga 
communities were incorporated. In extent the Gaza state stretched from 
the lower Zambezi to just south of the Limpopo. T h e authority of the king 
was backed by an army based on the age-regiment system and used the 
military techniques of the Zulu army. T h e original Nguni group from the 
south formed a kind of socially superior class known as 'ba-Nguni', while 
46. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 57-8; H . Fynn in J. Bird, 1888, Vol. 1, pp. 86-90. 
47. A . T . Bryant, 1929, p . 313; J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, ch. 4. 
48. A . Smith, 1969, pp. 176-^. 
49. S . Marks, 1967b. 
50. A . Smith, 1969, p. 169. 
51. J. Stevenson-Hamilton, 1929, p. 169. 
52. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p . 57. 
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the newly incorporated citizens were referred to as 'ba-Tshangane'. In 
contrast with m a n y founders of Mfecane-inspired states, Soshangane did 
not use his age-regiments to unify subject communities with his nuclear 
Nguni group. J. D . Omer-Cooper states that they were kept in regiments 
of their o w n distinct from those of the Nguni group but placed under 'ba-
Nguni' officers. It is also suggested that they were considered to be 
expendable and on the battlefield were invariably put in the front line.53 
The Ndebele 
Mzilikazi, the founder of the Ndebele state, was the son of Mashobane, 
the head of a small Khumalo chiefdom on the Black Mfolozi river, paying 
tribute to the N d wand we monarch Zwide. Born in 1796, Mzilikazi became 
ruler of his people when in 1818 Zwide had Mashobane killed, suspecting 
him of betrayal. As the son of Mashobane's senior wife (who was a daughter 
of Zwide), Mzilikazi, the heir-apparent, was duly installed head of the 
Khumalo chiefdom by Zwide. 
Soon after Shaka's victory over Zwide at the battle of the White Mfolozi, 
Mzilikazi deserted his grandfather Zwide and transferred his allegiance to 
Shaka. Sent by Shaka on an expedition against a neighbouring Sotho group 
in 1822, Mzilikazi defied Shaka by refusing to deliver the captured cattle. 
H e then repulsed a Zulu regiment sent to punish him. H e had gathered 
his Khumalo people on the top of Ntumbane hill. A second regiment was 
able to dislodge Mzilikazi from his supposedly impregnable fortress and 
also delivered a heavy punishment to the Khumalo regiments. Mzilikazi 
escaped over the Drakensberg Mountains with a considerably reduced 
following of some 200 m e n , w o m e n and children. In the words of one 
writer: 'Largely shorn of w o m e n , children and livestock and backed by a 
few hundred foot-soldiers armed with hand-weapons, Mzilikazi stood on 
the threshold of a twenty-year odyssey which was to take him over 1500 
miles through m a n y strange lands'. 
Mzilikazi managed to evade pursuing Zulu regiments as he cut his path 
of escape among several small-scale Sotho groups on the highveld. O n his 
way across the Vaal river he captured cattle, m e n , w o m e n and children. 
H e was also joined by pockets of Nguni w h o had earlier crossed over the 
Drakensberg to live among the Sotho communities of the highveld. In 
1824 Mzilikazi settled on the Olifants river in country generally occupied 
by the Pedi, a Sotho-Tswana group w h o until 1820 had been ruled 
by Thulare. His settlement was called Ekupumleni. Mzilikazi's military 
campaigns against the Pedi and other Sotho groups, mainly of what is n o w 
the eastern and northern Transvaal, not only enormously increased his 
herds but also swelled the numbers of his followers through conquest and 
capture as well as through accommodating refugees from Shaka. O n the 
53. J. Stevenson-Hamilton, 1929, p. 169. 
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Transvaal highveld, occupied predominantly by Sotho-Tswana c o m -
munities, Mzilikazi's Nguni followers were called Ndebele. B y 1825 
Ndebele regiments were fighting Sotho-Tswana communities all over the 
highveld, even as far west as eastern Botswana. In two to three years 
Mzilikazi's kingdom had become the most powerful and richest on the 
highveld. 
It was the news of Mzilikazi's wealth that attracted bands of adventurers; 
plunderers such as those led by Moletsane of the Taung (whose settlement 
was on the Vaal river) and Jan Bloem's gun-firing and mounted half-caste 
raiders w h o had for some time been harrying several African states in 
Transorangia. These raided Mzilikazi's enormous cattle posts not far 
from the Vaal river and helped themselves to his vast herds.54 This, and 
occasional harassment by Zulu regiments, plus the threat of a possible 
attack from Zwangendaba and Nqaba 5 5 - both former generals of Zwide -
persuaded him in 1827 to m o v e his capital to the northern slopes of the 
Magaliesberg Mountains, near the source of the Odi (Crocodile) river. 
This was in the heart of the K w e n a and Kgatla country in what is n o w the 
Transvaal Province of South Africa. There, near the site of the present 
city of Pretoria, Mzilikazi built his n e w headquarters, called Mhlahlandlela, 
from which his regiments systematically attacked the K w e n a and Kgatla 
states of the central Transvaal for some five to seven years. His regiments 
went on expeditions northwards beyond the Limpopo river, southwards 
beyond the Vaal river and westwards as far as the fringes of the Kalahari 
Desert. At Mhlahlandlela, Mzilikazi also laid the basis for effective nation-
building around the capital and its satellite settlements of Gabeni and 
Nkungwini. But even at his new h o m e Mzilikazi found no repose. Jan 
Bloem's armed Koranna, reinforced by some Sotho-Tswana regiments, 
attacked his cattle posts in 1828, looting thousands of cattle and killing the 
herds. Mzilikazi's regiments that had been on duty elsewhere quickly 
caught up with the southward-moving raiders as they were leaving Ndebele 
territory, killed most of the raiders and recaptured any cattle. A year later 
an attack on his cattle posts by a strong Griqua and Sotho force under the 
leadership of Barend Barends was similarly frustrated. But Mzilikazi still 
dreaded the possibility of another Zulu attack. In 1832 he moved his 
settlement westwards to Mosega on the Madikwe (Marico) river. F r o m 
this new base he attacked most of the Tswana groups in the western 
Transvaal and those in present-day Botswana until he was defeated and 
driven out of Mosega by a joint force of Boers, Tswana and Griqua in 
1837.56 
Mzilikazi n o w went to build his headquarters at Bulawayo. His regiments 
gained reasonably easy control over the Kalanga and Shona chieftaincies 
54. J. D . Omer-Cooper , 1966, ch. 9. 
55. ibid. 
56. L . Ngcongco, 1982, pp. 161-71. 
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of the region. T h e power of Shona states had been sapped by the earlier 
battles against the Zwangendaba and Nxaba Nguni. F r o m Bulawayo 
Ndebele regiments frequently attacked the Shona in order to capture cattle. 
M a n y Shona chiefdoms submitted as tribute-paying vassal states, while 
others put up a stout resistance. S o m e Shona, especially those east of the 
Sabi and Hunyani rivers, never really came under Ndebele authority. But 
the Kalanga chieftaincies were scattered and the inhabitants incorporated 
into Ndebele society. S o m e were obliged to migrate southwards and in a 
south-westerly direction into present-day Botswana. 
In his new h o m e Mzilikazi felt less threatened by powerful enemies. H e 
therefore spent less time on military expeditions, and more and more on 
the consolidation of his kingdom. But as the Ndebele state was essentially 
expansionist and militarist it still needed to ensure a steady inflow of tribute 
in the form of cattle, grain, iron tools and weapons, personal ornaments 
and leather goods, or the provision of labour and services. Regiments 
accordingly continued to be sent out to the north and east a m o n g the 
Shona-speaking communities as well as some of the Sotho-Tswana states 
in the south. S o m e Tswana, like Bakaa, were left with some of Mzilikazi's 
herds to look after." In 1842, for example, the Ngwato king, Sekgoma 
defeated an invading Ndebele regiment. In the following year Mzilikazi's 
tribute-gatherers were killed by the Ngwato.5 8 Either because the militarist 
streak in Mzilikazi's character was gradually fading away or because he 
considered it less of a priority to do so at that point in time, Mzilikazi 
surprisingly took no action to punish this Ngwato insult until twenty years 
later. 
Mzilikazi appeared keener to avenge his defeat on the Zambezi at the 
hands of Sebetwane's Kololo in 1839. Against them he despatched two 
powerful expeditions, one in 1845 and the other five years later. Both ended 
disastrously, putting an end to any further designs on so formidable an 
enemy. O n the other hand, in 1847 the Ndebele were surprised by an 
invasion by a Boer C o m m a n d o under Hendrik Potgieter, aided by Pedi 
auxiliaries. T h e expedition proved utterly abortive. As he had done to 
Griqua and Koranna raiders some twenty years earlier, Mzilikazi sent a 
regiment in pursuit of the apparently successful raiders, w h o had captured 
thousands of Ndebele cattle. T h e crack Zwangendaba regiment caught up 
with the raiders as they were camping for the night. T h e Pedi guards were 
massacred and the cattle recaptured. 
For a whole decade after 1850 Mzilikazi fought no major war. Anxious 
to cement good ties with Europeans, he signed a treaty with Boers in 1852 
permitting them to hunt in his country. Mzilikazi also received three visits, 
57. A . Sillery, 1952, p. 118. 
58. R . K . Rasmussen, 1977, p. 35; A . Sillery, 1952, p. 118, gives the date 1838 for this 
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in 1854, 1857 and i860, from the missionary Robert Moffat.59 These visits 
paved the way for the entry of Europeans into the Ndebele kingdom. 
Moffat also secured, in particular, Mzilikazi's consent to missionaries 
operating in his country.60 After this, Europeans began entering Ndebele 
kingdom in ever-increasing numbers. There were hunters, traders, and 
missionaries - all harbingers of Rhodes and the British South Africa 
Company . 6 1 This was particularly so after the ancient Tati gold diggings 
of the Kalanga had become k n o w n to Europeans in 1867.62 B y then 
Mzilikazi was already a very sick m a n . H e died early in September 1868. 
T h e Ndebele kingdom was a militarist state. W h e n it was established in 
what is today Zimbabwe a pattern of statecraft that had been evolving in 
the Transvaal blossomed into full maturity. In building his kingdom, 
Mzilikazi replicated some of the features of the Zulu empire of which his 
o w n K h u m a l o polity had been only a tiny part. H e employed the age-
regiment as his essential instrument for absorbing conquered peoples and 
for cutting across the social strata that ultimately developed north of the 
Limpopo. 
After 1840, Ndebele society comprised three such strata. T h e first layer 
was made up of the parent groups of original followers of Mzilikazi from 
the Natal-Zululand area and others w h o joined him south of the Vaal. 
They were k n o w n as the Zansi people. Next in prestige came those w h o 
were incorporated during migrations north of the Vaal, predominantly 
Sotho-Tswana peoples. They were known as E-Nhla. T h e lowest group 
in the hierarchy were the Hole, m a d e up of those conquered in the country 
north of the Limpopo. 6 3 T h e prestigious social position of the Zansi 
encouraged the other groups to strive consciously to emulate their way of 
living, speak their language and adopt their culture. Intermarriage between 
the members of these social 'classes' was frowned upon.64 But as individuals 
became more proficient in speaking Sindebele and distinguished themselves 
in war, they became socially acceptable and could even rise in the army. 
T h e age-regiment system had the effect of cutting across these social classes 
and made for quicker absorption of the conquered youth. It helped to 
assimilate such youths into Ndebele customs, the Sindebele language and 
loyalty to Mzilikazi. 
T h e position of the king was crucial in binding the different groups of 
subjects together. This was reflected in the annual first-fruits (incwala) 
ceremony. M o r e than any other ritual this ceremony dramatized the central 
role of the king's person in the life of the nation. In the words of one 
59. R . Moffat, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 225. 
60. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p . 153. 
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63. A . J . B . Hughes, 1956. 
64. ibid. 
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anthropologist,65 the first-fruits ceremony ritualizes the king and served as 
a device for protecting the whole community 'by allaying the evil forces 
which might harm their ruler and consolidating the political nation around 
him'.66 T h e ceremony was attended by all his subjects and was held at his 
capital.67 As the theoretical owner of all the cattle in the Ndebele kingdom, 
Mzilikazi was in a position to control the ability of his subjects to contract 
marriages. In addition to the control of the national herd, Mzilikazi also 
had under his care all the captured maidens. This meant that he controlled 
both the economic productive as well as the biological reproductive poten-
tial of his subjects. H e himself became attached to a large number of his 
subjects through marriage. 
Since the Ndebele kingdom was a conquest state, the organization of its 
vast army significantly overlapped with, and somewhat overshadowed, the 
political and administrative organization of the state. This army, numbering 
some 20 000 in the latter years of Mzilikazi's reign, was divided into 
regimental units, all overseen by regimental indunas or commanders. These 
in turn were under the supervision of four divisional indunas, with Mzilikazi 
himself at the apex of the system. 
Nearly all adult m e n formed part of the army, and therefore belonged 
to regiments. These regiments lived in regimental towns. Married members 
of a regiment were allowed to live in the regimental town with their wives 
and servants. They constituted a kind of reserve force that could be called 
up in an emergency. Sons were enrolled in the same regiments as their 
fathers. Thus , instead of youths being recruited into a single regiment from 
all the communities forming part of the state (as was the case a m o n g the 
Sotho-Tswana), membership of a regimental town became hereditary. 
Occasionally, when population growth warranted it, Mzilikazi would select 
youths from the various regimental towns to form a new regiment which 
would be placed under its o w n induna w h o would then be permitted to build 
a new regimental town. Each regimental town was under the supervision of 
both its induna and one of Mizilikazi's queens. 
It is essential to note, however, that while the regimental system operated 
in this manner for the purpose of absorbing the youth, not all the conquered 
people lived in the regimental towns. There were ordinary villages of 
conquered persons leading their traditional life styles in the midst of the 
whole Ndebele kingdom. But these were generally attached to regimental 
towns. 
Finally, in the Ndebele kingdom Mzilikazi himself was the focus of all 
political power. H e appointed all the indunas or headmen of villages and 
received detailed reports from them. Mzilikazi travelled frequently a m o n g 
the various regimental towns and m a d e surprise visits in order to inspect 
65. H . Kuper, quoted in T . R . H . Davenport, 1978, p. 45. 
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the progress of affairs in the satellite towns. Within a relatively short time 
he had built a well-founded kingdom, in which conquered peoples - some 
only associated with the state rather than being an integral part of it - had 
embraced the Ndebele language and culture. O n the other hand, the 
Ndebele also became devotees of the Shona Mwar i /Ml imo religion char-
acterized by an oracular priesthood or spirit mediums. 6 8 
The Sotho 
T h e kingdom of Lesotho was another new state born out of the turmoil of 
the Mfecane. It was welded together out of a series of small autonomous 
Sotho-speaking communities that were scattered widely over the plains 
stretching north and west of the Drakensberg Mountains. Most of these 
communities comprised several clans and lineages belonging to K w e n a and 
Fokeng groups of Sotho—Tswana societies. 
T h e internecine wars unleashed by the campaigns of the Hlubi and 
N g w a n e against these Sotho-speaking communities of the Transorangian 
highveld provided a suitable outlet for Moshoeshoe's talent for leadership 
and organization. Moshoeshoe was the son of a comparatively obscure 
chieftain of the small Mokoteli clan, a junior branch of one of the K w e n a 
chiefdoms in the region. Recorded tradition attributes some of M o -
shoeshoe's achievement to the tutelage and influence of an eminent 'phil-
osopher king' of the Sotho world, one Mohlomi , ruler of the Monaheng , 
another branch of the K w e n a confederacy of chiefdoms on the highveld. 
Mohlomi's wisdom and reputation as a rainmaker had earned him tremen-
dous respect among the Sotho-speaking states of Transorangia. His exten-
sive travels among them, and the numerous diplomatic marriages he 
contracted with the daughters of m a n y of the rulers, are considered by 
some to have prepared the way for the subsequent unification of these 
states by Moshoeshoe.69 
It is possible, however, to exaggerate the influence of the wise Mohlomi 
on Moshoeshoe's character and achievement. It should be readily recog-
nized that Moshoeshoe was himself endowed with unmistakable leadership 
qualities. First noticed in the initiatives he took among his age-mates 
during their initiation, these qualities n o w came to be clearly demonstrated 
when the incursions of the Hlubi and N g w a n e resulted in a general collapse 
of most of the Sotho chiefdoms in Transorangia.70 Early in his career, 
Moshoeshoe perceived the defensive potential of flat-topped mountains. 
H e accordingly established himself, his family, and some of his age-mates 
on such a mountain fortress, Butha-Buthe mountain, and fortified the 
68. ibid.; A . J . Wills, 1967, p. 155. 
69. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p. 99; D . F . Ellenberger, 1912. 
70. L . T h o m p s o n , 1969b, p. 399. 
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narrow passes giving access to the summit with stone walls punctuated by 
lookout huts situated at vantage points.71 
Using this mountain fortress as a base, Moshoeshoe was able to mount 
raids against some of his neighbours, as well as to defend his people against 
the Tlokwa of Mma-Nthatisi w h o m he defeated at the 'Battle of the Pots'. 
But when the Tlokwa returned in 1824 and laid a prolonged siege on 
Butha-Buthe mountain, the stubborn resistance of Moshoeshoe's people 
nearly collapsed from exhaustion and starvation. They were rescued by the 
appearance of an N g w a n e army72 that attacked the Tlokwa, causing them 
to abandon the siege. Later that year Moshoeshoe moved his people 
southward through cannibal-infested country73 to a new mountain fortress 
that had been earlier identified by his scouts. This new mountain fortress, 
called Thaba Bosiu, on the Little Galedon river, was easier to defend. 
Moshoeshoe, his father and some of his closest followers built their houses 
on the summit of this flat-topped mountain - about 500 ha in extent with 
good grazing 'and a fair supply of perennial spring water'.74 Considerable 
work was done to fortify the various approaches to Thaba Bosiu.75 
Feeling secure on his well-nigh impregnable mountain, Moshoeshoe 
n o w concentrated on the task of building a new nation out of the remnants of 
m a n y broken peoples. H e quickly subdued N o n e , chief of the Bamantsane, 
w h o m he found in occupation of the land around Thaba Bosiu. Meanwhile, 
several groups — Sotho and Nguni - came to Moshoeshoe to seek refuge 
under his rule. H e placed some under the supervision of his brothers, later 
also under his sons. Larger groups such as the Baphuthi under Moorosi, 
the Bataung under Moletsane, and the Barolong under Moroka, he allowed 
to remain under the local administration of their o w n traditional rulers as 
long as they recognized his paramountcy. 
In dealing with the threat of powerful and dangerous neighbours, M o -
shoeshoe employed the tactic of cultivating their friendship by sending 
them tribute. Thus he protected himself from the attacks of A m a - N g w a n e 
by paying tribute regularly to Matiwane. At the same time he sent a tribute 
of blue crane feathers to Shaka. Ultimately, the Basotho became alarmed 
at the possibility of the N g w a n e remaining in the vicinity indefinitely. At 
Moshoeshoe's instance, therefore, the N g w a n e were attacked by a Zulu 
army in 1827 and severely mauled, but not driven out of the area of 
Transorangia. In retaliation, Matiwane's N g w a n e attacked Moshoeshoe on 
his mountain stronghold of Thaba Bosiu in July 1827, but they were beaten 
and driven back.76 T h e defeat of the much-dreaded N g w a n e of Matiwane 
spread Moshoeshoe's fame far and wide. Most of the N g w a n e went into 
71. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 100-1. 
72. ibid., p. 101. 
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the present-day Transkei and were defeated at M b o l o m p o . M o r e broken 
groups n o w flocked to Moshoeshoe. His victory over the N g w a n e had 
demonstrated the wisdom of his choice of Thaba Bosiu as capital. 
T o add to his reputation, Moshoeshoe sent armies in association with 
the Baung of Moletsane against groups like the T h e m b u to raid for 
cattle. In a counter-attack, Moshoeshoe's people beat off the invasion by 
Sekonyela's regiments and put an end for quite a while to Tlokwa harass-
ment. Another test of the strength of Moshoeshoe's mountain capital was 
administered by Ndebele regiments sent into Transorangia on a punitive 
expedition against Moletsane and his Taung.7 7 T h e Ndebele army entered 
Lesotho and attempted to storm Thaba Bosiu. They were beaten back and 
forced to withdraw. Diplomatically, Moshoeshoe sent the retreating army 
a small herd of slaughter cattle as a gift, begging for peace and saying he 
was convinced that starvation must have driven them to attack him. T h e 
Ndebele went away with tremendous respect for the great mountain king, 
and never returned to attack him again.78 Once more, the success of. 
Moshoeshoe's defensive tactics against such a redoubtable foe as the 
Ndebele reverberated throughout the Sotho-speaking world. This success 
enormously increased Moshoeshoe's prestige. It also clearly demonstrated 
his defensive strategy, namely to fight his powerful enemies when necessary 
and to conciliate wherever possible.79 
N o sooner had the Ndebele danger receded than Moshoeshoe's kingdom 
had to face a new scourge. This appeared in the form of a series of attacks 
on Sotho villages by bands of mounted and armed raiders. These Griqua 
and Koranna banditti had started harrying the Basotho early in 1830. Their 
attacks n o w became frequent and more alarming. T h e intensive wars in 
Transorangia had weakened and impoverished most of the states in the 
region. Moshoeshoe's kingdom was a striking exception especially in terms 
of the number of cattle held by the Basotho. Griqua and Koranna raiders 
descended on their villages and herds with lightning speed. They attacked 
in small companies, but being mounted they enjoyed superior mobility. 
They were also armed with muskets of greater range than any kind of 
throwing spear. They were good shots and specialized in sudden attacks 
on their victims. T h e Basotho responded by organizing counter-ambushes 
and night raids on the camps of the Griqua and Koranna bandits. They 
killed the people and captured their horses and guns. In time, the Basotho 
bred an indigenous horse, the 'Basotho pony' and turned themselves into 
'a nation of mounted gunmen'.8 0 This was a tremendous development in 
defensive nation-building. 
Through a Christian Griqua m a n , A d a m Krotz, Moshoeshoe m a d e 
77. E . Casalis, 1861, pp. 22-4; L . Thompson, 1969b, p. 400. 
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79. G . Tylden, 1950, pp. 8-10; L . Thompson, 1969b, p. 400. 
80. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p. 104. 
"3 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
contact with white missionaries. In 1833 he sent cattle to the Philippolis 
mission station 'to buy missionary'. His request coincided with the arrival 
of a small party of French missionaries whose hopes to start work a m o n g 
the Bahurutshe were frustrated by news of Mzilikazi's harassment of 
the Bahurutshe and other neighbouring Tswana peoples.81 These French 
missionaries were persuaded that it was providential that they should 
instead commence their labours among the Basotho of Moshoeshoe. H e 
settled them at Makhoarane, which the missionaries named Morija. Other 
mission stations were opened shortly at Beersheba and Mekuatling. 
Missionaries were brought into the Sotho kingdom as a defensive move . 
They were supposed to help Moshoeshoe defend his kingdom by offering 
him the best advice, and by assisting him to acquire firearms as well as 
establish contact with powerful white governments with w h o m Moshoeshoe 
could establish ties of friendship and alliance. 
T h e effect of Moshoeshoe's nation-building technique could be seen in 
the accretion to his kingdom of several groups dislodged from their o w n 
h o m e areas by the disturbed conditions of the Mfecane. T h e Batlhaping 
under Lepui came to settle under French missionaries at Bethulie mission 
station. In 1836 the Bataung of Moletsane came to live at Beersheba before 
migrating two years later to Mekuatling, while in 1833 the Barolong of 
Moroka were allowed to live at Thaba N c h u with their Wesleyan mission-
aries. Subsequently T h e m b u immigrants fleeing from the effects of the 
Sixth Frontier W a r sought the protection of Moshoeshoe. 
T h e 1830s saw the intensification of Boer encroachment on Sotho-
occupied territory. This reached its peak after 1836, the year of the Boer 
exodus commonly referred to as 'The Great Trek'. Numerous clashes 
ensued between the encroaching Boer and dispossessed Basotho farmers. 
While some of the conflicts were the result of disputes over land, others 
were the result of counter-claims to cattle ownership, and differences over 
labour questions. T h e frequency and the growing intensity of these conflicts 
drew forth the reluctant intervention of the British government which, after 
attempting two abortive solutions,82 threw in the sponge by recognizing an 
independent Boer republic in the heart of Moshoeshoe's country. T o add 
insult to injury, the Bloemfontein Convention, by which Great Britain 
legitimized Boer expropriation of Sotho territory, included as one of its 
provisions an article that banned the sale of arms and ammunition to the 
Basotho and other black states while the Boers themselves could freely 
purchase such requirements. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the Orange Free State republic 
embarked upon an aggressive expansionist foreign policy that threatened 
81. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966. 
82. Such solutions were the Treaty System of 1843-5, a s P a r t °f which a treaty 
was signed with Moshoeshoe in 1845; and the creation of a Boer enclave under British 
administration entitled Orange River Sovereignty in 1848. 
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to undo all the work of Moshoeshoe and, in its desperate bid to reach the 
sea at Port St Johns,83 annihilate the very kingdom of Lesotho. T h e Basotho 
had to fight two wars in 1858 and 1865 against the Orange Free State 
before their country was taken over on behalf of Her Majesty's Government 
by Governor Wodehouse. 
Moshoeshoe's plea for the annexation of his country by the Queen's 
government was a defensive m o v e in the preservation of the nation that he 
had worked so hard to build. It was done to prevent the incorporation of 
his kingdom into the Boer republic of the Orange Free State. By the time 
Moshoeshoe died in March 1870 he had not only saved his kingdom from 
disintegration, he had also created the basis for an independent state that 
has survived to the present. 
The Kololo 
T h e Kololo were Bafokeng of the Patsa branch. Before the outbreak of the 
Mfecane they lived near Kurutlele mountain on the left bank of the Vet 
(Tikoane) river. Their neighbours were the Bataung of Moletsane.84 A 
sudden attack upon them by the Mma-Nthatisi Tlokwa, and the capture 
of nearly all their stock, uprooted these Fokeng Patsa. They fled poverty-
stricken across the Vaal river where their numbers were increased by the 
accretion of another and larger group of Bafokeng.85 M a n y small Sotho 
communities, fleeing from the wars of the Hlubi and N g w a n e , had crossed 
the Vaal river and left the area of Transorangia. Sebetwane, a prince of the 
Patsa house, n o w took over the leadership of the combined Fokeng group. 
Sebetwane's followers wandered extensively in search of a new h o m e , 
and cattle to replace their lost herds. Their travels took them westwards 
towards the country of the Batlhaping. In that area they encountered two 
other dislodged and wandering groups, the Baphuting and the Bahlakwana. 
After an initial skirmish between the Fokeng and Phuting, the three groups 
subsequently joined forces in a combined attack on the Tlhaping capital 
of Dithakong on 26 June 1823.86 Robert Moffat, an agent of the London 
Missionary Society w h o had been resident at K u r u m a n among the Batlhap-
ing, procured the assistance of the pro-missionary Griqua captains at 
Griquatown, and the co-operation of other half-caste leaders at nearby 
centres. A mounted force of one-hundred g u n m e n was quickly assembled 
and despatched to help defend Dithakong. 
O n the day of the battle the invaders were heavily defeated and driven 
back with great slaughter. T h e y were put to flight by the guns of the 
83. G . Tylden, 1950; D . Ellenberger, 1912, p. 306. 
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Griqua horsemen.87 After this disastrous defeat at the battle of Dithakong 
the mixed horde broke up. T h e Phuthing and Hlakoane moved in an 
easterly direction,88 while Sebetwane led his followers, n o w renamed M a k -
ololo, northwards through the country of the Barolong. 
In his campaigns against the various sections of the Barolong, Sebetwane 
is said to have teamed up with that veteran raider Moletsane, chief of the 
Baung.89 They extended their campaigns to the Hurutshe where they 
sacked and destroyed the Hurutshe capital, Kaditshwene (Kureechane), 
scattered the inhabitants, and slew the regent Diutlwileng. Next, these two 
allied groups fought the Kgatla-Kgafela near the confluence of the Api and 
Crocodile rivers,90 but their campaigns in that neighbourhood drew forth 
the attack of Mzilikazi's army upon them, presumably because they had 
encroached upon what the Ndebele considered their o w n sphere of oper-
ations.91 Sebetwane and Moletsane n o w separated, the latter moving south 
towards Matlwase (Makassie).92 
T h e Makololo n o w went on to attack the larger section of the divided 
K w e n a kingdom at Borithe, under Moruakgomo. T h e Bakwera had been 
weakened by dynastic strife and split into three sections.93 Subsequently 
Sebetwane turned upon the Bangwaketse, w h o were the strongest of the 
Tswana states in the region. They defeated them at Iosabanyana in 1824, 
where their old fighter king, Makaba II, was also slain. Sebetwane fell 
upon the K w e n a once more, flushed out remaining pockets of resistance 
from the fastnesses of Dithejwane, and captured large numbers of cattle. 
H e then settled d o w n at Dithubaruba, the former K w e n a capital, in what 
seemed to have been intended as a permanent, or at least a prolonged 
settlement. But the following year, 1826, a skilfully executed surprise attack 
by the Ngwaketse king, Sebego, son of the late Makaba II, defeated 
Sebetwane and expelled him from the Dithejwane Hills with m u c h loss of 
life and nearly all the cattle the Kololo had.94 
Once more Sebetwane and his poverty-stricken Kololo followers were 
forced to set out on their travels. In their northward wanderings, they 
twice fought with the Ngwato under Kgari, defeating them and relieving 
them of m u c h of their cattle. But on their journey to Lake Ngami , they 
lost their way in the desert and were forced to abandon m a n y of the Ngwato 
cattle.95 But once they reached the country of the Batawana in the vicinity 
87. R . Moffat and M . Moffat, 1951, pp. 87-8, 91-7. 
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of Lake Ngami , they easily defeated the inhabitants and dispossessed them 
of their stock.96 
Sebetwane n o w attempted to cross the Kalahari Desert in order to reach 
the west coast. Defeated by desert conditions and by the stiff resistance of 
some desert communities,97 he was forced to return to Lake N g a m i . Moving 
northwards he once more fought and defeated the Batawana and took over 
their new town and their government. T h e Tawana later broke away and 
returned to their original h o m e near Lake Ngami . 9 8 After an arduous 
journey the Makololo settled near the confluence of the Zambezi and the 
Kafue rivers. T h e y had hardly settled before they had to fight back 
invasions from Nguni regiments. O n e was from Nqaba , the leader of the 
M s e n e Nguni. T h e other two were attacks by Mzilikazi's Ndebele, w h o 
had also been wandering along the Zambezi river in search of a new h o m e . 
Sebetwane and his Kololo succeeded in warding off all those invasions. 
But the experience persuaded them to move their settlement further west 
on the Kafue plateau. As was the case among the K w e n a , in the land of 
the Tswana, Sebetwane's triumph over the Lozi was facilitated by the 
civil strife then raging in that kingdom because of a succession dispute. 
Sebetwane conquered the Lozi, except for a small group that fled into exile 
under the leadership of some members of the royal family.99 
Having successfully disposed of the Ndebele threat, Sebetwane n o w 
settled down to consolidate his n e w kingdom. His military prowess, d e m -
onstrated in the manner in which he handled the Nguni and, particularly, 
the Ndebele invasions, tremendously increased his prestige and presented 
him in the eyes of m a n y communities of the area as a leader worth following. 
Under Sebetwane's rule the Kololo state flourished significantly. H e 
tackled the challenge of building national unity with vigour and imagin-
ation. H e fostered unity by taking wives from among the Lozi as well as 
the other conquered peoples, and encouraged his closest Kololo followers 
to do the same. Sebetwane insisted that all the subjects in his state were 
the children of the king. Sebetwane retained m a n y Lozi chiefs in their 
offices and replaced royals w h o had fled with new Lozi functionaries. S o m e 
Lozi chiefs were co-opted onto Sebetwane's council and were regularly 
consulted by him.100 
Sebetwane did not impose the Sotho age-mate initiation on the Lozi or 
any of his other conquered subjects. But he saw to it that the Kololo 
language was spoken throughout his kingdom. H e respected the Lozi 
political system and did not replace it, but he allowed it where possible to 
exist side by side with the n e w Kololo system until the two grew into each 
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other and merged. However, socially and politically the Kololo figured as 
a ruling aristocracy. Sebetwane pioneered an original system of local 
administration whereby villages were grouped into 'provinces' or, at least, 
'districts'. Kololo functionaries were placed in charge of such administrative 
units to administer and collect tribute from the subject peoples. Part of the 
tribute was appropriated by the king and part was distributed. In every 
village Sebetwane placed at least two Kololo families as lords of the land.101 
Whereas Lozi tradition and religion had required the king to seclude 
himself from the people, Sebetwane made himself accessible to all his 
people, irrespective of social, political or economic status. In this way he 
not only proved to be truly the father of all his people but, what was more, 
he fundamentally changed the character of Lozi kingship. W h e n he died 
in July 1851 most of his subjects, including the Lozi, had come to regard 
themselves as Makololo. H e was succeeded by Sekeletu. 
Lozi royals like Masiku and Sepopa, w h o had fled up the Leambye river 
w h e n Sebetwane conquered the Lozi state, had only maintained there a 
kind of government in exile and worked hard to keep the flame of Lozi 
'nationalism' flickering steadily. Sekeletu's iron yoke served only to fan 
this smouldering fire into a roaring blaze. His death in 1864, and the even 
greater cruelty of his successors, provided the signal for Lozi rebellion. 
Sepopa led an army against the Makololo. It was joined by people on the 
plain and on the Toka plateau. T h e Kololo were defeated, their rule 
overthrown and the Lozi dynasty was restored.102 
O n his journeys to Angola and down the Zambezi, Livingstone had 
recruited Kololo porters. W h e n he returned the majority to their h o m e 
country in i860 some sixteen of them remained behind in the Shire valley. 
They had married local w o m e n and wished to build their homes there. 
These young m e n possessed guns, and had also acquired m u c h experience 
of Kololo methods of military and political organization. They were gen-
erally imbued with pride in the achievements of the Kololo state. T h e y 
organized the Manganja peoples of the Shire valley into several chiefdoms 
of stockaded villages, and m a d e themselves rulers over them. At the time, 
the Manganja were subject to cruel and ravaging raids by slave-traders. 
These Kololo chiefdoms defended the Manganja against the Nguni, Yao 
and Portuguese slavers. T h e villages were later grouped into two kingdoms 
under Molokwa and Kasisi, the ablest of these leaders. They distributed 
other Kololo as chiefs over the local Manganja at strategic points in the 
valley. They welcomed the Livingstonia mission and co-operated with it. 
Ultimately the Kololo established cordial relations with the Yao , but the 
Nguni remained a problem. T h e influence of these Kololo chiefs of the 
Shire endured despite strong Nguni harassment until the colonial partition 
in the 1890s. 
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Trans-Zambezi Nguni states 
After the defeat of the N d w a n d w e at the battle of Mhlatuze, splinters of 
that confederacy were scattered in all directions. Zwangendaba and Nqaba 
(Nxaba) led their Nguni followers into southern Mozambique not far from 
Delagoa Bay, where Soshangane had preceded them, and was in the process 
of establishing his kingdom. In a three-cornered struggle for supremacy, 
Soshangane successively defeated both Zwide and Nqaba, forcing them 
out of the area. H e subsequently consolidated the organization of his 
kingdom at the expense of the local Tsonga peoples. 
Zwangendaba and his Jere Nguni followers crossed the Limpopo into 
Rozwi country, fighting most of the Shona states of the region, and in the 
process destroying the Changamire empire. Not far from the present city 
of Bulawayo, at Thaba Zika M a m b o , Zwangendaba's regiments engaged 
the Rozwi army, defeated them and killed the last M a m b o , Chirisamhuru. 
Zwangendaba then led his Nguni regiments across the Zambezi into Nsenga 
country. They crossed the Zambezi near Z u m b o on 20 November 1835.103 
Pressing northwards west of Lake Malawi, Zwangendaba's Nguni fought 
many wars against the Chewa and T u m b u k a communities, taking many 
captives and resting for a few years at one place before moving on. They 
continued their northward march until they reached M a p u p o on the Fipa 
plateau, between the northern end of Lake Malawi and the southern end 
of Lake Tanganyika.104 Their numbers had been immensely increased by 
fresh recruits from the many people they had defeated on their long 
journey. 
After Zwangendaba's death, in about 1848, his Nguni split into several 
factions. These engaged in separate campaigns of invasion against many 
states in the area. Their operations extended as far north as the southern 
shores of Lake Victoria and as far east as the Indian Ocean. From M o z a m -
bique, Nqaba also led his Msene Nguni into the area of present-day 
Zimbabwe. They emulated their Jere Nguni predecessors in the upheavals 
they created with their successive military campaigns against one group or 
another in the region. In a brief skirmish between Zwangendaba's Jere and 
Nqaba's Msene Nguni the latter had the upper hand. They subsequently 
moved in a westerly direction towards the country of the Lozi. There, in 
a battle against Sebetwane's Kololo, the Nguni of Nqaba were defeated 
and dispersed, and their leader was slain.105 
T h e Maseko Nguni, under their leader Ngwane , also migrated into 
Zimbabwe from Mozambique, crossing the Zambezi between Sena and 
Tete in 1839. Passing through southern Malawi and around the southern 
tip of Lake Malawi, the Maseko penetrated south-eastern Tanzania. There, 
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in the Songea district, they established a powerful state under M p u t a , the 
successor of N g w a n e . 1 0 6 
Conclusion 
In retrospect, it becomes clear that the Mfecane was the result of radical 
socio-political changes in most of the northern Nguni states. It was trig-
gered by a combination of population explosion and land shortage, as 
well as dendro-climatological changes that adversely affected the delicate 
ecological balance between the patterns of sweet and sourveld pastures on 
the one hand and the pressures on these by a steadily growing h u m a n and 
cattle population. This critical situation appears to have been exacerbated 
by the Madlathule drought, which seems to have intensified the intense 
struggle in that region for rapidly dwindling resources. There is an indi-
cation that the influence of and competition for a burgeoning trade in 
imported goods brought in through the port of Delagoa Bay m a y also have 
weighed more than scholars have hitherto been willing to consider. 
It is, however, equally clear that the impetus for these important changes 
that so immensely revolutionized the political and military organization 
of these Nguni states derived entirely from internal sources. T h e Zulu 
revolution was certainly not a result of the transplantation or wholesale 
adaptation to local conditions of ideas gleaned from external sources. But 
the Zulu successor states - Swazi, Gaza, Ndebele, and the various Nguni 
polities - all carried with them the essential features of the revolutionary 
Zulu state organization, namely, a formidable military machine based on 
the age-regiment system. In all these states the regimental system became 
the central or main institution used for the purpose of welding together 
disparate ethnic entities in the n e w states. 
T h e Sotho-type kingdoms like those of Moshoeshoe and, to a certain 
extent, Sebetwane, while they did make use of age-mate circumcision 
among their original core or founding groups, did not extend to or impose 
the system on newly incorporated communities, for the purpose of keeping 
the nation-state together. T h e y appear to have relied more on such devices 
as diplomatic marriages and proconsular-type supervision (whether by 
the traditional rulers of such incorporated states or by m e m b e r s of the 
conquering royal families), permitting considerable local autonomy and 
making use of extensive consultative mechanisms, whether direct or 
through individuals and councils. 
T h e Mfecane revolution brought about the genesis of n e w states in 
Southern, Central and East Africa. T h e Zulu kingdom rose out of the ashes 
of the Mthethwa and N d w a n d w e confederacies, as well as from the debris 
of numerous pre-Mfecane Nguni chiefdoms of the Zululand-Natal region. 
Today the Zulu kingdom survives as a truncated and considerably reduced 
106. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p. 73. 
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base for one of South Africa's Bantustans. T h e kingdoms of Swaziland and 
Lesotho have survived from the pre-colonial creations of Sobhuza and 
Moshoeshoe respectively as islands of sanity in a sea of racialism. Today 
they are respected members of the international comity of nations. M z i -
likazi's Ndebele kingdom survived for only half a century before suc-
cumbing to the wave of British chartered company colonization then 
sweeping whole regions of Southern and East Africa during the high point 
of European imperialist expansion. T h e Kololo kingdom of Sebetwane 
proved to be not m u c h more than a personal creation that disintegrated 
quickly in the hands of less capable successors. It therefore did not long 
survive the death of its founder. 
While the Mfecane created n e w polities, it also resulted in m a n y small 
states disappearing, some temporarily (e.g. the Batawana state of M o r e m i I 
and the Luyi (Lozi) kingdom) and others permanently, e.g. the Hlubi, 
N g w a n e , Mthethwa, N d w a n d w e , Zizi Bhele and numerous others. S o m e 
chiefdoms or states were broken into fragments and considerably weakened 
by the Mfecane. This happened particularly among the Tswana states. A 
few states in the heart of the Mfecane operational area emerged unscathed, 
and could even be said to have been strengthened by the turmoil of the 
Mfecane, e.g. the Pedi, Tlhaping and Tlharo. 
It seems possible to divide the Mfecane states into several categories. 
There were the aggressive militarist-offensive states. T h e Zulu, Ndebele 
and Gaza kingdoms appear to have been fairly good examples of this genre. 
T o this group m a y also be added the various Nguni states of the trans-
Zambezi region. These states, which employed the military machine to 
conquer and subdue others, tended also to rely on the edge of the sword 
or the barrel of the gun to maintain the allegiance of subordinate polities. 
Their expansionist or imperialistic policies required that they keep pro-
fessional or semi-professional armies on a permanent basis in 'barracks' or 
military villages. Regiments were required to embark on regular tax- or 
tribute-gathering expeditions at outlying parts of the kingdom. These 
armies were built on the age-regiments, which in the Ndebele and Zulu 
cases were the essential instruments for the absorption of conquered youths. 
T h e Gaza state did enrol conquered youths in age-regiments but kept these 
segregated from those of the 'Nguni' youths, even though the regimental 
leaders were drawn from the conquering ruling group. Thus in the Gaza 
state, the regiments did not contribute to building national unity. Because 
of the blatant discrimination against the 'ba-Tshangane', as the conquered 
Tsonga were called, they were not assimilated into the Gaza state. This, 
more than any other factor, accounted for the weakness of the Gaza 
conquest state and its ultimate collapse under the Portuguese onslaught. 
Conquest states tended to draw their state bureaucracies from commoner 
and military rather than royalist members . In the Ndebele state, regimental 
commanders not only supervised their regiments but also together with 
one of Mzilikazi's queens represented him in their regimental town. 
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Examples of Mfecane states building defensive nations were the king-
d o m s of Lesotho, Swazi and, to a certain extent, the Kololo. In these states, 
age-mate initiation, although practised, was not exploited as an instrument 
for incorporating youths from conquered communities. These states were 
not essentially militaristic or expansionist. T h e campaigns they fought were 
either considered defensive, or essential for defining or delimiting the 
geographical boundaries of the state, or imperative for acquiring wealth in 
cattle. T h e founders of these states put m u c h emphasis on strong defensible 
positions. Moshoeshoe built his capital on a flat-topped mountain (gho-
bosheane), Sobhuza located his capitals in inaccessible mountain areas, 
while Sebetwane chose the Kafue flood plain with its treacherous islands, 
a location that proved disastrous to unsuspecting enemies. 
These defensive kingdoms did not maintain standing armies. Initiation 
age-mates functioned as military units in times of war. T h e kings inter-
married extensively with their subjects to forge closer ties, especially with 
leading families, both in the core group and a m o n g the newly incorporated 
communities. Cattle were needed in order that they might be loaned 
out (the mafisa system) to favoured citizens or even whole chiefdoms. 
Consultation and local autonomy were m u c h used to keep the disparate 
elements happy. These defensive states also attracted missionaries and 
strove hard to acquire guns and ammunition for defensive purposes. Even 
the conquest states ultimately admitted missionaries. 
All these Mfecane states were founded on kinship as the basic social 
matrix on which the state was finally shaped. So was the institution of 
kingship. Both conquest and defensive states exploited the first-fruits 
ceremony as a ritual to stengthen the monarchy. With the evolution of the 
African state system of the Mfecane period the importance of kinship ties 
gradually gave way to service, functionality and territoriality. S o m e states, 
like the Kololo, insisted on a language policy for the whole kingdom. 
Others, like the Ndebele, did not impose a language policy but proficiency 
in the language of the rulers could be a golden key with which individuals 
could unlock doors to the corridors of power. Even after the Kololo 
kingdom had formally ceased to exist, the language and culture of the 
Kololo endured. In the Ndebele state, likewise, m a n y Kalanga and Shona 
became acculturated Ndebele. 
Finally it should be observed that the m a n y wars of the Mfecane period 
did considerably reduce African populations in, for instance, the areas of 
Natal and the Orange Free State. In a way the Mfecane could be said to 
have weakened m a n y African states and to have rendered them less prepared 
to cope with or withstand a second and more destructive Mfecane, namely 
that unleashed by the Boer farmers w h o n o w encroached upon African 
lands with impunity, seizing not only land but also cattle and children. 
T h e Mfecane also redistributed African populations in Southern Africa. 
It produced greater concentrations in certain places and left 'open spaces' 
in others. It also gave rise to a galaxy of talented leaders such as Shaka, 
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Mzilikazi, Sobhuza, Zwangendaba and Sebetwane. As Omer-Cooper cor-
rectly observed, these m e n 
demonstrated not only courage, powers of leadership and military 
skill but [also] the capacity for original thought and action; the ability 
to devise or adopt new institutions and n e w techniques to solve new 
problems; the statesmanship to rise above a narrow tribal point of 
view. T h e y demonstrated the capacity of the Bantu to respond to 
challenges and that the traditional tribal education had a far less 
cramping effect on the development of h u m a n personality than some 
have supposed.107 
107. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p. 180. 
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Introduction 
T h e rise of the Zulu nation under Shaka during the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century was followed by widespread wars and disturbances in 
Southern Africa. A m o n g the most affected were the Nguni-speaking and 
Sotho-speaking peoples of the region w h o still remember the destruction 
and the period during which it happened as Mfecane (Nguni) and Lifaqane/ 
Difaqane (Sotho).1 This movement, which rapidly spread beyond the 
region to as far north as the southern shores of Lake Victoria, was as 
significant to Southern Africa's subsequent historical developments as the 
spread of the reformist spirit among the Fulbe (Fulani, Peul) people and 
the accompanying djihàds which this spirit inspired were to historical 
developments in the Western Sudan during the same period. Like the 
Fulbe djihäds, the Mfecane transformed most Southern African societies 
in ways~no other movement had done since the start of the Iron Age in the 
region. This chapter analyses the impact of the Mfecane upon the Cape 
Colony.2 
T h e original area of the Mfecane was not the Cape but the country of 
the northern Nguni peoples in present-day Natal. It must be noted that 
although the outbreak of the Mfecane appears to have been a sudden 
occurrence, the fermentation causing the explosion was itself a long process 
building up over generations. T h e process entailed, among other things, 
the transformation of cattle-keeping and agricultural Nguni peoples from 
small polities based on the clan to larger states. T h e emergence of large-
scale states, it appears, was a result of the need to cope with an increasing 
shortage of pastures and agricultural land. By the end of the eighteenth 
century the process had resulted in the rise of the N d w a n d w e , N g w a n e , 
Mthethwa and other larger chiefdoms under powerful military leaders. In 
order to protect and promote the interests of their people, the leaders were 
i. W . G . A . Mears, 1970, p. 5 
2. Comprehensive studies of the Mfecane have been made by J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, 
1969; L . Thompson, 1969b; W . F . Lye, 1967. 
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extending control over the territories of weaker neighbours. Thus , by the 
mid-1820s, small chiefdoms could hardly maintain their independence and 
separate identities. 
The Cape Colony on the eve of the Mfecane 
Three things need to be done before w e look at the Cape Colony on the 
eve of the Mfecane. First, w e must provide a working definition of the 
Cape Colony. Then w e need to give a brief picture of the population 
distribution and the relationships between the various groups. Finally a 
word has to be said about the economic situation in the Colony. 
Defining the Cape Colony is rendered more difficult by the fact that the 
frontiers of the Colony were never static. T h e eastern boundary, especially, 
was notoriously fluid and unreliable.3 For example, while in 1771 it was 
roughly the Gamtoos river, eight years later in 1779 it had been moved 
further, to the Great Fish river, where it still remained on the eve of the 
Mfecane. T h e Great Fish river was, therefore, roughly the dividing line 
between the whites to the south and west and the blacks to the east and 
north of it. T h e majority of the Africans were people generally known 
collectively as Cape Nguni,4 also sometimes called southern Nguni,5 inhab-
iting the territory between the Keiskamma and the Umzimkulu . T h e Cape 
Nguni fell into three broad groups: the Xhosa, T h e m b u and M p o n d o . 6 
Robin Derricourt's broad classification includes the Mpondomise and the 
Bomvana among the main groups.7 T h e neighbours of the Cape Nguni 
were the Khoisan, most of w h o m were found west of the Kei river. 
In this chapter the Cape Colony will be defined to include the territory 
inhabited by the whites as well as that occupied by the Africans west of 
the Great Fish as far as the Umzimkulu . This definition has been justified 
by the socio-economic patterns and the nature of new relationships which 
emerged after, and as a result of, the Mfecane, as will be seen. 
O n the whole, the relationships between the various Nguni-speaking 
peoples were relatively peaceful. T h e same could be said about the relation-
ships between the Nguni and their Khoisan neighbours. This is not, 
however, to suggest that conflicts did not exist between the two groups or, 
for that matter, between the various Nguni peoples. For instance, N g u n i -
Khoisan clashes were frequent, especially in the area between the Upper 
3. It has been described elsewhere as the 'moving frontier'. See W . M . Freund, 1974. 
4. J.J. Van Warmelo, 1935, p. 60. 
5. The names 'Cape Nguni' and 'southern Nguni' are, in fact, geographical and are 
applied to the Nguni-speaking peoples whose homes were south of the Umzimkulu. The 
Nguni speakers, north of that river, are known as 'Natal Nguni' or, simply, 'northern 
Nguni'. 
6. J.J. Van Warmelo, 1935, p.60. 
7. R . Derricourt, 1974. 
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Kei and the Amathole to the north-west of the Transkei.8 Conflicts were 
usually sparked off by the stock-raiding activities of the San, which pro-
voked reprisal raids by the Nguni. It must be said, however, that such 
conflicts, whether between the Nguni and the Khoisan, or between Nguni 
chiefdoms, were usually fairly localized and controlled. 
T h e so-called eastern frontier of the Cape was, however, a zone of black-
white tension and often open conflict, and for this several factors were 
responsible. First, it must be borne in mind that for centuries Nguni-
speaking communities had been slowly moving south-westwards from the 
Natal area. O n the other hand white expansion in the opposite direction 
had been taking place since 1652, when Jan van Riebeeck founded a 
Dutch settlement at the Cape. T h e two movements were bound to clash 
somewhere. They clashed in what South African historiography used to 
refer to as 'Kaffir Wars' . 
Secondly, the Fish river, although recognized by the Cape government 
as the boundary, was often violated by the people w h o m it was meant to 
separate and keep apart. T h e colonists, especially cattle-farmers, violated 
it in search of grazing. T h e Africans, on the other hand, had never had 
any intention of recognizing, let alone respecting, this boundary, because 
when it was proclaimed by the Cape government m a n y Xhosa communities 
had long been established along the Fish river and to the west of it. T h e 
frontier zone was regarded by many Xhosa as part of their ancestral lands 
of which they had been deprived by the ever-expanding Colony. For this 
reason, therefore, m a n y Xhosa continued to graze and water their herds 
across the Fish and in defiance of the Cape government. Xhosa hunters 
also continued to hunt west of the Fish river. 
T h e third reason w h y the eastern boundary line continued to be a zone 
of black-white tension and violence was that the two racial groups were 
pursuing similar economic activities such as, for example, cattle-farming 
and agriculture, which were staple industries on either side of the frontier. 
Coupled with this were the conflicting land tenure systems. 
Finally, in the eighteenth century and up to the early nineteenth century, 
Nguni expansion south-westwards was necessitated by a real dilemma 
created by developments in northern Nguniland. These developments 
m a d e it impossible for Cape Nguni to expand north-eastwards. 
Because they formed the vanguard of the Cape Nguni's westward and 
southward expansion, the Xhosa automatically bore the brunt of black-
white conflict on the border. As a result the Xhosa have not only been by 
far the most written about, they have also been the most abused and the 
most hated of the Cape Nguni peoples of the region in Cape colonial 
historiography.9 
8. R . Derricourt, 1974, p. 49. 
9. In fact the Eastern Cape Frontier Wars are generally known as 'Kaffir Wars' in South 
African history books. T h e Xhosa were thought to be 'savages w h o only understood force 
126 
plate 6. i Dolls representing a San man and woman on sale in Cape Town, early nineteenth
century.
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As already said, the Xhosa, w h o did not recognize the Fish as a boundary, 
simply crossed it at will to graze their cattle and sheep. Such boundary 
'violations' were sometimes accompanied by cattle-rustling, to which the 
Cape colonists often responded with organized retaliatory raids into Xhosa 
areas, arguing that such action was necessary for them to retrieve their 
property. It was not unusual, however, for the activities of the colonial 
commandos to exceed the stated objectives. 
It is clear, therefore, that black-white relationships in the region were 
not peaceful on the eve of the Mfecane. W e should n o w turn to the 
economic situation of the Cape Colony on the eve of the Mfecane. 
Economic situation and prospects 
It must be noted that when the news of general unrest in Natal, the Caledon 
Valley area and the Highveld was received in the Cape Colony in 1822-3 
m a n y colonists had been there for just over two years. A m o n g these were 
British settlers w h o had been brought to the Cape in 1820 to boost the 
Colony's scanty and predominantly Dutch population. Most of these nearly 
5000 settlers had been sent to the new district of Albany where they held 
about 40 ha (100 acres) each. Although they m a y not have realized it, one 
of the main considerations for the establishment of the Albany settlement, 
as far as Governor Somerset was concerned, was that the settlers would 
assist with the defence and stabilization of the notorious Eastern Frontier. 
T h e Cape Colony's economic situation and prospects had never been 
bright. T h e dangerous military situation on the frontier was simply aggra-
vating the economic problems. T h e 1820 settlers were in a worse situation 
than the Dutch farmers living in the old districts of the Colony. B y 1823, 
there were already indications that agriculture, expected to be Albany's 
staple economic activity and the main source of livelihood, was going to 
be a huge flop. T o start with, m a n y of the n e w farmers were not qualified 
to do the work for which they had been brought to Africa. There was also 
a general complaint that the holdings were too small. T h e n came floods in 
1822 that destroyed all the crops. M a n y farmers had abandoned their land 
by 1823 and those that still held on had lost their original enthusiasm and 
were broken in spirit. With the small amounts of capital they had brought 
from Britain rapidly dwindling, m a n y were either heavily in debt to the 
government for rations or were facing destitution. Excessive drinking was 
on the increase as m a n y a broken heart sought to drown its worries and 
sorrows.10 
With just about a third of the original number of the farmers still on 
their plots in 1823 and facing formidable odds, the whole future of the 
and punishment'; C . W . D e Kiewiet, 1968, p. 51. T h e Xhosa were also thought to be 
incorrigible cattle thieves who should be fought; E . A . Walker, 1968, pp. 116-19. 
10. G . Butler, 1974, p. 176; E . A . Walker, 1968, p. 157. 
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Albany settlement as an agricultural venture was highly doubtful. As 
already pointed out, the rest of the farmers had abandoned their holdings, 
some opting for other forms of employment in urban centres, or setting 
themselves up as independent traders, and m a n y more taking to cattle-
farming. 
A m u c h more serious problem facing farmers in the old settlements and 
in the Albany District was shortage of unskilled labour. Even in this 
respect, however, the 1820 settlers were worse off than the old colonists. 
While old colonists could employ Xhosa, Khoisan or even slave labour, 
the 1820 settlers were not allowed any of these forms of labour.11 T h e 
farmers of 'Anglostan', as G . Butler called Albany, were expected to use 
free labour from Britain. However, most of such labourers brought from 
Britain had deserted their masters on arrival in South Africa and had gone 
to urban centres where prospects were thought to be brighter. Desperate 
efforts were being m a d e to encourage further migration to the Colony. O f 
those w h o responded to the call to migrate to the Cape Colony, most of 
them Irish workers, only a very insignificant trickle actually reached the 
Eastern Frontier Districts. M a n y bought their freedom on arrival at the 
Cape, and sought careers elsewhere. In the circumstances, therefore, the 
new settlers were compelled to rely on themselves, their wives and children 
to do 'the most menial tasks' normally reserved for labourers and slaves.12 
All these hardships were aggravated by the need for the farmers and all 
able-bodied people to go from time to time to the Eastern Frontier for 
defence duties. 
In an effort to alleviate the financial hardships of the distressed settler 
farmers, some people formed an organization k n o w n as the Society for the 
Relief of the Distressed Settlers to raise funds for them. T h e Society did 
raise money, so that by 1824 it could assist some farmers with m u c h -
needed capital. But, as already mentioned, no financial assistance could 
solve the two chronic problems vexing the Colony; labour shortage and 
the volatile situation of the Eastern Frontier. These problems had not yet 
been solved when , in about 1822-3 , t n e effects of the Mfecane reached the 
Cape Colony from across the Orange river and from Natal. 
The coming of the Mfecane 
T h e details of events in the northern Nguni territory, the Caledon valley 
area and the High veld do not concern us here.13 O f interest to this chapter 
is to see h o w the waves of events in Natal, the Caledon valley and the 
Highveld engulfed the Cape Nguni area and the Cape Colony proper. A n 
attempt will be m a d e to identify new social forms, relations between the 
various groups in the region, and any socio-economic patterns emerging 
11. ibid., p. 157. 
12. G . Butler, 1974, p. 178; G . M . Theal, 1891, pp. 238-9. 
13. Such details are the subject of Chapter 5, above. Also see Note 2 above. 
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various groups in the region, and any socio-economic patterns emerging 
as a result of the Mfecane. 
As already pointed out, the original centre of the Mfecane was in Natal 
among the northern Nguni-speakers. T h e exact causes of the Mfecane are 
not known. It would appear, however, that the population of this area had 
been steadily growing over the generations. Apparently this trend had, by 
contemporary methods of land use, led to overcrowding. In response to 
this apparent pressure on the land, new methods of political organization 
were tried. B y the last decades of the eighteenth century, a number of 
strong chiefdoms had emerged, the best known of which were those of the 
N d w a n d w e , the Ngwane , and the Mthethwa. Within the first two decades 
of the nineteenth century all these chiefdoms, including the Zulu, had 
been transformed into formidable military states under semi-monarchical 
leaders: Zwide, Sobhuza, Dingiswayo and Shaka respectively. 
H a d the new state system not been accompanied by a revolution in 
military methods and strategy, the tension and open violent conflicts 
characterizing relations among northern Nguni states from around 1815 
on would not have led to large-scale wars. It is also possible that without 
the efficient military strategy such as was employed later by the various 
northern Nguni armies and, especially by the Zulu, the waves of events 
would not have gone beyond northern Nguniland. 
As far as is known, the first major open conflict began in 1815 between 
Zwide's N d w a n d w e and Sobhuza's Ngwane . T h e Ngwane were defeated 
and forced to flee across the Phongolo (Pongola) river where they laid the 
foundations of the Swazi nation. According to J. D . Omer-Cooper this 
conflict marked the beginning of the Mfecane. With Sobhuza's departure, 
a conflict between Zwide and Dingiswayo was almost inevitable. Indeed, 
towards the end of 1817, the expected clash between the N d w a n d w e and 
the Mthethwa took place. Dingiswayo, king of the Mthethwa, was killed 
in this war, leaving his people demoralized, scattered and leaderless. 
T h e N d w a n d w e would have gained full victory and mastery over the 
whole territory between the Thukela (Tugela) and the Phongolo, following 
the fall of Dingiswayo, but for a new power which had been rising under 
Dingiswayo's patronage. This was Shaka, son of Senzangakhona, the chief 
of a then very insignificant Zulu group. As a youth, Shaka had been trained 
in one of Dingiswayo's Mthethwa regiments. Because of his intelligence 
and initiative he had been rapidly promoted to high ranks in the army. At 
the time of the clash between the N d w a n d w e and the Mthethwa not only 
was Shaka a high official in the Mthethwa army, he had also succeeded his 
father as chief of the small Zulu group, then under the Mthethwa. After 
the death of Dingiswayo at the hands of Zwide, Shaka and his Zulu 
emerged as the only centre of serious resistance against Zwide and his 
N d w a n d w e . Shaka prepared himself for a decisive showdown with Zwide 
by bringing under his control several chiefdoms including the n o w de-
moralized Mthethwa. H e also perfected his new military methods and 
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conscripted into his army all the youth w h o had reached the age to enter 
the initiation school. T h e initiation school had been abolished and re-
placed with military training for youths. 
T h e celebrated war with Zwide's N d w a n d w e came in 1818 and the 
N d w a n d w e were decisively defeated after a number of campaigns. O m e r -
Cooper has rightly described the defeat of the N d w a n d w e as a turning 
point in both Shaka's career and in the history of the Mfecane.14 With no 
serious opposition in the northern Nguni territory, Shaka continued the 
campaigns of building his Zulu military state. T h e chief vehicle of Zulu 
expansion was military conquest and the incorporation of defeated chief-
doms into the Zulu nation. M a n y smaller chiefdoms were brought under 
Zulu rule. But many more also managed to avoid Shaka's clutches by 
fleeing their homes in the Natal region. Within a few years of the fall of 
Zwide in 1818, a welter of defeated and displaced chiefdoms, families and 
individuals had been forced to flee from their h o m e areas westwards across 
the Drakensberg onto the Highveld, where they set in motion waves of 
migrations as areas were devastated and homes and crops destroyed. Other 
displaced northern Nguni elements struck southwards across the Thukela 
and the Umzimkulu. B y 1822-3 t n e effect of the movement of insecure, 
hungry and destitute people from the north-east had reached Pondoland 
and Thembuland, striking terror and destruction wherever the fugitives 
went. B y 1823 Pondoland in particular was all excitement because of 
northern Nguni immigrants. T h e northern T h e m b u , under their chief, 
Ngoza, had settled there briefly before moving back to Zululand. In so-
called Nomansland, west of Pondoland, were Mdingi's Bhele w h o were 
later joined by the W u s h e and the Bhaca under Madikane. T h e n came the 
Zulu invasion of Pondoland in 1823-4. Although Faku very wisely 
restrained his people from attacking the Zulu, all the same the invaders 
drove away m a n y Pondo cattle. 
As reports of happenings in Pondoland reached the Cape colonists, 
among w h o m the northern Nguni refugees, wandering marauders and 
invaders were known as the 'Fetcane', the Cape Colony was also being 
entered from the north by groups of refugees. Unlike the so-called Fetcane, 
the refugees entering the Colony had lost their group cohesion and identity. 
Like the former, they were also destitute, demoralized, hungry and 
insecure. T h e 'Mantatees'15 or 'Bechuanas', as they were generally called, 
14. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, p. 33. 
15. T h e terms 'Mantatees' (also spelt 'Mantatis') and 'Fetcane', as used by white 
colonists, early writers and Cape government officials, need brief explanations. As used by 
these people, the terms apply to agents of the Mfecane. T h e name 'Mantatees' as used by 
people like Robert Moffat, for instance, collectively refers to such groups as the Phuthing, 
Hlakoana and Fokeng marauders w h o fell upon the Thlaping capital of Dithakong in 1823. 
Calling these people 'Mantatees' is, of course, misleading as these people had no connection 
with M m a Nthatisi, the Tlokoa chieftainess. Later the term was again misleadingly used 
to refer to Tswana- and Sotho-speaking refugees drifting into the Cape Colony from across 
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had run away from the Caledon valley area and Transorangia, after the 
invasions of the N g w a n e and the Hlubi and the devastating effects of the 
activities of the Tlokoa under their chieftainess, M m a Ntatisi. S o m e had 
come from as far north as the Vaal river and beyond, having been disturbed 
by the ever-expanding waves of the Mfecane. M a n y of the Tswana refugees 
had fled their areas in Botswana after the attack on the Tlhaping capital of 
Dithakong by the Phuting, Hlakoana and the Fokeng in 1823. 
T h e refugees poured into such districts as Graaff-Reinet and Albany. 
They were not a military threat as they were unarmed and without chiefs. 
All they were looking for was support and protection. 
T h e Cape's initial response, 1823-8 
T h e response of the Cape colonial government and that of the colonists to 
the influx of the refugees must be considered and understood against the 
background of the two most pressing needs of the Cape Colony on the eve 
of the Mfecane; border security and cheap labour. T h e question of labour, 
in particular, had m a d e m a n y prospective farmers decide to abandon 
agriculture and opt for other forms of employment. 
It soon became clear to the frightened and anxious farmers in the Graaff-
Reinet and Albany areas that the hundreds of so-called Mantatees and 
Bechuana (Tswana) drifting from across the Orange river were not likely 
to create security problems for them. If anything, their gentle and almost 
timid-looking faces, and the fact that most of them had lost their cohesion 
and group loyalty encouraged the colonists to think that the Sotho and 
Tswana refugees would m a k e 'docile and willing servants'16 and satisfy one 
of the Colony's most critical wants. This assumption was correct, as 
gradually the destructive effects of the Mfecane in the interior were proving 
to be extremely beneficial to the Cape Colony. Indeed, the governor decided 
in 1823 that the refugees should be apprenticed to interested colonists as 
labourers for a m i n i m u m period of seven years.17 T h e farmers in the Graaff-
Reinet and Albany districts in particular found the decision beneficial as 
they had not had any labourers. 
Contemporary opinion as to the quality of the Sotho and Tswana workers 
is not unanimous. In 1834, the Cape naturalist and explorer, D r Andrew 
Smith, found that some of the farmers had thought their servants 'low' 
and m a n y of them 'extremely covetous, nay even dishonest, and all very 
the Orange and the Caledon, especially after Dithakong. 'Fetcane' or 'Mfecane' on the 
other hand, if applied to people, generally referred to northern Nguni invaders, e.g. the 
Zulu and the Ngwane of Matiwane. See J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 93-6; W . G . A . 
Mears, 1970, pp. 5-13; L . Thompson, 1969b p. 393; G . Butler, 1974, p. 182; H . H . 
Dugmore, 1958, p. 44. 
16. See, for example, pictures (and captions) of two so-called Mantatees in G . Butler, 
1974, p. 228, also pp. 181-2. 
17. G . M . Theal, 1891, p. 240; G . Butler, 1974, p. 182; W . F. Lye (ed.), 1975, p. 20. 
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lazy'.18 O n the other hand, another explorer, George T h o m p s o n , found 
that 'the distribution of some hundreds of refugee Mantatees among the 
most reputable families, as servants and herdsmen' had proved a 'great 
advantage'.19 Thompson's view does not however differ from Andrew 
Smith's independent opinion and observation, that in spite of what the 
farmers said about their servants, the presence of the Sotho and Tswana 
in the Colony was 'desirable inasmuch as they . . . supplied the deficiency 
of servants created by the circumstances of the Hottentots having of late 
years preferred other vocations to the service of the farmers'.20 In fact, 
most Khoi people of the Cape had either drifted to urban centres or were 
living under the protection of Christian missions to avoid the humiliation 
of having to work for the people w h o had grabbed their ancestral lands. 
It is not possible to give exact figures of Tswana-Sotho destitutes w h o 
were given temporary asylum in the Cape Colony. Possibly, w e are speaking 
in terms of several hundreds, if not thousands. Moreover, the influx went 
on for as long as the disturbances in the interior continued, and it was not 
until the late 1820s that some Tswana and Sotho refugees began to return 
to their countries. T h e volume of returnees increased round about the mid-
18308 after peace and stability had been established by such rulers as 
Moshoeshoe, founder of the Sotho nation.21 T h e first five years of the 
Mfecane seem to have seen more refugees entering the Colony. George 
T h o m p s o n is reported to have said that there were 1000 Sotho and Tswana 
refugees in the Colony by 1826.22 This was about three years after the 
influx into the Colony started. 
Whatever numbers were involved, several points are indisputable. First, 
as already pointed out, the scourge of the peoples of Natal, the Caledon 
and the Orange valleys and the Highveld areas was, ironically, the blessing 
of the Cape Colony, bringing as it did cheap labour into an agricultural 
community that was on the point of collapse for lack of labour. T h e timely 
arrival of this source of labour gave a fresh impulse to the agricultural 
industry of the Colony's Eastern Districts. Secondly, the influx of refugees 
was bound to generate socio-economic patterns that were to alter the 
character of the Colony. For instance, it is said that in Albany and Graaff-
Reinet the 'all-white phase' of the settlements, during which white farmers, 
their wives and children had been compelled to do the most menial tasks, 
was ended by the arrival of African labourers. This change, w e are told, 
had been completed by the late 1820s.23 T h e change undermined one of 
the fundamental principles underlying the founding of 'Anglostan' or 
Albany, that of white settler self-reliance. F r o m then on, the importance 
18. W . F . Lye (ed.), 1975, p. 21. 
19. Quoted in G . Butler, 1974, p . 182. 
20. W . F . Lye (ed.) 1975, p. 21 
21. W . F . Lye, 1969, p. 203. 
22. ibid., pp. 202-3, citing G . T h o m p s o n . 
23. G . Butler, 1974, p. 181. 
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of black labour in the Colony's economic development was very firmly 
entrenched. 
T h e third indisputable point about the Tswana-Sotho influx into the 
Colony is that it m a d e cheap labour more readily available. This in 
turn undermined a second principle of the Albany and GraafF-Reinet 
settlements: that of intensive farming. For instance, partly because of 
pressure from the farmers for more land, and partly because of the avail-
ability of cheap labour, the ioo-acre farms were extended into larger 
holdings in 1825.24 
For their part, the Tswana and the Sotho also benefited from the 
temporary sojourn in the Colony. First, they were allowed to establish 
homes on their employers' property. Secondly, according to the terms of 
their 'apprenticeship', they were to be remunerated in animals and other 
such valuables.25 In this way m a n y of them acquired personal property 
that they were allowed to take back to their countries. 
T h e presence of Sotho and Tswana in the Cape Colony did not, however, 
solve the other pressing want of the Colony. It did not in any way change 
the nature of the relationships between the colonists and their southern 
Nguni neighbours. Tension, open conflict on the border, cattle-lifting, 
retaliatory c o m m a n d o raids all continued. 
This picture of black-white relationships in the Colony, however, must 
be qualified lest the reader is left with the impression that no areas of 
peaceful intercourse existed. There was, in spite of disputes and fights over 
grazing and hunting rights, a desire by both black and white for the 
promotion of commercial relations, because each of the groups had access 
to certain things that the other did not have. For example, the Xhosa had 
ivory, horns, hides, beef and g u m for which there was a high demand from 
the colonial traders. T h e Xhosa needed copper, beads, buttons, guns, 
gunpowder and spiritous liquors, especially brandy, which only the colonial 
traders could supply. T h u s , in spite of the hostilities between the Africans 
and the colonists, a system of barter existed. N o form of control, military 
or legislative, could stop this. In fact, ever since the meeting of black and 
white on the Eastern Frontier, commercial intercourse had continued 
between them, and in defiance of government policy. Strict government 
control of the border only succeeded in encouraging co-operation between 
black and white in a system of smuggling. 
Indeed, it was because of the flourishing smuggling business that the 
Acting Governor, Sir Rufane Donkin, decided in 1821 to regularize c o m -
mercial relationships between the Colony and the Xhosa.26 His idea was that 
a regularly held fair or even fairs should be instituted on the Ke i skamma. 
Although the Governor opposed the idea at first, he also later accepted the 
24. Farms were enlarged in 1825, according to G . M . Theal, 1891, p. 239. 
25. W . F . Lye (ed.), 1975. 
26. G . Butler, 1974, p. 197. 
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realities of the situation and a fair was established at Fort Willshire. T h e 
fair, which began as an annual occasion, quickly developed into a quarterly, 
a monthly and, by 1824, a weekly market,27 where scores of colonial traders 
and thousands of Xhosa traders met to exchange their wares. Male and 
female African traders travelled to Willshire from as far away as the area 
between the Keiskamma and the Kei rivers,28 bringing horns, ivory, hides, 
g u m and beef and taking back beads, buttons, brass wire, brandy and a 
variety of European manufactures. 
T h e Willshire fair must also be seen as a meeting point, and the 
market day as an occasion to allow experimentation with meaningful 
communication between black and white. Indeed, in the process of bar-
gaining everybody tried hard to m a k e himself understood by speaking the 
languages of trading partners. In Dugmore's words, 'strange KafFer was 
spoken . . . and strange Dutch and English too'.29 
T h e Willshire market was, however, a façade, although perhaps a necess-
ary one. It could not conceal the realities of black and white relationships. 
Indeed, it must be emphasized that Willshire itself was first and foremost 
a defence post on a violent frontier, with everything about it bearing 
testimony to this fact. T h e market day was permeated with a military 
atmosphere in that the 'motley throng of black, and white, and brown' 
was, to quote D u g m o r e again, varied by 'the red, green, and the blue 
uniforms of "Line", Rifles and Artillery'. 
N o matter h o w successful commercial intercourse between black and 
white was, it could therefore never persuade the Xhosa to forget the 
ancestral lands n o w in white colonial hands. Indeed, while black and white 
were busy trading at Willshire before the watchful eye of the law, far away 
in Xhosa-land illicit firearms trading was also flourishing between white 
smugglers and Xhosa buyers. T h e Xhosa were acquiring guns in prep-
aration for an armed confrontation between black and white that they knew 
was sure to erupt. In fact the war did come in 1834-5 a n ^ it was not the 
last one, nor was it the first. Yet another reminder of the violent realities 
of Xhosa-colonist relations was that just as commercial activities were 
going on at Willshire and in far-off Xhosa-land, lonely white travellers and 
European herdboys tending their parents' cattle were being killed by 
disgruntled Xhosa.3 0 
27. G . M . Theal, 1891, p. 237. 
28. H . H . Dugmore , 1958. 
29. In the course of hard bargaining Dutch- and English-speaking traders tried to 
express themselves in Xhosa while the Xhosa traders also tried to express themselves in 
the two European languages. 
30. For example, the sons of Garbett and Sloman, the Clay Pit victims, the Irish Party 
etc. were among victims of Xhosa anger. 
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External threat and black-white concerted response 
It is clear so far that up to 1828 the events of the Mfecane had not 
very seriously threatened the stability and equilibrium of black-white 
relationships in the Cape. As already seen, Tswana and Sotho refugees 
w h o drifted into the white section of the colony from 1823 on were soon 
absorbed into its economic life. In the north-east, Faku's M p o n d o had 
almost single-handedly prevented Shaka's regiments from advancing 
beyond Pondoland. 
This situation, however, changed in 1828. A different class of fugitives 
suddenly appeared in the trans-Kei part of the Cape and, unlike the Sotho 
and Tswana refugees, they struck terror among the T h e m b u and the 
neighbouring Xhosa of Hintsa. They were also different in that, unlike the 
Sotho and Tswana, they still retained their political cohesion, loyalty and 
military capability almost intact. These were the N g w a n e under Matiwane, 
a seasoned warrior w h o had already terrorized several states, including 
Moshoeshoe's Sotho. 
T h e Ngwane , w h o now included Hlubi elements, crossed the Orange 
river from Lesotho and entered Thembu-land some time between January 
and February 1828. Their arrival coincided with that of Shaka's regiments 
in Pondoland, an event that was already creating a great deal of sensation 
among colonists, T h e m b u and Xhosa. Thus the whole area from the 
Eastern Districts to the U m z i m v u b u in the north-east was buzzing with 
rumours about the 'Fetcane' or 'Mfecane',31 as the Zulu regiments were 
called.32 Shaka's regiments in Pondoland were trying to penetrate further 
south in a bid to open the way to the Cape, with which Shaka had wanted 
to establish diplomatic contacts. Although they were determined to fight 
any southern Nguni state that stood in their way, the Zulu were, however, 
under strict instructions to avoid clashes with the British. 
T o go back to the Ngwane . As soon as they entered T h e m b u country 
they were met by an advance party of Cape colonial forces which was under 
the impression that they were the Zulu. A skirmish ensued but its results 
were inconclusive. Preparations were made for a major and decisive battle, 
and for this Governor Somerset, Hintsa, the Gcaleka chief and Vusani, the 
T h e m b u chief, co-operated. A combined force of British troops, colonial 
burghers, Xhosa and T h e m b u regiments was mustered for the final show-
d o w n , which took place at M b h o l o m p o , where the N g w a n e were thoroughly 
defeated and m a n y were killed. S o m e of the survivors joined the T h e m b u 
and the Xhosa to increase the Mfengu element in these areas. Others fled 
back to Lesotho with Matiwane and were allowed to settle in Lesotho 
by Moshoeshoe I. However, homesickness compelled Matiwane and his 
31. See Note 15 above. 
32. Reports about Zulu presence were no idle rumours as a Zulu regiment was already 
advancing southwards through Pondoland. 
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followers to go back to Natal. O n his return, however, Matiwane was killed 
by Dingane, w h o had by that time succeeded Shaka as the Zulu ruler. 
T h e decisive defeat of the N g w a n e at M b h o l o m p o resulted in the 
effective elimination of one of the strongest and most destructive agents of 
the Mfecane. In fact, after M b h o l o m p o the Colony and the areas of the 
Xhosa and the T h e m b u were free from any serious external threat. It 
should also be noted that concerted action against Matiwane's N g w a n e 
meant the formation of a temporary alliance of the British, the Xhosa and 
the T h e m b u . This, of course, necessitated the suspension of British-Xhosa 
hostilities. 
N o w , while concerted action between Xhosa and T h e m b u is explicable, 
British involvement is not so easy to explain. W h a t then were the con-
siderations lying behind British involvement? Their territory was in no 
immediate danger of being invaded by the N g w a n e . Moreover, even if they 
were still under the impression that the invaders of T h e m b u country were 
Shaka's Zulu, Shaka had never given them any reason to fear an invasion 
from him. Did they perhaps fear that continued unrest in Thembu-land 
might spread to the Xhosa area and force desperate Xhosa to flee westwards 
into the Eastern Districts and thereby create a sensation among the farmers? 
O r , as has been suggested elsewhere, was British involvement a calculated 
gesture motivated by diplomatic considerations rather than by fears of an 
invasion? Such a view would suggest that it was thought in Cape govern-
ment and white settler circles that military assistance given to the Xhosa 
and the T h e m b u would make the Xhosa forget the ancestral lands in 
European hands and thereby contribute towards friendly black-white 
relationships. 
Whatever reasons there were for British involvement in the 'Fetcane' 
campaigns of 1828, one important point has to be mentioned. T h e fight 
against Matiwane is an example of one instance when black and white 
buried the hatchet to face a c o m m o n enemy. W e can only conclude that 
in spite of the tension and open conflicts that characterized Xhosa-settler 
relations there was in the Cape some stability and equilibrium which in 
1828 both black and white felt was being threatened by an external force 
and needed to be defended. 
The emergence of the Mfengu 
O n e of the most important and enduring results of the Mfecane was the 
emergence of new social units or political states as the displaced and 
scattered victims of the widespread disturbances regrouped themselves, 
often in n e w areas and different environments. In most cases, the new 
groups were m a d e up of diverse elements w h o , thanks to the leadership 
qualities of certain individuals, were brought together into identifiable 
polities. T h e Swazi, the Gaza and the Ndebele are good examples of such 
polities. M a n y survivors of the wars either joined such leaders to increase 
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the membership of the emerging political states or they were absorbed into 
already existing polities. That is how, for instance, Moshoeshoe built a big 
Basotho nation. 
M a n y more survivors drifted about, leaderless, insecure and destitute 
and, although they were welcomed by certain chiefs, were never completely 
assimilated by the host communities.33 Such were the diverse elements, 
mainly from Natal, w h o entered the Cape Nguni territory. They arrived 
in ones and in groups, large and small, some straight from the northern 
Nguni area and others via the Caledon valley area. Because they were 
destitute and hungry, their career was one of begging - ukufenguza — from 
which the name, amaMfengu (Fingo), was derived. It seems that the n a m e 
was given to them by their T h e m b u , Xhosa and M p o n d o hosts. This n a m e 
is therefore collectively applied to those refugees or immigrants from the 
northern Nguni territory, mainly though not exclusively, Hlubi, Bhele, 
N g w a n e and Zizi, w h o were given a new h o m e in the Cape Nguni area 
after having been displaced and scattered by the Mfecane.34 These fugitives 
began drifting into the Cape area almost at the start of wars in the northern 
Nguni area and the volume of immigrants increased during the period 
between 1822 and 1828. T h e defeat of Matiwane's N g w a n e in 1828, by a 
joint British-Xhosa and T h e m b u force, resulted in m a n y N g w a n e survivors 
joining the already growing Mfengu population in the Cape Nguni area. 
T h e response of the T h e m b u , Xhosa and M p o n d o rulers to the requests 
of the fugitives was positive. They received them kindly as subjects and 
provided their immediate wants such as land, food and cattle. According 
to custom, although the ownership of the cattle continued to rest with the 
host chiefs, the Mfengu settlers were entitled to the milk from the cows 
and they could use the cattle in any domestic tasks. 
Because most of the Mfengu were hard-working, m a n y of them were 
settled within a short time and they also raised property of their own . They 
produced enough food and even surplus for exchange. O n e of the things 
that the Mfengu were good at growing was tobacco, which they exchanged 
for livestock. They also participated in the frontier trade with the colonists 
and were very successful in this.35 
Although on the whole the Mfengu living in Pondoland and in T h e m -
buland seem to have been happy, and m a n y of them were soon integrated 
into the host communities, the Mfengu in the Xhosa area continued to feel 
discriminated against. For this reason, the process of integration in the 
Xhosa area was not successful. True, the Mfengu soon learnt to speak their 
hosts' language, though with an accent, but because they continued to see 
33. See eyewitness account by one of the participants, B . Bowker (1810-1907) in G . 
Butler, 1974, pp.252-4; also in H . H . Dugmore , 1958, p .4 and J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, 
p. 92. 
34. As a rule the definition does not include voluntary immigrants from Natal w h o 
settled in Cape Nguni territory after the Mfecane. See also, J.J. Van Warmelo, 1935, p. 65. 
35. J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside, 1962, p. 20. 
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themselves, and were also regarded by the Xhosa, as a separate group and 
as subject people, complete integration was never achieved. 
T h e failure of complete assimilation of the Mfengu to the Xhosa created 
hostile relations between the two groups and further complicated the 
already tense Xhosa-British relations. A s mentioned above, Xhosa-Mfengu 
relations were originally w a r m and would have promoted the integration 
of the Mfengu into the host society. However, the relations between the 
two began to sour and the Mfengu started to look for alternative and more 
favourable circumstances. W h a t exactly led to the souring of the relations 
between the Xhosa and Mfengu is not known, although it is clear that 
external forces exploited the failure of the integration process by exag-
gerating and perpetuating whatever cultural, political and economic differ-
ences existed between them. T h e most important of the divisive external 
factors were the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, the white settlers 
and the Cape Colony government. 
T h e Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society had been working a m o n g 
the Gcaleka Xhosa since July 1827, w h e n William S h a w was allowed by 
Hintsa to establish a mission in his area. Following the negotiation, a 
mission had been established at Butterworth, near Hintsa's capital, by 
W . J. Shrewsbury. T h o u g h not very enthusiastic about the mission, Hintsa 
protected it and Shrewsbury and his wife. H e also allowed the Mfengu to 
attend services.36 
T h e appearance of the Wesleyan missionaries on the scene at this time 
was bound to interfere with the processes of assimilation and integration 
that had been initiated by the settlement of the Mfengu in the Xhosa area. 
T h e attitude of the individual missionary to Mfengu grievances, real and/or 
imagined would be crucial. T h e Mfengu felt themselves discriminated 
against, politically oppressed and economically exploited by their Xhosa 
hosts. It was this ruler-subject relationship between the Xhosa and the 
Mfengu that was to be exaggerated into a 'master and slave relationship' 
by John Ayliff, Shrewsbury's successor, and later endorsed by Cape govern-
ment officials. This slavery myth, together with another one - that the 
Mfecane had completely destroyed the Mfengu as a military force — had a 
number of effects and implications for Xhosa-Mfengu relations according 
to R . A . Moyer. 3 7 First, they represented the Mfengu as pitiable objects 
deserving the sympathies of the Cape government, the missionaries and 
humanitarians. Secondly, because they exaggerated the military incapacity 
of the Mfengu and their 'oppression' by the Xhosa, the two myths m a d e 
both the missionaries and the government feel that they had an obligation 
to champion the rights of the Mfengu and to 'deliver' them from Xhosa 
'bondage'. Thirdly, the two myths seem to have been readily swallowed 
by the Mfengu, w h o continued to regard themselves as apart from the 
36. J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside, 1962, p . 20. 
37. R . A . Moyer, 1974. 
139 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the ¡88os 
Xhosa. For this reason, not only did they begin to see the missionaries, the 
government and the colonists as liberators but they also tended to identify 
their o w n interests, aspirations and hopes, fears and anxieties with those 
of the external groups. 
T h e external forces had their o w n ulterior motives in promoting the two 
myths, of course. T h e more the Mfengu saw themselves as oppressed 
and exploited, the more they would depend on the missionaries for the 
articulation of their case. T h e Mfengu would be expected to reciprocate 
missionary assistance by being more receptive to Christian teaching. T h e 
more the Mfengu saw themselves as being economically exploited by the 
Xhosa, the easier they would be to recruit as cheap farm labour. 
Even more serious still, as long as the Mfengu saw themselves as apart 
from the Xhosa and identified their interests and anxieties with those of 
the British colony, they were bound to physically m o v e away from the 
Xhosa and join the British colony at the earliest opportunity. This oppor-
tunity was eventually provided by the Sixth Frontier W a r (1834-5) when 
the Mfengu had to decide what position to adopt in a war that they at first 
regarded as a conflict between the British and the Xhosa. A meeting held 
immediately after the outbreak of the war resolved as follows: first that no 
Mfengu would take part in the invasion of the Colony; secondly, that as 
far as possible the Mfengu should defend and protect missionaries and 
traders; and, thirdly, that the Mfengu should act as British intelligence 
agents conveying security messages from John Ayliff to the British army 
commander, keeping him and his forces informed about the movements 
and intentions of the Xhosa forces. 
Indeed, from the beginning of the war in December 1834 to M a y 1835, 
when they left the Xhosa area to go and settle in British-controlled territory, 
the Mfengu had done a great deal of intelligence work for the British army 
and against the Xhosa. Not only did they convey messages between Ayliff 
and the army commander, they also reported the activities of the Gaika 
and Gcaleka Xhosa to Ayliff at Butterworth. Ayliff in turn kept the 
magistrate/civil commissioner at Grahamstown well posted about develop-
ments in the Xhosa area. Mfengu couriers regularly travelled the 240 k m 
between Grahamstown and Xhosa territory.38 Although most of the secret 
activities were done at night, Hintsa, the Gcaleka ruler, soon discovered 
them and was determined to end Mfengu treachery. 
Within weeks of the start of the war m a n y isolated white centres were 
destroyed by the Xhosa w h o also killed a number of farmers and traders. 
Governor Benjamin D ' U r b a n was compelled to go to the war zone to see 
for himself and to organize the defence of the British Colony. It was while 
the Governor was camping near Butterworth that Ayliff and his Mfengu 
proteges asked him to declare the Mfengu British subjects as a means of 
their 'deliverance' from Xhosa 'bondage'. T h e request was granted on 3 
38. J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside, 1962, pp. 23-4. 
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M a y 1835 and the Mfengu, not less than 16000 m e n , w o m e n and children 
with about 15000 cattle and m a n y thousands of goats all belonging to the 
Xhosa chiefs, left the Xhosa area escorted by British troops.39 T h e trek 
began on 9 M a y and it effectively ended the processes of assimilation and 
integration that had been in progress since the arrival of the Mfengu in 
the Xhosa area. T h e long trek ended on 14 M a y when every person and 
animal had crossed the Keiskamma into the 'promised land': the Peddie 
District set aside for the Mfengu by Governor D ' U r b a n . After the formal 
handing over of the land to the eight Mfengu chiefs, every m a n was 
required to vow that he would be faithful to G o d and loyal to the British 
king, and would co-operate with the missionaries by sending his children 
to them to be taught. T h e Mfengu would not forget the 'bondage' from 
which the Cape government and the missionaries had 'delivered' them. 
T h e evacuation of the Mfengu from the Xhosa area came in the middle 
of the Sixth Frontier W a r and, as already pointed out, it was conditional 
on the Mfengu carrying out certain undertakings. For instance, they were 
expected to assist the British against the Xhosa, which they did immediately 
after their arrival in the new land. About 500 Mfengu joined the British 
army and were largely responsible for dislodging the Xhosa from the 
Buffalo River valley, guarding all the crossings into the Colony, and 
retrieving stolen cattle from the Xhosa area. 
Another condition of their 'deliverance' was that they would provide 
cheap labour for the Colony, a very welcome idea, especially at the time 
w h e n m a n y Tswana and Sotho were returning to their countries, having 
completed their apprenticeship and seeing that peace was returning to their 
o w n countries.40 Regarding co-operation with the missionaries, the Mfengu 
were willing for their children to be taught by missionaries and m a n y adults 
themselves attended church services. 
Above all, the evacuation of the Mfengu from Xhosa territory had been 
calculated to weaken the Xhosa in future conflicts with the whites. T h e 
area in which the Mfengu were settled was conveniently selected to be a 
buffer zone between the Xhosa and the British Colony. 
Conclusion 
T h e Mfecane brought about military, political, social, economic and in 
some cases, even cultural changes to the peoples of the various parts of 
Africa which it affected. T h e severity or otherwise of the impact of the 
Mfecane depended very m u c h upon such factors as, for example, the agents 
of the movement and their objectives, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
local factors such as the military, the political and social conditions. 
A s w e have seen, three kinds of victims of the Mfecane entered the area 
39. ibid, pp. 28-9. 
40. See 17 above. 
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defined as the Cape Colony. These were the hungry and destitute refugees -
Sotho, Tswana and northern Nguni - w h o came in search of food, pro-
tection and support. Most of the Tswana and Sotho were apprenticed to 
the colonial farmers, while Natal Nguni fugitives were offered protection 
and food by the Xhosa, T h e m b u and M p o n d o rulers. T h e second kind 
were Shaka's Zulu regiments, which invaded Pondoland but, because of 
M p o n d o resistance, could not penetrate it. T h e third were people other 
than the Zulu w h o were equally strong and destructive, such as the 
Northern T h e m b u of Ngoza and Matiwane's N g w a n e . Ngoza's T h e m b u 
entered Pondoland in 1822-3 but, like the Zulu after them, did not get 
beyond the U m z i m v u b u , again because of M p o n d o resistance. 
T h e only serious force that seems to have gone further south was the 
N g w a n e of Matiwane, w h o created such a sensation in the whole area 
from the U m z i m v u b u to the Gamtoos when they suddenly appeared in 
Thembuland from Lesotho. Because they were mistaken for Shaka's Zulu, 
and because they were seen as a threat to the stability and equilibrium 
obtaining in the Colony, in spite of Xhosa-white border clashes, the 
N g w a n e were fought by a combined British, Xhosa and T h e m b u force. 
Whatever military impact the N g w a n e invasion might have had was short-
lived, as they were quickly and effectively defeated by the combined force. 
British-Xhosa—Thembu military unity, which had been brought about by 
the need to defend c o m m o n interests against an external threat, was also 
short-lived, as it ended on the disappearance of the N g w a n e menace. 
It would appear, however, that the economic, social and cultural impact 
of the Mfecane was more impressive and durable than either the military 
or the political results. This is all the more interesting because the groups 
that were instrumental in the cultural, economic and social impact were 
the weakest of the agents, namely the helpless, militarily innocuous Tswana, 
Sotho and Mfengu destitutes and beggars. As already seen, it was the 
timely arrival of the Tswana and Sotho refugees in 1823 that saved the 
agricultural settlement of Albany and Graaff-Reinet from a disastrous 
collapse for lack of cheap labour. T h e availability of labour was also to lead 
to the undermining of white settler self-reliance and intensive agriculture; 
the principles on which the two agricultural settlements had been originally 
founded. T h e arrival of the Mfengu in the Peddie District in 1835 was to 
ensure an endless flow of cheap labour for the farmers. 
Because of their northern Nguni origin, and also because of their 
numbers, the Mfengu were, potentially, a political, social and cultural force. 
But their political impact upon their Cape Nguni hosts was weakened by 
their withdrawal from the Xhosa area in 1835 to go and settle with the 
colonists. As British subjects, they fought Britain's wars against the Xhosa. 
Whatever achievements or otherwise were m a d e in these wars tended to 
be associated with the British and not with the Mfengu. For example, 
although Mfengu participation and sacrifice in the wars of 1834-5, ^ 4 6 
and 1851-3 against the Xhosa were just as important as those of the colonial 
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soldiers, these wars remain an Anglo-Xhosa affair, with the Mfengu occu-
pying a peripheral position. 
T h e Mfengu cultural impact upon the Cape Nguni and the white settlers 
is not easy to assess. Moreover, culturally, the Cape Nguni and the Natal 
Nguni were very similar. There is one area, however, in which the Mfengu 
impact was significant. Because they accepted Christianity, Western edu-
cation, European agriculture and European employment m u c h earlier than 
Cape Nguni people, the Mfengu were to play a major role as agents of 
modernization among other African societies in the Cape. They provided 
the first African teachers, evangelists, agricultural demonstrators and sec-
retaries. 
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N . B H E B E 
In the period 1850 to 1880 South Africa remained simply a geographical 
expression with no political significance. It was divided into British colon-
ies, Boer republics and African states. U p to the 1870s Britain, which 
claimed supremacy in the subcontinent, hesitated from translating its 
claims into reality by taking over the political control of the whole region. 
M a n y of the British officials on the spot urged the British government to 
do so, arguing that the best way to meet British interests and at the same 
time be fair to the various peoples of South Africa was to bring the whole 
area under British rule. Successive British governments shied away from 
such responsibilities because of the expenses involved. It was indeed a 
potentially costly enterprise, because it meant conquering what looked like 
a multitude of African states, subduing the Boer republics (which were 
wedded to their independence), persuading the British colonies to join up 
with these states, and finally subsidizing the administration of the then 
very poor country. But from the 1870s onwards, with the onset of the 
European ' N e w Imperialism', the discoveries of diamonds and gold as well 
as the concomitant expanding British investments in the region, the British 
changed their minds and energetically sought to extend their hegemony 
throughout the subcontinent. B y the end of the period, the British had 
conquered and annexed m a n y African societies, afforded protection to 
others and humbled by force of arms the most recalcitrant and powerful 
of them - the Zulu. T h e British efforts to control more firmly the South 
African societies had further led them to war with the Boers. Because of 
these wars and their aftermath (arrangements involving either outright 
annexation or loose sovereignty) Britain could justifiably claim, a m o n g 
other European powers, at least by 1881, to have a hold on South Africa 
that was something more than simply a sphere of influence. Within South 
Africa, the period saw the British colonies acquiring a measure of self-rule, 
the Boers consolidating their unity, and the Africans progressively losing 
their land and sovereignty to both the Boers and the British. 
British withdrawal from the interior 
T h e 1850s opened with a British withdrawal from the interior of South 
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Africa. T h e energetic and overconfident Governor and High 
Commissioner, Sir Harry Smith, w h o assumed office in 1847, had within 
a short time of his arrival extended British rule in South Africa in a most 
dramatic manner. Convinced of the peaceful and stabilizing effects of 
British rule and the need to bring the 'benefits' of British industrial 
and cultural achievement to the Africans, he annexed the Xhosa country 
between the Keiskamma and the Kei rivers, calling it British Kaffraria, 
and the whole territory of the mixed population of Boers and Africans 
between the Orange and Vaal rivers, which became known as the Orange 
River Sovereignty. Smith was quite optimistic that the new responsibilities 
would not be a financial burden to the British, because the administrative 
costs of the new acquisitions would be met from local revenues. Subsequent 
events proved him totally wrong. His policy produced wars that were costly 
in money , lives and destruction of property, simply because the Boers were 
opposed to the annexation while the Africans rejected his 'civilizing' 
measures and revolted against the loss of their lands and sovereignty. 
T h e first to launch an armed resistance were the Boers, under the 
leadership of Andries Pretorius, w h o in 1848 raised a c o m m a n d o of 12 000 
soldiers and chased the British Resident (Major Harry Warden) and his 
other officials out of the Orange River Sovereignty. T h e Boers were unable 
to sustain their victory because they soon dispersed, leaving Pretorius with 
a tiny force that was easily defeated by Smith on 29 August 1848. 
After restoring the British administration and assigning to it a small 
force to back it up, Smith dashed back to the Cape. H e left Warden with 
the tricky and potentially explosive task of drawing up boundaries a m o n g 
the rival territorial claimants of the Orange River Sovereignty. T h e con-
testants were the powerful kingdom of Moshoeshoe, the lesser states of the 
Taung, Tlokwa, Rolong of Moletsane, Sikonyela and Moroka respectively, 
and the Boers, Kora and Griqua. Moshoeshoe's kingdom was growing very 
rapidly through the admission of refugees escaping the demands imposed 
upon them by the intrusive Boers. H e therefore needed for his people's 
occupation most of the lands along the Caledon river valley, right from its 
junction with the Orange river to its headwaters. As Moshoeshoe's expans-
ive people infiltrated into these fertile and arable northern and western 
frontiers of their country, they clashed violently with their neighbours, 
w h o prized the same lands. T h e British tried to resolve these conflicts 
by drawing up boundaries. But W a r d e n worsened the situation, as his 
boundaries favoured the Boers and the smaller states at the expense of 
the Sotho of Moshoeshoe. Besides, the announcement of boundaries was 
itself sufficient to trigger off an intense competition for land occupation 
among all the population groups, which in turn led to increased livestock 
raids. 
T h e whole crisis put Moshoeshoe in a difficult position in which he 
could only survive by sitting on the fence. H e did not want to antagonize 
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the event of a war with his white neighbours, he wanted to be able to count 
on British support. But the British embarrassed him. H e had welcomed 
them in the region, expecting them to restrain the Boers from gobbling up 
his lands. Yet n o w the Boers took up his lands with the connivance of the 
British. Indeed, his people criticized him severely for what they saw as his 
collaboration with the British in giving away parts of their country. In the 
circumstances he could not effectively check his subjects from violating the 
Warden boundaries. All he could do was to rebuke his subjects, w h o 
disregarded the n e w borders at the same time as Moshoeshoe took every 
opportunity to protest to the British officials against the unfair boundaries. 
His people simply ignored his chidings, settled where they wanted and 
carried out livestock raids and counter-raids into neighbouring states. 
Warden , the British Resident, could not bring about peace in the 
area either. His military force was inadequate, and he chose to ignore 
Moshoeshoe's territorial claims. W h e n he created a boundary for the 
Tlokwa, Warden struck a blow at the Sotho of Moshoeshoe's national 
integrity, because they were constantly awaiting a propitious m o m e n t to 
destroy the Tlokwa, their object being to recover lands taken away from 
them by the Tlokwa when Moshoeshoe's kingdom had still been weak. 
Warden even forced a boundary on the Taung of Moletsane, w h o had 
never asked for it because they knew the land they occupied belonged to 
Moshoeshoe. Similarly, Moshoeshoe and his people could never coun-
tenance such recent intruders as the Kora of Taaibosch being generously 
provided with land by Warden. Warden's aim, on the other hand, was to 
try to weaken Moshoeshoe's kingdom at the same time as he wooed the 
support of the smaller states to overcome the British military weakness in 
the region.1 v 
Indeed, when the war broke out following numerous incidents of live-
stock raids and counter-raids between the Taung and the Tlokwa, Warden 
was able to muster a sizeable force from the few Boers w h o cared to support 
him, the Griqua Rolong, as well as the Kora and come to the aid of the 
Tlokwa. H e dispersed the Taung army at the Viervoet hills and crowned 
his victory by looting 3468 head of cattle, as well as goats and sheep. T h e 
redoubtable Moshoeshoe joined the struggle on the side of his allies, the 
Taung of Moletsane, and together they inflicted a crushing defeat on 
Warden and his African allies, causing a collapse of the British admin-
istration in the Orange River Sovereignty in June 1851.2 
Warden could not secure m u c h help from the local Boers and the British 
in Cape Colony. T h e Boers either looked for assistance from their kith and 
kin across the Vaal river or tried to reach a peaceful settlement with the 
victors, Moshoeshoe and Moletsane. In the Cape Colony the British forces 
were pinned d o w n by the Xhosa in the war that had been raging since 
1. P. Sanders, 1975, pp. 149-50, and p. 159. 
2. ibid., eh. 14. 
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December 1850. In fact it was these two wars on the eastern front and the 
Orange River Sovereignty that compelled the British to abandon Smith's 
expansionist policy in South Africa. 
T h e causes of the Anglo-Xhosa war of 1850-3 lay in Smith's efforts to 
deprive the Xhosa of their independence. In 1848 he took away vast Xhosa 
territories by annexing to the Cape Colony the area between the Fish and 
Keiskamma rivers and then declaring a separate British Colony of Kaffraria 
between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers. M a n y Xhosa were prevented from 
settling in their former lands west of the Keiskamma, which were n o w 
parcelled out to the Mfengu 'loyalists' and white farmers. In Kaffraria 
itself, the Xhosa were split, up and allotted 'reserves', while their chiefs' 
powers were severely circumscribed by the supervision of imposed white 
magistrates. Such customs as labola (bridewealth) and accusations of witch-
craft were outlawed as being contrary to British justice. Moreover, the 
white magistrates knew very little of the Cape L a w s and nothing of the 
Xhosa legal system, with the result that they followed their personal 
instincts in reviewing Xhosa cases submitted to them. T h e members of the 
500-strong African police force that backed the magistrates were untrained, 
and so proud to carry out the white man's orders that they became 
overbearing towards their people. All these grievances forced the Xhosa to 
try and rid themselves of British rule. 
Smith sparked off the war by his rough handling of the chief and, indeed, 
disregard of the people's attachment to their institutional authorities. H e 
s u m m o n e d the paramount chief, Sandile, to a meeting in King William's 
T o w n . Sandile refused to go because a few years previously the British had 
treacherously arrested him after he had responded to a similar s u m m o n s . 
Smith deposed him and tried to impose in his place a white chief and 
Sandile's mother, both of w h o m were rejected by the Xhosa. Smith then 
outlawed Sandile and tried to apprehend him by force. B y December 1850 
the Xhosa had had enough of the British Governor's interference in their 
lives and began to attack British forces and military installations in the 
area. They wiped out a number of military villages. 
Sandile's cause received wide support from neighbouring Africans. East 
of the Kei river he got the moral support of his brethren under Sarili's 
paramountcy. M a n y members of the African police and Cape Coloured 
Mounted Riflemen deserted and joined Sandile's forces. T h e Khoikhoi 
and some of the T h e m b u also fought on Sandile's side. T h e result was that 
m a n y white farmers and Africans w h o sided with the British were killed, 
their livestock captured and immovable property destroyed. Meanwhile 
Smith relied on local African allies because the Cape Colony white farmers 
were not willing to fight his war. Even with more reinforcements he 
received from the British government in March 1852, Smith failed to crush 
the Xhosa rising. T h e war was only brought to an end by his successor, 
Sir George Cathcart, w h o enlisted the support of the Cape white farmers 
by promising to give them a part of the cattle looted during the campaign. 
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Indeed w h e n the Xhosa were defeated in October 1852, both the Xhosa of 
Sandile and those of Sarili - w h o lived east of the Kei and had mostly 
accorded moral support to their fighting western brethren — lost vast herds 
of cattle to the British.3 
T h e expensive Anglo-Xhosa war and the complete disruption of the 
British administration in the Orange River Sovereignty caused the British 
to recoil from Smith's forward policy. They appointed two commissioners, 
Major William Hogge and Charles O w e n , to go and arrange for a British 
disengagement from the area north of the Orange river. In order to deal 
effectively with the situation in the Orange River Sovereignty, without 
interference from the Boers north of the Vaal river, the commissioners 
bought off the latter by guaranteeing their independence. Andries Pretorius 
managed to raise from the scattered and factionally torn Boers of the 
Transvaal a delegation that hammered out a settlement with the British 
and concluded the Sand River Convention on 17 January 1852. 
Under the Sand River Convention, the British recognized the inde-
pendence of the Transvaal and unilaterally abrogated any treaties of alliance 
with the African states to the north of the Vaal river. T h e Transvaal bound 
itself not to meddle in the affairs of the British colonies and not to engage 
in slavery and the slave trade. T h e British and the Transvaal Boers further 
agreed to exclude the African societies on both sides of the Vaal from their 
firearms and ammunitions markets, while permitting the Boers free access 
to the British arms markets.4 Needless to say, even though the Africans 
used clandestine means and 'unscrupulous' British arms dealers to obtain 
some guns, the Anglo-Boer arms embargo effectively prevented the African 
states from stockpiling large arsenals and, indeed, from purchasing the 
latest military equipment available in the British and other European 
markets. In short, by this agreement the whites guaranteed themselves 
military superiority over the Africans and m a d e the conquest of the latter 
by the former technically inevitable. 
With the Transvaal out of the way, the commissioners turned their 
attention to the Orange River Sovereignty. However, Cathcart, the new 
High Commissioner, wanted to patch up British military prestige, which 
lay in tatters in the eyes of the Africans, by striking a telling blow to 
Moshoeshoe's kingdom. With a large force of infantry and cavalry, he met 
Moshoeshoe at Platberg on 15 December 1852 and delivered an ultimatum 
that was impossible to fulfil. Moshoeshoe was ordered to produce within 
three days 1000 horses and 10 000 cattle, which would be used as c o m -
pensation for the Boer property lost during the Warden war and also to 
finance Cathcart's own current expensive expedition. W h e n Moshoeshoe 
failed to meet the deadline and pleaded for more time, Cathcart ignored 
3. E . A . Walker, 1957, pp. 250-4; C . Brownlee, 1896, pp. 306-19; M . Wilson, 1969b, 
p. 256. 
4. E . A . Walker, 1957, pp.252-3; L . Thompson, 1969b, pp.420-1. 
149 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
the King's excuses and ordered an invasion of what is today Lesotho. But 
he met with such stiff resistance from the Lesotho infantry and cavalry 
that he was only too willing and relieved to withdraw when Moshoeshoe 
displayed a diplomatically submissive posture in a letter dated 20 December 
1852. Moshoeshoe beseeched the High Commissioner to be content with 
the loot of over 5000 cattle which the Governor's troops had managed to 
capture. T h e King confessed himself sufficiently punished and indeed well 
impressed by the power of the British and therefore begged for peace. H e 
would also in future try to prevent his people from causing disorder. O n 
receipt of the letter the following day, the Governor with his mauled army 
(thirty-eight dead and fifteen wounded) quickly pulled out of the dangerous 
kingdom.5 
Cathcart's experience of the Sovereignty quagmire added to the British 
conviction that the region could only be retained at a high cost. Sir George 
Clerk was therefore sent out to go and complete the British withdrawal 
from north of the Orange river. Getting wind of the impending British 
departure, Moshoeshoe prepared for the certain long struggle ahead with 
the Boers by destroying their potential allies, the Tlokwa, Griqua, and 
Kora in the north-west of his kingdom. All the southern Sotho around 
his kingdom n o w fell under his rule, except Moroka's chiefdom, whose 
population had been whittled down anyway to only 1000 people during 
the previous war. 
In the meantime Clerk managed with some difficulty to assemble some 
Boers w h o were prepared to negotiate independence with him, and on 23 
February 1854 concluded the Bloemfontein Convention, which was more 
or less along the same lines as the Sand River Convention. T h e Convention 
gave the Boers complete independence. T h e British renounced any alliances 
with the African rulers to the north of the Orange river, except A d a m K o k . 
Even A d a m Kok's treaty, which had restricted the amount of land the 
Boers could purchase in his country, was eventually amended in such a 
way that enabled the whites to buy off all his lands. Clerk also refused to 
be drawn by Moshoeshoe into any discussions concerning the boundary 
between the Orange River Sovereignty (soon to be called the Orange Free 
State) and his kingdom.6 In their withdrawal the British therefore opened 
the way for A d a m Kok's land dispossession by the white farmers, as well 
as for territorial clashes between the Boers and the Sotho. 
O n the eastern front of the Cape Colony, Cathcart was primarily con-
cerned to prevent the Xhosa from disturbing the peace. After the 1850-3 
war he regarded m a n y of Sandile's Xhosa, the T h e m b u and Khoikhoi as 
rebels and, therefore, confiscated their lands west of the Keiskamma, in 
the White Kei and Kat river valleys, the foothills of the Mathole and 
5. P . Sanders, 1975, pp. 185-93; E . A . Walker, 1957, pp. 254-5; L . Thompson, 1969b, 
pp. 421-2. 
6. P . Sanders, 1975, pp. 200-1. 
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around the British military villages. T h e confiscated lands were sold to the 
white farmers and also given to the Mfengu 'loyalists'. In this way he 
hoped to neutralize the area so that it could be a buffer between the 
predominantly black east and the white Cape Colony in the west. Cathcart 
also changed the political aspects of Smith's policy. W h e r e Smith had 
severely curtailed the powers of the Xhosa chiefs, Cathcart left them to 
exercise unlimited jurisdiction over their people in the crowded 'reserves' 
and reduced the British magistrates to 'mere diplomatic agents without 
power'.7 
W h e n Cathcart bade farewell to South Africa in 1854, the British had 
withdrawn from the interior, leaving the Boers and Africans to their o w n 
devices. Even British Kaffraria, which they chose to hang on to, was not 
considered a 'normal' colony to be developed in the interests of its o w n 
people and of Britain. Instead, it was regarded as an aspect of the Cape 
Colony's defence system, a territory where nothing more seemed worthy 
of attention than what was required for British logistical needs. T h e British 
government was simply in a m o o d to do only what was needed to guarantee 
its possession of the naval base on the Cape peninsula. It seemed possible 
to achieve this by denying the weak and disunited Boers independent access 
to the sea through the retention of the Cape Colony and Natal. T h e two 
white colonies were also to be maintained with as little cost to the mother 
country as possible by granting them a measure of self-rule so that they 
would agree to shoulder the greater part of the expenses of their o w n 
administration and defence. T h e result was that the Cape Colony was 
granted a constitution with parliamentary institutions in 1853 and Natal, 
initially annexed in 1845 as a district of the Cape Colony, was separated 
and given its o w n Legislative Council in 1856. 
The Cape Colony and Natal before 1870 
T h e need to economize was not, however, the only reason that prompted 
the British government to grant representative institutions to the Cape 
Colony in 1853.8 T h e Cape constitution was born in the atmosphere of the 
British abandonment of the mercantilist system and the adoption of free 
trade. In Britain both the Manchester and Wakefield schools, which fea-
tured prominently in the discussions relating to colonial policies, advocated, 
for opposite views, the granting of self-rule to the colonies. A n d Lord 
Grey, the Colonial Secretary w h o initiated the process of granting self-
government in the Cape Colony in 1846, was in fact a free-trader. Fur-
thermore, the Cape colonists themselves were instrumental in bringing 
about self-rule, because for m a n y years they petitioned the British govern-
7. E . A . Walker, 1957, p. 286. 
8. S . Trapido, 1964, pp. 37-54; E . A . Walker, 1957, pp. 233-45; T . R . H . Davenport, 
1969, pp.321-4; C F . J. Muller (ed.), 1975, pp. 183-4. 
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ment to give them representative institutions. They were not even silenced 
by the Legislative Council m a d e up of the governor, officials and nominated 
unofficial members , which was established in 1834. T h u s a combination of 
colonial pressures, free-trade principles, and the need to economize, forced 
the British to grant the Cape Colony a measure of self-rule. 
T h e 1853 constitution was framed in such a way that it protected the 
interests of the rich English merchants, w h o were a minority, at the same 
time as it permitted limited political participation of the majority: poor 
Boers, Coloureds and Africans. This was achieved by means of the property 
qualifications for the franchise and membership of the two houses of 
parliament. Only the wealthy could be elected to the upper house, because 
qualification for election rested on being an enfranchised British subject 
and having unencumbered property worth £2000, or encumbered property 
worth £4000. T h e franchise and membership of the lower house were open 
to any male British subject having property worth £25 or a salary of ¿50 
per a n n u m . This permitted a few Boers and Coloureds to vote. But the 
use of English as the official language in parliament, barred from standing 
for election about 70 per cent of the rural Boers, w h o even as late as the 
1870s could hardly speak the language.9 
T w o issues dominated the Cape parliament, the demand for the partition 
of the Colony and the conflicts between the executive and the legislative 
authorities. T h e eastern Cape districts were predominantly English-speak-
ing and therefore wanted to be separated from the western, predominantly 
Dutch-speaking districts because of fear of being dominated. T h e con-
stitution produced conflicts by its attempt to combine autocracy and 
democracy. It provided for no responsible ministers, rather, bureaucrats 
w h o headed departments were appointed by the Colonial Secretary and 
were responsible to the Governor. T h e Governor initiated policies that 
were then discussed and voted on by the two houses. For the constitution 
to work, it depended on the personality of the particular governor and the 
economic situation of the colony. Sir George Grey, w h o was Governor in 
a period of relative economic prosperity (1854-62) and was tactful in his 
dealings with the Cape parliamentarians, incurred no serious conflicts with 
the two houses. But Sir Philip Wodehouse, his successor (1862-72) was 
authoritarian, high-handed, and overly insensitive to the separatist feelings 
of the easterners and found himself confronted by bitter factions and 
generally hostile houses which were ready to fight with their only weapon: 
refusal to vote him new taxes. His problems were aggravated by the 
economic depression of the 1860s, which resulted in huge government 
deficits. T h e frequent constitutional crises at the Cape were only partially 
resolved by the granting of responsible government in 1872. But even then 
the Governor's powers and functions continued to cause clashes between 
himself and the Cape cabinet. 
9. F . A . Van Jaarsveld, 1975, pp. 154-7. 
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It was during the rule of Governor Sir George Grey and his successor, 
Sir Philip Wodehouse, that the Xhosa of Kaffraria on the Ciskei lost their 
independence completely. Grey in particular put enormous pressure on 
the Xhosa of the Ciskei because of his so-called civilizing policy. H e created 
what has been termed 'a chequerboard of black and white' by planting 
white settlers among the Xhosa. H e also reduced the powers of the Xhosa 
chiefs, limiting their responsibilities to civil cases, while the white magis-
trates did everything else. Chiefs were given salaries so that they could give 
up the right to fines, which were thereafter collected by the British officials. 
A hut tax was imposed to help pay for the administration of the Colony. 
T h e people were forced to work on public works for low wages. T h e labour 
and financial demands, combined with population pressures caused by vast 
numbers of white settlers, compelled the Xhosa to seek millenarian sol-
utions to their problem of subjugation. Although direct imperial pressures 
fell heavily on the Xhosa of Sandile and their T h e m b u neighbours, the 
Xhosa of Sarili to the east of the Kei river (in what is n o w the Transkei) 
suffered enormous population pressures as a result of the continuous 
immigration of refugees w h o either voluntarily tried to escape direct British 
exploitation and oppression or were actually driven out of the west on the 
pretext that they were rebellious. 
T h e Xhosa, together with the T h e m b u , resorted to religious solutions 
in 1856-7. In March 1856 a girl by the n a m e of Nongqause, w h o was 
apparently under the religious tutelage of Mhlakaza, one of the advisers of 
Chief Sarili, prophesied that if the people killed all their cattle, destroyed 
their grain stores, and did not plant any crops that year, a whirlwind would 
come and blow the English oppressors into the sea. Besides, their heroes 
would rise from the dead and bring vast herds of cattle, huge quantities of 
grain, and even white men's manufactured goods. T h e message was obeyed 
by the Xhosa and the T h e m b u , and when the appointed day came nothing 
happened. Large numbers of people died of starvation on both sides of the 
Kei in 1857. M a n y of the Xhosa in the Ciskei streamed to the Cape Colony 
to seek employment a m o n g the whites as the only means of survival. T h e 
whole episode makes little sense and people have tried to look for hidden 
explanations without success. E . A . Walker was convinced that Moshoeshoe, 
w h o wanted to divert the British from the Orange Free State, where he 
confronted the Boers, engineered the Xhosa into their suicidal move so 
that in desperation they would rise against the British.10 S o m e people think 
that it was a white man's plot meant of course to lead the Xhosa into self-
destruction. Little or no evidence exists to support either of these views. 
Perhaps Monica Wilson is right in interpreting the cattle-killing among 
the Xhosa just like the m a n y , millenarian movements that have taken place 
in Europe, America and elsewhere in Africa. It was a movement, Wilson 
10. E . A . Walker, 1957, p. 289. 
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tells us, in which people sought to rid themselves of foreign domination 
and to recover their lands from the white settlers.11 
In the meantime Grey had taken advantage of the cattle-killing episode 
and its consequent weakening of the Xhosa and the T h e m b u . H e confiscated 
large pieces of land from m a n y of Sandile's chiefs w h o m he suspected of 
plotting an uprising against the British. T h e dispossessed chiefs and the 
people of Sarili were then all driven right across the Mbashe river so that 
an empty zone patrolled by the British police remained between the Kei 
and M b a s h e rivers. H e also encouraged white immigrants to settle on the 
confiscated lands. T h e black and white population was then ruled as a 
separate district with its o w n lieutenant-governor. In 1865 Wodehouse 
found the Ciskei too poor and too expensive to run as a separate colony 
and annexed it to the Cape Colony. 
During the period before 1870, the Natal whites also m a d e some con-
stitutional progress. Within a few years of its annexation, m a n y Boers 
returned to the highveld across the Drakensberg Mountains, in protest 
against British failure to recognize their land claims, the British African 
policy, and the new political arrangements, which excluded them c o m -
pletely from any participation. At the same time, Natal had a large African 
population, m a n y of them returnees from exile whence they had been 
driven during the Mfecane. 
T h e initial difficulties facing the weak colonial administration in Natal 
concerned the government of the Africans. T h e solutions were provided 
by the 1846 commission and elaborated upon over the years by Theophilus 
Shepstone, the Diplomatic Agent and Secretary for African Affairs (1853-
75). T h e 1846 commission recommended the setting aside of reserves or 
locations for African settlement, and by i860 land amounting to 2 million 
acres (810000 ha) had been delineated for that purpose. However, the 
locations were situated mostly in the rugged, barren and wild parts of 
Natal, which were unsuitable for agriculture. T h e commission m a d e other 
recommendations, such as provision for African education, administration 
of each location by a white officer backed by a black and white police force 
and the enforcement of the R o m a n - D u t c h law in the place of the African 
laws. In view of the amount of money required to implement some of these 
recommendations, they were never effected. A s a result, African education 
remained largely, if not exclusively, the responsibility of the ill-financed and 
. ill-equipped missionaries, while the administration was done by Shepstone. 
Fluent in the Nguni languages and having lived a m o n g the Xhosa, 
Shepstone was able to establish some working relationship with the African 
communities. All the Africans living in the reserves were placed under 
chiefs and headmen, and where the latter did not exist, new ones were 
created. African laws, except those concerning witchcraft, were permitted 
to operate. T o finance his administration, Shepstone imposed a hut tax 
11. M . Wilson, 1969b, pp. 256-60; see also C . Brownlee, 1896, pp. 135-70. 
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collectable in cash or cattle (which could be sold to the white farmers for 
cash). His administration was consistently attacked by the white settlers 
because, they argued, it m a d e the Africans economically self-sufficient and 
therefore prevented them from becoming labourers on the farms and 
plantations. But Shepstone did not lock up the Africans in locations because 
he loved them. Rather, he clearly saw that coercive measures to produce 
labourers would only result in resistance, which the comparatively weak 
Natal colonial administration could not possibly cope with. T h e settlers 
w h o criticized him seem to have ignored the contribution of Africans to 
the profits of large landowners w h o subsisted on the rentals of over half 
the black population living as squatters on white farms, and to the colony's 
revenues in the form of the hut tax. In fact what Shepstone had done was 
to produce a cheap administration that afforded the white colonial society 
opportunities to exploit both the Africans and their natural resources in 
comparative peace and security.12 
T h e white society was mostly of British origin. After the drain by 
Boer emigration the white population increased steadily as a result of 
immigration by British subjects escaping from the social problems 
accompanying the economic crisis of 1847-51. Financed by speculators, 
some 5000 white settlers left Britain for Natal in this period. B y 1870 the 
whites in Natal numbered 18000. T h e increase in the number of white 
settlers went hand in hand with constitutional changes. In 1856 Natal was 
made a separate colony and granted a Legislative Council. T h e franchise 
was m a d e colour-blind, so that male British subjects owning at the 
m i n i m u m immovable property worth £50 or renting property worth £50 
at an annual rate of £ 1 0 could vote. But the whites m a d e it impossible for 
the Africans to qualify for the vote. A law passed in 1865 allowed literate 
Africans with some property to petition the lieutenant-governor to exempt 
them from African customary laws. T h e lieutenant-governor could turn 
d o w n the application, even though the African might have the necessary 
qualifications. Then , to qualify for the vote, the exempted African had to 
show that he had resided in Natal for seven years, and put in an application 
supported by three enfranchised whites, and endorsed by a magistrate 
or any acceptable white official. T h e lieutenant-governor again had the 
discretion to turn d o w n such a petition. T h e result was that, up to 1903-
5, only three Africans had qualified for the vote in Natal and Zululand.13 
Economically, Natal came to rely on the sugar industry, which required 
intensive use of h u m a n labour. Efforts to compel Africans to supply the 
necessary labour came to nothing, because of the poor working conditions 
and low wages offered by the planters. T h e Natal planters, assisted by their 
government, resorted to the importation of Indian labourers. T h e scheme 
was arranged in such a way that at the end of a ten-year period of working 
12. E . H . Brookes, 1974, pp.41-57; J. Guy , 1980, pp.41-4. 
13. E . H . Brookes, 1974, pp. 55-7; E . H . Brookes and C . de B . W e b b , 1965, pp. 75-7. 
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in Natal, the Indian labourer had the option of either returning to India 
with his passage paid or exchanging his passage fees for a land grant and 
remaining in Natal permanently. T h e first Indians arrived under that 
scheme in i860 and towards the end of the 1860s there were 6000 of them 
in Natal; m a n y of these opted to remain in South Africa permanently. 
Because of Indian labour, the Natal sugar industry became established and 
indeed expanded until by 1870-71 it was the colony's biggest item of export 
trade. 
It is clear, therefore, that by the beginning of the 1870s political power 
both in Natal and the Cape Colony was slowly devolving to the white 
settlers by means of constitutional arrangements. In the Cape Colony, 
where there was a majority of non-English-speaking whites, the constitution 
had to prescribe qualifications beyond financial ones in order to maintain 
power in English hands. Both in Natal and the Cape Colony Africans were 
herded into reserves where they were taxed in order to compel them to 
become labourers in the white enterprises and also in order to pay for their 
o w n administration. Even though there were financial constraints, the 
intention was always there to proletarianize the Africans through industrial 
education, as well as by breaking d o w n their social cohesion through 
stripping the chiefs of their powers, the imposition of European laws, 
limiting the amount of land available for their use and, above all, through 
the activities of Christian missionaries. 
The Boer republics before 1870 
A s the two British colonies thus m a d e constitutional progress and, with 
British imperial assistance, established mechanisms for guaranteeing white 
political supremacy and economic deprivation and exploitation of the blacks 
in the 1850s and 1860s, the Boers also tried to achieve internal unity and 
to subjugate the African communities of the interior. W h e n the British 
retreated from the north of the Orange river, the Boers were divided into 
numerous groups. T h e main division was along the Vaal river, causing two 
Boer republics to eventually emerge - the Orange Free State in the south 
and the Transvaal (South African Republic) in the north. 
In 1854, w h e n the Bloemfontein Convention was signed, perhaps m a n y 
people in the Orange Free State wanted independence, but very few were 
prepared for it. Apart from poverty, ignorance, military weakness, and lack 
of administrative infrastructure, the Free State government dreaded its 
powerful neighbour, the Sotho kingdom of Moshoeshoe, with w h o m it had 
no settled border. T h e Orange Free State also suffered from a fundamental 
division that caused it for m a n y years to waver between joining the Cape 
Colony in the south or amalgamating with its sister republic in the north. 
In this way the Orange Free State exposed itself to frequent interference 
from both directions. 
T h e division was primarily between the trekboers and the voortrekkers. 
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T h e former were the Boers w h o went across the Orange river in search of 
land before the Great Trek. They settled mostly in the south of what later 
became the Orange Free State. Whenever they were embroiled in wars 
with their African neighbours, they tended to look to the south for assist-
ance. They were reinforced by British merchants and land speculators 
w h o settled in Bloemfontein during the brief period of annexation. Quite 
different from this group, variously called 'loyalists' or 're-annexationists', 
were the Boers living in the north-east of the republic, mostly in and 
around the Winburg district. These were the products of the Great Trek, 
m e n and w o m e n w h o had left the Cape Colony out of bitterness against 
the British government. These voortrekkers, 'faithful maatschappijers' or 
republican patriots, as they are variously called, always stood for complete 
independence from the British and when in trouble turned to the Transvaal 
for assistance.14 This division explains in part the way the Orange Free 
State was easily goaded by Sir George Grey, the federalist Governor and 
High Commissioner, to toy with the idea of joining the Cape Colony in 
1858; w h y the Free Staters voted the Transvaal President, Marthius 
Wessels Pretorius, to be their o w n president (1860-3); and w h y the Orange 
Free State remained neutral in the Anglo-Boer W a r (1880-1). Despite all 
these weaknesses, the Orange Free State achieved some semblance of 
statehood m u c h quicker than the Transvaal. T h e same committee that 
negotiated independence with the British arranged for the election of the 
first government and produced a draft constitution based on the American 
one. T h e government had an executive president and a volksraad (legislative 
authority). T h e Boers did not try to disguise their racism by means of high 
material franchise qualifications as in the British colonies; the blacks were 
totally excluded from the country's citizenship and therefore from the 
franchise. Only whites w h o had lived in the country for six months were 
m a d e citizens, and every white m a n w h o had registered for military service 
could vote.15 
T h e first President, Josias P . Hoffman, did not remain long in power 
because he was considered too friendly to Moshoeshoe and the English 
settlers. H e was therefore compelled to resign and Johannes Nicolaas 
Boshof, w h o had extensive administrative experience and stood for the 
complete independence of the republic, was elected. H e created a strong 
civil service and organized state finances on a firm basis.16 Nevertheless, 
Boshof's presidency was marked by instability arising out of border disputes 
with Lesotho, and out of tensions between the maatschappijers and the 
loyalists, resulting in the dual intervention of Sir George Grey and Preto-
rius. In October 1855 Sir George Grey intervened and managed to bring 
together Moshoeshoe and Boshof to sign an agreement on the procedures 
14. F . A . Van Jaarsveld, 1961, p. 29. 
15. L . Thompson, 1969b, pp. 429-30; C . F.J. Müller, 1975, pp. 233-5. 
16. C .F . J . Müller, 1975, p.255. 
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for settling disputes between their peoples. N o border was fixed, and 
Moshoeshoe later said he only signed the treaty out of respect for Sir 
George Grey.17 H e thus did nothing to restrain his people from quarrelling 
with the Boers. Still afflicted by border problems, Boshof had to confront 
Pretorius, w h o wanted to unite the two Boer republics. Driven by a 
misconception that the majority of the Free Staters desired amalgamation 
with their northern brethren, and claiming to have inherited the leadership 
of the Free State from his father, Andries Pretorius entered Bloemfontein 
on 22 February 1857 and on the next day declared his intention to take 
over the state and outlawed the Boshof government. Rejecting his claims, 
the Boshof government deported him and charged his supporters with 
sedition. This provoked the mobilization of commandos on both sides of 
the Vaal river, which confronted each other on the opposite banks of the 
Rhenoster river on 25 M a y . Pretorius had banked on m a n y maatschappijers 
deserting Boshof and joining his army. T o his surprise, not only were there 
not many people defecting to his side, but he n o w also had a further and 
more dangerous enemy in his rear, Stephanus Schöeman, the Zoutpansberg 
Commandant , with w h o m he competed for the leadership of the Transvaal, 
and w h o had formed an alliance with the Free State. Scared that he would 
be completely annihilated, Pretorius agreed to sign an agreement by which 
both republics acknowledged each other's autonomy on 1 June 1857.18 T h e 
abortive civil war, however, exposed only too clearly the deep divisions 
among the Boers. 
T h e agreement did not remove the tensions among the three factions 
which had emerged in the Orange Free State, consisting of the 'loyalists', 
w h o were for re-annexation to the Cape Colony, the supporters of Boshof 
w h o stood for Orange Free State independence, and the unionists w h o 
wanted incorporation into the Transvaal. T h e tensions reached such a 
pitch that Boshof was forced into a tactical resignation in February 1858 
and, when he withdrew his resignation, several members of the volksraad 
left in protest. Coupled with the internal disputes were the increasing 
border quarrels with Lesotho. Boshof decided to check the border disputes 
by invading Lesotho in March 1858. B y converging on Thaba Bosiu, 
Moshoeshoe's stronghold, the Boer commandos left their rear exposed, 
which was then raided by the Lesotho army. T h e Boers abandoned the 
struggle as they went back h o m e to defend their families and property. 
T h e military weakness of the Orange Free State, which was exposed by 
the half-hearted invasion of Lesotho, had already been acknowledged by 
Boshof even before the war when he requested military assistance from 
both Pretorius and Sir George Grey.19 Grey responded by arranging a 
17. G . M . Theal, 1900, pp. 16-18. 
18. G . M . Theal, 1900, pp.40-5. 
19. G . M . Theal, 1900, pp.50-60; P . Sanders, 197s, pp.203-36; L . Thompson, 1969b, 
P-432-
158 
The British, Boers and Africans in South Africa, 1850-80 
meeting between Moshoeshoe and Boshof and on 29 September 1858 both 
sides signed the Treaty of Aliwal North which confirmed the W a r d e n 
boundary.20 
Pretorius, on the other hand, found a chance to renew his efforts to unify 
the two Boer republics. T h e Transvaal m a d e it clear that it could only 
assist the Orange Free State in return for the latter's absorption by the 
Transvaal. T h e prospect of unity between the two republics alarmed Grey, 
w h o was already contemplating federating the individual republics with 
the British colonies. A s early as 1857 Grey had come to the conclusion that 
Britain had made a mistake by pulling out of the interior of South Africa. 
H e therefore started calling for the abrogation of the conventions and for 
the re-establishment of British rule under some form of federation. H e 
feared that fragmentation of the whites weakened them in the face of the 
ubiquitous African states. H e feared that the Boer republics might unite 
and enter into relations with foreign powers, thereby threatening the British 
colonies and Britain's retention of vital naval bases. Besides, he thought, 
the numerous Boer conflicts with the African states were potentially danger-
ous, as they could spill over into the British colonies. Grey therefore moved 
swiftly to smother the Boers' plans of unification by informing them that 
if they united Britain would feel itself free from the obligations of the 
conventions and therefore start negotiating alliances with the African states 
and even sell them guns. T h e Transvaal therefore retreated to the north 
of the Vaal river to safeguard its independence, leaving Grey to encourage 
the Free State to take steps towards unity with the Cape Colony. But when 
he tried to encourage the Cape parliament to discuss the Free State offer 
of unity, the British government removed him from South Africa in June 
i859: 
With the collapse of the federation scheme, Boshof and his supporters, 
w h o had been enthusiastic about re-annexation, were discredited and 
the president resigned. This strengthened the unionists and they elected 
Pretorius as president. But the desire of the Orange Free State for unity 
was not matched by similar sentiments in the Transvaal, where the fear of 
the cancellation of the Sand River Convention and re-annexation by the 
British predominated. T h e Transvaal volksraad forced Pretorius to resign 
his presidency in the Transvaal, but he continued for another three 
years to work through his supporters there for unity. B y 1863 Pretorius 
had failed even in the Orange Free State and he retired to his h o m e re-
public. 
T h e unsuccessful experiments of unity with either the Cape or the 
Transvaal m a d e the Free Staters turn to themselves in shaping their 
national destiny. They elected as their president Johannes Henricus Brand, 
a lawyer and experienced parliamentarian from the Cape, w h o was to rule 
them for twenty-five years. But before looking at the Free State relations 
20. P . Sanders, 1975, pp. 233-41. 
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with their neighbours during Brand's rule, it is necessary to consider h o w 
the Transvaal transformed itself into a state. 
T h e Transvaal took longer than the Orange Free State to attain recog-
nizable features of a state. T h e Boers to the north of the Vaal river 
were widely dispersed and further divided by religious differences. M . W . 
Pretorius, w h o took over from his father in 1853 and, as w e have seen, 
ceaselessly fought to unite the two republics on either side of the Vaal 
river, was the chief champion of the unification of the Transvaal as well. 
H e contended with such separatist groups as the Zoutpansbergers, centred 
around the Schoemansdaal village in the north; the Lydenburgers and 
W . F . Joubert in the east; and the Boers of the Utrecht district along the 
Buffalo river. T h e biggest group was that of Pretorius himself in the 
Potchefstroom Marico-Rustenburg area. 
S o m e form of unity was established in 1849 through the adoption of the 
Thirty-three Articles of 1844 as a constitution.21 T h e articles were nothing 
more than rules concerning the administration of justice, election of the 
members of the volksraad as well as general laws. T h e biggest flaw of the 
articles was their failure to separate legislative functions from executive 
ones - so that the volksraad tried to exercise both. Moreover, since the 
state had no capital, the volksraad met in different villages and invariably 
failed to form a quorum, so that local non-members had to be co-opted. 
Pretorius strove for a proper constitution providing for a legislature and an 
executive. O n this he clashed with the Lydenburgers, w h o were extremely 
suspicious of a one-man executive, such as the presidency, lest he should 
become an autocrat. 
These differences were worsened by the religious quarrels. T o sever their 
connections completely, Pretorius urged the Potchefstroom community to 
split from the Cape Synod of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch 
Reformed Church) and they formed the independent Nederduitse H e r -
evormde Kerk ( N H K ) whose pastors were to be recruited from the Nether-
lands. T h e Lydenburgers stuck to their connections with the Cape Colony, 
while a further splinter Church called the Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-
Afrika emerged from the N H K . Its distinguishing characteristic was a 
refusal by its members to sing hymns in church. 
Despite all these differences, a draft constitution providing for a presi-
dent, legislature, judiciary, and army authority was produced in January 
1857. T h e volksraad, which was dominated by Pretorius's followers, elected 
him the president and the Zoutpansberg leader, Johannes Schöeman, 
commandant-general. Schoeman rejected both the constitution and the 
army post and raised a c o m m a n d o to attack Pretorius's supporters in the 
Rustenburg district. W a r was avoided w h e n both sides agreed to choose 
a committee to amend the constitution in accordance with the wishes 
of the Zoutpansbergers. With the approval of the constitution in 1858, 
21. G . M . Theal, 1900, pp .413-17 , for an English translation of the articles. 
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Pretorius and Schöeman became the president and commandant-general 
respectively, while the Lydenburgers were persuaded to join the republic 
in i860. 
But Pretorius plunged the nascent republic into chaos when , as w e have 
seen, he accepted the presidency of the Orange Free State. Fearful of 
jeopardizing the Transvaal's independence, the volksraad asked Pretorius 
to choose between one of the presidencies, and he resigned from the 
Transvaal. However he continued to work through Schöeman and the 
people of Potchefstroom, his staunchest supporters. These set up a c o m -
mittee of their o w n with powers and functions that rivalled those of 
the volksraad. T h e volksraad in turn appointed its o w n president and 
commandant-general and both governments claimed to rule the republic. 
Peace only returned to the Transvaal when Pretorius resigned from the 
Orange Free State and was re-elected President of the Transvaal in 1864. 
H e ruled the Transvaal until he was forced to resign for his mishandling 
of the republic's claims to the diamond fields in the 1870s. 
Boer relations with the Africans before 1870 
In both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, m a n y African c o m -
munities had either been destroyed and absorbed into the Mfecane fugitive 
states, such as the Ndebele kingdom of Mzilikazi, or forced to seek refuge 
in the difficult and easily defended parts of the country. Located in such 
places, resourceful leaders, such as Moshoeshoe, were able to build large 
fallowings out of displaced refugees and to emerge as powerful nations in 
the 1840s, w h e n the Ndebele were expelled from the region by the Boers. 
Such states, as already seen in the case of Lesotho, were strong enough to 
contend with both the intruding Boers and the British. 
After the expulsion of the Ndebele, m a n y small chiefdoms that had 
submitted to Mzilikazi but had not been fully incorporated into his nation, 
together with others that had eluded the Ndebele by moving out of the 
range of their frequent raids reoccupied their erstwhile territories. M a n y 
of these peoples were overwhelmed and incorporated into the Boer states 
before they could build up their means of resistance. These were the 
Africans w h o suffered direct economic exploitation by the Boers. Exploi-
tation was built into the citizenship, labour and other laws enacted by the 
Boers. T h e Transvaal constitution, for instance, rejected any notions of 
equality between black and white. T o rule out any possibility of effective 
African resistance, the incorporated peoples were prohibited from pos-
sessing firearms or horses and they were forced to carry passes supplied by 
their employers or government officials at all times. Each farmer was 
entitled to keep a number of African families on his farm, w h o supplied 
him with regular free labour. 'With regard to natives living within the 
European area under direct protection of the Boers, the furnishing of 
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regular labour supply would be regarded as payment for the land which 
had been assigned to them.'22 
T h e Africans w h o did not live on the farms were put under chiefs and 
the different chiefdoms were allotted a location or reserve. T h e locations 
were widely dispersed, and each of them was placed as near as possible to 
a white farming area. This was meant to divide the Africans so as to 
preclude any concerted uprisings, as well as to ensure that every white 
farmer had easy access to a black labour reservoir. Each chief paid tax in 
cattle and labour. Indeed, one of the important duties of the landdrosts 
(magistrates) and fieldcomets (ward military commanders) was to collect 
labourers from the chiefs in their districts and distribute them a m o n g the 
white farmers on a one-year contract basis. T h e chiefs were further expected 
to supply m e n to assist the Boers in times of war. 
T h e Transvaal, moreover, practised the controversial system of appren-
ticeship, which had been carried over from the Cape Colony. African 
children captured in wars were distributed to farmers, for w h o m they 
worked until they were 25 years old (boys) or 21 (girls). In return for 
insignificant payments or favours, incorporated African parents were at 
first persuaded and later pressured to offer their children to farmers to be 
raised as apprentices. It was not u n c o m m o n for the Boers to organize 
c o m m a n d o raids on neighbouring African states purely for the purposes 
of capturing children. Even though the Transvaal laws prohibited the sale 
of these children from one farmer to another, the whole system smacked 
of slavery and was denounced by the missionaries and traders as such.23 
T h e Boers claimed the Transvaal and its people by right of their conquest 
and expulsion of the Ndebele. They therefore felt themselves entitled to 
demand submission and services from all Africans to the south of the 
Limpopo. These impositions were stiffly resisted by the Tswana in the 
west, the Sotho and Venda in the north and the Pedi in the east. For 
instance, the K w e n a of Sechele around D i m a w e and the Ngwaketse of 
chief Gaseitsiwe around Kenye used guns bought from missionaries and 
traders to resist the Boers. In this way they were able to maintain their 
independence so that their territories were used by missionaries and traders 
w h o were not permitted to pass through the Transvaal on their way to the 
north. 
In the east the Pedi resisted the military poundings of the Ohrigstad-
Lydenburg Boers until a border was drawn between the two communities 
along the Steelport river in 1857. At the same time the Pedi quickly learned 
the importance and effectiveness of guns in warfare, particularly w h e n used 
in combination with their Lulu mountain fortresses. A s early as the 1850s 
they therefore strove to build large stocks of firearms by purchasing them 
22. W . Kistner, 1952, p. 213. 
23. L . Thompson, 1969b, pp. 435-7; for the Cape Colonial system in the earlier years, 
see A . Atmore and S. Marks, 1974, p. 116. 
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from traders a n d working for t h e m as migrant labourers in Natal, the C a p e 
Colony a n d , w h e n the d i a m o n d m i n e s w e r e opened , Griqualand W e s t . 2 4 
In the north it w a s the V e n d a , the Transvaal N d e b e l e and Sotho w h o 
resisted the B o e r expansion. In 1854, for instance, the people of the Sotho 
chief M a k a p a n e east of the W a t b e r g ranges killed twelve m e m b e r s of a 
white hunting party u n d e r the leadership of the Boer military c o m m a n d e r , 
H e r m a n u s Potgieter. T h e s e whites behaved in an overbearing m a n n e r to 
Chief M a k a p a n e , apparently ' d e m a n d i n g oxen a n d sheep for slaughter 
without p a y m e n t , and forcing blacks to give t h e m several children for 
slaves.'25 W h a t e v e r the specific reasons, it w a s clear that M a k a p a n e wanted 
to keep his country clear of the whites, perhaps for fear of competition in 
ivory hunting. T h e killing of the white hunters signalled a fairly general 
attack o n white settlements south of the Zoutpansberg. T h e Boer c o m -
munities in the area a n d even those as far south as Potchefstroom and 
Rustenburg all sheltered their families in laagers. A large Boer c o m m a n d o 
of 500 troops w a s raised f rom all the Transvaal districts, except L y d e n b u r g , 
and it invaded the M a k a p a n e chiefdom u n d e r the joint c o m m a n d of P . 
Potgieter a n d President Pretorius. W a r n e d of the approaching invasion, 
the Sotho retreated into their nearby cave a n d m a d e ready to fire on the 
approaching e n e m y . Effectively checked f rom flushing out the Sotho, the 
Boers blocked the entrance of the cave with w o o d a n d stones a n d guarded 
it against a n y b o d y trying to escape for twenty-five days. It w a s estimated 
that 9 0 0 of M a k a p a n e ' s people were killed trying to escape and that 
m o r e than double that n u m b e r perished in the cave from starvation and 
thirst.26 
T h e Boers retired, convinced that the massacre w o u l d serve as a deterrent 
to further resistance from the Sotho a n d V e n d a of the north. B u t in 1859 
another rising occurred, this time a little further north, around the Boer 
village of Schoemansdaa l . T h e Boer administration in that village imposed 
heavy d e m a n d s o n the local Africans, b y supporting rebels, exacting tribute 
and wag ing unprovoked wars on the chiefdoms in order to capture slaves. 
Although the Africans w e r e defeated, the B o e r administration thereafter 
lost control of the blacks. 
B y the 1860s the V e n d a of Zoutpansberg h a d incorporated firearms into 
their military a n d hunting techniques. Their country t eemed with elephants 
and w a s therefore frequently visited b y white hunters a n d traders. M a n y 
of the V e n d a entered the service of the hunters and acquired m a r k s m a n s h i p 
and skills to maintain guns . A s the elephant zone receded into the tsetse-
fly zone of the L i m p o p o valley, hunting o n horseback, at wh ich the whites 
were adept, gave w a y to hunting o n foot. T h e latter w a s d o n e b y the 
Africans, w h o were loaned g u n s b y white merchants a n d were called swart-
24. P. Delius, 1980. 
25. G . M . Theal, 1900, p. 27. 
26. ibid., pp. 23-31. 
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skuts (black shots or black marksmen). M a n y of these guns were in the end 
not returned to their white owners but were in fact used to drive the Boer 
settlers out of the Schoemansdaal settlement. In fact, one of the leaders of 
the uprising of 1867, the Venda chief Makhado, was a former swart-
skut. T h e 1867 uprising was so effective that the Boers abandoned the 
Zoutpansberg district.27 
Meanwhile the Boers of the Orange Free State dealt mostly with the 
Southern Sotho of Moshoeshoe, the Rolong of Moroka and the Griqua of 
A d a m K o k . T h e latter ceased to be a factor in 1861 when he sold his land 
rights to the Orange Free State and migrated to Nomansland and founded 
another East Griqualand. Moroka too remained a faithful client of the 
Orange Free State. 
T h e Sotho of Moshoeshoe remained determined to resist the Boer 
expansion. Even though the king had signed the Treaty of Aliwal North 
in 1858, implying his acceptance of the Warden boundary, he had no 
intention of enforcing it on his people, w h o contined to violate the border. 
However, by the 1860s the balance of power was tipping in favour of the 
Boers. T h e king was old and losing control, particularly over his sons, w h o 
were already vying with each other for the succession. T h e Free State on 
the other hand was growing in strength. T h e economy was becoming 
healthy as the farmers strove to improve their livestock, the products of 
which found easy markets in Natal and the Cape Colony. Its population 
was expanding as the result of immigration from the colonies. By the 
1860s the Free Staters, too, had a fair amount of commitment to their 
independence to the extent that President Brand could count on them to 
fight a prolonged war with patriotic zeal. Consequently, when the 1865 
war broke out following numerous border violations on both sides, the 
Boers were able to sustain a ruthless campaign against Lesotho, while it 
was the Sotho w h o showed signs of disunity. Molapo, Moshoeshoe's son, 
governing the northern part of the country, concluded a separate peace 
treaty with the Boers. Such lack of unity forced Moshoeshoe to sign the 
Treaty of Thaba Bosiu in 1866 under which he lost a great deal of his 
arable lands to the Orange Free State. But Moshoeshoe did this only to 
gain time to reorganize his people; in 1867 another war broke out and 
dragged on until the British intervened. 
As early as 1861 Moshoeshoe had asked for British protection and 
repeated the request in 1865 through Sir Philip Wodehouse, the Governor 
and High Commissioner. Wodehouse was in favour of British expansion 
in South Africa and saw the annexation of Lesotho as a step in the 
right direction. Thus, at the same time as he was persuading the British 
government to accede to Moshoeshoe's request, he was also taking steps 
to cut off arms supplies to the Boers to ensure that the Orange Free State 
would not be able to take over Lesotho. W h e n the British government 
27. L . Thompson, 1969b, pp. 440-2; R . Wagner, 1980, pp. 330-6. 
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agreed to take Lesotho, Wodehouse annexed it as a C r o w n Colony on 12 
March 1868. 
British expansion in South Africa 1870-80 
T h e annexation of Lesotho represented a change in the British policy of 
withdrawal from territory north of the Orange river. T h e change became 
even more apparent with the disallowing of Transvaal territorial expansion 
in 1868 and the annexation of Griqualand West in 1871. British expansion 
coincided with the era of mineral discoveries in Southern Africa. In 1867 
a diamond was picked up at H o p e T o w n in the Cape Colony, and the 
following year alluvial and dry digging for diamonds started along the Vaal 
river towards its junction with the Orange river. In 1868 an elephant hunter 
called Henry Hartley and Carl M a u c h , a geologist, reported the existence 
of gold deposits between the Ndebele and Ngwato countries as well as in 
Mashonaland. Even though the gold discoveries proved largely illusory, 
they initially aroused a great deal of interest both in South Africa and 
Britain, while diamond mining grew rapidly into a major South African 
industry. 
President Pretorius, whose state seemed chronically poor, saw a chance 
of pulling it out of its predicament by enlarging its borders in such a way 
that it encompassed most of the k n o w n mineral deposits and had an outlet 
to the sea. In April 1868 he announced that his republic stretched north 
and west to Lake N g a m i and east to include a small section of the coast 
line south of Delagoa Bay. T h e Portuguese, w h o had the tiny village of 
Maputo near Delagoa Bay, and the British missionaries and traders whose 
road to Central Africa was threatened, all protested vigorously and put 
pressure on the government to prevent the Boer expansion. By 1869 
Pretorius had given up his territorial ambitions. 
T h e discovery of diamonds meanwhile sparked off territorial disputes 
among the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Waterboer's Griqualand West, 
the Rolong and the Tlhaping. T h e Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
claims clashed in the area between the Harts and the Vaal rivers, so that 
President Brand withdrew in favour of President Pretorius of the Transvaal. 
Pretorius and the African states submitted their cases for arbitration by 
the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, Robert Keate, and Pretorius lost his 
case to the Africans. Brand, on the other hand, pleaded to have his territorial 
conflicts with Griqualand West submitted for arbitration. This was rejected 
by the British, for fear of having their position as the paramount power in 
Southern Africa challenged. Waterboer then applied for British protection, 
and Britain annexed not only Griqualand West but also the rest of the 
diamond fields on 27 October 1871. 
T h e declaration of a protectorate over Lesotho, which Brand believed 
was timed to prevent its conquest and absorption by the Boers, the 
limitations imposed on the Transvaal's territorial aggrandizement, and the 
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snatching away of the diamond fields, all embittered the Boers to the extent 
that for m a n y years to c o m e the British forfeited their co-operation and 
indeed also reinforced the Boer determination to resist being brought back 
under British hegemony by physical force. This ensuing era of fresh 
British expansion in Southern Africa has generated m u c h discussion a m o n g 
historians. Antony Atmore and Shula Marks 2 8 in particular have s u m -
marized succinctly the current interpretations and have gone on to offer 
some new ideas which, in turn, have generated further research.29 
Atmore and Marks argue that the scholars w h o have relied most heavily 
on 'the official record' such as R . Robinson and J. Gallagher, broadly 
recognize the importance of economic factors in explaining late nineteenth-
century British imperialism, 'but veer sharply away from any further and 
more precise economic analysis of the events they portray, whether in 
South Africa or elsewhere.' Instead, the 'official mind' historians see British 
expansion, in the final analysis, as occurring w h e n policy-makers are drawn 
irresistibly into the African (including the South African) interior to stop 
'crises or emergencies' on the 'frontier' or 'periphery' of their formal 
colonial holdings or informal empire. However , what is omitted, Atmore 
and Marks point out, is the thorough analysis of these crises, which in the 
end proved so crucial for the creation of the British empire. In fact, w h e n 
these crises are explored, they reveal that they were actually 'related to the 
break-down of indigenous authorities under the weight of the demands of 
an increasingly industrialized Britain.' In the early nineteenth century these 
pressures occurred mostly on the eastern front in South Africa, where the 
informal agents of industrialized Britain - the missionaries, traders, and 
administrators - were active. But with mineral discoveries in the interior 
in the late nineteenth century, the demands of industrialized Britain rapidly 
shifted there and were imposed upon both the African states and the Boer 
republics. T h u s , although the strategic importance of the Cape on the sea 
route to India continued to influence British imperial policy in South 
Africa in the late nineteenth century, expanding British economic interests 
in the subcontinent weighed preponderantly. 
These British interests demanded vast supplies of African labour that 
could not be secured if Africans retained their independence and economic 
self-sufficiency. Their kingdoms therefore had to be smashed and their 
people proletarianized. T h e rapid industrialization of South Africa called 
for the subordination of the white states as well. T h e reason was that 
both the colonies and the Boer republics were incapable 'of successfully 
performing the role of collaborators'. W h a t followed this assessment was 
an extremely 'complex and confused situation', in which, a m o n g other 
28. A . Atmore and S. Marks, 1974; see also C . de B . W e b b , 1981, which distinguishes 
Marks and Atmore's 'radical' interpretations from those of the 'conservatives' and 'liberals'. 
29. See for instance the collected papers and illuminating Introduction in S. Marks and 
A . Atmore (eds.), 1980. 
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things, the British government sought to secure its interests by promoting 
a subordinate confederation in South Africa. Again, 'official mind' 
historians, the best example of them in this case being C . F . Goodfellow,30 
have explained the genesis and operation of the confederation policy -
which reached its climax in the annexation of the Transvaal, initiated the 
fall of the Zulu kingdom, and led to the destruction of the Pedi state - in 
terms of the personalities of the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnar-
von, and the Governor and High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere. Atmore 
and Marks argue that, though this m a y well have been true, the solutions 
offered by the confederation policy satisfied almost uniquely British inter-
ests and socio-economic imperatives in South Africa. 
It is therefore possible that the Transvaal m a y have been annexed to 
release the African labour locked up by the pass laws of 1873 and 1874 so 
that workers could flow freely to the diamond mines and railway con-
struction in the Cape Colony. Besides, the Transvaal obstructed the free 
flow of African labour by permitting the activities of British and colonial 
land speculators w h o subsisted on profits from rents paid by the African 
farm squatters. T h e squatters had little intention of selling their labour to 
the miners and other white employers because they had sufficient land to 
produce crops for their o w n consumption and for sale in order to pay taxes. 
For these reasons the Transvaal, like the Zulu kingdom whose military 
system held up labour supplies, had to go. 
Indeed, N o r m a n Etherington31 goes a long way to substantiating the 
views of Atmore and Marks w h e n he shows that after the discovery of 
diamonds, African labour was drawn from all over the subcontinent, 
including what are today Mozambique and Z imbabwe , and that the Trans-
vaal, Orange Free State and the Zulu kingdom obstructed its free flow. 
Moreover, Shepstone, the key source of information in the 1870s for British 
policy-makers and operators, was not only concerned about immediate 
solutions to the problem of securing African labour for the British capital-
ists, but looked further to see the solution to the whole problem as lying 
in a federation of the white states with a c o m m o n African policy. Clearly, 
therefore, some accounts of British imperialism in South Africa have 
neglected the growing economic importance of the region to Britain, a 
situation which became increasingly apparent at the end of the 1860s with 
the discovery of diamonds and reports of gold deposits, and most evident 
in the i88os when gold began to be mined in the Witwatersrand. 
Between 1871 and 1874, however, the British government tried to secure 
a federation of the South African states and thereby to guarantee the 
security of its interests in South Africa by means of persuasion. W h e n 
Britain granted the Cape Colony responsible government, it was with the 
hope that the Colony would take over the Lesotho labour reservoir and the 
30. C . F . Goodfellow, 1966. 
31. N . Etherington, 1979. 
167 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
diamond-rich Griqualand West so that the Cape would emerge as the most 
powerful state and draw to itself the rest of the white settlements. T o the 
disappointment of the British, the Cape government agreed to annex 
Lesotho but turned d o w n the offer of Griqualand West. T h e offer was 
refused because the Cape had a large Boer population that sympathized 
with the republics, which never gave up their claims to the diamond fields. 
B y the middle of 1873, Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, confessed 
that the quarrels over the diamond mines stood in the way of a South 
African confederation and stopped pressing for it.32 
Lord Carnarvon, w h o succeeded Kimberley in February 1874, resusci-
tated the federation policy and officially launched it on 4 M a y 1875. It 
seemed to be the only antidote to the festering ills of South Africa, 
which were epitomized by Griqualand West, where labour supplies were 
desperately short, imperial expenses on defence and administration high, 
territorial disputes deafening, and guns easily obtained by the Africans 
w h o then, in defence of their independence, turned the same firearms on 
the white m e n . T h e n there was the unsolved Langalibalele uprising, whose 
handling by the Natal whites exposed the dangerous weakness of the 
individual white states in confronting Africans with easy access to guns. 
In 1873 Langalibalele of the Hlubi refused to register the guns that his 
people had procured - mostly from the diamond fields - and this was 
interpreted by the Natal government as an act of rebellion. Shepstone and 
the Lieutenant-Governor raised an army to invade his kingdom, but the 
Hlubi chief escaped to Lesotho, where he was betrayed by Molapo, the 
Sotho chief, and handed back to his enemies. In the only encounter that 
took place with the Hlubi and their neighbours, the Natal troops ran away 
and in the process some of them were killed. But the Natal government in 
the end dealt with the Hlubi in a most cowardly and vindictive manner. 
Even before the Chief, Langalibalele, was apprehended, the government 
inflicted measures that were disproportionate to the crime committed. His 
chiefdom was erased, his cattle and horses impounded, his land taken away 
and his subjects distributed to farmers as indentured labourers. W h e n 
finally the chief was summarily tried and found guilty, he was banished 
for life and imprisoned on Robben Island. 
It was quite clear to the British government, which was also impressed 
by the arguments of the Anglican Bishop, John William Colenso, the only 
stout defender of the Hlubi chief, that injustices done to the Hlubi were 
the result of the excessive dread of the blacks held by the whites. Actual 
contacts made by Langalibalele with the Sotho, Ndebele, and Zulu before 
the rising, or rumours of them, further raised the spectre of a general 
African uprising against the balkanized whites in South Africa. Advised 
by Shepstone and others, Lord Carnarvon saw federation as the only 
answer to the 'terrible labyrinth' of South Africa.33 
32. C . W . D e Kiewiet, 1937, ch. 2; C . F . Goodfellow, 1966, ch. 3. 
33. E . H . Brookes and C . de B . W e b b , 1965, pp. 113-20; N . A . Etherington, 1979, 
pp. 246-7; N . A . Etherington, 1981, pp. 34-7. 
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As a first step, Lord Carnarvon secured the appointment of Sir Garnet 
Wolseley, recently returned from Kumasi where he had defeated the 
Asante, to deal with the Natal difficulties. Wolseley was instructed to gain 
control of African affairs for the Crown and to delay responsible government 
for the whites in preparation for a South African federation.34 Since peaceful 
approaches would be pursued, Carnarvon became conciliatory to the Boers 
by dangling a settlement of the diamond fields disputes. In 1875 he 
proposed a conference of the colonies and republics where minor issues 
such as a c o m m o n African policy and territorial misunderstandings would 
be discussed as a prelude to the main issue of confederation. T h e mistake 
Carnarvon m a d e was to suggest the names of the delegates and, in fact, he 
blundered gravely when he appeared to support the division of the Cape 
Colony by inviting the secessionist and leader of the opposition, John 
Paterson, as representative of the easterners and the Prime Minister, John 
Charles Molteno, as representative of the westerners. T h e result was that 
the Cape Colony and the republics, which were still aggrieved at the loss 
of the diamond fields, refused to participate, leaving Natal and Griqualand 
West as the only willing ones. 
After this fiasco, Carnarvon called another conference in London in 
August 1876. T h e conference was again a failure. President Brand of the 
Orange Free State negotiated a settlement of his claim to the diamond 
fields and received £90 000 as compensation but then refused to be drawn 
into discussions concerning federation. Highly sensitive to imperial inter-
ference and jealously guarding the responsible status of his country, Prime 
Minister Molteno, w h o happened to be in London at the time, also refused 
to attend the conference, saying he had no mandate from his government 
to do so. Only Griqualand and Natal came to the conference, so nothing 
could be accomplished. This second failure drove Carnarvon 'as far as his 
impatience, his patriotism, and his amour propre would allow.'35 H e resolved 
to use more forceful measures to unite South Africa. 
Lord Carnarvon's first target was the Transvaal. His chance came when 
he received a telegram in September 1876 from the High Commissioner 
which exaggerated the predicament of the Transvaal at the hands of the 
Pedi of Sekhukhune.36 T h e Transvaal had gone to war with the Pedi in 
M a y 1876 for a number of reasons. In the 1860s and early 1870s, the Pedi 
population and power grew rapidly. M a n y neighbouring African societies 
that wished to escape the labour demands and taxes imposed on them by 
the Boers attached themselves to the Pedi kingdom, while others were 
coerced into doing so. A s already pointed out, the Pedi were also actively 
building up their firearms supplies. T h e Pedi population expansion 
immediately deprived the Boers of labour supplies, as their territorial 
34. C . F . Goodfellow, 1966, p. 62. 
35. ibid., p . n o . 
36. ibid., p. 114. 
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extensions took them into the disputed areas, where they clashed with the 
Lydenburgers. Matters came to a head w h e n the Pedi prince, Johannes 
Dinkwanyane, prevented a Boer from occupying a piece of land and again 
when a Pedi contingent forced the African residents of a Berlin mission 
station to abandon it. T h e Transvaal President, J.J. Burgers, w h o was 
looking for loans to build a railway to the sea, wanted to crush the Pedi 
disturbances as a way of building up the confidence of investors in his 
republic. Burgers could also not ignore the Lydenburgers' call for firm 
action against their 'troublesome' Pedi neighbours and he therefore led the 
republic to war.37 
With the assistance of the Swazi, Burgers launched a three-pronged 
attack on Sekhukhune's Lulu mountain fortress. T h e Lydenburgers and 
the Swazi carried out their operations from the east where the first target 
was the stronghold of prince Dinkwanyane. Meanwhile, Burgers' c o m -
m a n d o swept its way from the west, the plan being that the two forces, 
together with a third, would ultimately converge on Sekhukhune. Because 
of the half-hearted show put up by the Boers, w h o left the Swazi to do 
most of the fighting and to sustain heavy casualties, the latter abandoned 
the struggle. A s soon as the Swazi left, Boer morale crumbled very quickly 
and they started to desert before they could make any assault on Sekhu-
khune's fortress. Undermining Boer patriotism were their several griev-
ances against Burgers, w h o m they accused of heresy, a wrong education 
policy and poor economic planning. Moreover, the Boers from the western 
districts were not as committed as the eastern Lydenburgers to the struggle 
against the Pedi because they were not directly affected by Pedi pressures 
and resistance and there did not seem to be any personal gain expected 
from the war.38. 
After Burgers' withdrawal, the local Boers continued to harass Sekhu-
khune, and, because it was the planting season, he agreed to negotiate a 
truce. Philip Bonner rightly points out that in that war neither the Boers 
nor the Pedi were defeated, 'the situation had reached a stalemate, with 
neither side holding any decisive advantage.'39 It was only in 1879 that the 
British, with their Swazi allies, managed to overpower the Pedi kingdom 
and to capture Sekhukhune.40 
T h e British, however, took the 1876 Boer fiasco to be a thorough defeat 
and a signal for the impending collapse of the Transvaal. Carnarvon 
appointed Shepstone to be the Special Commissioner for the Transvaal 
and on 9 October 1876 empowered him to take over the republic with or 
without the consent of its volksraad. Various motives for the annexation of 
the Transvaal have been suggested. T h e Transvaal was known to contain 
37. P. Bonner, 1983, pp. 137-4°-
38. ibid., p. 143. 
39. ibid., p. 144. 
40. L . Thompson, 1971, p. 282. 
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mineral deposits that m a d e it potentially the richest part of South Africa. 
T h e Transvaal blocked the free flow of labour from within Transvaal 
and from the neighbouring regions. T h e Transvaal government was also 
threatening to build a railway to Delagoa Bay so that it could not only be 
independent of the British colonial harbours but also threaten British 
supremacy by entering into relations with foreign powers. Carnarvon 
further calculated that the annexation of the Transvaal would result in the 
encirclement of the Orange Free State and therefore force the latter to 
come to terms. Shepstone's take-over of the Transvaal on 12 April 1877, 
though clumsy and not calculated to conciliate the Boers, was relatively 
simple because the republic was bankrupt and its president unpopular.41 
Having annexed it, Carnarvon appointed Sir Bartle Frere as the Governor 
and High Commissioner to carry his 'scheme of federation into effect.'42 
Frere's task was far from easy. T h e Cape Colony refused to take the 
lead in the confederation movement; its leaders regarded the British efforts 
to encourage it to do so as unwanted interference with its responsible 
status. T h e Orange Free State was also against being dragged into the 
union. W h e n in 1878 Frere invited its leaders to a conference to discuss 
the issue, President Brand replied that the republic was doing so well in 
every sphere of life that its leaders could not contemplate the loss of its 
independence. T h e Transvaal could have been forced to unite with the 
other states under the annexation arrangements. But Shepstone's admin-
istration failed to conciliate the Boers, so that they remained as wedded as 
ever to the idea of disannexation. Besides, Shepstone himself became so 
embroiled in the Transvaal-Zululand border disputes that w h e n he was 
requested to offer his opinion on confederation in 1878 he replied that he 
had 'scarcely been able to think sufficiently of it to give you m y opinion', 
and asked for 'a little free breathing'.43 Only Natal was willing to confer 
on the issue. Consequently Carnarvon was forced to resign on a matter 
unrelated to South Africa in January 1878 when his federation dream was 
nowhere near realization. 
F r o m the standpoint of securing British interests in Southern Africa, 
Frere was an ideal choice with the right vision. H e wanted to impose a 
South African confederation built 'upon European self-government and 
the subjugation and civilization of the Africans'.44 'Subjugation' and 'civi-
lization' meant basically the transformation of the African societies into 
labour reservoirs for British and colonial enterprises, and markets for 
industrialized Britain, while 'European self-government' would safeguard 
British capitalist investments. Frere decided that the African aspect of the 
confederation should be dealt with first. His vision encompassed the whole 
41. C . F.J. Muller, (ed.), 1975. VV- 263-4-
42. C . F . Goodfellow, 1966, p. 123. 
43. ibid., p. 147. 
44. ibid., p. 155. 
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subcontinent, so that the Tswana, the Xhosa, Zulu, Ndebele and Shona 
societies all had to be annexed by declaring protectorates or by conquest. 
O f immediate and practical significance was Zululand, whose border 
disputes with the Transvaal could be utilized to manufacture a casus belli. 
T h e disputed territory was an appropriate issue for Frere, and indeed the 
Colonial Office, in that it entangled Natal, Zululand and the Transvaal and 
involved Shepstone, w h o had always nursed grand ambitions around it. 
Its history dated to as far back as the 1850s. In 1856 Cetshwayo had gone 
some way towards guaranteeing the next Zulu succession for himself by 
annihilating Mbulazi, a possible contender, and his faction. Thereafter 
Cetshwayo co-ruled with M p a n d e , before the latter's death in 1872. But 
Cetshwayo still feared another of Mpande's sons, M k u n g u , w h o lived in 
Natal under the protection of Bishop Colenso and Shepstone. His fears 
seemed to materialize in the 1860s when there were rumours of a possible 
Natal invasion of Zululand, and these spread to the Transvaal and were 
taken advantage of by some Transvaalers. In 1861 some Transvaal Boers 
sent messages to Cetshwayo purporting to confirm the rumours and then 
offering to guarantee his succession and later his coronation in return for 
land in the territory under dispute. Cetshwayo m a d e empty promises which 
he never bothered to follow up. 
At the same time, Shepstone, w h o had since the 1850s yearned to found 
a black kingdom with a white administration that was self-financing, and 
free from settler interference, n o w saw a chance of realizing his ambition 
in the disputed territory. A s soon as he got wind of the Boer c o m -
munications with the Zulu, he rushed to Cetshwayo and on behalf of the 
Natal government confirmed him as the Zulu heir apparent. F r o m this 
point on, however, the Boers took up farms in the Utrecht district, the 
disputed territory. T h e Zulu refrained from throwing them out by force 
but turned to the British government to take over the Utrecht district so 
that it would form a buffer against the Transvaal. 
For years Shepstone urged the British government to accept the Zulu 
offer, arguing that it would serve to settle the excess Natal black population 
and prevent the Transvaal from reaching the sea through Zululand. Shep-
stone's idea became even more significant in the 1870s, the years of labour 
shortages in Natal, the Cape Colony and Griqualand West. It was soon 
discovered that migrant labour routes ran through the Transvaal, Zululand, 
and the disputed territory. Since both states interfered with the routes, a 
Shepstone kingdom between them would become the safest corridor. For 
as long as Shepstone had his eyes on his possible black state, he supported 
Cetshwayo's territorial claims against the Transvaal, because he needed 
the Zulu king's co-operation. Indeed that was w h y he attended Cetshwayo's 
coronation in 1873. 
Moreover, Shepstone believed strongly that if Britain wanted to control 
all the African states in Southern Africa it had to start by controlling and 
influencing the Zulu kingdom. But once Shepstone became the ruler of 
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the Transvaal he changed sides and began to support the territorial claims 
of the Boers. T h e reason was perfectly simple: ' N o w he had only to uphold 
the Transvaal claims in order to secure the corridor free of charge.'45 T h e 
only danger to his objective, indeed to the peace of the whole subcontinent, 
remained the Zulu kingdom, which had to be destroyed. In this, Frere 
and the Colonial Office, which had taken up Shepstone's views in 1874, 
concurred. 
W h e n Shepstone sailed to Natal in 1878 his aim was not to go and settle 
the territorial dispute but to use the whole issue to force a war on Cetshwayo. 
T h e Commission set up on 26 February 1878 by Sir Henry Bui wer, the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, had recommended a boundary that was 
favourable to the Zulu. But Frere's proposed implementation was simply 
calculated to provoke strong Zulu objections in that the Boer farmers on 
the Zulu side of the boundary were not to be evicted. 
T h e second issue Frere clutched at was that of Chief Sirayo. T h e sons 
of Sirayo pursued two wives of the chief into Natal on 28 July 1878 and 
brought them back to Zululand where they were tried and executed. T h e 
Natal government protested to Cetshwayo that some of his subjects had 
violated the Natal border, and demanded that Sirayo's sons be sent over 
to Natal for trial. Cetshwayo's response was to send a fine of £50 and to 
apologize for the rash and irresponsible behaviour of the youths. Frere 
took the matter up in December 1878 and demanded 500 head of cattle 
from Cetshwayo for defying the Natal government and that the Sirayo 
culprits should be handed over. W h e n war broke out, Cetshwayo was still 
trying to collect the cattle to pay the fine. 
Then in September 1878 two Natal whites strayed into Zululand and 
were roughly handled by the Zulu border guards, but they were not injured. 
Frere blew the whole event out of proportion by saying it was 'a most 
serious insult and outrage and should be severely punished.'46 Besides, 
Frere claimed that Cetshwayo had scared the missionaries out of his 
kingdom and that he must let them go back to their stations unmolested. 
Most likely the missionaries had left on the advice of Shepstone, w h o knew 
of the impending war, just as he had done in 1877.47 
O n 11 December 1878 the full ultimatum was delivered to the Zulu 
representatives. It demanded the dismantling of the Zulu army, acceptance 
of a British resident, reinstatement of all the missionaries, and payment of 
fines from the various alleged violations of the Natal border and persons.48 
T h e ultimatum was simply impossible to meet within the specified twenty 
to thirty days. W h e n the time expired, the British forces under Lieutenant-
General Lord Chelmsford invaded the Zulu kingdom on 10 January 1879. 
45. N . A . Etherington, 1981, p .41 . 
46. E . H . Brookes and C . de B . W e b b , 1965, p. 133. 
47. N . A . Etherington, 1981, p .42 . 
48. E . Brookes and C . de B . W e b b , 1965, p. 134. 
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Chelmsford's army consisted of 15000 soldiers, m a n y of w h o m were 
Africans drafted in Natal, while Cetshwayo's force probably numbered 
45000. T h e major advantage enjoyed by the British was their firearms, 
which were most effective when used in combination with such defensive 
measures as trenches, walls of waggons or sandbags. T h e Zulu, on the 
other hand, fought with spears and shields and had a limited number of 
guns which they had not yet integrated fully into their military technology 
and training. T h e shields were useless against bullets. T h e spears were 
devastatingly lethal in close combat, but the Zulu were not allowed to 
profit from this advantage by the British army, which fired at them from 
a long distance. T h e result was that in nearly all the battles the Zulu 
suffered enormous casualties while striving to get near their enemies. It 
was only at Isandhlwana on 22 January 1879 that the Zulu tackled a British 
column in the open and thoroughly beat it. T h e fighting, however, came 
to an end on 7 July 1879 when Chelmsford defeated the Zulu at Ulundi. 
Cetshwayo was hunted down, captured in August and then shipped off to 
Cape T o w n for imprisonment. 
A s Jeff G u y argues, the Ulundi defeat did not lead to the destruction of 
the Zulu kingdom. W h a t finally destroyed the kingdom were the political 
arrangements made by Sir Garnet Wolseley, w h o was appointed High 
Commissioner for South Eastern Africa with supreme authority, both civil 
and military, over Natal, the Transvaal and Zululand; he took over from 
Lord Chelmsford on 4 July 1879. H e did not annex Zululand but split the 
kingdom into thirteen independent chiefdoms. S o m e of the new chiefs 
found it almost impossible to govern because of the resistance put up 
by m a n y leading personalities of the pre-war period w h o were denied posi-
tions in the new political dispensation. T h e new chiefs resorted to 
ruling by violence, leading to the killing of m a n y people and general dis-
order in the country. T h e result was a civil war which raged well into the 
1880s.49 
Meanwhile, none of the objectives for which the Zulu war had been 
fought were realized. It had been fought primarily as a prelude to in-
corporating the African states into a federation, but the results went in 
opposite directions. Frere, the moving spirit on the spot behind the scheme 
was, as w e have seen, superseded by Wolseley w h o was sent to make peace 
even at the expense of federation. Besides, the Zulu war was followed by 
the Anglo-Boer W a r (1880-1) and the Cape-Lesotho W a r (1880-1), which 
sealed the death of the federation scheme. 
T h e Boers in the Transvaal never accepted the loss of their independence, 
and for three years they tried all peaceful means to persuade the British to 
pull out. T h e Boer resolve to recapture power from the British solidified 
with each failure of their pacific effort. In 1877 they sent a deputation to 
London to go and protest against annexation. Lord Carnarvon adamantly 
49. J.J. G u y , 1980, chs 3, 4, 5; J.J. G u y , 1981. 
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refused to consider dis-annexation but was prepared to discuss Boer self-
rule within a South African confederation. Paul Kruger, the most important 
delegate, requested a referendum in which the Boers would decide what 
form of government they wanted under the British C r o w n but flatly refused 
to have anything to do with the confederation.50 W h e n the delegates 
reported the results of their fruitless mission at a rally in Pretoria at the 
end of 1877, m a n y Boers demanded armed resistance. But the leaders 
seemed convinced that if the results of a referendum showed conclusively 
that the Boers were against annexation, Carnarvon would grant them their 
independence. A referendum was duly conducted, and by a vast majority 
the Boers rejected British rule. 
A second delegation was sent to London to go and elaborate on the 
Boer views to the Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, w h o had 
succeeded Lord Carnarvon. T h e n e w Colonial Secretary again refused to 
give up the Transvaal. W h e n the delegation reported back at a huge 
gathering, the cry for a war of liberation was heard again, only this time 
louder than before. But still the leaders insisted on exhausting all the 
peaceful means of achieving independence. But before dispersing they sent 
an emissary to go and confer with Frere, w h o was in Natal, and at the same 
time they vowed solemnly to strive unto death for the restoration of their 
republic. Frere came up to the Transvaal and met the Boers but he still 
emphasized that they could obtain self-rule and economic aid under the 
C r o w n and nothing else. H e also agreed to forward a fresh petition to the 
British government but nothing came of this either. 
Further, in M a r c h 1879, Shepstone was replaced by O w e n Lanyon, 
whose understanding of the Transvaal was limited, and Frere by Wolseley, 
a military m a n w h o believed not in diplomacy but in brute force. T h e 
actions of both officials helped to harden the Boer determination to try to 
regain their independence by force. O n 15 December 1879 a large rally 
attended by over 6000 Boers was held at Wonderfontein and resolved to 
discard peaceful methods of seeking independence, to reject the status of 
British subjects, and to set up as soon as possible a republican government. 
Wolseley arrested those he considered to be ringleaders and only released 
them on bail. At that point the Boers began to pin their hopes on the 
new Liberal Government in Britain whose leader, Gladstone, while in 
opposition, had spoken sympathetically of the Transvaal's need for inde-
pendence. However, when they asked him to live up to his promises, 
Gladstone, like his predecessors, informed the Boers that all they could 
hope for was self-government within a confederation. 
B y December 1880 the patience of the Boers had run out and they 
unilaterally reinstituted their republican government, which was to operate 
for a while from the new capital of Heidelberg. T h e provisional government 
was headed by Paul Kruger, Piet Joubert and M . W . Pretorius. O n 16 
50. C . F . Goodfellow, 1966, pp. 141-4. 
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plate 7.1 Boer commandos, c. 1880
December war broke out when Lanyon refused to give up the admin¬
istration of the Transvaal peacefully. The war was fought throughout the
rest of December and into January, until on 27 February 1881 the Boers
scored their decisive victory against the British at Amajuba hills.
The peace settlement came in the form of the Pretoria Convention,
signed in August 1881. In the settlement, even though the British failed
in their supreme objective of federating the Transvaal with the other
colonies and the Orange Free State, they gained control of African labour
in that a resident would be stationed in Pretoria to supervise Boer African
administration. Secondly, overall British imperial supremacy in the Trans¬
vaal was guaranteed through British control of the republic's external
relations as well as the British right to station and move military forces and
equipment freely about in the Transvaal in time ofwar. The Boers obtained
self-government, which indeed proved to be a stepping stone to greater
freedom. Further negotiations produced the London Convention of 27
February 1884 under which Britain relinquished its control over the
Africans, but retained control of the republic's foreign relations.51
51. C.F.J. Muller (ed.), 1975, pp. 264-72; CF. Goodfellow, 1966, pp. 198-213; L.
Thompson, 1971b; F. A. Van Jaarsveld, 1961.
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Just as the imperial forces were struggling to crush the Boer uprising, 
the Cape colonial forces were fighting the Sotho in a war that broke out 
on 13 September 1880. Just like the first Anglo-Boer W a r , the Lesotho 
armed conflict was intimately related to the British efforts to achieve a 
South African confederation. Both the Cape colonial government and the 
British officials at the Cape wanted to disarm the African states as a first 
step to federation. A n d it was the Sotho rejection of unilateral disarmament 
that led to the Cape-Sotho W a r of 1880-1. 
Since 1872 Lesotho had come under the Cape colonial administration. 
Indeed as part of the efforts to bring South Africa into a union, Gordon 
Sprigg, the Cape Prime Minister w h o had replaced Molteno, had colluded 
with Frere to have the Peace Preservation Bill passed by the Cape Par-
liament in 1878. T h e legislation empowered the government to order 
the Africans in the Cape Colony to surrender their guns in return for 
compensation. T h e law was initially not to apply to Lesotho; but Sprigg, 
w h o was aware of the large quantities of guns in Sotho hands, decided to 
extend it to that kingdom. 
T o the Sotho, guns had considerable social, political and economic 
significance. T h e guns were bought with wages earned at the diamond 
mines, and as such represented an enormous investment in labour. T h e 
Sotho also valued their guns because they might be used in future to defend 
their kingdom, as the long history of their struggle with the Orange Free 
State had only too clearly taught them. T h e possession of a gun by a m a n 
further signified the passage from childhood to adulthood among the Sotho. 
T h e Sotho also suspected that the Cape government did not fully trust 
them. Besides, the chiefs suspected that the Cape government wanted to 
weaken them so as to turn them into slaves. There were further measures 
that drove the Sotho into armed resistance. In 1879 the Cape Colony 
proposed to alienate the Qluthing district to white farmers as a punishment 
for its Sotho chief, Moorosi, w h o had recently rebelled. Such action was 
in complete violation of the British promises to Moshoeshoe that no part 
of his country would be alienated. Moreover, the Cape government also 
announced that the hut tax would be increased to £1. This was utterly 
unacceptable to the Sotho in view of the recent Cape move to appropriate 
£12000 from the Lesotho account to the Cape Colony. 
T h e Sotho tried to come to an understanding with the Cape Colony by 
peaceful means. They protested to Sprigg when he twice came over to their 
country to discuss most of these issues with them; they sent petitions to 
the governor and the Queen of England; they sent delegates to Cape T o w n 
to go and lobby the parliamentarians, but all these efforts came to nothing. 
Meanwhile power in Lesotho shifted from the king, n o w called Para-
mount Chief, Litsie, to the chiefs. T h e king was getting too old and, 
though opposed to the disarmament and other Cape colonial measures, was 
extremely fearful of the adverse effects of an armed resistance that might 
drive out the British and expose the kingdom to the Orange Free State. 
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H e therefore moved out of step with the popular clamour for armed 
struggle and called for peaceful protests. T h e result was that the majority 
supported chiefs Lerotholi, Masopha and Joel, w h o all vowed to oppose 
the Cape government measures by violence and encouraged their people 
to punish the supporters of the colonial administration by destroying and 
confiscating their property and disobeying the magistrates. 
O n 13 September 1880 the Cape moved its forces into Lesotho; war 
then broke out and continued for seven months. For the Cape government, 
the war expenses escalated dramatically and hit the unacceptable level of 
£ 3 000 000. At this point Sir Hercules Robinson, the n e w Governor and 
High Commissioner, began anxiously to seek peace with the Sotho. T h e 
Sotho were also tired of the war at the end of seven months and therefore 
sued for peace. It was a propitious m o m e n t for the Governor to make his 
Award of 29 April 1881. T h e Award still called for surrender of the guns 
in return for compensation; but added that the people could retain them 
as long as they licensed them. A complete amnesty was offered, but a fine 
of 5000 head of cattle had to be paid by the 'rebels' for compensating the 
'loyalists' and traders w h o had lost property during the war. O n the whole, 
therefore, the Sotho had w o n the war since they had fought primarily for 
the retention of their guns. T h e prestige and power of the chiefs, w h o had 
led the successful war, increased enormously at the expense of the king, 
w h o had vacillated at a m o m e n t when the country needed leadership of 
uncompromising militancy. Moreover, the Cape government decided to 
implement its new policy through the chiefs. It was indeed a double victory 
for the Sotho chiefs.52 
T h e Lesotho victory, the non-annexation of the Zulu kingdom and the 
granting of self-rule to the Transvaal marked the end of the British efforts 
to federate the region by force. For the time being the British government 
contented itself with controlling the various parts of South Africa loosely, 
mostly by means of stationing residents w h o monitored the situation. 
Britain would renew its efforts to gain m u c h firmer control after the 
discovery of gold in the mid-i88os. F r o m the point of view of the Africans, 
Britain had done m u c h to reduce their independence. O n the eastern front 
the Ciskei with its large Xhosa, Mfengu, and Khoikhoi population was 
firmly subordinated to the Cape Colony and so too were the Sotho, even 
though the latter enjoyed a large measure of internal freedom. Griqualand 
West had also lost its sovereignty. T h e Zulu and the Pedi were launched 
on the road to self-destruction. T h e arrest of Sekhukhune and the instal-
lation of his rival, M a m p u r u , guaranteed that that kingdom would be torn 
apart by factional fights and therefore ensure its subordination to the 
Transvaal. 
52. S. Burman, 1981, CI1S9-12. 
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A.F. I S A A C M A N 
This chapter1 examines the broad patterns of change that occurred during 
the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century in Central Africa, an 
area encompassing the present-day nations of Malawi, Mozambique , and 
Zambia. Special emphasis is placed on the Zambezi valley region, an 
important zone of economic and cultural exchange and the homeland of 
m a n y of the principal Shona- and Lunda-related states. Rather than merely 
describing the history of the various precolonial kingdoms, w e shall examine 
the region as a whole, with special attention to the changes brought about 
by the progressive incorporation of the region into the world capitalist 
economy and by the Nguni-Sotho diaspora. Together these events altered 
the political m a p of Central Africa and precipitated widespread economic 
and social transformations. Despite the focus on these extra-regional factors 
the indigenous societies were by no means static, and each society's internal 
configuration helped to condition both the initial pattern of interaction 
with the alien merchants and invaders and the ultimate direction of change. 
A n introductory overview of Central Africa at the end of the eighteenth 
century is included in order to place the subsequent developments within 
their appropriate historical perspective. Similarly, the chapter concludes 
with a brief examination of the region on the eve of the European 'Scram-
ble', since the changes that transpired during the nineteenth century carried 
important implications for the subsequent pattern of Central African 
response to European imperialism. 
O n the eve of the nineteenth century 
Although nineteenth-century economic changes and the Nguni-Sotho 
invasions, commonly k n o w n as the Mfecane, had a dramatic impact on 
Central Africa, these events can be viewed as part of a broader pattern of 
political and economic change that antedated the nineteenth century.2 
i. This chapter was commissioned in 1975 and completed in early 1976 and updated in 
1981. I would like to thank Barbara Isaacman, James Johnson and Paul Lovejoy for their 
penetrating criticism of an earlier draft of this manuscript. 
2. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, for example, argues that these events created a disjuncture 
in the history of Central Africa. 
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Throughout the preceding centuries, migrations, state formation and the 
development of long-distance trading systems had altered Central African 
societies. W h a t was unique about the nineteenth century was not change 
itself but the relatively rapid rate of change and the far-reaching impli-
cations that it carried. 
Well before the nineteenth century the Zambezi valley and surrounding 
regions had undergone a major political revolution. Successive Shona and 
Lunda groups had established their pre-eminence over most of the territory 
previously occupied by relatively small-scale agricultural societies. While 
fringe areas such as the Tonga of southern Mozambique or the T u m b u k a 
and lakeside Tonga of contemporary Malawi managed to maintain their 
autonomy, most of the indigenous societies were swept into either the 
Shona or Lunda state system. 
T h e process of state formation probably occurred first in the region 
south of the Zambezi river. B y the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
Shona-speaking immigrants coming from contemporary Zimbabwe had 
imposed their rule over the region stretching southwards from the margins 
of the Zambezi to the Sabi river. At the apex of this powerful kingdom 
was the M w e n e m u t a p a , from w h o m the Shona empire derived its name. 
Although subsequent wars, which reduced the power of the M w e n e m u t a p a , 
enabled several provincial leaders to secede and create autonomous king-
doms, Shona hegemony continued throughout the region. T h e most power-
ful of these independent Shona states — Barue, Manica, Quiteve and 
Changamire - maintained effective control over south-central Mozambique 
until the nineteenth century. Within this zone the only foreign incursion 
occurred along the southern margins of the Zambezi river. There, Por-
tuguese and G o a n settlers and traders established crown estates, or prazos 
da coroa, which were nominally incorporated into Lisbon's colonial empire.3 
T h e expansion of Lunda-related peoples from the Katanga region began 
somewhat later and had not yet reached its completion by the first decades 
of the nineteenth century. T h e Lozi, first of the Lunda immigrants, had 
settled in the fertile Zambezi flood plains two centuries earlier. They were 
followed in quick succession by settlers w h o established the kingdoms of 
Kalonga and Undi in what is n o w Malawi, and to the west the progenitors 
of the Lala, Senga and B e m b a states. B y 1740 the last of the major Lunda 
immigrants - M w a t a K a z e m b e - had settled in the Luapula region. 
Throughout the rest of the century the Lunda consolidated their holdings 
and extended their frontiers by both diplomatic and military activities. B y 
1800 a number of the Lunda-related states, such as Undi, Kalonga and 
Lozi, had reached their apogee, while others - like the B e m b a - were still 
in the process of expansion.4 
3. For a discussion of the Zambezi prazos, see A . Isaacman, 1972a; M . D . D . Newitt, 
1973a. 
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fig. 8.1 Peoples and politics ofCentral Africa, c. 1800-80 (after A. F. Isaacman)
181
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
Allowing for differences in detail, the Shona and L u n d a states were 
structured around similar organizational principles. At the apex stood a 
king believed to have sacred qualities that were either inherent in kingship 
or acquired through rites of investiture. T h e ruler's intimate relationship 
with the supernatural, sanctified by spirit mediums and cult priests, ensured 
the health and well-being of his subjects and the fertility of the land. T h e 
interrelationship between kingship and fertility underpinned the m y s -
tification of the ruler and reinforced his position as symbolic owner and 
spiritual guardian of the land. A s a result, he retained the exclusive right 
to allocate land, which was the basis of control over subordinate chiefs and 
other subjects and underpinned a cycle of reciprocity. In repayment for 
the opportunity to use the king's land and benefit from his divine prowess, 
his subjects were expected to provide specified taxes, labour service and 
tribute that varied from one kingdom to another. Throughout both state 
systems, moreover, the largest tusk of a dead elephant automatically 
belonged to the monarch as owner of the land. In some societies, such as 
Manica, the L u n d a of K a z e m b e , and Undi , the monarch also maintained 
a theoretical monopoly over commerce , while in Changamire's kingdom 
the ruler was the ultimate owner of most cattle.5 These tribute, labour and 
commercial arrangements enhanced the power and wealth of the monarch, 
w h o redistributed to his principal lieutenants a portion of the surplus 
which he extracted, to ensure their continued loyalty. In this respect the 
precolonial central African states organized the flow of scarce resources 
from the dominated classes to the dominant class.6 
Despite these unifying rituals and institutions, a n u m b e r of factors 
militated against the growth of highly centralized kingdoms. A m o n g the 
most important destabilizing factors were the recurring succession crises 
at the royal capital, the reluctance of outlying officials to subordinate their 
economic and political interests to those of the central authority, revolts 
against oppressive leaders w h o violated the 'rule of law', the lack of ethnic 
5. For a critique of the 'trade and politics thesis', as well as a discussion of the significance 
of cattle in the kingdom of Changamire, see S . I. M u d e n g e , 1974. 
6. I have employed the term 'dominant class' to refer to the surplus-appropriating 
aristocracy and its religious and commercial allies w h o governed the Central African states 
and controlled their scarce resources. T h e absence of historically specific analysis of pre-
capitalist Central African economies and, in particular, the lack of detailed reconstruction 
of ' w h o produced what for w h o m ' (the social relations of production in Marxist terms), 
makes it impossible to delineate with any certainty the exact class configuration of the 
states under examination. Before such a synthetic analysis can be undertaken, rigorous 
investigation of specific polities is needed to determine h o w the dominant class maintained 
and reproduced its access to scarce resources, the degree and manner in which it controlled 
and extracted labour and the extent to which these processes helped to shape the develop-
ment of distinct class interests and class consciousness. 
T h e works of C . Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972; C . Meillassoux, 1974; E . Terray, 1972 and 
M . Godelier, 1975, though not in total agreement, represent an important theoretical 
breakthrough for an analysis of class formation. 
182 
The countries of the Zambezi basin 
and cultural homogeneity, and the absence of a standing army to police 
the vast regions of the kingdom. T h e result was an irregular, though 
recurring, pattern of conflict and secession. T h u s , the Shona states of 
Barue, Manica, Quiteve and Changamire all asserted their independence 
from the M w e n e m u t a p a only to be faced with the same problems within 
their o w n homelands.7 A similar pattern characterized the area north of 
the Zambezi, especially in the Malawian kingdoms of Kalonga, Undi and 
Lundu. 8 T h e fragility of m a n y states should not mask the durability of 
more-localized kinship and community networks which provided a bedrock 
of social loyalties and assistance in times of need.9 
Just as far-reaching political changes antedated the nineteenth century, 
so complex trading networks operated throughout the region well before 
the nineteenth-century expansion. Despite tendencies by historians and 
anthropologists to characterize the indigenous societies as 'subsistence 
oriented', commerce in such basic commodities as iron, salt, cloth and 
grain was a regular feature of the indigenous economies and complemented 
the local agricultural sector.10 Thus while most Sena were predominantly 
farmers, a small group of weavers regularly exported their cloth several 
hundred kilometres to the Z u m b o region and the C h e w a homelands where 
it was in great demand.1 1 Similarly, Bisa traders engaged in large-scale 
commerce in iron throughout the eighteenth century,12 the Chewa of 
Kasungu used their salt surplus to acquire T u m b u k a hoes,13 and the Lozi 
national economy was based on the exchange of cattle, fish and a variety 
of manufactured and agricultural products between different regions of the 
kingdom.14 W h a t still requires detailed investigation is not whether the 
exchange of surplus occurred but rather the character of the productive 
system that generated the surplus. 
This pattern of local and inter-regional commerce, buttressed by a 
limited mining and manufacturing sector, helped to shape and sustain trade 
between the interior and the coast. Although the data are fragmentary, 
it is clear that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an 
international network built upon localized trading provided commodities 
for the Indian Ocean ports dominated by Indian and Muslim merchant 
capital. A m o n g the most important were ivory from the Luangwa valley 
and adjacent Undi territory, gold from the mines in the kingdoms of 
7. A . Isaacman, 1973; S. I. Mudenge, 1974; H . H . K . Bhila, 1972; D . Beach, 1980. 
8. H . W . Langworthy, 1971; K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 78-80. 
9. Within the kinship system inequalities also existed; male elders tended to accumulate 
and control scarce resources at the expense of junior male relatives and w o m e n . See C . 
Meillassoux, 1981. 
10. K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 109-37; A . D . Roberts, 1970a. 
11. A . Isaacman, 1972a, p. 73. 
12. A . D . Roberts, 1970a, p.723. 
13. K . M . Phiri, 1975, p. in . 
14. G . L . Caplan, 1970, pp. 6-7. 
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Manica and Changamire and just north of Tete, and copper from the 
Kafue region.15 T h e scale of this trade seems to have been relatively small 
and somewhat irregular until the last two decades of the eighteenth century. 
T h e eastward thrust of the Lunda of Kazembe and their commercial 
alliance with the Bisa, the intensified activities of Yao merchants from the 
coast, and the commercial expansion of the Chikunda traders from the 
Zambezi prazos dramatically increased the level of exports to the Indian 
Ocean entrepôts. All three groups acquired substantial quantities of ivory 
and slaves for the world market, setting the stage for the progressive 
incorporation into the larger world economy, which was based almost 
entirely on the exchange of these two commodities for European m a n u -
factured goods.16 
Transformation in the political and economic systems often generated 
parallel changes in the social and ethnic composition of Central African 
societies. T h e immigration of alien Shona- and Lunda-related peoples 
resulted in widespread intermarriage and even the emergence of entirely 
new ethnic groups, such as the Sena, Zambezi Tonga, and Goba. 1 7 T h e 
immigrants generally succeeded in imposing their core institutions and 
values upon the local population. T h e spread of the Lunda social m e c h -
anism of perpetual kinship and positional succession throughout m u c h of 
the region north of the Zambezi, for example, altered the basic structure 
of kinship and carried profound implications for the transmission of king-
ship.18 O f similar significance was the spread of the Shona M w a r i cult and 
the supporting system of national ancestor spirits (mhondoró) throughout 
the southern tier of the Zambezi. T h e simultaneous introduction of the 
Shona language and symbol system in conjunction with the spread of 
Mwar i must have fundamentally altered the cosmology of the indigenous 
inhabitants.19 Culture change, however, was not unidirectional. Although 
this problem needs to be studied in depth, it is clear that both the Shona 
and Lunda conquerors borrowed cultural elements from the indigenous 
societies, often creating n e w syncretic forms. T h e C h e w a and L u n d u cults 
of Makewana and M b o n a seem to represent such a hybrid,20 as does the 
division between land chief and political chief that characterized the rule 
of the L u n d a of K a z e m b e over the Shila.21 
By the end of the eighteenth century Central Africa had undergone a 
15. A . D . Roberts, 1970a, p.717; S.I. Mudenge , 1974, pp. 384-90; A . F . Isaacman, 
1972a, pp. 75-85; H . H . K . Bhila, 1972. 
16. E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 172-208; A . D . Roberts, 1970a, pp. 727-8; K . M . Phiri, 
!975, PP- 109-26. 
17. A . F . Isaacman, 1972a, p. 4; C . S. Lancaster, 1974. 
18. For a discussion of perpetual kinship and positional succession, see J. Vansina, 1966, 
p. 82. 
19. See D . P. Abraham, 1966; T . O . Ranger, 1973. 
20. T . O . Ranger, 1973; M . Schoffeleers, 1972a, 1972b; H . W . Langworthy, 1971, p. 9. 
21. I. Cunnison, 1959, pp. 180-4. 
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dynamic phase in its historical development. Migrations and conquests in 
the preceding centuries had altered the political and cultural m a p of the 
region, while the scale of trade had increased substantially. These changes, 
in turn, often generated tensions between the dominant and the dominated 
and between different commercial interests competing for the region's 
scarce resources. T h u s , despite the tendency towards political centra-
lization, conditions remained relatively fluid and could be exploited by 
alien merchants and a n e w wave of conquering immigrants 
T h e slave trade and incorporation into the capitalist world 
economy 
Unprecedented commercial penetration from the East African coast during 
the nineteenth century resulted in the incorporation of most of Central 
Africa into the capitalist world economy. A s in the case of West Africa, the 
slave trade figured prominently in the process by which the region, 
especially north of the Zambezi river, became part of the periphery of the 
international trading system. Despite some basic similarities, there were 
important differences. M a n y of the captives were exported to the Indian 
Ocean plantation system, Madagascar and the Middle East rather than to 
the N e w World. There was also the very significant role of the ivory trade, 
and the fact that the far-reaching changes accompanying this involvement 
in international trade were compressed into a m u c h shorter time-frame. 
Moreover, the level of violence that accompanied the slave trade was 
probably higher in Central Africa, creating unprecedented fragmentation 
and rural dislocation. While some Central African trading societies, or at 
least the dominant class within them, benefited in the short run through 
their participation in the ivory and slave trade, they ultimately became 
subordinate to and dependent upon the international trading system whose 
centres of decision-making lay outside Africa.22 
Several factors operated simultaneously to expand the slave trade during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. A s a result of the resurgence of the 
plantation system in north-eastern Brazil and the subsequent development 
of sugar estates in C u b a , slave-traders in appreciable numbers from the 
West Indies and Latin America began to visit Mozambican ports where 
captives were generally cheaper than in West Africa and the limited British 
naval force far less intimidating.23 Simultaneously, French planters on the 
islands of Bourbon (now called Réunion), Seychelles and the Mascarenes, 
as well as the rulers of Madagascar, intensified their demand for slaves. 
T h e most significant stimulant, however, was the development of clove 
22. See Chapter 2 above; also, I. Wallerstein, 1976; E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 264-7. 
23. E . A . Alpers, 1967, pp. 4-12; A . F . Isaacman, 1972a, pp. 85-94; K . M . Phiri, 1975, 
p. 130. 
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plantations on the islands of Zanzibar and P e m b a shortly after the turn of 
the century.24 
Conditions within Central Africa facilitated the growing demand for 
slave labour. Bisa, Yao and Chikunda trade networks already linked the 
interior to the coastal markets of Kilwa, Mozambique Island and Queli-
mane . Despite their initial emphasis on ivory, the inland traders had always 
brought a small but steady supply of slaves to these international entrepôts. 
T h e use of captives as ivory porters facilitated the addition of a larger slave 
component without disrupting the commerce in elephant tusks. O n the 
contrary, ivory exports also increased substantially as African merchants 
tried to satisfy the new markets in Britain and the U S A as well as their 
traditional Asian clients.25 
A s the demand for cheap labour and ivory skyrocketed, Yao, Bisa 
and Chikunda merchants expanded their commercial empires. T h e Yao 
penetrated into the Lake Nyasa region during the first half of the century 
and, after 1850, entered the Shire valley in search of new markets among 
the Manganja and Chewa. Simultaneously, they established commercial 
ties to the Indian Ocean port of Ibo, which became a major export centre. 
T h e Chikunda, initially in the service of Afro-Portuguese and Afro-Goan 
prazeros, extended their commercial contacts from the area immediately 
north of the Zambezi to the Luangwa valley and south into what is n o w 
Zimbabwe, while the Bisa intensified their operations in the territory 
between the Shire and Luapula valleys. All three groups continued to 
emphasize the ivory component of the trade as well and in the case of the 
Bisa traders it remained the dominant export commodity.26 
B y the middle of the nineteenth century Central Africa had become a 
major supplier of slaves. Annual exports from Quelimane to Brazil, for 
example, had increased by 400 per cent between 1800 and 1835.27 T h e 
newly developed port of Ibo on Mozambique Island, and Kilwa, were 
doing a booming business, while the post-1844 resurgence of the sultanate 
of Angoche was directly related to its entrance into the slave trade, and 
even the southern Mozambican ports of Inhambane and Lourenço 
Marques, largely ignored by European slavers, became important sec-
ondary entrepôts.28 Zanzibar remained the principal recipient of these 
captives, with annual imports increasing from 10 000 per a n n u m in 1810 
to at least 20000 in 1850.29 Paralleling this growth was a proportionate 
increase in ivory exports.30 
24. ibid.; E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 209-18; A . M . H . Sheriff, 1971. 
25. R . W . Beachey, 1967. 
26. K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 117-30; E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 209-63; A . D . Roberts, 1973, 
pp. 189-93; Y . B . Abdallah, 1973, pp. 29-31. 
27. A . F. Isaacman, 1972a, p. 92. 
28. E . A . Alpers, 1967, pp. 10-12; M . D . D . Newitt, 1973b; P. Harries, 1981. 
29. E . A . Alpers, 1967, pp. 10-12. 
30. R . W . Beachey, 1967; K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 117-26; E . A . Alpers, 1975, p-234. 
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A s the involvement of Angoche suggests, the economic pre-eminence of 
the Yao, Chikunda and Bisa did not go unchallenged for long. A number 
of African as well as alien merchants rapidly entered into the competition 
for slaves and ivory. Coastal M a k u a chiefs and aspiring merchants, for 
example, began both to exploit the populous hinterland and to prevent 
their Yao rivals from sending caravans across M a k u a territory to M o z a m -
bique Island. B y the middle of the nineteenth century they were able to 
replace the Y a o as the major supplier of slaves to Mozambique Island.31 
Arab and Swahili traders, often linked directly to the Zanzibar plantation 
economy, also became prominent. In some cases, they established per-
manent communities in the interior, as did J u m b e of Khota Khota, located 
on the western shores of Lake Malawi. M o r e commonly, however, the 
coastal entrepreneurs outfitted caravans that were sent to important inland 
markets where slaves and ivory were readily accessible. F r o m contemporary 
Tanzania came the Nyamwezi traders, the most important of w h o m , 
Msiri, imposed his commercial and political hegemony throughout eastern 
Lunda. 3 2 B y the middle of the century, news of the potential profits 
had filtered westward to Angola, motivating M a m b a r i traders to initiate 
commercial relations with the Lozi and their Kololo overlords.33 In short, 
increasing international demands for bond labour meant that m u c h of the 
region north of the Zambezi became a labour reserve in which the principal 
activity became the 'production' of slaves. 
T h e intensified competition among the traders and their virtual m o n -
opoly of modern weapons thus dramatically altered the character of the 
slave trade in the period after 1840. Whereas most slaves had probably 
been obtained through legal commerce in the preceding period, raiding 
and conquest replaced it as the dominant m o d e of acquisition. According 
to Chikunda traditions; for example, in the earlier phase of the slave trade 
they were able to purchase Nsenga, C h e w a and Tonga slaves, m a n y of 
w h o m were originally criminals, social outcasts or strangers. Subsequently, 
however, they used coercive tactics to satisfy the coastal demand. 3 4 
Similarly, Yao itinerant traders initially exploited their access to cheap 
cloth and iron hoes to achieve a pre-eminent commercial position, but 
external pressures during the second half of the century motivated them 
to exert military pressure in the Shire valley in order to ensure their 
economic hegemony.35 M a k u a participation in the slave trade underwent 
a parallel transformation while force had always been a component of the 
Arab-Swahili strategy.36 
31. E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 219-29. 
32. J. Vansina, 1966, pp. 227-31. 
33. E . Flint, 1970. 
34. A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 24-5. 
35. K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 147-50; E . A . Alpers, 1969. 
36. E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 219-28; K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 139-45; H . W . Lang-
worthy, n.d. 
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T o ensure a constant supply of captives and ivory, a number of trading 
groups carved out sizeable conquest states. Although differing in detail, 
these polities shared c o m m o n characteristics that shaped their historical 
development. All these alien overlords relied heavily on European weapons 
to impose their hegemony and maintain their pre-eminence. These soph-
isticated weapons were acquired in exchange for captives in an updated 
version of the gun-slave cycle. Once firmly entrenched, the alien ruling 
classes expanded the frontiers of their empire; while the amount of force 
varied, coercion was the dominant mechanism of incorporation. T h e new 
acquisitions provided additional sources of slaves and ivory, which were 
used to increase the size of their arsenals, thereby enabling further expan-
sion. Although politically independent, these conquest states were an 
indirect, or secondary, extension of European economic and military power 
into the interior. 
This pattern of commercial penetration, conquest and state formation 
occurred along the entire margin of the Zambezi river and in the adjacent 
Luangwa valley. After 1840 a large number of C h e w a , Tonga, Tawara, 
Nsenga and Soli chieftaincies were forcibly absorbed by the conquest 
states, which were dominated by Afro-Portuguese and Afro-Goan warlords 
and their Chikunda subordinates. O f these, the most important were 
Massangano, Makanga and the Z u m b o states of K a n y e m b a and 
Matakenya.37 A similar phenomenon occurred at an accelerated rate to the 
north, reaching its high point in the 1870s. As mentioned earlier, Yao 
merchant-chiefs, like Mataka, Makanjila and M p o n a , imposed their 
hegemony over m u c h of the Shire valley, Arab traders established political 
enclaves in the Lake Nyasa region and the Yeke leader, Msiri, gained 
control over the western provinces of the L u n d a kingdom of Kazembe . 3 8 
In short, throughout a large region the slave trade brought to power 
new dominant classes whose authority rested on the exploitation and 
intimidation of the indigenous population. 
Even when the slavers did not impose themselves as political overlords, 
their predatory raids and ability to exploit internal cleavages within m a n y 
polities in the region often eroded the authority of the indigenous aristo-
cracy. B y circumventing the royal trade monopoly, Arab and Swahili 
merchants established a base of local power within the L u n d a kingdom of 
K a z e m b e . In 1872 they intervened directly in Lunda politics, helping to 
arrange for the assassination of Kazembe M u o n g a Sunkutu and the selec-
tion of a more pliant successor.39 Similarly, the combination of Chikunda 
and Swahili incursions and their commercial alliances with outlying chief-
taincies eroded Undi's position throughout the nineteenth century and 
37. A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 22-48. 
38. J. Vansina, 1966, pp. 227-31; E . A . Alpers, 1969, pp. 413-16; H . W . Langworthy, 
n.d., pp. 14-18; K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 140-5; Y . B . Abdallah, 1973, pp. 40-60. 
39. I. Cunnison, 1966, pp. 235-6; A . D . Roberts, 1973, p. 199. 
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plate 8.2 Arab traders of the northern Lake Malawi region
caused the ultimate decline of the kingdom by 1 88o.40 Other alien merchants
precipitated an armed confrontation between the Senga leader Kambamo
and his arch-rival Tembu in order to gain additional captives for export.41
To the south, Chikunda bands exploited their military skills into prominent
economic and political positions by allying with victorious factions within
Senga and Sala society.42
The impact ofthe slave-traders on the political fortunes of the indigenous
aristocracy was not uniform. In some cases the dominant class emerged
stronger as a result of economic and military ties to the slave-traders.
Consider relations between the Bemba rulers and the Arab and Swahili
traders. Under the leadership of Chileshe Chipela the Bemba had just
completed a phase of territorial expansion and political centralization when
the foreign traders entered their homeland around i860. As a result, the
40. H. W. Langworthy, 1971, pp. 18-21.
41. H. W. Langworthy, n.d., pp. 20-1.
42. B. Stefaniszyn, and H. de Santana, i960, p. 364; W. V. Brelsford, 1956, p. 58.
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B e m b a kingdom was far more unified and powerful than most states in the 
region. T h e geographical position of the B e m b a , somewhat removed from 
the principal trade routes, precluded the growth of a large and potentially 
seditious merchant community within the core of their kingdom. Equally 
important, there was no incentive for the Arab and Swahili traders to adopt 
a hostile posture since the B e m b a were not economic rivals. Most of the 
royal families' wealth came from raiding and tribute in the form of ivory 
and slaves and they were happy to exchange them for the cloth and 
other imported goods provided by the coastal merchants. This economic 
complementarity fostered a harmonious relationship and simultaneously 
enhanced the internal position of the B e m b a aristocracy, which used the 
foreign commodities to recruit new followers and strengthen their links to 
subordinate chiefs. T h e continued demand for captives and ivory also 
fuelled a n e w expansionist phase from i860 to 1880, during which B e m b a 
forces conquered most of contemporary north-eastern Zambia. Thus , 
through ties to foreign merchants, the B e m b a rulers gained unprecedented 
regional power while accumulating a substantial amount of wealth.43 
As in the case of the B e m b a , other local chiefs and merchants entered 
into alliances with the slave-traders that proved extremely beneficial. 
Throughout the 1870s the C h e w a chief, M w a s e Kasungu, whose territory 
straddled the Lake Malawi-Katanga trade route, provided food for the 
Arab caravans in exchange for guns. These weapons enabled him to 
withstand the subsequent M b w e l a Nguni invasions.44 Economic con-
siderations also motivated Arab and Swahili protection of the Senga chiefs, 
w h o were important suppliers of ivory.45 Similar factors help explain 
Chikunda alliances with the A m b o against the B e m b a , and assistance that 
they provided the Nsenga against the Soli, which occurred in the decade 
preceding the 'Scramble'.46 In all these cases, it is clear that the aliens' 
strategy was to prevent the expansion of a commercial or political rival in 
order to maintain their o w n respective spheres of influence. 
Ironically, those rulers and merchants engaged in the quest for additional 
captives occasionally became victims of the political and social upheavals 
generated by the slave trade. In several instances, they overstepped their 
authority and enslaved their o w n subjects or neighbours in order to main-
tain the flow of wealth and weapons upon which their power rested. T h e 
M a k u a aristocracy pursued such a self-destructive strategy. Until the 1850s 
the M a k u a had been the principal exporters of slaves to Mozambique 
Island. O n e by-product of their predatory activities was a large-scale 
migration of the victimized societies. Faced with a diminished labour pool 
43. A . D . Roberts, 1973, pp. 164-214. 
44. K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 143-5; H . W . Langworthy, n.d., pp. 12-13. 
45. H . W . Langworthy, n.d., pp. 18-21. 
46. W . V . Brelsford, 1956, p .64; B . Stefaniszyn and H . de Santana, i960, p .64; K . M . 
Phiri, 1975, p . 150. 
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the M a k u a rulers began raiding each other and enslaving their o w n subjects 
in order to maintain the profitable slave trade on which they had become 
totally dependent. Within two decades the M a k u a were badly fragmented, 
leaving them easy prey to subsequent Portuguese invasions.47 T h e Afro-
Portuguese prazero community exhibited a similar myopic desire for profits 
which precipitated the rapid demise of the prazo system. A s in the case of 
the M a k u a chiefs, the prazeros violated their historic charter and began to 
enslave people living on their lands when they could no longer acquire 
captives from the interior. In reaction to these excesses the indigenous 
population either revolted and drove the prazeros off the land or fled into 
the interior, depriving the estate owner of his traditional source of tribute. 
T h e effect, in either case, was the destruction of most prazos by 1830, and 
those that managed to survive suffered from recurring famines that so 
debilitated the indigenous population that they proved no match for the 
attacks of the subsequent decades. Fifty years later the G w e m b a , Nsenga 
and Tawara rose up against their mestizo (Afro-Portuguese and Afro-Asian) 
and Chikunda overlords w h o had been enslaving them and exporting them 
to the coast.48 } '' 
T h e Shona-dominated region, stretching from the southern margins of 
the Zambezi to the Inhambane hinterland, becariie a secondary source of 
slaves, as did the Delagoa Bay area to the south. Within this broad zone 
there were only small pockets of alien commercial penetration, most notably 
Chikunda conquests along the southern margins of the Zambezi river, and 
occasional forays by Portuguese and African traders linked to commercial 
interests at the ports of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques (present-day 
Maputo) . These activities, which antedated the nineteenth century, were 
sporadic and on a very limited scale.49 •" ••• 
A combination of demographic, commercial and political factors explains 
the unwillingness or inability of the slave-traders to exploit this southern 
tier of the Zambezi valley to any appreciable degree. T h e lower population 
density meant that there was a smaller pool of potential captives to draw 
on than in the region to the north, to which the traders had easy access. 
In addition, the Shona states had ample supplies of gold and ivory which 
they exported for European goods. T h u s , the only way the alien merchants 
could acquire an appreciable number of captives was through force, and 
the powerful Shona states were able to repel most raids. T h e defeat which 
the army of the M w e n e m u t a p a inflicted on a Portuguese force in 1807 and 
the repeated Barue and Manica attacks on the Europeans demonstrated 
where the balance of power lay. While the Gaza Nguni, w h o imposed their 
hegemony over m u c h of the southern region in the period after 1830, did 
47. E . A . Alpers, 1975, p. 225. 
48. A . F . Isaacman, 1972a, pp. 114-23. 
49. ibid., pp. 89-92; A . Smith, 1969, pp. 176-7; A . Lobato, 1948, pp. 7-8; P. Harries, 
1981, pp. 312-18. 
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participate in the international slave trade, the blockade by the British 
naval squadron of the ports of Lourenço Marques and Inhambane after 
1850 m a d e the trade increasingly problematic and ultimately unprofitable. 
Within a decade the Gaza aristocracy and regional merchants had ceased 
their involvement in the maritime slave trade, preferring to utilize their 
captives internally.50 
Although additional research is needed, preliminary evidence suggests 
that a similar shift occurred throughout m u c h of Central Africa. O n e by-
product of the declining international demand for slaves in the second half 
of the century was the transformation of captives from export commodities 
to corvée labourers. There are several documented cases of slaves previously 
earmarked for export w h o were pressed into local production. Slave labour 
figured prominently a m o n g the Gaza, M a k u a , Lozi, G w e m b a , M a k o n d e 
and Chikunda, among others. In the latter two cases the reliance on captives 
enabled free m e n to collect ivory, wax and rubber for overseas export. T h e 
Lozi aristocracy and landlords also used slaves to dig canals and ditches in 
order to bring fertile marshy soil into cultivation. B y the last quarter of 
the century it was estimated that a quarter of the Lozi population were 
slaves. Similarly, Nguni dynamism was premised upon their ability to 
incorporate and extract surplus from their large pool of captives.51 
Allowing for local variations, a broad pattern of economic dislocation 
resulting from the slave trade is nevertheless discernible. T h e violent 
disruption of m u c h of the rural economy, the export of m a n y of the 
most productive m e m b e r s of the indigenous societies, the inadvertent 
introduction of highly contagious diseases, and the growing dependence of 
the Central African economy on the world trading system intensified the 
process of underdevelopment. It is true that this process was accompanied 
by the dissemination of n e w crops such as tobacco, maize, rice and cassava, 
the introduction of modest technological innovations like the Chikunda 
traps, granaries, and weapons, and the expansion of some local industry. 
But these were relatively insignificant developments when placed in 
juxtaposition to the economic retardation of the region as a whole.52 
Little needs to be said about the unprecedented level of destruction that 
50. P . Harries, 1981, pp. 312-18. 
51. L . G a n n , 1972, pp. 188-92; E . Flint, 1970, pp. 73-9; P. Harries, 1981; W . G . 
Clarence-Smith, 1979b; P . D . Curtin, S. Feierman, L . Thompson and J. Vansina, 1978, 
p. 403; T . I. Matthews, 1981, pp. 23-4. 
While slavery had been a feature of many Central African societies before the slave trade, 
preliminary evidence suggests a growing tendency to acquire captives to extract surplus 
which the aristocracy used to maintain its privileged position. T o the extent that slaves 
acquired as corvée labourers tended to become chattel, the nature of slavery often changed 
from earlier forms which emphasized the reproductive role and the use of slaves primarily 
to expand the size of the kinship network. 
52. G . Hartwig and K . D . Patterson (eds), 1978; A . D . Roberts, 1970a, pp. 734-6; B . 
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accompanied the raids and the expansionist activities of the slave-traders. 
Fields were ravished, entire villages destroyed and survivors often c o m -
pelled to flee their homelands and resettle in inaccessible, unproductive 
locations. O n e nineteenth-century traveller recalled the effect of the Yao 
raids in the 1860s against the Manganja: 
A number of the Manganja went with them. Everywhere they saw 
sad signs of the war - villages burnt, gardens uncared for, the beautiful 
land about them rapidly becoming desert. About midday they came 
upon a large party of Ajawa [Yao], w h o were just returning from a 
successful raid. T h e smoke of burning villages was seen in the distance. 
A long train of captives carried the plunder, and their bitter cry was 
heard, even above the triumphant utterances of the Ajawa w o m e n , 
w h o came out . . . to welcome back the visitors.53 
Chikunda forays in the homelands of the C h e w a , Tonga and Nsenga and 
as far north as the Lunda of K a z e m b e , and Arab-Swahili attacks against 
the people living in the Lake Malawi area produced similar turmoil and 
decay.54 In the most extreme instances, entire regions were depopulated. 
O n e British official recanted in 1861 that ' A n Arab w h o lately returned 
from Lake Nyasa informed m e that he travelled for seventeen days through 
a country covered with ruined towns and villages . . . where no living soul 
is to be seen.'55 
This loss of m a n y of the most productive members of the society 
reinforced the rural dislocation. Although the evidence is uneven, data 
from the Zambezi region, the Shire valley and the Lake Malawi region 
suggest that famines recurred with great regularity,56 which often necessi-
tated the exchange of slaves for food, further intensifying the population 
drain. Whatever the case, the unstable conditions and threats of new raids 
prevented the resurgence of the rural economy. 
Famines and psychological stress also left the uprooted and malnourished 
vulnerable to infectious diseases carried by the coastal traders. Diseases 
c o m m o n to the Indian Ocean communities, such as smallpox and cholera, 
but u n c o m m o n to the Central African interior, whose population lacked 
any natural immunity, had a devastating effect. Epidemics of both smallpox 
and cholera ravaged large portions of the region stretching from the present-
day Tanzania-Malawi border to southern Mozambique . In the late 1850s 
one European explorer noted that ' T h e most dangerous epidemic is . . . 
small-pox which . . . sweeps at times like a storm over the land.'57 D o c u -
mented epidemics of smallpox swept parts of Mozambique in 1834, 1836 
and 1862, and were reported in the interior throughout the period from 
53. H . Rowley, 1867, pp. 112-13. 
54. F . Selous, 1893, p. 48. 
55. Cited in R . Coupland, 1939, p. 140. 
56. A . F . Isaacman, 1972a, pp. 114-24; E . A . Alpers, 1967, p. 20. 
57. R . Burton quoted in G . W . Hartwig, 1978, p. 26. 
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1850 to 1880.58 Sleeping sickness, probably related to changes in the disease 
environment as a result of forest clearance and the hunting of g a m e , also 
struck m u c h of the area under investigation.59 
T h e high mortality and its debilitating effects further reduced rural 
productivity which, in turn, intensified the spiral of malnourishment and 
disease. T h e tendency of surviving communities to relocate in overcrowded 
stockaded villages, whose soils proved incapable of supporting them, 
further aggravated this problem. T h e epidemics had at least two other 
disruptive effects. Evidence suggests that they led to a sharp increase in 
witchcraft accusations and social upheavals. There are also suggestions 
that the privileged in a number of societies sought additional captives 
to compensate for demographic losses, thereby further augmenting the 
intensity of the slave trade.60 
While it might be argued that African trading societies, or at least the 
aristocracy and merchants within them, benefited at the expense of their 
weaker neighbours, the evidence suggests that the advantages which these 
groups enjoyed were short-term and m a d e them excessively dependent on 
the capitalist world economy. At a m i n i m u m , the great commercial states 
lost their economic autonomy. T o maintain their pre-eminent positions 
they had to expect not only that the coastal demand for ivory and slaves 
would continue despite growing British pressures, but also that they could 
acquire sufficient supplies of both commodities. In extreme cases, such as 
the M a k u a , the failure to maintain the external supply of slaves resulted 
in internal conflict and self-destruction. M o r e commonly , the competition 
for captive labour generated intense hostility a m o n g and within trading 
factions. There are numerous examples of wars a m o n g the Chikunda bands, 
Y a o chiefs and Swahili trading groups.61 T h e dependence on European 
arms and alien intermediaries often left the indigenous trading communities 
quite vulnerable. T h e Portuguese, for example, exploited their role as 
suppliers of weapons to pressure the Chikunda bands to recognize Lisbon's 
limited authority over their territory.62 Similarly, the Sena began to rely 
so heavily on their Arab allies that they jeopardized their sovereign status.63 
Even the powerful B e m b a were not totally i m m u n e to pressures from Arab 
and Swahili traders.64 
Moreover, with the abolition of the slave trade, those classes or strata 
within them w h o profited from the trade — the aristocracy, merchants, 
warlords and landlords - searched desperately for n e w commodities such 
58. R . Burton; J. R . Dias, 1981; G . Liesegang, n.d. 
59. J . R . Dias, 1981. 
60. G . Hartwig, 1978, pp. 25-31. 
61. A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 37-8; Y . B . Abdallah, 1973, pp. 52-4; K . M . Phiri, 1975, 
pp. 144-6; E . A . Alpers, 1969, pp. 413-14. 
62. A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 31-5. 
63. H . W . Langworthy, n.d., pp. 20-1. 
64. A . D . Roberts, 1973, p.268. 
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as wax, coffee, groundnuts, and vegetable oils which they could extract 
from their subordinates or acquire through commerce in order to ensure 
a constant supply of European consumer goods and weapons necessary to 
maintain their privileged position. In some regions this legitimate c o m -
merce offered new opportunities for aspiring itinerant traders to accumulate 
capital and for the growth of peasant agriculture. T o the extent that 
particular classes or strata successfully m a d e this transition, they merely 
perpetuated or extended their dependent position in a world economy over 
which they had no control. 
Viewed from a somewhat different perspective, the unequal value of 
commodities exchanged reflects the fragile position of the region within 
the larger international trading system. A s E . A . Alpers has noted, ' W h a t 
Africans received in exchange for ivory, even though it had little intrinsic 
value in their o w n societies, were goods that in no way equalled the value 
placed on ivory by the merchant capitalists of India, Europe and America.'65 
This discrepancy was particularly acute in the sale of captives. In return 
for the lost labour power, the Central African societies received a variety 
of inexpensive perishable commodities and weapons of destruction, neither 
of which compensated for the depletion of the work force. Similarly, w h e n 
Africans hunted ivory they were exhausting a limited resource and were 
not receiving capital goods that expanded the productive base of their 
societies. Recent research suggests that they were not only distorting their 
economies but also destroying the ecology. 
As the region was becoming progressively impoverished, disparities in 
wealth and social equality became more pronounced. Although more 
detailed research is needed to determine the character of the production 
systems and the allocation of surplus in specific Central African societies, 
it is clear that the dominant aristocracy, often allied with all or a fraction 
of the merchant class, was the principal beneficiary. T h e emergence of the 
powerful Y a o chiefs, Makanjila and Mataka, testifies to the growing political 
and social differentiation within these societies, as do the desperate efforts 
of the M a k u a rulers to remain in power.66 A similar phenomenon occurred 
in the sultanates of Angoche and Quitanghona and in the Chikunda and 
Arab-Swahili conquest states, where a small political-commercial class 
prevailed despite growing opposition and periodic revolts. T h e extent to 
which popular discontent surfaced more frequently during the second half 
of the century suggests growing class antagonisms as did slave uprisings 
in Lozi society and on the prazos." 
In other instances trading interests, independent of the rulers, were able 
to dominate commerce and undercut the position of the political authorities. 
65. E . A . Alpers, 1975, p . 266. 
66. Y . B . Abdallah, 1973, pp. 40-60; E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 228-9. 
67. N . Hafkin, 1973, pp. 253-80, and pp. 311-59; A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 23-30; 
K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 140^-6. 
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Perhaps the two best examples of this power shift occurred in the northern 
states of Undi and K a z e m b e . In both cases alliances between local m e r -
chants and foreign traders facilitated the circumvention of the royal m o n -
opoly and drastically weakened the position of the respective national 
leaders.68 A similar pattern occurred in the kingdom of Kassanje, located 
in the adjacent territory of Angola. There the local matrilineages were able 
to gain control of the slave trade, at the expense of the royal family, leading 
to the rapid fragmentation of the state.69 
O n e by-product of greater commercial interaction was the substantial 
amount of cultural borrowing that occurred between different societies. 
T h e direction of change varied appreciably, depending on such factors as 
the nature and duration of contact between the trading groups and the 
host population. W h e r e interaction was substantial, three broad patterns 
of acculturation occurred. In several instances, isolated bands of merchants 
and raiders became totally absorbed into the local society, as in the case of 
the Chikunda hunters, w h o were incorporated into Nsenga, A m b o and 
valley Tonga communities.70 In sharply contrasting situations, the aliens 
profoundly altered the host culture. T h e C h e w a subjects of Khota Khota, 
for example, absorbed aspects of Islam into their religion, adopted Swahili 
names, Swahili words and phrases, and underwent a major restructuring 
of their social system.71 Similarly, m a n y Y a o traders converted to Islam 
and adopted coastal cultural patterns as a result of their contact with the 
Arabs. Their participation in long-distance trade also led to the growth of 
urban centres and the development of rituals and prohibitions designed to 
ensure the fidelity of Y a o w o m e n while their husbands were in the interior,72 
suggesting that change also occurred as societies modified internal struc-
tures to meet new external conditions. In addition to these two patterns of 
acculturation, there are indications that the fluid conditions facilitated the 
development of new ethnic and cultural groups. Several of the bands of 
Chikunda broke away from the decaying prazo system around the middle 
of the century and organized autonomous communities in the L u a n g w a 
valley. Attracting followers from a variety of disparate ethnic groups, they 
evolved a culture incorporating diverse Malawian and Shona institutions 
and values.73 A parallel phenomenon occurred in the area of what is n o w 
eastern Zaire where the M a n y e m a were transformed from a disparate band 
of slavers into a coherent social and cultural group.74 
68. H . W . Langworthy, 1971, pp. 18-21; I. Cunnison, 1966, pp. 235-6; J. Vansina, 
1966, pp. 227-31. 
69. J. C . Miller, 1973, pp. 23-6. 
70. W . V . Brelsford, 1956, pp. 60-2. 
71. K . M . Phiri, 1975, pp. 140-6; H . W . Langworthy, n.d., p. 23; M . E . Page, 1974, pp. 
88-9. 
72. E . A . Alpers, 1972, pp. 172-96; E . A . Alpers, 1969, pp. 417-20. 
73. A . F . Isaacman, 1972b, pp. 454-61. 
74. M . Page, 1974, pp. 69-84. 
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The impact of the Nguni and Kololo invasions 
Like the progressive incorporation of Central Africa into the world capitalist 
system, the Nguni and Sotho invasions beginning in the 1820s represented 
a continuation of ongoing processes but in new forms and on an unpre-
cedented scale.75 T h e diaspora of Southern African peoples falls within the 
larger pattern of migrations and state formation that had begun several 
centuries earlier. In some cases the immigrants conquered groups that had 
managed to remain outside the sphere of the Shona or Lunda state systems. 
T h e Gaza Nguni domination of the Tonga of southern Mozambique 
illustrates this phenomenon. Often, the invaders imposed their hegemony 
over existing kingdoms. Whatever the case, the n e w conquest states encom-
passed an appreciable part of contemporary Mozambique , Malawi and 
Zambia and were organized around a set of unique military and centralized 
political institutions. 
Three waves of immigrants swept into Central Africa during the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century. T h e first were the Nguni followers of 
Soshangane w h o carved out the Gaza Nguni empire, stretching north from 
southern Mozambique to the Zambezi river and extending west into 
present-day Zimbabwe. Soshangane's defeat of his arch-rival Zwangendaba 
in 1831 compelled the latter to migrate across the middle Zambezi, where 
he ultimately settled at M a p u p o between Lake Malawi and Lake Tangan-
yika. At approximately the same time, Kololo immigrants of Sotho descent 
under the direction of Sebetwane migrated across the Tswana homelands 
and the middle Zambezi region before settling among the Lozi, w h o m they 
conquered. 
Although each of the migrating groups will be treated separately in this 
chapter, they exhibited certain c o m m o n characteristics. All were motivated 
by similar incentives to flee their historic homelands, faced similar problems 
in their trek northwards and benefited from the weapons and military 
strategy that they borrowed directly or indirectly from the Zulu. T h e 
groups had all suffered from the expansionist activities of their neighbours -
the Gaza and Zwangendaba at the hands of Shaka and the Kololo from 
the raids of the Tlokwa - and faced the prospect of losing their herds and 
being annihilated. Because these conflicts had substantially reduced their 
membership, they were forced to incorporate a great number of aliens if 
they were to become a viable military and political force. T h e adoption of 
the Zulu short stabbing spear and the development of superior martial 
skills facilitated the acquisition of captives and the development of conquest 
75. Recent work by Philip Bonner, Jeffrey G u y , David Hedges, and Henry Slater has 
suggested that nineteenth-century state-building processes associated with Nguni-Sotho 
expansion had their antecedents in political changes and consolidation of the power of chief 
and elders in the preceding period. See articles in S. Marks and A . Atmore (eds), 1980; 
D . Hedges, 1978. 
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states, although their pre-eminence did not go unchallenged. It also enabled
them to seize large herds which carried important social and religious as
well as economic significance within Nguni and Sotho societies. Thus, in
terms of their expansion and acquisition of wealth, access to new weapons
was as critical to the Nguni and Sotho as it was to the Chikunda, Yao and
Arab-Swahili slave-traders.
Fearing an attack by the Zulu, Soshangane and his Gaza Nguni followers
had moved northwards from the area north of the Thukela (Tugela) river
into the Delagoa Bay region by 182 1. Here they met only limited resistance
from the Chopi, who were organized into relatively small chieftaincies, and
from the Portuguese who maintained only a nominal presence at the port
ofLourenço Marques. Within a year or two, the Gaza Nguni had extended
their domain to the Inhambane hinterland, even as their ranks were swollen
by additional Nguni of Ndwandwe descent whom Shaka had defeated in
1826.
Despite these initial gains, Soshangane faced a number of threats, not
the least of which were attacks from the Zulu, whose army remained in
relatively close proximity. After military confrontations in 1828, Sosh¬
angane relocated the core of his kingdom in the middle Sabi, outside the
range of Shaka's army, but this placed his forces in direct conflict with the
Nguni of Zwangendaba, whom they defeated in a series of battles in 1831.
plate 8.4 Soshangane's Shangana arrive at Shapanga to collect the annual tribute from the
Portuguese
These victories enabled Soshangane to consolidate his southern holdings
and expand his frontiers. Gaza forces then moved westward into present-
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day Zimbabwe, where Soshangane built his capital at Chaimaite, and 
northwards into the Zambezi valley. B y the middle of the 1830s Gaza 
armies were raiding the Shona kingdoms of Manica, Quiteve, and Barue 
as well as the surviving prazos along the Zambezi river. Rather than attempt 
to incorporate this vast region into his empire, the Gaza leader was content 
to plunder the Shona states and to collect tribute from the prazeros and 
Portuguese officials residing in the towns of Sena and Tete.76 
T h e core of Soshangane's empire was southern Mozambique and the 
adjacent areas to the west. There the subject peoples were treated harshly 
and compelled to pay heavy taxes and provide young m e n for the Sosh-
angane age-regiments. Unlike the strategy of the Zwangendaba Nguni, no 
efforts were m a d e to incorporate the Tonga and Chopi recruits into Gaza 
society. Rather than blurring cultural and ethnic differences as occurred 
in other Nguni societies, the segregated age-regiments ruled by Nguni 
officers symbolized the inferiority of the indigenous population. Tensions 
between the oppressed majority and the Nguni aristocracy surfaced period-
ically. For example, several Tonga chieftaincies tried to regain their 
freedom by migrating outside the sphere of Gaza rule. Individual Chopi 
and Tonga polities forged alliances with the Portuguese, w h o m they hoped 
would act as a compelling force. A m o n g the Nguni it was commonly 
believed that their subjects sought revenge by bewitching Soshangane and 
causing his death.77 
As the Gaza were imposing their hegemony, Zwangendaba and his 
followers embarked on a twenty-year trek in search of an appropriate 
homeland. During this period they contested with the Gaza for control of 
the Delagoa Bay area, administered the final blow to the fragmented 
Rozwi empire of Changamire, temporarily settled among the Nsenga and 
plundered the western margin of Lake Malawi before finally settling at 
M a p u p o . At every phase of their migration they assimilated new followers. 
T h e problem of manpower was particularly acute because the original 
group of 300 was hardly a viable political or military unit and m a n y of the 
w o m e n and children were killed in the conflict with Soshangane. Like the 
Gaza, they initially sought to expand their following by incorporating only 
individuals and fragmented groups of Nguni descent, thus ensuring that 
the dominant culture and language would prevail. As they moved further 
from the Nguni homelands, however, Zwangendaba realized that aliens 
would have to be assimilated to ensure the survival of his relatively small 
band. 
Unlike the Zulu or Gaza Nguni, therefore, Zwangendaba and his advisers 
incorporated a multitude of disparate people into their ranks. Individuals 
were attached to specific Nguni families with w h o m they formed quasi-kin 
76. G . Liesegang, 1964, pp. 47-50; J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 59-60; M . D . D . 
Newitt, 1973, pp. 223-4; A . F . Isaacman, 1972a, pp. 122-3. 
77. J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp . 59-60. 
201 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
relationships that tended to blur their captive status. At the appropriate 
age, the young adoptees were placed into Nguni age-regiments which were 
important socializing institutions. Depending on their military prowess, 
the foreign-born recruits could acquire substantial amounts of plunder, 
high rank and status. T h e rapid expansion of the Zwangendaba Nguni 
thus provided a wide variety of opportunities, and facilitated the upward 
mobility of m a n y aliens w h o simultaneously adopted Nguni culture and 
shifted their primordial loyalty.78 That the vast majority, estimated at 90 
per cent, of the Nguni w h o settled at M a p u p o in the 1840s were originally of 
foreign descent, demonstrates the success of Zwangendaba's assimilationist 
policy.79 
Paralleling this incorporation was the creation of a highly centralized 
political structure capable of governing the expansive polity. T h e Nguni 
concept of kingship shifted from one based on seniority and limited 
authority within a loose cluster of related villages to one in which the ruler 
was the personification of the state and its ultimate authority. Simul-
taneously, the age-regiments were transformed into the military arm of the 
king, whose leaders were appointed by and m a d e responsible to Z w a n -
gendaba. Because the age-regiments were not initially coterminous with 
the territorial segments of the kingdom, provincial leaders lacked the 
military capacity to secede. By the death of Zwangendaba, the Nguni state 
had become a major power in Central Africa.80 
Zwangendaba's death marked the end of the expansive phase of Nguni 
development. T h e succession dispute was particularly bitter and resulted 
in the fragmentation of the kingdom into several major and numerous 
minor segments. T h e expansionist designs of the independent sections 
were severely restricted both by the powerful indigenous states, such as 
the B e m b a , Lunda and Fipa to the north, and the growing presence of 
well-armed Arab-Swahili, Yao and Chikunda forces. 
Nevertheless, by eventually selecting targets among the weaker polities 
to the south, two of the Zwangendaba offshoots were able to carve out 
substantial domains by 1870. T h e Mpezeni Nguni took advantage of the 
impotence of the Nsenga chieftaincies, which had not fully recovered from 
Zwangendaba's raids, to impose their authority over the south-western 
portion of the tsetse fly-free Malawian plateau in what is n o w the Fort 
Jameson region. T h e M b w e l a established their domain in territory that 
formerly belonged to the T u m b u k a , Tonga and Henga. In both cases, their 
ranks were swollen by other age-regiments w h o subsequently joined the 
newly created states. A s the Mpezeni were gaining new adherents, a former 
slave of Nsenga descent, Ciwere Ndhlou, w h o had become a prominent 
military officer, declared his independence and organized an independent 
78. T . Spear, 1972, pp. 9-13; J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 64-72. 
79. T . Spear, 1972, p. 11. 
80. ibid., pp. 9-13; J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 64-72. 
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kingdom bearing his n a m e in contemporary D o w a district. In addition to 
these three segments, the Gwangara, another segment of the defunct 
Zwangendaba state, moved into Tanzania where they defeated the Maseko 
Nguni, w h o fled southward across the R o v u m a and settled in the highland 
country of the Kirk Range in the late 1860s.81 
T h e migration of the Kololo followed the broad pattern of Z w a n -
gendaba's Nguni. Fleeing northward from Dithakong, the Kololo 
encountered a number of hostile peoples, including the Tswana and 
Ndebele, w h o defeated them. Continued threats from the Ndebele con-
vinced Sebetwane to cross the Zambezi river and m o v e westwards, arriving 
on the frontier of the Lozi kingdom around 1835. 
Despite their ostensible power, the Lozi were particularly vulnerable. 
T h e death of M u l a m b w a , w h o had ruled for nearly fifty years, not only 
created a leadership vacuum but also precipitated an intense struggle within 
the core of the kingdom. Moreover, antipathy towards the Lozi aristocracy 
was particularly acute in the outlying provinces among the subject peoples 
w h o were not prepared to defend the alien and authoritarian Lozi regime 
from foreign invasion. Thus , when the Kololo attacked, they faced oppo-
sition from only one segment of the royal family and within four years they 
had conquered the vast Lozi kingdom.82 
Once in power the Kololo faced the delicate problem of incorporating 
the more numerous Lozi and their former subjects into Sotho society 
while maintaining their dominant position. Their mutually unintelligible 
languages and the very different cultural systems complicated this process 
of social and political integration. T o fuse the disparate elements within 
the kingdom, Sebetwane entered into a number of marriage alliances with 
prominent indigenous authorities, encouraged people throughout the state 
to adopt Kololo as the national language, refused to allow his Kololo 
followers to become a dominant minority, spared the lives of the Lozi 
royal family and publicly declared that 'all are children of the king'. 
Accompanying these symbolic gestures were specific policies which brought 
Lozi into Sebetwane's government and ensured that a number of indigen-
ous rulers were allowed to maintain their positions in the reorganized 
territorial administration.83 
Sebetwane's incorporative policy enjoyed considerable success in the 
first instance. Kololo quickly became the lingua franca for m u c h of the 
kingdom, and Lozi living along the flood plains of the Zambezi began 
to adopt the nomenclature Kololo. They demonstrated their loyalty by 
defending the polity against successive attacks by the Naba Nguni and 
Ndebele. T h e victory against the Ndebele secured the south-western border 
81. T . Spear, 1972, pp. 15-19; J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 72-85; K . Rennie, 1966, 
pp. 303-6. 
82. J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 120-2; M . Mainga, 1973, pp. 65-88. 
83. G . Caplan, 1970, pp. 10-11; J . D . Omer-Cooper, 1966, pp. 123-4. 
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and enabled Sebetwane to shift his attention towards the continued con-
solidation of the kingdom and the acquisition of weapons from Angolan 
traders to bolster the state's military capacity.84 
Ultimately, several factors frustrated the assimilationist strategy. T h e 
death of Sebetwane in 1863 precipitated a bitter struggle for the throne 
that divided the Kololo community. This conflict demonstrated the fragility 
of the Kololo, whose numbers had already been diminished by their 
susceptibility to malaria. Operating from a position of relative weakness, 
Sekeletu, the n e w king, nevertheless reversed his father's policy of accom-
modation and imposed an authoritarian anti-Lozi regime. H e forced the 
Lozi out of the administration, terminated marriage alliances with promi-
nent local families and allowed his Kololo subordinates to become a 
dominant minority. Predictably, in 1864, the Lozi rebelled under the 
leadership of exiled members of the royal family. Within weeks they had 
liberated their homelands and killed virtually all the Kololo m e n . 8 5 
T h e popular uprising did not totally eliminate Kololo influence in 
the Zambezi valley. Several years earlier a small group of Kololo had 
accompanied David Livingstone in his eastern journey d o w n the Zambezi 
and had settled among the Manganja. Their adamant opposition to the 
slave trade and their reputation as soldiers quickly contributed to their 
popularity. With the aid of European weapons provided by Livingstone, 
the Kololo repelled the predatory activities of both the Yao and the coastal 
Arabs, to the relief of their Manganja hosts.86 
Under the leadership of Maluka and R a m u k k a n , the Kololo rapidly 
assumed a more active role in the politics of the Shire region. With the 
assistance of Manganja allies, the Kololo defeated a number of prominent 
chiefs and the reigning L u n d u Tsagonja, w h o was the titular owner of all 
the Manganja land. This process of conquest and incorporation took several 
years, but by 1870 they had established a Kololo state divided into six 
regions, each of whose leaders enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. For the 
next two decades the Kololo remained the dominant force in the stra-
tegically located Shire valley.87 
T h e realignment of the political m a p of Central Africa represents the 
most far-reaching effect of the Nguni-Sotho diaspora. T h e immigrants 
organized several n e w kingdoms that dominated an appreciable part of the 
region. In the process they not only incorporated a number of localized 
polities but did irreparable damage to several major states, most notably 
the Rozwi, Undi and L u n d u . T h e structure of the Nguni states, and to a 
lesser degree the Kololo, constituted a substantial departure from earlier 
political forms. T h e new polities were smaller in scale, denser in population 
84. G . Caplan, 1970, pp. 12-13. 
85. ibid.; M . Mainga, 1973, pp. 105-28. 
86. W . H . J . Rangley, 1959, pp. 59-98; A . F . Isaacman, 1976, p. 23. 
87. ibid.; E . Mándala, 1977. 
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plate 8.5 Drummer and dancers at the court ofSipopa, ruler ofthe Lozi, 1875
plate 8.6 Sipopa, one of the leaders of the Lozi rebellion against the Kololo in 1864 and
ruler ofthe Lozi until 1876
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and appreciably more centralized. Their most distinctive characteristic 
was the age-regiment, which underpinned the aristocracy's power and 
facilitated the domination and the incorporation of disparate peoples. 
Despite their significant territorial gains the South African invaders 
suffered a number of military setbacks. T h e Mpezeni Nguni, for example, 
spent almost a decade periodically trying to defeat the B e m b a . 8 8 Their 
failure reflected the more generalized inability of Nguni offshoots to pen-
etrate the territory of the powerful states living north of the Lake Malawi -
R o v u m a region. With the exception of the Gwangara, the Nguni segments 
were compelled to turn southward where they met some surprisingly stiff 
opposition. Both the C h e w a chieftaincy of M w a s e Kasungu and the Senga, 
for example, repelled Nguni incursions in the 1860s and 1870s. South of 
the Zambezi, Gaza raiders faced continued resistance from the Barue 
w h o managed to withstand the periodic incursions and maintain their 
independence.89 
Even within the conquered regions the hegemony of the invaders did 
not go unchallenged. During the 1870s the lakeside Tonga, T u m b u k a and 
Henga rebelled against the M b w e l a Nguni, w h o m they regarded as alien 
interlopers. T h e Gaza state also faced popular uprisings from Tonga and 
Chopi subjects, some of w h o m even allied with the Portuguese in an 
effort to gain their independence. T h e Lozi organized the most successful 
insurrection, driving out the Kololo and liberating their homelands.90 
Inextricably related to the process of Nguni state formation were the 
profound social and cultural transformations that occurred throughout the 
region. Despite the incorporation of thousands of captives and subject 
peoples, the rate and pattern of acculturation varied substantially from one 
subject group to another. As a rule, the process of assimilation was most 
rapid during the expansive phase of the migration rather than in the later 
sedentary stage when the power and prestige of the immigrants was 
tarnished, the plunder more limited and the host population more n u m e r -
ous. Thus , the Zwangendaba Nguni increased their numbers by geometric 
proportions as they moved through the fragmented polities on their north-
ward trek, but the autonomous segments were far less successful once they 
had settled in their new homelands. A similar phenomenon occurred among 
the Kololo. 
T h e actual pattern of acculturation also differed from one contact situ-
ation to another. At one extreme, exemplified by the Zwangendaba Nguni, 
the dominated population adopted the culture and identity of the invaders. 
At the other extreme were the Kololo immigrants, w h o established their 
ascendancy over the Manganja, but were totally absorbed into the sub-
88. H . W . Langworthy, 1972, p. 92. 
89. A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 8-9, 49. 
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ordinate society.91 Between these two poles were the more c o m m o n 
examples of cross-fertilization leading, in some cases, to the formation of 
syncretic cultures. Even the vanquished Kololo left their impact on the 
Lozi, w h o adopted their language and important governmental 
institutions.92 Within the Mpezeni kingdom, on the other hand, all the 
political elements of the n e w society were of South African derivation while 
non-political cultural elements such as land inheritance, marital patterns, 
female circumcision and language were heavily influenced by the indigen-
ous Nsenga tradition.93 This bifurcation is not surprising since the Mpezeni 
kingdom was controlled by political and military institutions designed to 
ensure the pre-eminence of the Nguni. Spatial and demographic con-
siderations seem initially to have determined the extent of cultural bor-
rowing within the M b w e l a Nguni state; in the core of the kingdom where 
the Nguni were more numerous, the Tonga and T u m b u k a adopted most 
aspects of the alien culture, but towards the outlying provinces the rate of 
borrowing diminished proportionately. This general pattern is complicated 
somewhat by the Nguni adoption of T u m b u k a as the national language 
and the subsequent T u m b u k a cultural renaissance, which suggests that 
m a n y of the subject people only superficially adopted Nguni culture.94 
Although a discussion of the effects which the Mfecane had on the 
existing patterns of social stratification is conspicuously absent from the 
literature, fragmentary evidence suggests the growth of new classes within 
the Nguni kingdoms. During the expansive phase, a military aristocracy 
consisting of the regimental commanders and their principal subordinates 
emerged. Their power was based primarily upon the tribute and plunder 
which they acquired — especially the herds of cattle and captives, some of 
which they redistributed to their followers. F r o m an economic perspective, 
their pre-eminent position closely paralleled that of the surplus-appro-
priating aristocracy w h o governed the neighbouring conquest states and 
controlled the ivory and slave trade. 
As the Nguni groups settled north of the Zambezi, the opportunities for 
plunder were more limited. While the military leaders continued to exact 
tribute from their subjects, they began to exploit their slaves in order to 
ensure a continued source of wealth. Rather than incorporating captives 
and strangers and providing them with opportunities for upward mobility, 
there are indications that m a n y were reduced to a permanent state of 
bondage. T h e M b w e l a , Maseko and Mpezeni aristocracy all kept appreci-
able numbers of slaves {abafo) to work their fields. Other slaves served as 
hunters and iron workers for their masters.95 T h e convergence of ethnicity 
91. W . H . J . Rangley, 1959, pp. 59-98; A . F . Isaacman, 1976. 
92. G . Caplan, 1976. 
93. J. A . Barnes, 1951, pp. 2-18; T . Spear, 1972, pp. 23-6. 
94. T . Spear, 1972, pp. 29-32; H . L . Vail, 1972, pp. 161-2. 
95. K . M . Phiri, 197s, pp. 154-6. 
207 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
and class factors suggests that the subsequent resistance to the Nguni 
should not be analysed exclusively in ethnic terms. 
T h e Nguni and Sotho immigrants primarily played only an indirect role 
in the slave trade. While their military campaigns undoubtedly facilitated 
Arab and Swahili plundering, there is little evidence that they developed 
a commercial alliance with the slave-traders on a regular basis. O f all the 
major Nguni and Kololo leaders, only Mpezeni, Soshangane, Sebetwane 
and the Maseko chief, Chikuse, exported slaves and in all four cases the 
transactions were limited in scale and sporadic.96 In general, they chose to 
utilize captives internally and thereby enhance their political and economic 
position rather than to sell the slaves to any of the trading communities. 
Nevertheless, their predatory activities created significant dislocation 
within m a n y societies. For those communities north of the Zambezi w h o 
suffered most heavily from the raids of the slave traders, the Nguni attacks 
aggravated the problems of rural stagnation and intensified the process of 
underdevelopment. 
O n the eve of the 'Scramble' 
During the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, Central Africa 
underwent an extensive transformation. T h e emergence of n e w ethnic 
groups, increased cultural exchange and intensified class cleavages are 
expressions of this far-reaching change. T h e incorporation of m u c h of the 
region into the world economy impeded rural growth and intensified 
economic dependency. T h e territorial ambition of the slave-traders and 
their Nguni-Kololo counterparts simultaneously precipitated a dramatic 
realignment of political power within the region. In short, on the eve of 
the 'Scramble' conditions within Central Africa were extremely fluid. 
In addition, the prevailing political, fragmentation, ethnic and regional 
particularism and internal strife, in part reflecting growing class antag-
onisms, placed serious constraints on the capacity of most African societies 
to resist European imperialism. 
B y 1875 there were very few indigenous regional powers. T o a certain 
extent this power vacuum reflected the past inability of m a n y Central 
African societies to organize or sustain a centralized political system. M a n y 
of the Lunda and Shona states had also undergone a process of political 
fractionalization. North of the Zambezi, the slave trade intensified internal 
rivalries in the kingdoms of the L u n d a of K a z e m b e , Undi , Kalonga and 
L u n d u that left them vulnerable to the seditious activities and attacks of 
the slave traders and their Nguni counterparts. T o the south, cleavages 
within the Shona aristocracy, coupled with the devastating raids of the 
Zwangendaba and Gaza Nguni , substantially weakened the regional 
powers. T h e incursions of Zwangendaba, for example, are generally 
96. E . Flint, 1970, pp. 73-9; H . W . Langworthy, n.d., pp. 34-7. 
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credited with destroying the badly divided Rozwi kingdom of Changamire, 
while the division of the Barue state into two competing factions, coupled 
with the debilitating Gaza raids, enabled the G o a n adventurer Gouveia to 
usurp temporarily the Barue throne around 1875.97 
Gouveia's success was part of a larger process by which Yao, Arab-
Swahili, Chikunda and Nguni invaders took advantage of the power vacuum 
to impose conquest states. While these n e w military states were undoubt-
edly stronger than the polities they had vanquished, the subject peoples 
often perceived them as alien interlopers and resented their authoritarian 
rule. As a result, the leaders were compelled to intensify their coercive 
practices, which heightened the level of hostility and increased the fre-
quency of insurrections. T h e revolts of the lakeside Tonga, T u m b u k a and 
Henga against the M b w e l a Nguni, and of the Tonga and Chopi against 
the Gaza, demonstrate the growing antipathy of the oppressed. A similar 
spirit of defiance motivated the Tawara and Tonga to periodically challenge 
the Afro-Portuguese and their Chikunda allies, w h o had carved out large 
territorial holdings along the southern margin of the Zambezi. T h e Swahili 
ruler, w h o governed the coastal sultanates of Angoche and Quitanghona, 
faced similar opposition. Such animosity did not lend itself to a unified 
struggle against the Europeans. O n the contrary, m a n y of the subject 
peoples subsequently refused to assist the alien rulers; others actually aided 
the Europeans w h o m they perceived as 'liberators'.98 
T h e dependence of the slave-trading states on European weapons and 
markets further compromised their autonomy. In the first instance they 
were particularly vulnerable to external pressures, as suggested by the 
willingness of the Afro-Portuguese and Chikunda to serve as Lisbon's 
imperial agents. Ultimately, changing conditions within the world capitalist 
economy provoked opposition to their participation in the slave trade and, 
together with growing European imperial ambitions, set the stage for an 
intensive conflict. 
While most Central African societies were becoming more vulnerable as 
the century progressed, there were a few cases in which external threats or 
temporary foreign annexation ultimately strengthened political and military 
capabilities. T h e B e m b a kingdom, in part responding to the Nguni incur-
sions, completed a dual process of political centralization and territorial 
expansion during the period after 1850. B y the eve of the 'Scramble', the 
kingdom had reached its apogee and, had it not been for the untimely 
death of M w a m b a III, it might have proved as formidable an opponent to 
the European invaders as it had been to the Nguni.9 9 Similarly, the liberated 
Lozi kingdom under the rule of Lewanika was appreciably stronger and 
97. A . F . Isaacman, 1976, pp. 48-52. 
98. A . Dachs, 1972, pp. 288-9; J- T . Botelho, 1921, pp. 469-504. 
99. A . D . Roberts, 1973, p. 217. 
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better organized than it had been during the pre-Kololo period.100 T h e 
resurgence of the kingdom of the M w e n e m u t a p a during the second half of 
the nineteenth century also demonstrates that fluid conditions could enable 
a state whose power had atrophied to regain its pre-eminence.101 But these 
examples were the exception. O n balance, the changes of the nineteenth 
century tended to favour subsequent European imperialist activities. 
ioo. M . M . Bull, 1972, pp. 463-72. 
101. T . 0 . Ranger, 1963, pp. 1-3. 
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T h e East African coast 
and hinterland, 1800-45 
A.I. SALIM 
Coastal communities, c. 1800 
T h e period under review witnessed some very significant developments 
and changes in the socio-economic and political status of the people of the 
East African coast and its hinterland. T h e advent of the O m a n i Arab 
hegemony was an important factor in these changes. In order to appreciate 
the nature and extent of these changes, a survey of the politico-economic 
pattern prevailing on the coast in about 1800 is important. 
O n e significant overall political factor was the high degree of autonomy 
enjoyed by. the coastal communities under indigenous leaders. T h e final 
expulsion by 1728 of the Portuguese, south of the R o v u m a river, with the 
aid of the O m a n i , was not followed immediately by the placing of an 
effective, comprehensive O m a n i authority on the coast. At the turn of the 
century, the O m a n i presence was significantly evident in only three main 
centres: M o m b a s a , Zanzibar and Kilwa. Even in M o m b a s a , the O m a n i 
Mazrui family had come to assume an autonomous status which, in time, 
encouraged its members to demonstrate virtual defiance of the Busa'idi 
dynasty ruling in Muscat. They were able to maintain this autonomy with 
the cooperation of the Swahili shaykhs of the Ithnaashara Taifa (Twelve 
Nations) which were subdivided~into two federations: the Thelaatha Taifa 
(Three Nations) and the Tissa Taifa (Nine Nations). T h e leaders of these 
Swahili groups participated noticeably in the administration of M o m b a s a . 
As late as 1857, two decades after the overthrow of the Mazrui, Richard 
Burton was to remark on this Swahili participation.1 
In 1799, an O m a n i governor (wait), w h o was a kinsman of the ruler 
(imam) of Muscat, was appointed to Zanzibar in succession to Yaqut, an 
Ethiopian eunuch and freed slave, w h o possessed large estates in O m a n . 
At first, the indigenous ruler, the mwenyi mkuu - with his regalia of office, 
two drums and two simas or horns - worked side by side with the O m a n i 
governor to administer his people.2 O n e of his most important duties was 
1. R . Burton, 1872, p. 40. 
2. J . M . Gray, 1962, p. 160, notes the reference by American observers to the 'King' 
and 'princes' of Zanzibar ruling side by side with the Omani governor. 
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the collection of tax imposed by the O m a n i on the indigenous W a - H a d i m u 
and W a - T u m b a t u , w h o lived by agriculture, fishing, and other maritime 
pursuits. As Zanzibar was preferred more and more by the O m a n i as a 
centre of power and economic development on the East African littoral, 
the mwenyi mkuu lost more and more political authority, whilst his people 
also lost more and more land to O m a n i settlers, w h o began to take over 
the fertile areas north and east of Zanzibar town. 
W h e n in the 1780s the I m a m of Muscat's brother attempted to use 
Kilwa Kisiwani, then under the rule of an indigenous Shirazi sultan, as a 
base for his rebellion against his brother, the I m a m took the determined 
step, in 1785, of sending an expedition to the island. This expedition left 
behind a small garrison to prevent any further possible subversion. This 
O m a n i presence on the island was also calculated to benefit economically 
from the French slave trade already established there. Even so, the local 
sultan for some time retained his title and one-fifth of the custom dues. 
H e exercised his authority with the help of notables from the island itself 
and from the opposite mainland settlements, as far south as Cape Delgado, 
where the Kilwa sultan enjoyed an indeterminate degree of overlordship.3 
T h e economic decline of Kilwa Kisiwani was speeded up by the emergence 
of the mainland settlement of Kilwa Kivinje, which began to attract the 
bulk of the slave and ivory trade away from Kilwa Kisiwani early in the 
nineteenth century. 
Around 1800 the rest of the East African coast was ruled by leading 
Swahili families, as were m a n y of the offshore islands. In the Mafia 
archipelago and its three main settlements - Kisimani, Chole and K u a -
several notable families, among them the Shatri, exercised real authority. 
T h e people's sympathy for Kilwa Kisawani's resistance to O m a n i power 
during the last quarter of the eighteenth century prevented the imposition 
of an O m a n i presence in the archipelago similar to the garrison left behind 
in Kilwa. 
Similarly, the coast between Kilwa and M o m b a s a was still free of an 
O m a n i presence by 1800. Traditional administration, exercised by local 
leaders -jumbes and diwanh - predominated in such settlements as Sadani, 
Pangani, Mtangata, Tanga, Vanga and V u m b a K u u . The jumbe or diwani, 
possessing the usual regalia of office — the siwa (horn), the drums and 
umbrella - carried out such functions as sectling disputes, pronouncing 
judgements, and imposing fines with the help of subordinate officials, the 
shaha, the mwenyi mkuu and the amiri, w h o came from prominent local 
clans. Customary law was mixed with Islamic law in the administrative 
and judicial processes. 
In this area of the coast between Kilwa and M o m b a s a the most important 
settlement was V u m b a K u u , situated between Vanga and Gasi on the 
3. E . A . Alpers, 1975, pp. 190-1. 
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southern coast of present-day Kenya. Here, there had developed the 
diwanate of V u m b a K u u , whose people, the V u m b a , were an admixture 
of Shirazi, African and Arab Sharifian elements. Its rulers adopted the title 
of diwani (from Persian divan, council). F r o m c. 1700, with the advent of 
Sayyid A b u Bakr bin Shaykh Al-Masila Ba-Alawi from Hadramawt, the B a -
Alawi established a dynasty formed through intermarriage with indigenous 
families. V u m b a statecraft embodied in its investiture ceremonies both 
Islamic and non-Islamic African rituals. T h e diwani's regalia of office were 
the ceremonial sima, the umbrella, wooden sandals and turban. Again, his 
most important functions were judicial - settling disputes in accordance 
with a syncretic system of laws - part-Islamic, part-customary. H e , too, 
had assistance to run the affairs of state from officials - shaha, waziri, 
mrvenyi mkuu and amiri- chosen from notable clans. Whilst the jurisdiction 
of the diwani was widespread, that of a jumbe only extended over a village 
or a section of a village, the Sharifian background of the diwanis had its 
religious impact, in as m u c h as the Ba-Alawi dynasty played a prominent 
role in the propagation of Islam among the Digo and Segeju, both as rulers 
and as practitioners of religious medicine, using charms, amulets, etc., in 
the execution of these functions.4 
T o the north of M o m b a s a , Malindi had declined considerably since 
Portuguese times, especially after the transfer of its ruling family to 
M o m b a s a in the 1590s. Throughout the period under review, it was to 
remain so. J. L . Krapf, w h o visited it in 1848, described it as living under 
the shadow of the O r o m o (Galla) w h o threatened the area.5 It was left to 
Seyyid Said to revive it, by encouraging O m a n i settlers, protected by a 
garrison of soldiers, w h o helped to turn it into one of the most impressive 
examples of agrarian development on the coast by the 1870s. 
North of Malindi, the only notable settlements were to be found in the 
L a m u archipelago. Pate represented the most important settlement at the 
turn of the century. It was ruled by the Nabhani, w h o still possessed the 
exquisite ivory siwa as the centrepiece of their regalia. But by 1800 the 
town had declined considerably from the great days of prosperity and 
power it had enjoyed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.6 
Internal conflicts over succession, rivalry with neighbouring L a m u and 
involvement with the ambitions of the Mazrui of M o m b a s a were to lead 
to more decline and pave the way for the island-state's subordination to 
Busa'idi Zanzibar. 
Factional rivalries and jealousies in L a m u encouraged interference from 
outsiders in the town's affairs. Proximity to Pate and the interrelationship 
between families in both towns involved L a m u in Pate's affairs. B y the 
turn of the century, Nabhani Pate, despite its economic decline, still 
4. A . I. Salim, 1973, pp. 29-30; for a detailed study, see W . F. M c K a y , 1975. 
5. J. L . Krapf, 1865, p. 152. 
6. See W . Hichens (ed.), 1939, and J. de V . Allen (ed.), 1977, for details. 
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considered L a m u subordinate to it, but L a m u ' s leading families thought 
otherwise. This uneasy relationship forced the two to take opposite sides 
in the wider dispute between the Mazrui of M o m b a s a and the Busa'idi. A s 
will be seen, the outcome was the subordination of both to Zanzibar. Siyu, 
the other settlement on Pate Island, managed to maintain an independent 
status beyond the period under consideration, thanks to the determined 
spirit of independence displayed by its ruler, Bwana Mataka. 
T h e mainland opposite the L a m u archipelago, northwards to the Somali-
inhabited regions, was settled by the Bajuni people, whose allegiance was 
to their o w n chiefs. Zanzibari control was never really felt here even beyond 
the period under consideration. A predominantly maritime economy was 
pursued by the Bajuni. Fishing, mangrove-pole cutting, collection and sale 
of cowrie shells, tortoise shells and ambergris, supplemented trade in cattle 
with the neighbouring Somali and O r o m o . 7 A s the slave trade later grew 
in importance on the coast, the Bajuni participated in it, shipping slaves 
to the neighbouring Benadir ports. 
During the period under review, the Benadir coast was predominantly 
self-governing, with centres like Mogadishu, Merka, Brava (Barawa) and 
Warsheikh being run by local Somali shaykhs w h o welcomed some Arab 
and Indian participation in the trade of tHe townships. But even after 
the establishment of the Zanzibari O m a n i sultanate, the Benadir ports 
maintained a great deal of political autonomy.8 It was not until 1842 that 
Seyyid Said appointed a representative at Mogadishu at the request of the 
Somali chiefs, w h o were more interested in promoting economic ties with, 
and acquiring a certain degree of protection from Said in the event of 
invasion from marauders in the Somali hinterland than in subordinating 
themselves to Zanzibar. It was a mutually convenient relationship, since 
Said merely expected his m a n at Mogadishu to monitor commercial traffic 
and supervise tax collection.9 That is to say the ambitions of Said were 
economic, not political. 
The Omani sultanate 
T h e growth and development of the O m a n i sultanate on the East African 
littoral was based on those essentially economic ambitions of Seyyid Said, 
w h o rightly considered himself a merchant prince first and foremost. 
Certain politico-economic factors at h o m e in O m a n and abroad on the East 
coast of Africa contributed to the genesis and development of the O m a n i 
sultanate on the coastal strip. T h e economy of O m a n expanded considerably 
towards the end of the eighteenth century. Using a neutral flag, the O m a n i 
exploited the Napoleonic W a r s to capture a good share of the carrying 
7. J .L . Krapf, i860, p. 114. 





fig. 9.2 Northern coast and hinterland: trade routes, c. 1850 (after A. I. Salim)
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plate 9.1 Pressing sesame oil in Mogadishu, 1847
trade in the Indian Ocean and neighbouring waters, leading to complaints
by British merchants that they were being overshadowed by Oman's
expanded merchant shipping. By the turn of the century, the Omani ruler,
Sultan bin Ahmed, had signed commercial agreements that gave his country
profitable contacts with the coasts ofmany regions surrounding the Indian
Ocean - Ethiopia, Shiraz, Sind and Batavia (Djakarta) - while his rep¬
resentatives on the East African coast were sending him revenue worth
40000 Maria Theresa dollars annually by 1802.10
When Said bin Sultan succeeded his father as imam in 1806, he shrewdly
maintained the policy of neutrality towards Britain and France. He signed
a commercial treaty with Ile de France (now Mauritius) in 1807. Britain,
aware of the strategic importance of Muscat, felt compelled to acquiesce
in this policy of neutrality and helped Said gain stability at home by
assisting him in his war against destabilizing forces such as the Gawassim
and the Wahhâbïs. A stable home front gave Said time and resources to
turn more confidently toward the East African coast.
The factors that focused his attention on the coast were economic and
political. He was aware of the economic potential of the coast; he wished
10. CS. Nicholls, 1971, p. 99. This source has been particularly useful in tracing the
growth of Omani power on the East African coast.
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to turn the local dynastic quarrels to his political advantage, and step in to 
counter growing European interest in the area. T h e O m a n i ' concern about 
French ambitions to carve a wider sphere of influence was a contributory 
factor in the decision to place a governor at Kilwa in 1785. In 1801, Pate 
had invited the British to establish a fort to protect it from French designs 
in return for half the produce ofthat island town.11 This, plus reports of 
subsequent visits by British ships, m a y have persuaded Said to m a k e his 
presence and influence on the coast more substantial. 
Subsequent political and military ventures are more familiar. Said 
decided to involve himself in Swahili political conflicts, particularly those 
in which the Mazrui were playing a hand. Pate's internal crisis of succession 
had led to Mazrui involvement. B y 1811, a pro-Mazrui sultan ruled Pate, 
while his rival was held hostage by the Mazrui in M o m b a s a and the rival's 
supporters were given refuge in L a m u . T h e stage was thus set for a 
confrontation between L a m u and Pate, which was supported by the Mazrui. 
1812/13 witnessed one of the most celebrated military encounters in Swahili 
history, the Battle of Shela, when a joint Pate-Mazrui force landed on 
L a m u island at the village of Shela with a view to bringing L a m u to heel. 
T h e invaders were thoroughly beaten and Pate's illusions about maintaining 
an overlordship in L a m u were finally shattered. 
It was fear of reprisals that prompted L a m u to ask Said for support and 
protection. T h e invitation was accepted and a Busa'idi governor and a 
garrison were despatched to the island, not only to counter further Mazrui-
Pate threats, but also to prevent any further extension of Mazrui influence, 
which would undermine the burgeoning Busa'idi influence; the Mazrui 
were then ensconced in M o m b a s a and enjoyed influence in P e m b a and 
Pate, while the Busa'idi had only Zanzibar and Kilwa. 
F r o m a defensive position, Said moved on to the offensive to reduce 
Mazrui influence and rule, and thus enhance his o w n . H e established a 
faction of his o w n in Pate. T h e leader of this faction became sultan on the 
death of the pro-Mazrui ruler; and when this pro-Busa'idi ruler died in 
1822, Said and his governor in L a m u fought the Mazrui and their new 
candidate, Fumoluti, and succeeded in installing a sultan amenable to the 
Busa'idi and establishing a garrison in Pate to protect their interest there. 
Thus , by 1822, Said had turned the political tide in his favour in the two 
most important points in the L a m u archipelago at the time, L a m u and 
Pate. In the same year, he challenged the Mazrui in Pemba. Acting at 
the request of an anti-Mazrui faction in P e m b a , which had sent two 
representatives to Muscat to seek support against the Mazrui, the Busa'idi 
took advantage of the absence of the Mazrui governor in M o m b a s a to take 
over P e m b a in 1823. T h e Mazrui attempt to regain P e m b a failed. 
T h u s , within a decade of turning his attention seriously towards the 
11. C . S. Nicholls, pp. 120-1. Captain T . S m e e was sent by the British B o m b a y Council 
to inquire into the economic possibilities of East Africa. 
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Swahili coast, Said had achieved for himselfand his dynasty a commanding
position and made his erstwhile rivals, the Mazrui, feel acutely vulnerable.
It was this feeling that led the Mazrui to treat with the British naval officer,
Captain W. F. Owen, and facilitate the declaration of a British protectorate
over Mombasa in 1824.
British official policy towards Owen's action was somewhat ambiguous.
While the declaration of a protectorate was not renounced, it was not
enthusiastically welcomed. Omani-British relations dampened any enthusi¬
asm there might have been otherwise. Owen had hoped and planned that
Mombasa could be used as a base to fight the slave trade. Britain had
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planned to work for the curtailment of the trade through Said and, in 1822, 
had signed the Moresby treaty with him for this purpose. N o w O w e n ' s 
support for his rivals, the Mazrui, put the British in a diplomatic spot. 
T h e protectorate, as it turned out, was short-lived. It ended in 1826 not 
only because the British government finally decided that Said was the 
m a n to work with, but also because the Mazrui themselves had become 
disenchanted with it. They were unhappy about the undue interference of 
British officers with their internal government; they were none too happy 
about sharing their custom dues with them and about the restrictions 
placed on their importation of slaves. A n d , of course, the British had failed 
to help them regain their lost possessions. 
Although the protectorate ended in 1826, it was another decade before 
Said succeeded in subduing the Mazrui. In 1828, a Busa'idi force managed 
to occupy Fort Jesus, but, after some months, Said's garrison was besieged 
and forced to withdraw. T w o subsequent expeditions - in 1829 and 1833 -
failed, largely because of support for the Mazrui from the two Swahili 
groups, the Three Nations and the Nine Nations. Said finally succeeded 
when , as elsewhere in Pate and P e m b a , internal division occurred. T w o 
factions arose a m o n g the Mazrui. T h e able and popular ruler, Salïm bin 
A h m e d , died in 1835. His successor alienated the Shaykhs of the Three 
Nations. Said was invited once again by a dissatisfied group. His expedition 
this time (1837) faced no opposition. T h e Mazrui surrendered and Said 
w o n his most coveted prize, M o m b a s a . A s elsewhere, acknowledgement 
of the Busa'idi overlordship was accompanied by a significant degree of 
autonomy. T h u s in M o m b a s a , Said's governor shared administrative 
responsibility with the Shaykhs of the Three Nations and the Nine Nations. 
Coast-hinterland trade relations 
B y the time M o m b a s a fell to him, Said seems to have already m a d e up his 
mind to m o v e his capital from O m a n to Zanzibar. It was to be in m a n y 
ways a momentous decision affecting his o w n fortune and the fortunes of 
the coast as a whole. Extremely fertile and blessed with an excellent 
harbour, Zanzibar was also strategically placed opposite the M r i m a coast, 
which by then had become the major outlet for the most important items 
of trade coming from the hinterland, ivory and slaves. G o o d revenue from 
this trade had begun to reflect itself in the coffers of the sultan even before 
he made his decision to make it his capital. His watt (governor) had already 
started nurturing Zanzibar's paramountcy by ordering all foreign traders 
to deal only with Zanzibar, banning all direct contact with the M r i m a . 1 2 
Zanzibar soon outstripped the other coastal towns in economic and 
political development. Within a short period, Seyyid Said's business 
acumen and his liberal and far-sighted policies made Zanzibar the 
12. ibid., pp. 80-1. 
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greatest single emporium on the western shore of the Indian Ocean. 
It became the most important market on the east coast for ivory, 
slaves, cloves, g u m copal, cowries and agricultural products, and the 
greatest importer of Indian, American and European manufactured 
goods - cottons, beads, wires, chains, muskets, gun-powder, china, 
earthenware, glass, knives, axes. Its status was enhanced by the 
international recognition it received in the form of commercial and 
consular agreements which the Sultan signed with America (1837), 
Britain (1839), France (1844) a n d , in time, some G e r m a n states.13 
O f all the items of trade noted above, ivory and slaves proved the most 
profitable to the O m a n i sultanate, owing to the increased demand for them 
overseas and, in the case of slaves, locally. During the first three or four 
decades of the nineteenth century, ivory and slaves reached the coast 
through the commercial networks established with the littoral by hinterland 
peoples, predominantly the Yao. E . A . Alpers stresses the importance of 
ivory in Zanzibar's trading pattern at the turn of the century.14 It dominated 
the long-distance trade of East-Central Africa and was the major pre-
occupation of most Yao . Attracted by higher prices, the Yao shifted their 
ivory away from the Mozambican coast towards Zanzibar's coast, its main 
outlet being Kilwa Kivinje. 
O n e should distinguish here between Kilwa Kisiwani, the island town 
of that n a m e and Kilwa Kivinje, n o w used by the Y a o in their ivory trade. 
Kilwa Kisiwani declined significantly by the third decade of the nineteenth 
century because of internal dissensions and unfavourable environmental 
conditions. Instead, the village of Kilwa Kivinje, 27 k m away on the 
mainland to the north, emerged as the principal trading centre. As early 
as 1819, an O m a n i governor had been placed there to promote the trade 
and exploit it. Alpers considers the rise of Kilwa Kivinje to be symbolic 
of the growing economic integration of coast and hinterland.15 T h e town's 
rise and prosperity, he argues, owed as m u c h to its role as a market and to 
Zanzibari initiative as to the inland peoples w h o brought d o w n their trade 
goods to it: 
O n e of the most important factors in the rise of Kilwa Kivinje to 
prominence in the trade of East Africa was the contribution m a d e by 
individuals from the far interior, like the Masaninga Yao adventurer, 
Mwinyi M k w i n d a , w h o settled at Kilwa Kivinje during the late 18th 
century. 
T h u s the caravan trade between the coast and the hinterland was initiated 
by Africans. T h e Y a o were joined by the Bisa in the carrying trade between 
the Lake Nyasa area and the coast. According to Alpers, competition 
between the Yao and the Bisa forced the former to concentrate more on 
13. A . I. Salim, 1973, pp. 15-16. 
14. E . A . Alpers, 1973, pp. 175-85. 
15. ibid., p. 236. 
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the slave trade to make more profit because the Bisa undercut the ivory 
price and thus made themselves more welcome at Kilwa. During the first 
half of the nineteenth century, the ivory trade was probably as important 
as the slave trade, if not more so. Both the Bisa and the Yao brought d o w n 
the ivory and slaves to Kilwa whence they were shipped to Zanzibar. B y 
1850, Kilwa Kivinje had become the most important town on the coast 
between Mozambique and Zanzibar, the export point of not only ivory 
and slaves but also other products, such as rice, g u m copal, and tobacco. 
But it was to ivory and slaves that the town owed its economic importance 
at this time. 
T h e interior peoples w h o were enslaved were often from groups w h o 
were themselves slave-traders, e.g. Yao, Bisa, M a k u a and Ngindu. Most 
slaves were acquired as a result of warfare or raids. These raids might not 
have necessarily been motivated specifically for the acquisition of slaves. 
Captives from such conflicts were subsequently traded for coastal goods 
such as cloth. Inland peoples kept slaves for their own use. Sometimes a 
slave changed masters several times before reaching the coast.16 According 
to Alpers, groups of slaves would pass in this manner from the interior to 
the coast or to one of the inland caravan centres of one of the Yao chiefs 
like M p o n d a , Makanjila and Mataka. There, they would be assembled and, 
in larger numbers, taken d o w n to the coast. 
T h e trading activities of the Yao, the Bisa and others w h o exploited the 
Lake Nyasa region were parallelled further north by those of the Nyamwezi , 
the K a m b a and the Miji Kenda . Foreign goods had found their way inland 
into Tanzania as early as the eighteenth century through regional exchange. 
This development stimulated elephant-hunting for ivory to be exchanged 
for these foreign goods. T h e S u m b w a and Nyamwezi thus came to make 
their own contacts with the coast around 1800, travelling through Ugogo.1 7 
This contact led to a commercial network between Unyamwezi and the 
coast and the blazing of new caravan routes to link the coast and hinterland. 
T h e first non-African caravan to reach Unyamwezi did so in 1824. In 
1831, Lief bin Said, w h o was half-Arab, half-Nyamwezi, marched inland 
to Lake Tanganyika and sent his own caravan inland in 1837. In 1841 an 
Arab caravan crossed Lake Tanganyika to reach Kazembe. B y the end of 
the period under discussion (1845) coastal traders had reached Buganda, 
where they were welcomed by the Kabaka not only for commercial, but 
also for military reasons, since the guns he could acquire from them would 
be useful in conflicts with his neighbours. Rising prices of ivory and slaves 
were the main incentive behind this push into the interior.18 
Further north, increased demand for ivory and other goods at the coast 
16. E . A . Alpers, 1973, pp. 240-1. 
17. J. Illife, 1979, p. 41. 
18. ibid., p. 42, notes that ivory prices at Surat, western India, doubled between 1804 
and 1808; at Zanzibar they increased sixfold between the 1820s and 1890s. 
222 
The East African coast and hinterland, 1800-45 
intensified Miji Kenda regional trade with the K a m b a by the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. T h e Miji Kenda had by then already established 
a network of trade with the Swahili, the Waata, the Vanga and the O r o m o 
at border markets. Thus , the Digo exchanged sorghum, sesame, coconuts 
and other goods for cloth, fish, wire and beads with the Swahili at the Digo 
market of M t a w e on the mainland south of M o m b a s a . They had established 
trade with Shambaa in tobacco, which they sold to the Giriama. T h e 1830s 
and 1840s witnessed V u m b a - D i g o caravans moving inland from Vanga to 
Taveta, Chaga, Samburu and eventually as far as Lake Victoria. 
T h e Giriama developed their own long-distance trade inland with the 
K a m b a by the end of the eighteenth century. They had been the main 
suppliers of ivory to the coast even earlier. T h e ivory was acquired through 
hunting and barter with the Waata and O r o m o . As demand for it rose and 
local sources of supply began to run dry towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, the Giriama were encouraged to travel inland, thus pioneering the 
first caravan journeys to the K a m b a of Kitui. T h e Giriama used the 
Rabai as intermediaries between them and the Swahili. They virtually 
monopolized the caravan trade with the K a m b a until the 1830s, when 
K a m b a caravans began to eliminate their intermediary role. 
Socio-economic effects of expanding trade 
T h e expansion of the K a m b a beyond the fertile highlands of Mbooni to 
the less fertile lowland areas such as Kitui by the early nineteenth century 
had necessitated socio-economic adjustment and adaptability. Hunting, 
pastoralism and the barter trade were resorted to in the less fertile areas to 
maintain subsistence. T h e system known as kuthuua ('search for food') 
developed. It inevitably led to a barter trade with neighbours like the 
Kikuyu, E m b u and Maasai. With the arrival of the Giriama, this regional 
K a m b a trade network extended to the coast. B y the 1820s the K a m b a were 
fitting out their o w n caravans to travel to the coast, involving more and 
more people as the potential of the trade became more evident. K a m b a 
caravans dominated the long-distance trade in the northern sector of the 
East African hinterland during the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s until - as had 
happened earlier in the southern (Tanganyikan) hinterland - they were 
supplanted by the Arab and Swahili caravans, which were bigger and better 
armed, and which moved decisively inland from the late 1850s onward. 
These coast-hinterland trade relations were to have some significant results. 
For example the Miji K e n d a system of living in enclosed or fortified 
settlements — kaya - was undermined. After 1830, the incentive to pursue 
commercial activities and opportunities forced many Digo, Giriama, Rabai 
and D u r u m a to abandon living in their kayas and establish themselves in 
the surrounding areas. 
This dispersal in search of trading opportunities and better pastures 
undermined not only the corporate life of the kaya but also the authority 
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of the elders. Instead, life became centred on a smaller segment of society, 
the sub-clan or the lineage. T h e age-set also died out since dispersal m a d e 
meetings in the kaya for initiation ceremonies increasingly problematic. 
There arose among the Miji Kenda and the K a m b a wealthy individuals 
w h o used wealth acquired from trade to build for themselves a following 
and influence. 
A n example of such individuals was the Giriama named Ngonyo, w h o 
parallelled his father's trade relations with the Swahili, O r o m o , Waata and 
K a m b a and built for himself a substantial village bringing together these 
disparate elements w h o constituted his following. H e thus paved the way 
for his recognition later as headman by the British. Another example is the 
Digo leader, Mwakikonge, w h o established a monopoly of trade with the 
V u m b a and utilized the wealth gained therefrom to develop personal 
alliances, his o w n following and even his o w n court at D z o m b o , adopting 
the title of kubo. 
T h e K a m b a had their o w n 'big m e n ' (andu anene) w h o acquired power 
and influence through wealth accrued from trade. T h e most notable 
example was Kivui M w e n d a , w h o gained prominence as a result of the 
long-distance trade between the coast and Ukambani in the 1820s and 
1830s.19 T h e sizes of caravans grew bigger as this trade developed. Kivui's 
caravans had some three hundred m e n . His network of allies covered Kitui 
K a m b a , E m b u and Miji Kenda, extending down to M o m b a s a , whose 
governor was a trading partner. 
A similar pattern of hinterland-coastal commercial relations m a y be 
discerned as having already been well-established by the early decades of 
the nineteenth century beyond the Swahili-Miji Kenda coast in the north. 
L a m u had replaced Pate as the most important commercial port in the 
L a m u archipelago by the early years of the nineteenth century. By this 
time, a veritable system of plantation agriculture had been established by 
L a m u ' s inhabitants on the opposite mainland - the K o n d e system.20 At 
the same time, traders from the archipelago ventured inland from such 
points as K a u and Kipini, on the Ozi river, up the Tana river to trade with 
the Pokomo and O r o m o in livestock, ivory and agricultural produce. 
A significant commercial network linked the Benadir towns on the 
Somali coast - Brava, Merka and Mogadishu - with the interior. In the 
course of the nineteenth century, the Benadir ports were joined to points 
in southern Ethiopia and present-day northern Kenya as far as Lake 
Rudolph (present-day Lake Turkana). K e y points on this extensive network 
of caravan routes were L u k (Lugh) and Bardera on the Juba river. Somali 
and Boran traders brought ivory, livestock and occasionally slaves to these 
towns, from where they were conveyed to market towns near the coast, 
such as Afgoy, in the neighbourhood of Mogadishu and Audegle, near 
19. For details, consult R . Cummings , 1975; on the Miji Kenda, consult T . Spear, 1974. 
20. Consult M . Ylvisaker, 1975 and 1983. 
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Merka. Eventually these goods reached these Benadir ports. Other Somali 
groups, such as the Bimal, Geledi and Tunni supplied the port towns with 
agricultural goods grown in the fertile W e b i Shebelle valley, and also acted 
as agents for Somali traders in the hinterland. 
These commercial relations, based upon the caravan trade linking each 
different segment of the East African coast with its hinterland, were to 
have a gradual socio-cultural impact, already noticeable by the end of the 
period under review (1845), but which was to develop more significantly 
during the second half of the century. T h e rise of individualism and the 
emergence of a few individuals w h o amassed wealth (however transient), 
influence, and prestige outside the traditional social framework has already 
been touched upon. Far more prevalent was the custom of acquiring foreign 
wives. This phenomenon became noticeable for example, among the Digo 
and the Rabai during the nineteenth century as an extension of their 
commercial relations. In this way, blood-brotherhoods were established 
between Miji Kenda, O r o m o , K a m b a and Swahili. There was also a 
noticeable adoption of n e w ritual practices resulting from interaction 
between these groups in eastern Kenya; ' N e w methods of healing and 
divining, of controlling rainfall, and of spirit possession spread throughout 
Kenya as individual cultural practices became amalgamated into regional 
patterns'21 in the course of the nineteenth century. 
T h e dynamics of socio-economic changes brought about cultural changes 
in the coastal towns and a m o n g some groups in the interior. With the 
growth of the caravan trade, the populations of these towns became bigger 
and more ethnically variegated. There was an influx of new Arab, upcountry 
African and, more noticeably, slave elements in these towns. T h e growing 
use of plantation and domestic slaves and the concomitant widespread 
practice of concubinage led to greater Afro-Arab and Afro-Swahili ethnic 
and cultural interaction and integration even within the ruling O m a n i 
aristocracy, indeed even within the Sultan's palace. Most of Said's wives 
were African, and his children spoke Kiswahili rather than Arabic. All 
Said's successors as sultans during the nineteenth century were born of 
slave w o m e n . T h e attempt to preserve an Arab identity in these cir-
cumstances became harder, as m a n y foreign visitors were to observe. 
As time passed, there were noticeable cultural differences between the 
'raw' Omani or Yemeni Arab and his settled Swahilized or Africanized 
counterpart in the Swahili towns. T h e former became distinguished as a 
Mmanga or M-Shihiri respectively. T h e coming of Busa'idi overlordship, 
and the new h u m a n influx from upcountry and the Y e m e n , helped to 
break d o w n pre-existing patterns of urban stratification and stimulated the 
evolution of n e w ones, e.g. in L a m u . 2 2 B y the 1850s, of Zanzibar's 150000 
21. T . Spear, 1981, p. 131. 
22. See A . El-Zein, 1979 and A . H . Prins, 1971. 
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inhabitants, some 60000 were slaves.23 T h e Mazrui, displaced from 
M o m b a s a in 1837, established themselves in Gasi to the south of their 
former city-state, and at Takaungu to the north, where they interacted 
closely with the Digo and the Giriama respectively. M a n y of them were 
initiated as Giriama elders. Ngonyo became a blood-brother with m a n y of 
them. Slaves were imported from Zanzibar and the M r i m a . T h e Mazrui 
developed Gasi and Takaungu as n e w politico-economic bases, using Digo 
and Giriama allies to further this aim. 
These changes along the coast were parallelled by those taking place in 
the hinterland, where m a n y groups experienced 'enlargement of scale' in 
differing degrees arising from their contact with, and participation in, the 
long-distance trade. Coastal material culture came to be copied or adopted. 
T h u s , the Swahili long shirt, kanzu, became more commonly seen and 
worn as far inland as Buganda. T h e Yao chief, Mataka, mentioned above, 
boasted of his attempts to transform his area into a replica of a coastal 
settlement. H e rebuilt his capital in coastal style, beautifying it with m a n g o 
trees.24 Other African rulers were later to do the same, such as Kimweri's 
son, Semboja, the chief of Mazinde, w h o dressed in Arab style and admired 
Swahili cooking; and the Haya ruler, the Rumanyika of Karagwe, whose 
palace was furnished with luxury goods acquired from the coast via the 
caravan trade, including stuffed birds, mirrors and clocks. 
T h e first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the implanting of the 
first seeds of Islam in the hinterland. Islam began to win converts not only 
among chiefly families, but also for the first time it began to penetrate into 
the rural areas. Nearest the coast, the Digo and Segeju were the most 
receptive to the faith. A m o n g the other Miji Kenda, it was not to have any 
noticeable impact until the last quarter of the century. It w o n acceptance 
among the Baganda soon after the arrival of the Arab trader-cum-mission-
ary, A h m e d bin Ibrahim in 1844.25 B y the time Christian missionaries 
arrived in Buganda in the 1870s, Kabaka Mutesa was already observing 
Islamic rituals such as fasting, and m a n y mosques had been built. B y that 
time, too, the influence of Islam was observed on a more modest scale in 
Bonde, in Uzigua and on the M a k o n d e plateau. 
Where it had been accepted, Islam tended to be in a syncretic form. At 
the same time, there were societies that incorporated Islamic elements into 
their o w n traditional religion or introduced coastal practices, personages 
and spirits into their religious rituals. Thus , some K a m b a spirits had 
Swahili names; the Zanzibar Sultan, Barghash, had his n a m e mentioned 
in S u k u m a rituals.26 
Kiswahili as a language spread more extensively than Islam in the 
23. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 42. 
24. ibid., p . 78. 
25. See A . Oded, 1974 and A . B . Kasozi, 1974. 
26. J. Iliffe, 1979, p. 79. 
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hinterland, especially that of Tanganyika. B y the 1850s, Burton found it 
spoken widely by Sagara and G o g o and noted that almost every inland 
ethnic group had someone w h o could speak it.27 
Apart from this coastal cultural impact on the hinterland, however 
limited it was during the first half of the nineteenth century, there was 
also cultural mingling among hinterland groups. However, there was also 
considerable resistance to coastal traders and their culture among some of 
the hinterland groups, especially those remote from the caravan routes. 
Indeed, important developments took place in the hinterland, independent 
of the caravan trade or which were at best only remotely affected by it. 
There were m a n y interior societies that did not consider commercial 
interaction with the coast necessary for their economic life. 
T h u s , during the first half of the nineteenth century, the Kikuyu were 
still expanding their area of settlement in the fertile, forested region of the 
central highlands of present-day Kenya. Abundance of food led to an 
increasing population and a barter trade in the surplus produce with their 
neighbours such as the K a m b a . T o some extent this also happened with 
the Maasai, w h o helped to confine the Kikuyu to the forested areas which 
the latter gradually cleared as their expanding population needed more 
room and food. T h e Kikuyu, like the K a m b a , had no centralized political 
system. Families on one ridge were generally independent of those living 
on another ridge under their o w n leader, although relations did exist 
between some groups, and some leaders did attempt, by force, to extend 
their authority to encompass other groups. Kikuyu commercial activities 
were more localized and never reached the coast. Even w h e n the Swahili-
Arab caravans found their way into the interior in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Kikuyu showed a distinct lack of interest in 
establishing any significant trade ties with them. 
B y 1800, the Maasai's legendary power had significantly declined. This 
section of the Plains Nilotes group had reached the limits of their expansion. 
They had also become divided into pastoralists, w h o occupied the Rift 
Valley plains between central Tanganyika and central Kenya, and the 
smaller agriculturist group - the Iloikop or W a - K w a v i - w h o settled in 
the area between M t Kilimanjaro and the Highlands of present-day Kenya. 
T h e history of the Maasai during the period under study is dominated by 
the struggle between these two groups at one level and by further civil 
strife between the various laibons vying for leadership at another level. 
This civil conflict drove groups of Maasai in different directions in the 
hinterland, a notable factor which inhibited an earlier penetration of this 
section of the interior by Arab and Swahili traders. Groups of W a - K w a v i 
raided as far east as the environs of M o m b a s a . In 1837, a skirmish took 
place between W a - K w a v i and an Arab-Swahili party that met them outside 
the town. T h e latter was badly mauled in the encounter. Contemporary 
27. ibid. 
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sources, such as the missionary J. L . Krapf, refer to the recurrent threat 
posed by the W a - K w a v i to the Miji Kenda , which justified the defensive 
aspects of the kaya system. 
West of the Rift Valley, movement and settlement of peoples took place 
in the Great Lakes region. These evolved into the Bantu-speaking groups 
such as the Abaluyia, the Baganda, the Basoga etc., and the Nilotic groups, 
such as the L u o , the Acholi and others. T h e first half of the nineteenth 
century witnessed a continuation of movement , settlement and interaction 
in that region, as well as a crystallization of diverse political systems 
within different groups that lent them some relatively distinct identity. For 
example, in the case of Buganda, a centralized state developed, headed by 
the ruler (the kabaka), with his insignias of office - drums, stools and 
spears, and his body of counsellors, the lukiko. B y the nineteenth century, 
Buganda, which had hitherto been dominated by Bunyoro, became more 
powerful and expansionist. 
B y contrast, the Bantu-speaking groups on the eastern shores of Lake 
Victoria evolved no centralized state (except for the W a n g a kingdom). 
Instead, each clan established its o w n political and social unit. Clan elders 
appointed a wise one amongst themselves to administer its affairs under 
the title of omwami, omukali, omukasa, etc.28 T h e W a n g a kingdom, which 
already had a ritual king, the nabongo, by the nineteenth century, had 
started life as a modest chieftainship. T h e growth of the state is attributed 
to adroit leadership, which gave the W a n g a a significant advantage over 
their neighbours and, with the passage of time, a significant degree of 
domination over m a n y of them. T h e kingdom was to establish relations 
with the coastal traders w h e n they moved inland from the coastal area 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Nabongo M u m i a hoped 
to use them to bolster up his declining kingdom in return for giving them 
a commercial base. 
T h e first half of the nineteenth century also witnessed an important 
historical development that was to have far-reaching political consequences: 
the Nguni invasion of the Tanganyikan hinterland. T h e Nguni invasion, 
like the long-distance trade, was to have negative as well as positive effects 
on interior societies. Politically, the two processes led to state formation or 
consolidation in some areas and to political disintegration in others. These 
developments concerning the Nguni took place during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, that is beyond the period under review. 
O m a n i international trade 
T h e survey has shown that there was a very wide spectrum of reactions to 
the long-distance trade a m o n g inland polities, just as there was a wide 
spectrum of consequences — social, political and economic - arising from 
28. G . S . Were, 1968, p. 195. 
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it affecting these inland societies. T h e Tanganyika hinterland was generally 
more affected by these relations with the coast than the Kenyan one during 
the period under consideration. 
O n e m a y n o w note several other important developments that took place 
on the coast during this period. A n important and far-reaching economic 
policy adopted by Said bin Sultan was his encouragement of Indian 
enterprise and settlement. Asian commercial relations with the East African 
coast predate the nineteenth century, but there was no particularly notice-
able Asian presence in Zanzibar or the mainland coast. Said admired Asian 
business acumen and expertise and decided that Asians would be useful in 
the commercial development and exploitation of his empire. B y 1804 , t n e 
custom house collection in Zanzibar had been farmed out to an Asian 
merchant. B y 1811, an appreciable number of Asians had taken residence 
in Said's capital. It was the beginning of their crucial and, soon, their 
dominant role as customs agents, middlemen, financiers or moneylenders 
and wholesale traders. While the growth of Asian settlement in Zanzibar 
and some mainland towns w o n them no political leverage or influence, it 
did give them a dominant and unsurpassed economic position. For example, 
Jairam Sewji gained considerable wealth during the period (1834-53) when 
the customs were farmed out to him, as did Taria Topan after him. T h o u g h 
their o w n income increased as custom dues rose over the years, invariably 
the sultans of Zanzibar remained in debt to the chief Asian customs farmers. 
At another level, Asian capital and goods became crucial for Arab and 
Swahili caravans. Inevitably, a considerably larger share of the profits from 
the caravan trade went to the Asian middleman and Asian financier. 
Another noteworthy step taken by Said that was to prove to be a 
landmark in the area's economic history was his introduction of clove-
growing in Zanzibar, giving his island capital near-complete domination 
of the international market for the crop by 1850.29 It was to be the beginning 
of the plantation economy that was to supplement the d h o w trade and the 
caravan trade of the coastal people. T h e littoral's fertility, especially that 
of Zanzibar, had been noted early by Said. Indeed, it was one of the main 
reasons behind the transfer of his capital to the island. Until the advent of 
cloves, coconut products were the only exports from Zanzibar, while P e m b a 
was historically an exporter of rice. T h e first shoots of the clove tree were 
brought to Zanzibar from Réunion by an O m a n i Arab, Saleh bin Haramil 
al-Abry, w h o is said to have either grown Zanzibar's first clove trees or 
given the shoots to the sultan. Said developed the clove industry, and 
became initially its major exporter. Using slave labour to farm some forty-
five plantations, he was producing two-thirds of the 8000 frasilas (a frasila 
is about 35 pounds) exported from Zanzibar by 1840. B o m b a y , a leading 
consumer of cloves, imported $29 000 worth of cloves from Zanzibar in 
29. N o source on Zanzibari history can omit a reference to cloves. T h e latest is F . 
Cooper, 1977, which provides a good survey of clove-growing in Zanzibar and Pemba. 
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1837-8. 'Five years later, imports from Zanzibar totalled $97 000, dwarfing 
all other sources'.30 
T h e last decade under consideration (1835-45) witnessed the expansion 
of clove-growing by Said's fellow O m a n i Arabs in Zanzibar and P e m b a , 
to the neglect of crops like coconuts and rice. S o m e w h o had begun life as 
caravan traders switched to the clove plantation industry, so that by the 
1840s the leading O m a n i families in Zanzibar and P e m b a had become clove 
cultivators. T h e clove industry was a major incentive for the slave trade, 
since m u c h labour was required during the growing and harvesting season. 
It also encouraged the acquisition of large areas of land. Various methods 
were used to acquire this land; taking over vacant land in the two islands, 
paying token rent to the indigenous inhabitants, purchase and, as increased 
profitability was sensed, expropriation. In this way, O m a n i Arabs acquired 
clove plantations in northern and western Zanzibar, while its W a h a d i m u 
inhabitants were reduced to cultivating subsistence crops and small-scale 
cash crops in the southern and eastern parts of the island.31 In Pemba , on 
the other hand, Arab plantations were interspersed with the farms of the 
indigenous W a - P e m b a w h o also grew cloves, though on a smaller scale. 
Better relations developed here between the two groups, since land griev-
ances were better contained under the P e m b a arrangement. 
T h e commercial treaties Said signed with the U S A , Britain, France and 
the G e r m a n states were important contributions to the rise and develop-
ment of Zanzibar's commercial 'empire' in East Africa. Relations with the 
U S A significantly favoured the commercial development of Zanzibar. 
T h e treaty was signed in 1833 when Said was involved in his economic 
development plans, so that the American presence stimulated those plans 
by providing an important market. T h e treaty provided the Americans 
with very favourable terms: 5 per cent duty on American goods imported 
into East Africa and no duties on East African goods purchased by the 
Americans. American shipping in East African waters increased sig-
nificantly after the treaty was signed. T h e Americans carried away goods 
such as ivory, g u m copal, and, as the industry grew, cloves in large 
quantities. T h e y imported into Zanzibar sugar, beads, brassware, guns and 
gunpowder and the cotton cloth that became famous in East Africa as 
'Merekani' (American). American sales rose from $100000 in 1838 to 
$550 000 at the time of Said's death in 1856, with American cotton imports 
showing the greatest increase.32 
T h e U S A became the most important Western nation to trade in East 
African waters, commercially overshadowing the British. It was indeed this 
fear of being overshadowed by the Americans that spurred the British to 
30. F . Cooper, 1977, p. 51. 
31. ibid., p. 58, adds, 'this unequal ethnic division of land became a major source of 
tension in the twentieth century'. 
32. C . S. Nicholls, 1971, p. 332. 
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sign a similar treaty with Said in 1839. Even so, British commercial 
interests - apart from those of British Asian subjects - and the British 
share in the East African trade, actually declined during this period. After 
initial reservations, Said signed a treaty with the French in 1844. T h e 
British had encouraged Said s apprehensions of French designs. After the 
establishment of a French consulate in Zanzibar in 1844, Anglo-French 
rivalry continued intermittently, and Said was compelled to use his utmost 
sagacity to maintain a neutral stance or to play one side against the other. 
His need for British military support in O m a n , however, helped to boost 
British political significance. Starting with Atkins Hamerton, the British 
consul came to enjoy and was at times even able to impose a significant 
degree of influence over the Busaldi Sultan-Imäm. T h e American consul, 
W a r d , even noted after a conversation with Hamerton in 1851 that soon 
the British planned to take over the East African coast. This British political 
influence more than compensated for the declining British share in the 
East African trade.33 
It was Hamerton w h o , after two years of negotiations, persuaded Said, 
in 1847, to sign what became k n o w n as the Hamerton Treaty, banning the 
export of slaves beyond the sultan's East African dominions. T h e expanding 
clove plantation industry and the slave export trade had led to an increase 
in the East African slave trade. Estimates of the traffic in h u m a n cargoes 
during the nineteenth century have never been reliable. Latter-day scholars 
have tended to consider figures given by contemporary nineteenth-century 
sources - European visitors, naval officers, missionaries and explorers - as 
exaggerated. But they differ in their o w n estimates. E . A . Alpers34 challenges 
C . S. Nicholls's figure of 20 000 traded annually. H e notes that A . M . H . 
Sheriff35 errs on the conservative side w h e n he arrives at a figure of only 
2500 slaves a year during the 1830s (basing the figure on importation into 
Muscat, Kharaq and Basra) since he seems to underestimate the importance 
of domestic slaves by concentrating on slaves used in the date plantations 
in the Persian Gulf area. But F . Cooper gives no figures of his o w n . H e 
merely notes that the slave export trade from Zanzibar to the Gulf was 
profitable business throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. T h e 
Hamerton agreement proved to be decidedly inadequate in curtailing local 
and overseas demand for slaves. 
Said is credited with having set in motion a series of economic and 
commercial policies that not only turned Zanzibar into the most important 
commercial emporium on the East African coast - importing manufactured 
goods from India, Europe and the U S A , and exporting cloves, ivory, slaves, 
rhinoceros horns, g u m copal and other goods — but also, inevitably, with 
tying East Africa's economy to the chariot wheel of the Western capitalist 
33. ibid., p. 187. 
34. F . Cooper, 1977, p. 43; E . A . Alpers, 1973, pp. 185-93. 
35. A . M . H . Sheriff, 1971. 
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system, which enriched the Asian, European and American merchants at 
the expense of the indigenous East African societies, thus leading to their 
underdevelopment. 
Under this merchant capitalist system, the h u m a n and material resources 
of East African societies were exploited through the unequal exchange 
that became entrenched between the parasitic foreign merchants based in 
Zanzibar on the one hand, and the coastal and hinterland peoples on the 
other. 
T h e very sizeable profits obtained were expatriated to Europe, the 
U S A and India and hardly ever invested in the physical or technological 
development of East Africa. T h e imported goods, exchanged for East 
African products like ivory, were inexpensive consumable items that were 
useless for capital development. T h e importation of some of them even 
undermined local industries, such as the textile industries of L a m u and 
the Benadir ports which were hard hit by Asian and, later, American 
cottons. 
At the same time, the slave export trade and the inter-group fighting 
and raids associated with it reduced manpower capital in the hinterland of 
Tanganyika and contributed to the region's underdevelopment36 and to its 
'progress towards an inevitable dead end'.37 
Conclusion 
During the period under consideration (1800-45), t n e E a s t African coast 
and hinterland was composed of city-states and interior societies virtually 
independent of one another politically, and involved in regional and local 
trade, and, in the case of the coastal people in trans-oceanic trade. 
With the advent of Busa'idi rule, some nominal allegiance was paid by 
most of the coastal towns to Zanzibar, although in effect local chiefs wielded 
real power. T h e period witnessed the growth of the long-distance caravan 
trade, which was initiated by inland African groups, such as the Y a o 
and the Nyamwezi . Increased demand for ivory, slaves and other goods, 
however, acted as a strong stimulant for Arab and Swahili caravans moving 
inland. i 
T h e long-distance trade was to have its social, economic and cultural 
impact on m a n y hinterland societies, though by no means all. Islam and 
the Swahili language spread inland, the latter more significantly than the 
former. Christian missionaries were to come after 1845. At the same time, 
other important developments took place in the hinterland independent of 
the caravan trade that were to have their o w n major impact. Notable 
36. There is a sizeable literature on this subject. Consult, for example, W . Rodney, 
1972; J. Iliffe, 1979, pp. 67-77; R . Gray and D . Birmingham (eds), 1970; B . Swai, 1984; 
A . M . H . Sheriff, 1971; and T . Spear, 1981. 
37. J. Iliffe, 1979, p.76, quoting A . D . Roberts, 1970b. 
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a m o n g these was the Nguni invasion, especially in its consequences for the 
formation of n e w states and the disintegration of existing ones. 
Finally, it has been noted that the creation and development of the 
Zanzibari commercial empire led to a very unequal exchange between the 
representatives of oriental and Western capitalism - the Asian, European 
and American merchants - and the indigenous peoples of the coast and 
hinterland, whereby the former benefited disproportionately from the 
international trade they fostered, developed and controlled. This con-
tributed in turn to underdevelopment in East Africa. 
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I . N . K I M A M B O 
In Chapter 9 it has been shown that by the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century most of the societies of the East African hinterland were developing 
independently. T h e y were certainly not stagnant, as some anthropological 
descriptions would tend to suggest. States of varying sizes had been 
established from the Great Lakes region to western, central and north-
eastern Tanzania. Pastoral and agricultural communities had established 
themselves in the highlands and rift valley regions. Changes were taking 
place in m a n y of these societies; people were still moving into agriculturally 
less attractive, hitherto unpopulated areas, while the influence of more 
recent movements like those of the L u o and the Maasai were still to be 
fully absorbed by their neighbours. Only the immediate coastal region and 
the islands of Zanzibar and P e m b a had been drawn into the international 
economic system. B y the early 1840s two separate invasions had begun to 
take place in East Africa: the first was the trade invasion which was to draw 
the interior into the international economic system, and the second was 
the Nguni invasion from Southern Africa, which was the cause of various 
movements and adjustments in the existing societies. T w o other factors 
were also important in this period: the struggle between the Maasai groups 
and the growing European interests and pressures in East Africa. This 
chapter examines briefly these factors in the period between 1845 and 1884. 
Omani penetration and the expansion of trade 
T h e shifting of O m a n i political and commercial interests from O m a n to 
Zanzibar and P e m b a and more indirectly to the other coastal city-states 
has been discussed in Chapter 9. T h e roots for the growth of a commercial 
empire penetrating the interior of East Africa were also laid in the early 
part of the nineteenth century. B y the 1840s the trade in ivory and slaves 
was expanding rapidly and was drawing the interior into the trading 
network already established on the coast. 
There is a tendency to consider ivory and slaves as interconnected 
commodities of trade since in most cases they came from the same region 
and also since slaves could be employed to carry ivory. But the importance 
of this superficial inter-relationship has been exaggerated. Clearly, for long-
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distance trade, both ivory and slaves had to be exchanged for other 
bulky commodities, such as cloth, wire and beads which also had to be 
transported. 
A m u c h more important inter-relationship centres on the fact that both 
commodities were involved in an international commercial system that was 
drawing East Africa into a subordinate role, and in turn influencing the 
development of trade in East Africa in the period prior to the establishment 
of colonialism. T h e fact is that East Africa was already drawn into the 
capitalist economic system prior to the actual establishment of colonial 
rule. 
T h e expansion of the slave trade into the interior depended on the 
establishment of a plantation economy, firstly on the French-dominated 
islands of Mauritius and Réunion, but more significantly in the clove 
plantations of Zanzibar and P e m b a . B y the time Sayyid Said had transferred 
his economic interest to East Africa, the slave traffic to Mauritius had been 
reduced by British intervention and the island had even been taken over 
by them in 1810. But Seyyid Said encouraged the expansion of clove and 
coconut plantations in Zanzibar and P e m b a . B y the time he transferred his 
capital to Zanzibar in the 1840s, clove plantations were already the domi -
nant economic activity and were mostly operated by slave labour. This 
created a class of landowners, originally mainly Arabs, but by the 1860s 
including indigenous Shirazi and Indians as well. B y the 1860s it is 
estimated that the islands of Zanzibar and P e m b a were absorbing about 
10 000 slaves per a n n u m . This was in addition to those supplied to other 
markets (largely Arab) abroad. It has been estimated that by the 1860s the 
Zanzibar market alone was handling as m a n y as 70 000 slaves per a n n u m 
and that the heaviest traffic started after 1840.1 Although these figures m a y 
have been greatly exaggerated, they do indicate that the slave trade has 
increased tremendously by the middle of the nineteenth century. 
T h e second commercial commodity exported from East Africa was ivory. 
In Chapter 9 w e saw h o w its market was beginning to expand in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century due to increased demand in the 
industrialized West, apart from the traditional market in India. Previously 
Europe and the U S A had obtained their ivory from West Africa. T h e 
demand for East African ivory, however, increased when it was discovered 
that it was of better quality (softer) and therefore more suitable for making 
luxury goods, such as combs , billiard balls and piano keys, which the richer 
classes were demanding. All British efforts to control this trade directly from 
East Africa failed because Indian merchants were already well entrenched in 
conducting the trade through B o m b a y from where it was re-exported to 
Europe. Only a few American traders were able to establish themselves 
gradually in Zanzibar as the most important Western traders, although 
they remained heavily dependent on the Indian merchants. 
1. E . A . Alpers, 1967, p. 11. See also E . A . Alpers, 1974, p. 236. 
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L. Thompson andJ. Vansina, African History, IQ78, p. 294)
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Clearly, the terms of long-distance trade in both ivory and slaves were 
quite favourable to those involved in exploiting the commodities. Conse-
quently, long-distance trade routes radiated from the coastal towns (such 
as Kilwa, Bagamoyo , Pangani, Tanga and M o m b a s a ) to various points in 
the interior. A s a result, by the 1870s most of present-day Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, eastern Zaire, northern Zambia, Malawi and northern 
Mozambique had become part of a vast hinterland connected with Zanzibar 
through these coastal towns and therefore integrated to varying degrees 
into the international trading network. 
It is tempting to consider this growth of long-distance trade as an 
unfortunate episode in which the Africans were helpless victims. Certainly 
in its degrading effects on h u m a n life, the slave trade had m u c h disastrous 
personal and moral impact on East African societies. But the long-distance 
trade, in all its aspects, had a m u c h greater impact in influencing the actual 
development of the societies involved. T h e Africans were by no means 
spectators of this process. A s w e shall demonstrate in the following 
examples, in m a n y cases it was the Africans w h o seized the initiative in 
establishing trade relations with the coast. Yet, it is difficult to assess 
adequately the overall economic impact of this trade invasion on African 
societies. It is easier to recognize certain discernible contributions brought 
into the interior by this coastal penetration, such as new crops like maize 
and rice, and cultural impact represented by the spread of Islam and more 
significantly by the spread of the Swahili language. But economically h o w 
was the East African affected? 
Philip Curtin, assessing the impact of a similar kind of trade involvement 
in the Senegambia region, concluded: 
T h e data are easily accurate enough to support the generalization that, 
in spite of the probability of strong contrary swings in wartime, the 
net barter terms of trade shifted consistently in favor of Senegambia 
over a period of nearly two centuries. Even if the accuracy of the 
estimates is no closer to reality than half or double, the overall shift 
to Senegambia's advantage from the 1680's to the 1830's would have 
been within the range of fivefold to twentyfold. O r , as a median 
estimate, the Senegambians at the end of the period received about 
ten times as m u c h as they had received 150 years earlier for the same 
quantity of goods exported.2 
Unfortunately no such data are available for East Africa. R . Coupland, 
compiling some statistics for Zanzibar and s o m e coastal centres, was able 
to show, for example, that by 1876 Kilwa was making £120000 profit 
yearly, and that between 1869 and 1876 customs revenue in Zanzibar had 
risen from £65000 to over £100000 per a n n u m . 3 This would seem to 
indicate that a study similar to that of Senegambia could be undertaken 
2. P . D . Curtin, 1975, p.340. 
3. R . Coupland, 1939, p. 227, pp. 319-20. See also J. M . Gray, 1963, p. 241. 
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for at least Zanzibar itself. But such a study would probably tell us very 
little about the numerous societies of the hinterland that were involved in 
commercial activities. It is known that by the 1870s the plantation economy, 
using slave labour, had begun to spread to the mainland coast and to the 
interior along the caravan routes, mainly in order to supply the food (grain) 
required to feed both the rich and the labouring sections of the population 
on the islands of Zanzibar and P e m b a , and to feed the large caravan 
expeditions to and from the hinterland.4 But this does not give us a complete 
picture. Furthermore, even if a complete picture could be obtained, a 
demonstration that the African producer was getting more at a particular 
time than he was getting previously would not change the exploitative 
nature of the international capitalist trading system of the time. In fact the 
coastal traders and their African allies were but middlemen for European 
traders w h o were getting the largest share of the profits. T h e African 
producer was being exploited by both the middlemen and the European 
traders. T h e situation becomes worse in terms of comparison w h e n the 
product is a h u m a n being! In addition w e can say that, by being drawn 
into the world economy on unfavourable terms, the East Africans diverted 
their energies from developing their o w n economies for their o w n purpose 
to supply raw materials and labour in exchange for foreign-manufactured 
goods (mainly luxury items) that only benefited certain groups of people 
in society. In some of these societies the trade had the effect of killing or 
retarding some of the local industries producing similar items, such as the 
bark-cloth in the Lake region and the hand-woven cloth industry in south-
western Tanzania. 
This integration of the vast area of the eastern African hinterland with 
the coast was not achieved merely by extending n e w trade routes from the 
coast to the interior, nor was it simply a result of Arab and Swahili 
penetration into the interior. T o be sure, it involved transformation and 
assimilation of pre-existing regional trading networks. T h u s , for the sake 
of clarity, w e shall discuss the long-distance trade routes in four regions: 
the Kilwa hinterland routes, the central Tanzanian routes, the Pangani 
valley route and the M o m b a s a hinterland routes. 
T h e Ki lwa hinterland routes 
T h e Kilwa hinterland routes were probably the oldest of those leading into 
the East African interior, having been stimulated by the late eighteenth-
century demand for slaves in the French-dominated islands. T h e contact 
between the whole region of Lake Nyasa and Kilwa was relatively easy 
because travellers could pass through fairly fertile and inhabited land. This 
land was controlled by the Yao, w h o were responsible for transporting 
ivory, wax and slaves to Kilwa. T h e Y a o continued to play an important 
part in this trade even during the peak period in the nineteenth century. 
4. A . Smith, 1963, p. 296. 
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L. Thompson andJ. Vansina, African History, 1978, p. 399)
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Their prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century, therefore, 
was dependent on their eminence in the regional trade of this area in the 
previous period. As already mentioned, the geographical position was in 
their favour. But more important was the effect this regional trade had on 
the society itself. T h e Yao, w h o had previously been loosely organized in 
small groups under petty chiefs around Lake Nyasa (present-day Lake 
Malawi), had by the middle of the nineteenth century formed larger 
settlements under chiefs playing a more commanding role. Previously 
m u c h more emphasis has been put on the effects of the Nguni invasion in 
causing this transformation. But, as shown below, the Nguni invasion came 
at a time when stratification in society had more clearly been set in motion 
by the trading activities. By the time Arab traders began to push inland 
through this route, Yao chiefs were simply too strong to be challenged. 
Therefore, except for isolated pockets like Khota-Khota and Karonga in 
present-day Malawi, the Arabs were never in control of the trade; they 
were generally clients of the powerful Yao chiefs to w h o m they supplied 
guns and other trade goods and with w h o m they shared the spoils.5 
T h e central Tanzanian routes 
T h e Nyamwezi were the most important group on the central Tanzanian 
routes. In the early years of the nineteenth century most of the trade along 
these routes was carried on by Nyamwezi caravans. As the trade expanded 
under the encouragement of Seyyid Said, Arab traders began to penetrate 
into the interior. This penetration was aided by the financing system 
established by Seyyid Said assisted by his Indian officials. Seyyid Said left 
the principal direction of economic affairs in the hands of an Indian customs 
master in Zanzibar w h o paid a yearly sum to the sultan. T h e customs 
master, on the other hand, with the collaboration of the Indian community 
w h o also manned the other coastal stations (Kilwa, Bagamoyo, Pangani, 
Tanga, M o m b a s a , etc), advanced to caravan leaders the resources needed 
to make their inland ventures possible. In the Kilwa hinterland the Arabs 
worked as clients of Yao chiefs. O n the central routes, however, the Arabs 
found it necessary to establish centres to serve as collecting points for ivory 
and slaves. Most caravans started from Bagamoyo or Sadani, passed across 
the country through the Zaramo, K a m i , Sagara, Luguru, and G o g o to the 
Nyamwezi country and further on to Ujiji on the shores of Lake Tangan-
yika. S o m e went even further, into Zaire and northwards to Karagwe and 
Buganda. A southward route went to the Lake Nyasa region to join the 
ones connected with Kilwa. 
T w o principal Arab settlements developed on the trade centres: the first 
was at Unyanyembe, near present-day Tabora in the Nyamwezi country 
and the other was at Ujiji on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. These 
settlements differed in one main respect: in Unyanyembe the Arabs made 
5. A . Smith, 1963, p. 286. 
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a settlement resembling a colony a m o n g the Nyamwezi , while in Ujiji they 
were more or less incorporated into the H a state.6 Thus , in Unyanyembe 
the Arabs were an independent community competing for trade with 
Nyamwezi traders, a m o n g w h o m were the rulers of the numerous 
Nyamwezi chiefdoms. T h e Nyamwez i called this group of traders 
(Nyamwezi and Arabs alike) bandewa? They were all struggling to get a 
share in the long-distance trade. This explains w h y there were constant 
conflicts between the Nyamwezi rulers and the Arabs. It also explains the 
struggles between various rulers of Nyamwez i states; struggles that resulted 
in new political and social alignments that greatly affected the Nyamwezi 
people. 
O n the other hand the Arabs of Ujiji took advantage of the H a political 
organization in which Ujiji was part of a larger H a state whose centre was 
also far away from Ujiji itself. T h e Arabs were therefore in an outlying 
area of the state and could easily be incorporated in a way profitable to 
both sides. 
T h e Pangani valley route 
Unlike the southern and central routes, the Pangani valley route was not 
specifically controlled by one group of people. It is true that at the 
beginning, between 1836 and 1862 (when Kimweri ye Nyumbai , the great 
ruler of the Shambaa kingdom died), the Zigula played a leading role in 
the development of trade in the area. In about 1836 there was a devastating 
famine,8 which caused m a n y Zigula to sell themselves as slaves in order to 
survive. It is reported that some of them were carried to Somalia by Brava 
(Barawa) traders where they retained their language to the twentieth 
century.9 T h e majority of them, however, crossed over to Zanzibar where 
they were employed as slaves in the plantations. S o m e of them managed 
to return to their country; there is a story of a group that escaped and 
returned to the Zigula country safely: 
According to a well-concerted plan a large party of the conspirators 
assembled one moonlit night on one of the plantations. They m a d e 
their way thence to the seashore to the north of Zanzibar roadstead. 
Arriving there in the early hours of the morning, they boarded a 
number of dhows, surprised and killed or overpowered the members 
of the crew, raised anchor, m a d e sail and crossed to the mainland.10 
6. See N . R . Bennett, 1974, pp. 213-21. 
7. See A . C . Unomah, 1972. 
8. R . F . Burton, i860, Vol. 1, p. 125. Burton said in i860 that the famine took place 
'about twenty years ago'. J . L . Krapf, i860, pp. 256-7, reported a similar famine in 
Mombasa in the same period. 
9. S. Feierman, 1974, p. 137. 
10. J . M . Gray, 1962, p. 141. 
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PLATE i o. i Nyamwezi hairstyles and head-dresses
plate 10.2 Nyamwezi traders on the road
Those who returned had gained an education on the value of the long¬
distance trade in slaves and ivory. They were the ones who pioneered
trade activities in the Pangani valley. Kimweri's capital in the Shambaa
mountains was far away from the plains and he was therefore slow to take
advantage of the new system of international trade, despite the stability of
his kingdom based on political control through territorial chiefs and tribute
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system. By the time he died in the 1860s it was his son, Semboja, the ruler 
of the western district bordering the Zigula, w h o had taken advantage of 
the situation and moved his capital to the plains at Mazinde. 
But neither Semboja nor the Zigula traders had fully explored the 
Pangani valley route to the interior. Most of the trade stations were limited 
to the Shambaa and Pare plains, although some individuals ventured far 
away from the region, e.g. Kisabengo, w h o established a state near present-
day Morogoro. 
It was the Arab and Swahili traders from the coast w h o ventured inland 
to the Chagga country in Kilimanjaro and beyond to Kenya. O n the Pare 
mountains there were a number of small states but, like the Shambaa, they 
were all located on the mountains far away from the caravan route. 
Most of the coastal traders w h o went into the Pangani valley had to 
establish direct contacts with individual rulers or their subordinates in 
order to establish trading centres. This tended to encourage rivalry among 
the rulers of numerous small states on the Pare mountains and Kilimanjaro 
and also between these rulers and their subordinates. W e shall examine the 
socio-political outcome of this rivalry later. 
T h e M o m b a s a hinterland routes 
T h e M o m h a s a hinterland was controlled by the K a m b a , although by the 
1880s they had lost control of the main route to the Arab and Swahili 
traders. This main route passed through the Ukambani country itself and 
moved towards the Kenya highlands and beyond to the Lake Victoria 
shores and onwards to Uganda. T h e other route moved towards M o u n t 
Kilimanjaro and joined up with the Pangani valley route. This second 
route, like the Pangani route, seems to have been under the control of the 
coastal traders. 
Most writers have accepted J. L . Krapf's suggestion for dating long-
distance trade by the K a m b a from the famine of 1836.11 But, as shown 
elsewhere in this volume, the K a m b a predominance in trade did not arise 
overnight. There is enough evidence to suggest that the K a m b a had 
dominated a regional trading network for over a century before the con-
ventional date.12 However, the conventional date is relevant in that it 
denotes the second stage of K a m b a trading activity which brought them 
into the international trading network of the time; the stage at which ivory 
and other local materials were being exchanged for imported goods. Krapf 
described this when he made his journeys into Ukambani country in 1848-
9: 'The Swahili purvey to the W a k a m b a cotton fabrics (Americano), blue 
calico, glass beads, copper, salt, luaha, blue vitriol (zinc), etc., and receive 
in exchange chiefly cattle and ivory'.13 By the 1840s, therefore, K a m b a 
11. See, for example, K . G . Lindblom, 1920, pp. 339-40; D . A . L o w , 1963, p. 314. 
12. I. N . Kimambo, 1974, p. 207; 1970, p. 18. 
13. J .L . Krapf, 1860, p. 248. 
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weekly caravans to the coast, carrying ivory estimated to weigh from 300 
to 400 frasilas were reported.14 Krapf estimated that each K a m b a caravan 
consisted of as m a n y as 300 to 400 persons.15 B y the mid-nineteenth century, 
K a m b a trading parties were visiting not only their Kikuyu neighbours, but 
also places far beyond the M o u n t Kenya region: M a u , Gusii, Lake Baringo 
and Samburu country. 
It appears that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Arab and 
Swahili traders were strongly in control of the K a m b a trade route.16 
This was because, having pushed through the Maasai country using the 
Kilimanjaro route (at a time w h e n Maasai power was heavily affected by 
wars and epidemics), the coastal traders had been able to gain control of 
the sources of ivory. At this time, trade in slaves (which had not been 
prominent under the K a m b a ) seems to have become more important. 
K a m b a traditions picture this as the most disruptive period in their history: 
disruptive famine led to inter-lineage conflicts that were used by ambitious 
members of society to sell weaker ones to Arabs.17 K a m b a traditions, 
therefore, rightly indicate the relationship between the decline of trade in 
goods in which they themselves played a major part and the rise of the 
system of profiteering in persons in which the Arabs and Swahili traders 
played a prominent role. 
T h e effects of long-distance trade on East African societies 
At this stage w e can look back and review the effect of this intrusion of 
long-distance trade into East African societies. First of all it is necessary 
to realize that not all East African societies were in direct contact with the 
trading network. Trading activities required stable centres and naturally 
such centres tended to be capitals or areas protected by strong rulers. That 
is w h y the constructive effect of the nineteenth-century trade was more 
noticeable in centralized societies. Non-centralized societies were in m a n y 
cases more vulnerable because they could easily be raided by those organ-
ized on a larger scale. Pastoral societies were generally an exception during 
this period. This was the period w h e n Maasai-speaking people were 
engaged in wars a m o n g themselves and with other pastoralists and, as w e 
shall discuss later, they formed a buffer region against slave raiding in a 
large part of Kenya and northern Tanzania. 
In general terms w e can say that long-distance trade affected the material 
base on which the society was organized. Although it is generally agreed 
that control of ritual was the main basis for authority in African societies, 
it is also recognized that large-scale organizations of states occurred where 
14. C . Guillain, 1856, Vol. 2, p. 211. According to Charles Rechenbach's Swahili-
English Dictionary, one frasila is equivalent to about 16kg or 351b. 
15. J. L . Krapf, i860, p. 248. 
16. J. Thomson, 1885, pp. 272-5. 
17. SeeK. A . Jackson, 1972. 
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the material base was sufficient to maintain a military force and a state 
bureaucracy. T h u s the difference in the size of states in m a n y places where 
centralized state organization was found in East Africa could be related to 
the economic strength deriving from the environment. Large states in the 
Great Lakes region could be maintained by the surplus food raised from 
the stable agricultural environment supporting bananas as well as grain 
and livestock. A s one moves south of Lake Victoria, rainfall decreases and 
the economy could only support states of smaller scale. T h e scale tended 
to increase in the highland regions, such as the Usambara and Pare 
mountains and to some extent in Kilimanjaro. In some of the large king-
d o m s of the interlacustrine region, rulers became stronger by increasing 
their material base for maintaining their kingdoms through the long-
distance trade.18 Besides traditional weapons, guns were added in their 
military organization, and imported goods such as cloth and beads could 
be used to pay for services in addition to foodstuff collected as tribute. But 
the attraction of the imported goods also increased dangers of instability 
since it could encourage independent actions by subordinate rulers and 
thus weaken the kingdom. That is w h y m a n y kings attempted to keep this 
long-distance trade strictly under their personal control. 
It was in the small-scale state systems that the effect of the imported 
goods was clearly seen. These covered a large part of Tanzania and, on a 
smaller scale, western Kenya. Traditional rulers w h o were able to control 
the trade were also able to accumulate the imported goods with which to 
build up a large army and to expand administrative machinery. Weaker 
states were either raided for slaves or annexed to form larger entities. In 
these areas the effect was either constructive in that it enabled certain rulers 
to build up bigger kingdoms in areas previously supporting smaller states, 
or destructive in the sense that it encouraged rebellion, which in turn 
destroyed the unity of the states that existed. Despite this generalization, 
the effect of the long-distance trade was generally destructive. There is no 
need to detail here the evils of the trade in h u m a n beings. But even the 
value of the material base built on imported goods was deceptive. Most of 
these goods were luxury items: beads, bracelets and other ornaments. 
W h a t was useful was cloth, but even this competed with local sources of 
production which were eventually destroyed. Worse still, the trade in 
luxury goods and the general violence caused by the need to raid other 
societies in order to maintain the trade, meant neglect of subsistence 
agriculture. It is unlikely that the n e w structure could have been maintained 
even if colonialism had not intervened. In fact few of the large states built 
up during this period survived intact to the 1890s. 
In order to illustrate this general picture it will be necessary to look 
briefly at the three caravan-route regions. In discussing the K a m b a , w e 
noticed h o w even their control of trade declined w h e n raiding for slaves 
18. R w a n d a and Burundi are the exceptions, see note 31. 
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became prominent. T h e K a m b a were a non-centralized society. T h e long-
distance trade probably encouraged an enlargement of scale of various 
traditional institutions, beginning with kinship, village age-group and 
defence organizations. But none of these became the basis for a centralized 
state structure. In the whole of Kenya, only in the western region did the 
coastal trade lead directly to an enlarged and centralized political system. 
This was in the kingdom of W a n g a among the Luyia people. 
Before one of its greatest rulers, named Shiundu, came to power in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the kingdom of W a n g a had remained 
small and was constantly harassed by its pastoralist neighbours. But 
Shiundu is said to have effectively overcome the instability and by the time 
he was succeeded by his son M u m i a in 1882, the kingdom had expanded 
beyond its borders. Although G . S. Were has explained that the idea of a 
large W a n g a empire was created during the colonial period as a British 
strategy for imposing colonial rule on the area by using the kingdom of 
W a n g a as an agent, he nevertheless agrees that Wanga's 'real influence and 
authority' had expanded to at least two neighbouring areas, Kisa and 
Buhólo.19 T h e rulers of W a n g a gained power in this period because of two 
factors: the use of Maasai mercenaries and the presence of Swahili traders 
at the capital. T h e first factor arose out of the Maasai wars to be discussed 
later, while the second was the result of successful penetration by coastal 
traders, possibly earlier through Buganda and Busoga and later through 
the Kilimanjaro and K a m b a routes. 
Both Shiundu and M u m i a welcomed coastal traders to their capital. 
This gave them access to guns with which to arm their military forces. 
F r o m the W a n g a capital raids on neighbouring peoples could be organized. 
In 1883, Joseph T h o m s o n described a raid that had taken place five years 
earlier: 
T h e traders had lost a few m e n through murder or otherwise. In 
revenge for this the traders, five years prior to our arrival, had resolved 
to 'tengeneze' the native (make them behave). For this purpose a 
combined caravan of some 1,500 m e n stationed at K w a - S u n d u 
[later M u m i a ] was marched upon them. Dividing into sections, they 
entered the district at different points, and crossed it, devastating 
every village on the way, killing thousands of m e n and w o m e n , 
committing the most horrible atrocities, such as ripping up w o m e n 
with child, making great bonfires and throwing children into them, 
while the small boys and girls were captured as slaves.20 
Most of the other people of the north-central interior of East Africa 
were less affected by this international trade. They had less direct or even 
indirect dealings with the foreigners from the coast; in fact in m a n y 
cases they were unwilling to welcome these foreigners into their societies, 
19. G . S . Were , 1967, p. 125. 
20. J. T h o m s o n , 1885, p . 306. 
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although they were willing to sell foodstuffs to caravans on the stopping 
stations. O n e major explanation for this is that the region as a whole had 
experienced an extended period of violence caused by Maasai wars and the 
leaders had therefore learned to protect their societies by being more 
sensitive to outsiders. 
T h e effects of long-distance trade in the Pangani valley were basically 
destructive. Prior to the trade invasion, a number of states had developed 
in the region, two of which had become fairly large kingdoms. These were 
the Shambaa kingdom, which by the mid-nineteenth century was under 
Kimweri, and the lesser-known G w e n o kingdom on the North Pare m o u n -
tains. T h e other smaller states were scattered on the South Pare mountains 
and on the slopes of M o u n t Kilimanjaro. All these states were located on 
the mountains, while the caravan routes passed through the plains along 
the Pangani river valley. Consequently the rulers of these states were less 
able to control the coastal traders and therefore less able to monopolize the 
imported goods. Subordinate rulers nearer the caravan route were in a 
better position to attract Arab and Swahili traders to their districts before 
they reached the state capitals. T h e effect of this was clear: rulers w h o had 
the support of the traders could build up well-armed groups and disobey 
the capital. This encouraged a lot of fighting within and a m o n g these states. 
Most of them broke up into smaller states. 
T h e Shambaa kingdom, which had covered the whole region from the 
Usambara mountains to the coast, was already in trouble before Kimweri's 
death in the 1860s. O n e of his sons, Semboja, w h o was the ruler of the 
western district, had moved his capital to Mazinde on the plains where 
he could be in direct contact with traders going into the interior. In this 
way he was able to build up military capacity and influence greater than 
those of other district rulers. W h e n Kimweri died, it was Semboja w h o 
was to decide w h o should occupy the throne, which he himself did not 
want to occupy, having realized that power had moved away from the 
traditional centre. F r o m the 1870s to the period of colonial invasion 
in the 1890s, Usambara was full of violence caused by the weakness 
in the centre. Most of the outlying areas of the kingdom became indepen-
dent. 
T h e same kind of thing happened to the Pare states. T h e G w e n o 
kingdom was, by the 1880s, reduced to a number of states and the smaller 
states of South Pare were segmented further. In Kilimanjaro, however, the 
continuous inter-state wars tended to produce a temporary union of states 
which at times seemed as if it would bring all the Chagga together under 
one ruler. But these were short-lived successes. In the 1880s two strong 
chiefdoms had become of regional importance, Kibosho under Sina, and 
Moshi under Rindi or Mandara. Both states were accessible to the coastal 
traders. Their rulers tried their best to attract these foreigners to their 
capitals and used their presence and the goods they brought (especially 
guns) to increase their powers. Periodically each of these states was able to 
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control a number of other Chagga states, but such larger entities were not 
able to survive long. 
T h e only people in the Pangani valley w h o seem to have been strength-
ened by the coastal trade were the Zigula w h o were discussed earlier. 
T h e Zigula had never been brought under the Shambaa kingdom. But 
because of their control of trade with the coast, m a n y Zigula built up 
political hegemonies that had not existed before. B y the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Zigula had come to dominate the whole region 
between Pangani and Bagamoyo. Several Zigula achieved considerable 
power and were able to build up new states. S o m e of these did not last 
long, but the one founded by Kisabengo near the present-day Morogoro 
survived to the period of G e r m a n invasion. Kisabengo is described by 
Burton as a Zigula w h o m a d e himself leader of a group of runaway slaves 
on the coast.21 B y doing so he angered the Sultan of Zanzibar and so he 
moved further inland in order to protect himself. In Morogoro he was 
received by one of the ritual leaders of the Luguru. H e built his fortified 
capital near the caravan route and imposed heavy tolls on caravans going 
to Tabora. Kisabengo's town was described by H . M . Stanley in 1871 as 
having several thousand inhabitants protected by high stone walls and 
watchtowers and finely carved wooden gates.22 
In western Tanzania there was rivalry both among the African chiefs of 
the numerous small states and among the Arabs settled there, and also 
between alliances of African chiefs and certain Arab traders. However, the 
only example of an up-country station where the Arabs were dominant was 
in the M a n y e m a country across Lake Tanganyika. In western Tanzania 
they were too weak to replace the African chiefs. It was only in the late 
1880s that certain Arabs threatened by European colonization, began to 
consider establishing their o w n territorial authority.23 
African rulers sought to gain a share of the profits of the long-distance 
trade by supplying ivory and slaves to the traders or (for those w h o could 
control territory on the caravan route) by imposing heavy tolls on the 
trading caravans. For this purpose, they had to build up their power by 
collecting around them groups of followers armed with guns and a m m u -
nition accumulated from the trade. T h e rivalry for control of trade increased 
the social disruption and this was further intensified by population m o v e -
ments caused by the contemporaneous Nguni (also referred to as Ngoni in 
some of the literature) invasion. T h e consequent instability increased the 
number of people w h o were ready to follow enterprising leaders. In western 
Tanzania such warriors of fortune were known as ruga-ruga and were 
mainly drawn from war-captives, runaway slaves, deserting porters, social 
outcasts and young m e n w h o would have normally performed military 
21. R . F . Burton, i860, p. 85 and p. 88. 
22. H . M . Stanley, 1872, pp. 115-16. 
23. A . D . Roberts, 1969, p. 73; N . R . Bennett, 1974, p. 218. 
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service. Such armies were, nevertheless, held together by 'a certain esprit 
de corps and by an iron discipline that was closely modelled on the Nguni 
warbands'.24 
Supported by such armies, a number of traditional leaders in western 
Tanzania carved out new dominions for themselves. S o m e of them even 
went outside their o w n localities to establish empires. In the 1850s, for 
example, Ngalengwa (later called Msiri), son of a M u s u m b w a headman, 
followed the copper traders' route to Katanga where he built up a con-
siderable empire.25 In Unyanyembe itself, there were rivalries among 
members of the ruling family, intensified by Arab support for one contender 
for the throne against another. In the 1860s the Arabs managed to have 
M n w a Sele deposed and replaced by Mkasiwa, and M n w a Sele's brother 
Simba left Unyanyembe to set up his kingdom among the Konongo to the 
south-west of Tabora. Another m e m b e r of the chiefly family in U n y a n -
yembe called Nyungu ya M a we left his country in 1874 to establish a 
well-organized kingdom among the W a k i m b u to the south-west of the 
Wanyamwezi . Besides such rulers w h o went away from their traditional 
states to subdue a number of small states to form larger ones, there were 
also examples of states that expanded because of the increased power of 
their rulers. Mirambo's state is the most striking example, but there were 
many others. Mtinginya of Usongo in north-eastern Unyamwezi was a 
hereditary ruler w h o took advantage of the trade route to Karagwe and 
Buganda to strengthen and expand his state. Even Isike, the successor of 
Mkasiwa in Unyanyembe, became powerful enough to offer the Arabs and 
later the Germans a great deal of resistance. 
T o illustrate how far changed conditions and opportunities brought 
about real changes in Nyamwezi patterns of government, we should 
examine briefly two of the largest states built up during the time: those of 
Mirambo and Nyungu ya M a w e . T h e two 'empires' had striking differences 
in their patterns of organization although they were both born out of the 
same conditions we have just described. Mirambo was a ruler of the small 
state of U y o w a to the west of Tabora. It is believed that he was probably 
captured in his youth by the Nguni when they invaded western Tanzania 
and that while he was with them he came to understand fully the possibilities 
of Nguni military organization. In the 1860s, using a small group of 
warriors, he gained control of a number of states surrounding U y o w a . 
Between 1870 and his death in 1884 he led many campaigns that greatly 
expanded the area under his control. As Jan Vansina has pointed out, his 
state extended 'to Buha and Burundi, to the Vinza and Tongwe in the 
west, to the Pimbwe and Konongo in the south, to the Nyaturu, Iramba 
24. A . D . Roberts, 1969, p. 74. 
25. For information on the Msiri empire, see J. Vansina, 1966, pp. 227-35. F ° r earlier 
sources, see F .J . Arnot, 1889, and A . Verbeken, 1956. 
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and S u k u m a in the east, and to the S u k u m a and S u m b w a in the north'.26 
H e gained control of the trade route between Tabora and Ujiji and in 1876 
obliged the Arabs of Tabora to pay tribute to him when using the route. 
Mirambo is known to have sent embassies to Mutesa of Buganda in 1876 
and 1881 in his attempt to control the Buganda route. H e also made direct 
contacts with the coast in order to obtain guns directly when the Arabs 
tried to prevent him from getting them. H e was quick in recognizing 
potential sources of new power: he welcomed missionaries to his capital 
and sought contacts with the British Consul in Zanzibar. 
Mirambo's method of control in his 'empire' was based on the imposition 
of military power on the traditional system..Conquered rulers were required 
to acknowledge his over-rule by occasionally sending him tributes of ivory 
and young m e n for his army. Where there was resistance from a traditional 
ruler, M i r a m b o removed him and replaced him with a more submissive 
m e m b e r of the same ruling family. Where a conquered province was near 
a powerful kingdom, M i r a m b o kept armed m e n of his o w n there. But his 
main method of control was that of keeping his army constantly on the 
move to intimidate both his neighbours and his subjects. 
N y u n g u ya M a w e ' s 'empire' was better integrated than that of Mirambo. 
Nyungu ya M a w e , like Mirambo , used the ruga-ruga to establish himself 
among the K i m b u . Between 1870 and 1880 he campaigned from his base 
in Kiwele and gained control of the trade route to the coast east of Tabora 
and the southbound route from Tabora to Ufipa and Lake Tanganyika. 
A m o n g the conquered states Nyungu posted his own officials called vatwale, 
w h o were directly responsible to him. In his 'empire' the real rulers were 
no longer the traditional chiefs but the appointed vatwale. It was the duty 
of these officials to collect and forward to N y u n g u all the ivory obtained 
in the kingdom. T h e area under each appointed official consisted of a 
number of traditional states. Therefore the K i m b u traditional states, n u m -
bering about thirty, were ruled by about six or seven vatwale.11 
Mirambo and Nyungu ya M a w e were contemporaries. Both built up 
polities based on the changed material conditions of the late nineteenth 
century. Both Nyungu and Mirambo died in 1884. Because Nyungu m a d e 
innovations in the administrative structure of his 'empire', when he died 
it survived until it was dismantled by the colonialists. O n the other hand, 
Mirambo's 'empire' broke up into its constituent states simply because 
there was no successor w h o could maintain the strong army required to 
keep it together. 
In examining the consequences of the expansion of long-distance trade 
to the interior w e have avoided discussing two major regions. T h e first is 
the Great Lakes region which is the subject of Chapter 11. Perhaps it 
would suffice here to note that by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
26. J. Vansina, 1966, p. 75. . 
27. A . Shorter, 1969, p. 19. 
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there were m a n y kingdoms of varying sizes in the area. S o m e of them were 
large and powerful while others were small and weak. But all of them had 
participated in a regional trade network whose routes connected most of 
the major capitals. It was into this regional trade network that the inter-
national trade from the East African coast was to be absorbed. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the most powerful of these kingdoms 
were probably Buganda, Bunyoro and Burundi. But there were m a n y 
others less powerful, including Busoga, Toro, the Ankole states (Nkore, 
Buhweju and Bunyaruguru),28 Karagwe, the Buhaya states and Buzinza. 
Traders from the coast had reached Buganda as early as 1844.29 In the 
1850s Burton noted that some coastal traders had been there for about ten 
years, and ten years later Stanley reported some coastal traders w h o had 
been in the region for as long as twenty years without going back to the 
coast.30 It would appear, therefore, that Buganda was the earliest centre 
of trade in the region. But soon the coastal traders were able to visit the 
other capitals. T h e exception here would be R w a n d a and Burundi, where 
the rulers were able to keep coastal traders out of their region and develop 
successful tactics for coping with the guns used by their adversaries.31 O n 
the other hand, the rulers of Bunyoro were also struggling to attract traders 
to their capital. In the 1870s the king of Bunyoro, Kabarega, was trying 
to compete with Buganda in making direct contacts with Zanzibar, while 
at the same time trying to attract the 'Khartoumers' (traders coming down 
the Nile) w h o were raiding widely among the non-centralized societies 
bordering the kingdom on the northern side.32 It was Buganda under 
Mutesa (1856-84) which seems to have gained most from the coastal 
trade. A centralized government with a disciplined bureaucracy had been 
established earlier. But the traffic in guns which Mutesa kept under his 
personal control further strengthened the centralized system. Buganda 
seems to have concentrated its attention more on the international trade 
than the regional network. Miitesa's raids on Busoga to the east, and his 
attacks on his western neighbours (Bunyoro, Toro, Nkore, Buhaya and 
Buzinza) ensured Buganda's predominance in the trade. At times, Mutesa 
even sought to control both Karagwe and Buzinza to ensure that coastal 
caravans could get to his capital without problems. 
Clearly, in the Great Lakes region some of the larger kingdoms were 
greatly strengthened by their connections with the coastal traders. T h e 
acquisition of firearms, especially, increased their capability to raid others. 
28. Ankole is a colonial creation. Previously the unit contained a number of states. 
29. J . M . Gray, 1947, pp. 80-2. 
30. R . F. Burton, i860, Vol. 1, p. 173; H . M . Stanley, 1878, Vol. 1, p. 455. 
31. T h e best source on Burundi during the second half of the nineteenth century is at 
the moment probably R . Botte, 1982, pp. 271-317. There is also a general description of 
Burundi in E . M w o r o h a , 1977, pp. 133-209. O n Rwanda, A . Kagame, 1963, is an improve-
ment on his earlier work, 1961. 
32. D . A . L o w , 1963, p. 337. 
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FIG. 10.3 The Great Lakes region, 1840-84 (adapted from R . Oliver and G. Mat hew 
(eds), History of East Africa, ¡963, vol. I, p. 2gg) 
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A s they raided, they accumulated cattle, hoes, ivory and captives; the last 
two could be sold to coastal traders for all kinds of luxury goods including 
textiles, bracelets, beads, tableware and, above all, firearms. Larger states 
could raid smaller ones, but all of them raided the neighbouring non-
centralized communities, w h o suffered the most. T h e exception of R w a n d a 
and Burundi (already mentioned) shows that it was possible to form an 
alternative strategy in dealing with this penetration of trade. Their strength 
came not from acquisition of guns but from their ability to maintain 
stability and unity in the densely populated mountain environment. Their 
extensive wars and raids during the period enabled them to accumulate 
wealth in a situation in which ivory and captives were irrelevant. 
T h e second region w e have deliberately omitted in this section is southern 
Tanzania. This is because the consequences of long-distance trade in this 
region are best considered along with the consequences of another intruding 
influence, i.e. that of the Nguni, to which w e should n o w turn our attention. 
The Nguni invasion 
T h e Nguni came from South Africa where they had been part of the 
Nguni-speaking peoples of northern Zululand. Having fled from their 
homeland in about 1820 to escape the rising power of Shaka, the Nguni 
warriors moved northwards under their leader Zwangendaba. For about 
fifteen years they wandered in southern Mozambique and adjacent areas 
before crossing the Zambezi in 1835 on their march northwards until they 
reached the Fipa plateau in western Tanzania early in the 1840s. B y this 
time what had started as a group of warriors had become an armed nation 
of over a hundred thousand people on the march.33 
At this stage it would be interesting to ask ourselves h o w this spectacular 
growth of the Nguni people was accomplished. In order to answer this 
question one has to go back to the Zulu homeland. Shaka had built up a 
highly centralized military state organized according to two overlapping 
principles: one based on lineage and the other on military regiments. 
According to the first principle, the king was at the top of the pyramid of 
authority and below him there were segments of lineages consisting of the 
king's wives and their children and dependents. T h e segments tended to 
split and multiply at each generation as they grew larger. T h e youth, on 
the other hand, were organized into age-regiments cutting across territorial 
and lineage lines and directly controlled by the king. This meant that a 
foreigner could easily be absorbed as he gradually entered into the dynamic 
structure of the society through both the lineage and the age-regiment. 
Shaka also introduced changes in military techniques, the most important 
being the use of the short stabbing spear which m a d e the age-regiments 
very efficient fighting units. 
33. For a detailed account, see J. D . Omer-Cooper, 1966,1969 and P. H . Gulliver, 1955. 
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Msene (from J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, 7966, p. 66)
Having inherited this dynamic social system, the Nguni were able to
build up a well-unified people out of the people they encountered on their
movement northwards. Their superior military organization enabled them
to survive by raiding other people as they moved. Theirs was, of necessity,
a predatory life, although at several places where resources allowed they
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settled for a number of years. As they moved on, the warriors augmented 
their numbers with war captives w h o were in turn assimilated into the 
Nguni social order. Initially, each captive was allocated to a particular 
segment of the society and as quickly as possible he was put into the age-
regiments where social distinction between a 'true Nguni' and a captive 
was minimal. B y the time they reached the Fipa plateau, the majority of 
the Nguni nation were these assimilated people captured from such groups 
as the Thonga from Mozambique, Shona from Zimbabwe, and Senga, 
Chewa and T u m b u k a from the region north of the Zambezi river in Zambia 
and Malawi. • 
Zwangendaba's death in about 1848 initiated succession rivalry, and 
eventually factionalism triumphed. T h e nation split into five kingdoms, 
each moving in its o w n direction and settling in a different territory. M a n y 
writers have attributed this factionalism to the loss of Zwangendaba's 
peculiar ability to keep his people united. But one also has to recognize the 
spectacular 'snowballing' growth that had multiplied the Nguni population 
more than a hundredfold.34 A rapid growth of this kind would have made 
centralized control more difficult. A n d bearing in mind the character of 
the environment on the Fipa plateau, one can perhaps argue that the 
population had become greater than the environment could sustain by the 
time Zwangendaba died. 
Three out of the five Nguni factions moved south and established 
kingdoms in Zambia and Malawi. T h e fourth, known as the Tuta, pressed 
northwards into the Nyamwezi country, where its members raided villages 
and upset the Arab trade route between Tabora and Ujiji. They eventually 
settled north of Tabora, but their raids went as far north as the southern 
shores of Lake Victoria. A m o n g the Nyamwezi captured by the Tuta was 
Mirambo w h o , as w e have noted, having learned the Nguni military 
techniques, escaped to organize his o w n forces out of the refugees fleeing 
from Tuta raids. 
T h e other Nguni group, the Gwangara, moved south-east from the Fipa 
plateau, under Zulu G a m a , to the Songea area, east of Lake Nyasa. There 
its members met another Nguni group, the Maseko, w h o had broken away 
before the Nguni reached the Zambezi and had moved into southern 
Tanzania from Malawi. T h e Maseko Nguni were known to be m u c h 
stronger than the Gwangara and their leader, Maputo , was accepted as an 
overlord of both groups. However, this alliance did not last long, for 
rivalries between them soon broke into open war and the Gwangara 
eventually defeated the Maseko Nguni and drove them south across the 
R u v u m a river. T h e Ndendeule, an absorbed group, tried to establish a 
successor state, but were finally defeated by the Gwangara and driven into 
the Kilombero valley where they established the M b u n g a kingdom in the 
1860s. 
34. A . M . H . Sheriff, 1980, p. 33. 
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T h e Gwangara themselves split into two kingdoms, one under Chipeta 
w h o formed the M s h o p e kingdom, and the other under Mtakano 
Chabruma, w h o established the Njelu kingdom. T h e former settled north 
of Songea while the latter moved further south. Most writers have e m p h a -
sized the way in which these two kingdoms terrorized by their raiding the 
whole region between Lake Nyasa and the coast until the G e r m a n period. 
However, A . M . H . Sheriff has more recently shown h o w misleading this 
interpretation can be; for, 
it would appear that if the Ngoni had continued to lead a predatory 
life, 'like a swarm of locusts forced to continue advancing as it destroys 
its o w n livelihood', they would not have been able to settle d o w n . It 
is therefore very likely that once they settled in the Songea area, the 
pattern of their economy must have changed to a more orderly 
exploitation of the local agricultural resources, using the indigenous 
people more effectively as cultivators while the Ngoni cared for their 
huge herds of cattle. With the allocation of agricultural activities to 
the conquered people on a more permanent basis, the latter's social 
status was bound to be affected, assimilated into the Ngoni society 
but not to the same extent as the captives had been during the 
migration. Raiding continued at the periphery of the Ngoni state but 
to a more limited extent, which would have provided m u c h less 
opportunity to the subjects to show their valour and to capture their 
o w n captives with which to build u p their social status.35 
Therefore, in terms of emphasis, the first and most obvious legacy of 
the Nguni invasion was the creation of Nguni states on Tanzanian soil. 
T h e two Nguni kingdoms continued to exist as strong entities well into 
the colonial period. Their role during the Maji Maji war against the 
Germans is a prominent epic of the early colonial history of Tanzania. T h e 
second legacy of the invasion was the introduction of Nguni military 
techniques, which were adopted by a number of Tanzanian societies. There 
was a time w h e n it was believed that the need to defend themselves against 
the Nguni had prompted such groups as the H e h e and the Sangu to use 
Nguni military techniques and build up centralized political entities. But 
recent research36 has indicated that this assumption is incorrect since 
centralization had started in both cases before the Nguni invasion. W h a t 
is true is that the Nguni military techniques did strengthen the societies 
that adopted them and m a d e them capable of facing the conditions of the 
time, including the effects of the slave trade. Besides the need for self-
defence against the Nguni themselves and against the slave-raiders, some 
of the societies were able to use the techniques to build up large states, as 
in the case of Mirambo , already discussed, and the Sangu and the H e h e 
in the southern region. 
35. ibid., p . 34. 
36. A . Redmayne, 1968a, p . 426; 1968b. 
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T h e Sangu were the first to learn Nguni military techniques. In the 
i86os and 1870s they dominated most of the southern highlands under 
their leader, Merere; but from 1875 onwards they were overshadowed by 
the Hehe , w h o learned the Nguni military techniques through the Sangu 
themselves. Merere lost most of the Sangu territory to the Hehe under 
their leader, Mwinyigumba. It was the Hehe w h o were able to fight 
protracted wars against the Gwangara Nguni between 1878 and 1881 
without victory on either side. From this time onwards, the Hehe remained 
a dominant force under Mwinyigumba's son, M k w a w a , w h o offered the 
Germans what was probably the stiffest military resistance in Tanzania. 
For southern Tanzania, therefore, there were a variety of social and 
political changes introduced during the second half of the nineteenth 
century. S o m e of these changes had started as a result of the widened 
contacts brought by the long-distance trade, but were accelerated by the 
Nguni invasion. By the time of the colonial invasion in the 1880s, southern 
Tanzania, which before the middle of the century was mainly inhabited 
by societies organized only on lineage lines, had come to possess some of 
the most powerful kingdoms, such as the Nguni kingdoms, the Hehe and 
the Sangu. 
The Maasai 
Earlier in this chapter w e alluded to the Maasai as a force affecting the 
history of the north-eastern interior of East Africa in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. T h e main reason for this was not expansion, for 
the Maasai had, by the end of the eighteenth century, passed their years 
of expansion.37 Their attempt to m o v e southwards in the first decades of 
the nineteenth century is said to have been effectively checked by the G o g o 
and the Hehe. 3 8 By the mid-nineteenth century, therefore, the pastoral 
Maasai controlled the grasslands in the rift valley between central Tanzania 
and central Kenya while a number of agricultural Maasai (Iloikop or 
W a - K w a v i ) groups bordered them on the eastern side between M o u n t 
Kilimanjaro and the Kenya Highlands and on the western side. 
W h a t happened to alter the situation towards the end of the century? 
T h e answer is to be sought in the long series of civil wars that occurred 
during the mid-nineteenth century. T h e reasons for these wars are still 
unknown, but several factors can be suggested as having contributed to the 
situation. S o m e writers have tended to emphasize the lack of opportunity for 
a warlike people to expand. 'Thus thwarted, the Maasai turned their 
aggressiveness inward.'39 Yet, the picture of the Maasai as warlike people 
is not borne out by detailed study of their society, as shown below. T h e 
37. E . A . Alpers, 1974, p . 241. 
38. J. Thomson , 1885, p. 414. 
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contributary factors can, therefore, be seen by looking at the civil wars 
themselves. 
Until recently our knowledge of the civil wars came from a study carried 
out by A . H . Jacobs a m o n g the Maasai in the first half of the 1960s.40 
According to this study the civil wars were basically conflicts between 
groups of pastoral and agricultural (Iloikop) Maasai. Both groups were 
Maasai-speaking, but the latter had taken to agriculture in addition to their 
main pastoral occupation. F r o m the point of view of the pastoral Maasai, 
the Iloikop were inferior since they had taken up a different style of life. 
F r o m the first half of the century, the pastoral Maasai had acquired greater 
unity through the evolution of a stronger ritual office of the oloiboni and 
therefore they had a central figure w h o could be widely consulted. Yet, 
there was no unified political organization either within the pastoral Maasai 
or within the Iloikop. Jacobs interpreted Maasai traditions as pointing to 
the transformation of the ritual office as the beginning of the rift between 
the two groups of the Maasai-speaking people. For, before the rise of 
Subet, w h o was the first k n o w n oloiboni to gain political influence, the 
pastoral Maasai ritual expert was consulted by Iloikop groups as well. But 
during Subet's period (covering most of the first half of the nineteenth 
century to 1864 when he was succeeded by Mbatian), the Iloikop are said 
to have acquired their o w n oloiboni. 
A more recent study by John L . Berntsen41 has indicated that the division 
between the two groups of pastoral Maasai and agricultural Maasai was 
never permanent. In his o w n opinion, to try to interpret Maasai history in 
terms of pastoralists versus agriculturalists 'leads one into insurmountable 
contradictions. All the Maasai people were pastoralists before a battle or a 
series of raids; loss of cattle and loss of their access to the pasture lands of 
the Rift Valley region forced some groups to supplement their subsistence 
by turning to non-pastoral sources.'42 This means that the picture of 
nineteenth-century Maasai society was m u c h more complicated than 
explained by earlier studies, i.e. some groups k n o w n as Iloikop at one time 
m a y be pastoralists at another, depending on their ability to replenish their 
herds and regain access to rich pasture lands. Yet, as a result of the 
nineteenth-century wars, m o r e Maasai groups were pushed away from the 
rift valley and their semi-pastoral life continued into the colonial period.43 
In order to avoid confusion, w e shall view these wars in terms of group 
alliances whose aim was the control of cattle and pasture lands, both 
considered to be important to pastoral life. 
T h e actual causes of conflict m a y have been varied. T h e first series of 
wars took place on the Uasin Gishu plateau. This m a y have been caused 
40. A . H . Jacobs, 1965. 
41. J . L . Berntsen, 1979. 
42. ibid. 
43. The Arusha are a good example. See P. H . Gulliver, 1963. 
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by pressure on grazing land. T h e pastoral Maasai in the Rift Valley wanted 
to use the good grassland on the plateau, which was being used by another 
Maasai group known as the Uasin Gishu. T h e latter were supported by a 
number of other Maasai-speaking groups living on the plateau. Eventually, 
the Uasin Gishu were driven out of the plateau and pushed to other areas. 
W e have already seen h o w some of them were used to strengthen the 
kingdom of W a n g a before the arrival of coastal traders. 
T h e second series of wars started after the famous famine of 1836, which 
is known to have affected m a n y parts of East Africa. It appears, therefore, 
that m a n y raids were undertaken at this time in order to replenish herds 
lost during the drought. Strife took place in all parts of Maasailand. In the 
south the Rift Valley Maasai raided groups living further east towards the 
Pangani river. They succeeded in pushing, these groups out of Kibaya, 
Shambarai and Naberera and forced them to settle east of the Pangani 
river, the Kilimanjaro lowlands and Taveta. T h e settlement of the Arusha 
on the slopes of M o u n t M e r u is also supposed to have taken place at this 
time. In the north, there were raids against the Laikipia. But the major 
conflict took place from i860 to 1864 between the Purko and the Losegalai 
w h o lived between Lake Nakuru and the M a u escarpment. A number of 
the Losegalai fled to the Kipsigis and the Nandi territories. According to 
traditions collected by Jacobs,44 these Maasai refugees were responsible for 
introducing the oloiboni-like office to the Nandi, where it was known as 
orkoiyot. This initiated the rise of Nandi power at a time w h e n that of their 
Maasai neighbours was declining. 
T h e end of the second series also concluded an era of Maasai history, 
for it ended the period of predominantly Maasai control of the Uasin Gishu 
plateau and heralded the growth in importance there of other Nilotic 
groups, such as the Nandi and the Kipsigis. It was this weakening of 
Maasai control of the plateau that m a d e it easier for coastal traders to use 
the Kenya caravan routes which they had previously avoided. 
T h e final series of Maasai wars also centred on the northern plateaux. 
Mbatian had succeeded Subet as ritual leader in the mid-i86os.45 Various 
alliances were formed, the Purko and the Kisongo pastoral groups, the 
Laikipia with a number of Iloikop groups, i.e. those w h o had been pushed 
out of the good grazing lands and were forced to be semi-agriculturalists 
as well as pastoralists. B y 1884, the pastoral groups had attained pre-
eminence and the Iloikop groups had been scattered in m a n y directions. 
It can be said, therefore, that the effect of the long series of wars was to 
eliminate the powerful Maasai groups, especially on the northern plateaux. 
Their survivors were widely scattered as a result of the wars: from the 
44. A . H . Jacobs, 1965. 
45. A . H . Jacobs, 1965, using age-set chronology, suggests that Subet died in 1864. 
D . A . L o w , 1963, p. 306, on the other hand, quoting a number of sources puts Mbatian's 
succession in 1866. 
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Kilimanjaro lowlands to Taveta, down the Pare and Shambaa plains in the 
Pangani valley, from Arusha d o w n to the southern Maasai Steppe towards 
the coast. These were the groups which came to be k n o w n as Iloikop or 
W a - K w a v i in the existing literature on the Maasai. Most of those dispersed 
further north and westwards were absorbed by other groups. 
O n the side of the pastoral Maasai, the picture of victory m a y be 
misleading. Certainly the land occupied by them was also reduced as a 
result of the wars. They no longer inhabited the regions east of M o u n t 
Kilimanjaro and the Uasin Gishu and Laikipia plateaux. Most of the Rift 
Valley, plains and open plateaux alike remained under their control but 
with a greatly reduced population. W h a t finally affected the power of the 
pastoral Maasai severely were the h u m a n and animal diseases that infected 
the region after the prolonged wars. T h e large areas covered in the raids 
brought the Maasai into contact with m a n y other groups and m a d e it 
possible for infectious and unaccustomed diseases to be passed on from 
other groups. In 1869, for example, the Maasai lost a large number of 
people from cholera contracted from the Samburu. 4 6 T h e worst scourge 
came in the 1880s when a serious outbreak of smallpox coincided with a 
pleuro-pneumonia epidemic that decimated Maasai herds. It was these 
h u m a n and animal epidemics, rather than the wars themselves, that finally 
weakened the Maasai and m a d e their reputed ferocity hardly noticeable at 
the time of the imposition of colonial rule. 
Increased European pressures 
Direct European pressures in East Africa between 1845 and 1884 revolved 
around four interlinked activities: the abolition of the slave trade, propa-
gation of Christianity, geographical exploration and the establishment of 
'legitimate commerce'. These four activities were interlinked in the sense 
that they were a product of the European capitalist expansion coming out 
of the Industrial Revolution. This developed new productive capacities 
that made slave labour less profitable and therefore produced n e w attitudes 
towards the slave trade. T h e so-called humanitarian spirit had already 
successfully persuaded Western countries to abolish the Atlantic slave trade 
and by the 1840s attention had been directed to the East African slave 
trade. Likewise, the evangelical movement associated with the humanitarian 
forces was, by the mid-nineteenth century, turning towards East Africa, 
partly because geographical exploration (itself a product of this new spirit 
of scientific curiosity and evangelism) was revealing challenging oppor-
tunities for action against the evils of the Arab slave trade through mission-
ary work and through the establishment of 'legitimate commerce'. 
T h e words 'legitimate commerce' were used to refer to trade in c o m -
modities other than h u m a n beings. However, w e saw h o w ivory became 
46. D . A . Low, 1963, p. 308. 
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one of the most important commodities for international trade in East 
Africa during the period under discussion. After the transfer of Seyyid 
Sard's capital from O m a n to Zanzibar, the major Western powers of the 
time — Britain, the U S A and France - established trade missions in 
Zanzibar. Yet, as w e have already seen, most of the ivory trade still passed 
through B o m b a y before going to Europe because of the predominance of 
Indian merchants in the East African trade. Nevertheless, in terms of 
Western imperialism, the East African trade was already within the informal 
empire47 of the West under the leadership of the British, whether operating 
directly from Zanzibar or indirectly through B o m b a y . Agents of American 
and G e r m a n (Hamburg) firms dealing in cheap calico and hardware respect-
ively carried a smaller volume of trade than that controlled by the Indian 
merchants.48 This kind of commercial relationship continued undisturbed 
until near the end of the period under discussion. 
T h e British government concentrated its efforts on stopping the slave 
trade. Prior to the 1840s the British had in vain attempted to limit the 
scope within which slaves might be carried in the area under the control 
of the sultan of O m a n . In 1841 Colonel Atkins Hamerton was appointed 
British consul in Zanzibar. For a number of years his efforts were directed 
towards reaching a n e w agreement with the sultan of Zanzibar, w h o had 
moved his capital from O m a n in 1840. As a result of these efforts the 
Hamerton Treaty of 1845 was signed. It sought to restrict the slave trade 
to the sultan's possessions. Even if the treaty could have been enforced, its 
effect would have been very limited as long as the sultan's empire extended 
from East Africa to the Arabian peninsula. Furthermore, the unwillingness 
of the sultan to see the trade stopped m a d e the enforcement of the treaty 
difficult. W h e n Seyyid Said died in 1856, and his empire was divided into 
two parts, Seyyid Majid w h o inherited the East African half was just as 
reluctant to give up the slave trade. H e even thought of strengthening his 
control over the trade by building a n e w capital on the mainland coast, a 
place called 'Haven of Peace' (Dar es Salaam), but the project was still 
uncompleted when he died in 1870. Efforts to abolish the Arab slave trade 
did not succeed until 1873 when, through intensified diplomacy and threat, 
the British were able to make Majid's successor, Seyyid Barghash, issue a 
decree prohibiting all trade in slaves by sea. 
W h y was it so difficult to get the sultan of Zanzibar to agree to stop the 
slave trade? T h e answer is obvious if one bears in mind the nature of the 
expanding plantation economy in Zanzibar and P e m b a . Its dependence on 
slave labour meant that restriction on the procurement of slaves would 
limit its growth. It is known that plantation agriculture continued to expand 
after the decree of 1873.49 A s slave-trading was still legal on the mainland 
47. R . Robinson and J. Gallagher, 1961, p. 51. 
48. R . Oliver, 1952, pp. 1-2. 
49. F . Cooper, 1977, p. 54, reports that in 1877, as many as 1000 Omanis emigrated 
from O m a n to Zanzibar. 
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coast, traders were able to transport slaves a long distance along the coast 
between Kilwa and M o m b a s a or even Malindi and smuggle them to 
Zanzibar, and especially P e m b a , in small vessels at night in order to avoid 
the British naval patrol. Even after the slave trade was prohibited on the 
mainland in 1876, neither the sultan nor the British were in a position to 
enforce the decree effectively. T h e clove plantations on the islands had 
increased demand for food production on the mainland coast, especially 
grain. Thus , a number of plantations producing grain with slave labour 
had sprung up all along the coast between Pangani and Malindi. It was 
therefore impossible during this time to distinguish slaves intended for sale 
from those intended for use on these plantations.50 T o make things worse, 
this was the time when internal strife in m a n y parts of the hinterland was 
producing large numbers of captives. T h e traders could easily invent new 
ways of evading the sultan's soldiers and the British naval patrol. A number 
of new concealed stations sprang up all along the coast between Pangani 
and M o m b a s a , from which small dhows could slip off at night and reach 
P e m b a unnoticed. It is therefore clear that the slave trade remained a major 
activity well into the colonial period. 
T h e European trade missions and the naval patrol against slave traders 
were limited to Zanzibar and the coastal areas. Although Europeans could 
no doubt obtain from Arab traders a few stories about places far away from 
the coast, the vast hinterland remained unknown to them. Gradually, 
however, events were to turn the attention of the humanitarians and the 
evangelicals to East Africa. Until 1856 their main interest was still focused 
on the trans-Atlantic trade. But as more became known about the horrors 
of the East African slave trade, European public attention was more and 
more drawn to the region. 
It was David Livingstone's travels in East and Central Africa, more than 
anything else, that started the process. In 1856 he completed his second 
journey across Central Africa from Angola to the Zambezi delta. Prior 
to this period, the Church Missionary Society had sent three G e r m a n 
missionaries to start work in East Africa. Johann Krapf arrived in 
M o m b a s a in 1844 and was followed by J. R e b m a n n in 1846 and by J.J. 
Erhardt in 1849. Their mission station was established at Rabai near 
M o m b a s a . B y 1856 R e b m a n n had crossed the Nyika plain to Kilimanjaro 
to become the first European to see the mountain, and Krapf had gone 
farther south to visit the Shambaa kingdom of Kimweri and then north-
wards to the K a m b a country where he was the first European to be shown 
M o u n t Kenya. Erhardt and Krapf also travelled farther south to the mouth 
of the R u v u m a and later, after spending some time in Tanga, Erhardt was 
able to publish a m a p of East Africa containing a mass of information he 
had gathered on the coast about the interior, including the Great Lakes, 
50. F . Cooper, 1977, p. 126. 
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which he represented as an inland sea. Erhardt's ' m a p was to be the main 
inspiration of Burton and Speke in their expedition of 1858'.51 
This first group of missionaries acted as pioneers; they gathered con-
siderable information that was extremely valuable to those w h o followed 
them. Yet their information hardly came to the attention of the general 
public and it was only w h e n Livingstone began his attacks on the Arab 
slave trade in speeches and writings that the popular imagination was 
caught. In the spirit of the capitalist free-trade conviction of his time, 
Livingstone was emphasizing the power of commerce, which, he believed, 
would integrate the vast interior with Christian Europe, thus relieving 
Africans of the poverty and humiliation caused by the slave trade. H e 
therefore concentrated on travelling in search of navigable rivers, or what 
he called the 'open path for commerce and Christianity'.52 T h e publication 
of his Missionary Travels53 in 1857, together with his personal appeals, 
inspired the formation of the Universities Mission to Central Africa 
( U M C A ) by a group of English High Churchmen. T h e U M C A attempted 
to follow Livingstone's ideas by trying to enter the Zambezi region, only 
to find that neither the Zambezi nor the R u v u m a had navigable entries. 
After the initial problems, the mission had to m o v e to Zanzibar to con-
centrate instead on freed slaves. 
T h e question of freed slaves attracted the attention of all missionary 
societies working in East Africa. Between 1858 and 1873 the C M S , U M C A 
and the Holy Ghost Fathers were all involved. T h e C M S continued to 
work at Rabai near M o m b a s a , where freed slaves from B o m b a y were sent 
to assist R e b m a n n . T h e U M C A was located in Zanzibar while the Holy 
Ghost Fathers worked in Bagamoyo. N o n e of these societies had succeeded 
in carrying out Livingstone's mission of opening the interior for commerce 
and Christianity. Nevertheless, the work had begun. For, while the missions 
were beginning to take root on the coast, the interior of East Africa was 
being explored by Europeans w h o had been inspired by the initial efforts 
of these missionaries. In 1858 Burton and Speke had set out to find 
Erhardt's 'Sea of Unyamwezi ' . 5 4 T h e y reached Lake Tanganyika and Speke 
also visited the southern shores of Lake Victoria. In 1862 Speke returned 
with Grant to explore Lake Victoria, and also located the outflow of the 
Nile. While following the White Nile they met Samuel Baker, w h o had 
come up the river from the sea. Later Livingstone himself was to return 
once more to the heart of Africa, adding more to what had already been 
revealed. T h e explorations had a tremendous effect on the missionary 
invasion. T h e existence of the big lakes immediately seemed to prove the 
validity of Livingstone's plan. All major British missionary societies that 
51. R . Oliver, 1952, p. 7. 
52. ibid., p. 27. 
53. D . Livingstone, 1857. 
54. R . Oliver, 1952, p. 27. 
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were working in East Africa wanted to place steamers on these inland 
waterways. T h e most important stimulus derived from these explorations 
sprang from their revelations about the extent and character of the Arab 
slave trade. For it became clear that the interior was not as inaccessible as 
Krapf had thought of Kenya or as the U M C A missionaries had thought 
of the Lower Shire. Certainly caravan routes penetrated the whole interior 
and h u m a n cargo was getting to the coast through them. Even more 
significant was the revelation of what this trade implied for the lives of the 
Africans. . <-
After Livingstone's death greater zeal was roused a m o n g British mission-
ary societies. T h e impact of his public funeral ceremony in Westminster 
Abbey touched almost every pulpit and stimulated popular support for 
missionary work. A s a result, the Scottish Free Church plunged for the 
first time into missionary work in Central Africa. In 1875 its first expedition 
penetrated the Zambezi and the Shire and planted a station at Blantyre on 
Lake Nyasa. T h e other missionary societies already at work on the coast 
expanded their efforts rapidly. In 1875 the U M C A started a station at 
Magila on the mainland in what was part of Kimweri's empire of Usambara, 
and in 1876 established a station in the southern region of Tanzania at 
Masasi. Meanwhile, Stanley, an Anglo-American journalist, adventurer 
and explorer, w h o had previously been commissioned to look for Living-
stone, had completed a second journey to explore the region further. In 
1875 his letter about the possibilities for missionary work in Buganda 
appeared in the Daily Telegraph. This stimulated a number of British 
churchmen to offer funds for missionary work. A s a result, the C M S 
expanded from Freretown in Rabai near M o m b a s a and established a station 
at M p w a p w a in the middle of Tanzania in 1876 from where missionaries 
were able to reach Mutesa's capital the following year. Livingstone's o w n 
h o m e society, the London Missionary Society, soon decided to follow his 
steps and, stimulated by a specific offer of funds, decided to go to Lake 
Tanganyika, the region where Livingstone spent his last years. F r o m 1877 
onwards the London Missionary Society established a number of stations 
near Lake Tanganyika; Ujiji, U r a m b o , Kavala Island and M t o w a . Unfor-
tunately work at these stations had to be abandoned because the climate 
and G e r m a n political interests proved too hostile for the missionaries. T h e 
Society eventually re-established its base in the British sphere of influence 
in Rhodesia. 
Unlike the Protestants, R o m a n Catholic missionary activities owed their 
stimulus during the same period to the vision and energies of one individual, 
Cardinal Lavigerie, w h o was appointed the Archbishop of Algiers in 1867. 
A year later, he founded the Société de Notre-Dame d'Afrique, later known 
as the White Fathers. Its aim was to work in 'Central Africa' as 'the 
religious counterpart of the African International Association, working 
within the same geographical limits, from ten degrees north to twenty 
degrees south of the Equator, and placing its stations within reach of those 
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of the lay organization, so that mutual assistance could be rendered.'55 T h e 
Society's first station in East Africa was established at Tabora in 1878. T h e 
Holy Ghost Fathers, w h o had preceded it ten years earlier at Bagamoyo, had 
concentrated on establishing colonies for freed slaves rather than expand-
ing mission stations. T h u s , by the time the White Fathers started invading 
the interior, the Holy Ghost Fathers had only gone as far as Morogoro 
where they established a station 'about a hundred miles inland at M h o n d a ' . 5 6 
F r o m Tabora a number of White Fathers went north to establish a 
station at B u k u m b i on the southern shores of Lake Victoria and thence to 
Buganda. W h e n they arrived at King Mutesa's court they found that the 
C M S missionary, Alexander M . Mackay, had preceded them by several 
months and that the Muslims 'had been in the country for several years, 
and a number of the Chiefs had accepted the faith'.57 This was the beginning 
of religious rivalry between the Muslims and Christians on the one hand, 
and between Protestants and Catholics on the other. Mutesa was able to 
control these rivalries by balancing one group against the other, but, after 
his death in 1884, the rivalries were to influence greatly what was happening 
at the court. 
Another group of White Fathers left Tabora and went westwards to set 
up a mission station at Ujiji in 1879 and from there to R u m o n g e in 
Burundi, some 120km south of the present Bujumbura, but the station was 
abandoned in 1881 after the massacre of three missionaries there. ' T h e 
White Fathers were not able to return to their mission for almost fifty 
years'.58 In 1885 the White Fathers took over two stations near Ujiji, which 
had been established by the African International Association after King 
Leopold of Belgium had decided to concentrate his efforts in the Congo 
Free State. 
Until 1884, therefore, European pressures in the East African hinterland 
were mainly exerted by missionary societies. Even where there existed 
commercial activities, they were offshoots of missionary work. T w o such 
examples existed. T h e first was the Livingstonia Central African Trading 
C o m p a n y , which was associated with Scottish missionary activities in the 
Lake Nyasa region. Its aim was said to be that of supplying the mission 
station at Blantyre with necessities through running steamships in the 
waterways of the region and also that of bringing ivory for commerce at a 
price that would undercut the Arab merchants using slave labour for 
porterage. T h e second example is also associated with the Scottish Free 
Church. A m e m b e r of the Church, William Mackinnon, w h o owned the 
British India Steam Navigation C o m p a n y , started running ships to Z a n -
zibar in 1872. A few years later he was able to convince the sultan of 
55. ibid., pp. 4 & - 7 . 
56. J . M . Gray, 1963, p. 244. 
57. G . D . Kittler, 1961, p. 161. 
58. ibid., p. 157. 
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Zanzibar to approve his plan for building roads to Lake Nyasa and Lake 
Victoria. Although the roads were not built, it was these plans that matured 
into the more imperialistic organization k n o w n as the British East Africa 
C o m p a n y during the partition period. 
Missionary work, during the period under discussion, was in its pion-
eering phase. O n the surface it m a y appear to have m a d e little impact on 
African societies but, w h e n examined more carefully, it will be found to 
have already exerted considerable impact. Missionary societies in East 
Africa were in fact more powerful during this period because they did not 
have to face the restraints imposed by colonial governments in later periods. 
As Roland Oliver puts it: 
T h e missions became a power in the land, and not a spiritual power 
only. In Buganda, as at Zanzibar, the native political authority was 
firmly enough established to include the stranger within its protection. 
Elsewhere even the missionary w h o set out with a few dozen porters 
and tried to settle in a native village had to set up what amounted to 
a small independent state.59 
T h e early mission stations were also heavily influenced by their con-
centration on establishing colonies for freed slaves. Whether the colonies 
were on the coast (like Freretown or Bagamoyo) or further inland (like 
Masasi, Blantyre, M p w a p w a , Tabora or Ujiji), the main intention was to 
build near the slave caravans and to use freed slaves as a nucleus of the 
mission colonies. This was consistent with the intention to fight the Arab 
slave trade. But, in fact, the stations became theocratic states that could 
even attract political exiles, fugitive slaves and misfits in the societies in 
which they were situated.60 In this way, the mission stations were increasing 
the weakness of those societies already weakened by the economic pressures 
of the time and thus reducing their ability to oppose the imposition of 
colonial rule. In a more general way, it can be said that missionary societies 
were also the pioneers for colonial rule. Most of the 300 Europeans w h o 
had lived on the mainland before 1884 were connected with missionary 
activities.61 Even where they were effectively controlled by a local ruler, 
the existence of a European mission station with its cultural impact opened 
the way for a colonial claim during the partition period. 
A s w e have already mentioned, during the period under discussion East 
Africa was part of a large informal empire under British control. Towards 
the end of this period, however, the rise of G e r m a n y as a major Western 
power was beginning to increase the competition that already existed. 
Outside the East African sphere, tensions caused by this competition were 
already beginning to appear. W h e n King Leopold called an international 
conference in Brussels in 1876 'to discuss methods of peaceful and co-
59. R . Oliver, 1952, p. 50. 
60. ibid. 
61. ibid., p. 49. 
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operative action to develop legitimate commerce and attack the slave 
trade',62 the rivalry was already appearing on the surface. T h e international 
conference eventually broke up into jealous national sub-committees and 
Leopold went ahead with establishing his personal empire in the Congo. 
T h e most significant action of the period was the British occupation of 
Egypt in 1882. For the British the action was justified because of the 
strategic position of Egypt (with the Suez Canal and the Nile) for British 
interests in India and East Africa, although East Africa was considered of 
less importance. But the international reaction to this occupation included 
a series of colonial annexations by Germany: South West Africa in April 
1884 and Cameroon in July of the same year. In West Africa G e r m a n y 
and France were beginning to stand together to challenge the British 
position on the Niger. T h e 'high tide of imperialism' had begun to flow. 
W h e n Bismark convened the Berlin Conference in November 1884, the 
process of partitioning Africa had already started. In East Africa Carl 
Peters had already arrived in Zanzibar under the auspices of his Gesellschaft 
für Deutsche Kolonisation (German Colonization Society) and had gone 
inland to negotiate treaties. T h e British kept hoping that strengthening 
Seyyid Barghash's authority on the mainland would be enough to protect 
their interests without direct colonization. 
62. J. Flint, 1963, p. 362. 
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Great Lakes region 
D . W . C O H E N 
Introduction 
During the first half of the eighteenth century, the king of Buganda, 
Kabaka M a w a n d a , sought to bring under his control the rich regions to 
the east of the central administered zone of his kingdom. H e launched 
a major military campaign. T h e campaign had some immediate success 
and M a w a n d a installed one of his generals to bring the region of the 
Kyaggwe entirely under the administration of the Buganda kingdom. 
At several points, however, Kabaka Mawanda ' s governor in Kyaggwe met 
resistance. A n d his successors saw sections of Kyaggwe slip under the 
influence of Buganda's north-western neighbour, Bunyoro, and the 
immense Mabira forest of Kyaggwe was closed to the penetration of the 
Buganda state. B y the end of the eighteenth century, the Mabira, directly 
east and not 45 k m from the Ganda heartland, had become a reserve for 
forces of opposition to the Buganda courts, a place of exile, a haven 
of refuge. For countless individuals within and without the kingdom, 
the dark galleries of the Mabira held the promise of a reversal of for-
tunes. 
Towards the close of the eighteenth century, Kakungulu fled the domain 
of his father, the Ganda king, Semakokiro, whose great-grandfather was 
Mawanda's brother. Kakungulu found refuge and support in the Mabira. 
F r o m there, he and his followers organized a patchwork of alliances with 
states around the frontiers of Buganda and then launched a series of attacks 
to gain the throne of his father. Kakungulu never captured Semakokiro's 
throne. But his activities increased the turbulence around the older admin-
istrative zones of Buganda, gave the Ganda circle of leaders greater incen-
tives to punish and incorporate regions of opposition to the east and to the 
west, and m a y have reinforced the violent character of relations between 
Buganda and its neighbours. 
Kakungulu was not the first individual to attempt to convert a c o m -
munity of refuge in the Mabira into a force of insurgency. In looking to 
the Mabira, Kakungulu was taking a leaf from the book of tactics of his 
very o w n father, Semakokiro. Perhaps some thirty or forty years earlier, 
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Semakokiro sought to recover his fortunes in the Mabira, taking with him 
a powerful retinue of support. His exile was a long one. 
F r o m our perspective today, Semakokiro's community of exiles in the 
Mabira has the appearance of a state in formation. T h e process of formation 
of a state based in the Mabira was, in this instance, interrupted by its 
o w n success in gathering support. Semakokiro succeeded eventually in 
overthrowing his brother Junju and was seated on the Ganda throne as 
Kabaka. In looking back through Kakungulu's refuge in the Mabira and 
to his father Semakokiro's exile before him, one is reminded of the immense, 
durable, and powerful community organized around the G a n d a general 
and administrator Semei Kakungulu during his 'exile' in eastern Uganda 
in the early twentieth century,1 and of the tense and complex character of 
relations a m o n g rulers and their adjutants that typified the political life of 
the Buganda kingdom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
T h e story of Kakungulu and Semakokiro in the Mabira, located in time 
towards the close of the eighteenth century, offers historians several paths 
of entry into the extraordinarily rich and complex nineteenth-century 
history of the Great Lakes region. O n e path provides the observer with a 
view of the state in the Lakes region as still evolving, still incorporating 
n e w terrains and peoples within the reach of their authority, the picture of 
the Lakes region state as a relatively young complex of institutions. A 
second path offers the observer a view of considerable turbulence as an 
eighteenth-century backdrop to the nineteenth century. Rulers faced solid 
opposition from within their domains and from outside. Tenure in office 
could be brief, providing precious little time to construct ruling coalitions 
or to build working administrations. T h e ruler's o w n brothers and sons 
were foci of revolt. A third path suggests that the domains or kingdoms of 
the region were not enclosed social and political units. There was con-
siderable interaction across political frontiers. T h e lives of rulers and the 
quality of life for the members of courts and subjects were contingent on 
the character of relations among states. A fourth path of'observation' takes 
us into the little-known and little-understood social and political terrain 
away from the courts and the capitals of the region and towards some first, 
faint appreciation of what the Lakes region state meant in the lives of 
people in the region, h o w far it reached into domestic lives and production, 
into trade and exchange, into religious thought and practice. 
T h e Great Lakes region is today, and was in the nineteenth century, a 
densely populated, well-watered region of eastern and central Africa. T h e 
region extends from the Kyoga basin of northern and eastern present-day 
Uganda and the M o u n t Elgon foothills and W i n a m Gulf of western Kenya 
to the eastern uplands of the Zaire river watershed of eastern present-day 
Zaire and to the shores of Lake Tanganyika. T h e Great Lakes region is a 
historical and cultural area (as well as the physical juncture of two great 
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watersheds) defined by language, continuous in cultural forms, and, most 
prominently, characterized by the general shared patterns of precolonial 
political organization. T h e Lakes region state conformed to certain region-
specific elements of political culture, structural principles, and authoritarian 
ideology, which touched and sometimes enclosed social formations marked 
by 'caste', class, and multi-ethnic compositions. 
T h e political order 
T h e Great Lakes region was, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
and seven or eight decades later w h e n European pressures began to affect 
directly the fortunes of both individuals and states in the area, an agglom-
eration of small and large, of weak and strong, yet superficially similar, 
states. T h e Lakes region kingdom is defined as the domain organized 
around a ruler, drawing status from association with a dynastic lineage, 
supported by a court of aides and councillors, the domain organized by a 
hierarchic array of appointed officials, artisans, and lordly princes. 
T h e traditional focus of students of the region on formal political 
elements and offices2 gives special 'voice' to the insurgent activities of 
Semakokiro, Kakungulu, and the thousands of folk w h o joined them in 
exile and rebellion. T h e story of Semakokiro and Kakungulu and of their 
exiles draws attention to the potential forces of opposition to existing 
authority and to the existing capitals in the region and helps us escape rigid 
concepts of the domain of politics. T h e Great Lakes state was not - at the 
outset of the nineteenth century, or later, or earlier - simply an assemblage 
of king and court and country, or a coupling of political culture, admin-
istrative orders, and structure. Semakokiro and Kakungulu relay to us that 
the state domain was defined, in an important sense, by conflict from within 
and from without. 
T h e political order of the Lakes Plateau region was extensively trans-
formed in the nineteenth century through the elaboration of two major 
trends. O n e was the growing cohesion and power at the centres of a number 
of states, through the accumulations of labour and trade goods, through 
the growth of bureaucratic institutions, through the resolution of old 
divisive processes, and through the control and management of new influ-
ences and forces entering the region. 
T h e second trend was the decisive expansion of power of three or four 
states - Buganda, R w a n d a , Burundi, and eventually, Bunyoro, during its 
period of revival - at the expense of other states. These two trends were 
closely intertwined. T h e success of these four major kingdoms during 
the nineteenth century rested upon the reorganization of administration 
2. Understandably so, given the prime attention of anthropologists and historians on 
the political histories of the kingdoms of the region and the disappointingly small amount 
of work done on precolonial economic history in the region. 
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towards stronger central control, the quelling of long-persistent civil strife 
by the elimination of opposition and by the extroversion of internal conflicts 
through expansionary and tribute-gathering campaigns, the enlargement 
of domains through conquests of new areas, the capture and incorporation 
of sections of regional production and trade, and the integration of n e w 
elements and forces entering the wider region. 
A signal of this wholesale change in these major domains from the 
eighteenth to the nineteenth century is noted in looking at the duration of 
reign-length of the nineteenth-century rulers of Buganda, R w a n d a , 
Burundi, and Bunyoro. In Buganda, K a m a n y a ruled thirty to thirty-five 
years, beginning in the first years of the century. Suna followed K a m a n y a 
and ruled twenty years. Mutesa followed Suna and ruled twenty-eight 
years. B y comparison, eleven kabakas ruled Buganda in the eighteenth 
century and a considerable proportion of these eleven were murdered or 
removed from office. A n eighteenth-century 'era of princes' had been 
transformed into an 'era of long reigns', and K a m a n y a , Suna, and Mutesa 
each had the breathing space to organize an initial control, to limit oppo-
sition from contending princes and factions, and m o v e to expand the 
resources of the state. 
In R w a n d a , a similar 'era of long reigns' supplanted a pattern of abbrevi-
ated tenure in the previous era. M w a m i Yuhi Gahindiro assumed power 
in the last decade of the eighteenth century and ruled for more than thirty 
years. His successor, Mutara Rwogera, ruled for about three decades, and 
Mutara's successor, Kigeri Rwabugiri, ruled for nearly four decades until 
his death in 1895. 
In Burundi, there were only two rulers in the nineteenth century, Ntare 
II R u g a m b a , w h o is thought to have been placed on the Burundi stool in 
the last years of the eighteenth century, and M w e z i II Gisabo, w h o ruled 
from the mid-nineteenth century until his death in 1908. It is thought that 
four different kings ruled Burundi in the eighteenth century. In Bunyoro, 
such a pattern of long reigns is less clear for the nineteenth century, though 
the long reign of M u k a m a Kabarega, from about 1870 to his removal by 
imperial agency in 1899, was part and parcel of the revival of the power 
and regional influence of Bunyoro in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. 
There is a circular effect to be recognized in the presentation of the 
evidence of long reigns in the nineteenth century. T i m e gave rulers, their 
courts, and their clients, opportunities to construct stronger and more 
durable networks of authority and more secure administrations. T i m e gave 
rulers and administrations opportunities to routinize the circulation of 
rewards, payments, and offices, and provided m a n y folk away from the 
courts with assurances that opportunity and security lay with participation 
in the present regime rather than in opposition to it. Conversely, these 
effects assured the rulers, courts, and big m e n of the nineteenth century 
more time and opportunity to continue the elaboration of their power and 
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plate 1 r.2 Kabaka Mutesa with chiefs and officials
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administration. Sequences of long reigns m a d e more likely the carriage of 
coalitions and routines formed during one reign into the next. Legitimacy 
and authority in the Lakes Plateau state were established not simply 
through an accession ritual. Legitimacy and authority must be seen to have 
been constructed over time through the section-by-section erection of 
lattices of social relations. Participation in the state involved the play of 
institutions of marriage, service, and clientage, and it involved opening 
n e w lands for production, building n e w circuits of exchange, and expanding 
provisioning of the capitals. These elements could only be built over time. 
Buganda, R w a n d a , Burundi, and Bunyoro were, over most of the nine-
teenth century, the most expansive states in the region, and the develop-
ments within those states in the nineteenth century had the most 
demonstrative effect on the shape of the region in the twentieth century. 
But there were, in the wider region, more than two hundred other domains, 
virtually all with political institutions similar to those of the larger 
kingdoms. S o m e of these smaller states went through processes of political 
transformation in the nineteenth century, enhancing power within their 
o w n immediate arena. Others lost control of the centrifugal forces within 
and became dependencies of distant organizing centres. T h e capitals and 
courts of the major kingdoms began to attract dissidents and insurgents 
from nearby states, and these adventurous visitors sought assistance from 
their more powerful hosts in overthrowing authority in their h o m e area. 
Repeated hundreds of times, these initiatives contributed to the weakening 
of the smaller states and the expansion of influence of the larger ones. 
F r o m the middle of the nineteenth century, the distinction between 
larger and smaller domains became greater, as the major states in the region 
gathered in the n e w resources from outside the region — trade goods, 
including firearms, European, Arab, and Swahili merchants and adven-
turers, and Christian and Islamic missionaries. T h e smaller domains of the 
Lakes Plateau came more and more to resemble 'gardens' to be cultivated 
for servants, slaves, and tribute by the larger kingdoms, or simply as 
tramping grounds for the mobile forces from within and without the region. 
Production and extraction 
This last observation moves us some way from the view of the region 
simply as a political terrain. W e begin to observe that, in the nineteenth 
century, the predominant 'business of the state' was the aggregation of 
production and exchange, whether this process of accumulation was evolv-
ing within the framework of the old domain or whether evolving beyond 
the effective administrative boundaries of the state. T h e control of pro-
duction and exchange was very m u c h at issue as states such as R w a n d a , 
Buganda, Burundi, and Bunyoro enlarged their domains and expanded 
their range of influence in the nineteenth century. 
Earlier, note was m a d e of M a w a n d a ' s programme of expansion into 
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Kyaggwe . This eighteenth-century move was directed at productive regions 
lying beyond the control of the Buganda kingdom. K y a g g w e held bark-
cloth, iron ore and iron-working artisans, and it held access to the pro-
ductive islands of the northern Lake Victoria area. T h e B u v u m a Islands, 
offshore from K y a g g w e , were well linked into the trading networks of the 
eastern Lake Victoria area. T h e aggregation of productive forces, materials, 
skills, labour, and access to, or control over, the nodes of regional trade 
circuits were a m o n g the main items of business of the precolonial Lakes 
Plateau state. 
Extractions from routinely administered areas and extractions from 
outside the domain brought wealth into the courts and fed the governing 
regime. In the nineteenth century, extractions of tribute, with the opposed 
resistance to the extractions of the state, linked regions of production and 
regions of consumption in a broad network of 'conflict-driven' relations, 
while overlaying and affecting — and often deforming - the precolonial 
market networks that spanned the Lakes Plateau region. T h e interplay of 
state extraction and the resistance of producers and producing areas to 
coercion by the tribute-taking state is most apparent, in the nineteenth 
century, in the domain of food production, food exchange, and food 
consumption. Paradoxically, within this region of apparent, and m u c h 
noted, abundance, the control of supplies of food appears to have moved 
to the centre of relations a m o n g states and relations between the state and 
producers.3 
In the routinely administered zones of the region's kingdoms, specialized 
and non-specialized production generated foodstuffs, along with arrays of 
other goods, for the courts and capitals. T h e collections by the state were 
both regular and irregular in terms of period. Contributions to the courts 
and capitals were expected from season to season. O n the other hand, 
particular occasions, such as the sending off of military expeditions, various 
court ceremonies and entertainments, and intermittent food shortages, 
occasioned special collections of foodstuffs for redistribution through the 
courts and capitals. 
In Buganda, it appears that a form of governmental farm evolved under 
appointed officials w h o were charged with responsibility for provisioning 
the courts of specific chiefs and for provisioning the palace of the kabaka.4 
In R w a n d a , Nkore, Karagwe, and Burundi, royal herds - part of the stock 
of wealth of the state - provided meat, fats, milk, and butter for the 
coteries of lords, officials, and their clienteles and their households. All this 
production was, essentially, 'administered production'; that is, organized 
3. This is taken up in some detail in D . W . Cohen, 1983. Material presented here is 
drawn from that study, presented in June 1981 to a conference organized in Naivasha, 
Kenya by the United Nations University. 
4. It is hoped that a paper will soon be finished on this subject. T h e outlines of this 
pattern of provisioning are glimpsed through the screen of a number of sources. 
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and regulated by the state. Administrative farms were capable ofproducing
immense supplies of foods and beverages at relatively short notice. There is
an implication that production levels were geared high to meet momentary
demands and that there was, by necessity, an overcapacity in the catering
organizations.
plate 1 1.3 Treasure house, and regalia ofKing Rumanyika ofKaragwe
Programmes of extraction extended beyond these specialized food pro¬
duction sections into external arenas and into 'tribute-taking'. There may
be value in viewing the economic activities of the state on a continuum.
The transition in extraction from occasional collection towards regularized
collections may have marked the process of incorporation of frontier areas
and entirely new areas of production into the Lakes region state. An
example of a pattern of collection falling along the middle of such a
continuum is the extraction of production from central Busoga by agents
of Buganda.6 These were not regularly administered extractions but they
were sufficiently controlled and routine to require no military force and to
5. J. Tosh, 1980, p. 9, has, in a recent article, directed attention to the means by which
significant surpluses of food were achieved in pre-colonial Africa and challenges the view
that the surpluses which supported specialist artisans, hunters, trading caravans, and courts
were just the normal surplus of subsistence production.
6. The Buganda collection are treated in S. Kiwanuka, 1972, pp. 139-53; J- Kasirye,
1959; F.P.B. Nayenga, 1976; D.W. Cohen, 1977.
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enable them to produce foodstuffs in a prepared form in enormous amounts. 
There is a suggestion of prior notification and prior preparation. In these 
extractions from central Busoga, the most c o m m o n commodity extracted 
was dried bananas (Lusoga: muteré) transported both as meal and as sun-
dried cakes. T h e routine and frequent tribute collection from a specific 
area would have forced production in the tributary zone far beyond the 
expected consumption requirements of the producers themselves. In a 
sense, this tributary zone production encompassed 'defensive surpluses'. 
Such surpluses would have given the impression to early European trav-
ellers in the region of unending abundance and self-sufficiency of the little 
producer,7 alongside the more familiar image of sumptuous conditions in 
the courts. W h a t these travellers would have missed was the structure of 
'defensive surplus' in which the effective costs of production of whatever 
'reciprocal' goods and services the tribute-taking state offered its tributary 
zones were transferred to the tribute-producers. These 'defensive surpluses' 
did not provide security to the producers themselves, for the tribute-taking 
state in the nineteenth-century Great Lakes region was well positioned to 
seize these surpluses if they were, for whatever reason, withheld. 
Another example located near the middle of our continuum of types of 
extraction was the collection of fine salt from the Lake George salt source, 
taken off to the remote, yet regulative (and sometimes protective) courts 
of Toro and Bunyoro.8 Further along the continuum were the irregular 
and unexpected collections of tribute from more remote regions.9 Here, 
one might postulate that such foods as mutere and other foods and beverages 
requiring considerable effort in harvest, preparation, and transport were 
m u c h less significant. In these remote zones, extractions appear to have 
been more military in character. A r m e d bands, if not major expeditions, 
tramped through an area, gathering available stocks of tribute, especially 
cattle and humans , but also artisans' and marketeers' stocks of ironware 
and bark-cloth. This was predacity on an immense scale. O n e military 
expedition organized in Buganda m o v e d into Busoga, camping in one area 
for several months. Smaller collection parties were sent hither and yon. In 
this case, the sources suggest that the tribute-collecting army from Buganda 
was stationed in the country long enough to force up the production and 
preparation of foodstuffs and preparation beyond the typical military booty. 
T h e tribute taken was consumed by the occupying expeditionary force and 
some was eventually returned to the courts of Buganda. W h a t almost 
certainly happened in this case was that the Ganda army remained in 
Busoga too briefly to stimulate or force a permanent expansion in the 
production of foodstuffs and other commodities in the region they occupied. 
7. For example, see F . D . Lugard, 1893, Vol. 1, p. 366; H . H . Johnston, 1902, Vol. 1, 
p. 248, and H . M . Stanley, 1880, pp. 142-3. 
8. E . M . Kamuhangire, 1972a, 1972b. 
9. D . W . Cohen, 1977, pp. 73-80. 
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But they were there long enough to dismantle a substantial part of the 
productive organization of central Busoga — which would require m a n y 
years to recover. Similar large-scale tribute-gathering expeditions were 
organized from the capital region of R w a n d a in the nineteenth century, 
organized to extract valuable commodities and cattle from the unad-
ministered areas to the north and west, including those around the western 
shores of Lake Kivu.10 In time, both production and marketing in these 
areas were stultified and R w a n d a had to look still further afield for n e w 
sources of production. 
O n e element of these military expeditions was the establishment of fairly 
stable transit routes into the target regions. In south-western Busoga, two 
or three polities were essentially provisioning stations for the Buganda 
expeditions. These small states were able to produce army provisions in 
immense quantities at short notice. These provisioning states apparently 
drew supplies from contiguous areas. B y the 1860s, areas just to the north 
of the Buganda transit route were abandoned. T h e y ceased to offer any 
productive capacity for the provisioning states, for the Buganda kingdom, 
or for a resident population.11 Over several decades, the large-scale tribute 
extraction organized by the larger kingdoms, such as Buganda, would have 
had the effect of establishing a significant distinction between areas in 
which external demand for foodstuffs stimulated production and areas in 
which external demand weakened or destroyed productive organization. 
Sources on the nineteenth century indicate that the extractive pro-
grammes of the major kingdoms in the region were actively resisted in the 
areas of production. In northern and eastern Busoga, Buganda military 
expeditions were resisted, and occasionally turned back, in the nineteenth 
century. T o expand its collections from the rich areas to the east, Buganda 
welcomed opportunities to acquire firearms, actively involved itself in local 
civil conflicts, inserting dependent princes on the stools of a number of 
states, increased the scale of its military expeditions, and m o v e d farther 
afield as extractions from the old productive zones collapsed. Resistance to 
Buganda extractions in the B u v u m a Islands was witnessed by H . M . Stanley 
during his visit to Buganda in 187s.12 T h e peoples and polities along the 
western and north-western frontier of the R w a n d a state resisted R w a n d a n 
extractions through m u c h of the nineteenth century.13 
10. D . S . Newbury, 1975, pp. 155^73; Anon., nd; M . C . Newbury, 1975. 
11. This is briefly discussed in D . W . Cohen, 1977, pp. 116-77. I£ ' s pursued in the 
present writer's forthcoming study of Busoga, 1700-1900. 
12. H . M . Stanley, 1880, pp. 304-42. 
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Coercion, violence and the market 
T h e effects of resistance to the almost insatiable demands of the larger 
states in the Lakes region in the nineteenth century included the decline 
of productivity in nearby tributary areas and the consequent shift back to 
the courts of some of the costs of surplus production of foodstuffs - since 
more elaborate means had to be evolved to maintain the high levels of 
tribute from beyond the regular producing areas within the existing 
domains. Resistance, of course, raised the levels of violence in the wider 
region and resistance appears to have destabilized long-operating trade and 
market routines organized around and through Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, 
Lutanzige and Kivu, along with the salt lakes of south-western present-
day Uganda, which had generated surpluses and had organized exchanges 
over a very long period.14 W e can draw a simple portrait of the region in 
the nineteenth century that highlights the m u c h increased competition 
between two systems of regional exchange, one based on military force and 
political coercion, the other based on the market. In the third quarter of 
the nineteenth century, the Great Lakes region experienced the refinement 
of the system of coercion rather more than, and at the expense of, the 
system of marketing. Leaders and courts appear to have abandoned a 
dependence on markets for the intra-regional supply of goods. 
In the nineteenth century, productive areas of the Lakes region became 
targets of two or three tribute-collecting states simultaneously and they 
thus became arenas of intense conflict. Both the older Bunyoro state and 
the newer Toro kingdom forwarded claims to tribute from the saltworks 
of south-western present-day Uganda. T h e salt wealth of these two states 
rose and fell periodically in the century.15 T h e Budiope area of northern 
Busoga and the Bugerere area to the west of the Nile became simultaneous 
targets of the Buganda and Bunyoro states, which sought to capture the 
grain, tubers, cattle, bananas, and manufactures from these areas. T h e 
resistance of Bugerere and Budiope held back the incorporation of their 
production into the Buganda and Bunyoro states throughout most of the 
century.16 Needless to say, the simultaneous invasion of these productive 
areas by Buganda and Bunyoro was a central part of the wider conflict of 
14. Three interlayering or overlapping circuits of market exchange are noted in the pre-
colonial Lakes Plateau region: an eastern lake circuit extending from the Buvuma Islands 
east and south around Lake Victoria into Usukuma; a Bunyoro-Kyoga circuit extending 
from M o u n t Elgon westwards into the grasslands of western Uganda; and a Kivu circuit, 
extending from the rimland of the present-day Zaire forest around the lakes of the Western 
rift into Burundi, Rwanda, and the western grasslands of present-day Uganda. See Fig. 
11.2. For valuable work on the trade circuits of the region, see J. Tosh, 1970; A . D . Roberts, 
1970b; C M . Good, 1972; B . Turyahikayo-Rugyeme, 1976; E . M . Kamuhangire, 1976; D . 
Newbury, 1980; J. P. Chrétien, 1981. 
15. E . M . Kamuhangire, 1972b. 
16. T h e situation of Bugerere is most instructive. A brief, clear discussion is presented 
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Bunyoro and Buganda over m u c h of the century. In some areas, the 
competition for 'rights to farm tribute' a m o n g several regional powers m a y 
have stimulated various defensive and alliance strategies a m o n g the tribute-
paying groups. In other areas, such conflicts m a y have simply reduced 
population and output in the contested arena. In still others, the c o m -
petition a m o n g several powers for resources and the competition a m o n g 
members of the courts for the privileges of 'farming' tribute m a y have 
pushed collections far beyond consumption possibilities.17 O n e of the early 
effects of European activity in the Lakes region was to strengthen the hands 
of the major regional powers in the collection of tribute from remote areas, 
at least in the short run. 
If some areas of the Lakes Plateau region were being pushed to increase 
production far beyond local consumption requirements, other areas experi-
enced more than exceptional shortfalls in food production. These shortages 
were felt both at the beginning of the wet season and during long seasons 
and years of poor harvests. In western Kenya, occasional markets were 
opened during periods of crisis.18 These were located in the interstices 
between moister, more secure uplands and drier, less secure lowlands 
extending in a quarter-circle from the W i n a m Gulf of western Kenya to 
southern Busoga. In this area, occasional markets were organized in times 
of crisis for the exchange of livestock, grain, fish, greens, and manufac-
tured goods. M e m b e r s of the dominant lineage in the area of the market 
site regulated these exchanges and by the early years of the twentieth 
century, these market regulators had begun to resemble the 'big m e n ' 
or 'almost chiefs' familiar to students of different parts of the African 
continent. 
Towards the W i n a m Gulf area, staple foods were frequently in short 
supply, particularly in the lake littoral zone affected by a unimodal pattern 
of rainfall and an extended dry season. F r o m at least the eighteenth century, 
the lakeshore populations moved slowly and steadily upland into the more 
secure and productive bimodal rainfall areas, constrained only by those 
groups already occupying the higher ground, by groups over the horizon 
routinely raiding the rich, higher lands, and by insufficient organization to 
wedge open more land in the higher zones. This uplands shift in population 
continues today. It involves transitions in production and diet a m o n g those 
pressing upland, the compression of population in the higher elevations, 
and the expansion of Luo-speaking communities. T h e process of upland 
migration has produced some of the highest rural population densities in 
17. Court intrigue in such kingdoms as Buganda m a y have been a stimulus to extractive 
campaigns in remote places in the pre-colonial era. See D . W . Cohen, 1983. 
18. M . J . H a y , 1975, pp. 100-1. See also the forthcoming work of L . D . Schiller, on 
G e m and Kano in western Kenya, and R . Herring, 'The Jolue Before 1900', forthcoming. 
T h e present writer, working in Siaya, and Priscilla O . Were, working in Samia, have 
collected some supporting evidence. 
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Africa in the twentieth century, contributing to the exhaustion of soil and 
the depletion of forest and woodland reserves.19 
Those w h o did not migrate upland continued to suffer the shortfalls of 
a fragile agricultural system. T h e occasional markets offered some relief, 
permitting the exchange of cattle, grazed in the lowlands, for grain and 
root crops grown more successfully at the higher elevations. Since, in the 
lowlands, the period of hunger was also the period of heaviest labour 
demand for cultivating and sowing of grains in the first rains, the occasional 
markets provided a means of overcoming rather quickly the excessively 
long dry season or an earlier short harvest. Cattle maintained by the people 
of the lowlands constituted, through regional exchange, the means of 
agricultural and nutritional continuity. T h e so-called 'cattle complex' had 
an immediate logic for the lowland people, providing them with a means 
of accumulation of convertible wealth. 
Trading circuits 
Fragile agriculture in R w a n d a was offset by inter-zonal, inter-ethnic, and 
inter-class exchange.20 Complementarities in production and consumption 
among regions of surplus and regions of shortfall created a network of 
communication, exchange, and interaction that reinforced the broader field 
upon which the R w a n d a n state was organized. Such routine exchanges 
m a y have permitted the retention of specialized local economies, as well as 
ethnic-specific or class-specific dietary patterns, reinforcing the social class 
distinctions in the western Lakes Plateau region. 
R w a n d a participated in wider extractions through the frequent raiding 
of rich areas to the north, north-west, and west, and some of these areas 
were brought under Rwanda's regular administration during the nineteenth 
century. R w a n d a also participated in a trade system centred on Lake Kivu. 
W o v e n bracelets manufactured in B u t e m b o - to the west of Lake Kivu -
were carried by traders into the markets along the Lake Kivu littoral and 
the markets on the island of Ijwi. These butega of Butembo began to 
acquire the characteristics of a currency and, by the second half of the 
nineteenth century, were widely used in exchange in the Kivu zone, 
enriching marketeers from Ijwi, and bracelet manufacturers in Butembo, 
while making possible exchanges of cattle, foodstuffs, and other goods over 
a wide region of Kivu and R w a n d a , with the effect, perhaps, of stimulating 
production throughout the area.21 
There is evidence of similar growth in an exchange circuit connecting 
19. M o r e work needs to be done on twentieth-century social and economic processes in 
western Kenya, with particular attention to demography, rural economy, and public health. 
For similar processes in Tanzania, see H . Kjekshus, 1977. 
20. H . L . Vis, C . Yourassowsky and H . van der Borght, 1975. 
21. L . S. Newbury, nd. 
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areas on the eastern side of Lake Victoria. There was, first of all, an 
extensive network of exchange in foodstuffs and other commodities in place 
by the beginning of the nineteenth century. It had probably been active 
for centuries. This circuit connected the coasts of Buganda and southern 
Busoga and the B u v u m a Islands in the north with the shores and 'interior' 
of present-day western Kenya and with the south lake regions of Buzinza, 
U s u k u m a , and Unyamwezi , in present-day Tanzania. Apparently central 
to the nineteenth-century configuration of this circuit was the agricultural 
revolution which has been noted as coming to the Bukerebe island state in 
the south lake area in the late eighteenth century or early nineteenth 
century.22 T h e Bukerebe state organized the production of several n e w 
crops, including maize and cassava, and introduced to regional production 
new strains of sorghum and millet. Institutional changes — including the 
organization of unfree labour (introduced by trade from the mainland) — 
generated a substantial leap in output. Mainland areas offered markets for 
Bukerebe's surpluses of food, and Buzinza metalware and U s u k u m a cattle 
were sucked into the regional trade circuit through Bukerebe. T h e peoples 
of Buzinza and U s u k u m a looked to the Bukerebe surpluses and the Buker-
ebe marketeers as means of resolution of periodic shortfalls in the local 
food supply. Occasionally, it seems, this dependence led to accusations 
against Bukerebe traders of profiteering from the misery of U s u k u m a 
farmers by simply raising the prices of Bukerebe food transported to 
U s u k u m a during famines.23 
If Bukerebe traders held a predominant middleman position in the 
south, Basuba intermediaries dominated transport and exchange along the 
more northerly reaches of this eastern lake trade circuit. With exceptional 
skill and courage, the Basuba navigated the Lake Victoria waters, trans-
porting salt, slaves, dried bananas, grain, beans, livestock, fish, and iron 
over a great area, connecting the Bukerebe markets in the south to the 
south Busoga and B u v u m a markets in the north.24 
T h e monopoly of exchange that the Basuba developed over the northern 
sectors of the eastern lake system in the nineteenth century rather paralleled 
the monopolies developed by Bagabo and Bashingo traders in the region 
of the salt lakes in western present-day Uganda.2 5 Each of these groups 
constructed a well-organized exchange diaspora encompassing political 
control over production and marketing of salt under the remote licence 
and protection of the Nyoro and Toro courts. In both the salt lakes and 
eastern lake circuit, the exchange diaspora evolved its monopoly away from 
the regular purview of the Lakes Plateau state, did not utilize the model 
of the state in evolving its marketing network, and only came to accom-
22. G . W . Hartwig, 1976, pp. 62-83, 1 0 4 - n . 
23. ibid., p. 107. 
24. M . Kenny, 1979. 
25. E . M . Kamuhangire, 1972b. 
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modate the demands of states of the region when , occasionally, their regions 
of production, their markets, and their fleets came under attack. 
T h e Bukerebe trading system - the southern sector of the eastern lake 
circuit - was sufficiently attractive to other trading groups to encourage 
Waswahili and Arab traders operating in the Unyamwez i area to draw up 
the filaments of Bukerebe carriage and exchange. Then , through encour-
aging the production of slaves and ivory in the Bukerebe market area, these 
newcomers ultimately eclipsed the Bukerebe traders and their food-based 
exchange system in the south lake region. It was through this southern 
displacement that Waswahili and Arab traders and their merchandise first 
touched the Great Lakes region. T h e merchandise, first, then the traders 
after, plunged into the markets and states of the Lakes Plateau, moving 
along the same deeply cut routes west of Lake Victoria that were utilized 
by the salt lakes traders. Perhaps more important than the merchandise 
they introduced was the market for slaves and ivory they carried into the 
central part of the Lakes region. Firearms were exchanged for slaves and 
ivory. Eventually, Islamic and Christian teachers and European explorers, 
adventurers, and agents followed these same footpaths as the traders, 
creating new forces of change in the wider Lakes Plateau region. 
While the east coast traffic was extending northward through the western 
grasslands towards the populations and capitals around the northern side 
of Lake Victoria, navies from Buganda began to cut away sections of the 
Suba and Bukerebe monopolies to the east and south, introducing the 
possibility of active, direct relations between the Buganda heartland and 
Arab and Waswahili traders on the southern side of the lake. T h u s , while 
Bukerebe influence was being displaced from the south by parties from 
Unyamwezi and the east coast, Bukerebe influence was being supplanted 
from the east and north by Buganda's expansionist programmes. A n 
interesting contrast can be drawn between Buganda and Ukerebe in the 
nineteenth century. As in Bukerebe, Buganda agriculture had been trans-
formed, at one point, towards the production of quite exceptional surpluses 
of foodstuffs. Unlike Buganda's surpluses, however, the Bukerebe surpluses 
were destined for areas of quite extreme scarcity, yet areas that could 
produce what Bukerebe required and was unable to produce itself. In 
Buganda, surplus production served as social and political aliment within 
the state, rather than as a stock of wealth to be exchanged in areas of 
complementary production. Further, the well-developed transport organ-
ization created by the Bukerebe state and by the Basuba was deeply cut by 
Buganda penetration, but this was a penetration by military force rather 
than by a n e w marketing organization. 
There was, in the nineteenth century, another extensive exchange 
network centring on the general Bunyoro area, extending to the north and 
north-west into the Acholi region and West Nile, to the east through the 
Lake Kyoga area to the slopes of M o u n t Elgon, and to the south-west 
through the salt lakes into the Kivu area. Ironware and salt were the evident 
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mainstays of this trading circuit, yet foodstuffs and livestock were probably 
crucial to the elaboration and maintenance of the system. In one zone north 
of Lake Kyoga, the Langi produced planned surpluses of food, particularly 
sesame, for trade.26 In the nineteenth century, this sesame was destined 
for Bunyoro to the west, for exchange for iron hoes, which in turn con-
tributed to the expansion of sesame production in the Lango area. Careful 
study has shown that such surplus production probably involved an array 
of innovations and refinements in production, land use, cropping, planting 
and sowing cycles, and labour, in order to maximize output.27 Here was 
something of an agricultural transformation, in some ways comparable to 
that evolving nearly simultaneously in Bukerebe and still another in the 
Ijwi Islands of Lake Kivu.28 
O n e might postulate that individuals and groups participating in the 
exchange circuit of western present-day Uganda saw the readiness of the 
Langi to increase sesame output for the market in the nineteenth century 
as a means of, first, stimulating the trade in ironware to the east - over-
coming the precedence in that area of the ironware produced in Samia 
near the Lake Victoria coast (close by the present Kenya-Uganda border) 
and thereby stimulating further growth of iron production in Bunyoro; 
second, forging deeper inter-regional relations between Bunyoro and 
Lango, relations, perhaps, of dependence or unequal exchange; and, third, 
creating wealth through the expansion of such commerce, which would in 
the second half of the nineteenth century pull in valuable ivory from the 
north-western foothills of M o u n t Elgon. 
Throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, the 
western present-day Uganda exchange circuit was the basis of influence of 
the Bunyoro heartland over a very broad region, even during the periods 
when conflicts internal to the Bunyoro state enveloped and weakened the 
power of Bunyoro's monarchs. In such areas as Busoga, there were, in the 
nineteenth century, reorientations of exchange from the older Lake Victoria 
markets to the more recently established sites of regular exchange in the 
Lake Kyoga basin, with Nyoro iron pushing back Samia iron from the 
markets of northern and north-eastern Busoga. T h e Lake Kyoga basin 
attracted new settlement in the nineteenth century, with production from 
these areas oriented to the Nyoro market. This expansion of the Kyoga 
circuit complemented the process of population shift northwards in Busoga 
and allowed a much-harassed population to m o v e farther from the arena 
of Buganda tribute-gathering adventures. Later, this arm of the Bunyoro 
or western trade circuit extending through the Kyoga region was quite 
26. J. Tosh, 1978. 
27. T h e implication here is that this was a social revolution, worked out by household, 
or community by community, in the reorganization of social relations of work, task 
definition, and time. 
28. See G . W . Hartwig, 1976, for Bukerebe; and L : S. Newbury, nd, for Ijwi. 
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resilient in the face of British pressure to convert the population to cotton 
production. 
In the west, the Lake Kyoga trade joined with the trade that passed 
through the grasslands of western present-day Uganda and centred on the 
salt production of the south-west present-day Uganda lakes. Agents of the 
Bunyoro kingdom, and of its tributaries, levied taxes on the production, 
carriage, and marketing of goods, foodstuffs, and livestock, and with these 
entered the market on their o w n account.29 T h e rulers of Bunyoro and 
Toro played robust roles within the exchange economy of the western part 
of the Lakes region without destroying the routines of traffic and exchange. 
While some of the historical literature on western present-day U g a n d a 
portrays Bunyoro as a pastoralist kingdom and warfare state, it appears 
that the Bunyoro state was extensively integrated in the regional market, 
and very dependent on conditions in that market for supplies to its courts 
and for articulation of control and sway in remote areas. B y contrast, 
Buganda in the nineteenth century looks like the classic warfare or tribute 
state with no reconciliation between the processes of elaborating a complex 
internal bureaucracy on the one hand and elaborating the infrastructure of 
external markets on the other. 
If it can be said that in the nineteenth century the activities of the 
Buganda state tended to deform or destroy sub-regional market activities 
in the Lakes region, it can also be said that at the same time Buganda 
began to participate more actively in what might be termed international 
exchanges extending from the Victoria lake-shores to the East African 
coast. T h e differences between Buganda and Bunyoro in respect to existing 
market opportunities in the nineteenth century are perhaps not so simply 
perceived after all. T h e key difference m a y be located in h o w each state 
utilized varying strategies to take advantage of distinct levels of market 
activity in the region. While Bunyoro participated within the regional 
market system in ways that strengthened and extended the system, Buganda 
routinely sought military solutions to its perceived shortages of local 
commodities and services. At the same time Buganda joined the broader 
international market steadily reaching into the Lakes region from the East 
African coast, participating in ways that strengthened and extended the 
east coast system into the interior, managing, to a remarkable extent, to 
exclude Bunyoro from participating in this 'higher-level' system of 
exchange. Indeed, in the last decade of the century, Buganda managed to 
array the forces associated with the east coast market directly against 
Bunyoro, with the result both of reducing Bunyoro's influence in the region 
forever and of cutting away the 'northern factor' - Anglo-Egyptian and 
Sudanic interests - from the region. 
Central to this 'higher-level' exchange system extending d o w n from the 
Great Lakes region to the East African coast was the exchange of ivory 
29. E . M . Kamuhangire, 1972b. 
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and slaves, gathered in the Lakes region, for firearms imported from the 
coast through the Zanzibari trade network. Carried along with the firearms 
were small quantities of goods destined for, essentially, aristocratic con-
sumption, including textiles, bangles, tableware, and, later, books. For 
m u c h of the century, the Buganda court was able to control the distribution 
of such imports within the kingdom and beyond, increasing the sway of 
the court (and therefore the influence of all the outsiders w h o visited there) 
in the life of the wider society. Importantly, tastes were 'extroverted' in a 
period preceding the penetration of the region by Europeans, since the 
Baganda managed, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, the 
incorporation of their society in the general imperium of the United 
Kingdom. 
Growth of inequalities and tension 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, n e w tastes and consumption 
pressures from below the aristocratic elements facilitated European influ-
ence in the life not only of Buganda, but also of most of the wider region. 
For some fifty years, firearms acquired by the most powerful states had 
increased their advantages over tributary areas and, as elsewhere in Africa, 
had permitted the concentration of politico-military power in the hands of 
narrowed sections of the region's population. Inequalities, most notable in 
slave-gathering expeditions but everywhere important, hardened through-
out the Great Lakes region in the last few decades of the century. T h u s , 
when Europeans entered into the region's life in some numbers, their 
support was sought not only by the strong, and increasingly powerful 
centres, but also by the weak and helpless. 
If the eighteenth century was seen to close around the m a n y efforts of 
parties and forces here and there to resist and overthrow the rulers of states 
in the Lakes Plateau, so also w e see evidence of a n e w wave of resistance 
and conflict in the last two or three decades of the nineteenth century. 
Evidently, in the last third of the century, people were restive over the 
growing force and c o m m a n d concentrated in the capital regions and the 
distributed provincial courts of the Lakes Plateau kingdoms. East and west 
of Buganda, small states resisted m a n y of the tributary campaigns of the 
Buganda state. In 1875, H . M . Stanley witnessed the disaster of Buganda's 
campaign against the B u v u m a Islands. Even where the larger state brought 
swift defeat to its target region, parties in the tributaries sabotaged the 
regular deliveries of tribute to the conqueror.30 In Bunyoro, R w a n d a , and 
Buganda, and in the small Busoga states, c o m m o n folk resisted the exactions 
of the capitals and courts, often by moving to areas more remote from the 
reach of routine collection, or to areas offering greater opportunities for 
acquiring land, office, and authority, or, as in the present-day K e n y a -
30. This is spoken of in a number of Buganda and Busoga sources. 
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U g a n d a borderland, through concentrating and entrenching their settle-
ments as defensive villages. 
In the Busoga area, there are thousands of stories of little migrations 
from state to state, c o m m o n folk seeking refuge or n e w opportunities, and 
there are stories of individuals moving through several domains in a single 
lifetime. T h e stories suggest that 'opportunity-seeking' had, by the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, c o m e to redefine the relations of indi-
vidual and household to the state in respect to land, service, and authority.31 
T h e nineteenth-century context was one of considerable individual and 
small-group mobility in Busoga. T h e court, as one opportunity niche, held 
a focal position in the lives of people whether in a particular domain or 
outside it, but this focality did not ensure the court's authority. Indeed, 
throughout the nineteenth century, the typical Busoga court was under-
mined in its efforts to sustain its authority or to expand its domain by the 
readiness of countless individuals to abandon their patrons and land so as 
to seek more attractive opportunities elsewhere. It is possible that during 
this period, and over issues such as these, an evolved concept of 'state' or 
'kingdom' became a significant part of popular discourse. T o an extent, 
this pattern of response of the wider community to authority m a y have 
balanced off the growth of force at the capitals through the monopolization 
of firearms and the arming of courtiers. Here and there, this distancing of 
central political authority m a y have facilitated significant shifts in market 
relations and productive activities; in particular, local spheres of economic 
activity became significantly detached from the apparatus of the state. 
It is clear that, during the nineteenth century, resistance to organized 
political authority often meant enhancing, sometimes for only a short 
period, the authority of religious institutions. This tended to reinforce 
opposition between religious and political authority here and there across 
the Lakes region. T h e small community organized around the possessed 
child W o m u n a f u in the Bunafu area of Busoga in the nineteenth century 
is an example of such opposition, or competition, a m o n g different c o m -
plexes of authority. In Bunafu, the enclosure of W o m u n a f u was for several 
decades outside of, and opposed to, the political world around. Yet, the 
ideas and institutions upon which W o m u n a f u ' s authority was based were 
extensively shared by the political capitals nearby.32 In Bushu, in the 
western part of the region, the competition between religious and political 
bases of authority was, to a considerable extent, resolved in the nineteenth 
century through the integration of opposed elements into a collection of 
ritual chiefships.33 In R w a n d a , in Bunyoro, and in south-western present-
day Uganda , kubandwa ideas and organization had long provided complexes 
of opposition to the authority of political capitals, a critically important 
31. See D . W . Cohen, forthcoming. 
32. D . W . Cohen, 1977. 
33. R . M . Packard, 1981. 
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plane opposed to the principles and activities of the state and from which 
the penetration of the state was substantially excluded. At times, kubandwa 
organizations were sufficiently strong to challenge and overthrow existing 
political authority. In the nineteenth century, perhaps the most substantial 
of all known kubandwa movements focused on the female deity Nyabingi. 
T h e Nyabingi movement emerged in opposition to the R w a n d a state, 
which was formalizing its influence beyond the old administrative region 
in the R w a n d a centre, particularly extending to the north and to the west. 
In the present-day Zaire-Uganda borderland, in Kigezi, and in parts of 
Nkore, followers of Nyabingi organized resistance to the extension of the 
R w a n d a state into their worlds. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
Nyabingi became a focus of resistance to political authority more generally 
and to European colonial activity as it was felt by peoples of the region.34 
Conclusion 
T h e Great Lakes region in the nineteenth century was not so m u c h a neat 
matrix of centralized polities as a large arena of conflict and struggle a m o n g 
varying interests and forces evolving both within and beyond the particular 
complex of polities. At one level, states competed for the control of tributary 
agricultural zones, and specialized resources such as salt, cattle, and iron, 
as well as access to, and control over, systems and channels of distribution. 
T h e competition was not only between states but also between states and 
organizations and enterprises constructed very differently from the polities 
of the area. 
At another level, c o m m o n folk here and there across the region sought 
to define through both participation and resistance the political, social, 
and economic space in which to pursue security and opportunity. For 
individuals and households across the region, the nineteenth-century state 
in the Lakes region often showed more of its extractive than its protective 
face. T h e responses of peoples throughout the region varied according to 
their limitations and opportunities. T h e y included the reorientation of 
production and marketing away from the demands of the state, the evacu-
ation of areas under excessive pressure from outside, the joining of n e w 
religious communities, the search for secure refuges, and the support of 
efforts to overthrow existing authority. T h e world of the Great Lakes 
region in the nineteenth century was not simply a world of states, large 
and small. It was also a world in which individuals and households were 
in innumerable small, sometimes undramatic ways, altering their orien-
tations to state authority, to service, to production, and to the market. 
O u r line of vision into the domain of everyday life in the nineteenth-
century Lakes region is considerably obscured by the passage of time. But 
the lines of change and the forces of change noted throughout the region 
34. I. Berger, 1981. 
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in production and consumption, in commerce, in the relations among 
states, and in the relations between c o m m o n folk and the courts, brought 
significant tensions into the relations of everyday life, penetrating the 
household, and setting in motion a chain of pressures and changes m a n y 
of which would be read, in later decades, as consequences of European 
colonialism. 
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The Congo* Basin 
and Angola 
J.L. V E L L U T 
T h e area with which w e are concerned is broadly bounded by the Atlantic 
coast on the west, Lake Tanganyika and the Nile-Zaire ridge on the east, 
the Ubangui savannas on the north, and the plateau separating the Zaire 
and Zambezi basins to the south. T h e period w e shall deal with cannot be 
limited to a single theme. Contrary to the c o m m o n belief, the history of 
the years 1800-80 is not a matter only or mainly of long-distance trade and 
links with the outside world (the economy of Central African communities 
at this period was still based more on production than on trade). N o r can 
the precolonial nineteenth century be regarded as an era of widespread 
violence, because of the slave trade, civil strife, etc.: the commonplace 
belief that Africa was racked by incessant 'tribal warfare' overlooks the 
basic fact that the bulk of the peoples in the area led peaceful lives 
as producers, steadily improving their farming methods, bettering their 
environment and exporting the produce of food-gathering. Finally, the 
history of the nineteenth century is not to be reduced to purely political 
history concerned with despotic kingdoms and states: if there is a political 
feature c o m m o n to the Central African communities of the period around 
1800, it is more likely to be the m u c h disputed quest for equilibrium and 
accommodation between powers derived from different sources. 
A n historical account of nineteenth-century Central Africa must in 
fact satisfy several requirements. It must describe the ordinary life and 
aspirations of the societies in this enormous area at the time. This would 
bring out the continuity between the 1800s and the more distant past: the 
changes, although noticeable, were slow. 
At the same time, the history of Central Africa in the nineteenth century 
is characterized by breaks with the past. After all, in the years 1800-80 the 
area was more a part of the world trading network than ever before. T h e 
impact of the world economic situation, or of some specific sectors of it, 
was making itself felt: in some areas it influenced social and political history, 
giving a noticeable impetus to trade and offering n e w opportunities for 
stockpiling, while in others it restricted the process. T h e beginnings of a 
* T h e name of the River Zaire customary in the nineteenth-century documents has been 
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fig. 1 2. i West Central Africa in the nineteenth century (after J. L. Vellut)
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European grip on the profits of the trading economy in the interior of 
Central Africa were already evident. 
T h e following account centres around these main themes, which left a 
special imprint on the years 1800-80. It is the history of social and political 
changes. It is the history of the ebb and flow of the world economy, as 
experienced by Central Africa. There is also the slow-moving history of a 
civilization and, particularly, the history of diversification in making use 
of natural resources. 
Production: models of sparse and dense populations 
In their distribution, population behaviour, systems of production and 
aspirations, Central African communities in the years 1800-80 showed that 
they retained traits inherited from a remote period, vestiges of which can 
still be seen today. A basic and very ancient characteristic of material life 
in Central Africa is uneven distribution of population, resulting from the 
operation of various geographical, economic and social factors, and also 
from the repercussions of historical events. W e shall n o w endeavour to 
trace the developments that were taking place during the period under 
consideration. 
T o the south of the rain-forest, in the vast area of open forest (miombo 
in Zaire, mato de panda in Angola) that extends to latitude i6-i7°S, 
nineteenth-century agriculture provided only part of the food supply, for 
agricultural production was far from being intensive.1 This type of farming 
was the one best suited to the poor soils of the open woodland, but it could 
only support a population density low by twentieth-century standards (a 
m a x i m u m of 8 per sq k m ) . In the nineteenth century the old-established 
African cereals - eleusine ('finger millet'), millets and sorghum - still 
formed the bulk of the crops grown in several of these regions. A s a 
complement to agriculture, food-gathering (nutrition plants, caterpillars, 
honey, rodents, etc.), hunting and fishing played a major role in the food 
supply: and even in the twentieth century food-gathering is still very 
widespread in these open woodland communities. 
Sparse populations most commonly did not live in complete isolation. 
T h e y were in contact with more densely populated areas, which shed their 
excess population on to the neighbouring territories. In some areas where 
the space available was very limited (for instance in the immediate vicinity 
of watercourses), agriculture became diversified and intensified, and led to 
polarization of the population, often near capital towns or chieftaincy 
centres. 
T h e remote origin of these more densely populated areas coincides with 
1. These open forests are the vestiges of old dry forest climaxes (muhulu). T h e y are 
characterized by a high proportion of Zambezian species. See the works of F . Malaisse, 
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the expansion of agriculture in Central Africa. Thanks to archaeology, and 
later to the earliest written documents, some of these ancient areas can be 
identified, such as the settlement in what in the nineteenth century was an 
area of Luba chiefdoms in the Lualaba valley, or again in the K o n g o region. 
For Angola w e have some information (of a more recent period) from the 
missionaries or from tax records. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, for instance, on the very rough basis of recruitment into the armed 
forces, the Luanda authorities thought that the main centres of density 
were among the A m b u n d u in the Golungo and A m b a c a areas (population: 
60000 and 37000 respectively), and a m o n g the O v i m b u n d u of Bailundu 
(56000) and Bié ('over 30000').2 In Zaire the high-density 'corridor' 
straddling the 5°S parallel, at the junction of the rain-forest and the 
savanna, was not demarcated until well into the twentieth century.3 
Despite the absence of accurate data, several indications suggest that the 
development of densely populated areas became clear relatively recently, 
and that the nineteenth century in fact represented the peak of a trend that 
began only a few centuries earlier. Iron-working, a feature of Bantu 
agricultural systems, only became widespread from the fifteenth century 
onwards. Oral historical sources in Central Africa all agree in regarding 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a turning-point for the savanna 
and Great Lakes peoples: new lands were colonized, dynasties were 
founded, political titles proliferated and so on. Lastly, all the high-density 
centres in the region k n o w n in the nineteenth century had enriched their 
agriculture by the introduction of American varieties. This innovation led 
to an increase in yields, as arable land was used more intensively (in several 
high-density areas there were two or three harvests a year), and high-yield 
plants were introduced (e.g. cassava). 
T h e chronology of these changes obviously cannot be traced in detail: 
depending on the region, they might have extended over more than two 
centuries (1600-1850). This is a rough estimate that can be pinpointed by 
some landmarks. Around 1800 all the American varieties (maize, cassava, 
sweet potatoes, beans, etc.) had no doubt not been adopted everywhere in 
the same way, but no area seems to have ignored them altogether. Moreover 
in some cases American plants had become so integrated that they were no 
longer regarded as foreign imports. T h u s in the K o n g o region w e have for 
the lower Zaire river the first systematic inventory of a Central African 
flora (Tuckey expedition, 1818), which confirms the widespread use of the 
American varieties. In the colonial period, a detailed inventory of K o n g o 
agriculture noted that several American imports (groundnuts, sweet 
potatoes, etc.) were perceived in the oral culture as of local origin as were 
2. J. C . Feo Cardozo, 1825, p. 352 et seq. These figures are very doubtful. Towards 1850, 
L . Magyar gave a very different estimate of the Ovimbundu population (1 220000). T h e 
location of the principal densely populated areas in well-known regions is, however, more 
reliable. 
3. See P. Gourou, 1955. 
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yams or voandzou."1 Elsewhere, however, proverbs and rites still serve as 
reminders that the foundation of African agriculture antedated the A m e r -
ican borrowings in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is a 
M o n g o proverb bonkúfo áfókité ngamomá ('sweet cassava never becomes 
like yam') , i.e., a foreigner never knows the language and customs like a 
native.5 
Demography, society and politics in high-density areas 
T h e development of more-complex agricultural communities had import-
ant consequences for the demography of Central Africa. It is generally 
considered that communities that gradually take up agriculture and animal 
husbandry continue for a long time to show a low annual growth rate 
(between 0.05 and 0.10 per cent), which is fairly close to the k n o w n growth 
rate of hunting and food-gathering communities. O n the other hand, 
communities with a more diversified agriculture have a m u c h higher annual 
growth rate, put between 0.10 and 0.15 per cent. Figures for a difficult 
natural environment like that of Africa are unknown: but they are no doubt 
not very far from this model. Spread over more than two centuries, an 
increase of this order in the growth rate would have had a considerable 
effect on the overall population of Central Africa.6 
Compared with twentieth-century growth rates these figures admittedly 
seem low. T h e fact is that in early African communities the death rate 
remained high. For the nineteenth century the main causes of death are 
known, but it is impossible to determine the extent of each one's con-
tribution to the total. 
First, there were historical factors, especially the slave trade and its 
attendant violence. While the manpower drain of the slave trade to America 
was sharply reduced as from the 1850s, the Swahili and Arab trade took 
over to the east and north of our area. Figures can be given of overall losses 
for the whole of Central Africa,7 but it is unlikely that it will ever be 
possible to give a geographical breakdown, especially as the continual 
movement of groups and individuals spread the impact of the slave trade 
far and wide. 
4. V . Drachoussoff, 1947. 
5. Proverbes Mongo, N o . 489, quoted in G . Hulstaert, 1976. 
6. T h e historical analysis of African demography is still in its infancy. For the moment 
w e have to make do with plausible growth rates based on the natality and mortality rates 
of societies with similar types of economic and social organization. For the Kongo region, 
a historian suggested an annual growth rate of about 0.20 per cent in the seventeenth 
century, and probably less in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (?): J. Thornton, 
1977. 
7. In the region under study, the M a n y e m a and the L o m a m i basins were affected by 
the Swahili slave trade. S o m e authors put at 1.75 million the total number of slaves taken 
from the whole of Central and East Africa and exported from the continent by Swahili 
slave-traders between 1800 and 1870. J. D . Fage, 1975. 
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There were also ecological and epidemiological factors. T h e nineteenth 
century certainly saw the beginnings of medical progress in Central Africa, 
such as better knowledge of endemic diseases, use of vaccination and more 
general use of quinine. But this progress remained confined to the circles 
visited by traders from Angola or the Swahili coast. B y and large the 
changes were too limited to defeat the major endemic diseases or epidemic 
outbreaks.8 
Hence growth in the nineteenth century was still slow; but it was 
doubtless more pronounced than before, for it started from the relatively 
high base level achieved by the population of the area. A s in the past, 
excess population was absorbed by movement elsewhere or by settlement 
in the savanna or the open forest, following a method of expansion that 
has left profound traces in the folk m e m o r y in the shape of traditions about 
'migrations'. Excess population was also absorbed by areas practising a 
more diversified form of agriculture, and hence able, as P . Gourou puts it, 
to 'capitalize their surplus population'. Here a more sedentary type of 
settlement finally succeeded in overcoming the hostility of environments 
that had been gradually broken in d o w n the ages, and from n o w on became 
favourable to h u m a n occupation.9 
This material history and the political and social history of the area both 
throw light on each other, with no one-way determining influence. In some 
cases a high-density area would develop as a base for hierarchical political 
organizations. This is what happened in the case of two high-density areas, 
Mangbetu and Zande, in north-eastern Zaire. In the M b o m u valley and 
as far south as the Vela, the Zande area was a relatively high-density area 
in the nineteenth century despite murderous wars (in the 1870s Georg 
Schweinfurth put its population density at 40 per sq k m ) . T h e agrarian 
system of the Zande was older than the military power of the Avungara, 
w h o only began to unify the area at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Under their rule, however, the term Zande became synonymous with 
subject-farmers; and they developed a high-yield agriculture capable of 
feeding a population which grew all the more rapidly because of the 
accumulation of captives and dependents resulting from the raiding and 
slave-trading of the warrior-aristocracy. 
In the hilly areas to the west and east of Lake Kivu the nineteenth 
century was a time w h e n new land was colonized. This is what happened 
with the Shi, and in Burundi and R w a n d a . Shi agriculture in particular 
8. Our knowledge of epidemic outbreaks is still sketchy. Only the smallpox outbreak of 
1864-5 is relatively well documented; it spread from Luanda into Golungo, Bié, the Kongo 
country, and as far as Namibia; it may have caused as many as 25 000 deaths in a single 
year: D . Wheeler, 1964. A journey made to the mussumba (the capital of the Lunda empire) 
in 1885-6 afforded Carvalho an opportunity to collect information on smallpox in the 
region. H e stated that smallpox was particularly rife after outbreaks of war, owing to the 
habit of leaving corpses unburied. 
9. P . Gourou, 1971, pp. 89-90. 
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retained several plant varieties from the agricultural system formerly prac¬
tised in the region, such as eleusine, sorghum and taro. However, by the
nineteenth century at the latest it had absorbed American crops: an inven¬
tory of twentieth-century Shi farming noted thirty-two varieties of beans
mm*
PLATE 12.2 Nineteenth-century royal drums from the Kuba kingdom
and four varieties of sweet potatoes known before the colonial period.10
The nineteenth century was also the period when the Shi developed
chiefdoms or small states. P. Gourou and J. Vansina observed in other
contexts (Rwanda and Kuba) that political factors can speed up population
growth and also intensify production. Higher-yield agriculture is found to
io. J.B. Cuypers, 1970.
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be necessary to feed the clients, dependents and captives w h o concentrate 
in the capital towns or chiefdoms. This political factor m a y have operated 
in the case of the Shi in the nineteenth century. 
It is, thus, not a one-way process: population growth m a d e possible by 
the production of increasing surpluses calls in turn for further expansion 
of production. This sometimes happened at the price of an erosion of 
political power. In the western part of Zaire there are several examples of 
areas that became in the nineteenth century population reservoirs fed by 
heavy immigration; but the power of the chiefs weakened whilst stockpiling 
by clan or lineage leaders and even by enterprising individuals was what 
really counted. In this way population growth was accompanied by radical 
changes in the structure of society. 
Thus , a pioneer frontier area developed in the nineteenth century to the 
west of the L u b a heartland (i.e. west of the area between the Busimaie and 
Lubilash rivers). These immigrants came as individuals, small groups or 
lineages. They did not obliterate all traces of former settlers, but where 
there had previously been a great variety of clan loyalties, the nineteenth 
century saw the gradual development of a sense of sharing the same 
civilization, language, and political organizations, usually in small chief-
doms . A feeling of ethnic identity grew out of this shared historical 
experience, in which increases in population and agricultural productivity, 
and also encouragement of individual enterprise, played a key role. During 
the same period, in small high-density areas on the upper Tshikapa and 
the upper Kasai, there were m a n y young C h o k w e w h o were prepared to 
leave their villages and the burdensome power of the chiefs and take to the 
open forest, hunting elephants, setting up hives and collecting the honey 
and wax. Because of their skill with plants, particularly cassava, which can 
tolerate poor soils, the w o m e n w h o went with them were able to start 
growing crops: these w o m e n often came from small L u n d a settlements 
along the tributaries of the L u e m b e , the Tshikapa, etc. 
T h e assimilation of L u n d a w o m e n into C h o k w e society illustrates a 
phenomenon that was widespread throughout the 'matrilineal belt': 
descendants of female captives were members not of their mother's clan 
(this was the privilege of the free-born), but of their father's. There were 
m a n y of these descendants of slaves everywhere: among the K o n g o they 
were the baña ba tizo (children of the house), among the C h o k w e the ana 
a tshihunda (children of the village), and among the Pende of Kwilu they 
even make up the majority of members of rich and powerful clans.11 
Genealogical trees show that the practice of assimilating captives was very 
c o m m o n in the nineteenth century. 
ii. T h e assimilation of dependents is studied by L . de Sousberghe, 1961. 
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T h e conquest of poor soils 
Political factors and social aspirations help to explain the fact that high-
density areas sometimes attracted immigration and sometimes, contrari-
wise, acted as emigration centres and contributed to the settlement of 
marginal or sparsely populated areas. Moreover the conquest of relatively 
poor soils represents one of nineteenth-century African agriculture's 
greatest triumphs. Coupled with stockbreeding, it m a d e possible the con-
solidation of h u m a n settlement, for example, in the difficult regions of 
southern Angola. 
This is sandy, arid country characterized by irregular rainfall. Southern 
Angolan societies were split up into a great variety of peoples distinguished 
from each other by their terrain and the varying importance they attached 
to agriculture and stockbreeding. Ethnic solidarity among the peoples of 
this region resulted from sharing a c o m m o n historical experience; that is, 
both political experience in the form of states that developed from the end 
of the eighteenth century onwards and also economic experience dictated 
by environmental similarities. All these peoples, of w h o m the K w a n y a m a 1 2 
are the most numerous, have c o m e to be k n o w n as the O v a m b o . Next 
a m o n g the O v a m b o , but m u c h smaller, come the N d o n g o , K w a m b i , etc. 
They all live in the Cuvelai river basin, in an area bounded by the Cunene 
and the Cubango (Okavango). T h e rise of the Cuvelai and the flooding of 
the grassy savannas enabled the O v a m b o to overcome the drought and 
make the inhabited areas of the region described by nineteenth-century 
travellers look like gardens. T h e O v a m b o irrigated and, thanks to their 
livestock, also manured their farms. 
Just as in other high-density areas, the transition to a more intensive type 
of agriculture in the nineteenth century was facilitated by the assimilation of 
immigrants and especially of captives taken during raiding expeditions into 
the lands lying to the south of the O v i m b u n d u highlands. Although certain 
American plants, such as groundnuts, beans and a little maize, were k n o w n , 
American plant varieties had not found their way here to the same extent 
as in the centre of Angola. Millet and sorghum remained the staple crops, 
being drought-resistant. Royal power was closely linked to the system of 
production. T h e king was the 'rainmaker' and also responsible for sharing 
out the land and organizing river d a m m i n g and other irrigation works.13 
A s a result of such development, w e can say that the long-standing 
disparities in population distribution were probably accentuated in the 
nineteenth century. T h e creation of a surplus from an increase in agri-
cultural production led to relatively rapid increase of population in certain 
12. In 1845, the first scholarly traveller in the region, B . J . Brochade, put their number 
at 120000. 
13. T h e most authoritative work on the region is still C . Estermann, 1956-61. For a 
useful survey of the subject as regards the situation in the nineteenth century, see: W . G . 
Clarence-Smith and R . Moorson, 1975. 
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areas such as O v a m b o , O v i m b u n d u , Luba, the whole area in Zaire some 
5° south of the Equator, etc. This, in turn, led to migratory movements 
away from other areas. This was further heightened by the varying effects 
of social and economic factors. S o m e economic factors encouraged the 
practice of gathering, such as the collection of ivory and wax by the C h o k w e 
and this promoted the dispersion of people in the forest. Other economic 
factors, as often happened in river valleys for example, helped bring 
together a mixed population to create centres of trade and population 
concentration. Next to production, therefore, w e must assess the degree of 
influence that world trade and economy had on the Central African region. 
Central Africa in the fluctuating world economy of the 
nineteenth century 
During the centuries that saw the gradual establishment of a system in 
which agriculture, stock-breeding, fishing and gathering were the main 
productive activities, a trade sector always existed in Central Africa, playing 
a more or less important role according to historical circumstances. G e n -
erally speaking, the difficulty and cost of transport restricted trading 
transactions for a long time to a few major products that were m u c h in 
demand, such as salt, iron, prestige goods (copper, raffia fabrics, etc.), 
whereas agricultural produce was rarely carried over great distances. 
T h e rise of a world-wide market economy, which began in the sixteenth 
century, gradually affected the organization of economic life in ever-
widening areas of Central Africa. Here again, the nineteenth century is 
part of a continuous process, that of unequal trade relationships with the 
capitalist world. However, from the 1850s, great changes began to take 
place. Slaves gradually ceased to be Central Africa's principal 'export' to 
the outside world. Trade expanded in the main products obtained from a 
gathering-based economy: ivory, wax, copal, oil and coffee. T h e growth of 
this market economy is undeniable: the value of goods passing through 
Angolan ports increased sevenfold between 1844 and 1881; the cash turn-
over of the Luanda branch of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino increased 
tenfold between 1865 and 1876. In the early 1870s, however, the value of 
exports derived from these products was still only twice that derived from 
the export of slaves in the 1820s.14 
T h e volume of these major African products reaching world markets 
was dependent on the way in which communications and trade networks 
functioned within the continent. These networks, with their staging posts, 
trade conventions and currencies, in turn defined the major economic 
zones on the nineteenth-century m a p of Central Africa, amounting to new 
14. Economic statistics on nineteenth-century Angola are to be found in numerous 
separate publications. For some basic facts see R . J . H a m m o n d , 1966, more especially pp. 
73-4 , and its bibliography. 
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'frontiers' that overlaid and modified the former political and economic
divisions of the region.
These new economic zones were dominated by the demands of the nerve
centres of the nineteenth-century world economy. Each of them had its
own historical traditions and political and social characteristics. Nonethe¬
less, they all had one thing in common, namely that they transformed
important aspects of the old African economic system, linking it more or
less loosely to the world economy.
Economic zones and trading networks
During the period 1800-80, four main economic zones can be identified
in Central Africa. Two were characterized by the important role played in
them by Muslim traders. In the north-eastern part of the region, there
were outposts of traders from Cairo, the Red Sea and Khartoum, who
scoured the Bahr al-Ghazäl and the area south of the Vela. This network
developed as a result of commercial and military expeditions sent into the
plate 12.3 King Munza of Mangbetu in plate 12.4 Kazembe in 1831
1870
Sudan and Därfür by the ruler of Egypt, Muhammad 'AIT. By about 1850,
the Egyptians had reached the Bahr al-Ghazäl, where Egyptian, Coptic
and European traders adopted the techniques perfected since the eighteenth
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century by the troops of the sultans of Darfur. They built zeribas, forts or 
just thorn-bush reinforcements which they used as bases during barter 
operations or forays. A European traveller, Georg Schweinfurth, 
accompanied some of these traders in the 1870s and left a valuable account 
of the Zande and Mangbetu kingdoms at the time when they first estab-
lished regular contacts with Sudanese traders. 
T h e Sudanese network had certain distinctive features, in particular the 
division of influence between state monopolies and private trade, the 
systematic use of force, mainly through the recruitment of local mercen-
aries, and a policy of developing plantations for trade, particularly in cotton. 
These objectives and methods helped inspire the King of the Belgians, 
Leopold II, when he embarked on establishing a trading empire for himself 
in the Zaire basin. 
Since the 1860s, whole areas of the Central Africa region had also been 
incorporated in a trading network with bases in the ports and warehouses 
on the Swahili coast, in places such as Zanzibar and Bagamoyo, on the 
Indian Ocean. T h e Swahili routes which went into the region east of 
L o m a m i comprised two major groups of tracks. O n e was a 'corridor' 
passing through Unyanyembe in the central part of present-day Tanzania 
and crossing Lake Tanganyika from places such as Ujiji; the other led to 
the Luapula-Moero region either from Lake Malawi or from south-western 
Tanzania. 
T h e Swahili network had long been characterized by small caravans 
stopping at the courts of influential chiefs, the Lunda chief, K a z e m b e , for 
example. In the 1870s, however, trading principalities began to develop. 
T h e most famous of them was that of Tippu Tip, established at Kasongo 
in 1875, and it dominated long-distance trade in the Sankuru and the Luba 
'empire'. It was through this network that the Swahili country was able to 
become the first base for colonial penetration into the eastern part of 
Central Africa. 
T h e two other networks that spread across Central Africa were centred 
around the outposts of European traders on the Atlantic coast: the Por-
tuguese centres in Luanda, Benguela and Moçâmedes , or the Dutch, 
French and English trading stations on the lower Zaire river and along the 
northern coast of Angola. This latter region relied for its supplies mainly 
on the Kongo trade and on the river trade. T h e K o n g o trade was itself 
based on the Kwango-Kwi lu communities where Kituba, the K o n g o local 
language, was being widely used. 
T h e river trade developed during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, superseding the old overland routes. T h e people living along the 
river, particularly those setded near the Ubangui-Zaire confluence or on 
the Zaire itself, at the level of the Equator, held exclusive sway over the 
waterborne trade, as they alone possessed and used canoes. These different 
groups disseminated the Babangi language, which became the lingua franca 
of the equatorial region, a language that was later adopted by colonizers. 
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FIG. 12.2 West Central Africa: trading zones, c. 1880 (after jf. L. Vellut)
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They set up trading centres (e.g. Lukolele), went d o w n the river as far as 
the Tio markets on the Pool, travelled upstream into the interior, collecting 
ivory and slaves, especially from the M o n g o . They introduced into the 
rain-forest regions important trading commodities hitherto unknown such 
as guns, copper rings, n e w varieties of crops, etc. As w e have seen, the 
slave trade encouraged the growth of small population centres comprising 
captives, refugees and other groups, w h o were concentrated around a 
trading centre on the river bank, or simply around private individuals w h o 
had made their fortune in trade.15 Ngaliema, a former slave w h o grew rich 
and held sway over the Pool region around 1880, falls into this latter 
category. During the colonial occupation, administrative bases established 
by the state, as well as trading posts and mission stations used the same 
method to mass together captive populations as the canoe traders had done 
before them. 
T h e Portuguese-African network was the oldest and most elaborate in 
Central Africa.16 Changes in the m a p of its routes can be followed through-
out the nineteenth century. In the first half of the century, the principal 
groups of tracks or 'corridors' led to Luanda and Benguela. Three large 
economic and cultural regions were centred on the roads leading to Luanda: 
the Kongo region with its 'Mubire' (Vili) network of tracks which passed 
through the K w a n g o chiefdoms (especially Holo) and Encoge, an Angolan 
fortified outpost; the region comprising the western Lunda states, reached 
either by crossing the territory of the Imbangala of Kassanje and passing 
through A m b a c a , another Angolan outpost, or by travelling through the 
Songo and Pungo Andongo country; finally, the Ovimbundu region, which 
maintained regular contacts with Pungo Andongo and the other Angolan 
posts in the Kwanza valley. T h e O v i m b u n d u highlands were linked to the 
coast by another route that led to Caconda and Benguela. Traders used 
this 'corridor' to penetrate southwards and eastwards into the Nyaneka, 
N k h u m b i and Guanguela regions. In the 1840s, the Luyi and Lunda 
kingdoms were also incorporated into this network. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the network was 
extended. T h e Ambaquistas started to frequent the mussumba of M w a n t 
Yav, especially during the reign of Muteba. They used a direct route setting 
off from the new Portuguese trading post established at Malanje in 1857, 
thereby avoiding Kassanje. Traders from this post soon set up a staging 
post near K i m b u n d u , a Lunda chiefdom halfway along the road leading 
to the mussumba. With the decline of the Lunda tribute-based trade system, 
and in the wake of C h o k w e expansion, the Ambaquistas opened up routes 
to the Lulua valley, in the Luba region, and reached the markets around 
15. T h e expression 'big river trade' was coined by G . Sautter w h o was the first to 
describe its main features. M o r e recent studies include: J. Vansina, 1973; R . Tonnoir, 1970 
and B . Jewsiewicki's commentary, L'administration coloniale et la tradition; with regard to 
the Giribuma, see R . Tonnoir, 1974; G . Hulstaert, 1976. 
16. J. L . Vellut, 1972. 
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plate 12.5 Kimbundu woman of the chiefly
class with her slave-girl, in the 1850s
plate 12.6 Kimbundu warrior with woman
ofthe chiefly class, in the 1850s
Kuba. There, they faced competition from the Ovimbundu caravans which,
in the 1870s, bypassed the Kalagne Lunda state and traded with the Luba
states, buying the slaves which they then sold to the Kuba, who supplied
large quantities of ivory.
The order of importance of the commercial centres situated in the major
economic zones that were based on the trade economy system can be
determined according to the complexity and diversity of the functions they
fulfilled in the predominating economy: giving credit to traders, providing
storage facilities, packing and equipping trading expeditions, etc. Luanda,
followed by Benguela and, in the second half of the century, Moçâmedes,
were the centres of the most complex operations and the headquarters of
the principal trading firms. Nineteenth-century Luanda had architectural
features and institutions characteristic of Portuguese tropical towns in
Brazil, Africa and India. But it was also a town possessed of originality in
which the Portuguese element was often dominated by Creole and African
culture. Here, fortunes were quickly made and as quickly lost. A traveller
who visited the town in the 1840s described the governor's ball, where he
met a woman decked out in gold and jewels, who had come to Luanda as
a mere slave, a man who had arrived at the coast as a prisoner aboard a slave
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ship and another whose childhood was spent in the crowded backstreets of 
Lisbon's slums.17 
In about 1850, none of the Angolan posts in the interior were nearly as 
big as Luanda, with its 6000 to 10 000 inhabitants. A few main staging 
posts were situated along the 'corridors' in the interior, where porters were 
paid off, new ones were recruited, m a n y of the credit arrangements were 
m a d e , etc. Most of the mulattos and the few Europeans engaged in trade 
with the interior were concentrated in these small centres. In the Luanda 
hinterland, D o n d o was a leading centre for trade with the left bank of the 
Kwanza , and it expanded during the coffee and rubber booms; Pungo 
Andongo was another important place, because it was the departure point 
for traders travelling to the Lunda chiefdoms and a junction of land-based 
communications between Benguela and Luanda.1 8 T o the south, Caconda 
occupied a similar position, but its activities were directed towards the 
peoples south of the O v i m b u n d u highlands and towards Bié. T h e latter 
kingdom was an important secondary centre of the network, where porters 
were changed, goods bought and credit arranged. It had a Portuguese-
African colony of about a hundred people, mainly Africans or mulattos 
(Mbundus from Golungo, Ambaquistas, 'Mambar i ' from Bié, etc.). 
Finally, the network of the tribute-based economy terminated at such 
centres as the mussutnba, Bunkeya, or capitals of small chiefdoms or the 
markets of non-centralized communities. Such termini were centres of 
active transactions. 
A system of this type was characterized by increasingly marked contrasts 
between areas that monopolized profitable operations - centralization of 
large quantities of products, handling and marketing operations — and those 
where there were fewer opportunities to accumulate wealth. T h e more 
fortunate regions had quite a different appearance from the others: arms, 
textiles and domestic slaves were plentiful there and rare elsewhere. As w e 
shall see, during periods of economic recession the Portuguese tried to 
monopolize the profits of the network by eliminating African 'middlemen', 
whereas during periods of economic growth most of the trade in the interior 
was carried on by Africans. 
During the nineteenth century, the network had to adapt to certain 
major trade cycles. U p to the 1840s the slave trade was by far the most 
important Portuguese-African activity. This last peak period was in fact 
the most disastrous in the history of the Angolan slave trade. It is estimated 
that from 1780 to 1830, between 15000 and 20000 slaves were exported 
annually from Central African ports (from the Loango coast to the south 
of Angola). Brazil was the main importer and Angola the principal supplier. 
It was Angolan slave labour that made it possible to expand the coffee-
17. The German doctor, G . Tarns, who visited Luanda in 1841, quoted by A . Stamm, 
1972. 
18. J. C . Feo Cardozo, 1825, p. 355. 
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plantation economy of Rio de Janeiro and Sào Paulo in the nineteenth
century. On the whole, the Atlantic slave trade, even the clandestine
operations, died out in the course of the 1850s, although in the lower Zaire
river area it survived outside Portuguese control until the disappearance
of the last of the slave markets in Latin America towards the end of the
i86os.
During the remainder of the century, exports from Angola were limited
to a few agricultural products (such as coffee and sugar) and especially,
products obtained by gathering - mostly wax and ivory - though during
the last three decades of the century a greater variety of exported products
were gathered, such as wild coffee, copal, palm oil and, later, more import¬
antly, natural rubber.
The development of Africa's major economic zones not only changed
the conditions affecting the accumulation of wealth, but also aggravated
social oppression. As in the Zaire river region and the Arab and Swahili
zones, the Portuguese-African zones favoured the growth of a sector of
production based on slave labour. Certainly this type of production had
not been unknown in the tribute-based economies of the savanna: slaves
PLATE 12.8 A caravan ofOvimbundu traders resting
worked the fields of the leading political families of the mussumba, for
example. But, in the nineteenth century, the accumulation of captives by
certain privileged groups often coincided with the rapid growth ofa market-
related sector of the economy rather than with economic expansion due to
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increased payments of tribute-money. W e have seen the result in the role 
played by 'domestic slaves' in the demographic and agricultural expansion 
of some of the communities in the region, such as the K o n g o , O v i m b u n d u , 
and O v a m b o . 
In Angolan colonial society, the slave trade was likewise linked to the 
capitalist market economy, and had grown to sizeable proportions by the 
second half of the nineteenth century. In spite of certain legal tech-
nicalities - slavery was formally abolished in Angola in 1878 - a slave 
labour sector was certainly the basis of the b o o m in cotton, plantation 
coffee, and especially sugar-cane production. At the end of the period 
under review, brandy distillation from Angolan sugar cane was the main 
object of trade with the sertäo. Slave labour also met the demands of the 
labour market rising from the beginning of white settlement in the regions 
to the south of the O v i m b u n d u highlands. 
Portuguese imperialism in Angola 
T h e existence of major trading zones in Central Africa and the nature of 
their relations with the world economy provide the key to the history of 
imperialism in this region in the nineteenth century. During this period, 
in Central Africa at least, financial imperialism had not yet made its 
appearance, but new forms of trade-based imperialism developed. Over 
the span of the century, it is possible to identify a number of broad phases 
in the expansion and contraction of Portuguese possessions in Angola, 
reflecting the hesitations of the Portuguese governors of the colony between 
two different conceptions of hegemony over the African trading economy. 
T h u s the n e w Portuguese imperialists could choose to exercise a purely 
commercial form of domination, with minimal administrative and military 
occupation, its only avowed aim being to promote the circulation of 
goods in collaboration with a large, active African trading community. 
Alternatively, Portugal could attempt to incorporate the African colonies 
in its o w n economic system, while protecting national trade, but more 
significantly, perhaps, opening up a n e w market for Portugal's budding 
industries. T h e second alternative implied consolidating occupation of the 
colony, curbing the role of African middlemen to the advantage of colonial 
traders, diversifying the colony's production of raw materials and securing 
a market for the new manufactures from the mother country, essentially 
through a policy aimed at the political and administrative unification of 
Portugal and its African 'provinces'. Another aspect of this policy of 
assimilation was the tendency to encourage 'white' settlers in southern 
Angola. 
These two trends, towards contraction or territorial expansion, alternated 
throughout the nineteenth century, like the swing of a pendulum, since they 
were bound u p with the economic situation and structural changes in the 
Portuguese economy. Events certainly played their part, and the military 
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setbacks inflicted on the Portuguese by the Africans go some way towards 
explaining the ebb of colonial occupation during the period 1862-72. 
Personalities also influenced developments; certain governors were associ-
ated with an aggressive policy of m a x i m u m occupation, others with a 
retreat to coastal bases. However, these factors do not assume their real 
significance unless they are placed in the context of world economic 
developments, particularly in so far as they affected the Portuguese 
economy. Indeed, Portuguese imperialism did not escape the general rules 
of colonial expansion in the nineteenth century.19 
T h e determination of the protectionists to ensure that Portugal and its 
colonies were united in an economic system independent of the great 
industrial powers was reflected in the first attempts to set up a white colony 
in the south of Angola, beginning on the coast at M o ç â m e d e s , and at Huila 
in the Nyaneka country. T h e spirit of conquest was still uppermost in the 
1850s, with sustained Portuguese efforts to occupy territory and eliminate 
competition from African traders, in particular the Imbangala and the 
K o n g o . Not until i860 or thereabouts, following some years of thriving 
trade, was a turning-point reached, with the Portuguese increasingly adopt-
ing a policy of withdrawal. F r o m 1862 to 1875, the colonial power continued 
to retreat, suffering a series of military defeats at Cassanga in 1862, and in 
the D e m b o country in 1871-2, which the government at Luanda did not 
seek to avenge. By the early 1870s the withdrawal was complete. T h e 
colonial power in Angola had fallen back to the coast, and Africans were 
rapidly gaining control of trade in the sertào. Silva Porto, the leading 
sertanejo of the Bié area, lost his entire fortune in this period under the 
pressure of competition from the O v i m b u n d u traders. Angola entered a 
period of rapid growth in trade: between 1867 and 1873, tonnage shipped 
d o w n the K w a n z a from D o n d o increased sevenfold. 
Soon, however, the Portuguese colonialists embarked on a new phase of 
territorial expansion. Following a slackening of world trade from 1873 
onwards, competition between the various foreign powers for a slice of the 
'African cake'20 grew increasingly fierce, and in Angola this period began 
with a severe recession following a prolonged drought and a credit crisis 
(1874-6). At the same time, work was beginning on the construction of the 
railway from Luanda to the interior; attempts were being m a d e through 
diplomatic agreements to stave off the threat from the n e w arrivals in 
Central Africa; and the first Portuguese 'explorers' were setting out in the 
wake of the G e r m a n and British travellers to be seen in Luanda and in the 
interior. Central Africa was approaching a major turning-point in its 
history. 
19. This view is not accepted by D . Wheeler and R . Pélissier, 1971, pp. 51-83. T h e 
authors give a purely political explanation for the fluctuating fortunes of Portuguese 
penetration in Angola. This is also the line taken by R . J . H a m m o n d , 1969. 
20. T h e expression is Leopold IPs and is quoted, among others, by J. Stengers, 1962, 
p. 490. 
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Society and power in Central Africa (c. 1800-80) 
T h e political and social history of Central Africa in the nineteenth century 
should first be seen in the context of an ancient tradition. A s far back as 
the oral and written sources go, w e see that the societies living in the region 
hesitated between two power structures: the hierarchical, well-defined 
order based on the payment of tribute, which was that of the kingdoms 
and, at the other extreme, the m o r e egalitarian and informal type of 
government by councils of elders and notables.21 
These two models were complementary, and in practice there were m a n y 
different kinds of intermediate situations, waverings and compromises. 
T h e realities of the environment and of economic activity, as well as 
historical circumstances and even personal considerations, determined 
whether the prevailing type of organization tended towards the monarchical 
model, with its qualities of order and security, or towards the more flexible, 
less authoritarian democratic ideal. 
In the period under study here, w e find in Central Africa some examples 
of administrative systems with stable, permanent hierarchical structures 
that were capable of concentrating quite large populations at specific centres 
or capitals. But such cases were not the most c o m m o n , for a combination 
of several factors was necessary before a political title and a state structure 
could emerge. A tribute-based economy which was the material basis for 
the organization of a state required a fairly strong agricultural sector. 
Even so, agriculture alone afforded rather inadequate opportunities for the 
accumulation of wealth. M o r e could be appropriated by levying taxes on 
the production of salt, copper and iron, in addition to tribute claimed in 
the course of conquests and raids. Lastly, tributes were collected from the 
trading sector. T h e power of chiefs thus relied on the existence of markets, 
exchange and communication networks, which m a d e it possible to impose 
monopolies or various forms of taxation and other tolls. 
G r o w t h or decline in any one of these economic sectors was a factor in 
the expansion or erosion in the power of states or chiefdoms in the 
nineteenth century, just as in earlier times. W h a t is peculiar to the nine-
teenth century is the social mobility in these communities, which m a d e for 
rapid access to positions previously held by chiefs, or simply encouraged 
the enterprise of particular individuals, either within a monarchical system 
or through the channels of clan and lineage. Monopolies and the levying 
of tribute failed to halt the expansion of trade during the nineteenth century 
and trade often thrived at the expense of the material power of the political 
aristocracies. 
In addition to these material factors, however, there existed ritual aspects 
of power, represented by insignia and charms against enemies both within 
21. For a sound analysis of the concept of power in two societies of the western savannas, 
namely the Kongo and the Tio, see the respective studies of W . McGaffey, 1970, and J. 
Vansina, 1973. 
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and without. H o w did the exercise of ritual and mystical power develop at 
a time of rapid reversals in the military and economic fortunes of these 
societies? Until historians have turned their attention to this question, our 
understanding of the history of the region must remain incomplete and 
confined within terms of reference that fail to reflect the deep aspirations 
of the ancient societies of Central Africa. 
State-organized societies 
A number of ancient kingdoms survived the upheavals of the nineteenth 
century. O n e of these was the Lunda state of Kalagne, which reached its 
zenith in the first half of the nineteenth century and subsequently entered 
a period of decline, from the 1870s onwards. Originally, Kalagne was 
identified with a densely populated area that lay almost entirely in a 
territory situated to the east of the Lulua, between latitudes 8°S and o/S, 
and longitudes 23°E and 24°E. Although at first concentrated along the 
waterways, in particular the Kalagne river, groups of L u n d a emigrated to 
neighbouring regions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. N e w 
political units were founded as a result of these migrations, but the exodus 
was also due to a desire to escape the efforts of the chiefs to appropriate 
captive manpower. This explains the origin of the L u n d a settlements in 
the Chokwe and Luval areas to the south of the state of Kalagne at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. 
T h e highest Lunda title was that of M want Yav. It originated in the 
Kalagne valley and, by the eighteenth century at the latest, it was at the 
centre of a political network that embraced in the symbolic language of 
perpetual kinship numerous Lunda chiefdoms, between the K w a n g o in 
the west and the Luapula in the east. 
O n e of the great reigns of the Kalagne dynasty in the nineteenth century 
was that of Nawej (c. 1820-52). Under him, the power of the M w a n t Yav 
increased. Nawej was held in fear for the vengeance and forced tribute 
he exacted from unruly chiefs, either by force of arms or through the 
unscrupulous use of witch-doctors. Although he preferred bows and arrows 
for hunting, it was in Nawej's reign that L u n d a warriors first began to use 
firearms from Angola (lazarinas). At his invitation, the C h o k w e hunters 
had begun to operate on L u n d a territory, using firearms and gradually 
driving the elephants northwards. S o m e C h o k w e visitors came to the 
capital around 1840, bringing firearms and gunpowder, and some settled 
on Lunda territory. Nawej tried hard to maintain good relations between 
the two peoples, but to no avail. Rivalry soon sprang up between Lunda 
and Chokwe political families. 
T h e Imbangala of Kassanje had been regular visitors to the tnussumba 
since the beginnings of the M w a n t Yav dynasty. But the most significant 
development of Nawej's reign was the rapid increase in trading over 




plate 12.9 A Chokwe carving of Chibinda Ilunga, the legendary founder of the Lunda
empire. The carving is probably nineteenth-century
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Ovimbundu and 'Mambari' . As late as the end of the century, people still 
talked about the caravans that used to arrive to do business for D o n a A n a 
Joaquina (Na A n d e m b o ) , a wealthy merchant lady of Luanda, and the 
royal caravans sent by Nawej to D o n a Ana at Luanda or to the 'Jaga' of 
Kassanje. 
Nevertheless, Nawej had a bad reputation with the traders, w h o re-
proached him with interminable delays in repaying debts and his readiness 
to find excuses to confiscate goods. His direct descendants were very numer 
ous, and before long the pretenders to the throne began to whisper that 
Nawej had had his fair share of state power and that the time had come 
for younger m e n to take their turn. H e died during an illness, smothered 
by his 'brother' Mulaj, w h o seized his bracelet - the insignia of power 
(lukano) - and was acknowledged as the new M w a n t Yav. T h e following 
years were marked by internal dissensions, temporarily quieted by the long 
reign of Muteba (c. 1857-73). In those years of peace, the great caravans 
would stay over in the mussumba during the rainy season, receiving friendly 
treatment from the M w a n t Yav. 
F r o m the reign of M w a n t Yav Muteba onwards, colonies of M b u n d u 
travellers stayed at the mussumba. Those people were natives of the A m b a c a 
area (Ambaquistas). T h e founder of the first of these colonies, Lourenço 
Bezerra, known to the Lunda by the nickname Lufuma (c. 1850-83), was 
a native of the Golungo. H e settled in the mussumba in about 1850 and 
spent some thirty years at the court of the M w a n t Yav, and for a long time 
benefited by Muteba's favourable attitude towards the Angolan traders. In 
1869, Lufuma's colony established itself in the immediate vicinity of 
Luambata, Muteba's new mussumba, and introduced M b u n d u agriculture 
and stockbreeding into the region. T h e M w a n t Yav took a keen personal 
interest in these fields, which grew plants imported from Brazil and Portugal 
(rice, maize, tobacco, etc.) as well as the staple African crops. T h e Angolans 
of Luambata also became craftsmen (metalworkers, weavers, potters, 
scribes, etc.). T h e colony traded alongside the Lunda families on a tribute 
basis. All transactions went through Lufuma. Over the years, Lufuma had 
built up a clientele of captives, redeemed slaves, etc., w h o m he took with 
him when he finally returned to the Malange region for good in 1882. 
During the years 1800-80, the colony was thus a major centre of trading 
activity controlled by the aristocratic families of the Lunda court and the 
Angolan businessmen, w h o were bound to the region by m a n y marriage 
ties and were themselves practising the tribute-based trade methods preva-
lent in the area. Lufuma had in fact become a titled Lunda dignitary, as 
is shown by his role in the life of the court: it was he, for example, w h o 
organized the funeral of the Lukonkesh of M w a n t Yav Muteba. 
T h e Chokwe expansion continued through the 1870s. Fleeing their 
villages and their chiefs, on the pretext of witchcraft, tied as they were to 
a gathering-type economy, searching for ivory, wax and later rubber, 
incorporating captive w o m e n and young m e n into their patrilineal families, 
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the C h o k w e were soon strong enough to eclipse the power of the Lunda 
chiefs in the region between the Tshikapa and Kasai rivers. T h e Lunda 
villages and chiefdoms in this region broke up and scattered. It was a 
period of decline for the long-established aristocratic Lunda power. T h e 
trend was accentuated by dissension within the mussumba: the head of an 
important political family, Shanam, allied himself with the Chokwe and 
seized power with their support. H e took the n a m e of M w a n t Yav M b u m b a . 
His reign was a time of violence, and he continued to use the Chokwe as 
a threat against Lunda vassals. After his death in 1883, C h o k w e warriors 
seeking to avenge him succeeded in obtaining the lukano for Mushidi, one 
of M b u m b a ' s sons, w h o had been adopted and raised by a C h o k w e family. 
The chiefdoms and the fragmentation of power 
Despite the far-reaching social changes in the L u n d a - C h o k w e region in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Lunda aristocracy did not 
die out completely. Elsewhere, states broke up according to various pat-
terns: some states, which had been centralized, split into groupings of 
chiefdoms, informally united but subject to no c o m m o n centre; others 
became even more decentralized, with a tendency in some cases towards 
the disappearance of the power of the chiefs. 
T h e region to the south of the Ovimbundu highlands in Angola falls 
into the category of groupings of large chiefdoms. T h e dominant cultural 
group on the plateau, broadly termed the Nyanyeka-Nkhumbi , consisted 
of several ethnic groups: Nyanyeka, Otyilenge, N k h u m b i , etc. In the 
nineteenth century, some of the chiefdoms in the region were, in fact, the 
remains of former kingdoms. O n e such was Mwila, a Nyanyeka kingdom, 
which dominated the entire Huila region in the eighteenth century and 
broke up towards the middle of the nineteenth century with the succession 
of Jau, which soon disintegrated in its turn. In the eighteenth century 
Mwila had entered into contact with Caconda and Portuguese Angola. It 
was the most densely populated part of the Nyanyeka land, and the scene 
of repeated Portuguese attempts to establish white settlers there in the 
1840s, at the cost of m a n y military confrontations. T h e Nyanyeka chief-
doms, especially Mwila, and later N g a m b w e , became trading centres for 
wax, ivory and livestock, supplying the whole of southern Angola in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Although trade itself contributed to 
the political break-up of the region, raids and plundering expeditions often 
favoured the swift rise to power of adventurers or newcomers. F r o m the 
1840s onwards, traders and petty warlords, often armed, scoured the entire 
region, carving out territories of their o w n and establishing strongholds for 
their following of captives (servicais), refugees and adventurers, where m a n 
and beast took refuge from violence behind thorn palisades. 
Another example of the process of disintegration is provided by the 
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L u b a 'empire', which spanned a vast area between the L o m a m i , the 
Lualaba and the western side of Lake Tanganyika. At the height of its 
expansion, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the military 
authority of the most prestigious L u b a state — that of the M u l o p w e with 
its capital, kitenta and the court - was directed against m a n y chiefdoms, 
which for the most part already shared the L u b a concept of power - the 
bulopwe - as the prerogative of chiefs born of the royal blood of the 
founders, Kongolo and Kalala Ilunga. 
T h e structure proved to be short-lived and a prey to the fluctuating 
military fortunes of the various political families. During the reign of the 
M u l o p w e Kasongo Kalombo (c. 1870-80), its political superstructure began 
to give way to the pressure exercised in particular by trading caravans from 
the Swahili area or from Angola. This commercial penetration merely 
fanned the flames of dissensions between different political leaders on the 
one hand, and on the other, between the political chiefs themselves and 
between the latter and chiefs of families which owned land and domains. 
B y the end of the period, the L u b a states and chiefdoms had become almost 
entirely autonomous.22 
Adventurers, traders, condottieri: the n e w masters 
T h e power of the bulopwe is one of the most ancient and illustrious in the 
history of the savanna peoples. Elsewhere in the region in the nineteenth 
century, w e see the title of chief being assumed, with great frequency and 
n e w forms of power appearing. Either the role of chief had become obsolete 
(as in certain K o n g o or M b u n d u groups), or the expansion of trade had 
led to polarization around enterprising groups or individuals. Examples of 
this process can be found throughout Central Africa, both in societies with 
and without chiefs. In the rain-forest of the Central Basin, for example, 
certain traders succeeded in accumulating slaves, arms, copper, etc. For 
the most part, they were canoe-traders living on the banks of the Zaire 
river, w h o had grown rich by the slave trade. Indeed the history of the 
kingdom of Msiri begins with a series of trading expeditions. 
Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, S u m b w a travellers from 
what is n o w Tanzania came to trade with the chiefs of the Lunda , Luba, 
Aushi, etc. of the Luapula valley and surrounding country. These traders 
were attracted by ivory, abundant in the region, and copper, worked in the 
west of the kingdom of K a z e m b e . In about 1885, Ngelengwa M w e n d a , the 
son of one of these travellers, w h o had accompanied his father on his 
expeditions, settled in the territory of chief Katanga, a major centre of 
22. Colonial administrators w h o adopted the theories of indirect administration and 
were anxious in the middle of the twentieth century to 'reconstitute' hypothetical past 
empires tended to overestimate the degree of centralization prevailing in the L u b a states. 
For a survey of this question see A . Wilson, 1972. 
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copper production, densely populated for that part of the world.23 During 
this period Arab, Swahili, N y a m w e z e and Ovimbundu trading expeditions 
visited the region in great numbers, seeking to expand their trade in copper, 
ivory and slaves. 
M w e n d a was perhaps the best known of these traders w h o succeeded in 
exploiting the differences among the ruling clans and could c o m m a n d a 
large and well enough equipped army to be able to settle in a chosen area, 
attract a large population to the capital and base their power on a following 
of trusted associates, fellow adventurers, relatives, local political families 
or simply enterprising individuals of whatever origin. Having established 
himself in Katanga's country, M w e n d a began to offer his services to 
opposing political factions. Helped by Ovimbundu traders, he intervened 
in disputes between the Sanga, Lunda, Luba and other chiefs of the region. 
T h e most successful of these ventures was his interference in the dispute 
among pretenders to the throne of Kazembe . Here again, arms from the 
Bié area played a significant part and contributed to his rise. 
B y 1880, M w e n d a had succeeded in setting up a state of his own. Taking 
the title and the insignia of Mwami, well known in his native country, he 
founded his capital at Bunkeya in the Lufira valley. At this time most of 
the chiefs in the region were associated with the power of the M w a n t Yav 
(Lunda) or the M u l o p w e (Luba). M w e n d a drew m a n y of them into his 
o w n empire and succeeded in making them accept his insignia (kilungu). 
Bunkeya became an important centre for all w h o sought to gain by associ-
ating with M w e n d a . M w e n d a himself became known as Msiri, a n a m e that 
appears to have been of local origin, derived from mushidi (meaning land 
in Sanga and Luba), the owner of the land. 
T h e w o m e n closest to Msiri included at one time a young Swahili girl 
from a place near Pweto and two mulattos from Angola, symbolizing the 
role played by the kingdom of Msiri in the trading networks. K n o w n as 
Garaganja to the Angolans, Katanga to the Swahili, it became a clearing 
house for trade in Central Africa from Zanzibar to Benguela and from 
Luba country to the outposts of the Portuguese in Mozambique or the 
Arabs on Lake Malawi. 
A m u c h feared chief and a product of his age, Msiri could be both 
munificent and implacable, conforming to the stereotype of the chief or 
the aristocrat. Sometimes he could be cruel. T h e execution of one of his 
wives, Masengo, gave the signal for the long Sanga revolt against the Yeke 
state. T h e rising continued to rage until after the death of Msiri,24 when 
it was eventually put d o w n by the arms of the colonial power. 
23. A n Arab traveller, Said ben Habib, described this population in the middle of the 
century. It had more inhabitants than the capital of Kazembe; there was abundant food on 
the market and local cotton was spun for making clothes. Quoted by F. Bontinck, 1974, 
p. 12. 
24. Msiri died a violent death at the hand of a European on 20 December 1891. T h e 
murderer was immediately executed by one of Msiri's sons. T h e main eye-witness accounts 
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Conclusion 
At the close of this brief survey, can w e draw any tentative conclusions? 
S o m e are perhaps suggested by the economic history of Central Africa as 
it developed through the nineteenth century. Conditions affecting the 
accumulation of wealth and dependents altered in the course of the century 
as a result of the rise of more-densely populated areas, advances in pro-
ductivity in agriculture and the various crafts, and the rapid expansion of 
certain sectors of economic activity. Trade, in particular, was developing 
constantly in tune with the economic situation and supply and d e m a n d as 
regards the various commodities, and in m a n y societies it contributed 
powerfully to the beginnings of social stratification. 
While various forms of servitude were widespread during this period, it 
would be rash to speak of 'social classes'. T h e gradually deepening social 
differences have too often fallen into the familiar pattern of established 
political institutions or ethnic and clan solidarity for us to be able to use 
the concept of 'class'. O n e age-old function, that of political chief, proved 
to be particularly malleable in the face of changing circumstances. There 
had been times in the past history of the region w h e n the office of chief 
had been liable to fall into the hands of groups or individuals, ranging from 
visionaries to upstarts or simply adventurers. In the nineteenth century 
this trend was accentuated, with traditional political office either increas-
ingly based on trade, taken over by upstarts or else replaced by newly 
created titles. 
T h e institution of chief in the nineteenth century thus continued to be 
shaped by a long tradition; yet the period lent it n e w characteristics. In 
particular, the position of chief seems to have been more unstable than it 
had been in the old days. T h e nineteenth century was a period w h e n 
political fortunes were rapidly w o n and as rapidly lost. Change came too 
suddenly, and the autonomous history of the region was too brutally 
interrupted at the end of the century to allow for great states to emerge. 
Complex hierarchies and regional divisions were not typical features of the 
state in Central Africa as it developed in the nineteenth century; the region 
tended to appear as a network of chiefdoms, a 'horizontal' pattern of 
communities rather than a 'vertical' territorially based hierarchy. 
However , an impression of the political history of the years 1800-80 
solely in terms of the fragmentation of Central Africa would be misleading. 
It was a time when boundaries were no longer being defined primarily by 
political forces,25 and the historian is forced to take into account the growth 
of vast economic regions reaching far beyond the boundaries set by ethnic 
cohesion or political organization. 
of life in Bunkeya before the colonial conquest are those of I vens and Arnot; F. A . Oliveira 
Martins (ed.), 1952, pp. 366-83; F . S. Arnot, 1889. 
25. J. Vansina, 1976. 
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T h e broad lines of the social and economic history of Central Africa in 
the nineteenth century are gradually beginning to appear: history as it was 
lived and experienced by the societies of the time, the history of their 
aspirations, the history of change in mentalities, each in itself a vast 
unexplored field, all questions which Africa today is duty bound to ask of 
its past in order better to understand its present.26 
26. This study owes m u c h to the inspiration drawn from years of work with Bogumil 
Jewsiewicki, former professor at the National University of Zaire. 
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A. A B D E L - M A L E K 
T h e impact of Europe: acculturation or renaissance? 
Since the Second World W a r , the Egyptian school of history and historical 
sociology, supported by innovative Western publications, has clearly d e m -
onstrated that eighteenth-century Egypt was not simply a time of silence 
and self-effacement after three centuries of alienating Ottoman domi-
nation.1 
It has also m a d e clear that the choice of M u h a m m a d cAlï to occupy the 
post of wait (Viceroy) in 1805 was due to the direct action of both the 
masses of Cairo and Alexandria and the traditional elites of the period, the 
(ulamay, the shaykhs and leading figures in the towns.2 It was this year, 1805, 
that saw the restoration of an autonomous, modern Egyptian state and 
signalled the beginning of the modern era in Egypt, and not, as traditional 
colonial historiography would have us believe, the 'Egyptian Expedition', 
the military invasion led by Napoleon Bonaparte from 1798 to 1801 on the 
initiative of the Directory, following the wars in Italy. This expedition was 
a major venture in the struggle against the British empire. As Napoleon 
himself said, 'It shall expel the English from all their possessions in the 
East that it attacks, and more especially, shall destroy all their trading posts 
on the Red Sea coast... [In view of] T h e vile treachery whereby England 
took possession of the Cape of G o o d H o p e having rendered access to the 
Indies by the usual route very difficult for the vessels of the Republic, our 
Republican forces must therefore secure another route . . . ' At the same 
time, research was carried out in Egypt by the 'scientific mission' and this 
brought with it the fruits of the age of encyclopaedic Enlightenment and 
of the patterns of 'polytechnical' thought that were soon to be applied in 
France and Europe: The Description of Egypt,2, a monumental work in 
twenty volumes, summarizes this impressive undertaking. 
1. M . al-Sharqâwï, 1958; P. Gran, 1979. 
2. Cf., essentially, the works of A . - R . al-Rafe'I, 1951; L . Bréhier, 1901; A . A . Mustafa, 
1965; M . Sabry, 1930; M . S. Ghorbal, 1928; A . F. S. Wahidah, 1950; H . H . Dodwell, 1931. 
3. J. C . Herold, 1962, provides a vivid and interesting description, to be compared with 
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Eighteenth-century Egypt is n o w seen as the laboratory from which the 
new Egypt emerged. First came the attempt by 'AIT Bey al-Kabïr to 
forge national unity by reducing the number of different feudal systems 
controlled by the M a m l ü k s in the delta of Lower Egypt. T h e n came the 
first signs of the aggiornamento of fundamental Islam undertaken by Shaykh 
Hassan al-Attar; and then the concentration in the towns, and not only in 
Cairo, of the surplus value derived from the land which a group of traders 
and scholars with hegemonistic leanings believed should be placed at the 
disposal of what was later to be k n o w n as a 'national effort'. T h e French 
expedition was an unparallelled venture that was later to enable the French 
to strengthen their position in the Levant following their conquest of 
North Africa. It also enabled them to be seen as the standard-bearers of 
revolutionary Europe in vast areas of sub-Saharan Africa. Contemporary 
Egyptian historians, inter alia, ' A b d al-Rahmân al-Djabartï and Niqöla al-
Turk, took an entirely different view: ' T h e French occupation improved the 
standing of the lower classes, retailers, street porters, craftsmen, donkey-
drivers, stable-boys, pimps and prostitutes'.4 In short, the riff-raff were 
happy because they were free, whereas the elite and the middle classes 
were subjected to all kinds of aggravations due to the suspension of imports 
and exports. 
In the light of this, the underlying reasons for the two Cairo revolts 
became clear. T h e first revolt, from 21 to 24 October 1798, having begun 
with the shaykhs and notables of Cairo, extended into the towns and 
countryside". T w o thousand people were killed, ten shaykhs were beheaded 
and the consultative diwàn was suspended. T h e seconcTrevolt was m u c h 
more serious and lasted from 20 M a r c h to 21 April 1800. It was led by the 
päshas, w h o still strongly supported the Porte, and by the shaykhs of al-
Azhar, w h o provoked sweeping and extremely severe repressive measures. 
T h e centrist group, forerunners of the general tendency of the national 
movement, whose leaders included the shaykhs, Khalîl al-Bakrï, 'Abdallah 
al-Sharkaï and ' A b d al-Rahmân al-Djabartï, sent a conciliatory message to 
General M e n o u stressing the need for friendly relations between the 'two 
nations'. T h e battles of the Pyramids and of Aboukïr and the evacuation 
of the French invasion force in 1801 were at last to give the nascent 
Egyptian national movement the opportunity to crystallize, or, in other 
words, to acquire a social power base. Undoubtedly, this was initially a 
movement seeking autonomy from the Ottoman empire. But in the nine-
teenth century, its fiery aspiration for full national independence was to 
shine like a beacon throughout the Orient, the Mediterranean and Africa, 
and leave its mark on the world order and the empires of its time. 
Between the French evacuation and the appointment of M u h a m m a d 'AIT 
the work of'Abd al-Rahman al-Djabartï(i754-i825), the exemplary historiographer ofthat 
epoch. 
4. N . Turc, 1950, p. 45. 
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as wall, the country had once again become an Ottoman province. T h e 
second Cairo revolt, which resulted in the decisive weakening of French 
positions, strengthened the local leadership, which tended to favour the 
Ottoman empire and the mamlüks. Although ' O m a r Makram's authority 
was growing, he could still not steer power in the direction of the new 
political class in Egypt, the 'ulamâ1, notables and merchants. This was 
because the army was still controlled by its former masters; the plans of 
the 'Independent Brothers' had been buried with their leader, General 
Ya'küb, w h o died on the ship taking him to Europe; and, finally, because 
any possible alternative put forward by the shaykhs of the diwän, w h o had 
a difficult choice to make in troubled times, when the air was thick with 
intrigue and plots, had been neutralized. T h e status of Egypt in 1805 was 
that of a witäya, a province of the Ottoman empire. T h e geopolitical 
situation of the country severely limited its room for manoeuvre. But the 
essential elements were already in place: a central authority, based on a 
small but effective military force and, more especially, a genuine mandate 
representing a national consensus of notables, lulama', and the merchants 
of the time, supported by the people of the towns and large provincial 
population centres. 
For the future, it was thus to be a question as always, of manoeuvre within 
the iron yoke of geopolitics. As Djamâl H a m d a n brilliantly demonstrated in 
his monumental work on The Personality of Egypt, this meant that the new 
rulers had to understand the 'genius of the topographical locus'. 
The founding of the modern independent national 
Egyptian state and the empire under M u h a m m a d cAlï and 
Ismä^ 
T h e 'Coptic Legion' of General Ya'küb (1800-1) and the proclamation by 
his supporters, the 'Independent Brothers', of the very concept of an 
'Independent Egypt' derived from French influence in opposition to British 
supremacy. With the departure of the French expedition the movement 
crumbled. T h e plans and political career of M u h a m m a d 'All were a different 
story altogether. His primary object was to give Egypt the military, political, 
economic and cultural institutions that would make it the driving force 
behind the reconstitution of a new Islamic empire to replace senescent 
Turkey. F r o m the start, his plans took into consideration the twin dimen-
sions - Egyptian and Islamic - of Egyptian identity. His campaigns and 
those of Ibrahim were to project Egypt, at one and the same time, as an 
Islamic, Arab and African country. Having wrested power for himself with 
the support of the lulama', the m o b and his faithful Albanians, he had first 
to take the measure of the land of which he was as yet the uncertain master. 
Britain supported the matnlûk party, which was led by M u h a m m a d al-
Alfï bey, and in 1806 called on the Porte to remove M u h a m m a d 'AIT from 
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office. In 1807, the British attempted a direct invasion of Egypt, but were 
defeated by the Egyptians at Räshid (Rosetta) on 31 March. M u h a m m a d 
'Alï, w h o was reputedly taking aïïvantage of the support of leading public 
figures, and especially that of ' O m a r M a k r a m , decided to put an end to the 
mamlüks' stranglehold on Upper Egypt, particularly as they were the allies 
of the British. Between June 1808 and August 1810 he conquered Upper 
Egypt, and on 1 March 1811, in the massacre of the Citadel, finally 
eliminated the leaders of the rebel movement, w h o stood as obstacles both 
to centralized authority and also to the future plans of the new viceroy. 
Until the fall of Napoleon, the geopolitical situation remained basically 
the same. But from 1815 Britain's influence grew and other countries 
entered the ring, among them the Austria of Metternich. Having brought 
the mamlüks to heel, M u h a m m a d 'All undertook the construction of the 
empire and the great task of national revival. 
W h a t was M u h a m m a d 'Alfs conception of independence? A n d h o w did 
autonomy within the empire fit into this framework? O n 28 November 
1810, M u h a m m a d 'All secretly conferred with the French consul, Drovetti, 
and suggested that France help Egypt throw off Ottoman domination. Only 
three days earlier, he had asked Istanbul to grant Egypt, a mere province 
(wilâya - eyälet), the status of odjak, with the same degree of autonomy as 
contemporary Algiers. H e then sent his army into Arabia (1813-19), and 
into the Sudan (1820-3), with the ultimate objective of occupying Ethiopia. 
However, the British government, which the Egyptian ruler had been 
flattering, turned against him because he had penetrated three British 
spheres of influence - the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and Ethiopia - all of 
which were indispensable to the security of the route to India. In point of 
fact, the situation was more complex. 'From the Persian Gulf to the Libyan 
Desert, from Sudan to the Mediterranean, and on both sides of the Red 
Sea, a Napoleonic or rather Pharaonic Empire extends over five million 
square kilometres.' A n d this at the very time Ottoman power was declining. 
T h e 'Egyptian question' seemed likely to supplant the 'Eastern question', 
thanks to the existence of a great civilizing force in North Africa.5 
T h e first clash occurred in 1827 on the two Greek islands of Hydra and 
Spezzia, where the powerful fleet of M u h a m m a d 'AIT and the army of his 
son Ibrahim had massed, coming to the assistance of the Ottoman empire. 
Negotiations were begun in Alexandria between Colonel Cradock, L o n -
don's special envoy, and M u h a m m a d 'AIT and his assistants. T h e subject 
was none other than the independence of Egypt on the basis of its position 
of strength at that specific time vis-à-vis the Porte. M u h a m m a d 'AIT, a good 
strategist, tried at the eleventh hour to avoid an armed confrontation. But 
the Sultan's stubborn refusal led directly to the destruction at Navarino, 
on 20 October 1827, of the Egyptian fleet, which was itself an integral part 
of the Ottoman battle fleet. 
5. E . Driault, 1925. 
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plate i 3 . i Muhammad 'Ali (painting by Sir David Wilkie)
As France, until then a friend, had withdrawn its support, Muhammad
'All fell back on the Ottoman empire, submitting to the Porte on 12
December a plan of revival that bore the hallmark of statesmanship:
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plate 13.2 Ibrahim, Muhammad 'Alt s son and leading general
There can be no doubt that the need for revival is acutely felt in all
Islamic countries. Our nation in its present state of apathy is living
like cattle. I beseech you: let us leave aside selfishness, quick temper
and overzealousness, and devote some thought to the distressing and
poverty-stricken state in which Islamic nations now find themselves.
Let us go back to the wisdom of yesterday and make a peace which
will be more like a truce . . .
It would be a thousand times better for us to live and serve our
fatherland and our religion in this way . . . The time has come for me
and my son to devote ourselves to the service of the state and of
Islam . . .6
What followed is well known: the Porte's refusal; the increasingly
ambitious designs of the Viceroy within the Arab world under the influence
of Ibrahim; the war between Turkey and Egypt marked by the great
6. Letter to Cheijh Effendi, 12 December 1827, quoted in M. Sabry, 1930, pp. 153-5.
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victories of Ibrahim at Konia, Kutâhiya, Nasïbïn; the intervention by the 
powers, which were intent on eliminating M u h a m m a d 'AIL T h e latter's 
from 1831 to 1840 brought him to the gates of Istanbul. T h e 'holy alliance' 
of all the European powers saved the government of the Sultan in order 
the better to destroy the only Islamic state able, on the one hand, to oppose 
European colonial expansion and, on the other, to assume responsibility 
for the revival, modernization and renaissance of the provinces of the 
Ottoman empire. 
T h e check imposed on Ibrahim's military activities by his father, at 
Kutâhiya at the gates of Istanbul, led the former to harden his position. A 
letter he wrote to his father on the eve of the negotiations m a d e this 
extremely clear: 
I believe that independence must be one of the first points to be 
discussed and resolved with the two negotiators. For m e this is the 
most crucial question. T h e cession of the three districts of Anatolia, 
Alaia and Cilicia and the Island of Cyprus and finally, the annexation 
of Egypt and possibly Tunisia and Tripolitania must constitute our 
m i n i m u m demands, from which w e must not desist at any price; our 
essential interests demand this. Firstly, we have to be firm and resolute 
on the subject of your independence so as to consolidate our position 
and surround it with guarantees for the future. For without inde-
pendence our efforts would all be in vain and w e should remain under 
the yoke of this treacherous power which is continually weighing us 
d o w n with its ridiculous requirements and demands for money . W e 
must n o w free ourselves from this intolerable burden and seek our 
only salvation in independence.. ? 
Thus , there were two possible roads to the status of an independent 
nation for Egypt; M u h a m m a d 'Alfs goal of autonomy within the Turkish 
empire bordering on independence, and the vision of Ibrahim w h o sought 
nothing less than complete independence, with Egypt as the head and the 
heart of an Arab empire. 
In this great enterprise of M u h a m m a d 'All and his son, Ibrahim's outlook 
began to diverge from that of his father. Contact with the falláhln (peasant) 
soldiers w h o spoke the same national language, Arabic, as the provinces of 
the Near East that they both conquered and liberated m a d e Ibrahim more 
conscious of the Arab character of Islamic Egypt and, above all, the urgent 
necessity of forging the instrument of its renaissance, namely, an army 
based on advanced technology and cast in the Arab mould. As he was to 
declare at Acre in 1831: 'I have two objectives, the first and most important 
of which is to preserve Egypt's eternal honour and restore its past glory...' 
Before the attack at Horns, he threatened to tear the Ottoman army to 
7. Letter of 3 February 1833, quoted in M . Sabry, 1930, pp. 227-8; G . Khankï, 1948, 
gives the date as 20 January 1833. 
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shreds 'in order to strengthen Egypt's position even further, ensure it an 
even more glorious destiny and enhance its honour and prestige'. At the 
siege of Acre, writing to Pückler-Muskau, Ibrahim proclaimed: 'It is 
impossible for any army in the world to show a greater spirit of endurance 
and bravery; whenever a case of indecision or cowardice was noted in the 
army, it was invariably among the Turkish officers, I do not know of any 
examples of this occurring among Arabs'. A n d finally to his father he 
declared, 'I have been living with these m e n for twenty years n o w and can 
state positively that for any three hundred Turks out of a thousand w h o 
are k n o w n for their loyalty, there are seven hundred Egyptians. Unless 
you are apprehensive of their habit of occasionally revolting against the 
established government.. .'8 T h e pan-Arab factor was actively involved in 
the process of consolidating the modern Egyptian state as long as progress 
was being made , but it disappeared with Ibrahim after 1840. 
After 'Abbas I (1849-54), w h o agreed to everything short of government 
by a European country, Ismail expressed the national problem in terms of 
independence and sovereignty. His intention was to reduce his country's 
dependence on Turkey by negotiation, and then m a k e it an autonomous 
and stable state with the institutions of self-government to be developed 
later. Ismail was successful in having the firman of 27 M a y and 15 June 
1866 and that of June 1867 promulgated. T h e first two established direct 
hereditary succession to the throne of Egypt from father to son according 
to the right of primogeniture and in keeping with the 'same m o d e of 
succession which obtained in most European dynasties', but in a 'complete 
break with the traditions of the Islamic world'.9 
T h e firman of 8 June 1867 created a new title, that oî khédive, for Ismail 
and his successors, the better to distinguish them from the other viceroys. 
It granted the khédive of Egypt the right to promulgate tanzlmàt, admin-
istrative ordinances, and conventions with foreign countries (customs, 
postal services, transport, the policing of foreigners, etc.) which, while not 
having the full status of international treaties, still conferred the effective 
right to negotiate economic agreements. T h e culmination came on 8 June 
1873. Egypt - for the first time defined in the firman ofthat date as a 'state' 
and no longer as a 'province' - was assured of the continuity of the khedive's 
power on the terms then obtaining. 
According to Sabry, the reconstruction of the Egyptian empire was, on 
the one hand in line with 'the idea of building a powerful independent 
state' and 'acquiring by money' what M u h a m m a d 'AIT had vainly tried to 
obtain by force, while on the other, it also satisfied the need to 'open up 
through expansion in Africa this possibility of achieving fame and freedom 
which would allow it to regain its sense of nationhood and to develop some 
of its dormant capacities'. Ismail thought that by using the new Egyptian 
8. Quoted by Prince H . Pückler-Muskau in M . Sabry, 1930, pp. 469-71. 
9. Texts quoted in A . Sammarco, 1935, Vol. 4, pp. 196-7. 
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corps of army officers to extend Egyptian territory d o w n to the Equator, 
he could somehow secure an ultimate and inaccessible refuge for his 
country's independence in the heart of the continent. Initially at least, this 
expansion into the heart of the African continent was opposed neither by 
Turkey nor by Britain. 
T h e infrastructure of the n e w empire, after leaving out some battleships 
delivered to Turkey and merchant ships able to cater for all Egypt's 
commercial needs, comprised a war fleet of average strength, eighteen forts, 
a good telephone and telegraph service, and the beginnings of a railway 
that was planned to reach Khartoum and Suäkin. This Egyptian military 
expansion brought aspects of European civilization to the Sudan and also 
to Somalia, Harar, the Equatorial Province, Bunyoro and Buganda. T h e 
liberal press in Europe was full of praise. Most of the African populations 
also seemed to have been favourably disposed. But the enterprise, which 
reached its peak between 1872 and 1879, was to end in failure. 
I s m ä ^ gave in on the question of the military high c o m m a n d , thinking 
that this would induce Britain to tolerate his African enterprise. H e 
accomplished nothing comparable to M u h a m m a d 'All's successes in the 
economic and, more importantly, industrial spheres. Although efficiently 
officered, the army was c o m m a n d e d by foreigners, and, after the Treaty of 
London, it no longer had a powerful industrial infrastructure to rely on. 
Egypt was no longer able to maintain its independence and modern econ-
omic development. N o n e the less, Ismâ'ÏÏ's motto, in its various formu-
lations, still continues to ring in our ears: 'The peoples of the regions where 
the Nile has its sources must, from n o w on, be friends and allies of His 
Highness the Khedive'.10 
Concurrently with the implementation of this great national enterprise, 
the representative and subsequently constitutionalist movement took root 
and reached its zenith under Ismail. Already, on 5 October 1798, Bonaparte 
had convened a General Assembly of notables which had termed itself al-
diwän al-'äm. Under M u h a m m a d 'Alï, although the creation of the different 
institutions of a modern state was to involve actively the entire country, 
the watchword was efficiency and order rather than a popular mandate. A 
n e w consultative body, the madjlis al-mushäwara was set up in 1829. It 
comprised 156 members - inter alia 23 senior civil servants and <ulama>, 24 
provincial ma'murs and 99 provincial notables and shaykhs. Ibrahim was its 
chairman. 
A special assembly, al-madjlis al-'umümJ, was constituted in 1847 at 
Alexandria to resolve the problems ofthat city. In 1832 a council of the 
leading public figures comprising twenty-two people was constituted in 
Syria.11 
10. M . Sabry, 1933, pp. 383-9; A . - R . al-Rafë'ï, 1948, pp. 104-96; R . Robinson and J. 
Gallagher, 1961, pp. 2-3, 59, 122-33. 
11. O n the evolution of constitutionalism in Egypt, see G . Douin, 1933-41, pp.298-
301; P. Ravisse, 1896, p. 9; A . - R . al-Rafe'i, 1948a, pp. 81-4; J . M . Landau, 1953, p. 9; 
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In 1834, Shaykh Rifa-'a al-Tahtâwï published the first edition of his 
reflections on the French Revolution entitled Takhlis al-ibfiz ¡la Talkhls 
Banz. It signalled the birth and crystallization of modern Egyptian political 
and social thought. Its contribution to reflection on 'the fatherland' and 
the 'nation' was substantial. It bears essentially on the two concepts of 
'freedom' and 'secularity' viewed both in their theoretical and practical 
dimensions. Tahtâwï very skilfully combines arguments drawn from the 
entire history of Egyptian civilization, with particular reference to the 
Copts, and that of Islam with particular reference to the Caliph ' U m a r , 
with the lessons of the French Revolution, to reach the conclusion that 
only a constitution or charter based on the social contract and not handed 
d o w n by the sovereign could constitute the basis of a civilized society.12 
Under 'Abbas I, Tahtâwï was exiled to the Sudan. Said set up a body akin 
to a council of state which comprised nine members , the function of 
which was consultative. It was not until about August 1864 that the 
constitutionalist movement seemed to be coming to life again. 
T w o texts - al-lä'ihah al-asäsiyyah (the fundamental statute) and al-
Wihah al-nizämiyyah (the law setting forth the powers of the assembly of 
delegates) — were promulgated on 22 October 1866 and combined in 
'statutes' whereby the madjlis shürä al-nuwwäb (consultative council, 
assembly of deputies) was constituted. Article I of the first text defined the 
nature of the new assembly as follows: ' T h e task of the Assembly shall be 
to deliberate on the higher interests of the country. It shall also have to 
take decisions on the projects which the government shall consider as 
falling within its scope and in respect of which it shall give its opinion, 
which shall then be submitted to His Highness the Viceroy for his approval'. 
There was a preponderance of village leaders in the Assembly - at the 
expense of intellectuals returning from training abroad — and a marked and 
continual increase in the number of them being appointed to administrative 
posts, including that of mudir. T h e support this group gave to Ismail 
during the last years of his reign, and then to the revolution staged by the 
army, reveals the village leaders as the most representative body in the 
political life of the period, and as elements of an emerging indigenous 
bourgeoisie w h o , in addition, controlled most of the country. 
T h e year 1875 was the turning point. Faced with the increasing pen-
etration of the European powers following the opening of the Isthmus of 
Suez, Khedive Ismail became locked in a struggle that was to lead to his 
downfall and exile in 1879. 
D.M.Wal lace , 1883, pp. 209-13; J. C . McCoan, 1887, p. 115; G . Baer, 1961^.127,11.37; 
Baron de Malortie, 1882, p. 214. 
12. R . al-Tahtâwï, 1834. 
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plate 13.3 Shaykh Riß- a al-Tahtâwl
The economy, society and culture: the dialectics of
modernity and tradition
Towards economic autarchy
The first point to emphasize is that Muhammad 'All created a national
economy in Egypt to replace the uncoordinated local economies that still
obtained in most contemporary oriental countries. The existence of a
unified national decision-making centre for economic policy was the logical
outcome of the thousands of years of Egypt's history. The autarchic
economy set up by Muhammad 'All was to help further his plans of
founding a modern Egyptian national state at the heart of an empire.
Despite the setback of 1840, Ismail was able to return to the route mapped
out by Muhammad 'AIL The pressure ofinternational big business followed
by its penetration, and, finally, the occupation of Egypt in 1882, were to
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affect this basic situation in two very significant ways. They led, first, to 
the creation of a single national market - thanks largely to the major efforts 
undertaken by I s m ä ^ - and, secondly, to the integration of the Egyptian 
economy into the international economic system through the contracting 
of loans and, above all, the cotton monoculture. 
T h e work of M u h a m m a d 'AIT deserves closer scrutiny. M u h a m m a d 'All 
was alone among contemporary Eastern Islamic rulers in considering 
economics as underpinning politics, and this is what m a d e this canny 
Albanian officer a statesman. T h e state he planned to establish was defined 
initially in 1805 as an ethnic formation centred around a powerful and 
efficient army, itself buttressed by a self-supporting modern economy.13 
F r o m 1818 to 1830, he created important industrial units: the munitions 
and ordnance factories at the Citadel, which reached their apogee in 1828 
under A d h a m bey; the munitions factory at the Arsenal; the gun factory at 
H ü d al Marsüd (1821) which included five gunpowder factories producing 
15874 kantärs (1 kantar = 45kg) in 1833; the navy arsenal at Alexandria, 
built in 1829 by Lefébure de Cerisy w h o had succeeded the brilliant master-
craftsman Hadj ' U m a r ; finally, the dry dock built by Mougel in 1844. This 
infrastructure~1illed Field-Marshal M a r m o n t and Clot Bey with wonder. 
In the sphere of 'civilian' industry, thirty textile and cotton mills were set 
up in Upper and Lower Egypt. T h e Cairo factories supplied factories in 
the provinces with machines, tools, spare parts, building materials and 
technicians to repair plant. 
This industrial production met the needs of the country both in import 
substitution and profits of the order of 100 per cent accruing to the national 
treasury. Three wool mills were built at Büläk, D a m a n h ü r and F u w w a , 
together with a large silk factory at Khurunffsh (1816) and m a n y flax mills 
throughout the country; three sugar refineries; seventeen indigo factories; 
two large glassworks; the Rosetta tannery (1827); the Cairo paper mill 
(1834); and, finally, the six saltpetre works built by the Frenchman H a ï m . 
But this infrastructure suffered from an inherent weakness which was to 
check the industrialization process a century later. T h e country lacked the 
essential minerals, iron and coal, and thus had difficulty in obtaining 
sufficient power to drive its machines. 
'Our goal is not to make profit, but to train our people in the use of 
industrial techniques', M u h a m m a d 'All told J. Bowring, w h o had come to 
put the case for an agricultural Egypt. Egyptian historiographers have n o w 
begun to devote attention to this aspect of the work of the founder of the 
dynasty which was to survive until ousted on 26 July 1952. 
13. See A . Abdel-Malek, 1969, pp. 23, 32, 65, 108; and more detailed studies in A . - R . 
al-Rafe% 1951; G . Baer, 1962; R . al-Barâwï and M . Hamza 'Elïsh, 1944; A . Linant de 
Bellefonds, 1872-3, p. 3; J. Bowring, 1840; F. Djirdjis, 1958; M . F . Lihîtî, 1944; G . 
Michailidis, 1950; H . Thiers, 1867; F . de Lesseps, 1869; M . K . Moursy, 1914; H . A . B . 
Rivlin, 1961; J. Tagher, 1949; M . Fahmy, 1954; A . E . Crouchley, 1938; A . A . A . al-Gritly, 
1948; A . Abdel-Malek, 1962; H . Khallaf, 1962; C . P . Issawi, 1966; M . S . Ghurbàl, 1944; 
A . A . Hatfâb, 1935. 
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T h e Treaty of London, which was signed by the European powers and 
Turkey on 15 July 1840, was to make it possible to curb this great drive 
by Egypt to build an independent economy, and its terms condemned the 
Ottoman empire, as it then was, to general decadence. Thus ended 
the monopoly established by M u h a m m a d cAlï. Egypt was n o w open to the 
penetration of foreign capital, which imposed distortions on the Egyptian 
economy. T h e dependence on cultivation of a single crop, cotton, obviously 
had a damaging effect on the entire Egyptian economy. T h e cutting of a 
canal across the isthmus of Suez completed the integration of the Egyptian 
economy into the world system and led directly to the military occupation 
of 1882. In this case, integration meant that Egypt was completely at the 
mercy of world prices and the vicissitudes of the international economic 
situation from which Egypt was isolated, especially after 1879, when it was 
deprived of its power to make sovereign decisions. 
Another type of distortion resulted from uneven development; Lower 
Egypt was favoured at the expense of Upper Egypt. It is true that most of 
the arable land was to be found in the Nile delta, which sustained the large 
towns. T h e towns were at the heart of the process of economic, social, 
political and cultural modernization. A n indigenous ruling class, formed 
by the leading landowners, progressively emerged with the development 
of the capitalist sector based on the establishment of private ownership of 
land. T h e interests of this ruling class were divided between the towns and 
the countryside on the one hand, and, on the other, the national and the 
international economy, including external trade, and particularly the sale 
of cotton. 
This symbiosis at the top, as it were, created very strong organic links 
between the hinterland and the towns. Certain population groups were 
moving from the countryside to the towns. Here, the term hinterland is used 
specifically to describe the south, i.e. Upper Egypt. For while Alexandria, 
looking towards Europe, played a leading economic role, especially from 
the reign of Said until the end of the century, Cairo also, situated in the 
heart of Egypt, controlled the Delta where most of the country's wealth 
was created and where most of its population lived. T o both Cairo and 
Alexandria, Upper Egypt, particularly under the pressure of foreign 
finance, became the veritable hinterland. 
Agriculture and land use 
Agriculture itself quite naturally took pride of place in the economic 
reforms. At the end of the eighteenth century, all the land, apart from the 
¡vakf, was in the hands of the multazim whose main task was to collect and 
transmit the revenues owed by their respective village, or villages, to the 
central or provincial treasury. However, the extent of the rights of usufruct 
that had been gradually acquired by the multazim, usually benefiting his 
family (to the point that 'State ownership was little more than a farce'), m a d e 
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the formation of the modern and centralized state of which M u h a m m a d 'All 
dreamed impossible. All he could do was to endeavour to minimize the 
scattering and dispersion of the income from the land. T h e two million 
feddäns (1 feddän = 0.56 ha) of arable land in Egypt in 1805 were divided 
into six categories: 200000 feda'ans of ab'adiyya or shiflik land allocated by 
M u h a m m a d ' A M to members of his family, and civil and military officers, 
which were exempt from land taxes; the lands of the mamtüks at the Citadel 
(1811), about 100 000 feddâns which on their liquidation in Upper Egypt 
(1812) were converted into awsiya land, granted as compensation to the 
mamlüks, so as not to deprive their families of all resources; the land of the 
shaykhs, or masmüh al-mashäyekh_ wal-masateb — 4 per cent of the arable 
area of each village, 154000 feddâns in all, which had been given to the 
(ulama\ w h o also performed the function oimultazims; the rizka land, 6000 
feddans, not subject to tax, which had been given as presents to foreign 
experts working in Egypt; the athar land which remained available and 
was given to the fallähln; finally, the 'erbân land on which M u h a m m a d 'AIT 
wished the Beduins to settle. This policy and land allocation m a d e the 
Viceroy appear to his contemporaries 'as the violator of acquired rights, 
the destroyer of prosperous businesses, one w h o takes what belongs to 
others and deprives them of their means of subsistence'. However, in the 
words of Shafik Ghurbäl, it was a question of 'emerging from chaos, 
poverty and hunger and striving towards order, abundance, wealth and 
strength'. 
W h e n considered from the point of view of land ownership alone, the 
situation appears more complex. True, the general trend was towards order, 
the Egyptian economy being at the time, generally speaking, state-managed 
and autarchic. While it is overstating the case to maintain, as does M u h a m -
m a d Kamel Mursï, that the land was registered, at that time, in the n a m e 
of the falläkln individually, since the greater part remained effectively state 
property, Ibrâhïm ' A m e r more correctly sees this system as a form of 
transition: 'Before M u h a m m a d 'All, the real estate régime in Egypt and the 
social system it supported were typical of an "Oriental feudalism",... the 
organization of farming at the time of M u h a m m a d 'AIT was a temporary 
phenomenon, a transitional stage between feudalism and capitalism.'14 It 
is necessary to emphasize that the development of the large private estates 
characteristic of modern Egypt began in the period of M u h a m m a d 'AIL 
T h e reason for their introduction, however, was not the desire to create a 
new class of landowners, but to facilitate administration and tax collection 
to the benefit of the government and the new ruling class. 
There are other facts which deserve to be m a d e clear. It was M u h a m m a d 
'All w h o diversified the crops and, in particular, from 1821 onwards inten-
14. Ibrâhïm ' A m e r explains the difference between Oriental feudalism and European 
feudalism as 'the absence of private property in the form of land and central state control 
of land ownership.' 
339 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
sified the growing of cotton, on the advice of Jumel w h o gave his n a m e to 
the new variety of long-staple cotton. T h e Jumel cotton along with the 
American 'Sea Island' type afforded the state - with its monopoly of foreign 
trade - an appreciable income, since in 1845 the crop amounted to 424995 
kantärs, produced on 212 ^•¡feddäns, an increase of 400 per cent in twenty 
years. O f this, a m a x i m u m of 80 000 kantârs went to Egyptian spinning 
mills, leaving 344 995 kantârs for export. T h e experts were unanimous in 
their praise for the Viceroy's policy of agricultural modernization: 'First 
of all, [he] supplied the capital that was needed to transform the Egyptian 
agricultural economy from a subsistence economy to a cash crop economy 
and he did this without sacrificing the production of cereals, upon which 
the Egyptian agricultural economy had always been based'.15 
T h e Viceroy described himself as being primarily 'a farmer and a 
merchant', especially in talking to foreign observers. H e used the word 
farmer in the sense of the Pharaohs; lords of the 'hydraulic society' of 
which Egypt offered the most compact and striking example throughout 
the ages. H e used the corvée to have thirty-six canals and drains dug, the 
best known being the Mahmüdiyya canal; blocked up the Phar'awniyya, 
which was unusable, and put up fifteen bridges and twenty-three dams on 
the Nile, including the big d a m at the Delta, al-kañatir al-khayriyya, not 
to mention numerous repair works. Such efforts were concentrated on 
Lower Egypt. There seems to have been a slackening off towards the end 
of the reign just when the commission appointed in 1838 recommended 
an extremely ambitious plan for irrigating 3800000 feddäns. M u h a m m a d 
'All hesitated to devote a considerable part of his resources in m e n and 
materials to building new dams when the economic, political and military 
offensive of the European powers had begun to take shape.16 
It was no accident that it was the British w h o carried out M u h a m m a d 
'Alfs ambitious project after their occupation of Egypt. Technically, the 
conclusion drawn was that the achievements of M u h a m m a d 'AIT in irrigation 
seem less impressive when compared with those of other major periods of 
Egyptian history. Nevertheless, shrewd observers of the period make no 
mistake: the issue was not only a question of modernization, or of town-
and-country planning, but of ensuring 'Egypt's independence of other 
countries' as John Bowring, the British commissioner in Egypt, correctly 
diagnosed. 
T h e period 1840-79 was one of transition, from an economy bearing the 
strong imprint of 'Oriental feudalism' to a 'backward capitalist economy 
of predominantly agrarian colonial type', dominated by the state, which 
rediscovered and developed M u h a m m a d 'Alfs desire for modernization. 
15. H . A . B . Rivlin, 1961, pp. 169-70. 
16. D r Clot bey was the only foreigner to be aware of the problem, for both con-
temporaries and researchers today - in particular, Bowring and Rivlin - confine themselves 
to technical considerations and do not explain this phenomenon. 
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PLATE 13.4 The arrival ofthefirst train on the railway between Cairo and Suez 14 December
1858
In fact, the policy of monopoly, which dealt a severe blow to the
privileges of the former feudality and concentrated the land, amongst other
things, in the hands of the Viceroy, prepared the way for the private
ownership of land, its usufruct being the first step. In 1846, a decree
enabled land held in usufruct to be mortgaged. In 1854, the transfer of
usufruct property deeds had to be conducted in the courts. The law of 5
August 1858, issued by Said, formally instituted the right to private
ownership of land, on various terms (clause 25) beginning with the right
of inheritance. Between 1858 and 1871, a number of successive measures
assimilated rizka, amsiya and aVadiyya land to kharadj land, which had
been the object of these reforms. By 1880, almost"ill landowners held their
land outright. The area of arable land rose from 3 856226 feddâns in 1840
to 4 758 tf^feddans in 1882 thanks to the major works of land improvement
and infrastructure undertaken mainly under Ismail.
There has for some time now been a clearer understanding of the
effectiveness of Ismail's use of foreign loans in developing capital works,
many of which had an impact on the rural areas. This process began
with 'Abbas who in 1851 granted George Stephenson a contract for the
construction of the first railway, which was to link Alexandria with Cairo.
Under Said, Kafr al-Zayyât, Tanta and Suez were linked to the capital.
The construction of the big dry dock at Suez, and the cleaning-out of the
Mahmüdiyya canal were also undertaken on his initiative. Egypt thus
became once again the meeting point between the Mediterranean and the
Red Sea.
On the basis of the Beardsley report, A. E. Crouchley estimated Ismail's
total expenditure on major works at £E. 51 394000. During his reign 112
canals extending over 8400 miles were built, the excavation for this, when
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compared with that necessary for the Suez Canal, being in a proportion of 
165 to 100. Several thousands of miles of canals were also dredged and 430 
bridges were built. Alexandria became the best port in the Mediterranean. 
Fifteen lighthouses were built on the two coasts; 1500 k m of railway; 
5200 k m of telegraph lines, plus 2000 k m in the Sudan, and sixty-four sugar 
refineries. H e also re-established the postal service, after a period of chaos 
under Said. In 1874, Egypt signed the agreements of the First International 
Postal Congress in Berne. T h e introduction of sewers, the improvement 
of the streets of Cairo and Alexandria, the supply of fresh water and lighting 
to several districts and the modernization of Cairo as a whole on the Paris 
model were amongst the m a n y municipal works which complemented the 
major works on infrastructure. 
T h e first social group to emerge as a class in the rural areas was that of 
the big landowners. During the first stage - from 23 March 1840 to 24 
December 1866 - the holding of 'uhda (tax-free lands given in the first 
instance in usufruct, which gradually became defacto property) was restric-
ted to M u h a m m a d 'Alfs family and to dignitaries. O f the total, then 
estimated at 1 200 000 feddäns, a quarter was owned by the viceroy's family, 
and the remainder formed the basis of the big estates to come: Safim al-
Salihdär pasha was given the villages of al-Balynäna and Fadhara; the al-
Shawâribï family owned 4000 feddäns (out of 7000) at Kalyub at the end 
of the century; Al-Sayyed Abâza pasha was given some twenty villages in 
Sharkiyya and still owned fifteen of them, totalling 6000 feddäns, on his 
death in 1876; Badrâwï pasha held Samannüd, some 1400 feddäns. T h e 
transition to full private ownership was not deliberately sought; it appears 
that M u h a m m a d 'Alfs successors had the defacto situation ratified in return 
for payment of the taxes owned by the fallähin w h o worked on the lands. 
A second group of landowners was allocated the fallow land, ab'adiyya, 
ab'adiyya, which covered an area of between 750000 and 1 million feddäns 
at the end of M u h a m m a d 'Alfs reign, mostly in the two provinces of 
Gharbiyya and Beheira: M u h a m m a d Sharif pasha, Daramallï pasha, all 
governors or ministers, were the mainlTeneficiaries. G . Baer points out 
that it was, however, the jiflik lands - the lands 'given' by the sovereign -
mainly composed of villages that had been abandoned because of heavy 
taxation and thus transferred to the royal family, that formed the main 
part of the big estates. A large proportion of the million feddäns which 
were the property of the khedive's family in 1878 were jiflik lands; it was 
Ismail w h o distributed the greater part of these gifts between 1867 and 
1876. 
T w o decrees issued by Said, on 30 September and 11 October 1854, 
divided all land into two categories; lushtiriyya (which included the three 
types described above, as well as the awsiya land, the area of which was 
insignificant) and kharädjiyya, that is the land that remained outside the 
framework of the large farm-holdings. In fact, Y . Artin and Lord Cromer 
considered lushuriyya land to be synonymous with large holdings; its area 
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rose from 636 177 feddâns in 1863 to 1423987 in 1891, or from 14.5 per 
cent to 28.8 per cent of the cultivated land, whereas the area of kharâdjiyya 
land fluctuated between 3 759 125 and 3 543 529 feddâns, that isli falffrom 
85.5 per cent to 71.2 per cent over the same period. 
T h e earliest available statistics of landownership indicated that in 1894, 
11 900 big landowners (with more than ¡0 feddâns) owned 2 243 000 feddâns 
or 44 per cent of the total farmland. T h e million feddâns belonging to the 
khedive's family in 1878 were distinctly more than its 664000 feddäns in 
1844; I s m ä H had appropriated m u c h of the new land, which he divided 
into Dä'ira al-Saniyya land (503 69c feddäns in 1880) and lands which were 
the property of the state (425 729 feddâns in 1878). As w e know, the state-
owned lands had to be sold in 1878 to cover the Rothschild loan but the 
khédive had taken the precaution of distributing a large proportion of them 
to his relatives before that date; later, measures were also taken that enabled 
this group to buy back some of the state property. Thus: 
while the dual role of the Egyptian sovereign as owner of state land 
and of his o w n lands ended at the end of the reign of Ismail . . . the 
reigning m e m b e r of the family (khédive, sultan or king) continued to 
be almost always the biggest landowner. But, in theory - and to a 
large extent in practice - he no longer had at his disposal a vast reserve 
of state lands to increase his personal property . . . Similarly, the royal 
family, as a whole, and thanks to its wakfs, as well as to its great 
wealth which enabled it to buy still more land, maintained its promi-
nent place, which dates from the nineteenth century, amongst Egyp-
tian land-holders. 
These big landowners were, quite naturally, to be recruited from the high 
dignitaries of the regime, officers, some village notables, some Beduin 
chiefs, tulatnâ> and Copts. T h e broader landownership position is indicated 
in Table 13.1. 
Information gathered on the socio-economic status of the village 'ümdas 
and shaykhs is also very revealing. T h e end of the era of the monopoly and 
the elnergënce of private ownership of land under Said appreciably reduced 
the size of this category of rural dignitaries w h o were previously the 
stewards of the multazims, and always the representatives of central power 
vis-à-vis the fallâhln. However, I s m ä H reinforced their authority: 'this 
office falls to the biggest landowner', wrote the correspondent of The Times, 
D . Mackenzie Wallace; 'Ali Mubarak pasha's encyclopedia confirms this, 
and supplies the family names of the 'ümdas (Al-Sharïf, Al-Hawwârï, Al-
Gayyâr, c A b d el-Hakk, ShiTr, Al-'Ukalï, Siyägh, Al-Wakil, Al-'ItribI, Al-
Shirn, etc.) These were the kulaks of Egypt w h o m the proconsulate of 
Cromer was to hesitate to use as a power base in the countryside. Their 
relative weight in the rural areas, at the time of the 1894 census, was a 
result of the gains acquired under I s m â H : the distribution of land, the 
granting of loans to poor fallâhln, the renting of their o w n lands, and 
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Big landowners (more than 50 feddâns) 
Number % Area 
11900 1.3 2243500 
12480 0.8 2396940 
Average landowners (5-10 feddâns) 
141 070 15.4 1 756 100 
132600 8.5 1638000 
Small landowners (less than 5 feddâns) 
761 300 83.3 1113 000 








N O T E : T h e most striking feature does seem to be the fragmentation of property at the turn 
of the century. T h e causes for this are numerous: the effects of the Islamic inheritance law; 
intense demographic growth; the law (December 1912) making the seizure of holdings of 
5 feddâns illegal. In fact, small landholdings are as m u c h a result of the fragmentation, 
which is entirely relative, of large holdings, as they are of that of average-sized ones. 
commercial transactions with the towns in particular. A s the numbers of 
relatively rich peasants grew in the rural areas so also did the n u m b e r of 
fallahjn families with less than 3 feddâns - the amount required for 
subsistence - and other landless people 'without an occupation'. This 
process of pauperization was to become even more rapid in the colonial 
period. Whereas 'Abbas I backed the Beduins against a possible alliance of 
shaykhs and fallähin, and Sa'id sought to reduce the political power of the 
village" dignitaries, I s m â ^ on the contrary leaned heavily on them; the 
members of the first consultative assembly of Deputies in 1866 were chosen 
in large part from a m o n g the shaykhs; A . R . al-Räfil estimates the number 
of lumdas w h o sat amongst the seventy-four to seventy-five delegates in 
1866, 1870 and 1876 at between fifty-eight and sixty-four; and, Ismail 
appointed a great m a n y to the office of triüdtr (governor) in opposition to 
the Turkish-Albanian aristocracy. Quite naturally, these m e n supported 
the 'Urâbï revolution in 1882 and rallied the fallähin to the national cause. 
Cultural development 
T h e development of culture from the admittedly unsuccessful beginnings 
of acculturation up to the emergence of an authentic philosophy of national 
culture deserves to be considered a major achievement in its o w n right. 
Once again, as throughout Egypt's seven-thousand year history, it was the 
state which was responsible for the initial planning and the training of 
officials, and which provided the driving force. T h e imposing figure of 
Shaykh Rifa'a al-Tahtâwï (1801-73) was central to this process. With him 
the Middle Ages drew to a close in Egypt, as in other countries of the Arab 
world. 
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H e preached the beginning of a new era, characterized by the reconquest 
of identity, which is the principal objective of societies and civilizations 
during the 'nationalist' phase. Such a renaissance can only be brought 
about within the national framework, with the help of radical thought and 
a critical approach to both the national heritage and foreign ideas so that 
'the fatherland can become the scene of our collective happiness which w e 
will achieve through freedom, thought and the factory'. His masterpiece, 
Manahed£ al-albab al-Misriyya fi mabahedj_al-adab al-'asriyya ('The paths 
of Egyptian hearts to the joys of the modern way of life'), published in 
1869, marked the point at which nationalist thought started moving towards 
socialism: 
It is work that confers value on all things which do not exist outside 
it . . . W o r k thus plays a key role in the acquisition of wealth: it is 
through work that m a n harnesses the energies of animals and their 
spontaneous industry, which are then directed into channels beneficial 
to members of the fatherland... 
All the virtues which the believer must display in his behaviour 
towards his fellow believers are also mandatory for all members of the 
fatherland, given the reciprocal duties and the patriotic fraternity -
not to mention the religious fraternity - which unite them. All those 
w h o are united within the same fatherland have a moral obligation to 
work together so as to better the condition of their fatherland and to 
add to its honour, its greatness, its wealth and prosperity. This wealth 
can only be created if social relationships are stable and work is carried 
out in the public interest. This work should be equally divided 
between the members of the fatherland so that everyone can then be 
justly proud of their nation. W h e n injustice, cowardice, falsehood and 
contempt disappear, then positive values and blessings will abound 
a m o n g them and will usher in an era of collective happiness..." 
T h e earliest students to be trained in Europe (chiefly in France, soon 
followed by England, Austria, Italy, the G e r m a n States and later the U S A ) , 
could not, of themselves, provide a framework for the whole country's 
educational system nor satisfy all its requirements. But with hindsight, 
when compared with measures taken in the same area by the British colonial 
rulers, the achievements of this period seem most impressive. T w o distinct 
types of education were available: one traditional and classical, based on 
Egypt's heritage, and the other modern, to meet the requirements of the 
military state and the ongoing cultural renaissance. T h e network of 
advanced educational institutions of M u h a m m a d 'Alfs time, which was 
unique in the contemporary non-Western world, was later extended and 
reinforced by the institution of a fully fledged system of national education 
under I s m â ^ . This was largely due to the efforts of 'Ali Mubarak and 
occurred after the hiatus during which European and American religious 
17. R . R . al-Tahtiwi, 1869. 
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missions took root under cover of imperialist penetration in spite of dogged 
opposition by the Coptic Church. A s a result of all these initiatives and 
thought, within half a century Egypt could boast of an educational system 
that was both modern and national in character, the main elements of a 
university of high academic standard, a diversified network of scientific 
institutions, and an educational curriculum based on modern humanist, 
scientific and rationalist values. A s one would expect, it was in this last 
area that the most serious obstacles were encountered, which proves yet 
again that it is easier to change institutions than attitudes. 
T h e conjunction of mission schools with the rise to prominence of n e w 
elite groups, as well as the emergence of n e w social strata, especially in the 
towns, gave rise to a powerful press and publishing movement. This 
from the creation of the official gazette al-Wakïi1 al-Misriyya (1828), was 
instigated and managed by the state but did, however, leave room for 
private initiative - al-Ahräm was founded in 1876. 
T h e fact is that Egypt was alone a m o n g all the provinces of the Ottoman 
empire in offering an asylum for intellectuals, thinkers, writers and p u b -
licists persecuted by the Porte. It was indeed the best of all refuges, not 
only Eastern and Islamic, but also intimately involved in the modern 
European movement, a place where intellectuals could meet and engage in 
creative work, the only modern Oriental state with an advanced material, 
technical and economic infrastructure. Since the coming to power of 
M u h a m m a d 'AIT, Egypt had m a d e a great effort to establish a modern state, 
end four centuries of decadence, and build up an advanced economy 
supported by an efficient and powerful army. This effort, which was 
continued by Ismail under infinitely more difficult conditions, produced a 
ferment of ideas and dynamic social and political movements. A s a result, 
the Arabic press, both Egyptian and Syro-Lebanese, official and private, 
flourished in an environment that stimulated national feelings and was 
propitious to the interplay of ideas and cultural renewal. This represents 
an essential contribution of Egypt to the progress of education, the press, 
publishing and of enlightenment generally in the Arab and Islamic world 
during a period that was later to be seen as one of gestation for national 
revolution and renaissance. 
T h e methodology of history moved very rapidly towards a scientific 
approach. Its field of application stretched beyond Egypt to cover the great 
events sweeping the world; in particular the modern world of competing 
spheres of influence and, specifically, Europe which represented the most 
immediate threat. T h e transition from the concept of umma to watan from 
the 'community of believers' to the 'fatherland' in the strict sense of the 
term mirrored, from an ideological standpoint, the political effort m a d e by 
Egypt to disengage itself from Turkey and become autonomous. 
T h e idea of independence did not evolve along the same lines as that of 
the concept of the fatherland. T h e oscillation between a more or less 
self-centred autonomy and a desire for real independence and imperial 
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ambitions formed part of the problem of defining Egypt's national per-
sonality, within an institutional framework, and in the context of the 
struggle of rival European powers to divide the world between them. T h e 
imperfections of the conceptual and ideological bases of analysis, while 
very real, were of secondary importance: the difficulty lay elsewhere. T h e 
thrust and parry of a direct dialectical two-sided confrontation being more 
or less impossible, three or more strategies had to be brought into play, 
the protagonists always being Egypt, France and Britain, not forgetting 
Turkey. Egypt thus had to seek within itself sources of strength and 
justifications for self-legitimization. 
Imitation of the West in the n a m e of 'reform' was quickly seen as a 
superficial pursuit, a mirror of the possible as opposed to the feasible. It 
affected dress, town planning, music, in the form of opera and martial tunes, 
the theatre especially and the first attempts at novel-writing. Everyday life 
in its personal and private aspects was not considered inviolable. Hence 
the initiative of the Coptic Patriarch, Kyrollos, and Tahtâwï to provide 
educational and vocational schemes for girls. Those w h o had the task of 
promoting the national renaissance of modern Egypt were faced with the 
task of reshaping family life, the primordial mould forming that haven of 
trust and love within which the nation perpetuated itself. Still, the salons 
and the desire for innovation in personal life could in no way mask the 
effort to reawaken the state as a national entity. N o r could they drown, 
even for a m o m e n t , the country's authentic voice, apprehended through 
sayings, proverbs and customs, which saw imitation as a dispossession of 
thousands of years of history. Such dispossession was unthinkable, given 
the attachment of each Egyptian to the immemorial soil. Popular sensitivity 
therefore started expressing itself in forms and formulations that e m p h a -
sized the need for viable intermediaries. 
Geopolitics and compradors 
T h e dissolution of the state of M u h a m m a d 'All which began with the 
Treaty of London in 1840 was the prelude to the penetration into Egypt 
of European big business supported by the 'compradors' of the time. T o 
the view that the reign of 'Abbas I was one of 'silence and terror' in the 
face of the European threat, M u h a m m a d Sabry has replied: 
It must be admitted that the viceroy's vigilant policy erected a barrier 
against the mass influx of Europeans into Egypt. A n d thanks largely to 
the regulations restricting domestic trading, this policy also prevented 
Europeans, Greeks for the most part, from going into the hinterland, 
leaving the two cities of Alexandria and Cairo to spread out into rural 
areas and trade with ignorant peasants. In this way 'Abbas was able 
to check, but not completely eliminate, the evil which was to spread 
very rapidly during the 'consular era' under his successor18 
18. M . Sabry, 1933. 
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T h e concession granted on 30 November 1854 by Said (1854-63) to his 
childhood friend Ferdinand de Lesseps for the construction of the Suez 
Canal, which was officially notified by the firman of 19 M a y 1855, marked 
the beginning of European big-business penetration into Egypt. It was 
Napoleon III himself w h o was. the driving force behind the transformation 
of the Société d'Etudes du Canal de Suez, founded on 27 November 1846 
by three groups of ten members each, representing Great Britain, France 
and Austria, into the Organisation du conseil d'administration de la c o m -
pagnie universelle du Canal de Suez, set up on 30 November 1854. This, 
as Napoleon told Enfantin, was 'so that its organization by businessmen 
would help the statesmen in their diplomatic negotiations'. Enfantin was 
soon excluded from the project in favour of de Lesseps alone, w h o took 
repeated advantage of his friendship with Said to wring all kinds of 
concessions from him. D e Lesseps contracted more and more foreign loans. 
W h e n Said died on 18 January 1863, Egypt's debt ran to 367 million francs 
(£E 14 313 000) according to the most widely accepted estimation, while 
M . F . Lihïtâ gives the figure of £E 16 308 075. Moreover, Said parted with 
the W â d ï estates of 10 000 ha for a ridiculously low price. This estate 
comprised Tall al-Kibïr, the key to Egypt, with four inland canals between 
the Nile and Lake Timsäh, three houses and adjoining buildings, and 
warehouses spreading over an area of 10 000 sq m at Büläk. 
In his address on 20 January 1863 to the consular corps in the Cairo 
Citadel, Ismail stated his intention of abolishing the corvée. 'Nobody is 
more in favour of the canal than I a m ' , he said a little later, 'but I want 
the canal to belong to Egypt and not Egypt to the canal'. At the same time, 
the major drive to develop the national economy, the diplomatic missions 
and military operations undertaken outside the country in Mexico, Crete 
and Africa on behalf of the Porte, and to establish an Egyptian empire in 
Africa, added enormously to Egypt's debt. Its growth pattern is very 
revealing: as the country got deeper into debt, the terms of loans became 
more and more draconian. A total of eight loans, including Said's, were 
contracted between 1862 and 1873. In actual fact, the 1868 loan was not 
available for repaying the floating debt, as it was used instead to finance 
current expenses, including the Canal inauguration ceremonies. Ismail 
Saddïk then devised what was known as the mukHbala law (1871): against 
payment of a sum equal to six annual instalments of the land tax, landowners 
had their property rights confirmed and were entitled to a 50 per cent 
reduction of the tax in perpetuity. This law was in force from 1871 to 1877. 
T h e bankruptcy that hung over Turkey in 1874 limited Ismail's room 
for manoeuvre. In order to meet the deadline of 1 December 1875, he 
negotiated the sale of 177642 shares in the Canal, first with his French 
creditors and then with Britain. O n 25 November, the British Prime 
Minister, Disraeli, with Rothschild's support, bought all the shares in 
question, i.e. all Egypt's holdings in the Canal company for the paltry sum 
of ¿3 976 580. 
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T h e foreign residents, w h o increased in number from 3000 in 1836 to 
112 568 in 1897, acted initially as a spearhead, and after 1882 as auxiliaries 
of the occupation forces. This group, according to M . Sabry, was composed 
mainly of delinquents, counterfeiters, jailbirds, nabobs and adventurers of 
all kinds. According to D . S. Landes, they included the best and worst in 
the European and Mediterranean world: 'bankers and usurers, merchants 
and thieves, staid English brokers and mercurial Levantine peddlers, proper 
clerks for the offices of the Peninsular and Oriental; painted harlots for the 
Square of the Consuls in Alexandria, dedicated scholars for the temples of 
Abydos and Karnak; cut-throats and confidence m e n for the alleys of 
Cairo.19 
T h e wholesale trade and imports and exports were almost entirely in 
the hands of foreigners, mainly English, Greek, Italian and German; only 
six or seven out of several hundred importers in 1908 were Egyptians. T h e 
retail and small wholesale trade was controlled by foreigners, mostly 
Greeks, Levantines and Jews. Local moneylending and banks were mostly 
run, in alliance or association with European banks, by Jews, the 'néo-
devorants' — Cattaui, Ménaché , Suarés, Sursock, Adda , Harari, Salvago, 
Aghion, Sinadino, Ismalun. T h e y operated alongside Greeks, Italians and 
Syrians and, later, Egyptians. T h e craftsmen, tradesmen and artisans were 
Mediterraneans and Levantines. British subjects, half of w h o m came from 
Cyprus, Malta and other colonies, were either soldiers, civil servants or 
cotton merchants. In 1897, 64 per cent of the indigenous working 
population, as against 0.7 per cent of foreigners, were working in the 
agricultural sector. Conversely, industrial and business activities occupied 
50 per cent of the foreign working population, as compared with 17 per 
cent of Egyptians. 
B y 1919, 1488 foreign landowners possessed over sofeddâns making a 
total of 583 463 feddans, i.e. an average of 400 feddâns each, whereas Egypt's 
leading landowners could only boast an average of 150 feddans each. T h e 
average salary per head of foreigners amounted to £ E 8 5 as against £ £ 9 . 5 
for Egyptians, not to mention foreign companies active in the country and 
the loans contracted abroad. In 1822, the Mixed Courts were set up in an 
effort to reduce the scope for financial and administrative disorder. 
The Egyptian Revolution: 1881-2 
Throughout the nineteenth century, and m o r e particularly after the stra-
tegic break of 1840, the Egyptian bourgeoisie rose to prominence within 
the straitjacket imposed by burgeoning imperialism. It was accompanied 
by the establishment of a truly national culture of which the chief architects 
as w e have seen, were Tahtâwï and A . Mubarak. At the same time an army 
was created which became the most powerful in Africa and was led by 
19. D . S . Landes, 1958. 
349 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
poly technicians and scientists w h o were past masters of long-term strategy. 
T h e final years of Ismail's reign saw the emergence of a group that was 
encouraged by the Khedive himself. This was the 'Hilwän Group' (Sharif, 
Ismä'fl Rägheb, ' U m a r Loutfí, Sultán pasha, Colonels A h m a d 'Urâbï, c A b d 
al-'Al Hilmï and 'All Fahmï; M a h m u d S â m ï al-Bârudï, Sulaymân Abâza, 
Hasan al-Shirïl, M a h m u d Fahmï pasha), which, like the secret meetings 
of groups of officers in the Egyptian army, began to have an effect in 1876. 
Their activities led to the 'National Programme' which was put before the 
Assembly on 2 April 1879 by sixty members of parliament with the support 
of senior religious leaders. T h e meetings also resulted in the first manifesto 
signed by the National Party, on 4 November 1879, and the m e m o r a n d u m 
drawn up jointly by M u h a m m a d ' A b d u h and W . S. Blunt, on 18 December 
1881. At the time these were viewed primarily as protest and con-
stitutionalist movements. But the National Party drew on the support of 
the army, the last resort. T h e Party gradually came to work with the 
country's most influential groups. It recognized the role of the army in the 
national revolution and took religion, i.e. Islam, as the framework for 
political life. 
These coalescing national groups came up against the European powers, 
led on this occasion by Britain, strongly supported by France. Under the 
pretext that heinous plots had caused the riots and a number of deaths in 
Alexandria on 11 June 1882, the European powers met in Constantinople 
on 23 June to discuss the 'Egyptian Question' again. They decided to 
intervene militarily. T h e British fleet, c o m m a n d e d by Admiral Seymour, 
bombarded Alexandria on 11 July 1882, causing considerable loss of life 
and the fire of Alexandria on 12 July. This action was a prelude to the 
military invasion, the objective of which was to destroy the national 
movement's spearhead, the army. Indeed, on 9 September 1881 the c o m -
manding officers of the three active army brigades had, at the head of all 
their troops, personally handed to the Khedive Tawfik, in his palace at 
'Abdïn, the demands of the National Party, on behalf of the entire nation. 
T h e British invasion resulted in the destruction of the Egyptian army, 
mostly at the battle of al-Tall al-Kâbïr on 13 September 1882, where 
Brigadier General M u h a m m a d Ebeïd was killed at the head of his troops 
and thereby became the unburied hero of the defeated revolution. A large 
number of pashas, centred around M u h a m m a d Sultan Pasha, threw in 
their lot with the occupation forces. A h m a d 'Urâbï and his companions 
were cashiered from the army and exiled to Ceylon. T h e long night of the 
occupation had begun; although, for months to come, almost a whole year 
in fact, the fallähln continued to take sporadic group action in order to 
keep the legend of 'Urâbï and his companions alive. 
T h e most outstanding feature of the period between the forced abdication 
of Ismä'fl (1879) and the British military occupation was the extreme 
and accelerated radicalization of the Egyptian national movement and its 
ideology. T h e issue of national renaissance was perceived and sometimes 
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expressed in explicit terms. Resistance to economic and political penetration
by the European powers dominated the national consciousness and deter¬
mined its themes and modes of expression. With the military occupation
began a period which came to an end formally with the 1954 evacuation
and, in reality, with the reconquest of Suez in 1956.
To evaluate the achievements of this period of failed revolution, let us
consider, first, the revival of Islamic thought. The reversal of 1840 and the
occupation could not fail to have their effect on whole groups of people
whose awareness had been heightened by Islam. The group of thinkers
working within social groups associated with the traditional sectors of the
economy and with traditional institutions felt the inhumanity of this
historical marginalization more acutely than those involved with modernist
sectors of the economy of the period. Their theoreticians, and foremost
among them Muhammad 'Abduh, diligently sought the reasons for, and
the keys to understanding this situation in the heart of the most influential
of the country's national and cultural traditions, that of Islam. They saw
the religion and ideology of the nineteenth century as no longer those that
the Prophet Muhammad had instituted. The distorted traditions and
exegesis of long centuries of decadence and dependence were all that was
left: Islam was no longer Islam. The source of the national decadence was
thus to be found in that distortion, and the key to any viable future for an
Islamic country was to be sought in the return to fundamental principles.
There was room in the suggested reforms for reason or, to be more
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exact, c o m m o n sense, but it had to be contained within the religious 
framework. This was a pragmatic approach, allowing for interaction with 
the modern world, but ruling out theorizing. Social dialectics, in whatever 
form, were excluded in the n a m e of the unity of the umma, as was 
historicism, given that the primacy of the past was a fundamental principle. 
This Islamic fundamentalism seems to have provided the basic tenets of 
the theology and the essential characteristics that were applied to the 
political and social dimensions of the national revival. 
T h e radicals were to be found elsewhere. T h e y took root in the same 
soil, but only, it is true, a m o n g certain sectors. Islam nourished both 
tendencies and Al-Azhar often accepted and moulded both sides, but only 
during the initial phase. At the time, Tahtâwï was a spokesman rather than 
a leader. T h e vanguard of the national movement - the 'Hilwân group' 
which claimed 'Urâbï as its leader — was guided by liberal, independentist 
and constitutionalist principles. This approach of cautious pragmatism 
was quite acceptable despite the temporary revolutionary explosion. T h e 
vanguard of the classes that were rising to social prominence, and which 
were either poorly structured or in the process of formation, quite naturally 
donned an eclectic ideological armour, for they were as yet incapable of 
the critical discrimination necessary for all synthesis. Superficial eclecticism 
was thus temporarily preferred to analysis, and revolutionary unanimity to 
clear definition in terms of principles and classes. It was at this time that, 
notwithstanding Tahtâwï, the ideology of liberal modernism became an 
ambiguous slogan. 
In the gloom of that period, during the long night of the occupation, 
whose weight was particularly crushing during this first phase, one m a n , 
'Abdallah al-Nadïm (1843-96), emerges, a legendary figure. Everything 
found its focus in him: thought and action, rhetoric and practical effect-
iveness, classicism and modernity. His main contribution lay essentially in 
the inculcation of nationalist principles and ideas that had until then been 
the prerogative of the various elites into the lowly masses living in the 
towns and rural areas. Journalist, orator, political organizer, playwright, 
historian, theoretician and outstanding practitioner of dialectal Arabic, 
'Abdallah al-Nadïm was the real originator of the revolutionary populism 
which, from the columns of his successive newspapers Al-Tankit u>ayl-
Tabklt and Al-Ta'efznà the activities of the Islamic Benevolence Society, 
succeeded in rousing public opinion. A s he declared, T have proclaimed 
love for the soldiers and the necessity of relying on their support. I have 
called on the masses to join with them . . . '. A n d , in his appeal of 20 July 
1882, at the time of the revolution led by'Urâbï: 
Inhabitants of Egypt! T h e English say that Egypt is the fortress of 
the Arab countries and that he w h o enters that fortress at the same 
time gains control of the Musl im countries. Rise up in defence of 
your fatherland. Stand firm, and safeguard this fortress of Musl im 
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countries. Y o u have a holy and just war to wage in the name of Allah 
in order to preserve this great religion and drive off an enemy w h o 
wants to penetrate with his m e n and cavalry into the country of G o d , 
into the holy Ka'ba, through your country, with the support of the 
Khedive w h o has sold the nation in order to ingratiate himself with 
the English and given away the lands of Islam in exchange for the 
protection given to him by the English! 
After the defeat, his last newspaper Al-Ustadh, which saw itself as the 
crucible for radicalization of the national ideology, the springboard for 
patriotic revival and the record-keeper of the long night which was to lead, 
in 1892, to the resurgence of the national movement around the National 
Party, declared: 
In short, the most drastic remedy is cauterization by fire. T h e situation 
has come to a head. If w e can m e n d this torn fabric, if w e can rely on 
each other, if Egyptians, Syrians, Arabs and Turks can speak with a 
single voice for the Orient, then w e can say to Europe: ' W e are 
ourselves and you are what you are'. But if w e continue as w e are, 
contradicting each other, capitulating, turning for help to one outsider 
after the other, then Europe will be entitled to drive us out of our 
countries and up to the mountaintops. A n d after having abandoned 
us with the wild beasts, to say to us 'If you had been like us, you 
would have acted like us'. 
A period of nine years of underground activity, the first in the history of 
the Egyptian national movement and one which set a precedent, m a d e 
Nadïm the spokesman for the fallähln masses. O n e of the few of the rebel 
fallähln of the time to survive, al-Hadj^'Uthman S h u T b , wrote in his 
invaluable recollections, published eighty-four years later, in 1966, 
T h e country did not remain silent. There were m a n y uprisings that 
were murderously suppressed by the sultans, the kings and the 
English. H o w m a n y young people were lost in this way to no avail...! 
T h e n came Gamäl . H e avenged 'Urâbï, he avenged the fallähln; he 
drove out the sultan and the English. T h e one thing that displeases 
m e is the photograph of 'Urâbï. W h e r e are his hands, where is his 
great stature? A n d where, his sword? 
During the long night that every occupation brings with it, in a bleak 
atmosphere of abdication and compromise, faced with the terror which 
descended on the country, a confused N a d l m proclaimed the accession of 
the masses to the controls of the revolution, which was to set the scene for 
the future. 
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The impact of Egypt: The 'other side of the river' 
Before making a final assessment, w e must first of all answer one funda-
mental question: what is the explanation for this renaissance at a time of 
crisis; and then, the blotting out of what for the period was a dazzling 
breakthrough, the cutting short of a process that is still remembered with 
regret by the Arab world and by Africa? 
First and foremost, there was the crushing weight of geopolitical factors 
from the beginning to the end of the entire process, which proved more 
powerful than that of internal factors, which also had a fundamental role 
to play. If w e represent the matrix of 'social dialectics' by two circles, an 
external, exogenous, circle, and an internal, endogenous, circle, it seems 
that for Egypt, that tortured country which was the meeting place of the 
Orient and the West, and of the three continents of Africa, Asia and 
Europe, the external circle, the circle of geopolitics, did control the whole 
process. 
Moreover, the blows dealt to the first phase of the Egyptian renaissance 
from the great naval battles in the Mediterranean and the Treaty of London 
of 1840 to the military occupation of 1882, the massive influx of capital 
and foreign settlers, the gradual dismantling of the independence and 
nation-building movement , left Egypt little time - and this brings us to 
the heart of the endogenous circle of 'social dialectics' — to develop a 
coherent system of national thought that could withstand foreign pen-
etration; and, at the same time, to give the nation's overall policy a realistic 
and appropriate structure. T h e main thrusts of Egyptian thought, liberal 
modernism on the one hand and Islamic fundamentalism on the other, did 
not endeavour to join forces until the mid-twentieth century. T h e nine-
teenth century was one of projects, of unsatisfactory compromises, of 
impossible mergers. Hence the nation's permeability, for the modernism 
derived from acculturation was easily confused with a well thought-out 
national modernity, and the 'Western wave' could easily isolate the different 
constituent factors and the principal formations of the Egyptian national 
movement . 
T h e repercussions of the first stage of the Egyptian renaissance were to 
make themselves felt beyond the country's borders. Sudan, Ethiopia, the 
H o r n of Africa and the region of the Great Lakes in Central Africa, were 
to learn from the experience of a renascent Egypt at grips with the forces 
of imperialism. In the Maghrib, the renaissance of political Islam and the 
great popular movements of armed resistance to colonial penetration were 
continually turning for inspiration to the various aspects of the Egyptian 
effort. T h e Treaty of Berlin codified the partition of Africa in 1884-5. This 
Treaty was designed, in large measure, to effect the rationalized and 
legalized dismemberment of the great continent, whose awakening 
threatened what was then the 'world order', the hegemonic order of the 
major powers. 
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Still further afield, the work of M u h a m m a d 'All was to be an object 
lesson for the team set up in 1868 by Emperor Meiji to foster the Japanese 
restoration. Here the geopolitical situation was the reverse. Secure, thanks 
to the surrounding seas and continental masses until the irruption of 
C o m m o d o r e Perry, Japan remained m u c h more in control of its national 
and cultural cohesion and was thus able to set about the task of moder-
nization free of the vice-like grip of geopolitics - until Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Here, the impact of the Japanese victory over the Russians at 
Tsushima (1905) on the awakening national consciousness and the National 
Party of Mustafa Kämal and M u h a m m a d Fand in Egypt at the turn of the 
twentieth century is worth remembering. Meanwhile, the constitutional 
reform effected by the Tanzimats in Turkey, situated between the Arab 
world and Japan, was directly and explicitly based on reforms carried out 
in Egypt: last ditch efforts by the Ottoman Caliphate, which were later to 
be taken over and rationalized by Ittihäd wa Taraqqi and the Young Turks 
of Enver Pasha and Mustafa K a m a l (Ataturk). 
Thus , w e are moving towards a better appreciation of the Egyptian 
national renaissance which, although in a state of crisis, was to become, 
objectively, a contributory factor in the resurgence of Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East from 1805 until the 1955 Bandung Conference. 
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Arab migrations into the eastern Sudan - roughly the present Sudan minus 
the Southern Region - started as early as the ninth century and reached 
their peak in the fourteenth century. Through gradual and peaceful means 
the Arabs infiltrated the country and spread their culture, religion and 
influence among its Christian and traditionalist societies.1 B y the early 
sixteenth century the Eastern Sudan was ruled predominantly by two 
Muslim sultanates: the Fundj and the Für. While the Für sultans, w h o 
descended from a distinguished Sudanese family - the Kayra — ruled 
Därfür until 1874, their counterparts in Sennär capitulated to the Turkish 
rulers in 1821.2 T h e Fundj sultanate had suffered from extensive dynastic 
rivalries, particularly between its founders, the Fundj and 'Abdallah, and 
subsequently between different hostile groups of the H a m a d j w h o had 
controlled its destiny since the 1760s. T h e upshot of all this was the final 
disintegration of the sultanate by the early nineteenth century into some 
weak and hostile shaykhdoms.3 T h e resultant chaos and local warfare 
gave the Viceroy oFEgypt, M u h a m m a d 'All, an opportunity that he was 
impatiently awaiting to add the Sudan to his domains in 1820-1. Thus 
started the first colonial era, one that dominated the Sudan for over sixty 
years. 
T h e term 'Egyptian' is often used to describe this colonial period in the 
history of the Sudan. But, if at all, it should be used with discretion. T h e 
Sudan was not conquered or ruled by Egyptians as w e know them today, 
but by a 'Turkish-speaking body whose members had dominated Egypt 
since medieval times'. With few exceptions, the true Egyptians - people 
of the Lower Nile - were not given senior political or military posts in 
Egypt or in the conquered Sudan, but were assigned junior posts in the 
administration and the army. Hence the Sudanese, and Europeans as well, 
called the rulers of the country Turks 'for the Sudan was Egyptian only 
in the sense that it was a dependency of the Ottoman province of Egypt'.4 
1. For a detailed study of this subject, see Y . F. Hasan, 1967. 
2. P . M . Holt, 1973, p.67. 
3. For details see Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. V , ch. 7. 
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FIG. 14.1 The Sudan under Turkish rule, 1820-81 (after H. A. Ibrahim) 
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In this chapter Turkïyya (Turkish) is preferred to 'Egyptian' or the other 
commonly used, but awkward, neologism 'Turco-Egyptian'. 
Turkish rule in the Sudan (1821-85) m a y be studied under the following 
three headings: the strategy of the conquest and the response of the 
northern Sudanese people; resistance to the imperial drive in the South 
1840-80, and the role of the new regime in modernizing the Sudan. 
T h e strategy of the conquest and the response of the 
northern Sudanese 
T h e strategy of the Turkish invasion of the Sudan has been the subject of 
m u c h controversy among historians. According to some Egyptian 
historians, M u h a m m a d 'Alfs primary objective behind what they called 
the 'opening up' of the Sudan was the welfare of the country and its people. 
M u h a m m a d 'AIT — so they argue - was so sorry for the deteriorating 
conditions of the inhabitants of the Fund) sultanate that he decided to step 
in by force to save them from this misery and hardship, and subsequently 
to unite the Sudanese people with their brothers in Egypt in a strong state 
that would work for the 'welfare' of both peoples.5 S o m e Egyptian historians 
have even asserted that M u h a m m a d 'All undertook this invasion 'on the 
request of the Sudanese people themselves'6 as represented by some 
notables w h o approached him in Cairo and urged him to do this. S o m e 
Sudanese dignitaries did do this, but it is reasonable to assume that their 
motive was strictly personal and related to some dynastic rivalries that they 
had with the rulers of the Fundj sultanate. Consequently they should not 
be assumed to have representecTthe Sudanese people as such. 
A distinguished Egyptian historian, the late M u h a m m a d Fu'ad Shukri, 
claimed that M u h a m m a d 'Alfs conquest had firmly established Egypt's 
'legal and historical rights' over the Sudan. T h e dissolution of the Fundj 
sultanate by 1820 and the disappearance of the legitimate authority of its 
sultan made the Sudan, in Shukri's view, 'a land without a sovereign'7 — a 
'no man's land'. Hence once M u h a m m a d 'All controlled it and established 
a strong government there, Egypt automatically became, after 1821, the 
undisputed sovereign of the Sudan by the right of conquest.8 O n e of 
M u h a m m a d 'AlFs fundamental reasons for visiting the Sudan in 1838-9,9 
Shukri claimed, was to propagate this theory - the 'theory of the vacuum' 
as he called it - and to depend on it to 'safeguard the unity of the Nile 
Valley', i.e. to keep its two parts — Egypt and the Sudan - under one 
political system.10 
5. M . F . Shukri, 1948, p. 23. 
6. M . A . al-Jâbrï, n.d., p. 18. 
7. M . F . Shukri, 1946, p. 18. 
8. ibid., pp. 38-9. 
9. For a study of this visit, see H . A . Ibrahim, 1980a, 1980b. 
10. M . F . Shukri, 1958, p. 13. 
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This claim to Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan dominated Egyptian 
and Sudanese politics - until the 1950s. Shukri seems to have been 
politically motivated to support the advocates of the unity of the Nile 
Valley against their counterparts w h o wanted an independent Sudan. It 
should also be added that the sultan of Sennar, though he had become a 
mere figurehead by 1820, remained until that time the legal sovereign of 
the country. Moreover, Egypt could not assume sovereignty over the Sudan 
by the right of conquest, as the invasion was undertaken in the n a m e of 
the Ottoman sultan, and Egypt itself continued to be an Ottoman province 
until 1914 at least. In any case the Fund) sultanate could not be equated 
with the Sudan as a whole. 
T h e 'welfare hypothesis' to explain the Egyptian invasion has also been 
challenged in recent studies by Sudanese scholars.11 Depending on a wide 
range of archival material, these studies demonstrate that M u h a m m a d 'Alfs 
primary objective was the exploitation of Sudanese h u m a n and economic 
resources to achieve his extensive ambitions in Egypt and abroad. 
Anxious to consolidate his independence in Egypt and to build an empire 
at the expense of the Ottoman emperor, M u h a m m a d 'All just before the 
conquest of the Sudan had embarked on the formation of a strong modern 
army. While at first ruling out for m a n y reasons the conscription of the 
Egyptian fallähin (peasants),12 he hoped to recruit twenty or thirty thousand 
Sudanese Africans in his nizatn-i-jedtd ('new organization'). M o r e of them 
were also needed in his numerous agricultural and industrial enterprises 
in Egypt. M u h a m m a d 'All had therefore kept urging his commanders in 
the Sudan to intensify their ghazuas - armed slave raids - and to send the 
greatest possible number of Africans to the camp specially made for them 
at Aswan. H e stressed in a directive that this was the most important reason 
for undertaking the 'difficulties and expenditure of the conquest', and in 
another he described this inhuman practice as his 'utmost desire irrespective 
of the means used to do it'.13 
T h o u g h hardly a year passed until 1838 without at least one or more 
ghazuas for the blacks in the N u b a hills and beyond Fazughli, the supply 
of black slaves ran short of the demand. M u h a m m a d 'Alfs hope to swell 
the black army of his dreams 'was pure optimism based on no thorough survey 
of the slave reservoir in the Sudan'.14 T h e Sudanese blacks had, moreover, 
stubbornly resisted the ghazuas and some of them had even committed 
suicide to avoid the humiliating life of slavery. M a n y of those captured 
were lost en route, while others died at Aswan of fever, dysentery, chills 
11. See for example, H . A . Ibrahim, 1973 and B . K . Humayda , 1973. 
12. Being an alien, M u h a m m a d 'All had perhaps felt that a national army would endanger 
his position in Egypt. Other reasons were presumably the reluctance of the fallâhin to join 
the military service and M u h a m m a d 'Alfs desire to spare their efforts for agricultural 
development in Egypt. 
13. Quoted in H . A . Ibrâhïm, 1973, p. 25. 
14. R . Hill, 1966, p. 25. 
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Egyptian invasion
plate 14.2 An encampment of Turco-Egyptian slave-raiders in the Kordofän
and homesickness. Faced with this drastic failure, Muhammad 'All finally
conscripted the fallähln in substantial numbers, and soon discovered that
they 'made some of the best regular infantry in the Middle East'.15
Even those blacks who were recruited for government military service
in the Sudan itself showed disobedience and a lack of interest. While some
fled from the service, others raised arms against the government. Perhaps
the most important of those risings was that of Medani in 1844. In
15. R.Hill, 1966, p. 7.
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reaction to injustice and humiliation Sudanese soldiers conspired to revolt 
simultaneously in four places: Khartoum, Sennär, Kamlin and Medani. 
But those of Medani rose before the scheduled time, killed some of their 
Turkish officers, and fled to Sennär to continue the revolt there. It was 
only with great difficulty that the government suppressed the rising.16 
Equally important was M u h a m m a d 'Alfs desire to exploit Sudanese 
minerals, particularly gold. O n his assumption of power in 1805, Egypt 
was one of the poorest provinces of the Ottoman empire, if not the poorest. 
Hence M u h a m m a d cAITs drive was also intended to find a quick source of 
revenue to achieve his internal and external aspirations. Being obsessed 
from early manhood to old age with the illusion that gold was to be found 
in abundance in the Sudan, he m a d e strenuous effort to discover it, 
particularly in the Fazughli area and around Djabal Shaybun. Apart from 
stressing to his commanders the urgency of g6I3-prospecting, M u h a m m a d 
'AIT sometimes sent mining experts to the Sudan, e.g. the Austrian Rosseger 
and his o w n engineer Boreani. Finally, in 1838-9, at the age of seventy, he 
travelled all the way from Cairo to Fazughli to supervise the mining 
the mining activities there. But his three-week stay was disappointing. 
Government mining activities had not only failed to provide gold but had 
also consumed m u c h from the meagre resources of the Egyptian treasury. 
T h e Turkish imperialists were, however, more successful in expanding 
agriculture in the Sudan. They sent Egyptian agricultural experts w h o 
improved irrigation systems, developed existing crops, planted n e w ones, 
and effectively combated pests and plagues, particularly locusts. Veterinary 
doctors were appointed to look after the animals and experts were despat-
ched from Egypt to teach the Sudanese the preservation of hides and skins. 
T h e conquest had, moreover, given greater security to northern Sudanese 
and Egyptian traders and m a d e possible the eventual introduction of 
European commerce.1 7 
But this prosperity in agricultural and animal wealth was presumably 
not employed to cater for the welfare of the Sudanese people. Instead, 
the government was mainly concerned with exporting wealth to Egypt. 
M u h a m m a d 'AIT had throughout his reign imposed a strict state monopoly 
on almost all of the country's products and exports. Consequently, con-
siderable quantities of Sudanese products - indigo, g u m , ivory, etc. - were 
exported to Egypt. Similarly, throughout the Turkish rule the Sudan was 
Egypt's cheapest source of livestock. In spite of the difficulties of moving 
them d o w n the Nile, with raids by thieving nomads, and a lack of organized 
feeding and watering arrangements, a steady flow of cattle arrived each 
year in Egypt. Animal products such as hides and hair were also sent.18 
T h e Sudanese people had not experienced the payment of regular taxes 
16. H . A . Ibrahim, 1973, pp.92-4. 
17. R . Hill, 1966, p. 50. 
18. H . A . Ibrahim, 1973, pp. 135-54. 
361 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
during the time of the Fundj sultanate, and the burden of the government 
was then light, particularly on the poor. But, in striving to mobilize and 
exploit all Sudanese resources, the Turkish administrators extended the 
Egyptian system of taxation to the Sudan, with suitable modifications. B y 
applying this altogether new system of taxation, they inevitably disrupted 
the economic life of the people. W h a t m a d e matters worse were the brutal 
means used by the bäzbuzq — irregular soldiers — to collect the heavy taxes, 
and the frequent insistence of the government that they should be paid in 
cash, though the c o m m o n usage of coins was still restricted to merchants 
and townspeople. 
T h e reaction of the people was immediate and usually violent. S o m e 
deserted their lands and sakias (waterwheels) to flee to the Ethiopian border 
or to the west. But m a n y others rose in numerous and disparate tax revolts 
that took place throughout the Turkïyya. Perhaps the most violent of these 
was the Sudanese revolt of 1822. 
Ignoring the traditional Sudanese taxation system, the Coptic financial 
intendant liana al-Tawïl imposed heavy taxes on the peoples of the Gezira 
and Berber in 1821. But they rose in violent protest in February 1822, 
attacking and killing members of the isolated detachments of Egyptian 
troops. F r o m Shendi to Sennär the people fled by the thousand to the 
borders of Ethiopia, to the valley of Atbara and to the region of Gedaref. 
T o avoid a large scale revolt, I smä^, M u h a m m a d 'Alfs son and his c o m -
mander-in-chief in Sennär hurried back from Fazughli to the Gezira. 
Through conciliation and a revised assessment of the taxes, he temporarily 
calmed the situation. But I s m ä ^ himself soon committed a disastrous 
blunder. O n his way from the Sudan to Egypt, he stopped at Shendi, and 
demanded an outrageous contribution from the Ja'liyïn people: 30000 
dollars and 6000 slaves within two days.19 Nimir, the mak (chief) of the 
local Ja'liyïn, protested that his people could not afford what was demanded. 
I s m ä ^ arrogantly hit Nimir across the face with his pipe. T o avenge this 
humiliation, Nimir conspired with his m e n to burn I s m ä ^ and all his staff 
alive at Shendi in late October 1822. Subsequently the revolt spread to 
other regions and caused extensive loss in life and property.20 T h o u g h a 
rising of despair, without proper leadership, this revolt was an early warning 
to the invaders that resistance to their rule was entrenched in the hearts of 
m a n y Sudanese. 
Oppressive taxation and maladministration had also provoked wide-
spread resistance to the short-lived Turkish rule in Därfür.21 Anxious to 
restore their ancient rule, the remaining members of the Kayra family 
mobilized Für resistance against the colonizers. T h e most popular and 
largest of those revolts was that of Amir Hariin in 1877. For three years 
19. R . Hill, 1966, p. 16. 
20. M . Shibayka, 1957, pp. 33-5. 
21. See below, pp. 371-2. 
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Harun continued to harass the intruders and could probably have ended 
their rule had he not been killed in 1880. His relative, 'Abdallah D ü d Banga, 
however, continued the struggle from his fortified military camp in the 
N u b a mountains.22 Faced with this gallant resistance, the Turks were 
unable to consolidate their rule until the people of Därfür, in active co-
operation with the Mahdï , finally overthrew it in 1884. 
T h e Sudanese military also had their share in resisting the first colonial 
era. Several military incidents and risings took place in some northern 
towns: Medani , Sennär, Obeid, Suäkin. But the most serious military revolt 
took place in Kassala in 1865. Infuriated by the suspension of pay, the 
Sudanese fourth regiment in Kassala defied the instruction of its Turkish 
officers, attacked and killed some of them, and besieged the town for 
twenty-six days. T h e revolt inflicted some damage in life and property and 
seriously undermined the Turkish administration in the whole Kassala 
province. Perhaps it was the most serious challenge that the imperialist 
had faced in the country for over thirty years. Nevertheless, through 
deception and diplomacy, the government finally suppressed the revolt. 
T h e soldiers surrendered their arms after a vague promise of a general 
pardon, but the survivors were either executed or sent to long terms of 
imprisonment.23 T h e khédive had also directed that the Sudanese regiments 
in the Sudan be reduced to three and the rest sent to Egypt. 
Resistance to the imperial drive in the South, 1821-80 
U p to the beginning of Turkish rule in the Sudan in 1821, the political 
and economic powers of the Muslim northern Sudan states and Southern 
Sudan peoples were comparable, if not evenly balanced. But the nineteenth 
century, especially the second half of it, was to be catastrophic for the 
people of southern Sudan. It was a period of great material loss and 
humiliation, a 'period of chaos' as it is popularly remembered in southern 
Sudan. F . M . Deng , himself a Jieng from southern Sudan, has written that 
it was a period identified in the memories of the southerners 'with the wars 
of slavery and conquest waged against them by waves of invaders w h o m 
they hardly distinguished, except by the use of such varied terms as the 
Arabs, the Turks, the Egyptians, the Ansars, or the Dongolawis'.24 
W h e n M u h a m m a d 'All invaded the Sudan in 1821, he divided the 
country into provinces and districts under Egyptian and Turkish officers 
w h o were placed under a governor-general based at the newly founded 
town of Khartoum. As noted above, the primary function of the alien 
regime was to collect revenue in the form of tribute and slaves to swell the 
ranks of the Egyptian army. Frequent raids were m a d e along the White 
Nile for the purpose of capturing slaves, and from 1840 the traffic in h u m a n 
22. M . M . al-Hasan, n.d., pp. 35-40. 
23. N . Shouqair, 1967, pp. 545-53-
24. F. M . Deng, 1978, p. 150. 
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lives reached enormous proportions. T h e slavers' private armies were 
armed with guns and huge parcels of land were farmed out to the merchants 
w h o found a rich return for their investments amongst the peoples of 
southern Sudan. T h e commercial network developed by M u h a m m a d 'All 
had certain distinctive features. T h e traders built zeribas (forts), an idea 
which they borrowed from Dârfûr, whose sultans had practised it since 
the eighteenth century. T h e forts were used as bases for barter operations 
and for conducting forays into the neighbouring areas. Other distinctive 
features of the network were the division of influence between state m o n -
opolies and private trade, the systematic use of force, mainly through the 
recruitment of local mercenaries, a policy of developing plantations for 
trade, especially in cotton. T h e Baggara, for instance, were supposed to 
pay these taxes in cattle to the governor of Kordofan. Those w h o could 
not, or would not, were allowed to pay taxes in slaves. They therefore 
raided the Jieng for slaves. 
Futhermore, there were the European merchants w h o were demanding 
from the Turkish government that the Sudanese ivory markets be thrown 
open to free trade. W h e n later the European traders were faced with lower 
profit margins, they decided to pay their Arab retainers in slaves rather 
than in cash, and this intensified the slave trade. Kaka in northern Shil-
lukland soon emerged as a major slave market, especially for slaves coming 
from the southern zeribas. T h e b o o m at Kaka was partly connected with 
the abolition of the slave trade in the Turkish-controlled Sudan in 1854. 
It became the main slave market of the White Nile, and its immigrant 
population swelled rapidly. T h e activities of the freebooter, M u h a m m a d 
al-Khäyr, a Dongalawi by birth, w h o moved to Kaka from Taqali in 1854, 
m a y also have facilitated the transformation of Kaka into a slave market.25 
It is estimated that by i860, an average of 2000 slaves were being sold 
annually at Kaka and, to acquire this number, Khâyr and his slave gangs 
were terrorizing the whole Shilluk countryside.2^ 
T h e southerners refused to co-operate with the traders and actively 
resisted their presence in their land. T h e wars that were waged against the 
intruders are too m a n y and too diversified to be enumerated here. Only a 
few need be mentioned as illustration. 
T h e Bari people were the first to seize an opportunity to attack the 
invaders. In 1854, they attacked a French trading mission, killing two of 
its m e n and wounding several others. Shortly afterwards another extremely 
violent battle took place between about 5000 Bari and another trading 
mission led by Vaudeny, the Sardinian vice-consul. Vaudeny, his Turkish 
deputy, and m a n y of his m e n were killed. Bari chiefs w h o showed any 
tendency to collaborate with the intruders were also attacked. Chief 
Nyagilo, for example, had his authority undermined and property 
25. R . Gray, 1970, pp. 76-8 . 
26. J. Frost, 1974, p. 216. 
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destroyed. H e fled to Gondokoro, but was hunted d o w n and killed there 
in 1859 by groups of Bari armed youth.27 
T h e traders were driven eastwards into the hostile land of the Lokoya. 
W h e n , in i860, in reaction to an assault on 5 foreigners, the traders sent a 
force of 150 soldiers, the Lokoya killed 120 of them and wounded m a n y 
of the rest.28 
T h e northern Shilluk were equally active against the traders in the White 
Nile. But the immigrants moving into Kaka in particular and northern 
Shillukland in general, were not all traders. M a n y of them were refugees 
escaping from the Turkish rule. T h e period between 1840 and i860 'saw 
a steady stream of refugees from the Turco-Egyptian north entering Shilluk 
territory. M a n y of these were Selim Baggara; but there were malcontents 
from the Muslim Sudan'.29 T h e relations between the immigrants and the 
Shilluk remained amicable until i860, when the reih (king) could no longer 
control the trading system that had developed in his kingdom, but which 
was dominated and eventually controlled by foreigners. 
Ret h Kwatker expelled m a n y Arab traders from his kingdom in i860. 
M u h a m m a d al-Khäyr replied by attacking the Shilluk with 200 Baggara 
cavalry, over 1000 riflemen and thirteen boats. Fashoda, the royal capital, 
was destroyed. John and Kate Petherick, w h o were in the region at this 
time, gave an eyewitness account of the consequences of this attack. B y 
1862, they say, Shillukland from A b a Island to the mouth of the Sobat 
was 'in a very disturbed state', and 'the once-powerful Shillooks have been 
scattered far and wide'.30 Kate Petherick noted in her diary: 'Passed an old 
ruined village of the Shillooks called Kaka; there were at least 600 deserted 
tookuls. Last year [they] were driven from their homes. They were an 
industrious people, and cultivated grain to a large extent.31 Later they 
saw one of al-Khäyr's expeditions that had captured 500 slaves and 12000 
head of cattle?1-
T h e Shilluk decided to fight back. A raid by al-Khäyr's marauders was 
repulsed and about seventy of his Baggara were killed. In 1863, the Shilluk 
forced the traders to retreat into the interior and al-Khäyr was tracked 
d o w n and killed. T h u s , the relationship between the Shilluk and the 
Turkish government deteriorated rapidly. T h e Shilluk had to pay heavy 
cattle taxes and supply slaves to serve as soldiers for the expanding Sudanese 
garrison. 
B y 1868 the protracted conflict had become a full-scale war. In November 
of that year, a force of 2000 troops sent to subdue the Shilluk met with 
fierce resistance and the results were inconclusive. T h e administration then 
27. R . G r a y , 1970, p. 44. 
28. ibid., p. 56. 
29. P. Mercer, 1971, p. 420. 
30. J. Petherick and K . Petherick, 1869, Vol. 1, p. 990. 
31. ibid., p. 96. 
32. ibid., p. 97. 
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decided to levy an annual tribute of £15000 upon the Shilluk and Jieng.
Deep resentment was felt throughout the country. As if this was not
enough, the Turkish government had decided in 1871 to extend the
cultivation of cotton in southern Sudan. By 1874 about 5000 to 6000 ha of
cotton, sugar cane and maize was under cultivation in the Fashoda area.
This agricultural work, which earned the alien government £300000 in
cotton taxes in that year, had only been possible through the use of forced
labour.33
The Shilluk rebelled. They killed ninety government troops and
reinforcements had to be rushed from Khartoum to quell the rebellion.
But the Shilluk were now determined to fight for their freedom. Reth Ajang
refused to collaborate, and he was murdered by the Arabs in 1874, who
then tried to rule without a reth. In October of the following year, thousands
of Shilluk attacked the government posts at Kaka and Fashoda. Only
fourteen soldiers at Kaka survived. More reinforcements arrived in 1876
from Khartoum, armed with Remington rifles. Thousands of Shilluk were
slaughtered, and by April of that year, the area between Kaka and Fashoda
was considered 'pacified'. The Shilluk were disarmed and large numbers
of them were conscripted into the army and sent to Cairo. To add insult
to injury, Fashoda was turned into a slave market, where government forces
sold the slaves they captured to the Jallâba,34 in order to recover the annual
tax of £12 500. Shilluk population, both bovine and human, was dwindling
33. J. Frost, 1974 for most of the details in this paragraph.
34. On the Jallâba, see below p. 373.
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rapidly. Small wonder that bridewealth, which had previously been twenty 
to thirty cows, was reduced to one cow during the period from i860 to 
1900. 
O f all the peoples of the southern Sudan, m a n y weak and defenceless 
groups could only put up a feeble, if not futile, resistance to the traders' 
raids. M a n y were either enslaved or killed in battles, with the result that 
several groups 'nearly vanished as cohesive political or social units'.35 T h e 
Jieng and Noath were perhaps best able to protect themselves against those 
raids by retreating with their cattle into the inaccessible swamps. Being 
accustomed to warfare, they often inflicted severe defeats on the raiding 
forces. 
Further south were the Zande w h o , under the leadership of the proud 
and aristocratic Avungara dynasty, had founded a centralized state in the 
eighteenth century. Their strong political system was part of the reason 
w h y they were able to withstand the slavers' assaults. A Zande chief called 
N d o r u m a was even able to capture a zeriba that A b ü K u r ü n , a slave-trader, 
had established in Zandeland. Subsequently, in 1870, he defeated an enemy 
force 2000 strong, killed A b u Kurün and several of his m e n , and confiscated 
a hundred loads of ammunition.36 
While none of M u h a m m a d 'Alfs two immediate successors ('Abbas and 
Said, 1848-63) wished to emulate his foreign adventures, the ambitious 
Khedive Ismail (1863-79) ' w a s intrigued by expansion in any direction 
but particularly up the Nile into the vast hinterland of the southern 
Sudan'.37 B y taxing and discriminating against the already weakened Euro-
pean traders, Ismail gradually exerted Turkish authority over the Nile 
trade. B y 1867 European traders were forced to leave the Sudan and from 
that time on no longer played a role in its commercial life, the control of 
which fell to Turks and Arabs from Egypt and the northern Sudan. Free 
from any local European control, Ismail advanced up the Nile to build for 
himself an African empire. T h e suppression of slavery and slave trade was 
given as a justification for this imperial expansion.38 
This Turkish attempt to annex Equatoria was under the c o m m a n d of 
two British officers: Samuel Baker (1869-73) and Charles George Gordon 
(1874-6 and 1877-9). In spite of their extensive use of violence and their 
lavish equipment, Baker and Gordon were unable to extend Turkish 
administration in Equatoria beyond a few scattered posts. While governor-
general of the Sudan (1877-9) Gordon himself finally abandoned the 
Turkish advance in Equatoria. His successor, the G e r m a n Edouard Carl 
Oscar Theodor Schnitzer (1840-92), commonly known as A m ï n Pasha, 
inherited only a weak and disorderly Turkish presence, and he was conse-
35. R . Collins, 1975, p. 18. 
36. R . Gray, 1970, pp. 64-5. 
37. R . Collins, 1975, p. 19. 
38. For a study of the question of slavery and the slave trade see: M . F . Shukri, 1937; 
A . I. M . Ali, 1972; B . K . H u m a y d a , 1973, pp. 254-316. 
368 
PLATE 14.6 A Zande minstrel
3°9
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
quently forced to abandon it altogether and to withdraw to the east coast 
in 1889.39 
Baker's attempts to secure the co-operation of the Africans were futile, 
as the tradition of resistance to foreigners was already deeply rooted in the 
southern Sudan. Immediately after his arrival at Gondokoro in 1874, Baker 
faced the open hostility of the Bari people and their chief, Alloron. They 
refused to sell him corn and destroyed that which his m e n cultivated. 
Though rivals of Alloron, the Beliman Bari and the Lokoya people joined 
in these operations.40 T h e Moogie Bari killed twenty-eight soldiers, har-
assed the caravans passing through their territory, and infected their 
neighbours in the west bank with this hostile attitude. 
Baker moved up the Nile to Patiko in Acholi in northern Uganda. Here 
he transformed all the local traders' posts in the area into government 
stations and recruited into his government forces m a n y of the Danakla (or 
Dongolawi, as they were generally known by the local people because m a n y 
of them originally came from the Dongola region), w h o were mercenary 
soldiers attached to the Arab traders. Such a policy m a d e it difficult for 
the local people to distinguish between the Khartoum traders and the 
Turkish government. Baker then rushed westwards into Bunyoro, where 
he hoped to enlist the support of Kabarega. But he was once more 
disappointed, and Kabarega was even reported to have conspired to poison 
the entire mission. Against great odds, Baker finally retreated to Patiko in 
August 1872.41 
In 1873, Gordon was appointed governor-general of Equatoria Province 
to consolidate the achievements of Baker. According to the terms of his 
commission, he was to build forts, open communications to the south, 
establish good relations with, and administration over, the local peoples, 
and regulate the slave trade in the southern Sudan.4 2 
After an initial tactical submission to Gordon, the Moogie Bari reopened 
hostilities and for more than a week there was fighting on both banks of the 
Nile. It culminated in a battle at which the Moogie defeated a detachment of 
over forty m e n , all but four of w h o m were killed, including their leader 
Linant de Bellefonds. H a d not the river prevented the Moogie from 
following up this success, Gordon's whole force would have probably been 
destroyed.43 
Gordon's advance southwards in the equatorial kingdoms was also a 
failure. Rather than recognize Turkish sovereignty over his kingdom, as 
Gordon naively hoped he would do, Mutesa of Buganda mobilized a 
powerful army against the invaders. In Mutesa, Gordon was 'confronted 
with an African ruler w h o combined the inherited political wisdom of an 
39. For the career of A m i n Pasha, see I. R . Smith, 1972. 
40. R . Gray, 1970, p. 96. 
41. S. W . Baker, 1879, pp. 272-3; R . Gray, 1970, pp. 84-104; N . Shouqair, 1967, p. 562. 
42. See P . Crabites, 1933, pp. 28-30. 
43. R . Gray, 1970, pp. 110-11. 
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ancient and firmly established dynasty with a remarkably acute appreciation 
of the role which diplomacy and evasion could play in the task of protecting 
the independence of his country.'44 T h e apparently friendly envoys sent to 
meet Gordon were spies despatched to report on the strength and m o v e -
ments of the enemy. N u r Bey, w h o was sent by Gordon to annex Buganda, 
soon discovered that the shrewd Mutesa had cornered him in his capital 
Rubaga, thus rendering him completely impotent and dependent for his 
survival on the good will of Mutesa. This forced Gordon in 1876 to order 
an immediate withdrawal northward to Lado. Subsequently, the Jieng and 
Noath, under the leadership of a prophet called Donluly, besieged the 
government garrison at Bor. B y 1885 the Bari chief Bego had exterminated 
this garrison and attacked Lado and Rejaf.45 For all practical purposes the 
Turkish advance in Equatoria had by that time come to a disastrous end. 
T h e Turkish colonial advance in Bahr al-Ghazäl had come up against 
the greatest of the region's slave traders, al-Zubayr R a h a m a Mansür, 4 6 a 
northern Sudanese w h o had built for himself a vast trading empire there. 
H e defeated a government expedition and killed its leader in 1872. C o n -
fronted with this fait accompli, Khedive Ismail officially recognized Zubayr 
as the governor of Bahr al-Ghazäl. But the adventurous Zubayr looked 
beyond the frontiers of Bahr al-Ghazäl to Därfür, an untapped source of 
slaves. Sultan Ibrahim mobilized the Für army and people and put up a 
gallant resistance against the invaders. But he was finally defeated and 
killed at the battle of Manwäshi in 1874, and Därfür was thus annexed to 
the Turkish regime.47 
Though Khedive Ismail had subsequently arrested Zubayr in Cairo, 
and inaugurated measures to break his power in Bahr al-Ghazäl, the Arab 
slave-traders rallied behind his son Sulaymän. They proclaimed their 
intention of conquering all of the southern Sudan and then marching on 
to Khartoum, but they were eventually defeated. 
Nevertheless the Turks were unable to establish effective rule in Bahr 
al-Ghazäl. This was largely due to the resistance of the African peoples there, 
w h o considered the Turks as nothing but new colonizers w h o should be 
evicted once and for all. B y 1883 the Jieng chiefs actively co-operated with 
the Mahdist forces to overthrow the Turkish regime in Bahr al-Ghazäl on 
the clear understanding that they would be left free in their land.48 
T h e advent of the Turkish administration had indeed brought an end 
to widespread slave-raiding in the Sudan, particularly in the south. But 
the new imperialists were never able to persuade the African peoples there 
accept their rule. In fact, they increasingly employed force to repress the 
numerous risings against their domination. Consequently, chiefs and people 
44. ibid., p. 117. 
45. ibid., p. 161. 
46. For Zubayr's o w n account of his career, see N . Shouqair, 1967, pp. 568-99. 
47. ibid. 
48. P. M . Holt, 1970, pp. 78-80. 
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were killed, their cattle were seized, and their crops were destroyed. Like 
previous invaders, the Turks had further disrupted the society of the 
southern Sudan until the resistance movement ultimately succeeded in its 
declared objective of ending Turkish colonialism in this region of Africa. 
Modernization and reaction in the nineteenth-century 
Sudan 
T h e Turkish adventure in the Sudan was thus largely unsuccessful, yet it 
is generally agreed that modern Sudanese history starts with the Turkish 
conquest of the country in 1820-21. B y the defeat ofSennär and Kordofan 
in that year the nucleus of what is n o w the Democratic Republic of the 
Sudan was founded. Turkish control of the northern and central Sudan 
was rounded off in 1841 by the conquest of al-Taka - the region of K h ü r 
al-Käsh and the Red Sea Hills.49 Därfür, Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazäl7änd 
the Red Sea coast were all incorporated in the modern SudarTHuring the 
reign of Khedive Ismail. O n the eve of the Mahdia the Sudan had thus 
formed an immense block of territory extending from the second cataract 
to the equatorial lakes and from the Red Sea to Därfür.50 
Apart from uniting the Sudan in its present frontiers, the Turkish regime 
had also started the process of modernization. B y modernization w e mean 
'the introduction of methods of political and economic organisation and 
techniques of production, transport, and communications, derived from 
those employed in European states — all of which substantially modified 
the structure of the antecedent traditional society'.51 
T h e three chief technical innovations of the Turkïyya were firearms, 
steamers, and the electric telegraph, which was extended to the Sudan 
during the reign of Khedive Ismâ'ÏÏ. Though k n o w n in the Sudan by the 
second half of the seventeenth century at the latest, handguns were not 
used on any large scale. T h e superiority of the armaments of the Turkish 
troops was crucial in overcoming the resistance of the Sudanese. Steamships 
were first used on the Egyptian Nile in about 1828, but they were not 
brought into Sudanese waters for another generation. B y the 1860s and 
1870s a substantial fleet had been established there, maintained by a 
dockyard at Khartoum.5 2 
Firearms and steamers played a vital role in the southward drive of the 
Turkish imperialists. While tentative and hesitant at first, this imperial 
expansion was later greatly facilitated by these two inventions. For they 
enabled the colonizers and their Sudanese collaborators to overcome the 
49. P . M . H o l t , 1970,p.3. 
50. Besides the Sudan proper, the Turkish Sudan comprised the Eritrean and Somali 
districts. 
51. P . M . H o l t , 1973, p. 135. 
52. R.Hill, 1965, pp. 2-5. 
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two principal obstacles to their advance up the White Nile: the obstinate 
resistance of the southerners and the immense barrier of the Sudd, which 
blocked the approach to both the equatorial Nile and the Bahr al-Ghazàl. 
T h e opening up of the south offered new opportunities to a particular 
sector of the northern society, subsequently known as al-Jalläba. While 
only a few of them had visited the south before the Turkish conquest, 
m a n y began to rush there subsequently, particularly after the Upper Nile 
and Bahr al-Ghazäl became more accessible to traders from the north. 
They went originally as servants and armed retainers of alien merchants, 
but had gradually acquired increasing responsibility and power on their 
o w n . T h o u g h accelerating the process of Arabization and Islamization in 
the south, the Jalläba's frequent resort to violence and their contemptuous 
attitude towards the southerners had, no doubt, nurtured the distrust and 
fear that still dominates the relations between the northern and southern 
parts of the country. 
Turkish imperialism had established a n e w administrative system in the 
Sudan. Its machinery was oppressive, corrupt and incompetent and the 
Turkish administrators were of low quality, but in contrast to the previous 
types of government to which the country was accustomed, it was highly 
centralized. At the head of the administration was normally a single 
governor-general w h o bore the Turco-Persian title hukumdär (colloquially 
pronounced hikimdar).53 Even during the brief periods in which the gover-
nor-generalship was abolished, as was the case in 1843 and 1882,54 Sudanese 
provinces were placed directly under a department in Cairo. T h o u g h some 
Sudanese w h o collaborated with the imperial regime were given junior 
administrative posts, it was m a d e clear to them that they were mere agents 
of a central authority that could appoint and dismiss them at will. 
T h e army, particularly the regular infantry (dßhädiyya),55 and improve-
ments in communications were important instruments for the colonial 
government's power of control. T h o u g h the colonizers did not embark on 
a serious road and rail construction programme, the steamers and telegraph 
networks m a d e an important contribution to centralization. A r m e d with 
these instruments, the Turkish administrators largely succeeded in main-
taining public security, in repressing the restive Sudanese, and, above all, 
in forcing the payment of taxes. 
T h e religious life of northern Sudanese society was also greatly affected 
by changes resulting from imperial rule. T h o u g h both the Turks and the 
Sudanese were loyal to Islam as such, there was a great gulf between the 
53. P . M . H o l t , 1970,p. 14. 
54. Being aware that the remoteness of Khartoum from Cairo might offer temptations 
to the ambitious, the viceroys m a d e these attempts at decentralization to prevent the 
excessive accumulation of power and influence in the hands of a governor-general. 
55. Both the southerners and the N ü b a , usually of slave origin, were conscripted into 
the djihadiyya. Besides this force, there were the Shäikia irregulars w h o had largely replaced 
the alien irregulars w h o had come into the Sudan at the time of the conquest. 
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palace at Khartoum with a paddle steamer on the river
official Sunnite Islam of the Turkish administration and the personal
indigenous süfí Islam of the Sudanese that had developed since the Fundj
period. In the Sudan, as in Egypt and the Ottoman empire generally, "it
was the policy of the rulers to establish a secular state in which Islamic
institutions as such would have a minimal role. Consequently the süfí Islam
of the Sudan, which already had a profound grip on the rulers and the
ruled,56 was bound to suffer severe blows. The imperial administration
increasingly undermined the prestige of its leadership, which consisted of
the hereditary teachers (fakis) of the süfí orders. This was in the main
done through the promotion oforthodox Islam. By maintaining a hierarchy
of kadis and muftis, and facilitating the education of Sudanese 'ulamä' at al-
Azhar, the colonizers confronted thefakis with a rival group 'more orthodox
and alien in its outlook, and more directly dependent on the government'.
By the end of the first imperial era, the prestige of the traditional religious
leaders had, therefore 'undergone considerable diminution'.57 This was
indeed a major factor that persuaded them to oppose the imperial govern¬
ment and actively support the MahdFs efforts to overthrow it.
The process of modernization was accompanied and fostered by an
increasing number of foreign visitors, both Europeans and Americans.
While very few Europeans had visited the Sudan before 1820, the Turkish
56. During the Fundj period the fakis were even more effective than the sultans and
other political leaders as a focus of stability and continuity.
57. P.M.Holt, 1973, p. 140.
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conquest opened up the country to foreign visitors w h o came as travellers, 
traders and missionaries, as well as experts, consultants and employees of 
the administration. Western employees of the government, w h o were 
rapidly introduced into the service, particularly during the decade pre-
ceding the outbreak of the Mahdia, m a d e an impact on Sudanese society 
both in the Arabized north and in the south. Being alien in language, 
customs and religion, their presence created tension among the mass of the 
Sudanese people.58 This excessive employment of Europeans in posts for 
which they were usually unfitted in fact provoked Sudanese resentment to 
such a pitch that xenophobia became generalized. T h e M a h d f s declared 
intention of freeing the country from alien and Christian control therefore 
found a ready and enthusiastic support from the populace. 
Conclusion 
T h e extensive drive of the Turkish imperialists to exploit Sudanese 
resources, as well as the socio-economic and technological innovations that 
they introduced, had profoundly shaken the traditional Sudanese society 
and created widespread discontent. This provoked m a n y uprisings and 
revolts. T h o u g h some of these represented a serious challenge to the 
colonizers, none commanded enough popular support to enable it to 
overthrow the government. In the Sudan, as elsewhere, discontent alone 
could not create a revolutionary situation, which had to be accompanied 
by a revolutionary ideology, a revolutionary army, and above all, a rev-
olutionary leadership. It was only w h e n the M a h d ï provided this in 1885 
that the Sudanese rose en masse in the Mahdist revolution that ended the 
Turkïyya, produced an independent Sudan, and at the same time con-
fronted advancing British imperial rule. At least that was the situation in 
northern Sudan. 
In the south, however, slave raiding, pillage and rapine continued 
unabated. T h e Mahdist government plundered the south for conscripts 
into its o w n army. Bitter memories were engendered which tended to 
discredit both the Arabs and Islam in the eyes of the Africans in the post-
Mahdist period. W h a t had been a socio-economic structure of domination 
in the Nile Valley was gradually transformed into a racial structure of 
domination. This, in turn, led to a racial ideology of resistance among the 
Africans in southern Sudan. 
58. See, for example, P . Santi and R . Hill (eds), 1980, p. 145. 
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R. P A N K H U R S T 
with some notes on Somali history supplied by 
L . V . CASSANELLI 
T h e situation of Ethiopia in the first decades of the century 
T h e nineteenth century dawned on one of the most difficult periods in 
Ethiopia's history. T h e once centralized Christian state, m u c h of which 
had been overrun by the O r o m o (Galla)1 had declined almost to dissolution. 
Though emperors still held nominal sovereignty, thus giving a semblance 
of unity, they were mere puppets of the feudal lords. T h e latter had become 
virtually independent, and were constantly skirmishing among themselves. 
Fighting was so extensive that several provinces, including Bagemder, site 
of the capital, were seriously impoverished. M a n y peasants, faced with the 
soldiers' exactions, had left their farms to seek their fortunes with one lord 
or another, or even as robbers. Agriculture was neglected, and caravans 
became smaller and less frequent than formerly. T h e population of Gondar, 
the only urban agglomeration of any size, was m u c h reduced, and there 
was less demand for the craftsmen's produce, while the decline in royal 
patronage led to the commissioning of fewer works of art. T h e dis-
organization of economic, political and social life made a deep impression 
on Ethiopian chroniclers. Abandoning their flattery of the monarch they 
showered praises on the warlords, but could not avoid sighs for the 
old imperial greatness. O n e scribe, Abagaz Sa'una, writing in Ge'ez, the 
traditional literary Semitic language, moaned that power had been usurped 
by upstarts, for lords had 'become serfs and serfs lords'. Noting that there 
were then four living monarchs bereft of authority he exclaimed that they 
had been: 
scattered like dust in the face of the wind. W o e is m e ! M y stomach is 
agitated and m y intestines torn because of your being injured, O m y 
lords. W h a t does it profit the kingdom which has been snatched away 
by the hands of serfs?2 
i. This important ethnic group was traditionally referred to by its Amhara neighbours 
as Galla, a term used in the written sources of our period, but also sometimes locally used 
with a derogatory connotation. In recent years, increasing preference has been given to the 
indigenous n a m e O r o m o , which tends to be favoured by the modern educated generation. 
2. W . Blundell, 1922, pp. 187-8, 191, 470-1, 477. 
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T h e decline of imperial authority, and the triumph of regional feudalism, 
caused this to be referred to by Ethiopian historians as the period of the 
Masafent,3 literally 'judges', an allusion to the time in the Book of Judges 
w h e n 'there was no king of Israel: every m a n did that which was right in 
his o w n eyes.4 
T h e Christian highlands 
T h e Christian highlands, the core of the empire, were n o w divided into 
three independent states, Tigré, A m h a r a and Shoa, besides several smaller 
political units. 
Tigré, the heartland of the ancient Axumite kingdom, was the north-
ernmost and most powerful. T h e population, which was mainly Chris-
tian, but with a sizeable Muslim minority in the east and south, spoke a 
Semitic language, Tigrinya. T h e rulers óf the province, because of its prox-
imity to the coast, had acquired considerable wealth from taxes on 
trade and, through it, m a n y more firearms than were available in other 
areas. 
T h e province was controlled at the beginning of the century by Ras 
Walda Sellase (i795-1816) of Endarta, an important district overlooking 
the Afar, or Danakil, Depression from which most of Ethiopia derived 
amolé, or bars of rock salt, used for consumption and as 'primitive money' . 5 
This chief, formerly the balgada, or official in charge of salt caravans, was 
the son of a general of Ras Mika él Sehul, a Tigré ruler w h o in the previous 
century had been master of Gondar and the maker and destroyer of kings. 
Ras Walda Sellase, scarcely less powerful than his father's former lord, 
ruled a vast domain stretching from the edge of the highlands within sight 
of the Red Sea, to the high S a m e n mountains less than a hundred kilometres 
from Gondar. Walda Sellase, w h o governed in accordance with long 
established custom, impressed the British traveller Henry Salt w h o 
observed that the chief was 'distinguished . . . for his intrepidity and 
firmness', and adds: 'all crimes, differences and disputes, of however 
important or trifling a nature, are referred to his determination, all rights 
of inheritance are decided according to his will, and most wars are carried 
on by himself in person'.6 Walda Sellase, the most powerful chief in the 
country, wanted to wrest guardianship of the nominal emperor from the 
Yajju O r o m o dynasty then in control of Amhara , and sought to rally 
the nobles of Tigré for this purpose. A s ruler of a region near the coast he 
was moreover interested in access to the sea, and, through it, to the 
technically advanced countries of Europe. H e expressed his 'utmost wish', 
3. Guèbrè Sellasié, 1930-2, Vol. 1, p. 204. 
4. Judges X X I , 25. See E . Ullendorff, i960, p. 82. 
5. R . K . P. Pankhurst, 1968, pp. 460-4. 
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Salt reports, to encourage contacts with Britain, but argued that it would 
be 'useless' to 'interfere' with the Muslims at the coast as long as they had 
control of the Red Sea.7 H e wrote to George III of Britain in 1810 
requesting firearms, and help in obtaining an abuna, or Metropolitan, it 
being the long-established custom to import such ecclesiastics from the 
Coptic clergy of Egypt. 
Walda Sellasé's death in 1816 was followed by a fierce succession 
struggle. T h e eventual victor was Dajazmach Sabagadis (1822-31) of 
A g a m é , another important province on the route from the salt de-
pression, w h o despatched Salt's servant, William Coffin, to Britain in 
1827 with a request for military and technical aid. T h e British sent a 
consignment of arms, but it was intercepted by the Egyptians at the 
port of Massawa. Sabagadis later fought against the Yajju, but was 
captured and executed. Ras W e b é (1839-55) of Samen succeeded, after 
m u c h fighting, in gaining control of Tigré, and later, despite m a n y 
rebellions, of the highlands as far as Gondar. Alive to the value of 
foreign contacts he obtained a small quantity of firearms and technicians 
from France. Proclaiming his intention of installing as Emperor at Gondar 
a pretender called Takla Giyorgis, he marched against Ras 'AIT, the Yajju 
ruler of Bagemder, w h o m he met in battle near the latter's capital, 
Dabra Tabor, in 1842. Webé ' s riflemen w o n the day, but the victorious 
chief was captured while celebrating. H e was released on payment of 
a ransom, and returned to Tigré. H e again came into conflict with Ras 
'AIT in 1843-4, DUt> faced by rebellion in Tigré and by the seizure of 
Massawa by Egypt, he submitted to the Yajju chief. Despite such 
setbacks he remained one of the most powerful, and enlightened, rulers 
of Ethiopia.8 
Amhara , the second main division of the empire, lay to the north-west. 
Its population, which was largely Christian, though with a significant 
number of Muslims, spoke Amharic, the most widespread of the Semitic 
languages of Ethiopia. T h e region was based on the important province of 
Bagemder, whose rulers at times also controlled D a m b e y a and Gojam to 
the south. Amhara owed m u c h of its significance to its control of the 
imperial capital, Gondar. However, being far from the coast, the rulers of 
Amhara depended for firearms on supplies brought in from the Red Sea 
through the Sudan or through Tigré whose rulers were reluctant to permit 
their import. 
At the beginning of the century Amhara was ruled by Aligaz Gwangui 
(1788-1803), brother of 'Alï Gwangui , a Yajju O r o m o Muslim w h o had 
adopted Christianity for political reasons, but was supported by the 
Muslims. Aligaz was succeeded by his nephew Gugsa Mersa (1803-25) 
7. H . Salt, 1814, pp. 383-4. 
8. For a brief contemporary history of Tigré see M . Parkyns, 1854, Vol. 2, pp. 88-120. 
See also C . Conti Rossini, 1947; and, on Webé , J. Kolmodin, 1912-15, pp. n o , 116-17, 
119-20. 
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who established his capital at Dabra Tabor, extended his domains to eastern
Gojam, and attempted to destroy the power of the nobility by declaring
the nationalization of their land.9 Islam gained steadily in the ensuing
decades. Gugsa's son and successor Ras Yeman (1825-8) sided with the
Muslims against the Christians, while Yeman's nephew Ali Alula (1831-
9. C. Conti Rossini, 1921; R. K. P. Pankhurst, 1968, p. 137.
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53) shared power with his mother Empress M a n a n , a Christian convert 
from Islam, several of whose Muslim relatives became provincial governors. 
Pilgrimage to the tomb of the sixteenth-century Muslim conqueror, A h m a d 
Gragn was revived.10 
T o the south of Amhara , and isolated by Lake Tana and the elbow of 
the Abbay or Blue Nile, lay Gojam, a virtually independent province whose 
population was Amharic-speaking and almost entirely Christian. T h e area 
had been unified in the late eighteenth century by Ras Haylu (d. 1784-5), 
whose descendants were long to struggle among themselves. His son Ras 
Mared (d. 1821) was thus opposed by Dajazmach Zawdé , an O r o m o from 
D a m o t w h o had married the latter's sister, and the conflict was inherited 
by their respective sons and grandsons. These rivalries played into the 
hands of the Yajju dynasty, for the Gojamé princes of the province, as a 
modern scholar states, were 'no match' for the Yajju w h o were, on the 
other hand, never altogether able to dislodge the Gojamés or to maintain 
appointees from outside.11 
Shoa, the third main unit of the empire, was situated in the south-east. 
Its central highlands were inhabited principally by Amharic-speaking 
Christians, while the south and west were occupied by O r o m o traditionalists 
and Muslims, with Muslim Afars to the east. T h e province had been 
isolated by the expansion of the O r o m o , which had enabled its rulers to 
gain independence from their overlords at Gondar. Though linked by a 
trade route to that city, Shoa in fact had more important economic ties, 
through the Afar and Somali lowlands with the Gulf of Aden ports of 
Tajurah and Zeila and the emporium of Harar. Through these routes 
a succession of rulers of Shoa obtained small but growing quantities 
of firearms with which they conquered the neighbouring O r o m o w h o 
lacked such weapons. This expansion gave Shoa control of trade with 
territories further inland that were rich in gold, ivory, coffee, spices and 
slaves. 
Shoa had been ruled since the late seventeenth century by a dynasty of 
its own . 1 2 T h e first chief in the nineteenth century, Asfa Wassan (1775-
1808) whose name, significantly, meant 'expand the frontier', had his 
capital at Ankobar. H e fought fiercely to capture O r o m o land, reorganized 
the tax system, and severed the last links of vassalage to Gondar.13 His 
son, W a s a n Sagad (1808-13), w h o assumed the high-ranking title of raj, 
conducted further expeditions against the O r o m o , and co-operated with 
Ras Walda Sellase of Tigré in raids against Wallo and Yajju. H e followed 
a policy of toleration and, though attempting to Amharize and Christianize 
10. J. S. Trimingham, 1952, pp. 110-11. 
11. C . Conti Rossini, 1947; Takla Yasus, nd; Fantahun Birhane, 1973, p. 11. 
12. H . Salt, 1814, pp.494-6. See also R . Perini, 1905, pp.210-11. 
13. C . F . X . Rochet d'Héricourt, 1841, p. 212; 1846, p. 243; A . Cecchi, 1886-7, Vol. 1, 
pp. 242-3; G . Guèbrè Sellassié, 1930-2, Vol. i, pp. 60-6. 
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the O r o m o , he appointed a number of them, as well as other Muslims, to 
positions of state.14 
Wasan Sagad's son Sahla Sellase (1813-47)was the first Shoan potentate 
to claim the rank of negus, or king, and claimed also to rule 'Yefat, the 
Galla people, and Guragé'. Residing partly at Ankobar and partly at 
Angolola, then recently seized from the O r o m o , he maintained a tolerant 
attitude towards the O r o m o and Muslims, and established dynastic m a r -
riages with them. Developing a system which the British envoy, Captain 
W . C . Harris, described as 'entirely feudal',15 he obtained larger numbers 
of firearms than his predecessors, and encroached further towards the 
fertile lands to the south and west. This enabled him to attract caravans 
from Enarya, Kaffa, Gojam, D a m o t and other regions.16 His desire for 
firearms led him into relations with foreign powers. In 1839 he requested 
a French traveller, Rochet d'Héricourt, to obtain rifles in Paris, and wrote 
to the British East India C o m p a n y to declare: 
G o d has given m e a good and large kingdom, but arts and science 
have not yet come to m y country, as they have to yours. M a y it 
therefore please you to assist m e , particularly in sending guns, 
cannons, and other things which I have not in m y country.17 
Sahla Sellase received diplomatic missions from both Britain and France, 
and signed treaties of friendship and commerce with them, in 1841 and 
1843, respectively. Harris, w h o brought a gift of firearms, quotes him as 
declaring that 'a few more muskets would render m e a match for all 
m y enemies'.18 During his reign Shoa enjoyed peace, which contrasted 
favourably with the war-torn northern provinces. T h e peasants, according 
to the French Saint Simonians, E . C o m b e s and M . Tamasier, 'having 
nothing to fear from the looting of the soldiers', devoted themselves 'with 
greater energy to the cultivation of their lands, certain to harvest after 
having sown'.19 T h e death of Sahla Sellase, like that of several of his 
forebears, was, however, followed by a major O r o m o uprising. This was 
quelled with difficulty by his son Hayla Malakot (1847-55), a weak monarch 
whose reign witnessed m u c h disorder.20 
14. C . F . X . Rochet d'Héricourt, 1841, p. 212; 1846, p . 243; A . Cecchi, 1886-7, Vol. 1, 
pp. 242-4; G . Guèbrè Sellassié, 1930-2, Vol. 1, pp. 67-9. O n the early history of Shoa see 
also D . N . Levine, 1965, pp.21-38; V . Stitz, 1974, pp.64-126, 349-50. 
15. W . C . Harris, 1844, Vol. 2, pp. 177-8. See also C . Johnston, 1844, Vol. 2 , p. 18; A . 
Cecchi, 1886-7, Vol. 1, p . 244; G . Guèbrè Sellassié, 1930-2, Vol. 1, pp. 70-7 . 
16. India Office Records, London, B o m b a y Secret Proceedings, 2060 G . Paragraph 23. 
17. C . W . Isenberg and J. L . Krapf, 1843, p. 251. 
18. India Office Records, London, B o m b a y Secret Proceedings, Vol. 3, p.489; W . C . 
Harris, 1844. 
19. E . Combes and M . Tamasier, 1838, Vol. 2 , p. 346. 
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The port of Massawa
Beyond the confines of the empire the region was also fragmented, and in
many areas distracted by inter-ethnic fighting.
Massawa, an island off the Red Sea coast, and the nearby mainland port
of Arkiko, which together handled most of the trade of northern Ethiopia,21
constituted a distinct cultural unit. The inhabitants, like those of the
neighbouring Samhar plain, were Muslims who spoke Tigré, a Semitic
tongue related to Ge'ez. Contacts with Arabia had also given Arabic exten¬
sive currency, but the presence of merchants and soldiers of many races
produced a babel of tongues. The area was the scene of conflict between
four main interests: first, the Ottoman empire, which had seized Massawa
in 1557, establishing a garrison whose descendants constituted a small
but powerful occupation force; secondly, Egypt, whose rulers on several
occasions purchased or usurped sovereignty on behalfof the Ottoman state;
thirdly, a local aristocratic family, descended from the Ottoman troops and
local Belaw, based at Arkiko and headed by the na'ib, literally 'deputy',
who was nominally in charge only of the coast, but exercised a stranglehold
over Massawa, which was dependent on him for drinking-water and all its
commerce; and, fourthly the governors of Tigré, who, regarding the ports
as indispensable for access to the sea, claimed historic rights there, but,
though dominating the trade of the interior, took only intermittent action
to enforce their claims.
Effective control of the ports at the beginning of the century was divided
21. R.K.P. Pankhurst, 1961, pp-339~46; 1968, PP-357~9i-
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between the Turkish garrison and the na'ib w h o , in the absence of any 
Ottoman governor, had made himself defacto ruler of Massawa, and spoke 
of'the gate of Habash as his'.22 Such pretensions were resented by Walda 
Sellase of Tigré, w h o 'expressed m u c h displeasure', sent a military force 
against the na'ib, and would have 'cut off all communication' had the latter 
not 'appeased him'.23 In an attempt to break the na'iFs power, a British 
nobleman, Lord Valentia, advocated the purchase by his government of 
an island in the nearby bay of Zulla, but nothing came of the plan.24 
T h e na'iFs paramountcy ended in 1813-14 when the ruler of Egypt, 
M u h a m m e d 'AIT, seized Massawa on behalf of the Ottomans. His soldier 
son, Ibrahim, was appointed by the Porte as governor of Hidjäz and 
Abyssinia, but the latter portion of the title, though expressive of M u h a m -
m a d 'Alfs ambitions, was a fiction, for Egypt's rule was limited to the 
island, and even there scarcely effective. In 1826 the na'ib, using his control 
over Massawa's water supply, forced the intruders to withdraw, and, 
despite the continued presence of the garrison, again dominated the area.25 
T h e Egyptian evacuation aroused the dormant Ethiopian interest. Saba-
gadis of Tigré requested King George IV of Britain to 'take the port of 
Mussowa, and give it to us or keep it',26 but the British government refused. 
M u h a m m a d 'AIT seized Massawa again in 1833, but withdrew in 1841. 
At about this time W e b é of Tigré sent an embassy to King Louis-Philippe 
of France offering the nearby bay of Amfilla in return for firearms and 
support for his claim to the coast, but the French were unwilling to co-
operate.27 T h e na'ib took advantage of Webé's defeat at Dabra Tabor in 
1842 to encroach into the district of Hamasén, whereupon W e b é carried 
out a razzia into the Samhar plain in 1843-4. T w o years later he offered 
Arkiko to the French government, but this proposal too was not accepted. 
M u h a m m a d 'AIT regained suzerainty over Massawa in 1846, in return for 
an annual payment to the Turks of 20 000 Maria Theresa dollars. In the 
following year his soldiers took over the island, and shortly afterwards 
attacked Arkiko, burnt it to the ground, and built a fort on the mainland. 
T h e na'ib became their puppet. Determined to establish control over the 
whole region, they called upon the coastal rulers as far as the Somali port 
of Berbera to submit to them. W e b é , infuriated, again despatched an army 
into Samhar in 1843. His m e n pillaged Arkiko, but, unable to capture 
Massawa, withdrew. H e addressed a dramatic appeal to Queen Victoria in 
which he claimed that his predecessors had formerly 'governed all the coast 
of the Red Sea' and requested her to prevent his enemies from 'setting foot 
22. G . Valentía, 1811, Vol. 3, p. 252. 
23. ibid., Vol. 3, p . 40. 
24. ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 261-78. 
25. R . K . P . Pankhurst, 1964b, pp.38-9. 
26. Public Record Office, K e w , England, F O 1/2. 
27. Public Record Office, K e w , England, F O 1 /3; T . Lefêbvre, 1845-54, Vol. 1, pp. 103-4. 
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on the mainland',28 but the British refused. His expedition nevertheless 
demonstrated Tigré's interest in the coast, and revealed the probability of 
further intervention should the Egyptians attempt to encroach on the 
hinterland. 
T h e Afar lowlands 
T o the south-east of Massawa the arid lowlands were occupied by the Afar, 
a Kushitic-speaking nomadic people, w h o at the beginning of the century 
were ruled by the inland sultanate of Awsa. Established a century earlier 
when the Asaimara or 'red' Afar, occupied the fertile Awsa valley, the 
sultanate was governed by Sultan Ijdahis whose main rivals were the 
Adoimara, or 'white' Afar, to the south. His death around 1810 led to 
confusion in which the Adoimara sacked Awsa , and forced his successor 
to share power with them. Their growing strength was reinforced by the 
rise of Shoa, whose expanding trade resulted in the emergence of the port 
of Tadjüra.29 
T h e Danakil coast acquired international interest after the British occu-
pation of Aden in 1839. In the following year an officer of the British East 
India C o m p a n y , Captain Moresby, purchased an offshore island from the 
sultan of Tadjüra for 'ten bags of rice'. T h e chief also signed a document 
engaging 'at all times to respect and regard the friendly advice' of the 
British, and 'not to enter into any other Treaty or Bond with any other 
European nation or person' without British approval.30 T w o Frenchmen, 
C o m b e s and Broquand, acting for a French company, the Société Nanto-
Bordelaise, soon afterwards bought the coastal village of E d d from its local 
chief for 1800 Maria Theresa dollars, only to discover that its exposed 
position made it unsuitable for a port.31 
T h e Somali and the H o r n of Africa 
Further to the east, the desert lowlands on the Gulf of Aden were inhabited 
by Muslim Somali, w h o spoke another Kushitic tongue and had long been 
under Arab influence. Zeila, a port handling the trade of Shoa, the Ogaden, 
and Harar, had since 1630 been a dependency of the Arab port of M o k h a 
whose rulers had farmed it out to a succession of Arab amirs whose 
authority, however, scarcely extended beyond the town.32 T h e rest of the 
coastal strip belonged to nomadic Somali w h o also claimed ownership of 
Berbera, a virtually uninhabited port that burst into life every winter when 
caravans from the interior arrived to exchange their goods for manufactures 
28. Great Britain, 1868, p. 30. 
29. M . Abir, 1968, pp. 23-4. See also I. M . Lewis, 1955, pp. 155-60. 
30. E . Hertslet, 1894, Vol. 1, p. 275; Vol. 2, p. 382. 
31. P . V . Ferret and J. G . Galinier, 1847-8, Vol. 2, pp. 436-7; R . K . P. Pankhurst, 1966b, 
pp. 203-18. 
32. J. S. Trimingham, 1952, p. 97. 
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imported by merchants from Arabia, the Persian Gulf and India.33 T h e 
fair was so important that a popular saying held that ' H e w h o c o m m a n d s 
at Berbera, holds the beard of Harar in his hands'.34 
T h e importance of the northern Somali coast was not lost on M u h a m m a d 
'All, w h o seized Berbera in 1821, but abandoned it on account of local 
opposition. A decade or so later the Egyptians resumed their interest in 
the area, but withdrew in 1841 whereupon the governorship of Zeila was 
purchased by an ambitious Somali merchant, Hädjdjl 'Ali Shermerki. 
Anxious to monopolize the commerce of the region, he seized Berbera and 
encouraged Issa groups from the interior to attack caravans bound for 
Tadjüra. His increasing power was, however, resented by the amir of Harar, 
w h o encouraged the Haber Awal Somali to oppose the occupation of 
Berbera. Shermerki responded by inciting other Somali to close the route 
to Berbera and to depose the amir, but the Haber Awal drove his m e n from 
the port in 1852. H e attempted to blockade it but the British at Aden 
obliged him to desist, and he was arrested by the Ottoman authorities at 
Mecca in 1855. Zeila was then given to A b ü Bakar, an Afar slave-trader 
from the Tadjüra area.35 
T h e coast from Bender Ziada on the Gulf of Aden to Illig on the 
Indian Ocean was part of the Majerteyn sultanate, which m a y have been 
established as early as the fifteenth century. This sultanate of semi-nomadic 
people derived most of its meagre revenues from the export of incense and 
aromatic wood. A long tradition of seafaring along the rugged coast pro-
vided the region's nomadic residents with an alternative source of income. 
B y the nineteenth century, the sultan's authority over the interior clans 
was nominal at best. In 1839, the sultan signed a treaty at Aden with the 
British that provided him with an annual stipend in exchange for his 
assistance in protecting the lives and property of British seamen ship-
wrecked off his coast.36 
Further south the Benadir, or Somali-inhabited Indian Ocean coast, was 
at the beginning of the century a protectorate of O m a n , but became 
independent of it in the 1820s as a result of British East India C o m -
pany intervention, after which the area passed under the suzerainty of 
the Sultan of Zanzibar whose representative resided at the port of Brava 
(Barawa). 
T h e port of Mogadishu (Mogadiscio) was practically autonomous; as C . 
Guillain noted, the Zanzibar sultans' authority, like their customs officials, 
came and went with the monsoons.37 T h e hinterland of Mogadishu was 
controlled by the Geledi clan, whose sultans contracted alliances with m a n y 
other clans in the region between the Shebelle and Juba rivers. Through 
33. R . Burton, 1894, Vol. i, pp. 71-4; R . K . P. Pankhurst, 1968, pp.421-4. 
34. R . Burton, 1894, Vol. 2, p. 28. 
35. ibid, Vol. 1, pp. 11-15; M . Abir, 1968, pp. 14-15. 
36. I. M . Lewis, 1965, p. 38; M . Pirone, 1961, Vol. 2, pp. 66-8, 87-8. 
37. C . Guillain, 1856, Vol. 3, pp. 185-6; I . M . Lewis, 1965, pp. 37-9. 
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m u c h of the century, the Geledi alliance dominated the ivory trade that 
ran from L u k (Lugh) on the upper Juba to Mogadishu; the Geledi sultans 
also collected tribute from the agricultural clans along the lower Shebelle 
valley as far south as Brava. Only the powerful Bimal clan, situated in the 
hinterland of Merka, succeeded in resisting Geledi hegemony.38 T h e sultans 
of Zanzibar, in the meantime, were forced to respect the authority of the 
Geledi rulers. Power in the Benadir was thus shared in a delicate equi-
librium; when, for example, the sultan of Zanzibar sought to construct a 
fort in Mogadishu in 1870, he had to obtain the approval of Sultan A h m e d 
Yüsuf of the Geledi.39 
A major event that is still vividly remembered in the oral traditions of 
the southern Somali was the Bardera djihäd, a militant movement of Islamic 
reform launched from the religious settlement of Bardera on the Juba river 
in the late 1830s. T h e reformers sought to impose their version of an 
Islamic theocracy on the peoples of southern Somalia, and even succeeded 
in subduing the coastal town of Brava in 1840. In 1843, however, the 
Geledi sultan, Yüsuf M u h a m m a d , gathered his allies from the area between 
the Shebelle and the Juba and led a massive expedition against the 
reformers. T h e settlement of Bardera was besieged and burned to the 
ground, and Sultan Yüsuf became for a time the most powerful leader in 
southern Somalia.40 In the second half of the nineteenth century, a number 
of Islamic orders - the Kâdirîyya, Ahmadiyya, and Salihiyya - began to 
penetrate the Somali interior, and religious settlements sprang up through-
out the countryside.41 
Finally, beginning in the early part of the century, the last great wave 
of Somali migrations carried nomads from the Ogaden plains toward the 
Juba river and beyond. S o m e of these pastoral nomads took part in the 
Bardera djihad and eventually pushed across the Juba, where they came 
into conflict with the O r o m o . T h e latter were ultimately forced toward the 
Tana river, where the British found them when they occupied the East 
African Protectorate.42 
T h e e m p o r i u m of Harar 
Inland from the Somali coast, in the highlands, stood the walled Muslim 
city of Harar whose inhabitants spoke Adaré, a Semitic language not known 
elsewhere. T h e town had for several centuries been an independent state 
ruled by an amir w h o wielded such extensive powers that the British 
38. O n two separate occasions, in 1848 and again in 1878, Bimal warriors were respon-
sible for the death of Geledi sultans on the battlefield. C . Guillain, 1856, Vol. 3, pp. 445-
6; G . Revoil, 1885, pp. 26-7. 
39. G . Revoil, 1885, p. 22; I. M . Lewis, 1965, p. 38. 
40. L . V . Cassanelli, 1982, pp. i35-4°-
41. ibid., pp. 194-7; E . Cerulli, 1957, Vol. 1, pp. 187-95. 
42. L . V . Cassanelli, 1982, pp. 29-30. 
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traveller Richard Burton exclaimed, 'The government of Harar is the 
Amir'.4 3 
T h e emporium of Shoa, Arussi, Guragé, and the Ogaden, the town 
coined its o w n money , and did a flourishing trade in coffee, chat (a narcotic 
leaf), saffron, hides and skins, ivory and slaves, besides textiles and other 
imported goods. Harar, which had m a n y mosques and Muslim shrines, 
and was a centre of Kur'anic scholarship visited by Arab shaykhs, exerted 
strong religious and cultural influence on the nearby Kushitic-speaking 
Qpttu O r o m o , as well as among some of the Somali. Both groups had 
intermarried with the Harari nobility, and in some cases their leaders 
sought recognition from the amirs. 
B y the early nineteenth century the city was torn by internal strife and 
under strong pressure from the O r o m o , but its perspicacious amir, A h m a d 
ibn M u h a m m a d (1794-1821), held his enemies at bay. His death was, 
however, followed by strife within his family, as a result of which the 
O r o m o and, to a lesser extent, the Somali, seized land in the vicinity of the 
city, which survived only through the strength of its walls, its handful of 
artillery and small band of musketeers.44 
T h e Guragé region and Kaffa 
Further inland again lay the Guragé region, whose inhabitants spoke a 
Semitic language, and were divided between those of the west w h o had 
been Christian since the Middle Ages, and those to the east w h o had 
adopted Islam. T h o u g h once governed by a local dynasty, the area had by 
the early nineteenth century come under the rule of seven independent 
clans known as the sabat bét, or seven houses, whose lack of unity m a d e 
them an easy prey to slave-raiders, and facilitated their annexation by Sahla 
Sellase of Shoa.45 
T o the south-west of the Ethiopian region, in fertile well-wooded high-
land country lay the old kingdom of Kaffa, a traditionalist state that spoke 
its o w n Katicho language. T h e area, the source of valuable exports, among 
them civet, ivory, slaves, and coffee, which grew wild, had been largely 
isolated by O r o m o expansion; but in the eighteenth century had m a d e 
inroads into the territories of its neighbours. B y 1820, its king, Hotti 
Gaotscho, ruled northwards and eastwards as far as the Gibbé and O m o 
46 
rivers. 
43. R . Burton, 1894, Vol. 2, p. 20. 
44. E . Cerulli, 1942, pp. 1-20; M . Abir, 1968, pp. 10-11; S. Tedeschi, 1874, pp.481-
500; J. S. Trimingham, 1952, p. n o . For a description of Harar in the middle of the 
century, see also R . Burton, 1894, Vol. 2, pp. 13-29. 
45. W . A . Shack, 1966, pp. 16-17; P. Lebel, 1974, pp. 104-5. 
46. F.J. Bieber, 1920-3, Vol. 1., pp.89-90; A . Cecchi, 1886-7, Vol. 2, pp.483-91; 




The regions south of the Blue Nile were inhabited by traditionalist Oromo,
who, early in the century, were in a state ofpolitical flux. The old egalitarian
gada system involving rule by rotating age-groups was challenged by rich
and powerful military leaders, often known by the title of abba dula or
'father of war', who began to claim life-long authority and the right to
establish dynasties. In the first decades of the century, three Oromo
monarchies emerged: Enarya (also known as Limmu), Goma, and Guma
to the west.47 Enarya, the most powerful, was ruled by Bofu, an able chief
who, to strengthen his power, accepted the advice of Muslim merchants
and embraced Islam. He was succeeded by his son Ibsa, or Abba Bagibo
(1825-61), who forged dynastic alliances with neighbouring ruling houses
and obtained a number of matchlock guns from Gojam, which gave him
an impregnable position. During his long reign trade, mainly in slaves,
plate 15.3 Amir Ahmad ibn Muhammad ofHarar, 1794-1821
gold, ivory and civet, flourished, and the kingdom became rich and power¬
ful, though the expansion of Shoa later severed the trade route to Harar
and the ports of the Gulf of Aden, and Abba Bagibo's death was followed
by the rapid decline of the polity he had built.
The more southerly kingdoms of Jimma-Kakka also known as Jimma
Abba Jifar, and of Gera, to the south-west, came into existence a few years
47. For a chronicle of Guma, see E. Cerulli, 1922, pp. 148-62.
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after the emergence of Enarya. J imma-Kakka , the most enduring O r o m o 
monarchy, was founded by A b b a Magal, a m a n of the Hirmata region, w h o 
conducted a series of victorious expeditions that were continued by his 
sons, one of w h o m , A b b a Jifar Sana, originally held the title of abba dula, 
but after adopting Islam in 1830, proclaimed himself moti, or king (1830-
55), and effected m a n y political and administrative innovations. His suc-
cessor A b b a Reba (1855-9) alienated the neighbouring O r o m o rulers, w h o 
united and killed him in battle in 1859. T h e state then passed under the 
control of A b b a Jifar Sana's brother A b b a Boko (1859-62) w h o expanded 
Islam, and ordered the building of mosques in all his provinces, while his 
son and successor Abba G o m m o l (1862-78) further extended the realm.48 
T h e area covered by this chapter thus constituted a galaxy of states and 
polities, each moving in its o w n orbit, but significantly affecting, and 
affected by, the other entities in the constellation. Each ruler kept a watchful 
eye on his neighbours but would often exchange gifts and courtesies with 
them unless actually at war. Dynastic marriages were made whenever 
practicable, though these only occasionally crossed barriers of religion. 
C o m m e r c e , on the other hand, made little distinction between faiths, and 
trade routes linked traditionalist, Christian and Muslim localities. Ethnic 
and linguistic communities remained largely distinct, but there was m u c h 
cross-fertilization of cultures. This was true not only of the Ethiopian 
highlands and the Red Sea coastlands, but also further south along the 
Somali-Oromo frontier where later nineteenth-century travellers reported 
the existence of bilingual trading communities.49 
The unifying efforts of Emperor Téwodros II 
T h e disunity of the first half of the century gave way in the second to two 
notable attempts at reunification, the first by Dajazmach Kassa Heyku, the 
future Emperor Téwodros II, or Theodore, of Ethiopia, whose reign put 
an end to the era of the Masafent. 
Born c. 1820, Kassa was the son of a chief of Qwara, on the borders of 
the Sudan, whose destitute widow had been obliged to make a living by 
selling kosso, the Ethiopian medicine for tapeworm. Brought up in a 
monastery, Kassa became a freelance soldier, made himself master of Q w a r a 
and assumed the title of Dajazmach. Empress M a n a n , mother of Ras 'AIT, 
the Yajju ruler of Bagemder, attempted to win his support by marrying 
him to her granddaughter, Tawabech, but he rebelled, pillaged D a m b e y a , 
and defeated the commander despatched against 'the kosso vendor's son' 
as he had disdainfully been called. Kassa occupied Gondar in 1847, and 
later captured the Empress. H e released her only when Ras cAlï recognized 
48. A . Cecchi, 1886-^7, Vol. 2, pp. 156-^7,238-40, 266-^7, 537-42; G . W . B . Huntingford, 
1955, p. 20; M . Abir, 1965, pp. 205-19; H . S. Lewis, 1965, pp. 24-41, 44. 
49. U . Ferrandi, 1903, p.316, n.i. 
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him as chief of the western frontier area. This triumph over the Yajju, 
whose pro-Muslim policy had alienated m a n y Amhara Christians, 
enhanced Kassa's following. In 1848, he attacked the Egyptians in the 
Sudan, and advanced to less than a hundred kilometres from Sennar. 
However, because of the potency of Egyptian firearms he was unable to 
capture it. Following reconciliation, he served Ras Ali until 1852 when 
he again revolted. T h e Ras proclaimed the transfer of Kassa's lands to 
Dajazmach Goshu Zawdé , the ruler of Gojam, w h o set off to crush the 
upstart. Kassa, however, easily defeated the Gojamé, and attempted to 
reconcile himself with Ali, but the latter marched with Dajazmach W e b é 
of Tigré against him. Kassa routed their combined armies in 1853, and 
burnt Ali's capital, Dabra Tabor, after which he defeated the Ras at Ayshal 
in Gojam. This battle marked the end of the Yajju dynasty and closed the 
era of the Masafent. T h e victorious chief's sole remaining rivals in north 
Ethiopia were Goshu's son, Dajazmach Beru of Gojam and W e b é of Tigré. 
Kassa attacked and captured the former in 1854, after which he assumed 
the title of negus. In the following year he marched against W e b é in Samen, 
and defeated him at Darasgé where he captured no less than 7000 firearms.50 
H e then had himself crowned as emperor, and chose the throne name 
Téwodros, a significant appellation as it was prophesied that a monarch of 
that name would rule righteously, eradicate Islam, and capture Jerusalem.51 
T h e character and aspirations of the new emperor are graphically por-
trayed by a British observer, Consul Plowden, w h o declared in 1855 that 
Téwodros believed himself a 'destined monarch' and was 'capable of great 
things, good or evil . . . H e is just, hearing in person the poorest peasant; 
he has stopped the system of bribes; he has by his o w n example . . . 
discouraged polygamy and concubinage; he has forbidden the Slave Trade, 
and has tranquillized the whole country'.52 T h e consul depicted Téwodros 
as a visionary, and observed: 
H e is persuaded that he is destined to restore the glories of Ethiopian 
Empire, and to achieve great conquests; of untiring energy, both 
mental and bodily, his personal and moral daring are boundless. T h e 
latter is well proved by his severity towards his soldiers, even when 
these, pressed by hunger, are mutinous, and he is in front of a powerful 
foe; more so even by his pressing reforms on a country so little used 
to any yoke . . . and his suppression of the power of the great feudal 
Chiefs at a m o m e n t when any inferior m a n would have sought to 
conciliate them as the stepping-stones to Empire . . . 
T h e arduous task of breaking the power of the great feudal Chiefs -
a task achieved in Europe only during the reign of m a n y consecutive 
Kings - he has commenced by chaining almost all w h o were dangerous 
. . . H e has placed the soldiers of the different provinces under the 
50. C . Conti Rossini, 1947, pp. 392-6; S . Rubenson, 1966, pp. 35—45. 
51. O n the Téwodros prophesy, see R . K . P. Pankhurst, 1974. 
52. Great Britain, 1868, pp. 143-4. 
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c o m m a n d of his o w n trusty followers, to w h o m he has given high 
titles, but no power to judge or punish; thus, in fact, creating generals 
in place of feudal Chieftains . . . 
As regards commerce, he has put an end to a number of vexatious 
exactions, and has ordered that duties shall be levied only at three 
places in his dominions . . . he intends also to disarm the people, and 
to establish a regular standing army, armed with muskets only, having 
declared that he will convert swords and lances into ploughshares and 
reaping-hooks and cause a plough-ox to be sold dearer than the noblest 
war horse. . . 
S o m e of his ideas m a y be imperfect, others impracticable; but a 
m a n w h o . . . has done so m u c h and contemplates such large designs, 
cannot be regarded as of an ordinary stamp.53 
Téwodros proved a notable unifier, innovator, and reformer.54 After his 
coronation he marched into Wallo, and seized the natural mountain fortress 
of Magdala which was to become his capital. Later in the year he overran 
Shoa, the last Christian province outside his control, and appointed Hayla 
Mika'él, a brother of the deceased King Hayla Malakot, as his governor, 
and took the latter's son Menilek away as hostage. 
Realizing he could control the country only by military means, Téwodros 
decided to reorganize his army. His experience with the Egyptians, wrote 
a British traveller, Henry Dufton, convinced him that the 'primitive m o d e 
of warfare' would have to be 'superseded'.55 H e therefore sought to replace 
unpaid feudal levies, w h o ravaged the countryside without being very 
effective on the battlefield, by a well-equipped army of professional soldiers. 
As early as 1853 he was reported to have 'disciplined his army',5 6 with the 
help of some Turks, and also m a d e use of a British adventurer, John Bell.57 
Téwodros adopted the practice of giving his soldiers 'sums of money' to 
accustom them to the idea of regular pay,58 and marshalled his m e n into 
regiments, by mixing up those from several provinces, 'thus striking a 
mighty blow against the feudal system, under which the m e n clustered 
round the Chief of their native district'.59 H e established granaries for the 
army, and ordered his soldiers to purchase their food instead of harassing 
the peasants, though this prohibition was difficult to enforce.60 
Téwodros, determined to increase his firepower, attempted, with the 
53. Great Britain, 1868, pp. 150-1. 
54. For various views of Téwodros see A . d'Abbadie, 1868a, 1868b; T . Noldeke, 1892, 
pp.257-84; C . J . Jaenem, 1966, pp.25-56; D . C r u m m e y , 1969, pp.457-69; M . Morgan, 
1969, pp. 245-69. 
55. H . Dufton, 1867, p. 138. 
56. Great Britain, 1868, p. 76. 
57. H . Dufton, 1867, pp. 183-4. 
58. Great Britain, 1868, p. 150. 
59. ibid., p. 166. 
60. M . Moreno, 1962, pp. 160-1. 
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help of foreign merchants, to import arms,61 but this was difficult as the 
Egyptians in the Sudan and the Turks at Massawa were both hostile, and 
the rulers of Tigré, which was largely outside his control, were also jealous 
of allowing the passage of weapons. H e therefore conceived the plan of 
compelling missionaries and other foreign craftsmen to manufacture guns. 
In 1855 he accepted an offer by Samuel Gobat, the Protestant bishop of 
Jerusalem, to send him a group of workmen-missionaries from the Chri-
schona Institute near Basle in Switzerland. W h e n they presented gifts of 
Bibles, Téwodros declared that he 'would have been more pleased with a 
box of English gunpowder'.62 Realizing the value of the craftsmen, however, 
he treated them kindly, and settled them at Gafat near his capital Dabra 
Tabor. They were later joined by a French gunsmith and a Polish deserter 
from the Russian army.63 In 1861 Téwodros ordered the foreigners to 
construct a cannon, mortars and bomb-shells.64 T h e missionaries at first 
demurred, but the Emperor insisted, and imprisoned their servants until 
their masters consented. 'In their perplexity, they could not do otherwise 
than promise to try', and it was not long before Dabra Tabor saw cannon 
balls 'soaring up into the air and bursting with a loud crash which m a d e 
the hills resound with a thousand echoes'.65 Téwodros presented the 
craftsmen with shirts of honour, horses and mules with gold and silver 
trappings, and one thousand Maria Theresa dollars each, and then ordered 
the casting of still larger weapons. Eventually he asked for a cannon capable 
of discharging a 1000 pound shell. This gun, which was called 'SebastapoF, 
weighed seven tons and required five hundred people to pull it. T h e 
Emperor declared the day of its casting one of the happiest of his life. H e 
also contemplated 'sending to England and France some of his more 
intelligent subjects, to learn useful arts and manufactures'.66 
Conscious of the need to move his forces with the greatest possible 
rapidity, Téwodros set his European craftlsmen to work on road construc-
tion.67 T h e manual work was unpopular with the soldiers, w h o despised 
such labour, but the monarch himself set the example, and according to a 
British observer, Henry Blanc, 'from early dawn to late at night . . . was 
himself at work; with his o w n hands he removed stones, levelled the ground 
and helped to fill in ravines. N o one could leave so long as he was there 
himself. T h e task 'would have driven any other m a n to despair', but 
Téwodros 'little by little m a d e a road creditable even to a European 
engineer'.68 His roads were designed to link Dabra Tabor with Gondar, 
61. H . M . Stanley, 1871, p.273; R . K . P . Pankhurst, 1972, p.92. 
62. C . T . Beke, 1867, p. 259. 
63. H . Dufton, 1867, pp. 81—3. 
64. ibid., pp. 83-4. 
65. ibid., pp. 84-5. 
66. Ibid., p. 138. 
67. Great Britain, 1868, p. 189. 
68. H.Blanc, 1868, p. 344. 
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Gojam and Magdala, in extremely mountainous country. Clements
Markham, another British observer, describes the road to Magdala as
'a most remarkable work, a monument of dogged and unconquerable
resolution'.69
Though a man ofwar, Téwodros was keenly interested in the pacification
of his war-torn land. He issued an edict in 1855 that 'everyone should
return to his lawful vocation, the merchant to his trade, and the farmer to
his plough'.70 He also sought to eradicate banditry. On one occasion a
group of robbers came to him armed to the teeth, asking him to confirm
their right to exercise the occupation of their fathers. Without suspicion
he asked what this was, to which they insolently replied 'Highway robbery'.
'Your profession', he answered, 'is dangerous, and agriculture is more
profitable. Go down into the plain and cultivate it ... I will myself give
you oxen and ploughs'. The men proving obdurate, he gave them a later
appointment, and when they again refused to listen, had his soldiers shoot
and hack them to death. Such severity, according to the French traveller
Guillaume Lejean, brought peace, and the trade routes, until then blood¬
stained by brigands and civil war, became as safe as those of France or
Germany.71 Téwodros, anxious to weld his empire together, also sought to
eliminate religious differences. He ordered the Muslims in his dominions,
69. C. R. Markham, 1869, pp. 295-6.
70. G. Lejean, 1865, p. 63.
71. C. Mondon-Vidailhet, nd, pp. 23-4; G. Lejean, 1865, pp. 63-4, 67.
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Plowden notes, 'to become Christian within the year', and expelled all
Roman Catholics.72 He was later quoted as declaring that if he did not
'make Gallas and Amharas eat together at the same table' he should no
longer be called a Christian.73 In order to consolidate his control of Tigré,
his first wife having died, he married Terunash, or Teruwarq, daughter of
his old enemy, Dajazmach Webé.74
The reforming monarch also turned his attention to the Church, whose
head, Abuna Salama, he had imprisoned as early as 1857. Téwodros sought
to reduce the number of clergy, to curtail ecclesiastical land, and to make
the priests dependent on state salaries.75 These measures were strenuously
plate 15.6 Ethiopian churchmen in the 1840s
opposed by the clergy.76 In the long run, hostility from the priests, coupled
with that of the provincial nobles, turned much of the population against
him. According to the Swedish historian, Sven Rubenson, this was 'prob¬
ably the single most important cause of his failure'.77
Provincial opposition in fact proved impossible to break. The first
72. Great Britain, 1868, p. 143. See also p. 172.
73. M. Moreno, 1962, p. 162.
74. S. Rubenson, 1966, p. 56.
75. R.K.P. Pankhurst, 1968, p. 143.
76. D. Dufton, 1867, p. 140.
77. S. Rubenson, 1966, p. 72.
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challenge came from Tigré, where a dissident chief, A g a w Negusé, 
attempted in 1856 to obtain the protection of France, and offered to accept 
a R o m a n Catholic, Bishop de Jacobis, as abuna. In 1859, Negusé ceded 
the port of Zulla in return for French military assistance78 but fear of 
offending the British prevented the French from ratifying the agreement,79 
and Negusé was routed in i860. 
T h e latter years of the reign were, however, a period of greater difficulties. 
There were constant rebellions, notably by A m a d é Bashir in Wallo where 
Téwodros fought a determined war, while in Shoa, Bezabeh, a local prince, 
declared his independence. Gojam came under the control of a rebel noble, 
Tedia Gwalu, while another chief, Tiso Gobasé, seized Gondar, and 
W a g s h u m Gobasé, son of the former ruler of Lasta, revolted there. N o less 
serious, Menelik, heir to the throne of Shoa, escaped from Magdala in 
1865, and proclaimed himself an independent sovereign. Faced with ever 
mounting opposition, Téwodros had recourse to violence. H e burnt Gondar 
in 1864 and sacked it, as well as neighbouring Dambeya , in 1866, when 
his soldiers destroyed most of the old capital's churches. Processional 
crosses, manuscripts and other valuables were carried off to Dabra Tabor, 
and many brass and silver objects were melted down to make cannon. 
Hundreds of persons were executed. Such violence, which stands in stark 
contrast to Téwodros's likeable characteristics, such as his love of children,80 
caused M a r k h a m to liken him to Peter the Great of Russia.81 
Conflict with Britain 
T h e last years of Téwodros's reign were clouded by a bizarre dispute with 
Britain. Faced by increasing opposition in his empire, and the need for 
technical assistance from Europe, he despatched letters to Queen Victoria 
and Emperor Napoleon III of France in 1862, proposing to send them 
embassies. T h e letter to Queen Victoria, which sparked off the conflict, 
declared: 
M y fathers the Emperors having forgotten our Creator, H e handed 
over their Kingdom to the Gallas and Turks. But G o d created m e , 
lifted m e out of the dust, and restored this Empire to m y rule . . . By 
His power I drove away the Gallas. But for the Turks, I have told 
them to leave the land of m y ancestors. They refuse. I a m going to 
wrestle with them. 
Explaining that the Turks had prevented him sending an embassy he 
declared that he wished Queen Victoria to arrange for its 'safe passage'.82 
78. S. Rüssel, 1884; J. Kolmodin, 1912-15, pp. i39~43» 145-6-
79. G . Douin, 1936-41, Vol. 3, Part I, pp. 248-9. 
80. H . Dufton, 1868, p. 106. 
81. C R . M a r k h a m , 1869, p.293. See also D . C r u m m e y , 1971, pp. 107-25. 
82. Great Britain, 1868, p. 225. 
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Consul Cameron, the British representative, forwarded this appeal to 
London, reporting that its author had asked him to procure engineers and 
doctors from England, and observed that there 'need be no fear of bad 
treatment' as the missionaries working for the monarch were 'very liberally' 
treated.83 T h e two letters reached London in mid-February, but were not 
considered of importance. N o reply was vouchsafed to the Emperor's, 
while Cameron's remained unanswered until late April when the British 
Foreign Secretary, Earl Russell, returned an unsympathetic response.84 
T h e British government, he later observed, felt that 'considering the short 
tenure of power of Abyssinian Kings' it was desirable 'to withdraw as m u c h 
as possible from Abyssinian engagements, Abyssinian Alliances, and British 
interference in Abyssinia'.85 
A s time passed and his letter remained unanswered Téwodros became 
impatient. H e was irritated that the British government showed no interest 
in Ethiopia, the more so as he knew the French had supported the rebel 
Negusé, and felt that his royal dignity had been slighted. Cameron m a d e 
matters worse by visiting the Egyptian side of the Sudan border, and 
exchanging courtesies with officials there, thus giving the impression that 
he sided with an enemy then overrunning Ethiopia.86 Russell's letter to 
Cameron confirmed the Emperor's fears, for it brusquely stated, 'it is not 
desirable for Her Majesty's Agents to meddle in the Affairs of Abyssinia', 
and that the consul should return to Massawa, and remain there 'until 
further notice'.87 T h e British government, it seemed, was breaking off 
diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and transferring support to Egypt and 
the Turks in Massawa. Shortly afterwards Téwodros learnt that a mission-
ary, Henry Stern, had published unfavourable remarks about him, among 
them the accusation that missionaries were tried and sentenced to con-
finement. Not long afterwards, in November , Cameron's secretary, Kerens, 
arrived with a letter from Earl Russell's secretary, reminding the consul of 
his instructions to return to Massawa, and adding that he was only consul 
at the port, and had 'no Representative character in Abyssinia'.88 
Téwodros's anger was intensified by a gift which Kerens brought - a 
carpet on which was represented a turbanned soldier, attacking a lion, and 
behind him a mounted European. Téwodros interpreted the animal to 
signify himself; the soldier, the Egyptians and the horseman, the French, 
supporting the Egyptians. 'But where,' he exclaimed, 'are the English to 
back up the Lion?'89 His conclusion that Britain was abandoning him to 
83. Great Britain, 1868, pp. 223-4. 
84. ibid., p. 229. 
85. ibid., p. 396. 
86. C . T . Beke, 1867, pp. 93-4. 
87. Great Britain, 1868, p. 229. 
88. ibid., pp. 236-43. 
89. C . T . Beke, 1867, pp. 124-5. 
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Egypt was no wild assumption, for Britain was anxious to be on friendly 
terms with Egypt, which produced 70 million kg of cotton a year,90 at a 
time w h e n world supplies were short as a result of the American Civil W a r . 
W h e n the head of the Ethiopian convent maintained since the Middle 
Ages91 in Jerusalem arrived with news that Egyptian Coptic priests had 
endeavoured to seize the convent, but that the British representative 
had been reluctant to intervene on Ethiopia's side,92 Téwodros became 
enraged and reacted in January 1864 by putting Cameron and his party 
in chains. 
N e w s that the consul had been forbidden to leave Ethiopia had m e a n -
while alarmed the British government. T h e Emperor's long-forgotten letter 
was taken from the files, and a reply was quickly drawn up and entrusted 
to H o r m u z d Rassam, the British Assistant Resident in Aden. After m u c h 
delay Rassam reached the Emperor's c a m p in February 1866. Téwodros's 
position had by then seriously deteriorated. T . M . Fiad reported that 
'the whole country' was 'in a most disturbed condition, rebels rising 
everywhere',93 while C . D . Cameron had prophesied that the state was 'on 
the eve of dissolution'.94 Téwodros nevertheless gave Rassam a w a r m 
welcome,95 and released Cameron, Stern and the other European prisoners. 
Shortly afterwards, however, he arrested Rassam and the other foreigners, 
apparently in the hope of forcing the British government to listen to 
his request for foreign workers. H e then sent Fiad to England, in April, 
to obtain two gunsmiths and an artillery officer, as well as several 
other artisans, and a blast steam-engine for his foundry and a gunpowder-
mill.96 
Initially, the detention of Rassam and his colleagues had the effect 
Téwodros desired. In July 1866 the British representative in Egypt 
observed that the release of the captives would depend 'very m u c h ' on the 
'amount of satisfaction' the Emperor would receive,97 and in August the 
British Political Resident in A d e n , Lieutenant-Colonel Merewether, 
declared that the government should meet the monarch's requests 'frankly 
and most liberally'.98 Such reasoning was accepted by the government, 
which agreed to Téwodros's request in less than a week.99 A few days later, 
however, news was received from Flad's wife that Téwodros had again 
imprisoned the captives. Relations with the foreigners had in fact taken a 
90. ibid., p. 35. 
91. For the history of the Ethiopian association with Jerusalem, see E . Cerulli, 1957. 
92. C T . Beke, 1867, pp. 129-34. 
93. Great Britain, 1868, p. 348. 
94. ibid., p. 351. 
95. H . Rassam, 1869, Vol. 2, p. 45. 
96. Great Britain, 1868, p. 478. See also H . Rassam, 1869, Vol. 2, pp. 102-3. 
97. Great Britain, 1868, p. 484. 
98. ibid, p. 492. 
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turn for the worse. Rassam, in trying to arrange for the departure of the 
prisoners, had aroused the ruler's anger which had been further intensified 
by a report that a British company had a contract to construct a railway in 
the Sudan designed to assist in the invasion of Ethiopia. Téwodros had 
accordingly ordered the captives to be taken to the fortress of Magdala. 
Fiad reacted by advising the British government to abandon its plan of 
despatching the workmen to the Emperor, 'because the release of the 
prisoners would, I fear, not be obtained. Most likely he would go on 
requiring other things from the British Government to which they never 
could surrender . . . I deem it advisable that Her Majesty's Government 
should at once use stronger terms'.100 T h e Emperor's policy thus miscar-
ried. 'The imprisonment of M r Rassam', wrote Merewether, was 'so great 
an outrage and insult' to Britain that the original plan was 'rendered 
impossible'.101 It was decided that the workmen should go to Massawa, 
but not be sent inland until the prisoners had been released and actually 
reached the port. T h e monarch, however, declared he would not free them 
until the workmen arrived at his court. 
Téwodros was no longer the powerful ruler he had been only a few years 
earlier, for he had lost almost the whole country except for Bagemder, 
Waala, Dalanta and some minor areas.102 His position, Merewether reported 
in January 1867, was 'becoming most desperate', his power was 'rapidly 
diminishing', and unless he made 'some brilliant stroke worthy of his 
earlier career, his rule will come to an end within the next few months'.103 
T h e British, aware of their enemy's declining strength, decided in July on 
military intervention. A n expedition from India led by the C o m m a n d e r -
in-Chief of the Bombay A r m y , Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, 
landed at Zulla in October in preference to the more obvious port of 
Massawa, which would have been defended by the Ottoman empire. 
Téwodros meanwhile m a d e desperate efforts to prepare for the impending 
trial of strength. Abandoning Dabra Tabor, which he put to flames, he 
had his cannons dragged to Magdala, almost the only place still under his 
control, where he planned to face the enemy. 
T h e British force, composed of 12 000 fighting m e n , two-thirds of them 
Indian and partly armed with breech-loading rifles never yet used in war, 
advanced inland without opposition. T h e invaders received co-operation 
in Tigré from Dajazmach Kassa, the future Emperor Yohannes IV, while 
W a g s h u m Gobasé of Lasta and King Menelik of Shoa were both sym-
pathetic. T h e first and only real battle was fought at Arogé, below Magdala, 
on G o o d Friday 10 April, a day of fasting in Ethiopia. T h e British inflicted 
heavy casualties on Téwodros's m e n , whose untried artillery was not 
100. Great Britain, 1868, p. 508. 
101. ibid., pp. 509-10. 
102. S. Rubenson, 1966, p. 81. 
103. Great Britain, 1868, p. 550. 
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effectively used.104 Napier, though without instructions as to h o w to treat 
the Ethiopian monarch, sent him an ultimatum declaring that if he would 
'submit to the Queen of England', and deliver all the Europeans 'this day 
in the British C a m p ' , he would be guaranteed 'honourable treatment'.105 
Unwilling to accept such humiliation, Téwodros replied with a proud letter 
which constituted his last testament. Addressing himself to his people he 
enquired, 'Will it always be thus that you flee before the enemy when I 
myself, by the power of G o d , go not forth with you to encourage you?' 
Turning to the British he declared that his countrymen had turned their 
backs on him and had hated him because he had imposed taxes on them 
and sought to bring them under military discipline. O n the outcome of the 
battle he exclaimed: 
M y followers, w h o loved m e , were frightened by one bullet, and fled 
in spite of m y commands . . . 
Believing myself to be a great lord, I gave you battle: but, by reason 
of the worthlessness of m y artillery, all m y pains were as nought. 
T h e people of m y country, by taunting m e with having embraced 
the religion of the Franks, and by saying that I had become a Mussel-
m a n , and in ten different ways, had provoked m e to anger against 
them. Out of what I have done of evil towards them m a y G o d bring 
good. His will be done. I had intended, if G o d had so decreed, to 
conquer the whole world; and it was m y desire to die if m y purpose 
could not be fulfilled. Since the day of m y birth till n o w no m a n has 
dared to lay hands on m e . . . I had hoped, after subduing all m y 
enemies in Abyssinia, to land m y army against Jerusalem, and expel 
from it the Turks. A warrior w h o has dandled strong m e n in his arms 
like infants will never suffer himself to be dandled in the arms of 
others.106 
After writing this remarkable letter Téwodros held his pistol to his head 
in an attempt to kill himself, but his soldiers snatched the weapon from 
his hand. H e then released Rassam, Cameron, and the missionaries, but 
continued to detain their wives and children, and several other Europeans. 
O n the following day he sent Napier a peace offering of iooo cows and 500 
sheep, and, learning that it was accepted, freed the remaining hostages. 
Napier, on hearing the 'magnitude and nature' of Téwodros's gift, decided 
however, to refuse it. T h e Emperor, realizing that this implied continued 
hostilities, attempted to flee, but changed his mind, and returned to 
Magdala. 
104. For the histories of the war see K . St. C . Wilkins, 1870; T.J . Holland and H . M . 
Hozier, 1870; H . M . Stanley, 1871; C R . Markham, 1869; A . J . Shepherd, 1868. H . M . 
Hozier, 1869; F . Myatt, 1970. 
105. C . R . Markham, 1869, p. 327. 
106. ibid., pp. 330-1. 
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Though the captives had been released, and the objective of the 
expedition accomplished,107 the British launched an assault on Magdala on 
13 April. Téwodros's army possessed 3000 'tolerably good' muzzle-loaders 
and 1000 matchlocks, besides 28 cannon, and 9 brass mortars, the latter 
locally made 'with neat inscriptions in Amharic'.108 This ordnance, accord-
ing to Captain Mozie, was ' m u c h superior' to that of the British, and 'had 
it not been deserted by its gunners, must have caused m u c h loss to the 
assailants'.109 A s it was, Téwodros soon saw that resistance was in vain, 
and dismissed his followers, exclaiming: 'It is finished! Sooner than fall 
into his hands I will kill myself. H e then placed his pistol to his mouth, 
and pulled the trigger.110 
T h e British, having accomplished their mission, prepared to depart. 
They had never had any intention of remaining, and had promised to 
withdraw as soon as the dispute with Téwodros was resolved. It was only 
on that understanding that the Turks had allowed them to land at the 
coast, and Kassa to allow their passage through Tigré. Before leaving, 
they destroyed Magdala fortress and most of its cannon, and took away 
Téwdros's young son Alamayehu, at the request of his mother,111 and some 
four hundred manuscripts, a part of those the Emperor had gathered to 
establish a library.112 T h e last act of the expedition was to reward Kassa 
of Tigré by giving him 12 heavy guns, 752 muskets and a supply of 
ammunition. These were to play a major rôle in the ensuing struggle for 
power. 
The advent of France at Obok and Italy at Assab 
T h e second half of the nineteenth century witnessed growing French 
interest in the port of Obok . In 1856 the port was purchased by M . 
Lambert, the French Consul in Aden. 1 1 3 N o effective occupation resulted, 
but a new treaty was signed in 1862 when four Afar chiefs ceded the 
territory to France for 10 000 Maria Theresa dollars and bound themselves 
'conjointly and separately' to reject any overtures which had 'not received 
the assent of the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of the French'.114 
T h o u g h couched in grandiose terms, the agreement was not highly regarded 
on the spot. A British observer, Consul Walker, reported that the principal 
chief 'after receiving the money disappeared, and his successor did not 
countenance the claim or right of the French to purchase this site of land, 
107. See R . K . P. Pankhurst, 1973a, pp. 189-203; C . Jesman, 1966, pp. 94-151. 
108. C R . Markham, 1869, p.240. 
109. T .J . Hozier, 1869, p. 240. 
no. C . R . Markham, 1869, p. 352. 
m . R . K . P . Pankhurst, 1973b, pp. 17-42. 
112. Lord Amulree, 1970, pp. 8-15. 
113. P. Soleillet, 1886, p. 23. 
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nor of the Chief to dispose of it', while the few huts erected by the French
'after their departure were thrown into the sea'.115
European interest in the area was enhanced by the opening of the Suez
Canal in November 1869. In the same month an Italian Lazarist missionary,
Giuseppe Sapeto, purchased the port of Assab on behalf of the Italian
Ministry of Marine from two Afar sultans for 6000 Maria Theresa dollars.
Returning in March of the following year as representative of the Italian
Rubattino shipping company, he found the vendors dissatisfied with the
price. A new treaty was accordingly concluded by which the two chiefs,
who had been joined by a third, received a further 8100 Maria Theresa
dollars, while another chief was persuaded to lease a nearby island for ten
115. Great Britain, 1868, pp. 231-2.
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years at an annual rent of ioo dollars with right of purchase for 2000 
rupees, or about 1000 dollars.116 These developments laid the basis for 
Italian contacts with Shoa in the late 1870s and early 1880s. 
Emperor Yohannes and the forging of Ethiopian unity 
T h e death of Téwodros had left Ethiopia divided and without an emperor. 
Three rival personalities held power in different areas. Menelik had m a d e 
himself King of Shoa, while Ras Gobasé, w h o emerged as ruler of A m h a r a , 
W a g and Lasta, was crowned Emperor and assumed the name of Takia 
Giorgis in 1868. T h e third personality, Kassa of Tigré was, however, the 
most powerful, in part because of the gift of arms he had received from 
the British. In 1871 Gobasé set out to capture A d w a , the capital of Tigré, 
but Kassa defeated him in July, and was crowned Emperor Yohannes IV 
at A x u m in January 1872.117 
T h e new Emperor, w h o was destined to achieve greater effective uni-
fication than Téwodros, did so by adopting a more conciliatory policy 
towards the provincial nobility,118 and by presenting himself as the friend 
and protector of the clergy. Before his coronation he succeeded in obtaining 
an abuna from Egypt, and later made contact with the Ethiopian community 
at Jerusalem and sent them funds of which they were badly in need. H e 
built numerous churches, notably at A d w a and Magdala, gave extensive 
lands to the Church at the ancient city of A x u m , and renewed a grant to the 
monastery of Dabra Bizan overlooking the Red Sea.119 Having converted 
his o w n wife, Halima, from Islam before marrying her, he attempted the 
mass baptism of Muslims,120 particularly among the Azebo O r o m o , and 
persecuted R o m a n Catholic converts.121 Anxious to purify religious prac-
tices, he forbade the practice of witchcraft, and, in accordance with the 
opposition of the Ethiopian Church to tobacco, prohibited smoking and 
the taking of snuff.122 H e was, on the other hand, keen to innovate in the 
military field, imported firearms, and employed a British officer, John 
Kirkham, to train his soldiers.123 
During the first part of his reign Yohannes was confronted by strong 
pressure from Egypt, then the most powerful state on the African continent, 
116. Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1906, Vol. 1, pp. 25-8. See also G . Douin, 
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120. J. S. Trimingham, 1952, p. 122; Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 94-100. 
121. O n the religious policy of Yohannes see Gabira Madihin Kidana, 1972. 
122. Mangestu L a m m a , 1959, p. 52; A . B . Wylde, 1901, p. 44; R . K . P. Pankhurst, 1968, 
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whose ill-fated Khedive, Ismail, was building an empire in the Sudan and
hoped to annex much of Ethiopia. The stage for conflict was set in May
1868 when the Ottoman sultan transferred Massawa once more to the rule
ofEgypt. Having occupied the port the Egyptians seized Zulla, and stopped
the import ofarms into Ethiopia. In the spring of 1872, Werber Munzinger,
a Swiss adventurer in Egyptian service, took possession of Bogos and
Halhal, two Ethiopian districts on the Sudan border,124 and the chief of
Ailet, inland from Massawa, sold his district to the Egyptian government.
Faced with these encroachments Yohannes despatched Kirkham to
England in September with a letter for Queen Victoria appealing for help
against Egyptian expansion. Kirkham later wrote to the Queen on the
Emperor's behalf to draw attention to 'the injustice' ofEthiopia's possessing
no port through which it could communicate with the 'Christian powers
124. A.B. Wylde, 1901, pp. 22-3; G. Rohlfs, 1885, p. 43; G. Douin, 1936-41, Vol. 3,
Part II, pp. 337-44-
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of Europe', and added that if the European powers would secure it 'an 
outlet to the Red Sea', Yohannes was prepared to enter into 'the most 
liberal treaties of commerce' with them.125 Such appeals, however, met 
with no more support from London than those of earlier times.126 
Yohannes, anxious for closer foreign contacts, appointed an Englishman, 
Henry King, as consul in London1 2 7 and, realizing the strength of the anti-
slavery movement, informed the British that he intended to eradicate the 
slave trade by executing merchants engaged in it. T h e sale of slaves had 
long been prohibited by the Ethiopian legal code, the Fetha Nagast, but 
the injunction had applied solely to Christians, not to Muslim merchants.128 
T h e Egyptians, having established themselves on the southern Red Sea 
coast, were meanwhile expanding into the Gulf of Aden area. In the winter 
of 1873-4 they temporarily seized Berbera, and in the following winter 
established a permanent occupation both there and at Zeila.129 They then 
thrust inland and seized Harar in October. Amïr M u h a m m a d ibn 'All, w h o 
had recently come to power there, was unable to resist.130 
Having acquired a foothold to the east, the Egyptians determined to 
annex northern Ethiopia as far as the Mareb river. They despatched a force 
of 2500 m e n led by an Egyptian nobleman, Arekel Bey; a Danish officer, 
officer, Colonel Arendrup; and an Austrian, Count Zichy, equipped with 
modern Remington breechloading rifles and field guns. Yohannes, learning 
that the intruders had advanced to Asmara, ordered the call to arms to be 
sounded throughout his kingdom.131 Vast numbers of m e n volunteered for 
a war that they regarded as a Crusade against the encroachment of Islam. 
Yohannes thus assembled perhaps 70 000 armed m e n . T h e decisive battle 
was fought at Gundat on 15 November 1875, when the Emperor's army 
attacked the invaders and almost completely annihilated them. Arekel and 
Arendrup were both killed, and Zichy mortally wounded, while Yohannes 
captured 2500 Remington rifles, 14 pieces of artillery, and 20000 Maria 
Theresa dollars. T h e Egyptians had meanwhile sent another column inland 
from Tadjüra which was intercepted by the local Afar w h o killed its 
commander, Munzinger, and m a n y of his m e n . 1 3 2 
Isma^ determined to avenge these disasters. In February 1876 a m u c h 
larger, well supplied army of 20 000 m e n commanded by Rhatib Pasha; 
the Khedive's son, Hassan Pasha; and an American officer, General Lorîïïg, 
advanced inland. Yohannes responded by summoning Christians once 
125. Public Record Office, K e w , F O 1/27, to Foreign Office, 13 M a y 1873. 
126. G . Douin, 1936-41, Vol. 3, Part II, pp. 378-87, 403-9. 
127. J. de Coursac, 1926, pp. 107-18. 
128. P. Tzadue, 1968, pp. 175-8. 
129. G . Douin, 1936-41. Vol. 3, Part II, pp. 266-79; Part IIIA, pp. 547-55, 583-602. 
130. ibid., Vol. 3, Part IIIA, pp. 602-7; J. S. Trimingham, 1952, pp. 120-2. 
131. W . M c . E . Dye , 1880, p. 135. 
132. A . B . Wylde, 1901, pp.23-5; G . Douin, 1936-41, Vol. 3, Part II, pp.745-1075; 
Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 61-5. 
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more to rally against the enemies of their faith. T h e Egyptians, though 
armed with Remington rifles and Krupp field guns, were again outnum-
bered, for close on 200 000 m e n responded to the Emperor's call. T h e 
invaders proved no match for the Ethiopians w h o in fighting at Gura 
between 7 and 9 March w o n another signal victory. Only a few hundred 
Egyptians survived the Ethiopian assault. They left behind them 16 cannon, 
and 12 000 or 13 000 Remington rifles, besides m u c h ammunition and other 
supplies.133 
. T h e Ethiopian victories at Gundat and Gura destroyed Egyptian dreams 
of empire. I sma^, w h o had lost over 20 000 m e n , besides most of his 
artillery and other weapons, and with his country facing economic collapse, 
had to abandon his expansionist aims. H e soon went bankrupt and was 
deposed in June 1879. Discontent had meanwhile spread among his army, 
largely on acccount of the arrogant incapacity of the Turkish and Circassian 
commanders w h o had led the Egyptian soldiers to disaster. Defeat in 
Ethiopia thus sowed seeds which bore bitter fruit for the Khedive, and it 
was significant that one of the Egyptian colonels at Massawa during the 
debacle, 'Urâbï Pasha, emerged as the leader of Egypt's first nationalist 
rebellion. 
Ethiopia, though the victor, also suffered from the fighting. A s early as 
1873 a British traveller, A . E . D e Cosson, observed that Hamasén had been 
'depopulated' as a result of the ravages of the Egyptians, and that Asmara 
'was almost deserted'.134 Yohannes, for his part, sought to minimize such 
miseries and, as Colonel William D y e , an American with the Egyptian 
army, admitted, ordered that though cereals might be taken by his soldiers, 
'herds and clothing must be spared'.135 T h e campaigns of 1875-6, followed 
by the depradations of an Egyptian-backed chieftain, Ras Walda Mika'él, 
nevertheless led to m u c h devastation.136 A British observer, A . B . Wylde, 
subsequently noted that Mika'él had 'turned the Hamasén plateau, formerly 
known as the plain of the thousand villages . . . into a howling wilderness 
of ruined houses, with a few half-starved peasantry.'137 
T h e victories over Egypt nevertheless enhanced the prestige, and 
strength, of Yohannes w h o , thanks to the supplies he had seized, became 
the first well-armed ruler of his country since the advent of guns over three 
centuries earlier. T h e end of the fighting left him free to proceed with 
unification. H e marched south to Wallo to settle accounts with Menelik. 
T h e ruler of Shoa, w h o was dependent on supplies passing through 
133. O n the Egyptian campaigns see W . M c . E . D y e , 1880, passim; G . B . Hill, 1881, 
pp.205-6; G . Rohlfs, 1885, pp.44-54; A . B . Wylde, 1901, pp.26-81; M . Chaîne, 1913, 
p. 8; J. de Coursac, 1926, pp. 322-4 and passim; A . Bizzoni, 1897, pp. 60-4; J. S . 
Trimingham, 1952, pp. 121-2; Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 59-63. 
134. E . A . D e Cosson, 1877, Vol. I, p . 50. 
135. W . M c . E . Dye, 1880, p.292. 
136. ibid., p . 652. 
137. A . B . Wylde, 1901, p .28. 
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Egyptian-occupied territories, had failed to support Yohannes in his time 
of need, and had carried out an expedition to Bagemder and Gojam, 
well into the Emperor's sphere of interest, while carrying on friendly 
correspondence with the Khedive.138 
W a r between the rulers of Tigré and Shoa, the two most powerful 
sections of Christian Ethiopia, seemed imminent. Menelik at first thought 
of suing for peace, but, on learning of the harsh conditions demanded by 
Yohannes, mobilized his m e n in January 1878. T h e prospect of conflict 
was, however, frightening to m a n y on both sides w h o felt that it would be 
only of advantage to their c o m m o n enemies. Yohannes, though the stronger 
of the two, was short of supplies, and would be operating in hostile territory 
against a by no means negligible army: the outcome was uncertain, but the 
large number of firearms suggested the likelihood of heavy casualties. M a n y 
a m o n k and m e m b e r of the clergy travelled between the camps, urging on 
both monarchs the undesirability of shedding Christian blood. 
Yohannes, convinced of the advantages of compromise, agreed in Feb-
ruary to open talks with Menelik. A n accord, negotiated by one of the 
Emperor's priests, was concluded in March. Its terms, though never 
published, seem to have covered the following points:139 
1 Menelik renounced the title of Emperor. 
2 Yohannes recognized Menelik's independence, subject to the payment 
of tax. 
3 Yohannes consented to crown Menelik as king of Shoa and Wallo, 
and accepted the right of Menelik's descendants to succeed as rulers 
of those provinces. 
4 Each ruler promised to help the other in time of need. 
5 Menelik agreed that within two years the route between Zeila and 
Shoa would be closed to Europeans. 
Yohannes then crowned his erstwhile enemy with p o m p and splendour. 
O n the one hand, this act symbolized the de jure paramountcy of Yohannes, 
but on the other was an expression of Menelik's defacto independence.140 
T h e two rulers subsequently met at Boru M é d a , in Wallo, to discuss 
religious controversies within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and the 
desirability of converting Muslims and traditionalists, particularly on the 
periphery of the country where loyalty was uncertain. It was agreed 
that they should be given three and five years respectively to embrace 
138. O n suggestions that Menelik was actually conspiring with the Egyptians against 
Yohannes, see H . G . Marcus, 1975, pp. 38-43; and Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 5 5 -
9, 61, 65, 260-2. 
139. G . Massala, 1892, Vol. 11, pp. 5-23; A . Cecchi, 1886-7, Vol. 1, pp. 422-3; T . 
Waldmeier, 1886, pp. 133-4; Guèbrè Sellassié, 1930-2, Vol. I, pp. 138-48. For a recent 
discussion of the Tigré-Shoa agreement, see Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 93-4. 
140. G . Massala, 1892, Vol. 11, p. 60. 
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Christianity, and that all non-Christian government officials should be 
baptised.141 T h e two principal chiefs of Wallo, I m a m M u h a m m a d 'AIT 
and I m a m A b b a Watta, were accordingly christened Mika'él and Hayla 
M a r y a m , and given the rank of Ras and Dajazamach.142 Their followers, 
and m a n y others, were also converted, and numerous mosques and sanc-
tuaries of traditional religions destroyed. A large number of such con-
versions were, however, nominal. T h e Italian missionary Massala saw 
converts going straight from the church where they had been christened 
to the mosque to have their baptism removed,143 while not a few were 
referred to as 'Christians by day, Muslims by night'. Other Muslims fled 
the country, though in certain areas where non-Christians were denied the 
right to o w n land baptisms enabled Muslims to acquire land, which they 
retained even after their return to Islam.144 Another result of the Boru 
M é d a agreement was the expulsion of R o m a n Catholic missionaries from 
Shoa in 1879. Yohannes had long been opposed to missionaries of any 
kind.145 Their main value was seen in the provision of technical skills, 
but Menelik offset any detrimental consequences of their departure by 
employing other foreigners, among them a Swiss craftsman, Alfred Ilg, 
w h o served as both a technician and a diplomatic adviser.146 
Peace negotiations between Egypt and Yohannes had meanwhile been 
entrusted by Khedive Isma'fl to Colonel Charles George Gordon, a British 
officer serving as Egyptian governor of the Sudan. Gordon, w h o recognized 
in his diary that his employer had 'stolen' territory from Ethiopia, and had 
treated her 'very badly and unjustly',147 travelled on a futile mission148 to 
Dabra Tabor to meet Yohannes in October 1879. T h e Emperor, he found, 
was intransigent in his demand for the 'retrocession' of the frontier districts 
of Bogos, M a t a m m a and the Shanqella country, and also wanted access to 
the sea.149 Insistent on the righteousness of his case, he upbraided the 
Englishman as a Christian serving a Muslim government. H e wrote an 
angry letter to Khedive Tawfik observing that Egypt had behaved like a 
'robber', adding, 'You want peace, but you prevent the Abyssinian m e r -
chants to go to Massawa. Y o u have taken land not your own' . 1 5 0 Gordon, 
141. G . Rohlfs, 1885, pp. 149-56; A . Oppel, 1887, p. 307; Guèbrè Sellassié, 1930-2, 
Vol. 1, pp. 145-56; Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 95-6. 
142. Guèbrè Sellassié, 1930-2, Vol. 1, pp. 155-6; J. S. Trimingham, 1952, pp. 24, 122. 
143. G . Massala, 1892, Vol. 11, p. 78. 
144. Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, p.97; R . Perini, 1905, p.344; R . K . P . Pankhurst, 
1968, p. 147. 
145. G . Bianchi, 1886, p. 86. O n Yohannes's attitude to missionaries see also Zewde 
Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 98-9. 
146. C . Keller, 1918; W . Loepfe, 1974; R . K . P . Pankhurst, 1967, pp. 29-42. 
147. G . B . Hill, 1881, pp. 403, 405, 406. See also p. 304. 
148. Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, 1975, pp. 111—17. 
149. ibid., pp. 412-14. 
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whose instructions precluded any cession of territory, found the interview 
embarrassing. Irritated by the close surveillance under which the Emperor 
placed him, he despaired of leaving the country, and later wrote in the 
memoirs of one of Téwodros's prisoners that had been lucky to get out 
alive. H e observed in the memoirs that Emperor Yohannes talked 'like the 
Old Testament' and was 'rapidly going m a d ' , 1 5 1 but to his sister he remarked 
that 'Johannes, oddly enough, is like myself- a religious fanatic. H e has a 
mission; and will fulfil it, and that mission is to Christianize all M u s -
selmans'.152 
Yohannes had by then solid achievements to his credit. Having staved 
off the invasion by Egypt, and created a greater measure of unity than had 
existed for most of Téwodros's reign, he enabled his people to enter an 
unprecedented period of peace. A . B . Wylde , an acute observer, notes that 
Ethiopia after the Egyptian defeat 'enjoyed the blessings of tranquility and 
good crops' and 'improved with rapid strides'.153 
Ethiopia, peaceful and prosperous at the end of our period, was, however, 
on the eve of major tribulations. T h e rise of the Sudanese M a h d ï , M u h a m -
m a d A h m a d , w h o was to announce his mission in 1881, meant the emerg-
ence of a dynamic new power which was soon to overrun the west of the 
empire and ravage Gondar, while the Italian seizure of Massawa in 1885, 
which began the European scramble for Africa in this part of the continent, 
was to be followed in less than half a decade by a great rinderpest epidemic 
and subsequent famine, which was once again to reduce the entire region 
to destitution and misery. 
Global overview 
T h o u g h Yohannes dominated the stage at the end of our period, and he 
was the ruler of the most powerful polity in the area and the only one 
significantly involved in international relations, his realm embraced only a 
fraction of the territory covered by this chapter. His empire, which was 
based on Tigré, nevertheless extended over virtually the entire Christian 
highlands. Ras Adal Tasama (later King Takla Haymanot) of Gojam and 
King (later Emperor) Menelik of Shoa had both been obliged to recognize 
his imperial authority. T h e Muslim leaders of Wallo, by n o w officially 
converted to Christianity, also indirectly accepted his overlordship. Further 
east however, the Muslim sultanate of A w s a was independent. T h e lowlands 
to the north-west and north-east of Tigré were under the control of the 
Egyptians, for Yohannes, despite his victories over them, had been unable 
either to reverse all their recent encroachments or accomplish his cherished 
ambition of gaining access to the sea. Egyptian rule was, however, to come 
151. ibid., pp. 421-2, 424. 
152. C . Gordon, 1902, p. 155. 
153. A . B . Wylde, 1901, p.30. 
410 
Ethiopia and Somalia 
to an end in less than half a decade, though the area would then fall into 
the hands not of the rulers of Ethiopia, but of a colonial power, Italy. 
T h e lands to the west, south and east were not yet incorporated within 
the Ethiopian state, for though Menelik had already made himself master 
of parts of Guragé, his major expeditions to the south were several years 
away. In the south-west of the country a cluster of small independent states 
still existed. They included the old kingdom of Kaffa, Janjero and W a l a m o , 
as well as several small O r o m o monarchies: J i m m a , whose last and most 
famous king, A b b a Jifar II, had just ascended the throne, and Léka where 
Moroda, a local chief, was consolidating his power, besides L i m m u , G o m a , 
G u m a , Géra and some other lesser political entities. T h e O r o m o , as well 
as other groups to the south, in Arussi, Borana and elsewhere, likewise had 
a separate political existence. 
T o the south-east, Harar, once an independent city state, was under the 
occupation of Egypt, though this was soon to come to an end and Menelik 
would gain control of the town. Along the Gulf of Aden coast the Somali 
ports were also under Egyptian domination but this too was soon to 
terminate and be replaced by that of the three colonial powers, Britain, 
France and Italy. T h e remaining Somali ports, on the Atlantic coast, in 
Majerteyn to the north and Benadir to the south, were under the suzerainty 
of O m a n and Zanzibar respectively. Around 1870, a dispute between the 
Majerteyn sultan, O m a n M a h m u d and his father-in-law, Yüsuf 'Ali led to 
a split in the sultanate and the founding by Yüsuf 'Ali of the new Sultanate 
of Hobya (Obbia) further south.154 Along the lower Shebelle river, the 
development of commercial agriculture in the cultivation of grain, sesame, 
orchella and cotton, contributed to the prosperity of the Geledi sultanate 
up until the 1880s.155 But O m a n i domination was soon to give way to 
Italian colonialism. Foreign influence in the Somali region was, however, 
limited to the coast, and the majority of the Somali w h o lived in the interior 
were, like m a n y of the O r o m o , entirely free of external authorities, and 
lived under the control of their local clans. 
154. M . Pirone, 1961, p. 88. 
155. L . V . Cassanelli, 1982, pp. 161-78. 
411 
Madagascar 1800-80 
P . M . MUTIBWA 
with a contribution by 
F.V. ESOAVELOMANDROSO 
Introduction 
T h e history of Madagascar between 1800 and 1880 is characterized by two 
major trends which provide guidelines for our discussion. T h e first was 
the political evolution of the country and the diplomatic interaction between 
Madagascar and foreign powers, particularly Britain and France. Second, 
major changes took place in the social organization of the country, par-
ticularly in the religious, administrative and economic fields. Political 
evolution consisted mainly of the consolidation of the Merina monarchy 
and the expansion of its authority to the rest of the island. T h e diplomatic 
relations that this monarchy maintained with both Britain and France 
became a cornerstone of the country's development. T h e changes that were 
effected in administration, particularly in the establishment of law and 
order, facilitated economic development. This was also a major factor in 
Madagascar's efforts to modernize itself and to resist foreign domination. 
T h e embracing of foreign religions was viewed as part of this process of 
modernization. 
A brief description of the country and its people m a y be necessary here. 
There are some eighteen ethnic groups in Madagascar of which the largest 
and, as it turned out, the most important in the nineteenth century, are 
the Merina w h o live on the central plateau of the island. This central 
plateau, known as Imerina (the country which one sees from afar), was the 
h o m e of the Merina a m o n g w h o m there was a privileged class w h o came 
to rule the greater part of the island before it was colonized by the French. 
It is difficult to say what the population of Madagascar was during the 
period under review, but the British consul in Madagascar estimated it to 
be 5 million in 1865, of w h o m about 800 000 were Merina.1 All the Malagasy 
groups speak the same language and have, with few exceptions, similar 
customs and religious traditions. T h u s , despite the existence of regional 
1. Public Record Office, K e w , England, Foreign Office, (hereinafter F O ) 48/10, Pak-
enham to Russell, 31 January 1865. 
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differences, the Malagasy were, and have remained, one people, with one 
profound cultural and ethnic unity.2 
T h e rulers of Imerina established their seat in Antananarivo, and it was 
from here that a line of able and often popular monarchs ruled the greater 
part of the island. T h e term 'government of the kingdom of Madagascar' 
will be used here to refer to this government in Antananarivo which, by 
1880, was in control, despite spasmodic rebellions here and there of over 
two-thirds of the entire island. Hence, in spite of the importance of the 
history of different provinces and regions,3 the discussion of the political, 
social, economic and administrative evolution of Madagascar turns mainly 
on the history of the central plateau as the focus or the heart of the rest of 
the island. 
The era of Andrianampoinimerina (i 792-1810) 
It is difficult to appreciate the history of Madagascar in the nineteenth 
century without an examination of h o w Andrianampoinimerina, the 
founder of the Merina kingdom, came to power and consolidated his 
position on the central plateau. H e reunified the Merina kingdom and 
expanded it. Furthermore, he reinforced the cohesiveness of the population 
as an essential factor in the policy of territorial expansion. 
Around 1780 there existed in Central Imerina only three or four small 
kingdoms, all of which were locked in internecine civil wars. In about 1785 
Ramboasalama, the nephew of the King of Ambohimanga , one of the small 
kingdoms, expelled his uncle and proclaimed himself king under the n a m e 
of Andrianampoinimerina.4 H e then started to consolidate his position in 
Imerina, using diplomatic as well as military means. H e liquidated the 
kings of Antananarivo and Ambohidratrimo w h o , although they had con-
cluded peace with him, had continued to defy him.5 In 1791 or 1792 
Andrianampoinimerina moved his capital to Antananarivo and started to 
build the political and social structures of the new kingdom. It has since 
remained the capital of both Imerina and Madagascar. 
T h e second part of Andrianampoinimerina's reign, roughly from 1800, 
featured expansion beyond Imerina, thus beginning the long and difficult 
task of uniting all the eighteen or so ethnic groups in Madagascar. H e felt 
a strong desire to conquer the rest of the island, and on his deathbed he is 
2. H . Deschamps, 1951, p. S3, has remarked that 'The unity of the Malagasy language 
is remarkable. From one end to another of the island, it is the same grammar, the same 
syntax and, for the great majority, the same words'. 
3. T h e University of Madagascar, Department of History is pioneering work on the 
history of the regions, and is beginning thus to deepen our knowledge of the internal history 
of Madagascar. 
4. For a short portrait of King Andrianampoinimerina, see H . Deschamps, 1967; A . 
Délivré, 1974. 
5. R . W . Rabemananjara, 1952, p. 53. 
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plate 16.1 A view ofAntananarivo in the 1850s
reported to have told Radama, his son and successor, that 'the sea is my
frontier'.6 First he conquered portions of territories which were tra¬
ditionally Merina, then occupied by neighbouring peoples such as the
Bezanozano and the Sihanaka in the east.7 Although he brought these
people under his suzerainty, some of them, particularly the Bezanozano,
continued to resist. He used force in consolidating his power in Imerina,
but he also tried to present himself to his adversaries as a ruler whose only
desire was peace and unity.
His expansion to the south was at first intended mainly to protect the
Merina who had emigrated there. The Betsileo were already under Merina
hegemony, and the Merina troops did not encounter great difficulties in
moving further south to the Ankaratra Mountain and to the region of
Faratsiho.8 In the west, however, Andrianampoinimerina found, as his
successors were also to find, that the Sakalava were a difficult nut to crush.
In fact, all attempts to subdue them totally failed. It is true that he
sometimes succeeded in establishing friendly relations with them; but quite
often the Sakalava invaded Imerina, carrying the incursions almost to
Antananarivo itself. The most important of the Sakalava kingdoms were
6. Lit. 'The sea is the limit of my rice paddy'. He linked the cultivation of rice to
the struggle against famine and gave directives for the development of the plains of
Betsimitatatra.
7. See J. Valette, 1971, p. 327fr.
8. ibid., p. 328. See also, J. Rainihifina, 1975. For the Merina emigration to Andrantsay
and Voromahery (northern border of Betsileo), see D. Rasamuel, 1980; E. Fauroux, 1970,
p. 83; J. Y. Marchai, 1967, pp. 241-80, and J. Dez, 1967, pp. 657-702.
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M e n a b e and Boina, which between them formed an impregnable barrier 
to Merina expansion to the west. T h e fiercest resistance however came 
from the A m b o n g o . It should be added also that the Maroseranana Sakalava 
dynasty constituted the only real alternative to the Merina rulers since it 
it had extended its hegemony over the western part of the island before 
the nineteenth century and had concluded alliances with some of the 
kingdoms of the eastern part, for example the Betsimisaraka.9 Nevertheless, 
by the time of his death in 1810, Andrianampoinimerina had m a d e Imerina 
a force to reckon with throughout the island of Madagascar. 
The great modernizer: King Radama I (1810-28) 
F e w rulers in Madagascar's history have become as legendary as R a d a m a I, 
w h o succeeded to the throne in 1810 at the age of about 18. H e is 
regarded, as indeed he saw himself, as the 'Napoleon' of Madagascar. 
At the announcement of Andrianampoinimerina's death, some of the 
people he had conquered revolted. It thus became Radama's first task to 
subdue these rebels, particularly the Bezanozano of Ambotomanga , m a n y 
of w h o m fled to the east. Although R a d a m a succeeded in consolidating his 
position in Imerina, what he desired most was to reach the sea, as his father 
had directed him to do on his deathbed. Without direct access to the sea, 
the Merina felt h e m m e d in by their neighbours, w h o even raided them for 
slaves. Merina traders, increasingly anxious to trade at the ports of T a m a -
tave and Majunga directly with Europeans, especially the British in the 
Mascarene Islands, were forced instead to exchange their handicrafts, rice, 
beef and other agricultural produce for European salt and ammunition 
through Bezanozano, Sihanaka and Sakalava intermediaries. R a d a m a saw 
territorial expansion as part of the heritage of the Maroseranana that he 
had taken over and, above all, as a filial duty to respect the wishes of his 
ancestors and fulfil the predictions of soothsayers.10 
It was to the east - towards the increasingly important port of Tamatave -
that Radama's eyes were first focused. However, the political situation in the 
surrounding Betsimisaraka area called for intervention. T h e confederation 
organized in the eighteenth century by Ratsimilaho had broken up into a 
multitude of rival principalities at war one with another, and riddled with 
internal challengers, generally opposed to the authority of the filoha (ruling 
chiefs), w h o invited R a d a m a to intervene. In the midst of this political 
chaos, Jean René, a métis, seized control of Tamatave in 1812.11 It was 
largely Radama's desire to establish a route to this eastern port that dictated 
his diplomatic contacts with Sir Robert Townsend Farquhar, the Governor 
of Mauritius. His desire to reach the sea coincided with Farquhar's desire — 
9. C . Guillain, 1845, p. 376. 
10. H . Deschamps, i960, p. 154. See also J. M . Filliot, 1974, p. 273. 
11. H . Decary (ed.), 1939. 
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and that of England - to control Madagascar, or at least to influence events 
there, since Madagascar was the sole source of the cattle and rice imported 
to Mauritius as well as an important consumer of Mauritius's manufactured 
goods. Moreover, Madagascar was important for political and strategic 
considerations. In particular, the British wanted to secure the support of 
the ruler for the abolition of the slave trade, since Madagascar was one of 
the main sources of slaves in the region. It was Sir Robert's desire, 
therefore, to pursue an active political role in Madagascar. This policy, 
coinciding as it did with Radama's o w n determination to expand to the 
east, was to have, as one writer has put it, 'important consequences for the 
future of Madagascar'.12 
After several friendly contacts, Farquhar sent a diplomatic mission, led 
by Captain L e Sage, which arrived in Antananarivo on 21 December 1816. 
A treaty of friendship and commerce was eventually signed on 4 February 
1817 between R a d a m a and L e Sage. But this treaty did not satisfy the 
Mauritian Governor because it did not mention the slave trade, a matter 
of considerable importance to Sir Robert. T h e Governor therefore sent 
another mission to Radama's capital, this time led by James Hastie, a 
former Sergeant at A r m s in India and more experienced in handling 
negotiations with oriental rulers.13 Hastie brought along with him a number 
of gifts for the king, including horses, a compass, a m a p of the world and 
a chiming clock, all of which greatly impressed the young king and helped 
Hastie to win his love and confidence. T h e negotiations, however, stumbled 
over the British insistence that R a d a m a should outlaw the slave trade in 
Madagascar. W h e n Radama argued that by doing this he would be c o m -
mitting economic suicide because the slave trade was the major source of 
his revenue, Hastie had a ready answer: the British would pay the Malagasy 
ruler an annual s u m of 1000 dollars in gold, 1000 dollars in silver, a hundred 
barrels of gunpowder, 100 English muskets with 100 flints, 400 soldiers' 
uniforms, 12 sergeants' swords, 600 pieces of cloth, a full-dress uniform 
for himself and 2 horses as compensation.14 R a d a m a considered that he 
had m a d e a fair deal, especially since the treaty also recognized him as king 
of the whole of Madagascar. T h e Anglo-Malagasy Treaty of Friendship 
and C o m m e r c e was signed at Tamatave on 23 October 1817. James Hastie, 
the successful negotiator, was dispatched to Madagascar again in 1820 to 
act as the British Resident in the Malagasy capital. However, when Far-
quhar was in Britain on leave, his successor, Major General Gage John 
12. J. Valette, 1971, p. 331. 
13. H . Deschamps, i960, p. 154. T h e first contact between Radama I and the Mauritian 
authorities was established early in 1816 when Sir Robert Farquhar sent Jacques Char-
denoux (a former French slave-trader settled in Mauritius) to Antananarivo to pay a 
courtesy call on the king and to gather as m u c h information as possible about the country, 
its people and its resources. See M . Brown, 1978, p. 137. 




Hall, refused to pay the subsidies stipulated in the treaty. This led to the 
breakdown of relations between the British and the Merina court, and 
allowed the French to retain a foothold in the Merina capital during a 
period of British dominance.15 R a d a m a was clearly upset by the British 
failure to fulfil the terms of the 1817 Treaty, but he was soon persuaded 
to forget the past in order to pursue his long-term interests, which he saw 
clearly as resting on the alliance between his country and Britain. H e 
therefore accepted Hastie's apologies for the mistakes of Hall (who was 
recalled) and he accordingly renewed the treaty on 11 October 1820. In a 
separate document, R a d a m a also allowed British missionaries to work in 
Madagascar. 
Following this agreement, on 3 December 1820, David Jones of the 
London Missionary Society ( L M S ) arrived in Antananarivo. R a d a m a 
welcomed British missionaries for they brought with them not only edu-
cation (although tied to Christianity) but also technical assistance.16 R a d a m a 
wrote to the L M S asking them 'to send as m a n y missionaries as they could, 
provided that they included craftsmen such as weavers and carpenters as 
well as m e n of religion'.17 T h e missionaries opened the first school in 
Anatananarivo on 8 December 1820 with three pupils, young nephews of 
the king; and because of the tremendous personal encouragement which 
R a d a m a gave to the missionaries, the L M S were able to boast of some 23 
schools and about 2300 pupils by 1829. T h e missionaries reduced the 
Malagasy language to written form, using the Latin alphabet, and translated 
the Bible into it. 
In this endeavour, several missionaries such as Jones, Bevan and Griffiths 
m a d e significant contributions and they relied on the assistance and co-
operation of able Malagasy converts. T h e missionary societies paid par-
ticular attention to printing and publishing. T h u s , through the schools, 
Bible classes and the dissemination of printed material, education assisted 
not only proselytization but also literacy and the evolution of the Malagasy 
language and literature as an instrument of island-wide national integration. 
B y 1827, more than 4000 Malagasy could read and write in their o w n 
language.18 In the field of technical education, the British missionaries also 
m a d e significant contributions. They sent some young Malagasy either to 
England or Mauritius for technical education; and at h o m e introduced 
m a n y technical skills and ideas such as carpentry, building, tannery, the 
art of modern tin-plating and weaving. T h e most outstanding missionary 
w h o assisted the Malagasy in technical education was James Cameron; he 
arrived in Antananarivo in 1826 and, except for the few years he spent in 
15. M . Brown, 1978, p. 144. 
16. V . Belrose-Huyghes, 1978b. 
17. M . Brown, 1978, p. 155. See also, V. Belrose-Huyghes, 1978b, and J. Valette, 1962. 
For foreign influence on architecture see V. Belrose-Huyghes, 1975. 
18. H . Deschamps, 1960, p. 161; V . Belrose-Huyghes, 1977; L . Munthe, 1969, p. 244; 
F. Raison, 1977. 
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exile, remained there until his death in 1875. O n e of the reasons w h y the 
missionaries were so successful was the role played by missionary wives in 
facilitating contact with Malagasy households, especially the aristocratic 
ladies, to w h o m they offered the rudiments of household instruction and 
provided services such as those of seamstresses.19 
T h e most important technical assistance that R a d a m a required was a 
modernized standing army on the British model. H e recruited an army of 
about 15 000 m e n , equipped with good English guns from the Napoleonic 
Wars and even some light cannon. T h e y were trained mainly by English 
instructors, the most important being Hastie and Brady. T h e resulting 
army was m u c h better and more effective than those of his adversaries on 
the island, T o sustain professional spirit, Radama I introduced a system 
of army ranks within the army, based on numbers of'honours', one honour 
for a private, and up to ten honours for a general. T h e army became an 
important instrument not only in the conquest of other territories on the 
island but also in the maintenance of law and order in the conquered 
territories. 
T h e submission of the coastal people in the east began in 1817 when, at 
the head of 30 000 soldiers, Radama descended upon Tamatave, securing 
on the way the submission of the Bezanozano. H e concluded a peace pact 
with Jean René w h o had been in control of the town, and, from then on, the 
gateway to the outside world was secured. Radama returned to Tamatave in 
1823 with an even bigger army, and on this occasion he secured recognition 
of his authority from the Betsimisaraka. H e visited other territories on the 
eastern coast such as Foulpointe, Bay of Antongil, Vohemar and the 
Antankara territory. O n his way back to the capital, in 1824, he passed 
through the country of the Tsimihety, where he established a post at 
Mandritasara, and that of the Sihanaka; both peoples recognized his auth-
ority. Meanwhile, Jean René, w h o had become Radama's agent at 
Tamatave, was carrying out a similar exercise in the regions south of 
Tamatave. Fort Dauphin in the extreme south-east of the island was 
reached in 1825, thereby further strengthening Radama's claim to be master 
of the whole eastern coast of Madagascar.20 
It was in the west, in the Sakalava country, that R a d a m a , like his 
predecessor, encountered the greatest difficulties. In 1820 he dispatched a 
large army against the king of M e n a b e , without success. In 1821, 
accompanied by Hastie, Radama returned to M e n a b e at the head of an 
army of some 70 000 soldiers, including a thousand professionals. This, 
too, failed to conquer the territory. In 1822, he returned with a well-armed 
and carefully prepared expedition of some 13 000 m e n which at last defeated 
the M e n a b e and established some fortified posts in their country. But the 
19. V . Belrose-Huyghes, 1978a. 
20. For more details, see H . Deschamps, 1960, pp. 151-61, to which this account is 
indebted. 
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victory was of limited duration because the Sakalava in the north continued 
to defy his authority. In 1824 he launched an attack against Boina in the 
north-west and this time he was more successful. T h e ruler of Boina, 
Andriantsoli, m a d e peace and R a d a m a was able to reach the north-western 
town of Majunga where a Merina post was established, but again the 
success was short-lived. 
These campaigns illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Merina 
army in the contest for national integration. They were usually able to 
defeat rival armies. Thereafter, the usual means of control was to establish 
administrative posts where Merina voanjo (colonists) were settled, protected 
by the building of a rova, a fortified area similar to the palace at the 
capital and symbolizing the Merina presence. Also, R a d a m a often arranged 
marriages of alliance, as in his marriage to Rosalimo, the daughter of 
Ramitraho, king of Menabe . 2 1 T h e army, however, had great difficulties in 
maintaining supplies from Imerina over great distances. Before the colonists 
were able to produce enough, the army was obliged to live off the conquered 
regions and this often provoked rebellion. A s soon as R a d a m a turned his 
back on the west and returned to Antananarivo, the Sakalava of Boina and 
M e n a b e revolted again. T h e Sakalava people were determined to preserve 
their independence from the control of Antananarivo. Similarly in Boina 
the Antalaotra trading group constituted a further obstacle to integration. 
They were Muslims, regarded by the Malagasy as foreigners.22 This created 
grave problems for the Malagasy government, particularly as the French 
were prepared to use some of the rebellious Sakalava chiefs to challenge 
the sovereignty of the Merina rulers over some territories in the west and 
north-west of Madagascar. 
Despite these setbacks, R a d a m a I's campaigns had enabled him to extend 
the Merina hegemony over most of the island. B y 1828, two-thirds of the 
whole island was under Merina control. Only the remote and desolate 
plains of the Antandroy and Mahafaly in the south-west and the Bara 
country, apart from a precarious Merina outpost at Ihosy, remained outside 
R a d a m a I's control. In the Sakalava territory, as w e have noted, although 
R a d a m a had conquered M e n a b e and Boina territories and established 
outposts, the Sakalava generally remained independent of Merina 
authority, especially in the southern part of Boina known as A m b o n g o . 
But even if Radama's authority on the island was not complete, at least 
there was no effective challenge to his title as King of Madagascar.23 But 
these campaigns had taken a heavy toll on Radama's energy and health, 
further weakened as he was by heavy drinking and licentious living. O n 27 
July 1828 he died at the early age of 36, thus bringing a successful reign 
to an abrupt end. 
21. C . Guillain, 1845. 
22. G . Rantoandro, 1981; M . Rasoamiaramanana, 1981. 
23. M . Brown, 1978, p. 150. 
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Rana valona I (1828-61): a period of reaction or 
stabilization? 
Queen Ranavalona I was the cousin and first wife of R a d a m a I and came 
to the throne with the assistance of the nobles and army chiefs w h o m 
R a d a m a had removed from influential positions.24 This meant that the new 
regime would attempt to remove Radama's close associates and replace 
them with m e n w h o had not accepted, or been party to, the policies pursued 
by the late king. T h e Queen's first chief advisers were Rainimahary and 
Andriamihaja; but these two m e n were eliminated one after the other and 
in the end the most important m e n w h o emerged to share power with 
the Queen were Rainiharo and Rainijohary. T h e former came from the 
Tsimiamboholahy clan and the other from Tsimahafotsy, the two clans 
that had assisted Andrianampoinimerina to found the Merina kingdom at 
the end of the eighteenth century. They developed for the most part from 
commoners and laid the foundation of the Hova middle class, which, as a 
result of the support its members gave the monarchy, gradually built up 
economic, administrative and political power that came to rival and erode 
the power of the monarchy. 
T h e cornerstone of Ranavalona's policy was to safeguard, as she saw it, 
Madagascar's independence from foreign influence, particularly as this 
affected national institutions, traditions and customs. This meant, in terms 
of foreign policy, the desire to disengage from British influence, particularly 
in political and religious fields. In December 1828 the Ranavalona's govern-
ment told Robert Lyall, the new British Resident, that although they would 
not reintroduce the slave trade, they did not wish to continue with the 
treaty, nor did they consider his presence in their capital necessary any 
longer. Trade between Madagascar and the islands of Mauritius and 
Réunion was banned. General Brady, w h o had been naturalized as a 
Malagasy and given noble rank by R a d a m a I, was forced into retirement 
in 1829. Madagascar's disillusionment with foreign powers was heightened 
when, in 1829, Charles X ' s government in France, desirous to raise its 
prestige at h o m e , ordered the bombardment and occupation of Tintingue 
and Tamatave, following a series of misunderstandings with the Malagasy 
over the French presence at Tintingue, opposite the island of Sainte-Marie. 
T h e Malagasy repulsed the invaders at Foulpointe. T h e unprovoked attack 
was disavowed by Louis-Philippe, Charles X's successor, but it left deep 
wounds in the hearts of the Malagasy. French claims on Madagascar 
became a permanent feature of Franco-Malagasy relations for the rest of 
the century. This sometimes produced a pro-British reaction and it explains 
w h y , in spite of the policy of cultural independence, British missionaries 
were not expelled from the country for another six years. 
24. See G . Ayache, 1966; A . Délivré, 1974, for the importance of oral tradition in her 
nomination, and the role of Rainimahary, Andrianampoinimerina's companion. There were 
a few executions, but Ranavalona was quickly accepted by the people as Queen. 
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Malagasy leaders welcomed and appreciated the technical assistance that 
the British missionaries were offering; but what they wanted most was 
secular, not religious education. T h e attitude of Ranavalona was, therefore, 
not one of systematic rejection, though she was from the start obviously 
less enthusiastic about Christianity than her predecessor. W h a t worried 
the new leaders most and eventually drove them into a struggle against the 
growing influence of Christianity was that it constituted a challenge to 
Malagasy traditions and institutions generally, and the monarchy in par-
ticular. Christian rituals competed with the ceremonies of the royal religion. 
B y discouraging the worship of sampimoanja-Kana (sampy), the royal 
divinity guaranteeing the well-being of the state, Christianity shook the 
foundations of royal power. Its egalitarian principles were also in conflict 
with the traditional hierarchy of castes.25 Christianity was changing the 
traditions of the country and turning the Malagasy into worshippers of 
Jesus Christ w h o m they regarded as the whitemen's ancestor. B y 1830 
there were about 200 converted Christians w h o were even prepared to die 
for their faith; the government could not remain indifferent to this 'new 
power which had arisen in the land'.26 W h e n the missionaries refused to 
offer education without being allowed to preach their religion, the breach 
with Ranavalona was unavoidable. Her first response was to forbid baptism 
in 1832. Three years later all her subjects were prohibited from becoming 
or remaining Christians. T h e preaching of Christianity was banned, but 
the ban did not apply to secular education. Explaining the reasons for her 
decision, Ranavalona told the British missionaries, w h o m she s u m m o n e d 
to her palace on 26 February 1835, that: 
While she thanked them for the good services they had rendered to 
the country, and while they were at liberty to follow their o w n religious 
customs, she would not permit her subjects to depart from their old 
customs . . . She gave full permission for the teaching of the arts or 
sciences but not religion.27 
T h e first martyrs fell; Rasalama in August 1837 and Raqarilahy-Andri-
amazok in February 1838. T h e missionaries went into exile and this was 
followed by a period of fierce persecution of Malagasy Christians during 
which several hundreds perished in violent deaths. Nevertheless, far from 
dying out, Christianity seems to have had a n e w rebirth. 
T h e religion spread underground, with clandestine meetings of Christian 
communities in caves (e.g. in the region of Fihaonana in the Vonizongo, 
north-west of Imerina) and in private homes , even in Antananarivo. A 
group of Christians fled to Britain where they prepared themselves for an 
eventual return as missionaries. T h e Jesuits, for their part, organized a 
mission to the Petites îles (Nosy Be , Nosy Faly and Mayotte in the north-
25. M . Brown, 1977. 
26. See W . E . Cousins, 1895, pp. 83fr. 
27. Quoted from P . M . Mutibwa, 1974, pp. 26-7. 
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west and Sainte-Marie in the east) from where they tried to infiltrate to 
the mainland, especially the Bay of Faly, which they were forced to leave 
in 1857. This has been referred to by some writers as 'the darkest period 
of Ranavalona's reign',28 and Ranavalona has earned such names as the 
'Queen M a r y of Madagascar', 'a modern Messalina or female Nero'. Even 
so, the Malagasy court was anxious not to break completely with Britain, 
so as to avoid confrontation with a hostile alliance of Britain and France. 
T h e Malagasy leaders realized that the country needed contact with the 
outside world, to secure European manufactured goods, particularly guns 
and ammunition. They also wanted to buy luxury goods such as cloth and 
alcohol and to expand their exports, mainly cattle and rice, to Mauritius 
and Réunion in order to pay for the necessary imports. Queen Ranavalona 
therefore wanted to find a modus vivendi with the Europeans, to enable her 
country to develop without the fear of European antagonism and war. In 
pursuit of this policy, she and her advisers decided in 1836 to send an 
embassy to France and England and to negotiate fresh treaties of friendship 
and commerce, based on respect for Malagasy culture and independence 
and to secure recognition for Ranavalona I as Queen of Madagascar.29 T h e 
Malagasy embassy — the first ever to be sent to Europe - consisted of six 
officers and two secretaries and was led by Andriantsitchaina.30 Their stay 
in Paris was uneventful and they then crossed the Channel to London. 
They were accorded an audience by King William IV and Queen Adelaide, 
but their talks with Lord Palmerston were unsatisfactory. T h e British 
government insisted on the freedom of commerce and navigation, which 
ran counter to Madagascar's desire to control its o w n trade and allow traffic 
only through ports under the effective control of the central government. 
T h e failure of the embassy to conclude any treaty with either France or 
England increased the suspicions of the Malagasy towards foreigners, and 
the fears were well founded. In 1845, an Anglo-French naval squadron 
attacked Tamatave on the orders of the French and British authorities in 
Réunion and Mauritius respectively. T h e pretext for this attack was the 
proclamation in M a y of a Malagasy law that obliged all foreigners to obey 
the laws of the land, with the implications, the British alleged, that they 
were liable to public works, could be enslaved and were subject to the 
ordeal of tangena. T h e Malagasy were flabbergasted by the attack. They 
succeeded in repulsing it, and the survivors of the Anglo-French force 
were obliged to evacuate Tamatave, leaving behind the corpses of their 
slain comrades, whose heads were cut off by the Malagasy and impaled on 
poles as a warning to other would-be invaders. Although this attack was 
28. M . Brown, 1978, p. 177; A . Boudou, 1940-2; also P. Rabary, 1957, and J . T . 
Hardyman, 1977. 
29. Yet another reason was that rumours were circulating at the time that England was 
about to attack Madagascar, moving from Islary Bay near St Augustin Bay where the 
Malagasy had seen some English ships. See R . E . P. Wastell, 1944, p. 25. 
30. For more details, see J. Valette, i960. 
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disowned by the French and British governments, the damage had already
been done. Queen Ranavalona reacted by expelling all foreign traders and
suspending overseas trade, especially the export of beef and rice to Mau¬
ritius and Réunion, although trade with the USA continued.
This reaction was typical of the Malagasy: if Europe would not co¬
operate with them, they would help themselves and rely on their own
initiatives. The Queen and the Andafiavaratra clan in particular and the
oligarchy in general could adopt this attitude of resistance to foreigners
because, despite sporadic revolts, they were in control of the most important
provinces, whose economy they controlled, including a monopoly on the
beef trade. In this lies their determination to continue to promote Western
education and establish industries to produce those goods which they
needed but which could not now be imported from outside. In maintaining
commercial contacts with the outside world, the Queen used the services
of a French national called de Lastelle, who was established at Tamatave,
and an American national called William Marks at Majunga. With the
support of de Lastelle, sugar plantations were established on the eastern
coast, and a factory was installed at Mahela producing sugar and rum.31
The Queen engaged Jean Laborde, a French adventurer, who arrived in
Antananarivo in 1832 'as a kind of general superintendent of works'. He
plate 16.8 The Queen's palace in Antananarivo begun in 1839 by Jean Laborde at the
request ofQueen Ranavalona I
31. F. Nicol, 1940.
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first established a factory at Ilafy, 10 k m north of Antananarivo before 
moving to Mantasoa, on the edge of the eastern forest in a region rich in 
running water but where it was difficult to get the Malagasy to work 
willingly. At Mantasoa, with official backing, he established an industrial 
complex employing some 20000 workers. This produced various goods 
ranging from guns and cannon to glass and soap. Perhaps Laborde's 
greatest and most lasting creation was the wooden palace of the Queen, 
later enclosed in stone by Cameron, which n o w dominates Antananarivo. 
D e Lastelle and Laborde became Malagasy citizens and were incorporated 
into the ruling oligarchy.32 
Queen Ranavalona continued the expansion which R a d a m a I had begun 
and consolidated her administration in the conquered territories. T h e 
equipment of her army necessitated the prosecution of external trade to 
obtain ammunition and the encouragement of gun production at Laborde's 
factory. She levied special taxes for the support of the wars. T h e town of 
Fianarantsoa was created in 1831 as a regional capital, and the province of 
Betsileo was reorganized. F r o m Fianarantsoa expeditions were dispatched 
in the 1830s to the south, some of which, under the c o m m a n d of Rainiharo, 
crossed the Bara, the Mahafaly and the Masikoro countries. O n e of these 
reached the Bay of Saint-Augustin in 1835.33 In the west and north, the 
Sakalava and the Antankara continued to resist the authority of the central 
government. W h e n the government's forces defeated the Sakalava chiefs, 
Tsiomako and Tsimiharo, they and their supporters fled to the neigh-
bouring islands of Nosy Be , Nosy Faly and Nosy Mitso from where they 
sent messages to the French authorities in Réunion, placing their territories 
under French protection. In 1841, Amiral de Hell, the Governor of 
Réunion, accepted these requests and the treaties between the French and 
the rebellious Sakalava chiefs-in-exile formed the basis of France's claims 
to the western territories of Madagascar.34 
With the death in 1852 of Rainiharo, w h o had headed the government 
from the 1830s, a new generation of younger m e n came to power. It was 
led by Rainivoninahitriniony and his younger brother Rainilaiarivony 
(Rainiharo's two sons) w h o became prime minister and commander-in-
chief of the army respectively. W h a t is more this new generation of leaders 
had the support of Rakoto R a d a m a , Queen Ranavalona's son, w h o had 
been designated Crown Prince. These young m e n , including Prince Rakoto, 
had received some education from the missionaries and they were more 
outward-looking than the old group of Rainiharo and his associates. It is 
true that Rainijohary, the m a n w h o had shared power with the late Raini-
haro, was still around, still referred to as Chief Minister and was opposed 
to any change of policy; but the presence of the Crown Prince, w h o called 
32. S. Ayache, 1977; O . Caillon-Filet, 1978. 
33. H . Deschamps, i960, p. 170; S. Rakotomah'andry, 1981; R . Decary, 1966. 
34. C . Guillain, 1845; R . Decary, i960. 
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Jean Laborde, the French engineer, ' M o n Père', could not but ensure a 
reorientation of Ranavalona's policies. In 1853, the ban on trade between 
Madagascar and the islands of Réunion and Mauritius was lifted after 
the merchants of those two islands (especially Mauritius) had paid a 
compensation of 15000 dollars to Rana valona. T h e Queen opened her 
doors to some foreigners. In 1856 she allowed the Reverend W . Ellis of the 
L M S to visit Antananarivo, bringing letters from the British government 
professing friendship and amity towards Madagascar. T w o R o m a n Catholic 
priests, Père Finaz and Père Weber , were smuggled into the capital, Finaz 
as secretary to a French businessman called Lambert and Weber as a 
companion of a doctor w h o was to care for Rainijohary's brother.35 
Joseph Lambert arrived in Antananarivo in 1855. H e was a trader-
planter from Mauritius whose chartered vessel had dealt with Madagascar 
and w h o had rendered important service to Ranavalona earlier in the year 
by replenishing supplies to the garrison in Fort Dauphin, which was then 
blockaded by rebellious peoples in the south-east. It is therefore not 
surprising that he was m a d e welcome at court. Acting through Laborde's 
influence on Rakoto R a d a m a , Lambert induced the prince to grant him a 
charter. This gave him rights to exploit the country's mineral and agri-
cultural resources. T h e prince is also alleged to have requested a French 
protectorate over Madagascar. But Emperor Napoleon III was too pre-
occupied with the Crimean W a r to pursue a policy in Madagascar which 
could only have antagonized England, France's ally; in the event, the 
protectorate proposal was rejected by Paris. 
Although Ranavalona was becoming more and more friendly towards 
foreigners, the hopes of the French and the British lay in the Crown Prince, 
w h o had clearly demonstrated his pro-European tendencies. It was largely 
this consideration that induced Lambert, on his return to Antananarivo in 
1857, to plan a coup d'état. H e did this with the support of Laborde, de 
Lastelle and the Rainiharo clan and other Malagasy w h o favoured 
modernity, especially the clandestine Christian communities, whose 
members had developed fraternal relations among themselves and w h o 
were close to the prince. T h e object of the plot was to overthrow Ranavalona 
and put the prince on the throne, but it was discovered before it could 
materialize, and Lambert and de Lastelle were expelled from Madagascar.36 
This brought to a head rumours that had been circulating in Madagascar 
and even in Europe that France was about to invade Madagascar, rumours 
which even received credence in London. 3 7 Ranavalona was hurt and 
disappointed by the treason of her son and by the disloyalty of the two 
35. A . Boudou, 1940-2. 
36. A . Boudou, 1943. 
37. Cowley to Ihouvenel, 'Note Verbale', 19 February i860, Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères, Archives (hereinafter M A E ) , Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Madagascar Series, T o m e 
IV. 
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Frenchmen, w h o m she had also come to regard as her o w n sons. Aged and 
worried, Rana valona lived in an unhappy isolation until her death on 18 
August 1861, after having designated Rakoto R a d a m a as her successor. 
Rainijohary and his 'conservative' supporters tried to organize the suc-
cession to the throne of Rambossalama, the queen's nephew; but the 
support of Rainivoninahitriniony and his younger brother Rainilaiarivony 
for Ranavalona's nominee, whose progressive ideas they in fact shared, was 
decisive and ensured the C r o w n Prince's peaceful accession to the throne 
as R a d a m a II. Rainivoninahitriniony was confirmed as prime minister and 
Rainilairivony as the commander-in-chief of the army. Their family, the 
Andafiararatra, thus established 'a firm grip of the government which they 
were not to relinquish for the duration of the monarchy'.38 
W h a t can be said of Queen Rana valona I's reign in the history of 
Madagascar? T o the Europeans it was a reign of terror, as one modern 
writer has called it.39 T o m a n y of the subject peoples brought under Merina 
hegemony, her rule was also regarded as exploitative and tyrannical. T h e 
revolts of the peoples of the south-east and the brutal repressions that 
followed were notorious. Raombana , a modern Malagasy historian, has 
described in graphic terms the consequent desolation. S o m e peoples, such 
as the Antanosy, emigrated west to the valley of Onilahi to escape Merina 
rule. Nevertheless considerable industrial development was achieved in her 
reign, education took real roots and the process of modernization in m a n y 
fields was never to be reversed. W h a t is more, to m a n y of her subjects, 
Ranavalona was a symbol of Malagasy nationalism and a bastion against 
foreign influences that were detrimental to Malagasy culture and tradition.40 
The open-door policy: King Radama II, 1861-63 
T h e main events of this short-lived regime of an extremely pro-European 
sovereign centred on Radama's precipitous attempt to reverse all the 
policies of the previous regime as far as foreign policy was concerned. In 
this, in fact, largely lie the reasons for its equally unprecedented brevity. 
R a d a m a IPs ambition was to modernize his country by attracting foreign 
traders, investors and missionaries to Madagascar. H e enthusiastically 
allowed Christianity to be taught and the missionaries and the exiled 
Malagasy Christians were all asked to return to Madagascar. H e welcomed 
back his old friends, Laborde and Lambert, and other Europeans. At the 
end of the year, he dispatched Lambert on a diplomatic mission to France 
and Britain to seek their recognition of him as king of Madagascar, a matter 
that was crucial to his plans for a free flow of commerce between Madagascar 
and the outside world. 
38. M . Brown, 1978, p. 189. 
39. ibid., p. 188. 
40. S. Ayache, 1975; Raombana, 1980; M . Brown, 1978, pp. 167, 188. For the lasting 
influence of the British missionaries on this period, see B . A . G o w , 1979. 
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France and Britain were not slow to respond to the Malagasy ruler's 
accession to the throne. They agreed to send goodwill missions and to 
appoint consuls to reside at Antananarivo. T h e British government nomi-
nated Conolly Pakenham as its representative in Madagascar, and pledged 
to support Madagascar's independence.41 T h e French government nomi-
nated Jean Laborde, Radama's great friend, w h o had lived in Madagascar 
since 1832, as their consul, no doubt hoping to capitalize on his great 
influence in and knowledge of the country. T h e French also recognized 
Radama as king of Madagascar, although in Emperor Napoleon Ill's letter 
to Radama II vague references were m a d e to France's 'ancient rights' on 
the island. T h e French government, however, m a d e it clear to their consul 
that they had no intention of taking over the island, nor did they wish to 
compete with Britain for special privileges there.42 
Missionaries soon followed the European diplomatic representatives. 
T h e Catholic mission, led by Père Jouen, arrived in September 1861. T h e 
L M S missionaries arrived in April 1862, led by the Reverend W . Ellis, 
w h o had visited Antananarivo in 1856. T h e fact that Ellis arrived with a 
bundle of letters for R a d a m a from the British government convinced the 
Malagasy leaders that the L M S was indeed an official arm of Britain and 
this partly explains why he enjoyed so m u c h influence in the Malagasy 
capital. 
T h e Europeans took the opportunity of the changed circumstances to 
negotiate new treaties of friendship and commerce. T h e French signed a 
treaty on 12 September 1862 and the British on 4 December 1862. T h e 
contents of these documents caused concern to the Malagasy nobility. 
Rainivoninahitriniony, the Prime Minister, and his colleagues were not 
happy because the traders stipulated, inter alia, that foreign nationals could 
purchase and o w n land in Madagascar, contrary to Malagasy traditions. 
Moreover, the treaties exempted foreign nationals from payment of import 
and export duties, which were the principal sources of revenue for Malagasy 
officials, w h o received no regular salaries from the government. In addition, 
in September 1862, Radama had ratified the Charter which he had granted 
to his friend Lambert in 1855, which permitted Lambert to exploit the 
mineral and agricultural resources in the north-western territories of M a d a -
gascar. Another concession, covering the region of Vohemar, was also 
granted to a British national from Mauritius called Caldwell. 
T h e King's Council was unanimous in its opposition to the conclusion 
of these conventions, which gave so m a n y privileges to foreigners. 
Moreover, on 28 September 1862, C o m m o d o r e Dupré, the French nego-
tiator, induced Radama to sign a secret treaty in which the king recognized 
41. P R O , FO/48 /9 , Russell to Pakenham, 10 M a y 1862. For more details see P . M . 
Mutibwa, 1974, pp. 58fr. 
42. M A E , Madagascar V, Thouvenel to Laborde, 24 April 1862; Emperor Napoleon II 
to Radama II, 22 April 1862. 
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French rights to some parts of the island.43 Although the French govern-
ment disavowed this secret convention, Radama's ministers came to k n o w 
of it and this increased their distrust of their king, w h o appeared ready 
to sign documents indiscriminately even when they threatened national 
independence. 
B y December 1862, R a d a m a appeared to have fulfilled his plans to open 
up his country to foreign influence. But those sixteen months had been an 
unprecedented period for his subjects. T o o m u c h had occurred in too short 
a period, and people had not had enough time to digest the m a n y rapid 
changes of policies, which were so different from those pursued by his 
predecessor. T h e treaties and the charters he had signed had angered the 
m e n w h o had helped him succeed to the throne; and the influence of the 
missionaries and other foreigners was growing so fast that m a n y of his 
influential officials were alarmed. There was such discontent at the n e w 
policies that during the Ratnanenjana epidemic, those affected claimed that 
they were possessed by the spirit of the late Queen Rana valona. T h e climax 
came when R a d a m a decided to remove from power Rainivoninahitriniony, 
the Prime Minister; Rainilaiarivony his younger brother; and Rainijohary. 
All three were leading members of the two clans of Tsimiamboholahy and 
Tsimahafotsy which, as w e have noted, had assisted Andrianampoinimerina 
to found the Merina kingdom. Radama's plan was to replace this oligarchy 
by his friends of younger days w h o called themselves mena maso (literally 
red eyes), led by nobles from Vakinisinaony, the area of the older capitals 
of Merina, w h o claimed seniority and superiority to the Avaradrano of 
Antananarivo.44 
Above all, R a d a m a appears to have had more confidence in foreigners 
v
 than in the Malagasy in running his government. His mission to Europe 
to seek recognition was led not by Malagasy officials (as in 1836-^7) but by 
Lambert, the French adventurer. H e relied too m u c h on Ellis for advice 
and, on the death of Rahaniraka in November 1862, R a d a m a appointed 
William Marks, an American national, and Clement Laborde, the French 
Consul's son, as Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. In this, as also in 
his decision to rely on the mena maso, the two sons of Rainiharo and 
their supporters, including Rainijohary, realized that the king was set on 
eradicating them. They decided to act before they were destroyed. W h e n 
R a d a m a refused to surrender the mena maso - and even threatened to 
punish those w h o opposed his will — the Prime Minister's group decided 
to remove him from power. In the early hours of 12 M a y 1863 R a d a m a 
was assassinated; strangled with a silken sash so as to avoid the shedding 
of royal blood, which was contrary to Malagasy tradition. As M e r v y n 
Brown has succinctly commented: 
43. M A E , Madagascar V, Dupré to Drouyn de Lhuys, 23 October 1862. 
44. For the ethnic background of Radama's supporters, see S. Ellis, 1980. 
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Weakness of character was the main cause of Radama's downfall. His 
natural goodness, undoubted intelligence and excellent intentions 
were not matched by self-discipline, powers of application or good 
judgement; and he proved unable to cope with the opposition aroused 
in various quarters by his sharp reversal of nearly all his mother's 
policies.45 
Madagascar's policies reviewed: 1863-8 
R a d a m a IPs successor was his wife Ravodozakandriana w h o took the royal 
n a m e of Rasoherina. She was R a d a m a I's first cousin, and the succession 
was therefore still in Andrianampoinimerina's line. She was invited - the 
word needs emphasizing - to become Queen by the oligarchy which had 
overthrown her husband and which, from n o w on, was the effective ruler 
of the country. It is important to emphasize that Rainivoninahitriniony, 
Rainilaiarivony and their associates were not anti-European or against the 
modernization of their country. It is true that the 'conservative' faction, 
led by Rainijohary, was still there and pressing for a complete reversal 
of R a d a m a IPs policies; but the prime minister's pro-European group 
c o m m a n d e d a majority in the Queen's Council.46 W h a t the n e w rulers 
disliked was the manner in which R a d a m a had gone about the pro-
European policy; they felt that modernization should not be pushed forward 
at the expense of the survival of their traditions and independence. 
T h e new government was in the hands of Rainivoninahitriniony until 
July 1864, when he was replaced by Rainilaiarivony, his younger brother, 
w h o was the commander-in-chief of the army. Rainilaiarivony was to 
remain in control of his country's destiny for almost the remainder of the 
century. T h e n e w government wanted to continue with Radama's foreign 
policy; but with important modifications. Lambert's and Caldwell's char-
ters, which compromised the country's independence, were cancelled. T h e 
treaties with France and Britain were to be revised, so that the offending 
articles permitting foreign nationals to o w n land in Madagascar and exempt-
ing them from import and export duties could be removed. In regard to 
domestic policy, Christianity would continue to be taught, but the customs 
of the country which forbade foreigners to visit or preach in such towns 
45. M . Brown, 1978, p. 195. Soon after Radama IPs death, rumours started circulating 
that he was alive and they went on for more than two years. M a n y of the Europeans, 
including the Reverend W . Ellis of the L M S and Laborde, the French Consul in Madagas-
car, believed these rumours and tried to get in contact with the fallen king. A study has 
been made by Raymond Delval in which it is demonstrated that indeed Radama II had 
survived and had escaped to the western part of the island where, after failing to make a 
comeback, he lived as an ordinary person until he died in old age in the late nineteenth 
century. See R . Delval, 1964. 
46. T h e discussion of the political alignment of the Queen's Council is based on Jean 
Laborde's account in Laborde to Drouyn de Lhuys, 25 M a y 1865, M A E , Madagascar, 
VII. 
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as Ambohimanga should be observed. Foreigners w h o wished to come to 
Madagascar and assist in development projects were welcome. T h e Mala-
gasy government sent letters to the French and British authorities in 
Réunion and Mauritius respectively, explaining to them the events that 
had occurred in Madagascar and outlining the n e w government's policies. 
In November 1863 the government sent an embassy to Britain and France 
in order to explain Madagascar's n e w policy and seek the revision of the 
treaties of 1862. T h e embassy was led by Rainifiringia, accompanied by 
Rainavidriandraina. 
Britain and France reacted differently to the overthrow of R a d a m a II. 
Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary appreciated Madagascar's 
difficulties in dealing with foreign governments; while he regretted that 
the n e w government had abrogated an international treaty, he accepted 
Madagascar's request for the revision of the old treaty and refused to be 
drawn into a quarrel with Madagascar over the cancellation of Caldwell's 
concession.47 T h e British government therefore gave a friendly welcome 
to the Malagasy embassy when it arrived in London in March 1864. A n e w 
draft treaty, incorporating most of Madagascar's proposals, was agreed 
upon subject to further negotiation in Antananarivo after the envoy's 
return to Madagascar. W h e n these negotiations eventually began in 1865, 
difficulties emerged over Britain's demands that its nationals should be 
able to o w n land in Madagascar and that the duties on imports and exports 
should be 5 per cent rather than 10 per cent as the Malagasy were proposing. 
But the Malagasy were adamant on these points and in the end the British 
government accepted all the Malagasy proposals. T h e treaty was signed, 
amid m u c h rejoicing, in Antananarivo on 27 June 1865. 
T h e French government's reaction was different. It refused to accept 
the policies of the new regime in Antananarivo. T h e French were greatly 
upset by R a d a m a IPs removal which, both in Paris and in St Denis, was 
attributed to the influence of British missionaries, especially Ellis. T h e 
French government therefore refused to accept the abrogation of their 
treaty of 1862 or of the Lambert Charter, both of which had been ratified 
by Emperor Napoleon III. T h e Lambert Charter had been constituted 
under the Emperor's o w n patronage and a company had already been 
formed to exploit the concessions. For the French, therefore, to accept the 
cancellation of the Charter or the treaty would have been a damaging blow. 
Rather, they broke off diplomatic relations in September 1863.48 
In Paris, the French government was under heavy pressure to use armed 
aggression to enforce the treaty of 1862 and the Lambert Charter; but even 
so it refused to be drawn into an expedition against Madagascar. Instead, 
it proposed considering revision of the treaty provided Madagascar paid an 
47. See Codore to Drouyn de Lhuys, 28 November 1863, M A E , Madagascar, VI and 
Russell to Cowley, 7 June 1864, P R O , FO/48/6 . 
48. See Pakenham to Russell, 30 September 1863, FO/48/10 in which the conduct of 
the French special envoy to Madagascar, Commodore Dupré, is well discussed. 
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indemnity of 1 200 000 francs (or 240 000 dollars) for the cancellation of 
the Charter. This was communicated to the Malagasy envoys while they 
were still in Europe. Their visit to Paris, in July 1864, was therefore 
fruitless. Emperor Napoleon III even refused to receive them. All that 
they obtained was a friendly but strongly worded sermon from Drouyn de 
Lhuys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the importance of 
observing international conventions and on his government's unequivocal 
demand for a speedy payment of the indemnity if friendly relations were 
to be restored between the two countries. 
O n their return to Madagascar, the ambassadors explained to their 
government the seriousness with which the French viewed the cancellation 
of the Lambert Charter and the treaty. Because of their great desire to 
disengage themselves from the obligations of these two conventions, the 
Malagasy agreed to pay the indemnity, particularly as the British govern-
ment showed no inclination to intervene in the matter on Madagascar's 
behalf. T h e indemnity was paid at Tamatave on 1 January 1866 and 
negotiations began between the two countries for a new treaty. However, 
instead of simply accepting a version of the Anglo-Malagasy treaty of June 
1865, as the Malagasy had expected, the French still demanded that their 
nationals should be able to purchase and o w n land in Madagascar. T h e 
Malagasy naturally rejected the French demands. T h e French government, 
finding itself in an embarrassing position, asked the British government to 
seek an amendment of its o w n treaty with Madagascar so as to enable 
British and French nationals to acquire land in Madagascar. But the French 
manoeuvres failed, for the British declined to amend a treaty that had 
already been ratified. In the end, the French had no alternative but to 
accept the text of the Anglo-Malagasy treaty as the basis for a new Franco-
Malagasy treaty, in which it was stipulated that French nationals would 
not have the right to purchase and o w n land in Madagascar. This was 
signed on 8 August 1868 at Antananarivo. 
T h e five years that followed R a d a m a H ' s overthrow were eventful for 
Madagascar. T h e island had experienced great difficulties with France over 
the cancellation of the conventions that R a d a m a II had concluded. It 
had impressed the Malagasy that while Britain remained friendly and 
undemanding, France had been unfriendly and hostile. There was even 
fear in Antananarivo at the time that the French might invade Madagascar. 
O n the occasion of the signing of the Anglo-Malagasy treaty in 1865, the 
Malagasy government, according to the French Consul in Antananarivo, 
'thanked all the English — that is the L M S missionaries resident in Antan-
anarivo — for having kindly associated themselves with the government in 
order to obtain the modifications they had demanded.49 This was seen as 
cementing the Anglo-Malagasy friendship, which continued for the rest 
of the century. O n the other hand, as a result of France's unfriendly 
49. Laborde to Drouyn de Lhuys, 29 June 1865, M A E , Madagascar, VII. 
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policies, Malagasy friendship with the French received a serious setback. 
T h e British had stolen a march upon the French, and in the context of 
Malagasy politics this was an important development in the history of 
Madagascar. 
Internal developments, 1861-80 
So far our discussion of the period under review has been largely political 
and diplomatic. It has touched on the political evolution of the country 
from 1800 to about 1880, and on the diplomatic interaction between 
Madagascar, on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. It is 
n o w necessary to turn to the evolution of the country in the field of 
administration and socio-economic development, particularly since 
developments in these areas were to prove crucial in Madagascar's struggle 
for survival as an independent state during the period of the European 
Scramble. 
O n e of the most important events that occurred in Madagascar in this 
period, which was to have a tremendous impact on later developments, was 
the conversion to Christianity, in February 1869, of Queen Rana valona II 
and her Prime Minister and husband, Rainilaiarivony. T h e zeal with which 
the missionaries worked, after their return to Madagascar in 1861, clearly 
indicated that there would soon be a religious revolution in the country, 
country. In 1863 there were already about 5000 Christians in the Malagasy 
capital out of a total population of some 60 000 people. At the end of 
1868, the L M S alone had 10546 church members and 153000 adherents 
throughout Madagascar.50 T h e Christian group, m a n y of whose members 
were among the leading officials in the government, could no longer be 
ignored. Persecution could not be used as a means of eliminating Chris-
tianity: it had been tried in the 1830s and 1840s and it had failed. By the 
1870s, the persecution of Christians would have meant trying to eliminate 
the most influential part of the population. T h e L M S converts had found 
leader in Rainimaharavo, the Malagasy Foreign Minister and Rai-
nilaiarivony's open rival for leadership, w h o also happened to be pro-
British. In order to neutralize Rainimaharavo and avoid a radical Christian 
revolution that m a y even have led to the replacement of Queen Rana valona 
II by Prince Rasata (an L M S protege) Ranav alona and her Prime Minister 
decided to embrace Christianity.51 This is not, of course, to suggest that 
they did not believe in what they professed; but it does explain w h y and 
h o w their conversion to Christianity occurred at the time it did. 
T h e fact that the Malagasy leaders had embraced Protestantism, the 
Englishmen's religion, rather than Catholicism, was important for the 
future of Madagascar in m a n y ways. T h e Malagasy tended to regard 
50. See the Chronicle of the L M S and the Reports of the L M S for the 1860s and 1870s. 
51. D . Ralibera, 1977. 
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Protestantism as the religion of rulers and associated it with power, the 
more so as outside Imerina and the Betsileo country Christianity flourished 
only at the fortified posts garrisoned by Merina colonists, where the 
governor was also often something of an evangelist. T h e Catholics were 
very active in the Betsileo country and a m o n g the subject peoples, w h o 
developed a kind of people's Christianity alongside the official religion. 
Furthermore, in reaction to authority, there was a revival of traditional 
religions, despite the public destruction of sampy that accompanied the 
spread of Christianity. T h e best-known priests oí sampy became the leaders 
of opposition to royal authority in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century.52 
Conversion of the rulers of Madagascar to Protestantism had occurred 
soon after the conclusion of the Franco-Malagasy treaty of 1868, which 
had been preceded, as w e have already seen, by quarrels and even threats 
of war from France. It was at a time w h e n Britain appeared - and 
posed — as Madagascar's true friend and ally, and British missionaries in 
Madagascar were not slow to emphasize this time and again. Through m e n 
such as James Cameron, the L M S had given a great deal of technical 
assistance to the Malagasy, and Rainilaiarivony and his colleagues believed 
that by embracing the L M S ' s brand of Christianity they would further 
cement this friendship. In fact, by embracing Protestantism they would 
draw closer to Britain as allies w h o could be expected to take their side 
should difficulties occur again with the French. T h e French also saw the 
Malagasy leadership's acceptance of Protestantism as indicative of its 
commitment to the British cause; its m e m b e r s saw the Queen's conversion 
as a demonstration of Madagascar's rejection of French culture and influ-
ence on the island in favour of the British. 
T h e British missionaries, n o w that they had w o n the religious war, 
exploited their new advantages in the capital to expand their activities 
throughout Madagascar. Even the Catholics, lacking direct political influ-
ence in the capital were not precluded from proselytization in other parts 
of the country.53 As mentioned above, they dominated evangelization in 
the Betsileo country. Other missionary societies came in and, by the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, outlines of a division of zones of influence 
began to emerge: the Norske Missionary Society in the Vakinankaratra, 
the S P G in the east, the F F M A in the west. With the contribution of the 
different societies and the close alliance between the British missionaries 
and the Malagasy government, m u c h was achieved in the field of education, 
social change and medical services. Reference has already been m a d e to 
the spread of literacy and a written literature. M a n y revolutionary changes 
flowed from this, such as the transition from the traditional lunar calendar 
to the Gregorian calendar introduced by the British missionaries in 1864. 
52. M . Esoavelomandroso, 1978b; S . Ellis, 1980. 
53. A . Boudou, 1940-3. 
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There was also missionary influence on architecture, especially with the 
feverish building of churches and other monuments to the martyrs in an 
effort to make Antananarivo replace A m b o h i m a n g o as a sacred city.54 It 
was because of the remarkable progress that the Malagasy people achieved, 
especially in education, in the period under review that they w o n the 
admiration of the 'civilized world'. This in turn contributed a great deal 
to a near social revolution in the country. 
British missionaries had opened the first schools in Antananarivo in 
1820. W h e n Christianity was banned and the missionaries left the country, 
secular education was continued by the Malagasy boys w h o had been 
taught by the missionaries. With the return of the missionaries after 1861, 
the pace of development greatly increased, with the result that by 1880 
there were over 40 000 pupils in mission and government schools and the 
prime minister decreed that 'all children over the age of seven must attend 
school.'55 Compulsory school attendance was in fact written into the Code 
of 305 articles in 1881, and in 1882 government inspectors began examining 
the schools in Imerina. Secondary schools were opened in the 1870s 
although these did not really take off until after 1880. M a n y boys, including 
two of the prime minister's children, were sent abroad for further studies, 
particularly to Britain and France. T h e expansion of education was facili-
tated by the number of printing presses established by the missions, 
publishing books, magazines and newspapers. With educational expansion 
dominated by missionary influence, it is not surprising that technical 
education did not keep pace with literary education, since the missionaries 
were more interested in building congregations than public works. T h e 
level of literary education that the Malagasy had achieved was however 
clearly evident from their diplomatic correspondence, both in English and 
French. 
Medical services began in Madagascar with the opening, in 1862, of a 
dispensary in Antananarivo by the L M S , and three years later a hospital 
was opened at Analakely in the centre of the capital. In 1875 the Malagasy 
government itself set up its o w n medical services, with paid personnel. B y 
1880, Madagascar had produced her first qualified doctors; D r Andrianaly 
and D r Rajaonah (a son-in-law of the prime minister) both of w h o m had 
spent nine years studying medicine at Edinburgh University.56 
In the field of constitutional and administrative evolution in Madagascar 
since the time of R a d a m a I, the most important change was the replacement 
of the Merina monarch as the ruler of the country by a Hova oligarchy, 
headed by the family of Rainiharo. M o v e m e n t in the direction of a con-
stitutional monarchy began in the 1820s w h e n Queen Rana valona I was 
54. F . Raison, 1970, 1977, 1979. 
55. M . Brown, 1978, p. 212. See also B . A . G o w , 1978, ch. 4 in which the educational 
and medical work of British missions is well and fully discussed. 
56. V . Ramanankasina, n.d. 
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obliged to share power with Rainiharo and Rainijohary, two m e n from 
important Hova families that had assisted Andrianampoinimerina in found-
ing the Merina kingdom at the end of the eighteenth century and had risen 
from lowly backgrounds to positions of power and influence. T h e traditional 
form of government in Imerina had been that of 'personal rule' by the 
sovereign w h o governed the kingdom as he saw fit and only consulted his 
advisers at his o w n discretion. After the death of R a d a m a I, however, the 
power of the Merina monarchy was increasingly eroded through the rise 
of the Hova middle class. T h e Hova played a leading part in the foundation 
and consolidation of the expansionist kingdom. Over the years, they 
exploited their position to enrich themselves from the new commercial 
opportunities as well as from their entrenched positions in the army and 
administrative hierarchies. Although the Andriana class continued to play 
an important role in the country, real power and influence in the army and 
government n o w rested with the Hova class. T h e most important change 
occurred after the assassination of King Radama II in 1863, when the new 
Queen, Rasoherina, was recognized formally as a constitutional monarch 
and the power to rule passed into the hands of the Hova oligarchy, which 
had overthrown her husband. Before her coronation, Rasoherina was 
required by the prime minister and his supporters 'to sign a set of articles 
in which she agreed, among other things, not to drink alcohol, not to pass 
the death sentence without the advice of councillors, not to promulgate 
any n e w law without the consent of the Council which they dominated.'57 
T h e powers of government were in fact initially shared by the two 
brothers, Rainivoninahitriniony and Rainilaiarivony, w h o became prime 
minister and commander-in-chief of the army respectively. W h e n , in July 
1864, Prime Minister Rainivoninahitriniony was overthrown and replaced 
by Rainilaiarivony, the latter became both the prime minister and the 
commander-in-chief of the army, this being the first time that the two 
offices were held by one and the same person.58 W h e n Rainilaiarivony then 
married the new queen, even though she was past fifty and fifteen years 
older than him, the new prime minister became the most powerful m a n in 
the land. Rainilaiarivony became the ruler, the uncrowned king, in fact, of 
Madagascar. A n d he continued to entrench his position when he also 
married the succeeding queen. T h e effect of all this was to shift the power 
from the sovereign and the Andriana group to the prime minister, w h o 
was the head of the Hova oligarchy.59 
In order to improve the maintenance of law and order and the functioning 
of the administrative organs of the state, a Code of 101 articles was 
promulgated in 1868, from which date more articles were added every year 
until the final figure of 305 articles was promulgated in March 1881. T h e 
57. B . A . Gow, 1979, p. 41. 
58. M . Brown, 1978, pp. 199-200. 
59. P . M . Mutibwa, 1974, p. 88; M . Brown, 1978, p. 207. 
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general theme of the Code was that the customs and traditions of the 
country would be allowed to continue as long as they did not obstruct 
innovation. T h e Code of 101 articles which was printed and circulated was 
severe in its application, but certainly an improvement on old customs in 
m a n y ways. It reduced 'the number of offences punishable by death from 
eighteen to thirteen - one of wilful murder and the other twelve being 
various forms of revolt against the state.' It also abolished the concept of 
collective family responsibility, under which wives and children were 
punished for a man's crimes. T h e laws were not applied in the same form 
in the provinces, where punishment tended to be lighter. There was even 
a special code of 118 articles decreed in 1873 by Rana valona II for the 
Betsileo country.60 
In 1876 three High Courts were created where there had previously only 
been one; these tried all the different types of cases, each with thirteen 
judges, eleven of w h o m were officers of the palace. In the villages, magis-
trates and village heads (sakaizambohitra) were appointed to administer 
justice; indeed at the local level the fokon'olona was reorganized in such a 
way that the village heads obtained more responsibilities in maintaining 
law and order and in ensuring justice and a fair deal for all. In all cases, 
however, whether tried in village courts or in the three superior courts 
at the capital, the final decisions rested with the prime minister. This 
centralization, although it placed a great deal of responsibility on one m a n , 
did however enable the government in Antananarivo to know what was 
happening in the provinces. 
In March of the same year, a more thorough reorganization of govern-
ment machinery was undertaken with the creation of a cabinet system with 
eight ministries: namely, interior, foreign affairs, war, justice, legislation, 
commerce and industry, finance, and education. T h e creation of these 
ministries was part of the new Code of 305 Articles which became the basis 
of other legal systems administered in Madagascar for the rest of the 
century and even during colonial rule. It marked, as one scholar has put 
it, 'a further advance towards a more h u m a n e system, although m a n y 
punishments remained harsh and the code retained its essentially Malagasy 
character.'61 This was another demonstration of the Malagasy desire to pull 
their country into the modern age and join the 'comity of nations'. 
T h e army, too, underwent some important changes. R a d a m a I's reforms 
in the army had been discarded by his successors; but, in 1872, the prime 
minister revived policies for modernizing the Malagasy army. In particular, 
with the assistance of a British army instructor, the government embarked 
on recruiting, training and equipping an enlarged and professional army. 
Jean Laborde's factory at Mantasoa for manufacturing light weapons had 
60. See M . Brown, 1978, pp. 214-15 to which the discussion which follows immediately 
here is greatly indebted. See also, E . Thebault, i960. 
61. M . Brown, 1978, p . 216. 
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plate 16.10 Ranavalona ITs encampment upon her return from Fianarantsoa, 1873
ceased operation when Laborde left the country. The government now
resorted to importing arms from Europe, particularly from England and
the USA. But this was expensive for the government, which had little
revenue and very little foreign exchange. Arrangements had to be made,
therefore, to manufacture smaller arms at home.
In 1876, further reforms were introduced in the army. From then on
soldiers received an annual medical examination, the purchase of 'honours'
and of release from military service was prohibited, and an end was made
to the abuse of the system of aides-de-camp. In 1879 compulsory military
service was introduced for a period of five years. Each of the six provinces
of Imerina was called upon to produce 5000 troops, making a fairly
formidable army of30000 professional soldiers. In the 1870s, well-planned
expeditions were sent to suppress rebellions among the Sakalava (par¬
ticularly of Menabe) and the Bara in the south. The expedition, which was
sent to the Bara in 1873, was successful and at last brought that region
under the control of the central government in Antananarivo. But as the
1870s gave way to the 1880s, it became increasingly clear that rather than
suppressing mere rebellions on the island, the Malagasy army was going
to be required for the defence of the country against French intervention.
In order to improve its image abroad, the Malagasy government banned
the traffic in liquor, particularly rum. In fact, in 1863, believing that the
consumption of alcohol had been responsible for Radama IPs misconduct,
the new government had decreed that the sovereign should not drink strong
liquor. Customs such as tangena (or trial by ordeal) were abolished during
Radama II's reign. The slave trade remained outlawed in Madagascar,
although some foreign traders, particularly British and French nationals,
continued in defiance of this law to trade slaves especially on the western
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coast of the island. In 1877 the Malagasy government also freed the Makoa,
or Masombiky as they were referred to by the Merina, that is, all the slaves
or descendants of the slaves who had been brought into Madagascar from
the African mainland. Short of the abolition of slavery itself, the decree of
1877, which meant a great economic loss to the owners of the estimated
150000 slaves who were freed, constituted a major social revolution and
an indication of the country's determination to modernize itself.62
Economic development63
Prior to Madagascar's involvement in international trade, especially before
the 1 860s when Europeans started arriving in Madagascar in great numbers,
the Malagasy had a self-sufficient economy. The bulk of the people were
engaged in agriculture, primarily for the needs of their families, rice being
the main food, especially on the central plateau of the island. The Malagasy
had developed the planting of rice to such a high degree of specialization
that one observer remarked 'that in few things is the industry and ingenuity
of the Malagasy shown more than in the cultivation of rice.'64 Besides
agriculture, the economy of Madagascar depended on the rearing of cattle,
particularly among the Sakalava in the west and the people in the south of
the island. Sheep and pigs reared on the central plateau, and fish, formed
major food items among the Malagasy. The Merina were unable to control
the trade on the west coast: in the southern part, they were virtually absent,
plate 16. 1 1 Iron-smelting and smithing in Madagascar in the 1850s
62. See PRO, FO/48/34, Extracts from Report by Rear-Admiral W. Core-Jones.
63. See P.M. Mutibwa, 1972. Much of the account which follows here owes a lot to
this article.
64. Quoted in ibid. See also, H. Florent, 1979; G. Rantoandro, 1981; M. Rasoam-
iaramanana, 1974, 1981.
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and in the north-western part, they had to compete with the Antalaotra. 
O n the eastern coast, however, they installed and controlled an efficient 
commercial network. 
T h e Malagasy were experts in two main industries, spinning and weaving 
on the one hand, and mining and metallurgy, especially iron, on the other. 
They made cloth, and produced a variety of metal articles for their o w n 
use. These provided the basis for the technical education received from 
Europeans. W e have already referred to the goods that were m a d e at 
Laborde's factory at Mantasoa, about 35 k m south-east of Antananarivo. 
Alfred Grandidier, the famous nineteenth-century French explorer of 
Madagascar, informs us that at Mantasoa: 
Laborde forged iron and made pure steel; cement, cannons and 
mortars; all sorts of arms and ammunition; tannery; glasses and 
earthenware; pottery; pots and plates; bricks and tiles; soap of all 
colours; candles, paper and ink; potash, alum; sulphuric acids; and, 
after 1843, raised Chinese silk-worms.65 
M a n y of these products ceased to be manufactured after Laborde left 
Madagascar in the late 1850s, but some of the m e n with w h o m he had 
worked were able to continue producing some of the goods necessary 
for their livelihood. W h a t killed local industry in Madagascar was the 
importation of cheaper materials such as cloth, shoes and earthenware, 
from Europe and the U S A . 
King Radama's accession to the throne in 1810 saw the beginning of 
Madagascar's intensive involvement in international trade. T h e slave trade 
was a major feature of this trade, but with the conclusion of the Anglo-
Malagasy Treaty in 1847, it was banned and was never carried out again 
in those regions where the Malagasy government's authority was effective. 
Slaves continued to be imported into Madagascar on the western coast and 
the north-west territories from the African mainland, under cover of 
contract labour. This trade was largely in the hands of the Antalaotra and 
the Indians, sometimes with the connivance of Merina officials.66 At the 
same time, some slaves were exported from Madagascar to Réunion, 
Mauritius, the U S A and the West Indies, especially from those areas 
outside the effective control of the Antananarivo authorities. T h e other 
important exports were rice and bullocks, while a variety of goods mostly 
cloth, guns, r u m and machinery were imported. T h e trade in beef provided 
half of the government's customs revenue. Besides direct trade with Europe 
and the U S A , Madagascar traded with Britain through Mauritius, Z a n -
zibar67 and the Seychelles and with France through the island of Réunion. 
T h e Malagasy trade was absolutely vital for the French island colony of 
65. Quoted in P . M . Mutibwa, 1972. 
66. M . Rasoamiaramanana, 1981; G . Campbell, 1981. 
67. H . Kellenbenz, 1981. 
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plate 16.12 Female slaves drawing water and pounding rice in Madagascar in the 1850s
colony of Réunion, which obtained almost all its cattle and rice, not to
mention slaves, from Madagascar. That was partly why the French settlers
in Réunion and the small traders in Marseilles regarded Madagascar as
their rightful sphere of influence.
Madagascar's international trade was based on treaties of friendship and
commerce. We have noted the 1862 treaties with Britain and France which
were reviewed in 1865 and 1868 respectively. The first treaty with the
USA came in 1867, with the arrival ofan American consul in Antananarivo.
The Malagasy government also established embassies in Mauritius, Britain
and France in order to facilitate trade.68 The prime minister preferred to
appoint as consuls leading traders in the capitals they were appointed to.
For London, he chose Samuel Procter, who was head of a flourishing
business with Madagascar. The appointment appears to have been made
in 1862 when Radama II placed an order with Messrs Procter Bros of
London for uniforms for Malagasy soldiers. For Paris, a well-known French
trader with connections with Madagascar, Monsieur Hilarión Roux, was
chosen in 1876 to be Madagascar's Consul General there. For Mauritius,
the man appointed as Malagasy Consul was Hippolyte Lemiere, a member
of the Mauritian Legislative Council and a leading trader there.69 In 188 1,
to further encourage trade, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,
68. See for example, Radama II to Lemiere, 25 September 1862, enclosed in Stenenson
to Newcastle, 1 November 1862, PRO, CO 167/443, also quoted in P. M. Mutibwa, 1972.
69. P.M. Mutibwa, 1972.
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generally k n o w n as the Ministry 'for the encouragement of Industrial Arts 
and Manufactures' was created. 
In international trade, the Malagasy rulers encouraged both private and 
state enterprise. Senior government officials with enough capital established 
businesses and carried out a lucrative trade with Mauritius, Réunion and 
even Europe. A m o n g the most active was Rainilaiarivony, the prime 
minister himself. Rainilaiarivony's agent in Mauritius was Consul Lemiere 
with w h o m he maintained a personal bank account which he used to 
purchase luxurious goods, mostly clothes, from Mauritius and Europe. 
T h e role of individuals was, however, only supplementary to that of the 
state. As w e have already noted, it was the government in Antananarivo 
itself that established trading relations with foreign powers and foreign 
nationals, through the conclusion of treaties, the establishment of consulates 
abroad, and the granting of concessions to foreign capitalists for the 
development of mineral and other natural resources of the country. M a l a -
gasy traditions and the state's constitution forbade the outright grant of 
land to foreigners, but the government was willing to lease land on which 
foreigners could establish plantations or capital mineral resources. T h e first 
concession was granted in 1855 by R a d a m a (while he was still a prince) to 
Joseph Lambert, a French adventurer, which was confirmed in the form 
of a treaty in September 1862. Although this concession was soon cancelled, 
it became government policy especially in the 1880s to grant similar 
concessions for the economic development of the country, though with 
more caution to avoid any terms or conditions that might threaten the 
independence of the country. In fact, the Code of 305 Articles promulgated 
in March 1881 forbade the sale of land, under pain of death, to any 
foreigners. 
Conclusion 
In our discussion w e have noted the modernizing efforts deployed by the 
Malagasy to establish firm bases for the development of their country. This 
process began with the accession of King R a d a m a I, and was consolidated 
in the first half of the nineteenth century. T h e return of foreigners after 
1861, and particularly the encouragement of foreign trade and cultural 
influences opened yet a n e w era for the Malagasy. T h e process of m o d e r -
nization involved embracing Christianity and instituting a series of reforms 
that were geared to mobilizing the h u m a n and natural resources of the 
country for greater development in the political, social and economic 
spheres. These reforms carried out by Malagasy leaders, particularly from 
the time of R a d a m a IPs accession to the throne in 1861, were crucial in 
the evolution of Madagascar. In view of the persistent argument that 
Africa was colonized because of its poverty and lack of development, it is 
noteworthy that at least Madagascar, during the period under review, 
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established important reforms which, as a British admiral observed in 
March 1881, had made the Malagasy 'a race fit to govern their land; and 
the fact obviated the necessity for the intervention of any outside nation'.70 
However, when the Scramble came, such developments did not shield 
Madagascar from the pressures of foreign intervention; in some ways, 
modernity had weakened the Kingdom;7 1 in other ways, the reforms also 
strengthened the resistance that the Malagasy were able to muster. 
70. P R O , F O 48/34, Extracts from Report of Rear-Admiral W. Gore-Jones. 
71. G . Jacob, 1977. 
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N e w trends in the Maghrib: 
Algeria, Tunisia 
and Libya 
M . H . CHERIF 
During the nineteenth century the Maghrib underwent several major 
upheavals. T h e most striking feature of these was the disappearance of the 
independent states that had m a d e up this part of North Africa at the 
beginning of the century, under pressure from and to the advantage of the 
principal European powers. T h e regime of the deys in Algeria began to 
decline in 1830 under repeated attacks from the French forces; Libya and 
its Kâramânlï rulers fell under direct Ottoman domination again in 1835; 
Tunisia, under the beys, became a French protectorate in 1881; Libya was 
invaded by the Italians in 1911 and Morocco met with a similar fate at the 
hands of the French and the Spanish in 1912. Needless to say, these 
political events are not the only changes that took place; they either crowned 
or preceded far-reaching n e w trends affecting economic, social or even 
cultural patterns, for all these were profoundly disturbed during the nine-
teenth century. 
It was during this period that there came to the fore the first signs of 
'development' on the one hand (in the European capitalist countries) and 
of 'underdevelopment' on the other hand (in parts of the world such as 
the Maghrib, with which w e are concerned here).1 A n abundance of 
contemporary literature has taught us that these two phenomena are 
intimately related. Accordingly, it would be futile to look for the causes of 
the problems of nineteenth-century North Africa in purely local cir-
cumstances and to attribute these difficulties, as has been done in the past, 
to one-sided considerations such as the 'archaic' nature of society, 'secular 
backwardness' and the 'defects' peculiar to the civilizations of North 
Africa - and not to those of Europe - in general. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Maghrib still enjoyed a 
relatively well-balanced way of life and w e propose to examine its foun-
dations and assess its strengths and weaknesses. This equilibrium was 
suddenly brought to an end, in the aftermath of 1815, w h e n European 
expansionism began to turn towards North Africa, which was so near and 
with which it had been linked for so long by warlike or peaceful contacts 
through privateering or trade. European influence m a d e itself felt in the 
1 
1. E.J. Hobsbawm, 1977; L . Valensi, 1978. 
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Maghrib at different periods and in various ways, depending on local 
circumstances; in the short term, it gave rise to different situations according 
to the different circumstances of each country and, in the long term, to 
similar upheavals, leading to the same result, namely colonization. 
At that time, the Maghrib was split up between a legally independent 
country, Morocco, ruled by the 'Alawite dynasty, and Regencies, which 
were theoretically provinces of the Ottoman empire but actually enjoyed a 
large measure of autonomy: the country governed from Algiers by an 
elective dey, the country governed from Tunis, where the Husaynid dynasty 
had reigned since 1705, and the Regency of Tripoli which had been in 
the hands of the KäramänlT family since 1711. W h a t were the c o m m o n 
characteristics of these Ottoman Regencies and on what type of society did 
they impose their rule? 
T h e Makhzen at the beginning of the nineteenth century2 
In Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli the state - the M a k h z e n , as it was traditionally 
called - took the form of a politico-military structure that was marginal to 
the main body of the society subject to its rule. T h e m e n w h o held the 
reins of power thought of themselves as being different from their subjects: 
Turks, w h o were assimilated in varying degrees in the Regencies, and 
sharlfs in Morocco. Within these circles, the highest offices were assigned 
tö mamlüks: former slaves of Christian origin w h o had been converted and 
suitably trained to serve at court or in the army. T h e mainstay of these 
regimes consisted of foreign military bodies, largely Turkish janissaries. 
T h e main instruments of control of the Musl im society were drawn 
from outside its ranks and from other countries: hard currencies (Spanish 
piastres, in particular) obtained by seaborne trading activities or by priva-
teering; 'modern' weapons and specialists in their use for the army; writing 
paper and book-keeping techniques (applied by Jewish accountants) for 
the 'administrative' services. However rudimentary these instruments m a y 
appear to be in comparison with those then used in Europe, they proved 
to be highly efficient in societies that were unfamiliar with them. T h e 
Makhzen represented a half-way stage between European or Turkish 
'mocíirnity' and the 'traditionalism' of local societies. T h e Makhzen was 
able to dominate the local societies and exploit them to its o w n advantage, 
sharing the profit to some extent with the notables in the cities and 
European merchant capitalists, for it was the latter w h o supplied the 
money, weapons, paper, etc. and carried away the produce from the 
countryside. Exploitation of this kind was responsible, to a large extent, 
for perpetuating the 'archaic' state of inland rural societies, if not for their 
actual decline.3 
2. A . Laroui, 1970, pp. 244-67; M . H . Chérif, 1977. 
3. These issues have been further explored in M . H . Chérif, 1979a. 
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plate 17. i The interior ofthe Ketchawa mosque in Algiers in 1833, (built in 1794)
There was no lack of local support for the Makhzen in pre-colonial
times: it could enlist the services of warlike groups (¿makhzen') and rely on
the allegiance of notables in the cities (who provided ka'tds or governors,
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lazzäm or tax farmers, wakil or stewards, etc.), as well as on the co-
operation of the prominent families in rural areas from which the skaykhs 
or local community leaders were drawn. It also had valuable aTTiesTn 
religious leaders: lulama' (scholars) in the cities, muräbits (holy m e n ) and 
heads of brotherhoods (both in the cities and in the countryside) preached 
obedience to the government and thus helped to legitimize its power. T h e 
extent to which such local support was given determined the nature of the 
regime and, in fact, its chances of survival. In Algiers, the ascendancy of 
the Turkish janissaries (at least up to 1817), and that of the deys of 
Levantine origin, held in check any m o v e towards an even partially inte-
grated type of government, whereas in Tunis the beys, while continuing 
to call themselves 'Turks', had been assimilated since the mid-seventeenth 
century into the country which they governed. T h e same had been true of 
the Kâramânlï in Tripoli since 1711. 
Urban society 
Generally speaking, the same pattern of h u m a n relationships - char-
acterized by the dominant sense of family or lineal interdependence, and 
the same Muslim culture —. prevailed throughout the Maghrib. However, 
urban society tended to be more firmly established in the 'Tunisian' region, 
'tribal' life was more c o m m o n in Libya, rural communities predominated 
in Algeria and the mountain Berbers carried more weight everywhere in 
Morocco. T h u s the Maghrib was already a heterogeneous society in which, 
roughly speaking, townsmen (h'adhar), sedentary villagers, 'tribal' groups 
and highlanders, especially mountain Berbers, could be distinguished. 
T h e city is known to be an integral part of Islamic culture: accordingly, 
a string of cities stretched across the whole breadth of the Maghrib from 
Rabat and Fez in the west to Benghazi and Tripoli in the east, including 
Tlemcen, Algiers and Constantine in the Regency of Algiers and Tunis, 
Susa and Kayrawân in the Regency of Tunis.4 Although these cities never 
accounted for more than 10 to 15 per cent of the population of the Maghrib, 
they constituted the focal points of the most lucrative and important 
activities: trade and handicrafts, some of which were developed on an all 
but capitalist scale, as in the case of the manufacturing of the fez - or felt 
cap - in Tunis;5 religious teaching, culture, general education and religious 
law, based upon the study of books and written documents; and the 
performance of political, administrative and military functions, since the 
power of the Makhzen was concentrated in the towns and was more diluted 
in the countrysiïïë. T o w n life was therefore associated with a monetary 
economy, a culture based upon the written word, and consciousness of 
4. L . Valensi, 1969a, pp. 50-61; P. Bourdieu, 1970, pp. 54-7; J. Berque, 1978, pp. 115-
17, 221-30, 398-401, 434-40; R . Gallissot and L . Valensi, 1968; D . Sari, 1970, pp. 3-12, 
32-S6. 
5. L . Valensi, 1969b, pp. 376-400. 
4SI 
plate 17.2 A Kur'anic school in Algiers in 1830
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in h u m a n relationships, as opposed to the lineal and theoretically egalitarian 
patterns of rural society. These features appear to be sufficiently distinctive 
to set urban society apart from rural society, despite a c o m m o n kinship 
basis.6 
Given such a variety of advantages, was urban society capable of evolving 
and leading the rest of the country along the road to radical changes, as 
was the case in contemporary Europe?7 This question hinges on the 
nature of the urban 'middle class', on its strength and more especially its 
weaknesses. T h e latter was, in fact, quite substantial. Most of the methods 
and techniques employed in the urban areas continued to be the 'traditional' 
ones, giving poor quantitative and qualitative results. T h e town's economic 
impact on the countryside was very limited because of the importance of 
the subsistence economy and the resistance to change displayed by the 
rural - and especially the 'tribal' - communities. T h e competition 
encountered from European merchant capitalists was also very fierce: 
they even succeeded in taking over the organization and supervision of 
communications by sea between the various Musl im countries. T h u s , those 
of the middle class w h o engaged in trade and handicrafts had difficulty in 
developing their activities on autonomous lines: they had to accept the 
somewhat paralyzing protection of the M a k h z e n whenever their business 
interests expanded beyond a particular point. It was usual to enter into a 
commercial partnership with some high-ranking person, for example, the 
Jews Bacri and Busnach with the dey of Algiers, and the Djerban merchant, 
Hadjdj Yúnis bin Yünis, with the Tunisian prime minister, in about 1800. 
Internally, the urban 'middle class' had a preference for investing its assets 
in tax-farming (lizma)} H a m p e r e d as it was in its o w n development, the 
middle class could not act as a leavening agent for the transformation of 
society as a whole. 
Rural society 
A clear distinction was m a d e by contemporary observers between the city-
dweller (h'adharî) and the country-dweller {badam). W h a t were the criteria 
for such a distinction? O n the one hand, there was a complex city culture 
based upon the written word, whereas in the rural areas there persisted an 
oral, repetitive tradition; in religious matters, the instruction in law dis-
pensed by the flirrt ('scholar') in the city contrasted with the teachings of 
6. L . Valensi, 1977, insists on the homogeneity of the Maghrebian society, characterized 
by the dominance of patrilineal kinship relationships. O n the contrary, I have stressed the 
differences of the urban communities, and have explored details in several works, in 
particular M . H . Chérif, 1979b, esp. pp. 235-77. 
7. R . Gallissot and L . Valensi, 1968, pp. 58-60; L . Valensi, 1978, pp. 574-86; A . Laroui, 
1970, pp. 244-67; J. C . Vatin, 1974, pp. 104-10. 
8. M . H . Chérif, forthcoming. 
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the marabout and the triumph of'audio-visual' worship in the countryside.9 
In material matters, a monetary system and its concomitant activities were 
the life-blood of the cities, whereas a subsistence economy and the poorly 
developed means of production, as regards both h u m a n and technological 
resources were characteristic of the rural areas. F r o m the social point of 
view, city-dwellers were becoming more rank-conscious and at the same 
time more individualistic, but country people abided by the undisputed 
rules of lineal or, to be more specific, patrilineal structures: this meant 
that h u m a n groups identified themselves in terms of their kinship ties -
sometimes more mythical than real - with an eponymous ancestor ('son of 
. . . ' ) . Beduin society formed a pattern of juxtaposed 'segments', either 
allied or opposed to each other in accordance with certain rules dictated 
not so m u c h by blood ties as by the natural environment or the necessity 
to maintain an overall equilibrium.10 T h e lineal principle implied egali-
tarianism, in theory, between 'brothers' and 'cousins' w h o , in some 
instances, might be enemies; the collective ownership of land; and mutual 
dependence and assistance in work. Decisions were taken by a shaykh or 
leader, etymologically, 'the elder', w h o was 'elected' or, to be more accurate, 
chosen by heads of families at each level in the subdivision of the group. 
W h a t interpretation can be placed on this oversimplified description of 
the way in which Beduin or rural society was organized? Those w h o support 
the segmentation theory consider this to be merely a model, without any 
real material foundation, a purely 'structural' and mythical reconstitution 
of a factual situation. Everything is accounted for in terms of lineage and 
genealogy, whether the context be communal life, village or even urban 
society.11 This interpretation has, not surprisingly, been criticized. It is 
objected to on the grounds that it attaches too little importance to material 
explanations of social organization, preferring the biological origins of the 
basic groupings rather than the results of adaptation to a very real natural 
environment; and analysing rural communities without reference to the 
Islamic or Makhzen background, thus overlooking the factor of historical 
development and so on.12 
T h e present writer will merely point out that, while 'segmentary' features 
are quite pronounced in remote areas and among isolated communities, 
they nevertheless became blurred or disappeared altogether in rural areas 
exposed to the influence of towns or market centres. Such areas included 
the flat country surrounding towns within a radius of some ten to thirty 
kilometres, according to our estimates,13 oases on the main caravan routes, 
certain regions specializing in a highly marketable commodity, such as corn 
9. E . Gellner, 1969, pp. 7-8. 
10. E . Gellner, 1973, pp. 59-66. 
11. Cf. notes 6, 9 and 10 above. 
12. A . Laroui, 1977, pp. 174-8; L . Ben Salem, 1982. 
13. M . H . Chérif, 1979b. 
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in the cereal-growing tnulk (property), or edible oil in the Tunisian Sahel, 
etc. T h e influence of the towns m a d e itself felt in the economy through 
the currency of tangible assets, the system of land tenure requiring proof 
of encumbrance-free land ownership in conformity with written laws, and 
social relations implying some degree of subordination and exploitation: 
the khatnmäs or 'fifth-share' tenant farmer was a familiar figure in these 
zones?4 Even though the genealogical factor continued to be of fundamental 
importance, and small family holdings were very c o m m o n in these 'open' 
sectors, the latter indisputably displayed features that were u n k n o w n in 
the 'tribal' or mountainous regions. 
Because of their great diversity, their comparative isolation and their use 
of an inefficient 'traditional' technology, the North African communities 
and the Makhzen that dominated them, thanks partly to means imported 
from abroad, undoubtedly had m a n y weaknesses, but they succeeded, all the 
same, in maintaining an equilibrium that was to be irremediably dis-
turbed after 1815 with the fresh onslaught of European fleets and profiteers. 
The European offensive 
With the end of the Napoleonic W a r s in 1815, the European offensive, 
relying on forces that became increasingly irresistible, was launched in the 
Maghrib and soon afterwards throughout the rest of the world. Initially, 
market considerations were the most decisive factor. As production grew 
in the Maghrib to keep pace with the rate of industrialization in Europe, 
prices fell accordingly and the terms of trade deteriorated. Under the harsh 
economic conditions of the times, competition became progressively fiercer 
and European policies for expansion overseas became more aggressive.15 
As early as 1816, the British fleet under Lord Exmouth was despatched to 
North Africa and this was repeated in 1819 under Admiral Freemantle 
with the co-operation of the French naval division of Admiral Jurien, in 
order to notify the 'Barbary' powers of the ban that had been placed on 
privateering by a concerted decision of the European nations. This osten-
sibly noble purpose, however, concealed rapacious intentions, since sub-
stantial commercial privileges were demanded by the French, especially on 
behalf of their countrymen living in Provence, and by the British on behalf 
of their Italian and Spanish clients, w h o were in competition with the 
French. This marked the beginning of an ultimately highly successful 
policy aimed at securing the submission of the North African countries to 
Europe's ever-growing economic and political demands.1 6 Instructions 
given to the new French consul w h o was sent to Tunis at the head of a 
squadron in 1824 stressed 'the necessity of establishing relations with this 
14. S. Bargaoui, 1982. 
15. R . Schnerb, 1957, pp. 44-5; M . H . Chérif, 1970. 
16. A . Laroui, 1970, pp. 275 if. 
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inferior power [the Regency] which are more in keeping with the dignity 
and interests of the kingdom [of France]'.17 European, and particularly 
French trade, derived the greatest benefit from this 'necessity', since it was 
enabled to expand rapidly by exceptionally advantageous facilities provided 
by a system that was revoltingly unfair. Even the shadiest European deals 
were sure to succeed thanks to the influence of the relevant consul. 'If 
there were no Barbary pirates, they would have to be invented', exclaimed 
one of the French merchants established in Tunis.18 Another factor that 
came into play was the sense of 'national honour', for various aspirations 
could be satisfied or failures compensated for with only a m i n i m u m of risk 
in the Maghrib. It is c o m m o n knowledge that the Algiers expedition in 
1830 was decided on by a declining regime, intent upon restoring its 
prestige and strengthening its positions within France itself. 
Concurrently with trading activities, business transactions of all kinds 
expanded, especially in the field of moneylending or usury. T o quote but 
one example: the bey of Tunis, being short of money , got into the habit 
of selling locally produced oil, over which he had a trading monopoly, in 
advance to European merchants: the poor crop in 1828 caused a shortage 
of oil whereupon the merchants demanded and obtained a refund of the 
money they had advanced at the price for oil prevailing at the time in 
Marseilles.19 This was by no means the end of the bey's difficulties. In the 
1830s, the burden of the debts that continued to be incurred fell partly on 
a few highly placed persons, such as the prime minister, w h o was completely 
ruined in this way, and partly on the producers of the Sahel oil, w h o had 
to part with over two million francs between 1832 and 1845.20 With 
consummate skill, the merchants induced the bey to insist that the sums 
he advanced to his subjects be repaid in money and not in oil, so that they 
alone would enjoy the profits from trading in this commodity. They 
eventually took the place of the bey in the practice of making pre-harvest 
loans to oil producers and, from 1838 onwards, a number of producers 
w h o were unable to settle their debts suffered a distraint upon their goods.21 
T h e lending process, which started in this way, never ceased to gain 
ground. Around i860, when there was plenty of capital in Europe and 
interest rates were falling, while the states of the Maghrib which were still 
independent at the time were embarking upon 'reforms' suggested by 
foreign consuls and advisers, European penetration developed on n e w lines, 
for it tended to turn from trade towards finance. Algeria was opened up 
17. Quai d'Orsay Archives, Consular Correspondence, Tunis, Vol. 44, 'Instructions to 
the French Consul-general in Tunis', 28 November 1823. 
18. ibid., Vol. 48, letter of 10 August 1830 (Discussions of the French 'nation' in Tunis). 
19. M . H . Chérif, 1970, pp. 741-2; K . Chater, 1984, pp. 335-8. 
20. Archives générales du Gouvernement tunisien, registres no. 2348, 2349, 2433, etc. 
..., cited by I. Saädoui in a 1980 research paper on Tunisian foreign trade in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. 
21. ibid., and L . Valensi, 1977, p. 343. 
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for capitalist ventures or 'kid-glove colonization', as it was called, in the 
fields of agriculture, banking, public works, mining, and so on.22 
T h e trend was more pronounced in Tunisia, where the country's financ-
ial resources were first exploited and then brought entirely under European 
control within the space often years, between about 1859 and 1869. Having 
committed themselves to a vast programme of 'modernization' and public 
works on the advice of the French and British consuls, the bey's ministers 
embarked upon a rash programme of expenditure to acquire in Europe, at 
exorbitant prices, obsolete military or naval equipment such as out-of-date 
guns, purchased in 1865, and engaging foreign contractors to carry out 
very costly public works of doubtful utility such as the rebuilding of the 
R o m a n aqueduct at Carthage, or the construction of consular residences 
for the representatives of European powers as from 1859,23 and so on. T h e 
bey inevitably fell more and more deeply into debt, borrowing initially 
from local financial brokers and agents, especially Jews from Leghorn 
operating under European protection. B y 1862, they already held claims 
amounting to almost 28 million francs in respect of loans raised by the 
government at usurious rates of interest.24 
F r o m 1863 onwards, the bey turned to foreign lenders, whose terms 
were theoretically more reasonable than those of local creditors, and loans 
authorized by the French government began to be floated on the Paris 
market. However, lucrative commissions, bribes, speculation or downright 
swindles serving the interests of European sharks like the Jewish bankers 
of G e r m a n origin, Erlanger and Oppenheim, the manager of the Comptoir 
d'Escompte, Pinard, etc., and unscrupulous representatives of the bey such 
as the prime minister, Mustafa Khaznadâr, m a d e drastic inroads upon the 
sums borrowed actually received by the beylik.25 These loans rapidly 
increased the national debt: approximately 100 million francs at the begin-
ning of 1866 and 160 million in February 1870, as against an annual 
revenue of about 10 to 15 million francs.26 Faced with a critical economic 
situation - poor harvests from 1866 to 1870, and even a famine and an 
epidemic in 1867 - the bey's government was soon bankrupt. O n 5 July 
1869 France, Britain and Italy compelled the bey to accept an international 
financial commission. This took control of all the revenue of the Tunisian 
state so as to ensure that the national debt would be repaid in annual 
instalments fixed at a figure of 6.5 million francs.27 T h e years from 1870 
to 1881 brought Tunisia some respite on the political scene owing to the 
absence of interference from France after her defeat and the honest and 
22. A . Rey-Goldzeiguer, 1977, pp. 583-606. 
23. A . Ibn Abï-Dhiyâf, 1963-4, Vol. 4, pp. 261-4; J- Ganiage, 1959, pp. 190-2. 
24. J. Ganiage, 1959, p. 195-
25. ibid., pp. 203-16 and M . Bdira, 1978, pp. 121-4. 
26. J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 335-402. 
27. ibid. 
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enlightened management of public affairs by K h a y r u d d m , w h o was prime 
minister from 1873 to 1877. Capitalist penetration continued, however, 
through the operations of banking establishments: T h e London Bank of 
Tunis, in partnership with Baring, Glynn, Mills, etc., from 1873 to 1876; 
the Société Marseillaise de Crédit, backed by the Crédit Industriel and, in 
association with the Péreire brothers, the Comptoir d'Escompte and the 
Banque des Pays-Bas, etc., especially from 1877 to 1881. Acting through 
subsidiaries or in association with certain industrial concerns such as the 
Société des Batignolles, capitalist consortia extorted profitable concessions 
from the defenceless bey: banks with special privileges, railway lines, mines, 
ports and vast estates.28 Because of the role it played in the construction 
of basic installations and even in the field of production, capitalism was 
opening the way for direct colonization. Since vested interests had to be 
defended, the spokesmen of capitalism called for, and justified in advance, 
political intervention, namely the military expedition that speedily resulted 
in the establishment of the French protectorate in Tunisia on 12 M a y 1881. 
In Algeria, the European penetration took a slightly different turn, due 
to the early conquest of the country in 1830. In addition to the inevitable 
arrival of capitalist commercial and banking interests, the colonists looked 
hungrily on Algerian land and m a d e their claims to the authorities. T h e 
authorities obliged them in different ways: by confiscating land (particularly 
following major revolts such as that of 1871),29 by billeting soldiers on 
unwilling rural communities, the most flagrant instance being the military 
ordinances and circulars of the 1840s,30 and by encouraging the parcelling 
of'collective' lands and the commandeering of property, e.g. by the law of 
26 January 1873.31 T h e few attempts m a d e to protect the property of the 
local inhabitants - c o m m u n a l groups in particular - such as the Senatus 
Consultum of 1863, marked time in the face of the pressure of 'settler' 
circles. In 1882 European interests had already taken over 1 073000 ha of 
land (1 337000 ha by 1890), most of which was in the Tell region,32 with 
obvious consequences for the indigenous population. 
Factors of change 
T h e age-old equilibrium of the way of life in the Maghrib was disturbed 
by European penetration in its various forms, the effects of which were felt 
either directly or indirectly in the commercial or financial fields. W h a t were 
28. ibid., pp. 421-6, 463^71, 564-88, 600-8 and 640-61. 
29. C R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 24-36. 
30. C . A . Julien, 1964; A . Rey-Goldzeiguer, 1977, p. 139. 
31. C R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 78-88. 
32. ibid., pp~ 94-102. 
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the main instruments of change and on what lines did this transformation 
take place? W h a t impact did European pressure have on the various 
categories of the local population? 
T h e first of the factors of change was the seaborne trade conducted by 
European merchants or, in some rare cases, by their local agents or allies. 
It gradually weakened, and eventually superseded, the traditional long-
distance caravan or even maritime trade with the Levant,33 with the 
exception of the trans-Saharan transport system in Libya, which regained 
m o m e n t u m around 1845 and held its o w n until after 1880.34 Within 
the Maghrib itself, European manufactured goods (textiles, metallurgical 
products and military imported equipment right d o w n to buttons for 
gaiters and food items such as sugar, tea and coffee quickly found customers 
among wealthy people in the Maghrib, and in due course among broader 
social classes. T h e volume of imports increased m u c h faster than that 
of exports, and the resulting drain on financial resources had manifold 
consequences, particularly as regards foreign exchange.35 Secondly, m a n u -
factured goods from Europe began to compete with the equivalent articles 
produced by craftsmen and eventually ousted them from local or foreign 
markets depending on well-to-do customers. A typical case is that of the 
Tunisian fez which, up to 1861-2, accounted for an annual export of about 
3 million francs. B y 1864-5, t n e value of these exports had been halved; 
by 1869-70, it had dropped to 850 000 francs; and it sank to its lowest level 
of 250000 francs per a n n u m in 1875-8.36 It is true that European 
competition chiefly affected the production of high-quality handicraft 
goods and long-distance trading, but small tradesmen, such as retailers, 
were also harmed by the loss of well-to-do customers, foreign exchange 
disorders, the inescapable mesh of taxes, and in short, a process of 
general pauperization. 
This process, coupled with the introduction of a monetary system into 
the economy calculated to benefit a minority, encouraged a tendency to 
resort to moneylenders, and usurers. Apart from the beylik's reliance on 
borrowed money already mentioned, usury wrought havoc everywhere, 
even in the remotest rural areas. Letters exchanged between the ka'ids 
(provincial governors) of Tunisia refer again and again to the question of 
unpaid debts, owed usually to European merchants but also to some local 
notables. Notarial registers, which were preserved from 1875 onwards in 
Tunisia, abound with records of transactions between humble peasants 
and local money-lenders, most of w h o m were Jews.37 T h e situation was 
probably worse in Algeria where, in the words of General Martimprey, 
33. L . Valensi, 1969, pp. 70-83; N . Sai'douni, n.d., pp. 39-40. 
34. J . L . Miège, 1975. 
35. M . H . Chérif, 1970, pp. 728-9; L . Valensi, 1978, p . 583. 
36. P . Pennée, 1964, p . 257. 
37. S . Bargaoui, 1983, pp. 353~7-
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deputy governor of Algeria in i860, 'unfortunately, it is only too true that 
the spread of usury . . . has been a consequence of French occupation'. 
Revolts and the ensuing repression, the disruption of rural life and tra-
ditional social patterns, the introduction of a monetary economy and the 
appearance of profiteers of every kind, even in the depths of the countryside; 
all these factors, combined with the ravages of a harsh climate and the 
crushing burden of taxation, contributed to the development of usury, one 
of the 'seven plagues' of Algeria in colonial times.38 
Owing to the difficulties encountered by the state in Tunisia and in 
Morocco and by the colonial administration in Algeria, the tax system 
became oppressive and insatiable. Spurred on by necessity, the bey of 
Tunis as early as 1820 instituted a kind of monopoly on the oil trade, oil 
being the main export. 
H e had to give up this monopoly under the terms of the treaty imposed 
by France after the capture of Algiers in August 1830, but he instituted 
other monopolies, increased the number of indirect taxes and extended the 
tax-farming system in the 1840s.39 H e revised the rate and basis of assess-
ment of the long-established taxes on production and introduced a poll tax 
(fana or tnajba) in 1856.40 T h e great uprising in Tunisia in 1864 was caused 
by the decision to double the rate of the majba. A few years later Morocco 
was faced with the same financial difficulties as those of Tunisia and 
resorted to the same disastrous expedients for dealing with them.41 In 
Algeria, the indigenous population was compelled to pay the traditional 
'Arab taxes' as well as n e w 'French taxes' (particularly the iniquitous 
communal taxes described by Jules Ferry in 1892 as 'a flagrant exploita-
tion of the native people'). It also had to pay indirect taxes and the 
cash equivalent of the various statutory labour obligations, besides 
having to shoulder the burden of heavy war reparations following every 
revolt: for instance, the reparation demanded after the uprising of 1871 
swallowed up about 70 per cent of the total value of the land owned by 
the Kabyles.42 
In the n e w circumstances created by the disruption of the old economic 
and social patterns and the fleecing of the local population by the tax 
system and extortionate interest rates, the recurring climatic crises - which 
seem to have occurred more often in the nineteenth century than in the 
eighteenth century - took on catastrophic proportions. T h e crisis of 1866-9 
in Tunisia and Algeria, and that of 1878-81 in Morocco reduced the 
38. C . R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 370-2, 383-6; A . Rey-Golzeiguer, 1977, pp. 171-2, 
484-5-
39. Ibn Abi-Dhiyaf, 1963-4, Vol. 4, pp. 43-8, 55-6, 80-3, 144-56; L . C . Brown, 1974, 
PP- 134-^ 7. 340-9; K.Chater, 1984, pp. 553-fo. 
40. Ibn Abi-Dhiyaf, 1963-4, Vol. 4, pp. 203-8; J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 101-2. 
41. J . L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 2, pp. 225-43; G . Ayache, 1979, pp. 97-138. 
42. C . R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 249-65, quoting Jules Ferry, p. 452. 
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population and had the effect of irremediably weakening the economy and 
the indigenous social structure.43 
Beneficiaries of the crisis 
A s elsewhere, the situation that prevailed in the Maghrtib in the nineteenth 
century produced its breed of profiteers. First of all, there were the 
European settlers, whose numerical strength stood at 164000 in 1855, 
245 000 in 1872 and 375 000 in 1882 in Algeria.44 In Tunisia, they numbered 
about 11000 in 1856, 14000 in 1870 and 19000 in 1881.45 In Libya, the 
figures remained fairly low until the early years of the twentieth century. 
Although most of the Europeans in Algeria and Tunisia were of humble 
origin, they enjoyed, nonetheless, a very privileged status by comparison 
with the majority of local people. T h e same was true of a Jewish minority, 
which succeeded in playing a role, in some capacity or another, within 
the European capitalist network and took advantage of their position as 
intermediaries between these networks and the indigenous 
population.46 There were some, though fewer, Muslims w h o succeeded 
in playing a similar role: those w h o became consular agents, brokers 
and, more frequently, business associates of European trading concerns 
w h o sought at the earliest opportunity to escape from the control of the 
Musl im authorities so as to benefit from the protection of the European 
consuls in Tunisia, Libya and Morocco.47 M u c h better known were the 
high-ranking servants of the Makhzen, w h o misused their positions in 
order to build up huge fortunes thanks to the confusion prevailing in their 
troubled countries: for example, Mustafa Khaznadar, the Tunisian prime 
minister from 1837 to 1873, accumulated a sum amounting, at a conserva-
tive estimate, to some 25 million francs, the greater part of which was 
invested in France.48 
T h e colonial officials in Algeria and the weakened authority of the bey 
in Tunisia had to rely, in rural areas, on certain influential persons w h o 
exercised a kind of 'feudal' power over the communities within their 
jurisdiction, for example Mukrânï in Algeria, until he rebelled and died in 
1871,49 and 'All bin Khalifa in south-eastern Tunisia from 1840 to 1881, 
43. L . Valensi, 1977, pp. 307, 315; J. Poncet, 1954, pp. 316-23; A . Rey-Goldzeiguer, 
1977, PP- 44i-^3-
44. C . R . Ageron, 1979, pp. 118-19. 
45. J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 44-5; A . Mahjoubi, 1977, p. 33, n. 84. 
46. J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 312-13; A . Laroui, 1977, pp. 310-14. 
47. O n the question of the status of 'infidel' accorded to some Muslims, for a favour-
able view, see Ibn Abï-Dhiyâf, 1963-4, Vol. 4, pp. 117-18; J. Ganiage, 1959; pp. 181-2; 
for Morocco, see A . Laroui, 1977, pp. 251-4, 314-15; B . Brignon et al., 1967, pp. 291, 
294. 
48. J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 426-36. 
49. M . Lacheraf, 1978, pp. 53-60; For Mukrânï, see A . Rey-Goldzeiguer, 1977, p. 775. 
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before he decided irTthat year to head the resistance movement against 
France which subsequently led to his exile in Libya.50 T h e same kind of 
trend seems to explain the rise of a number of religious families w h o 
monopolized, from generation to generation, the key positions either within 
the learned Islamic communities enjoying a semi-official status, especially 
in Tunisia,51 or a m o n g the various Islamic brotherhoods in Algeria and 
Morocco.5 2 
T h e victims of the crisis 
Countless individuals suffered from the combined consequences of the 
numerous factors already referred to: poor harvests, the effects of the 
integration of the Maghrib into the world market, crippling taxation and, 
in the case of Algeria, the devastation wreaked by the colonial war and the 
harshness of the law of the conqueror, w h o alienated some of the country's 
best land to a foreign minority. This state of affairs became immediately 
apparent in the widespread pauperization of the population and the dis-
ruption of traditional social structures, so that economic and demographic 
disaster was inevitable during a crisis such as the one that lasted from 1866 
to 1869." 
W h a t were the reactions of the victims? First of all, they expressed the 
'fatalistic' resignation which, in the eyes of all European observers of 
Musl im society in the nineteenth century, could not be too forcefully 
condemned. In 1892, Masqueray wrote with reference to the Muslims in 
Algeria: 'Resignation is even stronger than anger in this astonishing world 
of Islam' or, more appropriately, 'in this new confederation of paupers'.54 
This attitude, like the will to fight that had existed in the past, seems to 
have contributed quite naturally to reinforcing the positions of local saints 
and brotherhoods as the few bastions of resistance in a disintegrating 
society.55 In the very first years of the nineteenth century, there were 
distinct signs of a reactivation of the brotherhood system. This trend 
probably bore some relation to the serious events that were unsettling the 
established order in certain parts of the world at that time and which 
affected the Maghrib itself: it was apparent a m o n g the Darkäwiyya masses, 
w h o rebelled against Turkish rule in the early 1800s; among the Tijäniyya 
notables, w h o laid emphasis on meditation and were inclined to compromise 
with the authorities, even the French after 1830; and among the Kadirlyya 
50. A . Kraïem, 1983, pp. 145-58. 
51. The monopolistic tendencies of the great religious families was accentuated from 
the 1860s onwards, no doubt arising from the crisis in the regime. See A . H . Green, 1978, 
PP-93-5-
52. Cf. notes 55 and 56, below. 
53. Cf. note 43 above. 
54. Cited by C . R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 128. 
55. J. Berque, 1978, pp. 423-9. 
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and Rahmäniyya, w h o led, from time to time, the struggle against the 
occupying power. T h e phenomenon has been particularly well observed, 
not to say highlighted, in Algeria, where the destruction of the scholarly 
and urban aspects of Islamic life and, more generally, of the traditional 
fabric of society, is said to have caused the mass of the Mus l im population 
to turn once more for inspiration to the zäwiyas (sanctuaries) and brother-
hoods.56 In nineteenth-century Tunisia too, it seems to the present writer 
that the brotherhoods gave proof of fresh vitality after a long period of 
comparative apathy and that certain saints or representatives of brother-
hoods played a prominent role at that time.57 T h e trend was even more 
pronounced in Morocco , the land where zäwiyas and brotherhoods flour-
ished most. 
At the opposite end of the Maghrib, on the borders of Egypt, the 
Sanüsiyya was founded in 1843 and, within about sixty years, had built u p 
an organization that exercised effective religious and political power not 
only in Cyrenaica, but also well beyond its boundaries, in the Sudan, the 
Sahara and elsewhere: by 1900, it had established as m a n y as 146 lodges.58 
Although no research has been done specifically on the connection between 
European aggression and the growing influence of marabouts and brother-
hoods, the present writer has no hesitation in saying that there was a 
relation of cause and effect between the two phenomena. 
A s another consequence of European penetration or conquest, revolts 
broke out more and m o r e frequently and on an ever-increasing scale in the 
Maghrib in the nineteenth century. Individual acts of banditry, theft, arson 
or wilful damage to forests, performed either as an elementary form of 
resistance or as a m e a n s of survival, became everyday incidents in the 
countryside, especially in times of crisis, as in Tunisia during the 1860s.59 
Local rebellions also proliferated, not only in occupied Algeria up to 1881 
w h e n the last major rising occurred in the south Oran district60 but also in 
Morocco and in Tunisia where, in the aftermath of 1815, they once m o r e 
became c o m m o n occurrences, after a respite of more than fifty years. S o m e 
of the m o r e broadly based revolts roused to action the inhabitants of vast 
regions, or even of an entire country. There were, for example, the uprisings 
of Libyan rural communities and mountain folk against the Ottoman 
occupying authorities, during which the legendary heroes G h ü m a al-
so. C . R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 293-301; Y . Turin, 1971, pp. 110-15, 129-45. 
57. L . C . Brown, 1974, pp. 174-83; A . Ben Achour, 1977, pp. 218-22; A . H . Green, 
I97^, PP- 65-7 (see also notes 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, in particular). 
58. E . Evans-Pritchard, 1949. 
59. Several references to the rural unrest are to be found in Correspondence from the 
KaHds (provincial governors) in the Archives générales du Gouvernement tunisien; M . H . 
Chérif, 1980. 
60. M . Lâcherai, 1978, pp. 69-87; Proceedings of the Colloquium held in Algiers in 
February 1982, on the theme of armed resistance in Algeria in the nineteenth century 
(forthcoming). 
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M a h m u d ï and c A b d al-Djalfl w o n fame and a rudimentary fATab' con-
sciousness began to find expression in the struggle against the Turks in the 
1830s and 1840s;61 the insurrection of all the Tunisian peoples, w h o formed 
a league in 1864 when the tax burden was increased in order to pay the 
bey's foreign debts; the flare-up in Kabylia and the neighbouring regions 
in Algeria, in 1871, which was caused by the news of the establishment of 
the civilian government well-disposed towards the European settlers, and 
which took advantage of the defeat inflicted on France by Prussia. All these 
great endeavours failed, owing as m u c h to the firepower of the regular 
armies as to the inherent lack of cohesion between the insurgent peoples. 
Furthermore, the attempts at reform undertaken in various fields in 
order to restore an equilibrium that had been dangerously disturbed proved 
to be equally ineffective. These attempts will be studied below within the 
context of the situation prevailing in each state in the Maghrib. 
Algeria 
T h e countries of the Maghrib fell under direct European domination at 
different points in time: Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, Libya in 1911 
and Morocco in 1912. Needless to say, the fact that they were not all 
colonized at the same time should not be regarded as a mere historical 
accident, but as the result of the varying degrees of resistance encountered 
within each country. 
O f all the regimes in the Maghrib, the Regency of Algiers was most 
successful in preserving its non-indigenous features at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, at least as far as Algiers itself and the central govern-
ment were concerned. T h e government remained exclusively in the hands 
of the Turks, w h o continued longer than elsewhere to enjoy the privileges 
of a dominant 'caste'. This distinctive characteristic of Algeria is attribu-
table to its more rural nature by comparison with the other countries in 
the Maghrib: here, the segmentation of society was more pronounced than 
elsewhere, the 'middle class' (baldï), which could have assimilated the 
conquerors, was weaker and urban culture was less developed. 
C a n it be said, then, that the Algerian political regime was opposed to 
change? Seemingly not. Throughout the eighteenth century, a kind of 
limited oligarchy - invariably of Turkish origin - consolidated its position 
at the expense of the turbulent militia of janissaries: it chose the dey from 
within its o w n ranks and conferred greater stability upon the central 
institutions. It is clear that the trend was towards a gradual decline in the 
power of the purely military and alien element to the advantage of the 
'political' fraction of the ruling class. T h e process culminated in the 
'revolution' of 'Alî Khûdja, w h o dealt ruthlessly with the militia, in 1817, 
61. Archives générales du Gouvernement tunisien, box 184, files 1020-1023: see in 
particular letter from G h û m a to the Bey of Tunis, 10 dû 1-ki'da 1271 (end of July 1855), 
(file 184-1020). 
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and drew support from certain sections of the local population, such as the 
kologlus (people of mixed Turkish and Arab blood) and the Zwawa 
Kabyles.62 This was exactly the turn which events had taken in Tunisia 
and Tripoli, but in Algeria the trend developed a hundred years later. 
Changes occurred earlier in the eastern or western provinces (beyliks). Ever 
since the eighteenth century, the beys had been compelled to rely on 
predominantly 'Arab' armed forces and to practise a skilful policy of 
forming alliances with local notables.63 This was one of the reasons w h y 
the resistance to French occupation was more prolonged and more stubborn 
in those provinces than in Algiers and its region. 
Despite these signs of change, the 'Algerian' regime, as a whole, retained 
until practically the end of its existence its non-indigenous character, which 
generated contradictions and sharp conflicts. Serious uprisings, under 
religious leadership provided by the brotherhoods, shook the western part 
of the country from 1803 to 1805 and a large area in Kabylia in 1814-15.64 
A kind of 'national' reaction was taking shape before the French conquest 
and it foreshadowed ' A b d al-Kädir's iminent enterprise. 
T h e decision to launch the Algiers expedition was based on reasons 
pertaining to French domestic politics but had little to do with the real 
economic and social needs of France at that time. This accounts for the 
hesitations and contradictions of French policy in the years after the French 
victory. Plans were m a d e , in particular, for the limited occupation of certain 
coastal areas around the main towns, while the hinterland was to be left to 
rulers brought in from abroad, Tunisian princes were proposed in 1830 
and 1831; or chosen after negotiation with those w h o really controlled the 
country, for example, A h m a d , the Bey of Constantine in 1832 and the 
Amir <Abd al-Kädir.65 
Unlike his rival in Constantine, w h o perpetuated and perfected the 
Turkish, or kologlu, system of government in the province of Constantine 
from 1830 to 1837;66 and marabouts with their age-old traditions such as 
B ü - M a ' z a , active in the W â d ï Chelif region from 1845 to 1847, and the 
'Sultan' of Wargla, another 'political' mahdi, prominent in south-eastern 
Algeria from 1851 to 1853;67 ' A b d al-Kädir attempted to set up a true 
'national' state and to kindle the spark of a sense of 'Arab nationality' 
according to the testimony provided even by his enemies.68 H e was born 
in 1808 in a marabout family and was always, first and foremost, a scholar 
62. P . Boyer, 1970a, pp. 121-3; 1970b, p. 92. 
63. P . Boyer, 1970b, pp. 87-8; A . Laroui, 1970, pp. 248-9. 
64. P . Boyer, 1970a, pp. 119-21; N . Saïdouni, n.d., pp. 59-61. 
65. O n the Amïr c Abd al-Kädir, w e have an impressive bibliography; see for example, 
M . Lacheraf, 1978; A . Sa'dallah, 1983, Vol. 2, pp. 40-6; R . Gallissot, 1965, pp. 339-68; 
C R . Ageron, 1977, pp. 19-49. 
66. A . Temimi, 1978. 
67. A . Rey, 1978, pp. 197-221. 
68. Cf. note 65 above. 
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('älim) and a reformer in the sense in which the term was understood at the 
time: he taught that a return to the fountainhead of faith was the prerequisite 
for a regeneration of the cumma (Islamic community). In the prevailing 
state of anarchy, communal chiefs and marabouts from the Oran 
district elected him as sole leader of the resistance movement in November 
1832. 
Through sheer strength of personality, by diplomacy or by force, he 
succeeded in uniting under his leadership the inhabitants of two-thirds of 
Algeria in 1839 w h e n he was at the height of his power. Accordingly, the 
French authorities, under Desmichels in 1834 and Bugeaud in 1837, having 
decided to set limits to the French occupation, reached an agreement with 
him and recognized his authority over the Algerian hinterland in exchange, 
admittedly, for his recognition of the French occupation of the coastal 
regions. T h e French even helped him at one time to repulse his opponents. 
' A b d al-Kädir gradually worked out a state structure which although not 
centralized at least performed a unifying function and took account both 
of Kur'anic principles as regards taxation and justice and of local realities, 
harmonizing 'administrative' and military organization with the prevailing 
social conditions. Bugeaud, by w h o m ' A b d al Kädir was defeated, personally 
acknowledged that: ' T h e organization devised by the Emir, based as it was 
on a perfect knowledge of every part of the territory, of inter-ethnic 
relations and of the interests of the various sections of the population - in 
short, on a profound understanding of h u m a n and material problems, 
seemed to m e to be worth preserving'. This outline of a 'national' state, 
together with the intertwined religious and patriotic sentiments to which 
it appealed, explain the vigour and persistence of the resistance movement 
led by the 'amir of the faithful' from 1832 to 1847. However, the enormous 
disparity between his forces and those of his enemies (Bugeaud mobilized 
over a hundred thousand soldiers against him), the scorched earth policy 
applied by the French and, above all, the divided state of Algerian society 
at that time, eventually got the better of the indomitable amir: having been 
hounded across Algeria, he sought refuge in Morocco but finally gave 
himself up to the French at the end of 1847. 
Colonial society and its institutions were gradually established as count-
less difficulties were overcome after a good deal of trial and error. Algeria 
was placed under the authority of a governor-general and divided into a 
'civilian territory', where the Europeans lived and French institutions 
developed, and 'military territories', where the Muslim communities 
were subject to the discretionary powers of the army. Under the Second 
Empire, concurrently with the expansion of capitalist colonization, 
efforts were m a d e to consolidate the power of prominent leaders 
of the indigenous population with a view to obtaining their support in 
the administration of the 'military territories', for example, the famous 
'Arab kingdom' experiment. However, the Emperor's good intentions 
came to naught w h e n the economy collapsed, in so far as Musl im society 
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was concerned, in 1867-9 and the French army was decisively defeated 
in 1870.69 
This defeat and, more particularly, the threat of an extension of civilian 
rule, which was tantamount to the ascendancy of the European settlers, 
triggered off a major insurrection in Kabylia and the neighbouring regions 
in 1871. It was headed by 'feudal lords' like Mukrânï and other leading 
m e m b e r s of certain brotherhoods, especially those of the Rahmâniyya. T h e 
revolt was crushed with great bloodshed and was followed by the economic 
ruin of the communities involved. About 800000 people had to pay 
reparations amounting to more than 70 per cent of the value of their land.70 
This marked the beginning of the years when the settlers held the reins of 
power and the Musl im population experienced the darkest period of the 
'colonial night'. Having been reduced to poverty, deprived of m a n y of its 
social and cultural traditions and subjected to a special administrative 
system of great severity, the indigenous population could at last be exploited 
quite openly for the benefit of the European minority, from the ranks of 
which were drawn practically all the members of representative bodies at 
the communal , departmental and central government levels. Before 1891, 
Musl im interests were defended only by a small group of people w h o 
belonged mostly to the Société pour la protection des Indigènes founded 
in 1881.71 
Tunisia 
A s Tunisia was the country most open to foreign influence and most 
centralized in political terms, it was also the first to experiment with 
Western-style reforms and to suffer the worst disaster, second only to the 
one experienced by Algeria. 
A relatively active 'middle class' had regular foreign commercial contacts, 
particularly with the Levantine countries, while members of the ruling 
class w h o engaged in foreign trade dealt mainly with European merchants. 
T h e pressure of these different commercial interests and the power of 
the local notables soon influenced the political system, which gradually 
attenuated its military and alien features as it developed into a kind of 
'semi-national monarchy', following a trend that had begun even before 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. Without renouncing its allegiance 
to the Ottoman empire or dispensing with the services of the janissaries 
and mamlüks w h o continued to be two of the pillars of the beylik structure, 
the regime extended its network of allies and supporters a m o n g the local 
population so as to broaden and stabilize the basis of its authority. It 
69. A . Rey-Goldzeiguer, 1977, pp. 545-7, 686-8. 
70. See note 29 above. 
71. C . R . Ageron has devoted his monumental thesis (1968) to this period and this work 
has drawn heavily on it. The Société pour la protection des Indigènes is discussed in Vol. 
1, pp. 414 fr. 
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undoubtedly reached the peak of its power under the rule of H a m m ü d ; 
Pashä, from 1782 to 1814.72 
Immediately after peace had been restored in Europe, the leading Chris-
tian powers demanded and easily obtained from the Bey of Tunis a promis« 
to abolish privateering and to open up his country to trade and other forms 
of European enterprise. Mention has already been made of the harmful 
economic and financial consequences of this decision for Tunisia. In 
addition, a military threat arose in each of the neighbouring countries in 
the 1830s, when Tripoli became an outpost of the Ottoman empire in 1835 
and when Constantine came under French rule in 1837. Following the 
example of M u h a m m a d 'Alï of Egypt and M a h m u d II of Turkey, A h m a d , 
the Bey of Tunis (1837-55) also decided to borrow from Europe. More-
over, he was pressured into taking this path - for different, but equally 
prejudicial reasons - by both the Ottoman sultan and the consuls of the 
great powers.73 
H e immediately launched a bold policy of introducing reforms which, 
however, were carried out too hastily and without taking account of the 
country's h u m a n and financial resources. A n e w army (nizatriî) was organ-
ized on the lines of a Western army, with similar weapons, techniques and 
methods, even imitating the details of uniforms and parade drill. It was 
manned by conscripts and its officers were trained at an 'école poly-
technique' founded for this purpose at L e Bardo. T o meet the needs of 
the new army, A h m a d Bey set up modern factories for the production of 
guns, gunpowder, cloth and footwear. T h e ensuing financial problems soon 
led him to undertake a complete overhaul of the old tax system and of the 
administrative services; at one point, even a bank of issue was established. 
Apart from purely utilitarian measures, A h m a d Bey took a number of 
decisions that went against local traditions, although not against the letter 
of Kur'anic law. In 1846, he decreed the abolition of slavery in his provinces, 
one year before the same decision was taken by Turkey and two years 
before it was taken by the French in Algeria. H e was the first head of a 
non-European state to set foot in Europe when he undertook an official 
visit to France in 1847. Furthermore, he set in motion a trend towards the 
'nationalization' of the state by reducing the privileges of the Turks, not 
only within the army but even among the 'ulamâ', so that the Turkish and 
indigenous members of that group were placed on an equal footing; he 
thus appealed directly to the 'patriotism of the sons of Tunisia'. 
T h e programme of reforms was ambitious, as w e have seen, but the 
results fell far short of expectations. Within the regular army, recruitment, 
training, equipment and discipline left m u c h to be desired. Most of the 
factories, built at great expense, never became operational. It was symbolic 
72. M . H . Chérif, 1978. 
73. A . Ibn Abï-Dhiyïf, 1963-4, Vol. 4 , pp. 9-182; L . C . Brown, 1974; K . Chater, 1984, 
pp. 483-583-
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PLATE 17.3 Members of the Tunisian nizanii (army) in European-style uniforms
of the fruitless endeavours of Ahmad Bey that a large frigate built in a
dock at La Goulette was never able to put to sea because the access channel
was too narrow. Worst of all, these costly innovations quickly exhausted
the beylik's financial resources: hence the increase in taxation, the recourse
to ruinous expedients such as seventy tax-farming concessions granted to
the unscrupulous, but all-powerful Mahmud bin 'Ayyäd, and the ensuing
unpopularity of the reforms and of the regime itself.74
It is pointless to dwell here on the causes of Ahmad Bey's failure, since
the same experiments in modernization undertaken in Egypt, Turkey and,
later, in Morocco, produced the same negative results. Broadly speaking,
it can be said that the reforms were ill-adapted to the human environment
which they were supposed to change. Furthermore, it was not in the
interests of the advanced countries of Europe to see these reforms come to
fruition, for the attempts to introduce them were regarded simply as an
opportunity for obtaining profitable contracts for Europeans and their
business associates in the Maghrib.
On the death of Ahmad Bey in 1855, the situation in Tunisia was very
serious. The reforms had produced few tangible results, apart from sowing
the seeds of a nation-state and promoting the formation, at the bey's court,
of a group of people favourably disposed towards modernization; but they
had increased the danger of foreign intervention and accentuated internal
74. ibid.
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weaknesses. These were exploited by the European consuls and profiteers, 
together with their local allies, most of w h o m were Jews w h o enjoyed the 
protection of influential foreigners or of prominent courtiers. 
B y 1856-7, the European powers brought greater pressure to bear in 
favour of'reforms' which were to pave the way specifically for the develop-
ment of capitalist enterprise. O n 10 September 1857, A h m a d Bey's 
successor, M u h a m m a d Bey, was compelled by the British and French 
consuls, under threat of armed force, to adopt the Fundamental Pact or 
(ahd al-arriän. In addition to asserting the security of the life and property 
of the inhabitants of the Regency in general, the text granted rights and 
safeguards to non-Muslim minorities in particular, including the right of 
foreigners to o w n property and the unrestricted right to pursue any occu-
pation and proclaimed the freedom of trade.75 T h e Pact was only a preamble 
to a more detailed constitution, which was rapidly drawn up and came into 
force on 24 April 1861. A s the first of its kind in the Musl im Arab world, 
this document laid d o w n the principle of the separation of the executive, 
legislative and judicial powers, thereby establishing a constitutional system 
of government. Furthermore, a municipal council was set up in Tunis in 
1858, ministries and administrative services were reorganized and a printing 
house was founded in Tunis that included among its publications a weekly 
newspaper.76 
As was to be expected, these reforms met with the same fate as those 
that had been introduced previously by A h m a d Bey, since they were not 
adapted to the social conditions and psychological attitudes prevailing at 
the time, and were inspired by foreign models. In the meantime, even 
greater facilities were provided for the activities of European firms. Foreign 
trade expanded rapidly; the volume of goods imported by the Tunisian 
government significantly increased - the flow of supplies from France 
being ensured by the Rothschild company; the British secured land con-
cessions, the right to set up a bank with special privileges and the right to 
construct a railway line, ventures which collapsed soon after they were 
launched. T h e French undertook to supply military equipment and 
obtained major public works contracts to which w e have already referred.77 
T h e Regency's level of expenditure rose at an alarming rate, whereas its 
revenue had been reduced by the abolition of monopolies (in accordance 
with one of the provisions of the Fundamental Pact) and by the granting 
of privileges to Europeans: it soon started to sink into debt. In order to 
meet running expenses and cope with the servicing of the government 
debts, the bey M u h a m m a d al-Sadik decided to double the rate of the poll 
tax at the end of 1863. 
This sparked off the 1864 insurrection, which was supported by virtually 
75. A . Ibn Abï-Dhiyâï, 1963-4, Vol. 4 , pp. 240-4. 
76. J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 76-88. 
77. See note 23 above. 
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all the ethnic groups and some of the sedentary farmers, w h o were united 
by the determination to fight against the arbitrary imposition of taxes and 
the disastrous reform policy. For three or four months, the insurgents 
displayed exemplary discipline in their campaign against the beylik and its 
servants, but the bey's promises and the intrigues of his court soon 
undermined the unity and determination of the rebels. O n e by one, the 
groups laid down their arms and the farming regions were subjected to 
severe repressive measures from which they never recovered.78 
T h e financial situation of the beylik became all the more precarious 
when the country had to contend with poor harvests from 1866 to 1870 
and even a terrible famine, combined with a cholera epidemic in 1867. 
Bankruptcy was inevitable. O n 5 July 1869, an International Financial 
Commission was set up in Tunis in order to exercise control over the 
revenue of the beylik and ensure the repayment of the national debt in 
annual instalments amounting to some 6.5 million francs.79 
Various drastic measures succeeded, to some extent, in improving the 
situation, especially as France, which was the chief power interested in 
occupying Tunisia, lost m u c h prestige as a result of its defeat in 1870. In 
1873, Mustafa Khaznadâr, a venal individual w h o had governed since 
1837, was replaced by Khâyr al-dïn, a statesman of great integrity and 
perspicacity.80 H e undertook, through practical and deliberately limited 
measures, to revive economic activity, particularly agriculture; to organize 
the administrative services more efficiently; to raise standards of conduct 
among government servants, and to promote modern educational methods. 
H e was responsible notably for founding Sadiki College, which was to play 
a leading role in the cultural and even political life of Tunisia in colonial 
times. H e was aided, furthermore, by the very favourable agricultural 
conditions that prevailed between 1873 and 1875. However, with the return 
of lean years and the restoration of French prestige in Tunisia as from 
1876, he was faced with ever-increasing difficulties, until he fell from power 
in July 1877. This event heralded a relapse into incompetence and chaos 
and the country slid into the downward path towards disaster. Nothing 
could be more symptomatic of those sad times than the political success of 
Mustafa ibn Ismä^, the bey's former minion and favourite, w h o was all-
powerful until the French forces entered Tunisia, and the protectorate 
treaty imposed on the bey was signed on 12 M a y 1881.81 
Libya 
Libya, which formed part of the Ottoman empire, being dominated by the 
Sahara Desert to a larger extent than any other country in the Maghrib, was 
78. J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 267-70; B . Slama, 1967. 
79. See note 27 above. 
80. V . M . Bayram, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 46-93; G . S. van Kriecken, 1976, pp. 161-272. 
81. V . M . Bayram, 1885, pp. 97-115; J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 476-91. 
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less avidly coveted by the Europeans before 1880 and therefore preserved its 
specific identity and economic life the longest, as is demonstrated by the 
vitality of the caravan trade up to about 1903 (Tripoli) and even 1911 
(Benghazi). 
Around 1800 Libya comprised one real city, Tripoli, and a few other 
towns on the coast, including Benghazi and Darna, as well as some located 
in oases (e.g. Ghadämes , M u r z u k and Awdjfla). A mere handful of peasants 
(harvard) cultivated the little arable land to be found between Misrata and 
Zwara, while the overwhelming majority of the population led nomadic 
lives inland, either as shepherds covering small and fairly regular circuits 
('urtibà'), or as cameleers covering sometimes vast and highly irregular 
circuits (bawadt). 
Paradoxically, the most powerful communities were those that lived 
deep in the desert. At all periods the government of the country in Tripoli 
had to come to an arrangement with the desert powers in order for peace 
to prevail. O n the coast, long-distance trade, regional trade, handicrafts 
and, up to 1815, privateering were sources of revenue to the urban middle 
class, m a d e up of large families prominent in the military (karägkla), trade 
(tudjdjär) and religious studies ('ulama*) w h o had formed the mainstay of 
the local Kâramânlï dynasty from 1710.82 
Following a particularly serious power struggle, the dynasty recovered 
its position in 1794, in the reign of Yüsuf Kâramânlï. H e revived trans-
Saharan trade and revived maritime pillage, which led to a war with the 
U S A from 1801 to 1805.83 YGsuf emerged triumphant. However, the 
ban placed on privateering by the European powers in 1815 and the 
accompanying policing of the seas created financial difficulties. T h e tax levy 
that followed met with resistance, resulting finally in Yüsuf 's abdication in 
1832.84 At the beginning of his reign, two coalitions of nomads, headed 
respectively by the M a h a m i d ('urüba) and the Awläd Sulaymän (bawâdt), 
resisted the central authority's attempt to extend its power in Tripolitania, 
especially after the bawâdi had occupied the key points of the Fezzän in 
1804. But with the help of the Meghara, w h o headed a coalition of nomads 
allied to the Kâramânlï, this resistance was crushed in 1812 and the future 
chiefs of the two coalitions, G h ü m a and ' A b d al-Djalïl, were brought up at 
court. However, in 1830, takrng"advantage of the power crisis, they resumed 
leadership of the M a h a m i d and the Awläd Sulaymän, became independent 
and, when the dynasty came to an end in 1835, dominated the Fezzän and 
Tripolitania all the way to Benghazi.85 
T h e power crisis was resolved when the Porte resumed direct control of 
Libya. This switch was of immediate benefit to the middle class, especially 
82. A . Barbar, 1980, pp. 33-43, 96-121. 
83. K . Folayan, 1972, pp. 261-70. 
84. E . Rossi, 1968, pp. 259-94. 
85. D . Cordell, 1972, pp. 12-21; G . F . Lyon, 1821, pp. 54-6; G . Nachtigal, 1967, Vol. 
i, pp. 19-22. 
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the karäghla, in particular through the granting of tax relief, as the new 
authorities needed their support.86 For the Ottomans had to contend with 
the coalitions of nomads. Their military operations were unsuccessful. 
Finally the Turks managed to form an alliance with another luruba nomadic 
group, headed by Tarhuna, and above all to sow discord and distrust 
between G h ü m a and ' A b d al-Djalïl. T h e Awläd Sulaymän were finally 
defeated in 1842 and driven back" towards Chad. Weakened by the famine 
of 1856, the M a h a m i d in their turn submitted after G h ü m a ' s death in 
1858.87 T h e Ottomans n o w ruled over the whole of Tripolitania and part 
of the Fezzän. In the meantime a similar situation was developing in Barka 
(Cyrenaica), where the Sanüsiyya, a religious brotherhood bent on bringing 
the population back to the true faith and converting the T u b u , had been 
founded in 1843. It rapidly carved out a prominent place for itself through 
its success in organizing a major caravan route from Barka to Wadai and, 
above all, by effectively settling disputes between the various nomadic 
communities. T h e Turks began treating with the order in 1856 and secured 
its services as intermediary between themselves and the n o m a d popu-
lation.88 
Being eventually obliged to establish their direct or indirect authority, 
the Ottoman rulers, after i860, began to introduce their tanzimat - but 
cautiously, because their authority continued to be challenged in the Fezzän 
and in Ghat by the Tuareg and because it was necessary to avoid offending 
the urban middle class so as to be able to secure the support of at least one 
section of it for each reform. Steps were gradually taken to introduce 
judicial reforms from 1865 onwards, schools (1869), a municipal govern-
ment (1872), administrative reforms (1864 and 1875), hospitals and a 
central market (1880). Starting in 1870, centres for the distribution of food 
in times of shortage were also established. Serious famines occurred in 
1870-1, 1881-9, 1892, 1897, 1907, 1908 and 1910. T h e last measure was 
the only one to the advantage of the masses (al-latnma); all the other reforms 
benefited only the middle class, mainly traders, and had the effect of 
increasing the tax burden of the ordinary people. Their social and economic 
effects remained fairly limited, however. Despite the growing volume of 
imported European goods after 1850, the economy remained healthy. Local 
industry stood up well to competition, and a balanced budget continued 
to be ensured thanks to esparto exports.89 
But the continual food shortage from 1881 to 1889 was the first sign of 
far-reaching change. Exports suffered. In addition, the market price of 
86. A . Barbar, 1980, p. 25. . 
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473 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s
plate 17.4 The tomb ofHasanain Pasha, founder ofthe Sanusiyya
esparto collapsed, the volume of imported foodstuffs increased and from
1892 onwards the balance of trade showed a deficit. This deficit assumed
huge proportions and became permanent after 1897. For, from that time
onwards, the food requirements of the masses changed. Imported tea,
sugar, flour and tobacco were widely consumed in large quantities. Then
the income from Saharan trade dried up. Borno ceased to be a source of
trade in 1895; Kano in 1903.90 The Sanusiyya was also in difficulty in Barka
and after 1901 was weakened by its military operations in Chad. The order
became a big landowner in 1902 to make up for the losses foreseen on the
trans-Saharan trade, thereby alienating some of its supporters. Lastly, the
order was unsuccessful in holding its own against rival orders proselytizing
in the region. Around 19 10 the Sanusiyya had fewer settlements than in
1853-91
Under these circumstances, the wealthy European firms that had been
established in Tripoli, and also in Benghazi, found it easy to work them¬
selves into good positions. The society was undergoing a process of radical
change; the old patterns had been disrupted. This situation led directly to
the attempted Italian conquest of 191 1 and to the war that lasted from
191 1 to 1932.92
90. A. Barbar, 1980, pp. 139-44.
91. A. Barbar, 1980, pp. 128-31.
92. A. Barbar, 1980, pp. 139-82
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The trans-Saharan trade
The trans-Saharan trade was still flourishing at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, both in the west (from Timbuktu to Tafilälet and from
Goulimime to Taodeni) and in the centre (from Tunis and Tripoli to
Ghadämes), and Sudanese exports still consisted ofslaves and gold. Around
the 1840s, trade that relied on the use of the western routes declined while
trade by way of the routes of the central Sahara thrived, especially between
Tripoli and Kano and between Tripoli and Borno. In addition, a new
direct link between Wadaïand Barka, discovered in 1809 or 18 10, became
a major caravan route after 1850.93 During the latter half of the century
the slave trade went into a slow decline, although along the Borno route it
continued longer and along the Wadaï route it even increased and went on
doing so after 1900.94 Ivory exports, which were fairly stable, peaked
around 1877. The place of slaves as items of trade was taken first by ostrich
feathers, mainly from 1878 to 1883, and then by hides, especially goatskins.
To these were added fabrics dyed with indigo, from the Hausa country a
small quantity ofgold and a few other sundry articles. English cotton goods
plate 17.5 Upper-class Algerian women with a black slave attendant
93. Regarding this question, see C. W. Newbury, 1966; J. L. Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 3, pp.
371-447; M. Johnson, 1976; D. Cordell, 1977; S. Baier, 1974; 1977.
94. D. Cordell, 1977, p. 35.
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were the main item to be carried southwards. In i860 they represented 
some 70 per cent of the value of imports. Other imports consisted of North 
African woollen garments from Tripolitania, Austro-Hungarian textiles, 
woollen goods and carpets, ironmongery, medicines, devotional articles, 
perfumes, jewellery, silks, pearls and above all, weapons and ammunition. 
In addition, there was a constant demand for salt from the Sahara, dates 
from oases and cereals from the Sahel.95 
Trans-Saharan trade did not undergo a decline until Atlantic shipping 
and overland transport (railways) in West Africa began to constitute c o m -
petitive alternatives. Political developments played a secondary though 
important role. T h e fortunes of Wadai account for the importance of the 
Wadai-Barka route as early as 1850. In 1895 trade by way of the Tripoli-
Borno route suffered from the operations conducted by Rabeh, and the 
disruptions caused mainly by the French conquests in West Africa had 
their repercussions. But trade went into an irreversible decline in 1903 
when caravans became more expensive than rail and ship combined.96 In 
the east, the isolated position of Wadai and Barka enabled it to survive 
until 1911, even after the British regained control over the Sudan in 1898, 
no doubt because of the blockading of Därfür. It was then, after 1900, that 
traditional patterns of life in the Sahara were destroyed, shortly before the 
final invasion of the last extensive territories that had not yet been colonized. 
Conclusion 
Sooner or later, and with varying degrees of violence, each of the countries 
of the Maghrib was subjected to the same process, one which led from 
autonomy to dependence. It is therefore useless to seek the reason for this 
collapse at the local level in the errors committed by a particular ruler or 
in the unscrupulous behaviour of a particular European agent. A single 
external factor, namely the expansion of Western capitalism, sealed the fate 
of the Maghrib, just as it sealed the fate of the rest of the non-European 
world. In about 1885, this expansion was described by Jules Ferry, one of 
the promoters of colonization, as 'an irresistible movement [that is] impel-
ling the great powers to embark upon the conquest of n e w lands', 'the 
peremptory demonstration and inescapable law of an economic system 
c o m m o n to the whole of Europe'.97 
However, it m a y have been due to certain local conditions, or to an 
accidental event of historic importance in the case of Algeria, that there 
were marked discrepancies in the rate at which the various countries of the 
Maghrib were reduced to a state of dependence, as well as considerable 
differences regarding the methods used for that purpose and the reactions 
95. See note 93 above, and A . Barbar, 1980, pp. 64-76. 
96. A . Barbar, 1980, p. 140, gives figures. 
97. Cited by L . Bergeron, 1968, t. VIII, p. 319. 
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of the population. Algeria was crushed by force of arms even before the 
middle of the century and was the country where the European assault was 
most ruthless and most traumatic for the traditional society and culture. 
Tunisia, on the other hand, was penetrated gradually as the capitalist system 
itself developed, and the government attempted to react by implementing a 
policy of modernistic reforms. Although it proved to be ineffective and 
ruinous at the time, this policy nevertheless laid d o w n valuable foundations 
for the future, the emergence of a modernistic social elite, the first steps 
towards the creation of a nation-state, etc. Libya where direct Turkish rule 
was re-established in 1835, was thereby protected for some time from 
European ambitions, which were also discouraged by its poverty and 
remoteness. Can it be said that the specific conditions experienced by the 
countries of the Maghrib during the nineteenth century had repercussions 
throughout the colonial period and even beyond? T h e present writer has 
no doubt that this was the case. 
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A . L A R O U I 
After the long and glorious reign of Mawlây Ismâ'ïl (1672-1727) Morocco 
went through a period of anarchy that wrecked the economy, disturbed 
the social structure and destroyed the army. Sultan M u h a m m a d III (1757-
90) gradually took things in hand and laid the foundations of 'modern ' 
Morocco, a process consolidated by his son Sulaymän (1792-1822). H e 
made the Makhzen (government) conform more closely to the sharTa 
(Islamic law) an? gave it a more distinctly urban basis. H e governed directly 
the sedentary farming and arboricultural regions of Haouz and Dir, as well 
as Gharb, a swampy region good for subsistence farming; through the great 
kä^ids (kablla chieftains) and the shaykhs of the zäwiya (masters of religious 
orders) he governed indirectly the mountain and desert regions, thus 
making a distinction between a domain of sovereignty and a domain of 
suzerainty, customarily called bilad al-makhzen and biïàd al-sibä, although 
this places them in too systematic an opposition. 
Morocco was then reorganized on a restrictive basis. Certain groups 
profiteering from the privileges of the Makhzen were removed from power; 
naturally they attempted to regain their position, by resorting to rebellion, 
if necessary. Conscious of its youthful strength, the Europe of the Congress 
of Vienna made its pressure felt, particularly after the taking of Algiers by 
the French in 1830. T h e Makhzen had two problems to solve simu-
ltaneously: strengthening itself to stand against the foreign danger, and 
broadening its territorial and political base. T h e dual reform encountered 
colonial manoeuvring and domestic opposition. In spite of the strong 
personality of Sultan ' A b d al-Rahmän (1822-59), t n e intelligence of 
M u h a m m a d IV (1859^73), and the prestige of Hasan I (1873-94), t n e 
essential aim, to escape foreign control, was not definitively achieved, 
although in 1880 Morocco still presented the façade of a stable state. But 
the major achievement of this period, which saw heavier European pressure 
and an active policy of reform, was undeniably the implanting of a tra-
ditionalistic and highly sensitive sense of Moroccan community, which 
gave Morocco a special position in north-western Africa. 
Morocco from the beginning ofthe nineteenth century to 1880
^Ê
1
' ^f *&** *
afe 5»^
plate 18. i Sultan lAbd al-Rahman (1822-59) in 1832
The politico-social structure
The noteworthy political institution of nineteenth-century Morocco was
the bay'a (investiture contract), deliberately modelled directly on that by
which the Prophet Muhammad had set up the first Muslim community
of Medina, and which Morocco alone preserved in its original purity.1
1. A. Ibn Zaïdân, 1961-2, Vol. 1, pp. 8-35.
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A written contract binding the sultan and the various groups of the 
population, and a process of legitimizing political authority, which is thus 
no longer based on force alone, the bay'a strengthened the Moroccan 
people's feeling of belonging to an intangible national community unaffect-
ed by political and military changes. At each change of reign army c o m -
manders, representatives of the urban classes, kffids and shaykhs oïzâwiyas 
sent their oaths of allegiance to court. All written in approximately the 
same style, these oaths defined the rights and duties of the sultan and of 
the people. T h e duty of the former was dual: to defend the land2 against 
foreign enemies and to maintain peace at h o m e . In return, the people owed 
him complete obedience, as long as he did not transgress the law and 
custom of Islam, complying with the orders of the Makhzen , paying the 
legal taxes, providing armed contingents in time of peace and rallying to 
the colours in time of war. T h e ritual formula appears as follows, taken 
from the bay1 a of the inhabitants of Rabat sent to c A b d al-Rahmän: ' W e 
swear before G o d and his angels to heed and to carry out the orders of the 
I m a m , in so far as they are lawful and within our capacity . . . the bargain 
being concluded, w e obey as G o d has commanded us to do and the Sultan 
respects our rights and those of all his other subjects, as G o d has ordered 
him.'3 
T o carry out his duties the sultan had a Makhzen composed essentially 
of an army and a bureaucracy. 
Until the post-1885 military reforms, the Moroccan army consisted of 
three groups, of varying origin and efficiency: T h e bwakher (classical: labid 
al-Bukhàrï) represented the few hundred slave troops remaining from the 
50 000 w h o had m a d e up M a w l ä y Ismâ'fl's black guards; the gish^ (classical: 
jdtsh), numbering no more than 9000, were composed of contingents from 
certain communities (Cheraga, Oulad Jami', Oudaya, Cherarda) that farmed 
state lands for their o w n benefit and in the nineteenth century were settled 
around Fez and in the suburbs of Rabat and Larache; T h e nuaib (classical: 
nawa'ib, plural of riff iba) were temporary troops provided by other c o m -
munities, notably those of Haouz and Dir, at the sovereign's demand. A s 
conceived by M u h a m m a d III, this army was a police force to maintain 
domestic order. That is w h y troops trained in the European style, the 
'askarl, were created after the defeat of Isly at the hands of the French.4 
T h e bureaucracy was composed of viziers and secretaries of the ministries 
2. Contrary to general ideas, Morocco's territory was clearly defined from the sixteenth 
century on. T h e wars of the Sa'adian and 'Alawite sovereigns against the Turks of Algiers 
ended with a recognized frontier between the two parties. In the Sahara, Shlrifian sov-
ereignty extended to the oases whose sedentary inhabitants signed the bay'a and to the 
boundaries of the grazing zones of the nomadic groups that did likewise. T h e nineteenth-
century sultan's dealings with the European Powers show clearly that the Makhzen had a 
precise concept of what was Moroccan territory. 
3. A . Ibn Zaïdân, 1929-33, Vol. 5, pp. 9-15. 
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(kuttab) grouped into departments k n o w n as bariika in Morocco. This 
bureaucracy carried on the Andalusian tradition, maintained by the instruc-
tion proferred at Karâwiyyïn University at Fez and an elaborate system of 
co-optation. Also, a number of the viziers and secretaries were of A n d a -
lusian origin. F r o m the middle of the nineteenth century a n e w type of 
Makhzen official appeared, to meet the needs stemming from expanded 
relations with Europe. These were the umariä (plural of amln, customs 
inspector) and tulba (plural of tälib, advanced student), less versed in 
rhetoric and history, but more familiar with European languages and 
financial problems.5 
T h e Moroccan state, which was based on Islamic orthodoxy, had as its 
legal source of income receipts from the state lands, the zakät (a tax on 
commercial capital and farm produce), the proceeds of which were to be 
spent for specifically defined purposes, and the taxes on foreign trade; all 
other tax income, including the tithe (lushur), descendant of the kharâdj, 
were of dubious legality.6 
With his hands tied in the field of taxation, the sultan was forced to limit 
his spending to a strict m i n i m u m . M u h a m m a d III contented himself with 
revenue from the customs and the zakät from the H a o u z region and C r o w n 
farmland ('azib). H e had nevertheless maintained a tax on imported fabrics, 
leather and sulphur. After obtaining authorization from a few (ulama\ he 
later instituted town dues and a tax on markets and on weights and 
measures.7 T h e merchants and craftsmen resented these and forced Sultan 
Sulaymän to remove them on his accession to the throne. T o make up the 
losses to the Treasury, aggravated by his decision to discourage trade with 
Europe, the sovereign engaged in more and more tours of rural areas, in 
order to derive the m a x i m u m revenue from the zakät and tithe, which 
naturally led to lively discontent on the part of the rural population. In 
1850 his successor, ' A b d al-Rahmän, had to revive the tax on leather and 
then another on cattle sold in the stiks. In 1860, following its defeat by Spain, 
Morocco had to pay compensation of 100 million francs, the equivalent of 
twenty times the Moroccan budget of the time.8 Tax reform was imperative. 
In spite of Sultan M u h a m m a d IV's urgent appeal, the tulama> nevertheless 
clung to the orthodox point of view.9 All through the nineteenth century 
the problem of taxes remained central to Morocco's history and was 
never resolved satisfactorily. Experience impelled the Makhzen to limit its 
responsibilities, in order to keep expenditures d o w n to the level of available 
income, rather than raising the latter in order to be able to achieve desirable 
5. A . Ibn Zaldân, 1961-2, Vol. 1, pp. 46fr. 
6. In Muslim law kharadj is justified by conquest. But most 'ulama' consider that 
Morocco's inhabitants embraced Islam voluntarily. See P. Saran and J. Burton-Page, 1965. 
7. A . al-Nâsirï, 1954-6, Vol. 9, p. 61. It is thought that these various taxes brought in 
three million francs, which was enough to pay the costs of the army and bureaucracy. 
8. J. L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 2, p. 362. 
9. M . D â w u d , 1956-^70, Vol. 5, pp. 97-9. 
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be able to achieve desirable goals. However, with increasing European 
pressure, overall reform became increasingly urgent; there was no longer 
any question of being satisfied with what was possible. 
Between the army and bureaucracy on the one hand and the urban and 
rural population on the other there were intermediate bodies that, while 
enjoying some autonomy, were part of the Makhzen , in the broader sense.10 
As spokesmen for social classes or regionaPgroups, they energetically 
defended traditional rights against the sultan; being responsible to him, 
they carried out the Makhzen's orders; taking account of local habits and 
practices. 
T h e clerical class was m a d e up of the 'ulanta? teachers, kadis, muftis, 
nädhirs of the habits (administrators of the religious foundations), and 
muhtasibs (officers in charge of the markets). This essentially urban admin-
istration, which strictly applied the commandments of sharTz, was theo-
retically under the supervision of the sultan-imäm, but it enjoyed 
unquestionable autonomy.11 T h e sovereign could alter neither the content 
nor the form of education, which was the Karâwiyyïn's prerogative; nor 
could he disregard the views of other tulama> when making appointments 
to the posts just mentioned; nor could he turn towards his o w n coffers the 
income of the habüs; nor could he veto the decrees of the tnuhtasib. SharTz, 
a veritable constitution governing social life, was under the custody of the 
'ultima' and any open attempt to change it was out of the question, even 
w h e n it came from the sultan.12 
T h e shurafä (sharlfs), direct descendants of the Prophet M u h a m m a d , 
formed a kind of religious aristocracy distributed throughout Morocco's 
town and countryside. Three times, under sultans I s m ä ^ , M u h a m m a d III 
and Sulaymân, a census was taken of the shurafä, for they enjoyed special 
legal status and social prestige.13 T h e y ha3 the privilege of being judged 
by their o w n nakib (officials). As descendants of the founder of the state of 
Islam, they possessed rights over the public treasury and were thus exempt 
from several taxes as well as receiving numerous gifts from the sultan.14 As 
descendants of the Messenger of G o d , they were endowed in the public 
eye with a special blessing (baraka), usually dormant, but in favourable 
conditions capable of being transformed into supernatural power. Hence 
their role as miracle-workers and arbitrators, services for which they were 
paid, and to which the sultan himself did not hesitate to resort on occasion. 
T h e zàwiyas, social groups with a religious basis, took a number of 
10. There is a distinction between Makhzen in the strict sense of the government and 
Makhzen in the broader sense of the country's political and religious elite. It is the latter 
meaning that is understood when speaking of Makhzanïya and Makhzen families. 
11. Duties to shari'a are distinguished from duties to the Makhzen. See M u h a m m a d b. 
Ja'afar al-Kattânï, 1899, Vol. 3, p. 5. 
12. A . Ibn Zaïdân, 1961-2, Vol. 2, pp. 163-88. 
13. E . Lévi-Provençal, 1922. 
14. al-Mahdï al-Wazzânï, 1900, Vol. 2, p. 92. 
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forms in nineteenth-century Morocco, two of them of great importance: 
(a) the zàwiya-brothcrhood, such as the Tijäniyya or Darkäwiyya, without 
distinction as to social class, wealth, occupation or ethnic origin; they thus 
played a powerful role in horizontal integration; (b) the zàwiya principality, 
whose chief was delegated virtually complete authority over his fief, such 
as the Wazzäniyya in the north, the Sharkäwiyya at Tadla, the Näsiriyya 
in the south-west or the Zarwäliyya in the Anti-Atlas. Each zàwiya 
attempted to be both at the same time and sometimes succeeded, as witness 
the Näsiriyya; it could assume another form, but in every case it was a 
school of social discipline and an outpost of M a k h z e n authority, in spite 
of its apparent independence.15 This role was especially visible in the towns, 
where zàwiya and corporation (hinta) had the same members and pursued 
the same aims. 
T h e kablla chieftains had widely variable status. T o the M a k h z e n the 
kablla was essentially an administrative and fiscal concept, applied equally 
to a region (Doukkala), a mountain canton (Beni Ouriaghel), a n o m a d 
confederation (Ait Atta) or a transplanted community of soldier-shepherds 
(Cherarda). In every case authority was delegated to a kà'id appointed by 
a dahir (decree) after the approval of the people of the district. T h e kalid 
was of course both the sultan's representative and the spokesman of the 
people of the district, one of the two roles unfailingly predominating, 
depending on the distance from the central government and the region's 
wealth. Facing this kà'id there was always the camiV(governor), w h o collected 
taxes and raised the troop levies. In certain favourable circumstances one 
person could combine the two roles, but they were nevertheless separate 
functions. Kaidal families grew up - there were two per kablla - the one 
on the Makhzen's side, the other favouring local interests; whether in 
power or out of power, these families formed part of the country's admin-
istrative elite.16 
These intermediate bodies, urban or rural, based on individual ties or 
kinship, were in the final analysis cogs in the sultan's government. In 
defending sharTm the lulamà* were strengthening the legitimacy of the sultan-
i m ä m , since Islam is primarily a political community. T h e shurafà acted 
as mediators between central government and local chieftains in times of 
trouble, serious or fleeting. T h e zàwiya shaykh governed distant and 
unproductive regions on behalf of the sultan or maintained peace in 
strategic regions.17 W h e n a zàwiya set itself up against the sovereign for 
political reasons, he destroyed it. T h e same m a y be said of the kablla 
chieftains. T h e y were granted broad autonomy w h e n fighting foreigners, 
15. E . Michaux-Bellaire, 1921. 
16. R . Montagne, 1930, is a classic book, but should be read critically, for the Makhzen 
documents themselves oblige us to alter many accepted notions about the concept ¿Tthe 
kablla. 
17. A . G . P. Martin, 1923 (on the rôle of the Zàwiya Wazzäniyya zäwiyas in Tüwät); P. 
Durand, 1930, pp. 65^77 (on the rôle of the ziwiya Sharkäwiyya Zäwiya in the Tadla). 
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as in the Rïf where the Spaniards at Ceuta or Melilla were continually 
under siege, or when their region was mountainous or desert, but if they 
claimed complete independence by disobeying the sultan's c o m m a n d s or 
failing to apply sharTa, they were declared in a state of siba, that is, guilty 
of breaking without justification the bay1 a (contract); they could be reduced 
by force or diplomacy, in a whirlwind campaign or by a slow process of 
attrition, depending on the military forces at the sovereign's disposal, but 
the sovereignty of the sultan and sharTa was never surrendered.18 
Morocco's socio-political system, as reorganized by M u h a m m a d III, 
marked a return to Islamic orthodoxy. In recognizing the autonomy of the 
intermediate bodies and limiting the ambitions of the central government, 
it had reinforced the idea of a Moroccan state, by encouraging each 
occupational, social or ethnic group to voice its claims inside the Makhzen . 
However, this system contained its o w n contradictions; it manifestly 
wavered between two ideals: the one, the rule of sharTa and direct govern-
ment, would have been welcomed by the lulama' and the merchants; the 
other, more to the liking of the local chiefs, would have had the sultan 
merely as a unifying symbol, possessing only the authority delegated to 
him by those chiefs. This system was the result of the changed power 
relationship between Morocco and Europe arising during the mercantile 
era. Before it stabilized it had to cope with even stronger European pressure; 
its contradictions came into the open after Morocco's military defeats, by 
France in 1844 and then by Spain in i860. 
The Makhzen's reforms in response to the European 
offensive 
T h e colonial powers' policies in regard to Morocco will be analysed 
elsewhere.19 Here w e shall only recall that until 1880 there was a European 
consensus to maintain the status quo in the empire of Morocco. N o 
territorial expansion by France from its Algerian base or by Spain from 
Ceuta or Melilla; no commercial privileges for British goods. In spite of 
several concessions extorted by France and Spain after the wars of 1844 
and 1859-60 these principles were reaffirmed at the 1880 Madrid C o n -
ference and remained in effect until the end of the nineteenth century.20 
18. T h e colonial powers interpreted the concept oí siba according to the requirements 
of their expansionist policy. It is n o w to be understood in its original framework and not 
in relation to European law of the period. 
19. See Chapter 19 below. 
20. Bugeaud's forces attacked the Moroccan army at Isly near Oujda on 14 August 1844; 
the French navy shelled Mogador on the 15th after bombarding Tangier on the 6th. T h e 
Treaty of Tangier, signed on 19 September, ended the war, but the Lalla Marnia convention 
of 18 March 1845 did not settle the border dispute, due to French ambitions in the Sahara. 
In the autumn of 1859 the Spanish organized a European army at Ceuta; after a few 
skirmishes at Cabo Negro they entered Tetuán on 6 February i860. By the treaty of 20 
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Nevertheless, the demands of the European powers ran absolutely 
counter to the sultan's authority. During the conquest of Algeria, the 
sultan could not maintain the neutrality counselled by England and simple 
c o m m o n sense, for Muslim c o m m o n law imposed on him the obligation 
to assist neighbouring Muslims abandoned by their legitimate sovereign, 
in this case the Ottoman ruler.21 In 1859 m e n of the Rïf destroyed a 
building constructed by the Spaniards of Ceuta outside the town walls and 
tore up the flag flying over it. Madrid demanded that the twelve m e n it 
considered responsible be handed over. T h e sultan could not comply, for 
he would then have been guilty of a deliberate breach of his bay1 a oath.22 
In matters of trade, in which Britain was particularly concerned, the sultan 
could not by a simple stroke of the pen free exports, grant European rights 
of property ownership, or oblige the kadis to accept the evidence of non-
Muslims, for on all these points the prohibition of religious law was 
uncompromising.23 T h u s the sultan found himself in an unenviable 
position, torn between the demands of the Europeans and the arrogant 
opposition of the 'ulama'; to the former he was an obscurantist, to the latter 
an innovator. Hence the ambiguity of the reforms. 
In the nineteenth century both the Makhzen and the European consuls 
were agreed that the army should be reinforced and the government 
reorganized to ensure safety, order and justice for all. T h e problem lay in 
the legal framework: should it be shrarTa, or new legislation of European 
inspiration? T h e opposition between the two could not be peacefully 
resolved. T h e Makhzen did carry out a reform, but one that was limited 
and thus unsatisfactory in European eyes. 
M u h a m m a d IV lived through the two defeats of Isly and Tetuán, 
the latter when already sultan, the former while still heir-apparent and 
commander-in-chief of the army, which explains the moves he took to 
introduce military reforms from 1845 on. T o break through the prevailing 
traditionalism, he commissioned from a well-known 'alim a work that would 
justify reform on traditional grounds.24 
H e brought in Tunisians w h o had served in the Ottoman army to 
organize regiments trained in European style, the laskarl: initially they 
amounted to only some 500 m e n . With the help of renegade Europeans, 
the best-known being the Frenchman de Saulty, w h o had taken the Muslim 
name of ' A b d al-Rahmän al-'Alï, he set up at Fez an engineering school 
(madrasat al-Muhandisin) to train surveyors, topographers, cartographers 
and artillerymen. For it he commissioned a Maltese writer to translate 
various treatises on geometry, supervising the work directly himself. Via 
November 1861 Spain obtained an enlargement of the boundaries of Ceuta and Melilla, 
commercial concessions and a fishing port in the south, which was sited at Ifni in 1883. 
21. A . Tasulï, n.d. 
22. A . al-Nâsirï, 1954-6, Vol. 4; J. L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 2, pp. 360-2. 
23. A . Tasüli, n.d., C h . 1, section 4. 
24. M . al-Khardûdî, n.d. 
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his Gibraltar representative he asked the Pasha of Egypt to send him 
scientific books translated from the European languages. Sultan 'Abd al-
R a h m â n let his son have his way but assumed no responsibility for this 
reform, the immediate benefits of which he could not see. Once sultan, 
M u h a m m a d IV would undoubtedly have pursued this reform more vig-
orously, if the 1859-60 war had not raised a labyrinth of financial problems 
for him. N o n e the less, he decided to send a group of Bwakher to Egypt 
for artillery training. After 1870 there were regular missions sent to Gibral-
tar for two-year training courses. Hasan I carried on his father's policy, 
under more favourable conditions. H e set up a regular recruiting system: 
each town of the empire had to supply 500 recruits, each port 200, each 
region 2000; this produced an army of 25 000 soldiers. In 1877 he asked 
France to obtain officers to instruct his artillery groups. In 1880, 180 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers returned h o m e from abroad 
and were formed into the harraba regiment under a British commanding 
officer, Major Maclean. Later, Hasan I sent other military missions to 
Belgium, G e r m a n y and Italy. With this reorganized army he could reassert 
his sovereignty over distant regions like Süs and Tafilälet, which were 
coveted by several European Powers.25 
C . John D r u m m o n d H a y , Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tangier 
from 1839 to 1886, was as ardent in his defence of the sultan's sovereignty 
and territory as in his demands that the country be opened to international 
trade.26 H e used his immense prestige with Sultan ' A b d al-Rahmân to get 
him to accept the Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation of 9 
December 1856. This laid d o w n the following principles: freedom of trade, 
an end to all public or private monopolies, guaranteed safety of property 
and person, the opening of consulates throughout the country, exemption 
of foreign traders and their Moroccan associates from all taxes and duties 
except customs duties and anchorage and pilotage fees.27 
Opening Morocco to European trade had several unfortunate conse-
quences: the first was a severe monetary crisis. In the eighteenth century 
the dinar, a gold coin, had completely vanished: Morocco's monetary 
system became bimetallic, based on silver and bronze. T h e legal silver 
coins were the Spanish peseta and douro and the French franc and ecu; 
douro and ecu were called rials. T h e bronze coins, minted in Morocco, 
were the ukia (ounce) and mtizuna. T h e mithkal served as the unit of 
account: it was worth 10 ounces, and the ounce was worth 4 tnüzüna. A s 
trade relations with Europe expanded, silver coins became rarer and the 
more c o m m o n bronze coins became devalued. B y mid-century they had 
dropped to one-fourth their original value, with the consequences that are 
well known in all inflations: rising prices, impoverishment of the 
25. J . L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 1, p . 208. See particularly M . al-Mannûnï, 1973, p. 55. 
26. J . D . H a y , 1896. 
27. See the text in P . L . Rivière, 1924-5, Vol. 1, pp. 36-42. 
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population, government finances in difficulty, concentration of property 
in the hands of a minority. T h e M a k h z e n attempted to respond, with 
authoritarian measures in 1852, 1862, 1869 and 1877, each time hoping to 
return to a parity level already exceeded. T h e sultan could only benefit 
from these revaluations if he demanded payment to him in silver coins, 
while he himself was able to settle his debts in rials or ounces at will. But 
the foreign merchants reduced the state's income from customs duties by 
paying in devalued ounces, while the sultan had to pay his foreign debts 
in Spanish piastres and French ecus, which he bought at high rates. T h e 
currency measured thus had the end-result of accentuating the treasury's 
difficulties. At the end of our period Hasan I decided to mint a new silver 
coin (the Hasan rial, worth five francs) but without withdrawing the bronze 
coin; the latter continued to decline in value (by 1881 the rial was worth 
14 mithkal instead of 10) and it brought d o w n the n e w coins with it.28 
T h e Makhzen's spending was continuing to rise because of reform 
measures aïïH the m a n y debts and reparations to European states and 
merchants. Fiscal reform was imperative. But the sultan was not free to 
undertake it without consulting the <ulama>, since this was a matter of 
c o m m o n law. Earlier, the <ulamd? had several times declared illegal the taxes 
on commercial transactions known under the generic term muküs (pl. of 
maks), w h e n they were not temporary and spent on specific purposes; any 
land tax was also unacceptable to them, since Moroccans were independent 
and full owners of their land.29 In July i860, M u h a m m a d IV asked the 
'ulanta* to tell him h o w to pay the war reparations that would enable him 
to recover Tetuán, which was occupied by the Spanish, and to prevent 
other towns from falling into their hands. T h e 'ulamâ* remained true to 
their orthodox position, holding that only an extraordinary, that is tempor-
ary, tax, affecting all inhabitants equally and levied directly - i.e., not 
farmed out to third parties - would be legal, although the sultan had been 
careful to explain to them that circumstances did not permit him to put 
such a measure into effect.30 Overruling their objections, he instituted 
indirect taxes that incited sullen and tenacious opposition from the urban 
population. W h e n his successor was proclaimed in 1873, the craftsmen 
demanded abolition of these muküs as the price of signing the bay'a, and 
Hasan I had to reduce the rebellious town-dwellers by force. Later he 
introduced, on an experimental basis, the tertib, a fixed-rate tax on land 
collected by special categories of umariä (customs collectors). Without 
consulting iulama', of whose adverse views in the matter he was already 
aware, he began by levying it in the Haouz , the kingdom's best-governed 
28. J . L . Miège, 1961-3, V0I.2, pp. 388-9; Vol. 3, pp. 97-107, 434-^7. See also G . 
Ayache, 1958, pp. 271-310. At the beginning of the century 10 ounces were worth 5 pesetas; 
in 1845 t n e y were worth 3.25 pesetas and in 1874 only one peseta. Figures from al-Nïçirî. 
1954-6, Vol. 9, p. 208. 
29. al-Mahdï al-Wazzânï, 1900, Vol. 3, p. 92. 
30. M . D â w u d , 1956-70, Vol. 5, pp. 99-100. 
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district. But he quickly let it lapse, for reasons not yet clear but which
undoubtedly had to do with public opinion and the opposition of certain
army leaders. Without financial resources the Makhzen was obliged to
restrict its ambitions for reform, keeping its regular expenses down to the
lowest possible level.
After 1856 the number of European traders installed in Morocco rose
steadily. In response to their complaints the Makhzen launched on a
programme of government reform. In 1861 a corps oTcustoms inspectors,
the umanä, was set up. Recruited from traders, government officials and
notaries, and relatively well paid, they were installed in the eight ports
open to foreign trade; at their side they had Spanish inspectors responsible
for vetting customs receipts, 60 per cent of which were destined for war
reparation payments. These umanä, several of whom had made fortunes
490
Morocco from the beginning of the nineteenth century to 1880 
abroad (Gibraltar, Marseilles, Manchester, Genoa), helped to rationalize 
Morocco's bureaucracy and were very influential under M u h a m m a d IV 
and Hasan I. Another group also enjoyed increasing prestige: the tulba, 
w h o had been sent to Europe for training and to learn foreign languages. 
Between 1874 and 1888 there were eight missions, totalling 350 individuals, 
taking the road towards the principal countries of Europe. O n their return 
h o m e these young m e n were used in the tax division of the Department of 
the Mint of the celebrated tnakina at Fez (an armaments factory organized 
by Italians), which was reorganized in 1886, and in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (mzlrat al-bar).n 
But the European traders' real goal was to restrict the kadis' authority.32 
They would rather be judged by the governor (kâ'id or lamil), while hoping 
to be one day under the jurisdiction of a joint tribunal applying a legal 
code of Western inspiration. O n the pretext that it had been a moderating 
influence on Spain in i860, France brought M u h a m m e d IV to accept the 
convention of 19 August 1863, which granted judiciary privileges both to 
foreign merchants and their Moroccan associates. Instead of being under 
the authority of the kadi, they were to be judged by the governor, in the 
presence of the European consul concerned. While the number of their 
Moroccan associates remained low (200 per kabila around 1870), the 
situation, while offensive to the sultan, was nevertheless bearable. But the 
consuls soon conferred the status oîsamsâr (trade middleman) on any one, 
Jew or Muslim, w h o wished to evade the kadVs jurisdiction and w h o could 
afford to pay for the title.33 Seeing its authority undermined by this 
illegal protection, arising from a tendentious interpretation of the 1863 
convention, the Makhzen protested unendingly and finally w o n Britain 
over to its viewpointTA twelve-nation international conference was held at 
Madrid in July 1880 to put an end to the practice. T h e number of those 
entitled to protection was strictly limited: henceforth each trader had to be 
satisfied with two samsärs; only they personally and those members of their 
family living under their roofs could claim the protection of the foreign 
country. In return for this limitation, however, the property rights of the 
Europeans established in the ports were recognized, something which the 
sultan viewed with an unfavourable eye. 
T h e consequence of European pressure was thus a reform of Morocco's 
army, government, monetary and tax system. However, the scope of this 
reform was restricted both by foreign obstacles and by domestic problems. 
T h e Europeans were happy about measures guaranteeing them security 
and favouring their trade operations, but they did not - particularly the 
French and Spanish - want the Makhzen to become so strong as to be able 
31. J. L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 4, pp. 397-408. 
32. ' T o penetrate Morocco peacefully, it is first necessary to de-Muslimize it'. G . Maura , 
içii.p. 197. 
33. J . D . H a y , 1896, pp. 321-3. 
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to oppose their aims successfully.34 In addition, the sultan was not free to 
tamper with education, the judiciary or religious institutions, given the 
intransigence of the 'ulamF. This limitation of the field open to reform, 
further limited by scanty financial resources, had an unexpected result: 
instead of becoming strong and independent, the sultan was gradually tied 
more closely to Europe with each successive reform of his country. For, as 
foreign relations expanded, the number of foreign traders grew and there 
were more incidents calling forth heavy fines or territorial concessions or 
entailing a loss of prestige.35 
T h e people saw a cause-and-effect relationship between admission of 
the foreigners, the ensuing reforms and their o w n poverty. Public opinion 
became more and more incensed against the foreigners, for economic, 
psychological and religious reasons. 
Popular reactions 
Morocco's farm production depended - and still depends - on the vagaries 
of climate; n o w it had to cope with the growing demand of the European 
exporters. T h e result was a series of famines that had severe effects on the 
urban and rural population: 1850, 1857, 1867 and particularly the terrible 
years of 1878 and 1881, w h e n 12-15 P e r c e n t of the inhabitants of the towns 
are estimated to have survived on public charity and 64 000 Moroccans had 
to emigrate.36 Outside the ramparts of the towns there were already rising 
quarters of nualas similar to the slums and shantytowns of the twentieth 
century. Unable to pay their taxes or repay their debts to European traders, 
m a n y crop and livestock farmers left their lands; this drift to the towns 
affected about one-third of the agricultural land in the south and around 
the coastal towns. T h e M a k h z e n suffered doubly from the consequences 
of this situation. First, receipts from the zakät declined; second, the 
Europeans demanded that it pay the debts of private individuals, par-
ticularly w h e n the debtors were käHds. W h a t is more, illegal low-price 
transactions were taking place between foreigners, via the intermediary of 
the samsärs and with the blessing of unscrupulous kädis; and tax revenue 
on the property in question was accordingly forfeited. T h e sultan attempted 
to stem this disastrous tide. In a series of measures from 1873 to 1883, he 
banned Europeans from the rural silks, required kïïids to keep their o w n 
property separate from that of persons under their jurisdiction and restric-
ted the number of kadis and notaries entitled to authenticate the promissory 
notes covering these sales.37 If the rural population was becoming impover-
34. J. Caillé, 1951, p. 121. 
35. 'After the reforms Turkey and Egypt became richer but much less independent',said 
Sultan M u h a m m a d IV to the French Minister Tissot. See J. D . Hay , 1896, pp. 288-9. 
36. J . L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol.3, pp.367, 444. 
37. A . IbnZaidân, 1961-2, Vol. 1, pp. 364-6; Vol. 2, pp. 48-51, 129-31. 
492 
Morocco from the beginning of the nineteenth century to 1880 
ished, the urban population was in no better state. Everyone was affected 
by the rise in price of the basic necessities: grains, wool, hides. Imported 
goods (cloth, candles, matches, sugar) were cheap, but they represented 
severe competition for the craftsmen w h o were the backbone of the urban 
economy. Government employees, whether paid by the M a k h z e n , habu% 
or even the population themselves, were suffering from the evflTof devalu-
ation: between 1845 and 1874, their wages in real terms dropped to 
one-tenth of their original value.38 T h e only ones to escape this general 
pauperization were the merchants and associates of European traders, w h o 
were able to get hold of silver coins. Their capital automatically rose in 
value; they paid ridiculously low prices for their purchases of buildings 
and property and they lent m o n e y at usurious levels to the rural population 
and even to members of the Makhzen. T h e way they were enriching 
themselves, which appeared even worse because of its contrast with the 
general poverty, was felt as another evil consequence of opening the country 
to foreign business. 
T h e Moroccan people were sensitive to more than these merely economic 
aspects: they resented as well, and perhaps above all, the decline in the 
authority of the kadi, the sultan and, in the last analysis, Islam itself. Each 
colonial power laid m u c h stress on respect for its flag. If one of its citizens 
was killed, its consul cared little whether there had been provocation or 
whether it was intentional homicide or not; he demanded the execution of 
the guilty person (where this was uncertain, execution of all those present 
at the incident), monetary reparations to the victim's family, the dismissal 
of agents he considered insufficiently zealous in the matter, an official 
government apology, and protection for the flag.39 
Under conditions like these, officials did not k n o w h o w to act. If they 
rejected the consul's complaints and the affair turned out badly for the 
sultan, they were the ones to suffer the consequences; on the other hand, 
if they agreed to flout custom, which left the decision in the hands of the 
central authority, and were diligent about the case and then the result was 
a popular uprising, they again bore the responsibility. Their prestige was 
constantly eroded, to the detriment of the public order that the Europeans 
claimed to need.40 
T h e kadi and muhtasib were particular victims of this situation contrary 
to the letter of sharTz. Hence their fierce opposition to protection. With 
Britain's active Tucking, the British Jew and philanthropist Sir Moses 
Montefiore visited Morocco following which Sultan M u h a m m a d IV issued 
the dahir of 5 February 1864: it ordered Moroccan officials to treat Jews' 
affairs with speed and justice, threatening them with grave sanctions if they 
did not comply. 'As soon as the Jews had the dahir, they m a d e copies of 
38. See note 28 above. 
39. G . Ayache, 1965, pp. 159-204. 
40. A . Ibn Zaidan, 1929-33, Vol. 2, p. 374. 
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it which they distributed in all the towns; they acted together to m a k e 
themselves independent of all authority, particularly that of the ports', says 
the historian al-Nâsirï.41 T h e <ulama' saw this decree.as a blow aimed at 
sharTa and the reaction was so violent that M u h a m m a d IV had to back 
3 ö w n . Muslim proteges aroused even greater hostility. At the Friday 
prayers in the mosques the iulama> presented numerous pamphlets urging 
the sultan to take severe reprisals against them. 'If you do not,' one of these 
iulama' said, 'doubt will be sown in the minds of the ignorant, w h o will 
begin to think ill of Islam and to believe that the religion of the infidels is 
superior to it'.42 
W h e n the sultan failed to follow their advice, because he did not want 
to create problems with the European powers, they turned to the people 
for support. T h e same lalim just cited said on this subject: ' T h e duty of 
every believer is to refrain from frequenting these proteges, inviting them, 
sharing their food, tying himself to them in friendship or marriage'.43 Since 
the majority of these Musl im protégés were wealthy merchants, the 'ultima's 
campaign, which was supported by the urban working class, took on the 
aspect of an attack by the religious aristocracy against a new elite emerging 
thanks to the unprecedented conditions created by the opening up of the 
country. 
If the reforms were a consequence of foreign pressure, they were in turn 
the cause of violent xenophobia. Their net effect on everyday life was 
adverse and the Moroccans naturally associated them with the Europeans' 
daily more pervasive presence. ' T h e reason for price rises and famine is 
cohabitation with the Europeans', said al-Nâsirï.44 Everyone wished to 
reduce contact with the foreigners to an absolute m i n i m u m ; more, the ideal 
became a return to life of earlier times. All classes turned to a romantic 
ideology that beautified the past and resurrected tradition (ihya'al-sunná). 
T o restrict the Europeans' sphere of operations, the sultan dragged out 
every negotiation, which irritated the consuls and aroused cries of obstruction. 
' W e must discuss, discuss and discuss again, only good can c o m e of it', 
Hasan I advised one of his representatives at Tangier.45 T h e clerical orders 
demanded strict application of sharTa in all areas of social life and gave the 
word reform a very special meaning. It was, in the lulama'''s view, not so 
m u c h a matter of changing institutions, which was impossible in any event, 
but of returning to the code of the elders (salaf), those w h o set the Muslims 
their examples of greatness and justice. In opposition to the concept of 
nidhâm, reorganization of their army, bureaucracy and daily life, they set 
up the notion of islah, personal moral and religious renewal. This was the 
41. A . al-Nâsirï, 1954-6, Vol. 9, p. 114. 
42. M . al-Mannunï, 1973, p. 256. 
43. ibid. 
44. A . al-Nasïn, 1954-6, Vol. 9, p. 208. 
45. A . Ibn Zaîdân, 1929-33, Vol. 2, p. 376. 
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movement called salafism (Muslim fundamentalism).46 T h e urban man-in-
the-street thought back with nostalgia to the good old days when food 
and goods were cheap, and w h e n personal needs and the Makhzen's 
requirements were limited. For those w h o appeared to him clearly respon-
sible for the current difficulties, he nourished a mixture of fear, admiration, 
scorn and hatred. T h e people's xenophobia, the <ulamä"s salafism and 
the Makhzen's conservatism were expressions of their experience: the 
decadence of their earlier society when confronted with nineteenth-century 
liberal capitalism. Morocco's political and religious elite was violently anti-
liberal at the time. 'There is no possible doubt whatever that liberty as the 
Europeans understand it is an innovation of atheistic libertines, since it 
denies the rights of G o d , parents, and even h u m a n nature itself'.47 T h e 
positive value of the dialectic by which Moroccan society was being 
modernized, subjected to and at the same time reacting against European 
influences, was not perceived by those involved. T h e y failed to see in it 
promise of a different future; they felt only the submerging of a past that 
time had gilded over - a past w h e n the people were prosperous, the 'ularrw? 
were heeded, the M a k h z e n was obeyed, and the sultan was independent. 
Conclusion 
In 1880 the grave five-year agricultural crisis was coming to an end. T h e 
Makhzen was paying the last instalment of the war reparations to Spain 
and the loan from the British banks. T h e Spanish inspectors, whose 
presence was a continual source of friction and a painful reminder of the 
defeat of i860, were soon to quit Morocco's ports, and the mukus would 
soon be abolished.48 T h e Madrid Conference, the first session of which 
ended on 3 July 1880 with the signature of the international convention 
for the protection of Morocco, seemed to be a relative victory for Britain 
and Morocco. France, which had not completely recovered from the defeat 
of 1870, had not succeeded in imposing its views, in spite of tactical support 
from Germany. 4 9 T h e latter country soon after entered in force on the 
Moroccan scene to oppose British commercial interests and thwart French 
political designs. Morocco's territory was protected against the machi-
nations of the French at Tüwät , the English at Tarfaya and the Spanish 
at Sakiyyat al-Hamrä.50 In short, Hasan I, reigning over what was some-
times called the Caliphate of the West, to distinguish it from the Ottoman 
empire, appeared as a great sultan, both at h o m e and abroad. 
T h e social contradictions born of the intensified contacts with Europe 
46. See A . Merad, 1965. 
47. A . al-Nasïrï, 1954-61 Vol. 9, pp. 114-15. 
48. ibid., p. 147. T o w n dues were abolished in December 1885. The people impatiently 
awaited the removal of the other taxes as well. 
49. J . L . Miège, 1961-3, Vol.3, pp.263-92. 
50. ibid., p. 357; see also A . Ibn Zaidan, 1929-33, Vol. 2, pp. 333-5. 
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were at work, but at the time they seemed controllable. With the patronage 
of a country like Britain - or failing that, Germany - Morocco seemed to 
be on the path to successful regeneration. In any event, that was the 
belief of Moroccans in the twentieth century. Independent of its actual 
achievements, the reign of Hasan I became a new golden age. T h e reforms 
undertaken were considered adequate to give birth to a strong, modern 
and independent Morocco, had there not been the manoeuvres of France 
and Spain. T h e reformism of the Makhzen, the salafism of the <ulama' and 
the anti-Europeanism of the rural population combined to give rise to the 
activist ideology of twentieth-century nationalism. 
There remains the task of objectively evaluating the results of this policy 
of reform. W h a t must be stressed is that it took place entirely within the 
framework bequeathed by M u h a m m a d III, w h o himself had had to cope 
with an abrupt change in the power relationship between Morocco and 
Europe. In fact, a thorough understanding of the circumstances deter-
mining M u h a m m a d Ill's choices must be the foundation for any rational 
judgement of the evolution of Morocco's society in the nineteenth century. 
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European intervention 
in the Maghrib 
N . I V A N O V 
Commercial expansion and the struggle for control over the world's trade 
routes were among the most marked characteristics of European colonialism 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. T h e 'Holy W a r ' at sea, 
which Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania and Morocco had been waging for a 
long time, was a source of grave anxiety to European traders and 
shipowners. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Europe still went 
in fear of the corsairs of the Maghrib. If Neapolitan sailing ships were 
making for the coast and caught sight of a Tunisian or Tripolitanian flag, 
their crews were quick to m a k e their escape. T h e merchants of Marseilles, 
Leghorn and other major European trading ports used to take full advantage 
of such displays of panic to get the better of their competitors, and 
especially 'Tunis-ach-chattra' (Tunisia-the-crafty) which entered the broad 
Mediterranean arena during the Napoleonic Wars . In 1800, Tunisian ships 
arrived in Malta and in 1809 in Leghorn. T h e dey's government in 
Algeria did very profitable business selling wheat. T h e trade and shipping 
conditions laid down by the Maghribian states aroused intense annoyance 
in Europe. Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania levied tribute and obliged 
friendly countries to pay for the free passage of their ships on the basis of 
peace and maritime navigation treaties. M a n y conflicts arose on account of 
delayed payments and other violations of the treaties, so that relations 
between the Maghrib and Europe became increasingly strained.1 
T h e bourgeoisie of the Mediterranean states of Europe supported the 
Maltese and Neapolitan pirates w h o cruelly harried the Muslim merchant 
ships. A s soon as the Napoleonic Wars ended, the European bourgeoisie 
managed to organize massive naval expeditions against the Maghrib. Under 
cover of the struggle against piracy, Britain, France, the Netherlands, 
Austria and the U S A directed their squadrons towards the North African 
coast. American ships were the first to appear off Algiers, in 1815. They 
were followed by an Anglo-Dutch squadron under the c o m m a n d of Lord 
Exmouth and Van Cappellen at the beginning of 1816. After 'sanctions' 
had been imposed on Tripoli and Tunis, the squadron fiercely bombarded 
Algiers (27 August 1816), pouring 34000 shells into the town. In 1819, an 
1. For further details see N . A . Ivanov, 1976, chs 3 and 4. 
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Anglo-French squadron reappeared off the North African coast, thereby 
forcing the regents in Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli to declare an end to 
piracy. In 1825, the British again bombarded Algiers. O n 20 October 1827, 
at the battle of Navarino, the remains of the Tunisian and Algerian fleets 
and Egyptian and Turkish vessels were destroyed by a united Anglo-
French-Russian squadron. In 1829, the Austrians set fire to the Moroccan 
ships which, on Mawläy ' A b d al-Rahmän's orders, tried to revive the Holy 
W a r . T h e Maghribian countries lost the war at sea, which opened wide 
the gates to an intensive commercial expansion of the European states. 
After the destruction of the Maghribian fleet, these states secured the 
monopoly of the flag and, in fact, took over the Tunisian and Tripolitanian 
trade with Europe. 
Morocco and Algeria each tried to defend its o w n position, which led to 
a subsequent deterioration of their relations with the maritime powers. 
T h e refusal on the part of the dey's government to grant special rights and 
privileges to the French merchants, w h o called for the establishment of a 
'capitulation system' in Algeria and, in particular, the dey's refusal to 
recognize that France alone was competent to solve the monetary claims 
between the two countries led to the declaration of a French naval blockade 
of Algeria in 1827. A s for Morocco, its government decided to do without 
the outside world and closed the country to foreigners. In 1822, there were 
only five Moroccan ports open to Europeans where carefully supervised 
trading could be conducted. 
European pressure on traditional society 
T h é growth of European trade in Tunis and Tripoli, its usurious character 
and1 the process of inflation in the economy of those countries were the 
prime cause of their financial difficulties.2 In 1824, the regents in Tunis 
signed the first debtor's bills; those in Tripolitania - the Kâramânlïs -
merely followed their example. Several ministers in those countries fell 
into debt. A n d so it is not surprising that towards the end of the 1820s 
Tunis and Tripoli began to give up all political resistance to Europe. B y 
1827 they were no longer refusing the foreign consuls anything and by 
degrees fell into line with their policy. T h e first one-sided treaties imposed 
on trióse countries reflected the special nature of the relations of Tunis and 
Tripoli with the European powers. Under the Franco-Tunisian Treaty of 
8 August 1830, Tunis confirmed all previous peace, trade and shipping 
treaties; declared France to be the most favoured nation; gave up in advance 
all dues and tributes levied on European countries; accepted the principle 
of free trade, and extended the capitulation rights granted to foreigners. A 
similar treaty was signed between France and Tripolitania on 11 August 
1830. 
2. M . H . Chérif, 1970; E . Rossi, 1968, pp. 282fr. 
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All these treaties strengthened the French position in North Africa 
considerably. Tunisia was quickly turned into a semi-vassal of France, 
whose greatest rival, Britain, was seriously worried and did its best to 
ensure the success of the Turkish expedition to Tripolitania in 1835. In 
M a y of that year, the Turks invaded Tripoli and, after dethroning the 
Kâramânlï dynasty, proclaimed the re-establishment of Ottoman power on 
1 June 1835. In 1835-6, Turkish garrisons were stationed in several coastal 
towns in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. However, the Turks met with serious 
difficulties in their conquest of some of the inland regions. F r o m 1835 to 
1858, the Turks were desperately engaged in crushing rebellions of the 
indigenous population: the latter produced some remarkable leaders; among 
them G h ù m a al-Mahmüdí acquired the greatest renown as an uncom-
promising enemy of the Turks and died sword in hand in March 1858. 
A s the pacification proceeded, the Turks introduced reforms into the 
country, trying to establish administrative and legal organization along 
European lines. T h e governor, ' U t h m a n A m i n Pasha (1842-7), reorganized 
the administration, system of justice, taxation laws, etc. in accordance 
with the principles of the Tanzimät. In 1851, a mixed court of justice 
was established in Tripoli and this at once strengthened the position of 
foreigners. All that, together with reforms that undermined the founda-
tions of traditional society, caused dismay and gave rise to protests among 
the indigenous population, especially the nomadic groups and peasants. 
'Turks and Europeans,' Sïdï M u h a m m a d al-Mahdï, son of the founder of 
the Sanusï order used to say, 'are people tarred with the same brush'.3 
In Tunisia, reforms were begun in 1830 and continued by A h m a d Bey 
(1837-55),an ardent admirer of M u h a m m a d 'AIL T h e regents of Tunis, in 
an attempt to overcome military and technological underdevelopment, 
disbanded the militia composed of janissaries and laid the foundations of 
a regular army and an armaments industry by importing machinery and 
equipment from Europe. 
Following the example of Egypt, government monopolies were estab-
lished, leading to the nationalization of the economy. A State Bank was 
founded (1847) and fiduciary currency was put into circulation. In 1841, 
A h m a d Bey prohibited the sale of slaves and abolished all forms of slavery 
in Tunisia. In 1838, a military college and a polytechnic school were 
established; Tunisians began to study foreign languages, to go abroad for 
their studies and to translate the works of European authors. 
Wishing to flatter the foreign consuls, the authorities in Tunis and 
Tripoli encouraged the activities of the Christian missionaries. T h e Fran-
ciscans opened the first boys' school in Tripoli in 1816, followed by a girls' 
school in 1846. In 1845, A b b é Bourgade founded the Collège Saint-Louis 
and a few primary schools in Tunisia; he also set up an Arab printing press 
in Tunis. In 1826, the first performances of the Leghorn theatre took 
3. E . Rossi, 1968, p . 327. 
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place.4 In 1838, the first Tunisian newspaper appeared in Italian; a number 
of Italian immigrants settled in the country, including some in search of 
political asylum, as, for example, Garibaldi (in 1835 and again in 1849). 
M a n y contacts with Europeans contributed towards the intellectual 
awakening of the country and provided the basis for Westernization a m o n g 
the ruling elite. Influenced by the military uniform, government circles in 
Tunis and Tripoli adopted European dress, manners and way of life. N o 
trace remained of the old anti-European phobia. In 1845-6, the Tunisian 
authorities organized lavish receptions in honour of the D u c de Montpens-
ier and the Prince de Joinville, sons of King Louis-Philippe. In November 
1846, A h m a d Bey paid a visit to France, thereby breaking away from all 
the age-old prejudice. 
In contrast with their rulers, the people in general, w h o bore the full 
burden of building palaces, factories and barracks, were discontented with 
Westernization and the growth of foreign influence. They regarded their 
rulers as turncoats and continued to follow the traditional way of life. T h e 
attitude of the Algerian and Moroccan rulers was the same, as both these 
countries remained unaffected by Western influences which, at the time, 
were spreading throughout most of the Muslim states. 
The conquest of Algeria 
Algeria paid a heavy price for its government's inertia. Husayn D e y , 
having done everything to embitter relations with France, did nothing to 
strengthen the country's defences. In the eyes of Algerian patriots, this 
was tantamount to treason and pointed to the corruption of the regime.5 
Algeria was not in the least prepared for war. T h e enemy had been 
expected for the past three years, but when the French ships were sighted 
on 14 June 1830 in Sldi-Farrud| Bay (Sidi-Ferruch in French accounts), it 
came as a complete surprise. T h e French managed to land an expeditionary 
force consisting of 37 500 m e n led by General de Bourmont. It was not 
until 19 June 1830 that the bulk of Husayn Dey's army (composed of 
janissaries and tnakhzen) under Ibrahim Agha, reinforced by militia from 
Kabylia - a total ÖT 40 000 m e n - attacked the French at Staoueli. This 
battle ended in the complete defeat of Ibrahim Agha, and revealed all the 
shortcomings of the military and technical organization of Husayn Dey's 
army, which had nothing to oppose the French with save the courage of 
its soldiers. A second attempt to stop the enemy's advance (the battle of 
Sïdï Khalef of 24 June) again turned into a defeat for Ibrahim Agha. O n 
29 June the French, having gained possession of the coast of Bouzarea, 
began laying siege to the fort known as Sultan Calassi (le fort de l'Empereur) 
4. S. Pantucek, 1969, p. 47; T . A . Pontintseva, 1977; J. M . Landau, 1958. 
5. Opinions of this sort are particularly apparent in the account by M . al-Kadir, 1903; 
and the most characteristic extracts are given by A . Benachenbour, 1966. 
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that protected Algiers on the landward side. T h e assault was launched on 
4 July. 'It was a cruel fight between military skill and desperation,' wrote 
Colonel Bogdanovitch, 'finally military skill prevailed: the thick walls of 
the castle collapsed; the canons defending it were put out of action; m a n y 
a brave Turk perished under a hail of bullets and b o m b s ; the remnants of 
the garrison fled towards the city; but instead of finding there the safety 
expected, they fell under the bullets of the artillery fired at them from the 
Kasbah on the dey's orders'.6 
O n 5 July 1830, Husayn D e y signed an act of capitulation and sur-
rendered Algiers. H e was allowed — as were all the members of the Dïwân 
and the janissaries — to leave the country with their families and belongings. 
T h e supreme authority passed into the hands of the French military 
c o m m a n d . But the latter was entirely lacking in administrative organization, 
and had no clear idea of what needed to be done. It is curious to note that 
the C o m t e de Bourmont, w h o w o n his Field Marshal's baton for defeating 
the dey's army, ordered his engineers to prepare two projects sim-
ultaneously: the first, to widen and deepen the port of Algiers; the second, 
to fill it up. T h e Polignac Government entered into negotiations with a 
view to placing Algiers directly under Turkish administration.7 After the 
July Revolution (1830), plans for dividing up the country were produced: 
to the French were assigned the city of Algiers and a number of coastal 
centres, while the provinces of Oran and Constantine were brought under 
the beys of Tunis. T h e total number of m e n in the army of occupation 
was reduced to 9300. However, the treaties with Tunisia, signed by General 
Clauzel on 18 December 1830, were not ratified by the French government 
and the French generals continued to act at their o w n risk. After arranging 
for some increase in the military drafts, they occupied Oran (1831), Bône 
(1832) and Bougie (1834). 
T h e waverings of the French government finally ended in a decision in 
favour of the bourgeoisie of Marseilles and the army of occupation which, 
intoxicated by easy victories, had pillaged the country shamelessly and 
refused to give up the 'spoils of victory'. T h e decree of 22 July 1834 
establishing a governor-generalship of French possessions in North Africa 
signified a refusal to evacuate Algiers, and the idea of a 'limited occupation' 
was officially adopted up to 1840. Its interpretation in practice depended 
entirely on the will and personal inclinations of the m a n y French generals 
w h o governed the country from 1830 to 1841. In most cases they were in 
6. M . N . Bogdanovitch, 1849, p.54. 
7. In 1830, after the defeat of the dey's army, the Ottoman empire insisted on the 
maintenance of Algeria's territorial integrity under the sultan's orders and refused to 
recognize the French conquest. However, after losing its army and meeting with financial 
disaster during the war with Russia in 1828-9, Turkey was unable to do anything except 
utter protests. It should be noted that in trying to make contact with the Porte over the 
Algerian question, the French government wished first of all to obtain Russia's consent. 
For materials from the French diplomatic archives, see C . R . Ageron, 1964, p. 9 . . , 
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favour of a system of 'indirect government', and this was instituted by 
signing treaties with the indigenous chiefs (peace, recognition of vassalage, 
freedom to trade, payment of tribute). T o establish liaison with the French 
commanders, 'Arab bureaux' were organized that gradually became the 
principal link in indirect government. Only in the coastal towns, where the 
French garrisons were continually establishing themselves, did a civil 
administrative system begin to take shape; this system was naturally a 
reproduction of the principles and standards of public administration in 
the metropolis. Little by little it acquired legal status.In 1845, t n e whole 
of Algeria was divided up into 'Arab territory' in which the shaft1 a (Islamic 
legal system) and the system of indirect government prevailed, and 'civil 
territory' in which the French system of justice and administration was 
officially recognized. In particular, under a statute of 28 September 1847, 
'civil territory' was m a d e subject to the law of 1837 on c o m m u n e s . 
T h e resistance in Algeria 
T h e occupation of the coastal areas left the social structures of Algerian 
society unchanged. T h e traditional chiefs, w h o were very often the rep-
resentatives of the old ruling class, retained, as before, control over the 
local authorities. Husayn Dey's capitulation and the confusion into which 
the old form of administration had fallen created a political vacuum. A 
'period of anarchy' (1830-4) set in when various local centres and c o m -
munities no longer recognized any authority. Except for certain classes of 
the well-to-do urban population and a few politically minded chiefs, the 
country looked with hatred on the French occupation. T h e bulk of the 
population, and particularly the peasants and nomads , were determined to 
defend their personality and independence. However, the absence of any 
centralized authority or c o m m o n centre m a d e it inevitable that this struggle 
should be at the local level and that passive forms of resistance that 
were not well co-ordinated should very often predominate. T o start with, 
resistance took the form of a refusal to recognize the occupation, faithfulness 
to Islam, the blockading of occupied towns and regions and attacks on 
French detachments and fortified posts, the assassination of certain Euro-
peans, and s u m m a r y justice meted out to traitors and renegades, often 
turning into a large-scale massacre. 
A s the struggle proceeded, two main centres of resistance were formed, 
one in the east, the other in the west. In the east, A h m a d D e y , the former 
governor of Constantine, assumed leadership. H e relied upon what was 
left of the janissaries and on the makhzen communities in eastern Algeria; 
he modelled his policy on that of thT Porte and attempted to restore the 
dey system. Claiming to be the successor of Husayn D e y , he checked the 
decay of the administration, consolidated the machinery of state and 
reinforced the army. In the early days, he represented the main threat to 
the French. 
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In the west of the country, 'Abd al-Kädir, son of a marabout of Shärifian 
origin, headed the revolt, relying politically upon Moroccan support. In 
his proclamations he promised to put an end to anarchy, to uphold the 
sharTa and to lead a Holy W a r against the French. In October 1831, he 
was proclaimed amir and installed in the residence of the beys at Mascara. 
O n 27 November 1832, the Assembly oî<ulama> and representatives of the 
Beduin groups in western Algeria recognized him as governor. Through 
his energy, determination and courage and his successes in the armed 
struggle against the French, especially the victory w o n at Macta on 26 June 
1835, ' A b d al-Kädir consolidated his authority. O n two occasions, under 
the Desmichels Treaty (27 February 1834) and that of Tafna (30 M a y 
1837), the French recognized him as sole governor of the whole of central 
and western Algeria with the exception of the coastal enclaves. As a 
convinced upholder of Islam, a fervent admirer of M u h a m m a d 'All, and as 
a poet and thinker, ' A b d al-Kädir aspired not only to regenerate Algeria 
but also to reform it. In the bitter struggle against the beys of Oran and 
Titeri (former janissaries), kologlus and the makhzen communities serving 
under them, and against the partisans of A h m a d Bey and the Tijäniyya 
brotherhood whose stronghold was Ksär Ain-Mahdï (captured in 1838), 
'Abd al-Kädir created a unified and centralized state of Arab sharlfs, which 
encompassed two-thirds of contemporary Algerian territory. Here he put 
an end to anarchy and disorder and set up a well-co-ordinated legal and 
administrative system on the basis of local rule by caliphs, aghas and kä'ids, 
which ensured a rigid discipline. In 1838, he undertook the formation of 
a regular army which, two years later, numbered 10 000 m e n . Following 
M u h a m m a d 'Alfs example, he introduced a state-administered economy, 
established a system of monopolies, founded arms factories and built 
fortresses for defending the country against subversive elements and the 
foreign enemy. 8 
T o begin with, the Algerians met with success by taking skilful advantage 
of the wavering policy in Paris and the inability of the French generals to 
counter guerrilla tactics effectively. U p to 1837, they warded offall attempts 
by the French to penetrate into the beleaguered towns. S o m e setbacks met 
with in the west (the evacuation of Mascara, the loss of Tlemcen, defeat 
on the banks of the Sikkak in July 1836) were offset by the resounding 
victory of 23—24 November 1836 at Constantine, where the troops of 
A h m a d Bey and the defenders of the town led by Ben Aissa utterly defeated 
Marshal Clauzel's corps of 7400 m e n . However, this victory was rendered 
practically useless owing to the dispersed character of the resistance. After 
concluding the Treaty of Tafna, the French had a free hand in the west 
and, after careful preparations, they undertook a decisive campaign against 
A h m a d Bey in 1837. O n 13 October 1837, they seized Constantine, which 
8. See A . Benachenbour, 1966, p. 69fr, for a detailed analysis of state political and 
military structures under ' A b d al-Kädir. 
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PLATE 1 9 . i 'Abdal-Kädir
meant the collapse of the rampart shielding organized resistance in the
east. Ahmad Bey fled to the mountains, whence he harried the French and
the puppet government set up in the east until 1843.
With the fall of Constantine, the main part of the struggle centred in
the west. In answer to the provocative march-past of French troops at the
'Iron Gates' (Bibäns), 'Abd al-Kädir declared a dfihad and ransacked the
immediate neighbourhood of Algiers. However, he was forced to swing to
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the defensive after his defeat at Wâdï al-Alleug on 31 December 1839. In
1 840-1, he relinquished Mascara, Saida, Mëdëa, Taza, Boghar, Bü-Saäda,
and finally Takdempt, and in 1842 set up a nomad capital known as his
smala. His rout by the troops of the Due d'Aumale on 15 May 1843 led to
the disintegration of the whole administrative and military system which
he had set up. He withdrew to Morocco with a group of followers. Flattering
promises, gold offered by French agents, the part played by certain religious
leaders in disseminating the fatwa of the 'ulamâ' in Kayrawân and Cairo
condemning the 'absurd resistance' and the unnecessary cruelty displayed
by the amir himself- all these separate factors were not, however, ultimately
responsible for 'Abd-al-Kädir's defeat: supreme importance must be
ascribed to the 'scorched earth' tactics employed by Marshal Bugeaud,
who ordered the fields to be burnt, the flocks and herds driven off, and the
grain silos and water points seized.
'Abd al-Kâdir's attempts to rekindle the struggle from his base in
Morocco led to the Franco-Moroccan war. The Moroccan catastrophe at
the battle of Isly of 14 August 1844 and the bombardment of Tangier and
Mogador by the French fleet led Mawläy 'Abd al-Rahmän to abandon his
support of 'Abd al-Kâdir and to make peace with France. The sultan
denounced 'Abd al-Kâdir as a 'kâfir' and even started hostilities against him.
In 1845, the Taibiyya brotherhood announced the arrival of the Mahdï
Muhammad ben 'Abdallah, widely known by his nickname of Bü Maza
(the man with the goat), and proclaimed the djihad. Very quickly the
revolt spread to the Dahra, then to the Ouarsenis and the Cheliff valley.
Simultaneously, small mobile detachments of 'Abd al-Kâdir's forces
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appeared in the steppes, fighting side by side with their erstwhile enemies,
the Dergawa marabouts, against the French. The crushing of this poorly
organized and isolated rebellion was marked by exceptional displays
of cruelty. There was, for example, the case of Colonel Pélissier, who
caused hundreds of Algerians who had found shelter in caves in the moun¬
tains to be suffocated with smoke. It was not until 1847 that Bü Maza
and later on 'Abd al-Kâdir laid down their arms and surrendered to the
victors.
In 1848-9, the last pockets of resistance were wiped out in the Aurès
and in the Mzâb, where Ahmad Bey and the marabout Bü Ziyan were
leading the struggle. In 1852, after heavy fighting, the French occupied
Laghwât and in 1854 Tuggurt. In 1856, a delegation of Saharan Tuareg
came to Algiers and proclaimed their loyalty to France, promising Tuareg
support as far south as Timbuktu. In the northern part of the country, the
hillmen of Kabylia were the last to submit. In the years following 1851,
under the leadership of Bü Baghla, they obstinately opposed French
ambitions to penetrate into the mountains of Greater and Lesser Kabylia.
It was not until 1857, after a desperate struggle against the troops of
General Randon, that they ceased to resist. The entire country passed
under the control of the French military command and became a con¬
glomeration of French communes and vassal territories under the pro¬
tection of the 'Arab bureaux'.
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Colonization and financial servitude
The threat of a general uprising prevented the French government from
colonizing the inland regions of Algeria. Bugeaud's experiments in col¬
onization, together with the expansion of immigration under the Second
Republic (1848-51) and the Ministry for Algeria in Paris (1858-60), met
with the uncompromising resistance of the army, which was responsible
for the country's security. The policy of assimilation on the part of the
Republicans who, in 1848, proclaimed Algeria to be an integral part of
France and divided up the country's 'civil territory' into departments,
'arrondissements' and communes with French administrators in charge,
was halted under the Second Empire. Furthermore, in 1852, Napoleon III
abrogated the representation of Europeans in Algeria in the French par¬
liament and in i860, after his visit to Algeria, condemned for good the policy
ofassimilation. The 'romantic' attitude of the army officers triumphed over
the 'mercantile' attitude ofthe colonists. Instead ofsiding with the colonists,
Napoleon III decided to ally himself with the traditional chiefs (the 'feudal
lords') and declared Algeria to be an 'Arab kingdom'. The 'civil territory'
was strictly limited (10 160 sq km in 1866 or 2.5 per cent of the total
territory of northern Algeria, containing 8 per cent of the Muslim popu¬
lation). Beyond these limits, all power remained in the hands of the military
and the traditional Muslim administrative authorities, acting under the
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supervision of the 'Arab bureaux'. It was Napoleon Ill's idea that European 
emigrants should only settle in the town and practise trade and technical 
occupations. Under a Senate decree of 1863, the land was reserved for 
the Algerian communities, w h o held it in accordance with traditional 
principles.9 It was only what was held to be 'surplus' land that passed to 
the state and could be granted to concessionaire companies or individuals. 
In industry and trade, unrestricted private enterprise was the rule. T h e 
monopolies current in the time of the deys and ' A b d al-Kädir were c o m -
pletely abolished. In modernizing the administrative and legal structure 
inherited from c A b d al-Kädir, the authorities reorganized the Muslim 
system of justice (1854); this reform was backed by the setting up of mixed 
Franco-Muslim courts and of the Muslim high council of justice. T h e 
champions of the 'Arab kingdom' took an interest in Muslim religious 
observances, encouraged the building of mosques, the pilgrimage to Mecca, 
and so on. Under the Senate decree of 1865, Algerians had the right to 
join the French army and the administration. Lastly, in 1869, a draft 
constitution for Algeria was prepared,10 providing for the country's auton-
o m y and Muslim representatives in all elected assemblies. 
T h e administrative, legal and economic reforms carried out in Tunisia 
and Tripolitania in the mid-nineteenth century were similar in content. In 
Tunisia, the liberal group led by Khâyr al-Dïn Pasha (1826-89), supported 
by the powers, succeeded in producing, on 9 September 1857, the 'Ahd al-
Atnan (Fundamental Pact) — a reform manifesto reproducing the main 
principles of the Tanzimât. A s a result of this, the monopolies were 
abolished and private enterprise was established (October 1851) and the 
municipality was reorganized (i860). O n 23 April 1861, the Constitution 
was promulgated; it made ministers responsible to a representative 
assembly, the Supreme Council. In Tripolitania, in 1865, under the 
governorship of M a h m u d N e d i m Pasha, a new administrative reform was 
introduced and commercial, civil and~criminal courts were established. 
9. Fierce discussions have raged around the characteristics of traditional social struc-
tures in pre-capitalist Algerian society. That a m o n g Soviet historians on the nature of pre-
capitalist societies in Asia and Africa received an unexpected follow-up during discussions 
concerning the form of Asian production in 1962, in Paris, under the auspices of the Centre 
for Marxist Studies and Research. A n article by A . Djeghloul (1975, 1976) has become one 
of the recent echoes ofthat discussion. During the international symposia held at Kichinev 
(1973) and Bucharest (1974), a more insightful conception, to m y mind, of 'oriental 
feudalism' was put forward. Basing himself on the 'social pluristructuration' theory, R . G . 
Landa, 1976, pp. 49-55, 109-20, proposed his o w n solution to the problem. T h e work by 
M . M . Kovalevskii, edited by F . B . Miller, 1879, has lost none of its importance for the 
study of communal society in Kabylia. A n analysis of the various forms of farming contract 
can be found in the work of L . Milliot, 1911. O n e of the latest general works, which takes 
stock of the various contributions on the subject based on French sources, is that of J. 
Ruedy, 1967. 
10. See C R . Ageron, 1964, p p . 3 2 - 8 and 1972, pp.6off for a criticism of certain 
traditional tenets appearing in French historiography. 
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Through these reforms, the necessary conditions for the development 
of private enterprise in Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania were created, and 
the abolition of customs barriers between Algeria and France (1851) opened 
the markets of these countries to foreign goods. It was all plain sailing for 
big capital, banks, concessionaires and real-estate companies. In Algeria, 
the Banque de l'Algérie was opened in 1851, followed by the Société 
coloniale de crédit agricole (1863) and other banks. In Tunisia, the first 
attempts by the British to found the Bank of Tunisia (1853) were countered 
by the French, and it was not until 1873 that the British succeeded in 
opening the L o n d o n Bank of Tunisia. T h e Société franco-tunisienne de 
crédit was started with French capital (1879). In Tripolitania, the first 
banks made their appearance in 1880. Banks, concession-holders and 
companies were closely linked together. In Algeria, the authorities accorded 
them special advantages, notably in the case of the giant Compagnie 
genevoise (1853, 20000 ha), the 'Société générale algérienne' (1864, 
100 000 ha) and m a n y others. In Tunisia, the British were the first to obtain 
a concession (Djedeida, 7000 ha) in 1856. They were followed by the 
French (Sïdï Täbet Estates, in 1886) and the Italians (Società anónima 
commerciale, industríale ed agrícola per la Tunisia, in 1870). These began 
by mining lead, exporting esparto grass and experimenting with growing 
such crops as cotton, tobacco and potatoes. In 1857, in Algeria and in 1859 
in Tunisia, the building of railways was started. T h e foreign companies 
modernized the ports, set up telegraph lines, built roads and breakwaters, 
and under them town planning, particularly along the coast, was begun. 
T h e setting up of an economic infrastructure, which facilitated the 
'development' of North Africa by foreign capital, was reinforced by a sort 
of 'cultural' infrastructure connected with the study of natural resources 
and the training of Europeanized personnel. In Algeria, the first Franco-
Arab secondary school was opened in 1857, followed by a teacher training 
school in 1865. In Tunisia, in addition to the Saint-Louis secondary 
school the 'Sadikiya' national secondary school was established in 1875; the 
curricula of the 'Zitouna1 were updated. At Tripoli, the first day school in 
which foreign languages were taught was opened in 1858. A n Arab press 
m a d e its appearance, such as the government papers al-Moubachir in 
Algeria (1847), Ar-Raid at-Tunisi in Tunisia (i860) and Taraboulous al-
Gharb at Tripoli ( 1866). " 
Whereas in Algeria the development of the country by foreign capital 
was begun after the occupation, in Tunisia and Tripolitania it preceded 
the conquest. T h e colonial subjection of these countries went hand in hand 
with the compliance and even complicity of the indigenous chiefs; their 
modernization, which weighed heavily on their budgets, was largely carried 
out through foreign loans. T h e y were m a d e to accept extremely harsh 
11. For the first newspaper in Arabic in North Africa, see F.di Tarazi, 1913 and C . 
Sourian-Hoeberechts, 1969. 
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terms and were systematically robbed by the local officials and European 
contractors. Moreover, these loans led to an extravagant increase in foreign 
debts. W h e n , in 1869, Tunisia's foreign debt rose to twelve times the 
amount of its national revenue, the government declared itself bankrupt 
and approved the setting up of an international financial commission, which 
took over control of the state finances. Although the country retained the 
trappings of independence, it was, in fact, turned into a semi-colony of the 
Euopean powers. 
Morocco, which managed to resist foreign pressure longer than the other 
North African countries, finally submitted to the same fate. T h e Anglo-
Moroccan treaty of 1856 'opened' the country to foreign capital. T h e 
Hispano-Moroccan W a r 1 2 of 1859-60 ended with the onerous Treaty of 
Tetuän (26 April i860) by which Spain enlarged her enclaves, obtained a 
huge indemnity and, most important of all, managed to extend the capitu-
lation rights and privileges of her nationals. Similar treaties paving the way 
for the country's colonial subjection were concluded with France (on 19 
August 1863) and other European states. 
T h e 'discovery' of Tunisia, Tripolitania and Morocco, and the conquest 
of Algeria, were accompanied by the settlement in those countries of a 
large number of foreigners (Europeans and Levantines), w h o acted as the 
agents of big capital. T h e y represented foreign firms, went in for trade (not 
being averse to indulging in contraband, usury and various kinds of corrupt 
practices), and bought houses, gardens and real estate. B y 1856 they enjoyed 
extraterritorial rights in Tunisia, at Tripoli and in Morocco and were 
subject only to the consuls of their respective countries.13 
T h e European colonists in Algeria were in a still more privileged position. 
Throughout the civil territory, they had their o w n administrative and legal 
system and formed a closed society hostile to the indigenous population. 
B y 1856 the birth rate exceeded the death rate. 'These signs,' writes 
C . R . Ageron, 'made it clear that a colony of settlers had been founded'.14 
T h e intrigues of the immigrants kept pace with the increase in their 
numbers: they decided they must put an end to the 'military regime', 
'retrieve' the land that had been 'relinquished' by the Senate decree of 
1863, establish the system of private ownership of land everywhere and 
generalize the civil administration system. 
12. E . Szymanski, 1965, pp. 54-64. For the distressing financial consequences of the 
war see G . Ayache, 1958. 
13. A n excellent selection of materials concerning the privileges of Europeans in Morocco 
is found in J. L . Miège, 1961-3, Vols. 1-4. 
14. C . R . Ageron, 1964, p. 28. 
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T h e reaction of traditional society 
T h e ambitions of the colonists and omnipotence of the foreign tycoons, 
the very fact of the immigrants' increasing penetration in every sphere of 
national life aggravated the indigenous population of North Africa. Lib-
erals15 like Khäyr al-DTn, Husayn, K a b a d u , and M u h a m m a d Bayram in 
Tunisia ancHKoussantini in Algeria, w h o suffered at the sight of their 
countries' misfortunes and at the same time understood the need for 
reforms, were alone and cut off from the people. Napoleon Ill's 'civilizing 
policy' in Algeria, and the reforms in Tunisia and Tripolitania, met with 
incomprehension from the majority of the population, if not open hostility. 
It interpreted them as yet another stage in colonial subjection, like having 
to renounce the sharTa and Muslim personal identity. These reforms 
aroused particular animosity among the marabouts and the rural population. 
T h e peasants and nomads regarded the Europeanized Muslims as turncoats 
and refused to place any confidence in them. T h e folklore poetry15 shows 
that the c o m m o n run of Muslims were heartbroken at the collapse of the 
patriarchal past, felt themselves to be strangers in the 'century of dishon-
our', 'without faith or law', and turned away from those w h o , according to 
the poet M o h a n d - o u - M h a n d (1845-1906), had once been lions and were 
n o w under the yoke. 
At the beginning of the 1860s, the bitter struggle against the foreigner 
was widely supported among the people in nearly every Muslim country. 
Active propaganda for a pan-Muslim djihad was started. It was precisely 
at this time that the power of the Sanüsiyya brotherhood, which revered 
the assassination of Europeans as an act of the highest devotion, began to 
be felt. It is not surprising that under these circumstances all difficulties 
and even chance incidents were used as pretexts for displays of mass action. 
T h e relatively limited rebellions in the Aurès (1859) and the H o d n a (i860) 
and the disturbances in Tunis (1862) were the forerunners of the major 
national uprisings of the 1860s and early 1870s. They spread quickly 
and confusedly like some uncontrolled outburst of the people's wrath. 
Barbarous looting, assassinations, the seemingly absurd destruction of 
telegraph poles, post offices and of anything European testified to the 
tremendous force of the hidden desire for vengeance. As a rule these 
insurrections were not strictly organized. There were sometimes nominal 
leaders w h o were not in complete control of the situation. It was only the 
participation of the religious brotherhoods that united them in a Holy W a r 
for the triumph of the Faith. 
T h e first rebellion of this kind broke out in Tunisia; it started in M a r c h 
15. A . Hourani, 1962, gives the characteristics and peculiarities of Arab liberal thought 
in the nineteenth century. 
16. For interesting material reflecting the struggle of the Algerian people in their poetry, 
see A . M e m m i , 1963. 
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1864 and spread throughout the country. Its leader was 'All ben G u e d a h e m 
(the 'People's Bey') and it was ideologically motivated by the Tijäniyya 
brotherhood. It was only the isolation of rebels, w h o , according to J. 
Ganiage, 'could not make up their minds to win'17 that enabled the bey's 
government to save the capital, destroy the 'shartiyas? (communes, elected 
rebellious bodies dealing with local affairs), and in April 1865 to stamp out 
the last pockets of resistance. 
T h e rebellion of the Ouled Sïdl Shaykh, linked with the religious 
Dergawa brotherhood, was of a similar nature. It broke out in April 1864, 
spread over vast areas of the High Plateaux and towards autumn reached 
the region of Oran, the Dahra and other localities in western Algeria. Only 
after bringing reinforcements from overseas were the French able, in 1865, 
to crush the detachments of rebels led by the legendary Si Sliman. 
T h e promulgation of the civil regime of 9 March 1870 and the fall of 
the Second Empire were the signal for the most widespread rebellion in 
eastern Algeria. In the autumn of 1870 the first 'shartiyas' were organized, 
but it was not until January 1871 that the initial battles took place. T h e 
rebellion spread to most of the region of Constantine, Greater Kabylia and 
a few places in the west. O n 8 April 1871 Shaykh al-Haddäd, chief of the 
Rahmäniyya brotherhood, declared the djpiad. T h e bachagha Al-Makrani 
became the military leader of the revolt and, after his death, his brother 
Bü-Mezrag took his place. It was not until January 1872 that the French 
seized the rebel's bases and became masters of the situation. 
T h e stamping out of these insurrections was accompanied by wholesale 
repression, followed by fines, confiscations of land and disarmament of the 
communities. T h e European colonists, far from making c o m m o n cause 
with the insurgents, in m a n y cases took part in the armed struggle against 
the Muslims. It should be noted that the immigrants, w h o were fighting 
for democratic and socialist revolutionary ideals - which they did in brilliant 
fashion during the Algiers C o m m u n e of 1870-1 - were at the same time 
opposed to the national aspirations of the North African Muslims. 
Towards an imperialist policy 
T h e crushing of the uprisings of the 1860s and early 1870s opened the way 
to an unrestricted colonization of North Africa. Moreover, the changes 
taking place in Europe, and in particular the dominant role played by 
capitalist enterprise, fostered colonial expansion. By degrees it took on the 
character of a purely imperialistic struggle for dividing up the world, and 
for the monopoly of sources of raw materials and other natural resources. 
T h e 'golden age' of colonization started in Algeria.18 O n 24 October 
1870, the military governor-general was replaced by a 'civil governor of 
17. J. Ganiage, 1959, p. 251. 
18. See C . R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1. 
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the three departments of Algeria'. Within a few years the European colonists 
had turned into a privileged dominant social class of 'citizens' - a 'white 
minority' - enjoying all civil and political rights. T h e indigenous popu-
lation, referred to as 'subjects', was deprived of rights and governed by rules 
based on the so-called 'native code' (decrees of 1874), instituting the 'regime 
for the native population', which lasted until 1936. N e w landed property 
laws (the Ollivier decree of 1870 and, more particularly, the statute of 
26 July 1873) established the principle of private property and the free 
transfer of land to the colonists. French capital investment increased con-
siderably and trade and other economic ties with the metropolis expanded. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century a similar situation obtained 
in Tunisia. T h e destinies of the country were decided at the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878 where, after considerable diplomatic skirmishing, Bismarck 
'returned' it to France.19 Attempts by Khâyr al-Dïn, the prime minister 
(1873-7), t o 'cover' Tunisia's independence with the fiction of Ottoman 
sovereignty were unsuccessful. O n 24 April 1881 French troops crossed 
the frontier; on 12 M a y , under threat of deposition, the bey was forced to 
sign the Treaty of Bardo, and on 8 June 1883, after all resistance had been 
crushed, he also signed the Convention of Al-Marsa which provided the 
legal basis of the colonial regime for the Protectorate. 
Tripolitania and Morocco succeeded in postponing a European occu-
pation. T h e chief claimant as regards Tripoli was Italy, which had been 
watching the struggle for Tunisia anxiously in the years preceding 1881, 
but it was only at the beginning of the 1880s that it began pressing its 
claims.20 In 1884-5, t n e Italian High C o m m a n d prepared plans for war. 
However, owing to a lack of agreement among the imperialist powers, their 
execution had to be postponed.21 For the same reason, Morocco was 
able to avoid foreign occupation until the end of the nineteenth century. 
However, its attempts to curtail the privileges and high-handedness of 
foreigners suffered a setback. At a conference of the European powers and 
the U S A , held in Madrid in 1880, Moroccan sovereignty was once again 
subjected to restrictions and it was announced that no changes could be 
made in the administration of the country without the prior consent of the 
powers that attended the conference. 
In the Muslim world, the carving up and occupation of the greater part 
of North Africa were regarded as a fresh outrage against Islam. T h e struggle 
of the North African fighters for the Faith met with support (in most cases 
19. See J. Ganiage, 1959, pp. 701-58 for various aspects of the Great Powers' struggle 
for Tunisia. 
20. E . de Leone, i960, pp. 301fr. T h e general atmosphere of Italian activity is described 
in the notes of the Russian traveller, A . V . Elisseev, w h o visited Tripolitania in 1894. See 
A . V . Elisseev, 1896, p. 79. 
21. For the main features of the diplomatic struggle that preceded the conquest of Libya, 
see V . L . Loutskii, 1965, pp. 269-^72 and the English translation, V . Lutsky, 1969. 
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moral support only) in Istanbul and in other countries of the East.22 Relying 
on this support, new attempts were m a d e in Algeria and Tunisia to arrest 
colonization by force of arms: these were the uprisings led by B ü A m ä m a 
in Algeria, in 1881, and by 'AIT bin Khalifa in Tunisia in 1881-3. Despite 
the tenacity and heroism displayed b~y~the rebels, these uprisings failed to 
attain their objective. In point of fact, they had already become rearguard 
actions, the last-ditch attempts of a traditional society to defend the avenues 
of its idiosyncratic development on the basis of ancient moral and social 
structures, already undermined during the foreign conquest and the 
development of colonial capitalism. 
22. For data on this question, see A . Martel, 1965, pp. 228ÍF. For the relations between 
the Porte and the Sanüsiyya, see N . A . Ziadeh, 1958, pp. 6iff. A n d for the attempts by ' A b d 
al-Hamïd II to co-ordinate and direct the anti-foreigner demonstrations in the Arab 
countries, especially in Egypt, see H . Adali, 1968, pp. 54fr. 
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T h e Sahara in the 
nineteenth century 
S. BAIER 
T h e reconstruction of Saharan history should take account of events at two 
levels, first the ebb and flow in the lives of Saharan nomads and inhabitants 
of oases — seasonal migration to and from pasture, the formation of n e w 
alliances and the break-up of others, the rise and fall of leaders, the story 
of raid and counter-raid, the epics of gallant warriors and noblewomen, 
and the life and times of merchants, holy m e n , and scholars.1 Superimposed 
upon these local histories is the second level, with its larger patterns of 
historical change. In the nineteenth century the Sahara, remote though it 
was, came into increasingly close contact with the world economy. B y the 
close of the century European economic penetration had affected the lives 
of m a n y people, and the European conquest of the desert, though far from 
complete, had produced fundamental change in the nature of relationships 
between the Sahara and the outside world. 
T h e paucity of data for history at either level presents both problems 
and challenges and points to the need for research in Ottoman, French, 
Italian, Egyptian, and Moroccan archives and in private collections. By 
the nineteenth century European interest in the desert increased because 
European powers viewed it as a commercial avenue to the Sudan, and 
European sources provide data that give some notion of historical processes. 
All written accounts, whether in European languages, Turkish, or Arabic, 
need to be filled out with oral histories, which have been collected only in 
a piecemeal fashion. For example, the Tuareg of the central Sahara have 
been well researched, but for other groups very little historical material 
exists. In some Saharan societies the lack of depth in genealogies and 
the absence of local Arabic historical writings present the historian with 
problems that m a y never be solved. 
This chapter will survey the history of the Sahara in the nineteenth 
century by focusing on the camel nomads, the inhabitants of the desert 
w h o lived from their herds. In good times wealth in camels conferred 
awesome military power on their owners by giving them the ability to 
mount lightning raids on oasis dwellers and sedentary agriculturalists, and 
i. T h e author would like to thank Charles Stewart for reading a draft of this chapter 
and making a number of helpful suggestions for revision. 
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then to escape into the wilderness with impunity. This military advantage 
allowed them to raid for slaves, as they often did along the southern shore 
of the desert, the Sahel; or to dominate sedentary agriculturalists living in 
oases or in the Sahel by demanding tribute in return for protection. 
Although nomads could enslave, destroy date palms or standing crops, 
steal grain stores, and disrupt trade, more often their goal was to control 
and appropriate the production of agriculturalists, not to annihilate them. 
T h e nomads are therefore the proper focus for m u c h social and economic 
history, as well as key actors in political, military, and religious change. 
Society and environment 
Pastoral nomadism is of course a complete and perfect adaptation to the arid 
environment of the desert. But within the deceptively simple framework 
implied by the word desert, as defined by low rainfall, there exists a rich 
variety of climate and landform that has shaped the societies of the Sahara. 
At the risk of simplification it m a y be said that the desert is subject to 
two rainfall regimes, with the southern desert receiving precipitation in the 
s u m m e r and the northern desert in the winter, and some overlap of the 
two along the Atlantic coast. Little rain falls, and even that is extremely 
unevenly distributed in time and space, so that in the most arid parts of 
the desert some locations m a y not have had rain for ten years or more. T h e 
desert is driest in the central portions and especially in the eastern central 
desert, in present-day Egypt and eastern Libya. Three 'bridges' of higher 
than average rainfall traverse the central, dry portions of the desert from 
north to south, the first joining Senegal to Morocco slightly inland from 
the drier Atlantic coast, the second connecting the Niger bend to Algeria, 
and the third following the high ground bordering on the R e d Sea. Not 
surprisingly, population is concentrated in relatively well-watered portions 
of the desert, and caravaneers have usually avoided the most arid regions 
of Egypt and Libya. Precipitation increases with altitude up to a certain 
height, and the landform of the Sahara has as m a n y nuances as does its 
climate. After rains, formerly dry river beds or wädts m a y flow for hundreds 
of kilometres, and for great distances just under the surface of the sand. 
In some cases irrigated agriculture is possible because of the high water 
table. In areas of dunes called ergs the sand itself holds great quantities of 
moisture; dunes absorb almost all rainfall and give off very little water to 
underground aquifers. In addition, the sand loses moisture to the atmos-
phere very slowly, since drifting exposes only the windward surface of the 
dunes.2 
Herders and their animals can live in the desert only if they m o v e from 
place to place to take advantage of scattered and short-lived pasture. But 
in the desert fringes a variety of h u m a n adaptations to the environment 
2. J. Dubief, 1973, pp. 125-30. 
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are possible, including various degrees of dependence on agriculture and 
various mixes of animals in the herds. In the Sahel, cattle nomads lived in 
symbiotic relationships with sedentary agriculturalists, and some camel 
nomads divided the labour of their families between herding and farming. 
Others sacrificed crop yields to the needs of the herds by sowing crops, 
leaving with the herds to search for pasture, and returning to harvest the 
meagre returns of the fields. In the central, dry parts of the desert, nomadic 
pastoralists kept several kinds of animals, but they relied heavily on the 
camel because of its adaptation to aridity. Camels needed various kinds of 
pasture to do well and therefore had to be taken periodically from ergs to 
rocky ground (regs). This necessity, as well as the search for pasture, 
determined the amplitude of movements of camel nomads . 3 Those whose 
territory included adjacent areas of rocky and sandy ground, such as the 
C h a a m b a , migrated shorter distances than those without both kinds of 
terrain, such as the Regibat, despite other similarities in their respective 
territories. 
T h e arid environment has encouraged the evolution of similar uncen-
tralized political systems a m o n g most nomadic people, systems that balance 
the need for dispersal in the search for pasture with the necessity of unified 
action in the face of an outside threat. These societies, which have been 
described in the anthropological literature as segmentary lineage systems, 
place each person in a series of widening and overlapping descent groups 
that are larger the more distant an ancestor is chosen as a point of reference.4 
Genealogy can be used to divide a society into x n u m b e r of maximal 
segments, each of which is in turn divided into y number of segments and 
z number of clans, on d o w n through intermediate levels to the extended 
family. Societies organized according to descent m a y resolve internal con-
flict without recourse to central authority if the power of segments at an 
appropriate level in the genealogical structure is in balance, and the history 
of these societies often exhibits this mechanism in operation. But history 
also demonstrates that segments m a y unite to face an outside threat, and 
that military exigency m a y even give rise to something resembling central 
authority. Sedentary or semi-sedentary people have often assimilated non-
kin w h o migrated to their territory, and in these societies residence in the 
same territory m a y replace kinship as a principle of association. Even 
societies that are organized according to descent m a y have leaders or 
councils at various levels in the segmentary structure or distributed 
throughout it; wealthy m e n m a y attract followers w h o are not kin; or 
alliances m a y contradict or partially offset the notion of kinship as a 
determinant of allegiance. 
Another similarity a m o n g Saharan people was hierarchical social struc-
3. A . Cauneille, 1968, pp. 108-9. 
4. D . M . Hart, 1967; E . Gellner, 1973, pp. 18-19; 1969, pp. 35—69; E . E . Evans-Pritchard, 
1949, pp. 29-61. 
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ture, a consequence of the power of warriors to concentrate wealth so as 
to reinforce their o w n position of dominance. A c o m m o n pattern was that 
lineages of aristocratic warriors controlled groups of free but politically 
subordinate people, the descendants of conquered nomads. People of lower 
status, slaves or the descendants of slaves, worked as servants, herders, 
artisans, trade specialists, or farmers. 
Changing relations with the outside world 
Desert nomads lived in a world of their o w n , but they were not i m m u n e 
from influences from the outside. For one thing they were so specialized 
in animal husbandry that to obtain grain and other items they depended 
not only on plunder and tribute, but also on peaceful trade with sedentary 
states. Another factor was that their military advantage of mobility did not 
extend far beyond the desert fringe. M o r e fertile regions supported larger 
populations, and these thickly settled areas could muster enough defenders 
to offset the advantage that the less numerous nomads enjoyed in their o w n 
realm. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the style of interaction 
between nomads and sedentary states differed greatly at the northern and 
southern edges of the desert. In West and Central Africa a principal 
for sedentary rulers was to keep the nomads at a safe distance, a problem 
mitigated somewhat in North Africa by geographical barriers such as the 
Atlas and other mountain ranges. South of the desert the best strategy was 
to involve nomads in the economy of the fertile areas by giving them a 
stake in desert-edge commerce, urban growth, and agriculture, and by 
using nomadic contingents in armies fighting other sedentary states. It was 
also prudent, as in China, to use one group of nomads as 'hired guns' to 
keep others at bay. T h e same principles applied north of the desert, but 
in the nineteenth century the Ottoman regencies and the sultanate of 
Morocco showed considerable skill in maintaining balances of power a m o n g 
nomads and sparing themselves direct confrontations.5 A principal differ-
ence was their wealth relative to sub-Saharan states, which facilitated ruling 
through favoured groups and allowed North African rulers to support 
small but well-armed forces which might intervene from time to time in 
the affairs of nomads. In addition, Maghribi authorities enjoyed prestige 
as the spiritual as well as temporal rulers of Musl im states, or their 
representatives, a status that enabled skilful or revered sultans or governors 
to use diplomacy to maximize the effect of their small armed contingents. 
T h e advance of the Ottomans in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and the 
French in Algeria marked a turning point in relationships between Saharan 
societies and outsiders. T h e French and Ottoman advances southward into 
the desert had similar timing in the early stages and derived from analogous 
5. E . Gellner, 1978. 
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strategic considerations, namely the desire to control and tax trans-Saharan 
trade and to prevent other powers from annexing the hinterland of footholds 
near the Mediterranean. Despite the similar speed of the advance, the style 
of the two powers differed greatly.6 Since Ottoman governors had fewer 
means at their disposal than the French, their relations with nomads in the 
hinterland of their domains in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were far more 
discreet. Their knowledge of the structure of local politics enabled them 
to exploit the changing pattern of feuds, warfare between groups, and 
alliances. They drew upon a long experience of governing segmentary 
societies and carrying on diplomatic relations with those they could not 
govern, and they were also accorded legitimacy and status as representatives 
of the political centre of the Muslim world. 
In 1835, the Ottomans took direct control of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
from the semi-autonomous Kâramànlï dynasty in an effort to block the 
inroads of French influence from Egypt. A series of incidents in Ottoman 
efforts to extend their control of the desert in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
illustrate the character of their government. In theory a kaimakam resided 
in Djalo, and it was his duty to oversee efforts to collect taxes levied on 
the date palms of Djalo and Awdjila and to maintain order in the sur-
rounding desert. But by 1869 the kaimakam spent most of the time in 
Benghazi, and so a tax collector, w h o visited the oasis once a year, was the 
only regular Ottoman representative in the interior. In return for the tax 
they paid, oasis dwellers of Awdjïla asked for protection from the nomadic 
Zuwaya, w h o were interfering with the flow of trans-Saharan trade and 
attempting to extend control over the oasis. J. P . M a s o n recorded an oral 
tradition telling of the visit of an Ottoman official to Awdjïla to make peace 
with the Zuwaya, w h o m the Ottomans had apparentlybeen fighting. In 
1856, the kaimakam of Benghazi ruled through the shaykh of the Bara'asa, 
a Beduin group, which he supported with fifty armed soldiers.7 T h e 
influence of the Ottoman government never reached very far into the 
Cyrenaican desert, and by the later decades of the century the Sanüsiyya, 
a süß tarlka (brotherhood) founded in the 1840s, had become the effective 
government in the interior.8 
Even the limited ability of the Ottomans to tax date production or 
interfere in the affairs of nomads met with resistance. T h e Ottoman 
governor, 'All Askar w h o arrived in Tripoli in 1838, encountered three 
resistance leaders in the Tripolitanian hinterland, and the experience of 
one of these leaders, c A b d al-Djalïl of the Awlâd Sulaymân, a nomadic 
group of the Fezzan and the Syrte, is instructive. T h e Pasha first negotiated 
6. A . Martel, 1965, Vol. 1, pp. 101-32. For the role of the British in blocking French 
advances towards Ghadâmes, see A . A . Boahen, 1964, pp. 132-212. 
7. For a general history of Tripolitania, see L . C . Féraud, 1927. For Awdjïla history, 
see J. P. Mason, 1971, pp. 200-6; 1976. 
8. D . D . Cordell, 1977a; and E . E . Evans-Pritchard, 1949, passim. 
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with ' A b d al-Djalfl, recognizing him as the legitimate ruler of his domains 
in return for a promise not to disrupt trade between Tripoli and the 
interior. But c A b d al-Djalfl proved too powerful for Ottoman purposes 
when he initiated contacts with commercial interests in Tunisia and Egypt, 
demonstrating that he had at least the potential to threaten the prosperity 
of Tripoli. 'All Askar used diplomatic contacts to discredit ' A b d al-Djalfl in 
the eyes of his allies, w h o recognized the threat posed by a concentration 
of power. O n three critical occasions when c A b d al-Djalfl faced Ottoman 
forces on the battlefield in 1840 and 1841, he was "deserted and turned 
upon by former allies. In the final fight, c A b d al-Djalfl was killed and his 
forces nearly wiped out, but the defeated Awläd Sulaymän fled south along 
the caravan route from the Fezzän to Borno. Previously ' A b d al-Djalfl had 
formed marriage alliances with important families in Borno as~part of a 
strategy of building a commercial empire that would have included contacts 
in the Sudanese kingdom. Capitalizing on these alliances, surviving Awläd 
Sulaymän took up positions on the nomadic frontier of Borno, where they 
were of use to the Borno ruler to block the depredations of the Tuareg. 
But in 1850 the Awläd Sulaymän were soundly defeated by these nomadic 
foes. Twice in a decade they had nearly been annihilated, but they survived 
to become the scourge of trade and of neighbouring nomads and agricultural 
people. They augmented their numbers by assimilating slaves taken in 
raids and by calling on their former soff allies from the Syrte and the 
Fezzän.9 
T h e experience of the Awläd Sulaymän demonstrates that even the 
limited military resources of the Ottoman pasha of Tripoli could produce 
disruption a m o n g nomads, and it shows that the ability of the Ottomans 
to manipulate segmentary politics and to shift io$~alliances was an important 
skill. T h e French, on the other hand, had no so such advantage and relied 
almost entirely on the force of arms. T h e first obstacle to the expansion of 
the French in Algeria was the state formed by 'Abd al-Kädir, but after 
defeating him in 1847 they turned their attention towards the desert, and 
in the 1850s under General Randon they took an interest in re-establishing 
commercial relations between Algeria and the Western Sudan. T o provide 
security for the trade they hoped to promote, they established outposts at 
Géryville and Laghwât in 1852, Wargla in 1853, and Tuggurt in 1854. In 
the west, military expansion south of Géryville halted with the revolt of 
the Awläd Sîdî Shaykh, which lasted intermittently for nearly twenty years, 
and suffered other temporary setbacks with the Franco-Prussian war of 
1870 and a serious uprising in the Kabylia Mountains in 1871. Renewed 
9. For a general account of resistance in the Tripolitanian hinterland, see A . Martel, 
1965, pp. 103-6; for a detailed history of the Awläd Sulaymän, on which the above account 
is based, see D . D . Cordell, 1972, p p . 11-45. In tn' s instance soff refers to a pact between 
the Awläd Sulaymän and another Beduin group; but soff alliances, like /¿¿f alliances in 
Morocco, might also unite groups within a kab'da and in some cases partially replace or 
contradict relations of descent. 
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interest in trans-Saharan commerce and ill-considered plans for a trans-
Saharan railway spurred further penetration into the desert in the 1870s. 
T h e southern portion of the Algerian desert remained beyond French 
control, and the advance south of Wargla was halted w h e n Ahaggar Tuareg 
massacred the second Flatters expedition in 1881, demonstrating that the 
occupation of Tuareg country could prove costly indeed. After 1890, the 
French had the approval of the British for further Saharan conquest, and 
the final phase began in 1899 with the occupation of In Salâh. T h e last 
serious resistance was put d o w n in 1902 with the defeat of the Ahaggar. 
In these final operations the French turned to the new expedient of 
recruiting nomadic people en masse into their service as irregulars, and 
this allowed them to combine the mobility and local knowledge of nomads 
with the vastly superior firepower of the French army. In the defeat of the 
Ahaggar in 1902 the French took advantage of long-standing animosity 
between C h a a m b a and Tuareg; in the final battle a single French officer 
led a force composed entirely of well-trained and heavily-armed Chaamba 
mounted on their best camels.10 
Unlike the French, the Moroccan central government, despite economic 
reforms in the second half of the nineteenth century, did not have the 
means to finance an army capable of extending effective occupation beyond 
the Atlas mountains to the pre-Saharan fringe. N o r could the Moroccans 
stand up to the French army, which exerted pressure on the frontier with 
Algeria and sometimes pursued dissident groups into Moroccan territory. 
T h e pre-Saharan fringe of Morocco belonged to the biläd al-sibä, or land 
of dissidence, but this translation obscures long-standing and important 
economic, religious and social ties between siba and Makhzen , the territory 
where the sultan could collect taxes and exert his authority. Morocco 
enjoyed the informal protection of the British, w h o controlled the lion's 
share of Moroccan import-export trade, and British interest in Morocco 
helped to postpone the French takeover. In efforts to protect their territory 
beyond the Atlas, Moroccan sultans took care to throw into relief existing 
political and diplomatic ties with the south-east. Even if Moroccan sultans 
could not tax or control nomadic groups beyond the Atlas, they could enter 
into local politics by throwing their weight behind one faction or another, 
by mediating disputes, or by capitalizing on their prestige as religious 
leaders. T h e religious influence of the Moroccan sultan extended as far as 
the Niger bend; the Kunta shaykh A h m a d al-Bekkai, leader of the Kâdirïyya 
in the Sudan, recognized M a w l a y 'Abd al-Rahmän as imam of all Muslims 
and carried on diplomatic correspondence with the Moroccan crown.11 
10. A . Bernard, 1906, pp. 16-110. For the Moroccan-Algerian border region, see R . E . 
Dunn, 1977, pp. 137-75. For the conquest of the Tuareg, see J. Keenan, 1977, pp. 72-85. 
11. R . E . D u n n , 1972, pp. 106-^ 7; 1977, pp.31-9, 137-75; E.Burke H I , 1972, pp. 176-
8; 1976, pp. 1-40; J. M . Abun-Nasr, 1975, pp. 284-303. O n the Kunta, see A . Zebadia, 
1974; A . A . Batran, 1974. 
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T h e real significance of the French occupation of the Algerian desert 
was that it was a phenomenon of an entirely n e w order. It was far more 
permanent than the occasional expeditions of the Moroccan sultan into the 
desert, journeys whose main purpose was to make and renew acquaintances 
with important local people. It also contrasted sharply with the infrequent 
visits of Ottoman officials to the oases of Cyrenaica and with the Ottoman 
policy of leaving the nomads to themselves except for occasional attempts 
to tip the balance in disputes between groups. For the first time, nomads 
had to contend with an army of occupation that was armed with modern 
weapons and staffed with local guides and irregulars w h o knew the desert. 
T h e French army administered nomads through the Bureaux arabes, an 
elite group of officers, some of w h o m spoke Arabic. These officers gathered 
intelligence on Muslim leaders and brotherhoods, dispensed justice, and 
ruled their charges through appointed chiefs. While it would not be 
advisable to overstate the degree of control that the French actually had in 
the early years in the desert, it is necessary to point out that the French 
occupation was far more complete than sedentary states on the periphery 
of the Sahara had ever even attempted. It was also very expensive, especially 
in relation to the ability of marginal land in the desert and desert fringe to 
produce a surplus. Historians have explored the impoverishment of the 
Muslim population as a result of losses of land and livestock, and the 
revolts that were caused by the French policy of cantonnement. It would, 
however, be instructive to assess to what extent Saharan people, as opposed 
to Algerians in general, had to pay for the occupation of the desert, but 
this will have to await further research.12 
While it is not possible to give a full account of resistance to the French 
in the Algerian Sahara, a history of this resistance would benefit from the 
framework worked out by Ross D u n n for responses to the French in the 
pre-Saharan fringe of Morocco. This conceptual framework draws attention 
to the uncertain nature of alliance groups in nomadic societies, and the 
extreme unpredictability of the French invasion. T h e French could destroy 
standing crops, palm plantations, irrigation works, and livestock. O n the 
other hand, they established conditions for permanent peace on their terms, 
a peace which might nonetheless promote expanded trade. Above all, 
according to D u n n , the arrival of the French created a new degree of 
uncertainty in the life of nomads and oasis dwellers: 
In short, their coming added to the extreme caprices of nature a whole 
n e w set of economic uncertainties. Consequently, every tribe and qsar, 
indeed every group, large or small, with shared interests in resources, 
was obliged to weigh its response to the French army against the 
effects, for better or worse, on its economic well-being. T h e crisis 
produced not an adjournment, but an intensification of the struggle 
12. C . - R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 3-56, 239-65. 367-93; Vol. II, pp. 737-858; A . 
Bernard and N . Lacroix, 1906, pp. 122-6. 
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to outwit the environment, as cooperating groups and individuals 
sought simultaneously to protect their vital resources and to avoid 
unconditional submission to the advancing army.1 3 
D u n n observes that the ideology of kinship could form a basis for 
military unity in the face of an ephemeral outside threat. But it was of little 
value 'in circumstances where survival depended essentially upon the 
ability of groups with shared resources to reconcile their politics to their 
economic interests through a fragmented, contradictory process of attack, 
compromise, and evasion'.14 Although this conclusion is intended for the 
D a w i M a n i , it might well apply to the history of m a n y other Saharan 
societies. 
Unity in resistance was of course possible despite the uncertainties of 
the environment and the fission inherent in nomadic society, and religion 
provided the framework for most large-scale movements. In the normal 
course of desert life süß tarlka, with their zawiyas or centres of learning, 
which drew followers and attracted students, performed valuable political 
services by dispensing justice and mediating disputes between factions, 
segments, or whole peoples. T h e need for education and the arbitration of 
disputes w o n respect for süß saints and leaders and earned them reputations 
as scholars, mystics, and jurists. In a crisis it was natural that the orders 
and their respected leaders would be thrust into political and military roles. 
Before the French conquest the Darkäwiyya channelled opposition to 
Ottoman rule a m o n g the Kabyles and south of Oran. Similarly, resistance 
to the French coalesced around religious leaders and their orders, as for 
example the movement led by l A b d al-Kädir, the revolt of Awlâd Sîdï 
Shaykh, and resistance organized by the Sanüsiyya in Libya, Chad , and 
ÑTger after 1900.15 
In another case unusual economic circumstances resulting from the 
French push into the desert in the 1850s and 1860s helped bring about 
unified action a m o n g the Ahaggar Tuareg. Cut off from northern markets, 
Ahaggar transformed the basis of their economy. Because of relative stab-
ility under the leadership of the amenukal al-Hadjdj A h m e d (1830-77), it 
was possible to extend cultivation in Ahaggar with the labour of servile 
agriculturalists. T h e attack on the Flatters mission in 1881 occurred during 
a severe drought in 1880-3. Later, as the French occupied the oases of the 
central Sahara, Ahaggar responded by using pastures in what is today 
north-western Niger and by caravan trade with the southern desert fringe. 
T h e y took salt from the sebkhra or salt plain at Amadror , along with dates 
and small quantities of imported British cotton goods, to D a m e r g u , at the 
northernmost limit of sedentary agriculture on the Tripoli-Kano route 
13. R . E . Dunn, 1977, p. 225. 
14. ibid. 
15. C . - R . Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, pp. 62-6; J. A . Abun-Nasr, 1975, pp. 240-6; B . G . 
Martin, 1976, pp. 36-67. 
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north of Zinder. T h e unity of the Ahaggar confederation, which facilitated 
these economic adjustments, was without doubt the product of conflict 
with neighbours. In the 1870s, the Ahaggar had mounted a serious challenge 
to the Ajjer Tuareg to their east and north, which was growing rich with 
the b o o m conditions in Tripoli-Kano trade during that decade, and they 
faced hostile Tuareg groups in other directions, such as the Oulliminden 
to the south-west and certain Air Tuareg to the south-east.16 
A full account of resistance would also call attention to the mobility of 
camel nomads and their ability to migrate with their herds from one end 
of the Sahara to the other as long as they were willing to take up a life 
fraught with danger and uncertainty. A case in point is the fifty years' 
odyssey of the Djeramna, w h o first ran afoul of the French in 1881 near 
Géry ville during the revolt of the Awlâd Sïdï Shaykh, an uprising sparked 
by land shortage, news of the massacre of theTIatters expedition, and the 
departure of French troops to help in the Tunisian campaign. W h e n B ü 
A m ä m a , the leader of the uprising, was deserted by his partisans, the 
Djeramna left to join the Ahaggar Tuareg. In 1889, they took part in a 
raid led by the C h a a m b a on the Tripoli-Kano road south of Ghadämes; 
somewhat later they were reported to have taken part in a raid in the 
Fezzän and another in southern Tunisia. With the collapse of Tuareg 
resistance they retreated to the Tripolitanian highlands bordering on 
southern Tunisia and Algeria and their raids became an issue in territorial 
rivalry between the French and the Turks. In 1925, they finally returned 
to surrender at Géry ville nearly fifty years after having "left on their 
wanderings.17 
Desert trade and the nomads 
Changes in European military technology accelerated in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, with the result that European forces, armed with 
the latest weapons, faced opponents with outdated arms. Technological 
change did not only permit the conquest of the desert; it also transformed 
the economic life of the Sahara, as the manufacture of cheap products 
permitted a new phase of European penetration. Trade with Europe had 
existed before, but the nineteenth century witnessed a massive increase in 
the scale of this trade with varying effects depending on the structure of 
Saharan regional economies. For example, the cotton goods industry of 
Morocco, which had trans-Atlas outlets, succumbed after i860 to the 
competition of Manchester cotton goods, while the woollen textile industry 
of southern Tunisia fared m u c h better and continued to feed products into 
trans-Saharan networks.18 O n the fringe of the Sahara various groups 
16. J. Keenan, 1977, pp. 63-85, 139-40; 1972, PP-345-56; J. Dubief, 1947, pp. 15-16; 
G . Gardel, 1961, pp. 126,144-56. 
17. P. Boyer, 1971. 
18. K . Brown, 1976, p. 9; A . Martel, 1965, Vol. 1, p. 125. 
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involved themselves in exports of primary products. For example north of
the Senegal basin increased exports ofgum arabic allowed a zawiya lineage,
whose members specialized in Islamic scholarship and the mediation of
disputes and organized trading caravans to escales on the Senegal river to
gain in power and influence.19 In the area north of the Sokoto caliphate
the rise ofexports ofostrich feathers and tanned goat skins in the last thirty
years of the century forced nomadic ruling classes to adjust to the new¬
found ability of peasants and servile agriculturalists to earn income from
collecting and selling these products.20 European economic penetration also
affected the tastes of consumers, so that the custom of drinking heavily
sugared tea spread during the century.
i~JI
plate 20.1 Desert-edge trade: 'Moors' trading gum at the escale of Bakel on the Senegal
River
A major mechanism ofcloser contact with the world economy was trans-
Saharan trade, which for centuries had involved Saharan merchants, guides,
transporters, and suppliers of commodities as diverse as food, goat skins
to serve as water containers, and exports such as ostrich feathers for the
European market. In the first place the people of the northern oases such
as Tafilâlet, Mzab, Ghadâmes, the Fezzân, AwdjUa, and Sïwa played a
pivotal role in organizing and financing trade. Perhaps because of the
strategic location of these oases and because the oases relied heavily on the
trade of dates for grain from zones of rainfall agriculture farther north,
oasis dwellers, with their long histories of trade, moved naturally into trans-
Saharan commerce over the centuries as opportunities opened up. Nomadic
19. C. C. Stewart and E. K. Stewart, 1973, pp. 86-97, 119-20, 151-3.
20. S. Baier, 1977.
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groups such as the Ahaggar and Kel-Ewey Tuareg, the Tubu, and the
Zuwaya of the central Sahara (a Beduin group not to be confused with
zawiya clerical lineages in Mauritania) traded small quantities of slaves
and other products on their own account, but they could not match the
scale of sedentary merchants from the northern oases, who had financial
backing from middlemen in Mediterranean ports and ultimately from
Europe, especially when prices and conditions on the routes were favour¬
able. Consequently the main role of camel nomads was to provide transport
animals, guides, and military escorts for caravans, and they also ran freight
delivery services for merchants who were unable to or preferred not to
accompany caravans.21 Most groups of Saharan nomads had a major stake
in the trade that passed through their territory: Regibat on the route to
western Morocco; Ait Khabbash (a segment of the Ait Atta) on the
Tafilälet-Tüwät road; Chaamba on the routes north of Tüwat; Tuareg on
the Tripoli-Kano route; Tubu on the Borno-Fezzän road; Mujabra and
Zuwaya for traffic between Benghazi and Wadai; KabäbTsh on the Darb
al-Arbaln (forty-day road) between Därfür and the lower Nile.
plate 20.2 The kasba (citadel) ofMurzuk in the Fezzan in 1869
A major dynamic of nineteenth-century desert history was the ebb and
flow of trade on these routes. Much further research will be necessary
before the detail or even an outline of this process can be completed, but
21. On trans-Saharan trade through Tripoli, see M. El-Hachaichi, 1912, pp. 200-2; H.
Méhier de Mathuisieulx, 1904, pp. 20-34; T- s- JaS°> l9°2. For arrangements between
merchants and Tuareg lineages for transport, escorts and deliveries, see M. Brulard, 1958,
pp. 202-15.
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shifts in trade can be presumed to have affected the constant themes in 
desert history of migration and warfare. Control of a trade route, with the 
revenue it brought from tools and services, was a considerable prize and 
was subject to challenge from nomadic rivals. T h e concentration of wealth 
in lineages, segments, or whole ethnic groups often upset the normal course 
of affairs in local politics, which depended on roughly equal distribution 
of power among segments at a given level in the structure. Wealthy groups 
were likely to maintain their positions, but an element of instability came 
from the ease with which even large caravans fell prey to raiders lying 
in ambush. Finally, the decline of a once-active trade route required 
readjustment. T h e paucity of historical material on this issue does not 
permit conclusions. S o m e groups, such as the C h a a m b a , responded to a 
decline in the trade they carried by increasing their commitment to desert-
edge regional trade or by raiding wealthy neighbours; others, such as the 
Kâbâbîsh of the desert Nile, w h o took the decline of the forty-day route 
in their stride by turning to nearly exclusive reliance on animal husbandry, 
seem to have adjusted more easily.22 
A prominent overall pattern in the shifting location and volume of trade 
through the desert was the movement of trade away from the French in 
Algeria, a major irony because it so thoroughly frustrated imperial economic 
objectives. In the early days of the French occupation, trade picked up; 
after 1833, caravan traffic between Fez and Tlemcen began again, and 
British products imported through the Moroccan port of Tetuân entered 
western Algeria. Trade between Tetouän and c A b d al-Kädir's domains 
increased after 1837 and especially after 1839 w h e n the need for arms 
assured a lively commerce. But trade declined after the fall of ' A b d al-
Kädir's state, a result in part of the prohibitive import duties on trans-
Saharan products in transit from the Western Sudan, and restrictions on 
goods entering Algeria from neighbouring territories. T h e French tried to 
remedy both situations in the 1850s and 1860s, but trade failed to respond.23 
Another factor was the collapse of Algerian demand for slaves; while this 
is often cited as an explanation for Algerian commercial difficulties, it needs 
to be re-evaluated in the light of recent evidence that the Algerian slave 
trade was never important compared with other North African receiving 
areas.24 A final consideration was that Algerian territory did not offer an 
advantage in terms of security for caravans, since at any given time hostility 
between the French and one or another group in Saharan Algeria threatened 
the safety of commerce. 
T h e route west of Algeria prospered until the late 1870s, when it began 
its final decline, and it shifted westward in Morocco during the course of 
the nineteenth century. As the importance of Figuig, located near the 
22. Y . Tégnier, 1939, pp. io8ff.; T . Asad, 1966, pp. 79-88. 
23. J . -L. Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 2, pp. 158-63; Vol. 3, pp. 74-5. 
24. R . A . Austen, 1979. 
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plate 20.3 Oasis Society: women in the Murzuk market, 1869
Algerian border, declined, Abu Am, situated about 240km south-west of
Figuig, prospered, and Abu Am took over most of the slave trade entering
Morocco. Most other commerce shifted even farther west towards the
Atlantic coast, a consequence of the founding of the port of Mogador,
which from its strategic location took over an increasing share of trans-
Saharan trade after the 1840s.25 A way station for the route to Mogador
grew up at Tindüf, the site of an ancient ksar, when an alliance centring
on the Tadjakant was victorious over the Regibat at mid-century. An
enlarged alliance defended the oasis until 1884 when Regibat won out once
more.26 Declining trade was without doubt a factor in this struggle; trade
to Mogador reached a peak in 1878 but began its final downward slide
thereafter. It ended altogether shortly after the arrival of the French in
Timbuktu in 1894 and the opening of a combination of river and overland
routes between Timbuktu and St-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal.27
25. R. E. Dunn, 1977, pp. 107-12; 1971.
26. A. Pigeot, 1956, pp. 85-94; A. Laugel, 1959, pp. 301-10.
27. J.-L. Miège, 1961-3, Vol. 4, pp. 380-5.
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plate 20.4 Minaret ofthe Agades mosque
Trade on the route between Tripoli and Kano increased after mid-
century, especially after the success of Ottoman efforts to keep peace south
of Ghadâmes after 1850. The next thirty years represent the golden age of
commerce on this route, and a boom in ostrich feather exports in the 1870s
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pushed the value of trade to what must have been a record high. Trade 
suffered a temporary decline during the depression of the 1880s but 
recovered with rising exports of tanned goat skins in the 1890s. Adjdjer 
Tuareg ran caravans between Ghadämes and Iferuan, a resting place in 
the Air Mountains, and Tuareg of the Kel-Ewey confederation carried 
trade between Iferuan and Kano . Both groups encountered challenges from 
their neighbours; in the north the Adjdjer beat off attacks from Chaamba 
and from Ahaggar Tuareg, and in the south Kel-Ewey encountered a 
challenge from the Imezureg of Damergu , a semi-sedentary Tuareg group 
with a localized power base and the ability to profit from the taxation of 
the ostrich feather trade from their area. Tripoli-Kano trade lasted longer 
than trade to Mogador because K a n o was better protected from competing 
maritime routes, but cheap maritime freight rates combined with growing 
insecurity on the desert portions of the route to bring about a sharp decline 
in trade after 1900. T h e British in Nigeria sought to deflect Tripoli-Kano 
trade towards the port of Lagos, while the French in Niger attempted to 
keep the desert route open. T h e final blow to the old route occurred when 
the railway arrived in K a n o in 1911.28 
B y the turn of the century the Benghazi-Wadai route was more vital 
than any other. This direct route between Cyrenaica and Wadai had been 
discovered early in the century, and Wadai sultans, whose state had grown 
increasingly powerful after the mid-eighteenth century, were anxious to 
promote a route which bypassed Borno to the west and Dârfur to the east. 
F r o m i860 the fortunes of the trade route were intertwined with those of 
the Sanüsiyya, a Muslim brotherhood that spread among the Beduin of 
Cyrenaica after 1843 and later extended southward along the trade route. 
T h e success of the order had a great impact on trade, since a single 
organization spanned the entire length of the route, providing merchants 
with a c o m m o n legal, social, and commercial framework and even a postal 
system. T h e leaders of the order strove to promote trade by maintaining 
peace along the route, and to this end they mediated disputes between 
lineages, segments, or whole ethnic groups and often successfully appealed 
for the return of merchandise stolen in raids on caravans. Trade in turn 
benefited the leadership of the Sanüsiyya by bringing revenue from tolls, 
payment for storage space, and gifts from merchants, as well as lending an 
element of unity to far-flung Sanusï domains.29 
Benghazi-Wadai trade lasted past the turn of the century because of the 
Sanüsiyya and because the route served areas more remote than the 
southern termini of Tripoli-Kano trade. T h e easternmost route, the Darb 
al-Arbaln, declined after mid-century with the rise of Benghazi-Wadaî 
trade and the formation of the far-ranging trade empire of the Djalläba. 
28. M . Johnson, 1976a; S. Baier, 1977, pp. 39-45; C . W . Newbury, 1966; S. Baier, 1980, 
chaps 3 and 4 . 
29. D . D . Cordell, 1977. 
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After 1885, the Mahdist state in the Sudan disrupted the Darb al-Arbaln 
and the Nile routes as well. 
T h e trans-Saharan slave trade also affected the lives of nomadic people 
in a variety of ways. Saharan societies near the West African Sahel raided 
Sudanese populations for slaves, and occasional trans-Saharan slave raids 
have been recorded, as in the case of the Awlâd Sulaymân before they 
moved to the Chad basin and the Banü M u h a m m a d in the early twentieth 
century. N o m a d s traded some slaves on their o w n account, just as they 
handled small quantities of other trans-Saharan products, but by and 
large they were transporters rather than financiers. Transit trade in slaves 
probably brought nomads less revenue than other forms of commerce, 
because merchants did not have to pay for transport, but they did pay tolls. 
Perhaps the most important impact of the slave trade on Saharan societies 
was the ready supply of slave labour, which became an important factor 
during times of expansion, especially on the desert edge, where labour 
could be used not only for herding but also in agriculture and artisan 
occupations. A case in point is that of the Kel-Ewey Tuareg, w h o expanded 
their economy during the nineteenth century, a time of good climate in 
the region, achieved prosperity from trans-Saharan trade and salt trade, 
and m a d e growing investments in the entire region centring on the corridor 
from the Air to K a n o . Little information is available on the evolution of 
systems of social stratification in the desert except a m o n g other Tuareg 
groups. T h e new reliance on agriculture based on servile labour in Ahaggar 
has been mentioned, and among the Kel-Gress and the Tuareg of the 
Imannen emphasis shifted from the use of slave labour in herding to the 
collection of tribute from sedentary agriculturalists. This reorientation 
came about when desert warriors arrived in areas of the Sahel where 
agriculture was possible and demanded tribute from local cultivators, or 
raided for slaves, w h o in times merged with the sedentary tribute-paying 
population.30 Another case of economic expansion also suggests that there 
was a need for additional slave labour, namely the imperialism of the Ait 
Atta, a group that had been on the m o v e in the pre-Saharan fringe of 
Morocco since the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century, the Ait 
Kabbash, a segment of the Ait Atta, led the desert vanguard of this 
expansion by extending their influence over trade between Tafilâlet and 
Tüwät and extorting protection money from the inhabitants of Tüwät.3 1 
Little is known about the volume of the slave trade across the desert, 
but Ralph Austen has compiled preliminary estimates, based on a wide 
variety of sources, and these offer some surprises. According to Austen, 
the commerce in h u m a n beings, far from declining in the nineteenth 
century, was actually on the rise; a greater volume of trade reached receiving 
30. P . E . Lovejoy and S . Baier, 1975; S . Baier and P . E . Lovejoy, 1977. O n seden-
tarization and tribute, see P . Bonte, 1976; H . Guillaume, 1976. 
31. R. E. Dunn, 1972. 
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areas in North Africa and the Middle East than in any previous century. 
Austen's figures show that between 1800 and 1880 something in the order 
of half a million slaves entered Egypt, and a quarter of a million were taken 
to Morocco. F e w entered Algeria after the French conquest, but Algeria 
had never been as important a market as other areas.32 In Libya, the 
Benghazi-Wadai route continued to provide slaves to Egypt and other 
areas in the Middle East into the late nineteenth century, because this 
route was less easily monitored by European abolitionists than the Tripoli-
K a n o route. Farther east the Nile routes continued to carry slaves even 
into the early twentieth century.33 
T h e firearms trade into and across the desert also continued, despite 
attempts by European powers to stop it. At Tripoli, and especially at 
Benghazi, a lively firearms trade was reported in the early 1880s, and 
m a n y smuggled rifles, especially eighteen-shot Winchester repeaters, were 
imported for use by caravan escorts. But some of these modern weapons 
must have reached other nomadic groups as well, allowing them to mount 
successful raids because firepower added to the tactical advantages of 
surprise that raiding parties already enjoyed.34 T h e penetration of modern 
repeaters into the desert seems to have been greatest along the Benghazi-
Wadai route, but other areas were affected as well; Joseph Smaldone has 
assembled evidence to show that a turning point in the spread of firearms 
occurred among Ahaggar Tuareg in the 1890s. T o the north-west, in 
Morocco, contraband sales of the i860 model single-shot Remington 
breechloader were so great that by the end of the century it had become 
the basic rifle for m a n y groups throughout the country, including pre-
Saharan nomads. Although the evidence is far from complete, increased 
insecurity on the Tripoli-Kano route after 1898 m a y have been due to the 
spread of firearms to raiders.35 
T h e region surrounding the southern terminus of the Tripoli-Kano 
trade route provides an example of the economic, political, and religious 
influence of desert people on the Sudan. In the savanna, the nineteenth 
century marked the culmination of a process in which the centralization of 
state structures, Islamization, and economic growth were closely inter-
twined. T h e djihad of the early nineteenth century, although only a final 
stage in thislonger process, resulted in the formation of the Sokoto 
caliphate, a large state which promoted economic growth in its centre near 
K a n o , Katsina, and Zaria (and around its secondary centre in the Sokoto-
R i m a valley) and relocated population from beyond its borders towards 
the centre through slave-raiding. In the centre of the region, rich farmland 
32. R . A . Austen, 1979. 
33. J. P . Mason, 1971, p. 267. For the slave trade from equatorial Africa towards Egypt, 
see D . D . Cordell, 1977b. 
34. P . Bettoli, 1882, p. 267. 
35. J . P . Smaldone, 1971, pp. 161-2; 1977, pp. 100-1; H . J . Fisher and V . Rowland, 
1971, pp. 233-4, 240. 
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permitted production for the market on slave estates or by peasants, and 
this surplus production encouraged the growth of urban centres and craft 
production.36 K a n o and neighbouring towns developed a cottage textile 
industry which supplied cloth to a large area of the Central Sudan and 
Tuareg country to the north. Economic growth in the desert, especially in 
the corridor between Zinder and the Air massif, which was dominated by 
Kel-Ewey Tuareg, complemented the development of the savanna. Tuareg 
traded dates and salt from Bilma and Fachi, animals, and animal products 
for grain and manufactured articles from the Sudan. T h e Kel-Ewey and 
their allies maintained an elaborate commercial network in the savanna 
that included urban centres of craftsmen and trade specialists, most of 
servile origin, and rural estates worked by slaves or their descendants. 
These estates, located throughout the Sahel and savanna, provided a 
proportion of the grain needed by desert nomads , served as resting places 
for transhumant Tuareg during the dry season, and functioned as places 
of refuge during drought.37 
Although peaceful economic exchange was the predominant m o d e of 
interaction between Tuareg and their sedentary neighbours, at least in the 
Kano-Air corridor, the economic strength of the noble Tuareg rested on 
their possession of camels and firearms and their mobility. Tuareg could 
be powerful allies of sedentary states, valued as m u c h for their aid in 
military campaigns against enemies as for their economic potential, as was 
the case in relations between D a m a g a r a m , a state formed north of the 
Caliphate in the early nineteenth century and increasingly powerful and 
troublesome by the end. Tuareg could, on the other hand, be devastating 
enemies, as witnessed by the destruction they wrought in Borno in the 
early nineteenth century. 
T h e southern Sahara also served as a reservoir of Islamic learning that 
had a continuing impact on the savanna over the centuries, and particularly 
during the nineteenth century.38 A number of desert-edge regions, includ-
ing the Central Sudan, the Senegal basin, the interior delta of the Niger, 
and the Chad basin, supplied grain to neighbouring desert people, and 
these economic ties fostered the exchange of ideas. Characteristic of 
southern Saharan societies was a division into warrior and saintly lineages, 
the first aspiring to warfare and politics, the second having an ideology of 
pacificism, experience in commerce, and a shared intellectual tradition. 
Like the segmentary structure itself, the bipartite division was a model of 
society rather than a description of reality, so that only the holiest of holy 
m e n actually refrained from fighting, and warrior lineages engaged in 
commerce, though they were less specialized in this activity than the clerical 
36. P . E . Lovejoy and S. Baier, 1975; P . E . Lovejoy, 1978; Smaldone, 1977, pp.39-68 
and passim. 
37. P . E . Lovejoy and S. Baier, 1975, pp. 564-71. 
38. C . C . Stewart, 1976a. 
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lineages. Nevertheless the zawiya clerical lineages of Mauritania, Kunta 
clerics of the Niger bend and the inislimin among the Tuareg mastered 
the two politically useful sciences of fikh (jurisprudence) and tasatvwuf 
(mysticism). Like the Sanüsiyya or Moroccan clerical lineages, they per-
formed the valuable function of mediation and arbitration, and their 
activities had economic, political, and scholarly aspects. T h e y maintained 
and developed Islamic scholarship over the centuries and their influence 
extended south of the desert where Saharan scholarship affected both the 
quietist tradition and the spread of Islam by militant reformers. 
Conclusion 
T h e nineteenth century was a time of dramatic change in the desert. T h e 
French occupation of Algeria shattered the economic unity of North Africa 
by deflecting trans-Saharan trade to routes east and west of Algeria and by 
disrupting east-west caravan traffic along the northern fringe of the desert. 
T h e advance of the French army was a direct and immediate manifestation 
of the impact of Europe, a presence more remote if no less real elsewhere 
because of the shifting volume and composition of trans-Saharan trade. B y 
the end of the century trans-Saharan trade, with the revenue and ready 
supply of labour it brought, had all but collapsed. T h e importance of this 
trade in the lives of nomads suggests the need for further research on the 
effects of shifts in commerce and its decline: what was the effect of the 
formation of the state ruled by ' A b d al-Kädir astride a major east-west 
route? H o w precisely did desert people react to shifts in commerce? H o w 
did declining trade affect resistance? T h e French occupation of the desert 
also introduced a n e w military factor in the relationship between desert 
oeople and the outside world. T h e mobility of nomads allowed a number 
>f options in resistance that might coalesce around Muslim leaders and 
.eligious orders, but the arid environment often limited the freedom of 
groups or individuals with shared resources by presenting them with a 
choice between resistance and survival. Another subject for further research 
is the uneven and dissimilar effect of European economic penetration on 
the regional economies at the fringe of the desert in pre-Saharan Morocco 
which was dominated by Ait Atta expansion; in coastal Morocco where 
trans-Atlas and trans-Saharan economic links were shaken to their foun-
dations; in Algeria where the activities of the French were predominant; 
north of the Senegal basin where g u m exports increased the stakes in 
competition among Moorish groups; north of the Niger bend; in the Sokoto 
caliphate where economic strength must be seen in light of the end of the 
Atlantic slave trade as well as Islamization and centralization within the 
region; in the Chad basin; and to the east where the expansion of Wada i 
transformed both the desert to its north and the forest to its south. T h e 
history of each of these regions raises a series of questions on issues such 
as change in social stratification, similarities and differences in response to 
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the French army, and the direction of reorientation in regional economies. 
Another task for researchers is, as Charles Stewart has suggested, to provide 
detail on religious ties between the southern Sahara and West and Central 
Africa seen within the theme of religious, political, and economic unity in 
these desert-edge regions.39 
A theme that runs throughout Saharan history is the all-pervasive 
influence of climate, as the pressures of drought or overpopulation drove 
nomads from arid regions and attracted them to more fertile land on the 
desert margins or towards higher and better-watered land. Existing climatic 
data permit only the most general conclusions about the nineteenth century: 
little more can be said than that the century did not witness catastrophes 
such as those of the middle seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or the 
Sahelian droughts of 1911-14 and 1969-73; that the early nineteenth 
century, despite the absence of severe drought except in the Chad basin in 
the 1830s, was drier on the average than the period 1600-1800; and that 
moist conditions returned between 1870 and 1895 but deteriorated towards 
the end of the century and culminated in the drought of the early twentieth 
century.40 These general statements obviously mask a plethora of local 
and regional variation. Detailed data on climate would permit a better 
understanding of m a n y aspects of h u m a n activity, and especially relation-
ships between scarcity and warfare, migration, and social stratification, but 
unfortunately data at this level of detail are almost non-existent. 
39. C . C . Stewart, 1976a, pp. 81-5. For a study of desert-savanna economic links north 
of the middle Niger, see R . Roberts, 1978. 
40. S. E . Nicholson, 1976; forthcoming. 
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A. B A T R A N 
T h e setting for the drama that was to unfold in nineteenth-century West 
Africa was that corridor known to classical Arab geographers and historians 
as Biläd al-Südän (Land of the black people). H e m m e d in between an ever-
encroaching Sahara in the north and an unfriendly climate in the south, 
the region's historical importance, prosperity and stability depended to a 
large extent on a delicate balance maintained between the environment, 
m a n and animals; between settled agriculturists and pastoral nomads; 
between town dwellers and rural populations; between free m e n and those 
of servile status; and between Muslims and those w h o adhered to their 
traditional beliefs. Furthermore, the region had become, since ancient 
times, an international market where local merchandise and foreign imports 
were exchanged. Again, Biläd al-Südän represented an area of tremendous 
h u m a n mobility and population mixing exemplified by the spread of the 
Fulbe (Fulani, Peul) whose original homeland was in Futa Toro, over a 
wide canvas extending from Lake Chad and the Cameroon in the east to 
the Atlantic Ocean in the west. It was the region where great states and 
empires rose and fell, a region that represented the earliest dar al-Islâm 
(abode of Islam) in West Africa. It was the stage that witnessed, after a 
long gestation - a long period of teaching and preaching, and ultimately 
of violent outbursts - the birth of three caliphates: the Sokoto caliphate in 
northern Nigeria, the Hamdullahi caliphate in Massina, and the Tijäniyya 
caliphate in the Senegambia and Massina. 
The religious background of the reform movements 
T h e nineteenth-century West African djihâd movements were basically 
religious drives towards the realization oîthe basic teachings and practices 
that had characterized Islam in its early days. A n d since Islam is a c o m -
prehensive religion concerned with every aspect of society, the religious, 
social, economic, and political motivations of the djihad cannot be separated. 
Hence, the nineteenth-century Islamic revolutions expressed a variety of 
deep-seated concerns that were reflected in a situation of crisis in the 
Sudanic milieu. 
T h e West African revolutionaries, Shaykh (Shehu) ' U t h m a n dan Fodio 
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(Usman ibn Fudî), Seku A h m a d u (Shaykh A h m a d Lobbo) and al-Hadjdj 
' U m a r , were m e n of religion. T h e y were scholastic giants and charismatic 
leaders whose lives and actions followed closely the example of M u h a m m a d 
and the dictates of the sharJ'a.1 Their call for reconstruction and reform 
(tadjdid) and their ultimate recourse to militant action, they sincerely 
believed, were ordained by Allah, foretold by the Prophet, sanctioned by 
the spiritual forefathers, and had precedents in past and contemporary 
times. Accordingly, they perceived themselves to be the chosen instruments 
to execute the Divine will. 
T h e proponents of djihäd drew upon several Ku'ränic verses, Prophetic 
traditions (hadttjj), and the consensus of the jurists (idjma1) to emphasize 
the obligation oí djihäd and the abundant rewards awaiting the mudjahidun 
in the hereafter^t is important to note that in West Africa, as elsewhere 
in dar al-Isläm, djihäd had assumed süß (mystical) overtones involving self-
mortification ana a strict code of moral behaviour. T h e mudjahidun were 
fully expected to lead an exemplary life and to practise what they preached. 
Furthermore, M u h a m m a d ' s prophecy that 'Allah will send to this umma 
(Muslim community) at the beginning of every hundred years he w h o will 
renew her religion for her' was all too well known in the Western Sudan. 
Indeed, the whole eschatological tradition, bequeathed by earlier gener-
ations, had a profound influence on the programmes and actions of the 
djihäd leadership. T h e popular appeal of this tradition and the frenzied 
passions it is apt to unleash are universally acknowledged; for the messianic 
figure embodied the hopes and aspirations of the masses, and provided 
what they believed to be a sure way out of a crisis. T h e expected deliverer 
is said to have been commissioned by Allah to promote vigorously by the 
tongue (preaching and teaching) and, if necessary, by hand {djihäd) the 
Ku'ränic injunction oiamr bil-ma'rufvpal-nahi lan al-munkar (commanding 
the good and prohibiting the evil). H e was to erase unbelief, injustice and 
oppression; he was to build a better world and attain, for the umma, a 
satisfying religion. 
i. There are several general works on the nineteenth-century West African Islamic 
revolutions, for example. J. R . Willis, 1967; M . Last, 1974, pp. 1-24; H . F . C . Smith, 1961; 
B . Martin, 1976, pp. 13-35, 68-98; M . Hiskett, 1976. O n the djihäd of Shaykh 'Uthmân 
dan Fodio, see M . Last, 1967)3); H . A . S. Johnston, 1967; F . H . el-Masri, 1963, 1979; M . 
Hiskett, 1973. For Seku Ahmadu's movement see: W . A . Brown, 1969; A . H . Ba and S. 
Daget, 1962. O n the djihäd of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , see: J. R . Willis, 1970, forthcoming; O . 
Jah, 1973; M . A . T y a m , 1961: B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1972(a). 
2. Kur'ân II: 126: 'Fighting is enjoined on you, though it is disliked by you; and it may 
be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it m a y be that you love a thing 
while it is evil for you; and Allah knows while you know not.' Kur'än II: 193: 'And fight 
them until there is no persecution, and religion is only for Allah. But if they desist then 
there should be no hostility except against oppressors.' Also the hadtth ' W h o s o among you 
sees anything blameworthy shall alter it with the hand: if he cannot do this, he shall do it 
with the tongue; if he cannot do this, he shall do it at heart; this is the least that religion 
demands'. 
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Nowhere in dar al-Isläm did the concept oîtadjdid have a more profound 
effect than in nineteenth-century West Africa. In that century, the Muslims 
in West Africa anxiously awaited the advent of the mudjaddid (refor-
mer/renewer).3 It is claimed that M u h a m m a d had prophesied that twelve 
caliphs (mudjaddidun) would follow him. Thereafter, a period of anarchy 
heralding the end of the world would prevail. Local traditions proudly 
maintain that the Prophet had honoured Takrür (West Africa) with the 
last two mudjaddidun. It was generally believed in the Western Sudan that 
the first ten reformers had already appeared in the Muslim East (five in 
Medina, two in Egypt, one in Syria, and two in Iraq) and that Askia al-
M u h a m m a d , the great Songhay monarch (i 493-1528), was designated the 
eleventh. T h e twelfth and last mudjaddid, so it was said, was to make his 
appearance in the Western Sudan during the thirteenth century of the 
Hidjra, i.e. between 1785 and 1881.4 This millennial climate was exploited 
by the nineteenth-century West African djihad leaders to their o w n advan-
tage. That both Shaykh ' U t h m a n dan Fodio and Seku A h m a d u claimed to 
be the mudjaddid of the fateful thirteenth century of the Hidjra had already 
been noted.5 Although al-'Hadjdj ' U m a r never took the title of either 
mudjaddid or makdi, he nonetheless assumed a Tijäni-süfi variation, that 
of Khalifat Khatim al-Awlyya1 (successor of the Seal of Saints, that is, 
A h m a d al-Tijani, founder of the Tijàniyya tañka).6 
T h e legitimacy and righteousness of the djihad were further strengthened 
by the claim that the three m e n were each entrusted with the Divine 
mission by the Prophet and the founder of the tarika (süfi order or 
brotherhood) to which he belonged. Such claims presented convincing 
proof of the sincerity of the leadership and countered the anticipated anti-
djihad charges levelled by sceptics and detractors, the so-called 'ulama' al-
lu( (time-serving and evil scholars). Shaykh ' U t h m a n assured his audience 
that he was ordered to carry out the djihalhy th~e founder of the Kâdirïyya 
tarika himself, ' A b d al-Kädir al-djiTänf^ d. 1166), in the presence of the 
Prophet, his Companions, and all the notable saints. This mystical vision 
was experienced by Shaykh 'U thman in 1794, ten years before the c o m -
mencement of his djihâd: 
W h e n I reached forty years, five months and some days, G o d drew 
m e to H i m , and I found the Lord of djinns and m e n , our Lord 
M u h a m m a d . . . With him were the Companions, and the prophets, 
and the saints. Then they welcomed m e , and sat m e down in their 
midst. T h e n . . . our Lord 'Abdal-Kadir al-Djilani brought a green 
3. J . R . Willis, 1967; A . A . Batran, 1983; M . A . al-Hajj, 1967. 
4. ibid. 
5. J . R . Willis, 1967; A . A . Batran, 1983, pp.32-9; al-Naqar, 1972, pp.77-8; W . A . 
Brown, 1969, p. 21. 
6. O . Jah, 1973, p.4, pp.123 et sea- According to J . R . Willis, forthcoming, and B . 
Martin, 1963, al-Hadjdj 'Umar's followers claimed for him the title of mahdi and that of 
tvazir al-mahdi. 
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robe . . . and a turban! . . . T h e Messenger of G o d clasped them to his 
bosom for a t ime. . . 'Abdal-Kädir al-Djilani sat m e d o w n , and clothed 
m e and enturbaned m e . Then he addressed m e as ' I m a m of the saints' 
and commanded m e to do what is approved of and forbade m e to do 
what is disapproved of; and he girded m e with the Sword of Truth 
[Sayf al-Hak] to unsheath against the enemies of G o d . 7 
It is claimed that al-Hadjdj ' U m a r was ordered by his spiritual mentor, 
M u h a m m a d al-Ghali of Mecca to bring about reform in the Western 
Sudan.8 Later, when the violent clash with his adversaries became inevi-
table, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r began to be gripped by mystical visions instructing 
him to undertake the djihäd: 
Previously I had only been authorized by M u h a m m a d and shaykh al-
Tidjâni to s u m m o n the unbelievers to Islam and to guide tfiëm ïïown 
the correct path . . . then I was instructed to execute the djihäd. . . . I 
received this permission through a Divine voice which said to m e : 
'you are n o w permitted to conduct djihäd1. This took place in the 
evening of 21st of Dhul-Qa'da, in the year 1268 [6 September 1852].9 
Rooted deeply in orthodoxy and süß thought, the nineteenth-century 
West African djihäds were not, however, an isolated phenomenon: they 
were the latest manifestations of a long tradition of reform in Biläd al-
Südän that aimed at the revolutionary realization of equity and justice 
promised by Islam but denied by oppressive, compromising, and iniquitous 
regimes. 
Attempts have been m a d e to find a c o m m o n origin for the West African 
Islamic revolutions in the djihäd of Nasïr al-DTn (d. 1677),10 in the A l m o -
ravid movement of the eleventh century," and even in the Khäridjite 
revolution in North Africa in the eighth century.12 It has, however, been 
correctly argued that such a chronological approach 'suggests . . . somewhat 
simplistic causal links' with these early outbursts of militancy rather than 
direct descent.13 While it cannot be denied that the leaders of the West 
African dßhäds were aware of these successful movements and even of other 
less successful attempts,14 it seems more likely that they drew immediate 
inspiration from contemporary sources closer to h o m e . Before them were 
the achievements of their o w n ancestors, the Torodbe, in Bundu , Futa 
7. M . Hiskett, 1973, p. 66. 
8. J. R . Willis, forthcoming, ch. 6; O . Jah, 1973, pp. 131-2. 
9. ibid. 
10. P . D . Curtin, 1971. 
11. M . A . al-Hajj, 1964, p.58. 
12. O . Jah. 1973, pp. 62-4. 
13. C . C . Stewart, 1976a, p. 91. 
14. See F . H . el-Masri, 1979, p. 32, where it is reported that SJiaykJ^'Uthman made 
references to the unsuccessful, indeed disastrous djihad of A h m a d ibn Abu Mahalli of 
Tafilälet in the early seventeenth century. 
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Jallon and Futa Toro, the peaceful reform endeavours of Shaykh al-
Mukhtär al-Kunti and M u h a m m a d ibn *Abd al-Karïm al-Maghïlï, tïîësufï 
reaction to the outbreak of Wahhâbï fundamentalism in Arabia, as well as, 
in the case of Shaykh^ A h m a d u and al-Hadjd) ' U m a r , the precedent of 
Shaykh 'XJthrcmFs djihäd in Hausaland. 
T h e djtÏÏad leaders traced their roots back to the holiest region in Biläd 
al-Südän, the celebrated Takrür (Futa Toro), where the earliest Islamic 
state in West Africa is said to have emerged.15 Most important is that they 
all belonged to that 'society' of 'ulamä' (scholars) known as the Torodbe. 
J. R . Willis informs us that the Torodbe were an eclectic group of Muslims 
drawn from diverse ethnic groups throughout the Western and Central 
Sudan.16 Torodbe 'society', he adds, comprised groups of individuals of 
Fulbe, Wolof, M a n d e , Hausa, Berber, slave and caste origin. Nevertheless, 
the Torodbe were identified with the Fulbe. They spoke the Fulbe language 
(Fulfulde), intermarried with them, and accompanied the Fulbe in their 
endless migrations. Throughout the Western Sudan, Torodbe became 
synonymous with Fulbe. In fact, the Torodbe constituted the scholarly 
faction of the Fulbe. 
Islam was the Torodbe way of life; it was the means of their spiritual 
and material sustenance. T h e Torodbe shared their preoccupation with 
Islam with the neighbouring scholastic clans, the zawäyä, of the Western 
Sahara.17 But, while each zawäyä clan stood out as a separate ethnic unit 
whose members were related by blood, the Torodbe 'shook the sense of 
ethnic differences . . . to establish a society open to all individuals inclined 
to embrace their customs and beliefs.'18 This social amalgam of clerics and 
students could still boast of having given birth to scholastic dynasties (bayt 
al-'ilm), such as the Toronkawa of Shaykh ' U t h m a n , the Bari of Shaykh 
A h m a d u , and al-Hadjdj 'Umar's family, the TaflTFurther still, the Torodrjè 
could proudly point to a distinguished past: to the Torodbe djihäd of Malik 
Sï in the closing decades of the seventeenth century, of Karamoko Ibrahim 
M ü s a and Ibrahim Sori in the middle of the eighteenth century, of 
Sulaymän Baal in the 1770s, and to the resultant formation of the Torodbe 
imamates of Bundu, Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro. It was to this background 
of historical vintage that al-Hadjdj 'Urnar reached out to awaken the 
dormant djihäd spirit among the Banu Toro (sons of Futa Toro). Remind-
ing them that djihäd was their cherished tradition, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r said: 
Banu Toro are the same as our first ancestors; painstaking and strong, 
and the best of m e n , and upright. Banu Toro . . . return to your 
15. J . R . Willis, 1978, pp. 195-6; forthcoming, ch. 2; B . Martin, 1976, pp. 15-16; J. S. 
Trimingham, 1962, pp. 161-2. 
16. J. R . Willis, forthcoming, ch. 1; 1978, pp. 196 et seq. 
17. O n the Zawäyä see, for example, J. R . Willis, 1979b, pp. 3-12; C . C . Stewart, 1976(a); 
H . T . Norris, 1968; A . A . Batran, 1972. 
18. J. R . Willis, forthcoming, ch. 3. 
541 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
inheritance: the djihäd against the enemies of Allah . . . M o u n t Sinai 
is your place of origin because of the djihad... Banu T o r o , . . . become 
like your ancestors.19 
T h e Torodbe revolutionary tradition was further underlined in a poem 
attributed to M u h a m m a d Bello, son and successor ofShaykh ' U t h m a n dan 
Fodio. T h e p o e m , if at all authentic, would have been written by Bello 
before 1837, w h e n he died. T h e poem opens with a lengthy introduction 
in praise of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , Bello's son-in-law. Thereafter, it recounts the 
'glorious' exploits of the Banu Toro (the Torodbe). It is said that al-Hadjdj 
' U m a r included the poem in his propaganda messages to the dignitaries of 
Futa Toro. 'Umar ' s intentions were obviously to impress upon the readers 
that the Fodio family fully supported his (Torodbe) djihäd: 
These [Banu Toro/Torodbe] are m y people; the origin of m y clan; 
. . . for the support of Islam they are in league; . . . of them are some 
w h o excelled in the religious sciences . . . and those w h o defended 
themselves against the wickedness of the enemy and declared djihâd.20 
T h e West African djihäd leaders had yet another fountain of inspiration 
in the 'quietiest' reform model of Shaykh al-Mukhtâr al-Kunti (1729-
1811). F r o m around 1750 until the time ofïïis death in 1811, al-Kunti held 
the mantle of the Kâdirïyya tßfika in West Africa; he was its founding 
father and spiritual director.21 It was with the 'pen' and not the 'sword' 
that al-Kunti exercised unparalleled influence in the Western Sudan. Both 
Shaykh ' U t h m a n and Shaykh A h m a d u considered him their spiritual guide 
in the Kâdirï W a y . His legal opinions on religious matters were often 
referred to by the djiKäd and his name was invoked by them to shore up 
and legitimize revolutionary action. M u h a m m a d Bello asserts that when 
al-Kunti heard of Shaykh 'Uthmän's djihäd he blessed it and predicted its 
success. ' U s m a n ibn Fudi,' he is reported to have said, 'is one of the 
accomplished saints; his djikad^ is just.'22 With these words, al-Kunti cast 
the weight of his enormous prestige behind the Torodbe leader. Although 
al-Hadjdj ' U m a r was of a different mft persuasion, he nonetheless held al-
Kunti in high esteem and was equally influenced by the latter's opinions.23 
T h e reformers were also influenced by the radical ideas of the itinerant 
Maghribian scholar M u h a m m a d ibn c A b d al-Karïm al-Maghïlï (d. 1503-
6).24 They relied heavily on his judgements to distinguish between dar al-
hlam and dar al-Harb (abode of war/infidels), to define the state of kufr 
(unbelief), and to identify lulama' al-su\ According to al-Maghïlï: 
19. J.R.Willis, 1970,pp.98-100. 
20. ibid., pp. 97-8. 
21. A . A . Batran, 1973, 1974, 1979. 
22. A . A . Batran, 1973, pp. 349-50. 
23. J .R . Willis, 1979c, p. 181. 
24. M . Hiskett, 1962, pp. 578 et seq.; M . A . al-Hajj, 1964, pp.53 et seq., J .R . Willis, 
1970, pp. 38-42 and 148-51. 
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T h e inhabitants of any land reflect the true religious sentiments of 
the ruler. If the ruler is Muslim, his land is Bilâd al-Isläm, if the ruler 
is kafir (infidel), his land is Bilad al-Kufr and flight from it to another 
is obligatory.25 
Al-Maghîl?s ruling with regard to the syncretic rulers and 'ulama' al-su1 
was clear: they were unbelievers, and dfihäd against them was obligatory 
on Muslims. Such rulers and scholars, he said, 'have covered truth with 
falsehood in a way that makes a n u m b e r of ignorant Muslims go astray.'26 
West African Muslims were by no means closed to influences from 
the outside. Religious and political developments in the Muslim East, 
particularly those that directly affected the birthplace of Islam, Arabia, had 
their repercussions throughout däral-Isläm. O n e such event was the 
reaction of Eastern süfism to the capture of Mecca (1803) and Medina 
(1805) by the Wahhâbï fundamentalists. 
Notwithstanding the rejection of some of the Wahhâbï doctrines by a 
large segment of Muslims, the W a h h â b ï revolution had naturally served as 
a catalyst for militant action in the world of Islam. Moreoever, by their 
condemnation of süfi beliefs and practices, the Wahhâbïs provoked a 
vigorous süß revival spearheaded by the Khalwatiyya tarika and the 
renowned sufi teacher, A h m a d ibn Idrïs al-Fasi (id. 1837).27 Part of that 
süß revival was the birth of the Tijâniyya order which al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
espoused and cultivated in West Africa in his capacity as Khalifa of A h m a d 
al-Tijäni. It is claimed that during his sojourn in Cairo, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
came directly under the influence of Khalwati shaykhs.28 It is also argued 
that the dfihäd of Shaykh ' U t h m â n was linked-to the Khalwati süfi re-
formism through the agency oThis mentor, Djibril ibn ' U m a r . 2 9 
If the West African dfihäds were thus considered within the context of 
the wider Islamic militant and quietist reform movements, there were 
undoubtedly 'familial' ties between the three of them. Indeed, the dfihäd of 
Shaykh ' U t h m â n , launched in 1804, reactivated the revolutionary religious 
Fervour that was fermenting underneath the surface in the Western Sudan. 
T h e Sokoto dfihäd literature 'calling upon Muslims to overthrow c o m -
promising and pagan authorities, or at least to withdraw from political rule 
of such authorities, and poetic epics in Fulfulde celebrating the exploits of 
the Fudis and the mudjahidün in Hausaland', were widely spread in Bilâd 
25. M . A . al-Hajj, 1964, p. 50; J. R . Willis, 1970, p. 38. 
26. M . A . al-Hajj, 1964, p. 56. 
27. J. O . Voll, 1969, pp. 90-103; B . G . Martin, 1972, pp. 302-3. Reaction to the Wahâbï 
anti-çûfïsm was very strong in Western Sudan. Shaykh al-Mukhtär al-Kunti issued nfetwa 
declaring that hadjdj was not obligatory on Muslims under the prevailing conditions in 
Arabia. See U . al-Naqar, 1972, pp.47-8; A . A . Batran, 1972, pp. 186-9. 
28. M . Hiskett, 1976, pp. 161-2. 
29. B . G . Martin, 1976, pp. 24-5. Is is said that Djibril ibn ' U m a r had tried unsuccessfully 
to raise the djihad in the region of Air. See F . H . El-Masri, 1963, pp. 438-9. 
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al-Südän.30 Fulbe mudjahidun from the Niger Bend are reported to have 
participated in the djihäd of Shaykh ' U t h m a n and to have carried the 
revolutionary spirit with them back to theîFrespective homelands. U n s u b -
stantiated claims not only make Shaykh A h m a d u a former student of 
Shaykh ' U t h m a n , but also an active campaigner in the latter's djihad?1 In 
âïïdition, SEaykh A h m a d u is said to have received the support an3 blessings 
of the leaders oTthe Sokoto djihad. It is also reported that Shaykh ' U t h m a n 
had personally furnished Shaykh A h m a d u with a flag to displayTJefoFe his 
marching mudjahidun?1 Furthermore, Shaykh A h m a d u corresponded with 
Abdullahi dan Fodio, brother and successor of Shaykh ' U t h m a n , seeking 
his legal opinion in regard to the status of the Massina Muslim scholars 
w h o opposed his djihäd. Apart from Shaykh A h m a d u ' s djihäd, the northern 
regions of Massina witnessed between 1816 and 1823 the outbreak of at 
least three Sokoto-inspired movements. T h e first was led by a Hausa 
scholar, M a l a m Sa'id and was directed against the Tuareg in the Guimbala. 
Sa'id's forces were however vanquished. Subsequently, M a l a m Sa'id dis-
appeared from the region and presumably returned to Hausaland. T h e two 
other djihäd leaders, al-Fakih al-Husayn Koita and Alfa A h m a d Alfaka, 
were ¿7 local Fulbe origin. Koita's movement broke out in the Fittuga, 
while that of Alfaka was centred in the Farimaka. Shaykh A h m a d u , w h o 
saw in the two movements a direct threat to his youngHina (caliphate), 
moved quickly to defeat Koita and to incorporate Alfaka as an agent of 
Hamdullahi.33 T h e third djihäd leader, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , had an extended 
stay in the Sokoto caliphate that lasted for more than six years. H e visited 
Sokoto twice on his outward and return journeys from the pilgrimage. 
While in Sokoto, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r continued his preaching and mediating 
activities and initiated followers into the Tijâniyya brotherhood. 
T h e motivating forces underlying the reform movements 
T h e establishment of a truly Islamic society and the extension of the 
frontiers of dar al-Islant were thus the objectives of the leaders of the West 
African djihäds. Islam, they believed, provided the ideal framework for the 
organization of the community as well as a means of salvation in the world 
to come. But the translation of these beliefs into reality depended on their 
ability to win over a following committed to their cause and strong enough 
to bring about the desired changes. 
A s heirs to a rich tradition of scholasticism, the future reformers had 
their education in the 'academies' of illustrious professors within their o w n 
localities and even in distant lands. There, they received intensive training 
30. W . A . Brown, 1969, pp. 66-^7; U . al-Naqar, 1972, p. 51. 
31. J. S. Trimingham, 1962, p. 177. It would appear that Shaykh A h m a d u had never 
travelled outside Massina. 
32. U . al-Naqar, 1972, p. 51; W . A . Brown, 1969, pp. 17, 22. 
33. W . A . Brown, 1969, pp.66-7. 
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in the exoteric as well as the esoteric sciences, and emerged as accomplished 
scholars and süfi shaykhs dedicated to teaching and preaching and to the 
spread of their respective süfi brotherhoods. Students w h o joined the 
peripatetic 'Zäwiya of Shaykh ' U t h m a n and Shaykh A h m a d u were initiated 
into the Kâdirïyya, while those taught by aFHad]dj 'Urnar received the 
Tijüni wird. It was this body of faithful initiates that constituted the nucleus 
of the mudjahidün. Thoroughly reared in the secrets of the Mystical W a y 
(asrar al-Târik), they faithfully upheld the ideals of their masters. Their 
absolute and blind obedience to their spiritual guides, the result of their 
süß training, made of them a potentially explosive force, ever eager to 
answer the calls of their shaykhs and to fight and die as martyrs for them. 
For, in their eyes, the shaykhs were spiritually and intellectually superior 
to all other lulamä'. T h e y were the favourite saints of Allah, the possessors 
of the baraka (Divine blessing and miraculous powers), and the only link 
between the disciples and the founders of the tarikas. Indeed, they were 
the awaited saviours and liberators of the thirteenth century of the Hidjra. 
Islam in the nineteenth-century Western Sudan undoubtedly felFfar 
short of the ideals of the reformers and their committed followers. T h e 
reformers complained of the pervasiveness of non-Islamic practices a m o n g 
rulers and subjects alike. T h e y condemned the injustices and oppression 
perpetrated by the ruling dynasties and accused them of mixing Islam with 
traditional religious customs (takhlit), and even outright unbelief. T h e y 
assailed the tulama> for tolerating, indeed endorsing the debased state into 
which Islam had sunk. A m o n g the most disturbing factors — of particular 
relevance to al-Hadjdj c U m a r - was the aggressive French (infidel) military 
and economic expansion into Futa Toro and the neighbouring countries. 
Most, if not all, of these complaints are evidently legitimate. Islamic 
influences and literacy in Arabic permeated Biläd al-Südän mainly through 
the agency of local Mus l im traders and scholars.34 T h e success that these 
proselytizers had ought not to conceal the fact that the converts did not 
altogether abandon their religious inheritance. Indeed, such non-violent 
proselytization produced, as it was bound to, a rapprochement between 
Islam and traditional African beliefs. This mixed or syncretic Islam was 
practised by members of the ruling class and their converted subjects. In 
Hausaland, Massina and the Senegambia, West African rulers not only 
exhibited a commitment to Islam, but also had intimate relationships with 
the Musl im trading and scholarly communities. T h e Musl im scholars, 
literate in Arabic and reputedly in possession of potent 'magical' powers, 
became especially useful as political and administrative functionaries in the 
royal courts. Muslim traders, with their intimate historical connection with 
the international trade in gold, salt, slaves and other items, were an 
important source of wealth. Hence, the Musl im party welcomed the patron-
age and protection of the ruling dynasties. Understandably, it tolerated the 
34. See, for example, N . Levtzion, 1973, pp. 183-99; J-S- Trimingham, 1969. 
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excessive un-Islamic indulgences of the rulers and was even prepared to 
defend them. 
T o the reformers, true Islam offered no room for compromise. Hence, 
the whole range of bid1 a (innovations, i.e. traditional religious practices 
grafted onto Islam) had to be stemmed. This was first attempted by 
preaching; by calling upon Muslims to return to pure, unadulterated Islam. 
Eventually, preaching undermined the 'constitutional' establishments as 
the reformers aimed their venom at the rulers and the court scholars. T h e y 
scourged the 'ulama' for their moral laxity, unscrupulous opportunism, 
ignorance and corruption of Islam. T h e y condemned such things as the 
oppression and corruption of the rulers, their abuse of power, their impo-
sition of uncanonical and brutal taxation on their subjects and their 'raising 
of the flag of the worldly kingdom higher than the banner of Islam'.35 Al-
Hadjdj ' U m a r warned, 'Be it known to every sensible m a n in every epoch 
of h u m a n history that those w h o involve themselves in worldly affairs 
(mukibbin 'ala ad-dunya), such as the infidel dogs, treacherous kings, and 
the corrupt 'ulamä', are subject to humiliation and disappointment in this 
world and in the hereafter.'36 That such words preached revolution is 
obvious. T h e reaction of the authorities to the menacing storm came 
quickly. They tried to nip the impending revolution in the bud. 
Predictably, the reformers considered such attempts to be acts of 
unbelief, and their perpetrators infidels. A n d since it was ordained that 'if 
the ruler is infidel, his land is Biläd al-Kufr\ the Western Sudan n o w 
represented dar al-Harb, the conquest and incorporation of which into dar 
al-hïàm was obligatory on Muslims. Within a few years, the mudjahidun 
and their allies swept away the authority of the sarkis of the Hausa states, 
that of the ardos of Massina and the famas of Segu and Kaarta, as well as 
the authority of the almamis of B u n d u , Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro. 
Hausaland was consequently transformed into a caliphate under the lead-
ership of amir al-mu'miriin (Commander of the Believers) ' U t h m â n dan 
Fodio; Massina became a dina (caliphate) with Shaykh A h m a d Lobbo, n o w 
holding the title oí amir- al-mu'miriin, as its ruler; aruTthe Senegambia and 
Massina were in turn united as the Tijâniyya caliphate under the authority 
of Khalifat Khatim al-Awlyya', al-Hadjdj ' U m a r . 
T h e mudjahidun w h o humbled the mighty powers of Biläd al-Südän 
were of different social and ethnic backgrounds. T h e y came from the 
Fulbe, the Hausa, the M a n d e , the Wolof, and the Tuareg; from nomadic 
pastoralists, semi-settled and settled communities; from the ranks of literate 
<ulama> and murids (süß disciples), and the illiterate societies; and from caste 
groups, and manumitted and bonded slaves. Each group had its particular 
grievances, and all shared the dream of great advantages accruing to them 
if the status quo was changed. 
35. M . A . al-Hajj, 1964, p. 50. 
36. O . Jah, 1973, p. 184. 
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At the core of the mudjahidun were the students (murldsjtaUbs) w h o 
followed the shaykhs in their preaching tours (siyaha) and accompanied 
them in theirTorced emigration {hidjra) from the land of kufr. Together 
with the independent or self-supporting scholars w h o joined the camps of 
the shaykhs, they constituted the ajama1 a (the Communi ty of the Faithful). 
Driven By religious zeal and guided by the visions of the shaykhs, the 
djama'a became the staunchest strugglers in the path of Allah Jmudjahidün 
Jisabil Allah). Certainly, the religious fervour that the reformers hadignited 
did spread to some Musl im elements outside the immediate djama'a w h o , 
spellbound by the charisma of the shaykhs, threw in their lot with the 
reformers. But these 'insiders', the vanguard of reform, were by no means 
numerically or militarily superior to the armies that the West African rulers 
had under their c o m m a n d . Hence, victory was m a d e possible only after 
the ranks of the djama'a had been swollen by 'outsiders' w h o , doubtless, 
formed the majority of the fighting forces. These 'outsiders' were certainly 
syncretists (mukhallitün), but their participation in the djihäd decidedly 
closed the socio-religious gap that had separated them from the djamala. 
T h e imperfects were n o w brought into the fold of the mudjahidun whose 
ultimate reward was paradise. 
T h e bulk of the 'insiders', and perhaps the 'outsiders' as well, were 
Fulbe in origin. T h e reformers themselves had close ties with the Fulbe 
and the leadership of the caliphates was Fulbe dominated. This pre-
ponderant Fulbe influence in the reform movements has led some to 
conclude that the djihäd was a series of ethnic wars designed to foster Fulbe 
domination over their host countries. T o be sure, some Fulbe had joined 
the djihäd out of a sense of ethnic solidarity. However, it is evident that 
large numbers of Fulbe fought on the side of the anti-djihad forces. Again, 
the djihäds of Shaykli A h m a d u L o b b o and al-Hadjdj ' U m a r were in large 
part directed against Fulbe political leadership in Massina and the Sene-
gambia. 
T h e Fulbe diaspora from Futa Toro predated the djihäd by some four 
or five centuries. Wherever they went, the Fulbe, largely cattle herders, 
lived outside the confines of urban centres and agriculturalist societies. 
Their seasonal search for water and pastures, however, took them into 
settled agricultural areas in the south, and Tuareg regions in the north.37 
In the dry season the Fulbe were forced to graze their cattle on farmlands. 
This seasonal pressure on the agriculturalists, particularly at the time w h e n 
crops were still being harvested, aroused tension between the agriculturalist 
communities and the pastoral Fulbe. Further still, by coming within reach 
of the urban-based authorities, the Fulbe were subjected to taxation, and 
to restrictions on the movements of their herds and use of water sources.38 
T h e Fulbe were also forced to pay fines for damages that their cattle caused 
to crops. During the wet seasons, the Fulbe moved their herds to drier 
37. W . A . Brown, 1969, p. 60; M . Last, 1967, pp. lxii-lxiii; M . Hiskett, 1976, p. 138. 
38. M . Last, 1967; pp. lxii-lxxiv; M . Hiskett, 1976, p. 138. 
547 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
areas in the north where they competed with the Tuareg for water sources. 
It was during that time that the cattle of the Fulbe bore the brunt of Tuareg 
raids.39 Moreover, Tuareg depredations and pressure on the nomadic Fulbe 
increased whenever drought or famine struck the Sahel. T h e Fulbe had 
long chafed at the restrictions, the taxes, the fines, and the constant threat 
to their herds. T h e djihad offered them a welcome alternative: freedom 
from the burden of taxes and fines, and security from Tuareg pillage. 
Besides, the Fulbe of Massina and Senegambia had other complaints. 
In about the middle of the eighteenth century, the Bambara of Segu 
succeeded in extending their suzerainty over the Fulbe of Massina. T h e 
famas of Segu did not, however, administer Massina directly. They relied 
on the local ruling dynasties, the arma (descendants of the Moroccan 
conquerors of Songhay) to oversee the towns of Jenne, Timbuktu and 
Sungojo, and the Fulbe Dikko warlords to govern the rest of the Niger 
Bend on their behalf. The famas exacted an annual tribute from the Fulbe, 
said to have consisted of'ioo boys, ioo girls, ioo male horses, ioo female 
horses, a measure of gold', and a large number of cattle.40 Moreover, the 
herds of the Fulbe became fair game for the Bambara overlords and the 
Dikko, w h o habitually raided Fulbe camps. T h e arma joined in the forays. 
It is said that on one occasion (1810-11), the Bambara spent some four 
months in Massina pillaging Fulbe cattle and seizing large quantities of 
rice from the farmers. T h e enslavement of the Fulbe and the plundering 
of their cattle, as well as the unrestrained use of violence against them by 
the Bambara and the local authorities were among the major factors behind 
the Fulbe alliance with Shaykh A h m a d u . 
Apparently, Shaykh "Shmadu's djihâd was one of a series of Fulbe-
inspired attempts to overthrow Bambara hegemony in the region. T h e 
nationalist struggle was championed by the Fulbe leaders, H a m m a d i 
Badejio and his son, Golajio. In 1815-16, only two years before Shaykh 
A h m a d u began his djihad, Golajio had captured the region of KunaTTfrom 
the Bambara. Shaykh A h m a d u quickly allied himself to these patriotic 
forces. T h e coalition w o n a resounding victory against the Dikko and the 
Bambara at the battle of N u k u m a . 4 1 
T h e Fulbe of the Senegambia fared no better than their kinsmen else-
where. They too suffered from the ravages and the harsh rule of the 
Torodbe almamis w h o m they had helped put in power a century or two 
earlier. For by the middle of the nineteenth century, the almamis turned 
into oppressive hereditary oligarchies that preyed on their subjects. Fur-
thermore, the almamis entered into economic and political partnership with 
the French w h o m they allowed to construct fortified posts along the valley 
39. W . A . Brown, 1969, pp. 35-6; M . Last, 1967, p. lxiii. 
40. W . A . Brown, 1969, p. 182, n. 25. 
41. ibid., passim. N u k u m a was the decisive battle that resulted in the establishment of 
the Hamdullahi caliphate. ' 
548 
Nineteenth-century Islamic revolutions in West Africa 
of the Senegal river. T h e military presence of the French and their growing 
authority in the area were strongly resented by the pious a m o n g the Fulbe 
w h o considered them (as Christians) to be ahl adh-dhimma (protected 
people) to be tolerated provided they paid the prescribed djizya (poll tax 
or tribute) and exercised no influence in dar al-hläm.42 T h e refusal of the 
French to pay the djizya, or any other tax for that matter, was considered 
incompatible with their status as tributaries under Muslim law. It is thus 
not surprising that the Fulbe of Futa Toro responded enthusiastically to 
the appeal of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r to join his djihâd against the corrupt local 
rulers and the 'infidel' French. Throughout the different phases of the 
djihäd, Futa Toro, 'Umar's h o m e area, continued to furnish the bulk of the 
Tijäni mudjahidün. 
Similarly, the reformers drew substantial support from the immense 
slave population and caste groups that existed in Bilâd al-Südan. T h e 
nineteenth-century Sudanic aristocracy, that is the ruling dynasties and 
the scholarly and trading communities, depended to a large extent on the 
toil of and trade in these servile groups for its wealth and prestige. 
T h e endogamous caste clans were employed in socially inferior artisanal 
occupations, such as blacksmithing, fishing, weaving and tanning. Slaves 
were employed in farming, herding, domestic services, and in fighting (as 
warriors and bodyguards). 
It would appear that the enormous pool of slaves that had existed in the 
Western Sudan increased greatly on the eve of the djihad as a result of the 
availability of firearms, and the dramatic expansionan the export of slaves 
to the European merchants on the coast.43 T h e aristocracy in the region 
preyed on peasants and pastoralists, and on Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. T h e fear of loss of freedom, and the violence that accompanied slave-
raiding drove scores of would-be victims to seek refuge with the shaykhs. 
Muslim and non-Muslim slaves likewise sought redemption by joiïïîng~tne 
djihad and becoming members of the new society. Consequently, slaves 
constituted a considerable proportion of the mudjahidün and the flock of 
students and initiates that had gathered around the reformers. Both Shaykh 
A h m a d u and al-Hadjd) ' U m a r successfully appealed to slaves to fight on 
their side. Shaykh A h m a d u is said to have announced, 'All you tnachube 
[slaves] w h o came to m e today are liberated. All the tnachube will find 
paradise with m e . ' 4 4 It is not without significance that Shaykh A h m a d u 
m a d e his stand against the Bambara and the Dikko at the Sebera, a region 
that was densely populated with slaves and caste groups. 
T h e indebtedness of the reformers to the servile groups was boundless. 
42. J. R . Willis, 1970, pp. 160 et seq.; O . Jah, pp. 152-3, 179-81, 205 et seq. 
43. J . R . Willis, 1978, pp. 208-10; W . A . Brown, 1969, pp. 114-15, 124-5; M . Hiskett, 
1976, pp. 138-9; P . E . Lovejoy, 1983, pp. 188-99. I' was estimated that by the middle of 
the nineteenth century the slave population in Futa Jallon was almost half the total 
population of the region. 
44. W . A . Brown, 1969, pp. 188-9, footnote no. 52. 
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Consequently, they rewarded them abundantly. Slaves were manumitted, 
and were endowed with the legal share of the booty. A few of them 
filled prestigious positions in the administration. Hence, one meets in the 
caliphates 'with the strange paradox of the lowest orders of humanity 
ascending to the highest offices of state'.45 
The Community of the Faithful in dar al-Hidjra 
T h e teaching and preaching of the reformers had continued for several 
decades before the authorities detected any sign of danger. But once the 
teachers turned into political agitators, the rulers and their 'ulama* were 
quick to expel them from their midst, to restrict their activities, and to 
harass their followers.46 T h e inevitable violent confrontation took place 
following the expulsion of the shaykhs and their retinue from their centres 
of Degel in Hausaland, K u b y in Massina, and Jugunku in Futa Jallon, and 
their subsequent settlement in dar al-Hidjra. There, in G u d u (1804), 
N u k u m a (1816-17) a n ^ Dinguiraye (1849), t n e djama'a took its definite 
shape. Far removed from the immediate attention of the authorities, the 
djama'a n o w prepared itself for the imminent eruption. A r m s were collected 
and stored, defences were erected, and ' U t h m ä n dan Fodio and Shaykh 
A h m a d u Lobbo assumed the title oí amir al-mu'miriin. Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , it 
must be remembered, had already been appointed Khalifat Khatim al-
Awlyya'. 
A continuous stream of a whole population of refugees, either responding 
to the appeals of the shaykhs or fleeing from persecution, m a d e its way to 
dar al-Hidjra. Teachers and their students, slaves and free m e n , and 
peasants and nomads milled around the leaders of the djihads. T h e atmos-
phere inside the settlements was one of great religious intensity and 
expectations. Students were instructed in Islamic sciences, particularly 
süßsm, and were initiated into the Kâdirïyya and Tijäniyya süß orders. It 
is to be expected that there was endless discussion of the events that led 
to the hidjra (emigration) and its parallelism with the hidjra of the Prophet 
from Mecca to Medina (622), as well as of war preparations. 
T h e hidjra was certainly the most critical phase in the careers of the 
reformers. It was, however, by no means self-imposed, nor was it, as most 
scholars would have us believe, deliberately undertaken to legitimize the 
djihàd*1 Again, the hidjra was not, as is generally argued, a fundamental 
prerequisite for the West African reform movements, for the revolts would 
have erupted even if the hidjra had never taken place. T o be sure, the 
45. J. R . Willis, forthcoming, ch. 3. 
46. A . A . Batran, 1974, p.49. 
47. O . Jah, 1973, pp. 180-5, maintains that it was not certain whether al-HadjdjJUmar 
had left Jugunku voluntarily or had been forcibly expelled. N o n e the less, he argues that 
the Almami of Futa Jallon did decide to expel ' U m a r and that the Almami could have made 
conditions too difficult for the Shaykh_and his djama'a to remain in Jugunku. 
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drama began to unfold several years before the hidjra. Quoting the Tazyyn 
al-Warakat of Abdullahi dan Fodio, F . H . el-Masri explained that prep-
arations for the Sokoto djihäd, particularly the collection of arms, had 
begun since 1797.48 B y that time, the djjhad had developed an almost 
unstoppable m o m e n t u m ; it had certainly matured in the mind of Shaykh 
'Uthrnan: 
A r m s had been collected since 1797 when the community had 
demanded to break with unbelievers and wage a djihad but D a n Fodio 
asked them rather to arm themselves. H e himself turned to prayer 
and sought the intercession of his Shaykh, 'Abdal-Kädir al-Djaylani 
to let him see Hausaland ruled by Islamic law.49 
Equally, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r ' s activities (recruitment of followers, agitation, 
and the collection of arms) before his hidjra to Dinguiraye (1849) nacl 
sufficiently alarmed the authorities in Massina, Segu, and throughout the 
Senegambia, to either detain him, plot his assassination, or deny him 
passage through their territories. ' U m a r ' s choice of Jugunku, his first 
academic centre, according to Willis, was not accidental, for its geographical 
location 'afforded [the Shaykh] a convenient place from which he could 
venture into an active tracTe in arms and armaments'.50 Stripped of its post-
djikâd pious trappings, the hidjra, or more correctly the forced exile of 
the reformers, still proved to be invaluable. It removed the djattfa from 
immediate danger and afforded the time to prepare for the inevitable 
confrontation. 
Undoubtedly, the reformers had an overwhelming advantage over their 
adversaries. They profoundly believed in the sacredness of their mission; 
and they were able to articulate the grievances and frustrations of the 
masses. Above all, they had the unflinching loyalty of the djama'a, for sûfï 
education stressed complete and blind obedience to the person of Shaykh 
aUTañka. According to the süßs: 
T h e murld [disciple/initiated] is he w h o has no wish other than the 
wish of his shaikh. H e must lose himself in his shaikh to such an 
extent that nothing of himself is left for him. H e is [to be] like the 
corpse between [sic] the hands of the mortician, or the pen between 
the fingers of the copyist.51 
T h e reformers had yet another asset in their personal religious charisma. 
As spiritual guides of süß brotherhoods, they were recognized as saints and 
possessors of the Divine baraka. These powers, so their followers believed, 
enabled the shaykhs to relieve natural disasters such as drought and famine, 
to fertilize the land", animals and w o m e n , to smite their enemies, etc. Stories 
48. F . H . El-Masri, 1978, p. 23. 
49. ibid. 
50. J. R . Willis, 1970, p. 90. 
51. A . A . Batran, 1974, p.49. 
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about the shaykhf miracles were widely circulated and believed. In a 
society that nurtured a strong belief in the existence of supernatural forces, 
the reputed efficacious fmagical' powers of the shaykhs contributed 
immeasurably to their popularity.52 A n d the numerous unsuccessful 
attempts on their lives were strong proof of their Divine protection. 
Moreover, their intellectual superiority, their ascetic life style, and their 
distance from the 'corrupt' rulers, underscored the confidence that the 
masses had in them. 
T h e reformers did not hastily plunge their followers into reckless adven-
turism. Their retaliation to provocations came after thorough preparation 
and at a time chosen by them. Shaykh ' U t h m ä n , for example, warned 
against adventurism for 'it only results in failure and drags weak Muslims 
into perdition'.53 Hence, their conquest of such large areas was a testimony 
to their careful planning. They certainly w o n their victories 'despite the 
strength of their opponents', for there is no conclusive evidence to support 
the commonly held view that dynastic rivalries, and an alleged general 
decline in the power of the Sudanic states were major factors in the success 
of the djihads.54 
It isTnteresting to note that while the djikàds of Shaykh ' U t h m a n and 
Shaykh A h m a d u were mainly restricted to their h o m e regions of Hausaland 
and Massina, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r ' s movement , launched from the eastern 
borderline of Futa Jallon, aimed at the conquest of the whole of the Western 
Sudan. ' U m a r was never able to secure his homeland, Futa Toro, for by 
that time the French were well entrenched in the area. H e did, however, 
attack the French positions at Medina (Médine) (1857) and M a t a m (1858— 
9) but his forces were repulsed with heavy losses. Subsequently, he turned 
his attention towards the east to devour Segu (1861) and the caliphate of 
Hamdullahi (1862). 
It is not difficult to imagine h o w far east al-Hadjdj ' U m a r contemplated 
extending his caliphate. His objective was simply to establish the authority 
of Khalifat Khatim al-Awlyya' over the entire Biläd al-Südän.55 His 'inter-
national' conquests were m a d e possible by the fact that his forces were 
more broadly based than those of Shaykh ' U t h m ä n and Shaykh A h m a d u . 
They were drawn from all the regions; and were composecTof largely well-
trained and well-equipped Tijäni affiliates w h o m al-Hadjdj ' U m a r had 
personally initiated during his extensive travels throughout the Western 
Sudan. His eastern drive however came to an end following his tragic death 
in Massina (1864). 
52. M . Last, 1967, pp. 3-13; W . A . Brown, 1969, pp. 48,116, 123; O . Jah, 1973 pp. 237 
et seq. 
53. F . H . El-Masri, 1978, p. 22. 
54. M . Hiskett, 1976, p. 139. 
55. O . J a h , 1973, passim. 
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S o m e consequences of the d[ihads 
It was for the first and perhaps the last time that such huge territories in 
Biläd al-Südän were transformed into centralized Islamic theocracies. But 
the degree of centralization differed from one caliphate to the other. It 
would appear that it was only in Hamdullahi (1818-62), with its small area, 
its small homogeneous population, and its good communications, that a 
high degree of centralization was achieved. A s a result, Shaykh A h m a d u 
and his successors were able to apply the sharTa to an extent tKat was not 
possible in the other caliphates. 
T h e supreme offices of amir al-mu'minln (al-Hadjdj ' U m a r ' s son and 
successor, A h m a d , assumed that title as well) and that of Shaykh al-Tarlka 
were vested in the descendants of the reformers w h o resided in the capital 
cities. T h e caliphates were divided into imarat (emirates), each governed 
by a top-ranking mudjahld. M o s t of the amirs (provincial governors) were 
scholars, but clan leaders and freed slaves (al-Hadjdj ' U m a r is said to have 
entertained a preference for slaves) were to be found among them. In later 
years appointment to high-ranking positions depended, to a large extent, 
on blood ties to the caliphal line or to prestigious mudjahidun. 
In general, traditional power and social standing were transferred to a 
n e w elite, the mudjahidun. Since the Fulbe had formed the backbone of 
the fighters, they tEus became the aristocrats par excellence of the Western 
Sudan. They filled most of the administrative positions, and m a n y of them 
were settled on land alienated during the course of the djihäd. Fulbe and 
other landowners depended on slave labour to farm their agricultural 
holdings.56 It seems that the proportion of slaves to freemen in the caliphates 
remained at the high level it had reached in pre-dßhäd days. Slaves w h o 
had participated in the djihâd were freed, but those w h o had not gone over 
to the shaykhs were re-enslaved. M o r e slaves were secured in raids across 
frontiers and" in rebellions. T h e legal status of captured slaves was spelt 
out in úv&fatwa (legal opinion) of al-Maghïlî: 
As for one you find in their [unbelievers'] hands, as a slave, w h o 
claims to be a free-born Muslim, his word is to be accepted until 
proof is established to confirm that he is a slave . . . A n y person you 
leave from among them, because he claims that he is a free-born 
Muslim, then it becomes evident to you that he was unbeliever, 
enslave him again.57 
All individuals and groups within the caliphates were afforded protection 
and security. T h e southern movements of pastoral groups were regulated 
to minimize tension between them and the peasant communities. Northern 
frontiers and pastures were constantly watched to restrain Tuareg raids. 
56. M . Last, 1974, p.28; P . E . Lovejoy, 1983, pp. 188-99. According t 0 Last, the 
settlement of the pastoral Fulbe was more intensive in Sokoto than in the other caliphates. 
57. F . H . El-Masri (ed.), 1979, p. 119. 
553 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
A n d slave-raiding within the communities was stopped. SkarTa courts were 
established and kädis (judges) were appointed by the caliphs and the amirs. 
M a n y un-Islamic practices were banned. For example prohibition on 
drinking of alcohol was strictly enforced; the hated taxes of the discredited 
regimes were replaced by the canonical zakät (tithe), kharadj (land 
tax), and djizya; the number of wives was restricted to four, etc.3^ Taxes 
were allocated and collected by the amirs w h o , more often than not, levied 
them arbitrarily. 
T h e revolutions achieved their greatest success in the fields of education 
and conversion. Schools were founded throughout the caliphates, and a 
large number of missionaries penetrated unconverted areas. A cadre of Süß 
teachers emerged. S o m e teachers settled in the newly founded cultural and 
learning centres such as Sokoto, G w a n d u , Hamdullahi and Segu, as well 
as in other towns and villages. Other teachers pursued the traditionally 
honoured siyaha. But most teachers, especially those in the outlying 
districts, had to wrestle with the eternal problem oîtakhlit. M a n y traditional 
norms were eventually tolerated. Indeed once the initial zeal had subsided, 
some of the original ideals slowly bowed to pragmatism and the passage of 
time. T h e sheer size of the caliphates and the dominant presence of the 
'imperfect outsiders' within the djama'a made compromises unavoidable. 
It must be remembered that although the declared objective of the 
reformers was the realization of an ideal Islam, most of the mudjahidün 
espoused more mundane motives. Nonetheless, the djihäd resulted in the 
entrenchment of Islam and the two rival $üß brotherhoods, the Kädiriyya 
and the Tijäniyya, in West Africa. T h e Torodbe Islamic revolutionary 
tradition was kept alive by a new generation oidßhäd leaders such as M a b a 
Diakhou of the Gambia (c. 1809-67), M a h m a d u Lamin of Senegambia 
(1885-8), and Samori Ture of Guinea (1879-98) w h o rose in the n a m e of 
Islam against the foreign invaders and their local allies but were finally 
overwhelmed by the might of the European war machine.59 
58. A . G . Hopkins, 1973, p. 144, states that the ban on alcohol raised the demand in 
Hausaland for kola, a stimulant that was not prohibited by Muslim law. 
59. I. Hrbek, 1979; C . A . Quinn, 1979; Y . Person, 1979. 
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M . LAST 
Introduction 
T h e Sokoto caliphate and Borno are part of a single region, in which for 
most of the nineteenth century the caliphate was the dominant partner. But 
also within that region were other states and peoples whose contribution, 
willingly made or not, was very considerable. In this chapter I will, 
however, outline only the political structures and general developments 
within the caliphate and Borno in the belief that these largely determined 
the shape of the region's c o m m o n history. 
In the past fifteen years almost every state in the region has been the 
subject of at least one, more or less detailed, historical study, and almost 
without exception these studies have been confined to political develop-
ments. M o r e recently religious and n o w economic themes have been taken 
up, but despite the quantity of material available there are still large gaps 
both in our data and in our understanding. This chapter does not attempt 
a synthesis of all these studies; it is meant instead to suggest a framework 
for understanding the history of the region in the years 1820 to 1880 and 
for opening some further avenues for research. 
T h e emphasis here is put on the period 1820-80, the period w h e n 
relatively stable government had been re-established following the fighting, 
the famines and the dislocation of civil society during the period of wars 
k n o w n as the djihad. But by way of introduction, the period c.1775-
1820 will be summarized in three sections: the first, c.1775-95, w h e n the 
expression of discontent a m o n g the Musl im reformist party in such states 
as Gobir was both peaceful and successful; the second, tr.1795-1810, w h e n 
the clash of interests and ideas pushed the various parties involved in state 
affairs into a full-scale war; and the third, c. 1810-20, when the n e w 
governments sought to cope with the consequences of war, in some cases 
trying out new methods of administration, in others trying out n e w sites 
for settlement. T h e real achievement of the administrations after f.1820 
was their success in bringing back to the region a stability that was the 
foundation for an unprecedented economic b o o m : a period of growth on a 
scale not seen in the region since perhaps the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. 
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The Sokoto caliphate and Borno 
T h e social cost of this success was the loss of m u c h local autonomy, both 
political and economic, as well as the loss of a particular style of life: though 
these losses were resisted, the full history of this resistance has yet to be 
written. 
c. 1775-95: the opening door to reform 
T h e areas where the Muslim reform party was strongest and w o n the most 
notable successes were not in Borno itself but in the Hausa states and N u p e 
which had once been part of a wider Borno 'caliphate'. In the context of 
urban politics, rulers mainly in favour of religious reform came to power 
for example in N u p e (the Etsu Jibril), in K a n o (the Sarki Alwali), in Zaria 
(the Sarki Ishäk) and in Katsina (the Sarki Gozo); even in Gobir, Kebbi 
and Zamfara where Shaykh 'Uthmln dan Fodio (Usman dan Fodio) was 
preaching reform to an increasing following, the sultans in the region (such 
as Bawa Jan Gwarzo at Alkalawa) were prepared to come to a political 
agreement with the reformers. It was, however, in the countryside where 
the reform movement was most radical and was achieving spectacular 
success. L e d initially (but rashly) by al-Hadjdj Jibril al-Aqdasi (from 
Agades) but developed with great skill by Shaykh ' U t h m a n , the reform 
movement was at first primarily concerned with spreading better Islamic 
education and practice throughout the rural areas, while the Shaykh (like 
other scholars elsewhere in the region) acted as tutor and adviser to the 
sultans in his area. After c.1788, however, the movement sought to establish 
autonomous communities of its own, mainly on the margins of Hausa 
states, and to claim for Muslims living in existing settlements the rights of 
an autonomous'caste'.1 
T h e shift away from a strategy of reforming the state to a strategy of 
autonomy within or outside the state paralleled political developments in 
other contexts. T h e Gobir state had largely ceased to pay tribute to Borno 
(and had perhaps forfeited thereby some of its formal Islamic legitimacy 
in the eyes of the reformers); similarly, the sultanate of Mandara, immedi-
ately to the south of Borno, had successfully fought for its independence 
from Borno, ¿•.1781, while even within Borno the local ruler of Daya was 
ready to try and assert his autonomy.2 At a time of political fragmentation 
the reformers, it seems, recognized that their successes in getting reform-
1. For an extended study of the life of Shaykh 'Uthman, see M . Hiskett, 1973. A 
contemporary account is in U . F . Malumfashi7~i973. For a new analysis of the movement 
within its wider West African context, see M . Last (1988). 
2. O n Mandara, see B . M . Barkindo, 1980. O n eighteenth-century Borno, see J . E . 
Lavers, 1980, pp.206-9. Daya finally revolted, it is thought, about 1805, cf. S . W . Koelle, 
1854, pp. 212-23. T h e broader reasons for the decline of Borno on the one hand, and the 
increasing acceptance of Islam in rural areas on the other, are complex and m u c h debated. 
Economic factors include the shift in eighteenth-century trade away from a northern to a 
more southern orientation, and a consequent increase in the importance of rural producer-
traders and their struggle for a free market. 
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minded sultans appointed could only be temporary, and that the better 
solution - having their o w n autonomous communities and their rights as 
an autonomous 'caste' — was likely to be longer lasting, if more dangerous 
to attain. But as a strategy it has two other advantages: first, it was a 
solution used earlier not only in Borno but elsewhere in West Africa; 
secondly, and more importantly, it paralleled the experience of the Prophet 
at Mecca . 
c. 1795-1810: the military confrontation 
O n e consequence of claiming, and getting, special rights within the Musl im 
state for Muslims of a particular persuasion (the reformers were dis-
tinguished by the n a m e 'Kadirawa' in Hausa on account of their m e m -
bership of the Kâdirïyya brotherhood) was that local government officials 
were thus deprived of their authority to adjudicate and tax all their subjects. 
A s increasing numbers (including slaves) claimed the n e w privileged status, 
political authorities at the local level rejected m a n y of the n e w claims and 
used military force to reimpose their authority. In the turmoil slaves 
escaped and m a d e their way to freedom in the newly autonomous c o m -
munities, which refused to return them, on the grounds that they were 
Muslims, to their owners. T h e measures the government took to restore 
order and recoup its lossses only exacerbated the rift between rural and 
urban society: officials were apt to raid markets and confiscate people's 
produce and livestock. M o r e significantly, attacks, possibly as reprisals, 
were launched against Fulbe (Fulani, Peul) pastoralists, to enslave them and 
seize their cattle, on the assumption that the reformers (a large proportion of 
w h o m spoke the Fulbe language, Fulfulde) would thus be forced to call 
off their activities. With hindsight it was arguably the most fateful decision 
of the war: it drove the pastoralists into the reformers' c a m p and so enabled 
the reformers in the long run to withstand disastrous setbacks, with the 
result that the reformers and their pastoralist allies eventually w o n the war; 
it gave the pastoralist military faction an unintended influence in the post-
djihad state, and so altered considerably the way the n e w state came to be 
administered; finally, it reinforced the stereotype that the djihäd was merely 
a Fellata (Fulbe) war, as the Borno scholars called it; and consequently 
gave substance to the jibe that the caliphate was a 'Fulbe empire'.3 
Formal war was declared in 1804 after Shaykh ' U t h m a n m a d e the hidjra 
with his community from Degel to G u d u where the Shaykh was then 
elected imam of the n e w 'state'. B y the beginning of iSofj war flags had 
been distributed regionally and commanders formally appointed for each 
3. For contemporary accusations that the djihâd was a Fulbe affair, see the letters from 
Borno quoted in M . Bello, 1951, and the letter from the scholar 'Abd al-Salâm quoted in 
M . Bello, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 18-35. M u c h of the detailed campaigning in the djihâd is known 
only for the Sokoto area, from contemporary documents: for summaries based on these, 
see M . Hiskett, 1973; M . Last, 1967. 
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area. Within each of the Hausa states, the reformers' strategy was for units 
to continue to operate locally and then unite for a concerted attack on the 
state capital. T h u s the Shaykh's forces operated independently of, for 
example, their allies in K a n o , "while within K a n o each unit fought its o w n 
separate campaign. A disaster in one battle did not therefore endanger the 
whole movement , but decentralization of c o m m a n d was to have important 
political consequences later. 
T h e reformers, using guerrilla tactics and weaponry, were relatively 
secure in the countryside; their main losses, they said, came not from 
fighting, but from famine and epidemic disease. But on at least two 
occasions the Shaykh's army came near to being wiped out (Tsuntsua, 
1804; Alwassa,~i8o5)7and these losses, of scholars and students especially, 
m a d e the Shaykh more than ever dependent on pastoralist support. Fur-
thermore, because of the famine, more and more Tuareg were being forced 
south to buy or seize food, and they were n o w in competition with the 
reformers and their pastoralist allies for scarce pasture and grain. Until 
n o w , (f.1804), the reformers, amongst w h o m were a number of Tuareg 
scholars and w h o counted the Sultan of Agades as an ally, had been able 
to prevent serious clashes with the Tuareg. 
T o bring the war to a quick end it was necessary, however, to capture, 
and hold, the sultan's palace in each of the states. For the war was about 
'kingship' and not, at this stage, m u c h about territory. Only in Borno was 
the authority of the mai strong enough to survive the loss of his capital, 
Birni Ngazargamo; in part because the reformers were themselves unable 
to hold onto the capital once they had captured it (in the end the site was 
simply abandoned). Militarily, kingship was symbolized, and defended, by 
heavy cavalry, of which the state had the effective monopoly. T h e reformers' 
b o w m e n and spearmen with their superior morale and a few horsemen, 
and so long as they chose their ground, might be able tactically to defeat 
in battle the rather ineffective state cavalry sent against them. But to win 
the war, the reformers needed their o w n cavalry, and some of the military 
organization it required. 'Guerrillas' had to become government. 
B y January 1809, a^ t n e main Hausa states had capitulated and their 
sultans had fled into exile, after four years of intermittent campaigning. 
T h e hardest fighting had been endured by the Shaykh's forces in Gobir. 
T h e success of the outnumbered, out-equipped Muslim reformers, first in 
battle and then in their final series of triumphs in state after state during 
1807 a n d 1808 seemed to them to be both a miracle and proof of the 
Tightness of their cause; the parallel, again, with the Prophet's success at 
the battle of Badr only confirmed it. 
c. 1810-20: the aftermath of war 
After the four years of fighting, famine and epidemics, the main problem 
was reconstruction. For some of the defeated - the mai of Borno, for 
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example, or the ex-sultans of the Hausa states - the task was to instal 
themselves in places of exile, reassemble their courts and build up their 
armies again in order to recover their lost kingdoms. T h e most successful 
were the mais of Borno, the least so were perhaps the ex-sultans of K a n o , 
whilst others merely came to terms with the n e w regime. In some areas, 
such as N u p e , the war was not yet over, in other areas, such as Q y o , it had 
scarcely begun. 
For the victorious Muslim reformers, reconstruction was complicated 
by the need to keep precisely to Islamic law. Initially Shaykh ' U t h m a n had 
been very strict in his interpretation of what was legal and illegal for a 
proper Muslim, but after 1810 he gradually altered his position, tolerating 
practices (such as the use of music) he had earlier condemned.4 Nonetheless 
the concern of all the djihad leaders - Shaykh/Uthmän, his brother 'Abdullah 
and the Shaykh's son M u h a m m a d Bello - was to appoint at all levels of 
the administration m e n with both the education to understand Islamic law 
and the personal authority to implement it. But casualties among scholars 
and students had been especially high during the war, and even in Sokoto 
at this time there were not enough learned m e n to post as local amirs, 
judges and imams to the rural areas. Elsewhere in the caliphate the shortage 
in this early period was even more acute, despite the Shaykh's policy of 
sending students back to their h o m e areas. Inevitably~the"shortfall was 
m a d e good by appointing kinsmen w h o could be supervised from the 
centre. 
A stop-gap solution to the shortage of personnel was to employ former 
officials of the previous regime. Initially some were given territorial or 
judicial posts - in K a n o , they were known as Hausawa - but their loyalty 
to the new government soon came under suspicion, and m a n y at the local 
level were replaced. Similarly there was a problem over whether to allow 
traders from formerly 'enemy areas' to come and buy in the markets of the 
caliphate. F r o m early on, this cross-frontier trade seems to have been 
regarded with suspicion, and Hausa traders w h o had stayed behind, or 
local Hausa officials w h o wanted to restore an economy based on trading, 
found themselves in a difficult position. 
Given the inexperience of the n e w administration and thé potential for 
distrust, the burden of supervising the caliphal government was initially 
enormous. 'A ; great number of complaints and disputes from all over the 
caliphate came to the Shaykh for arbitration. First there were the disputes 
among military commanders and among scholars over w h o should be 
allocated what territory to administer. But in practice a number of such 
disputes were resolved either by force or by the aggrieved party setting 
himself up independently of his rival and owing allegiance to the Shaykh 
direct. A second group of problems consisted of claims arising out ~oï 
misconduct by the djihäd armies during the war: cases of wrongful enslave-
4. For a fuller examination of this shift in attitude, see F . H . El-Masri, 1978, pp. 13-33. 
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ment or wrongful seizure of property or land. A third group were problems 
a m o n g disillusioned scholars, caused in part by the Shaykh's earlier 
espousal of millenarian ideas, about which after 1810 he changecTnis mind.5 
Nonetheless at least one n e w claimant to Mahdist leadership came forward 
and attracted support away from the n e w caliphate, and he was executed 
by staking. But there continued to be other dissident scholars, such as D a n 
Buya or those with ' A b d al-Sallm. 
Inevitably the number and complexity of disputes became too m u c h for 
the Shaykh, w h o n o w retired to teach and write: he fell ill c. 1815 and died 
two years later. A s five years earlier, in 1812, the task of arbitrating disputes 
had been divided between 'Abdullah dan Fodio and the Shaykh's son 
M u h a m m a d Bello, there was no dramatic shift in policy at the Shaykh's 
death. O n e reason for the number of disputes lay in the structure of emirate 
government in this early period, in which the pattern of decentralized 
military c o m m a n d had been carried over from the days of djihäd. T h e 
amir, though the original appointee and 'flag-bearer', was still only the first 
a m o n g equals; in some cases there was more than one 'flag-bearer' in a 
territory, while in other cases the original appointee proved too weak to 
assert his authority. By 1820, some of the older 'flag-bearers' had died, or 
a m o d u s vivendi had been reached. 
Finally, at this early period, the areas under the full control of the 
reformers were relatively restricted. In Sokoto itself, the settled, secure 
zone was perhaps as small as a strip 40 k m wide was 65 k m long, stretching 
south from Sokoto. Similarly in K a n o , Katsina, Daura and Zaria the secure 
hinterland was limited, and it is probable that in emirates like Bauchi the 
situation, territorially, was even more precarious. But the important point 
is that by 1820 there was no other viable government with any semblance 
of legitimacy or widespread support that could rival the n e w administration. 
T h e problem, then, was to extend the administration to the countryside, 
and incorporate the rural areas into the caliphate. In Borno, by contrast, 
the problem for the mats was to use their existing ties to the countryside 
to reorganize the state in order to preserve its autonomy vis-à-vis the n e w 
caliphate. 
The Sokoto caliphate: 1820-80 
In 1820 the Sokoto caliphate was composed of some seven major emirates 
with a further ten large emirates still in the process of formation. Borno 
too was re-established after the retreat from its capital and the loss of 
extensive areas in the west and south. In order to understand the changes 
implied by the terms 'caliphate' and 'emirate', let us briefly and very 
schematically recapitulate the old political system the reformers had 
replaced. 
5. For a detailed examination of Mahdism, see M . A . al-Hajj, 1973. 
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T h e most notable feature of the old system was the role of the king, 
k n o w n variously as mai, sarki, etsu, alafin. Before the shifts in power in the 
late eighteenth century, the king had ritual functions and a role that 
required a certain seclusion from the public; the palace was more sacred 
than a mere house. T h e king was more or less above politics, a symbol of 
great authority in whose n a m e all acts were done; he represented the state. 
A number of m e n and w o m e n w h o as slaves or eunuchs were without kin 
or heirs were servants dedicated to the palace and the king's person; they 
formed one section of the administration. Another section was formed by 
large independent households with hereditary claims to titles, the holders 
of which thus had their o w n followings of m e n . A third section was the 
family of the king, particularly the king's mother or sister, his brothers and 
sons. T h e composition of councils and bodies responsible for rituals or for 
military leadership varied in detail from state to state, often with the 
palace slaves and the free office-holders divided into orders through which 
individuals could m o v e by promotion. Political competition was limited to 
the offices under the king. As far as w e know there were in the late eighteenth 
century trends for kings to take a more active part in politics, to become 
more exclusively Musl im and to promote reforms on the lines of Islamic 
government.6 Economically, it seems that it was a period of rising levels of 
consumption (particularly of cotton cloth) and demand for slaves; and there 
was a need to regulate the expanding market and protect it. T h e effects of 
these changes reverberated d o w n to the trading, farming and pastoral 
communities in the countryside, as those involved in political competition 
sought to strengthen their hold on their bases of power; as a consequence 
of which the ¿jihad found widespread support a m o n g the victims of these 
changes. 
T h e Muslim reformers (who included at least one of the last, reforming 
Hausa kings) had a very different blueprint to institute. T h e role of the 
king was replaced by an amir neither whose person nor whose palace was 
sacred. Allah, and not the state personified by the king, was the source of 
authority. Consequently the amir was chosen not for any inherited quality 
of sacredness but for his personal piety towards Allah. T h e amir was the 
first among equals; his companions as a group were to share power under 
the amir's leadership. As a result, the role of palace slave-officials was to 
be reduced to that of personal servants and the formal office of queen 
mother or sister was eliminated. T h e amir was part of the political process, 
and his office was theoretically open to any suitably pious candidate. A 
minimal bureaucracy of ministers, judges, inspectors, police and imams 
was established as prescribed by the blueprint; and the regulations of the 
sharTa law, following the Mäliki school of interpretation, were to order 
6. Fora reconstruction of the pre-djihäd state of Borno, see J .E . Lavers, 1980, pp. 187-
209; N . M . Alkali, 1978. For a pre-djihâd Hausa state see A . Hassan and A . S . Naibi, 1962; 
M . G . Smith, i960; Y . B . Usman, 1981. 
563 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
relations between persons and between groups. T h e changes were designed 
to limit and formalize the political processes, to prevent gross manipulation 
of previously unwritten rules as well as to curtail the growth of palace-
centred government. It was intended to do away with the ambiguity of a 
Musl im wielding ritual authority based on local, traditional religious belief, 
and replace it with an authority derived solely from Allah, an authority not 
only acceptable to the Muslim community but also accountable to it. T h e 
blueprint's detail is most conveniently set out by 'Abdullah dan Fodio in 
his book to guide the K a n o community on their n e w constitution, Diyd" al-
hukkatn.1 But as problems arose, M u h a m m a d Bello and subsequent caliphs 
wrote letters to the various leaders of nascent communities, outlining the 
crucial elements of the new system and adding some practical details. F r o m 
one viewpoint, the political and intellectual. history of the nineteenth 
century can be seen as an extended exercise in trying to implement or 
modify the reformers' blueprint. F r o m another viewpoint (also implied in 
the blueprint), it is a history of the development and purposeful integration 
of the rural economies of the region, and their closer linking with first 
the Mediterranean and later the Atlantic economies. T o these reformers' 
concerns, there was also added a distinctive sense of urgency and seriousness 
if the community was to be rebuilt, materially and spiritually, in time for 
the expected coming of the M a h d ï . 
T h e office of caliph 
O n e of the most important innovations the reformers instituted was the 
office of caliph. In the eighteenth century the Hausa states and their 
neighbours were autonomous political units. Borno had exercised a degree 
of suzerainty over the states at various times in the past, and had used the 
term caliph; its mai even in the eighteenth century was the most senior, 
probably the most powerful ruler in the area. Under the n e w system the 
emirates were clearly under the suzerainty of the caliph at Sokoto, from 
w h o m authority to govern in specific areas emanated. With its explicit basis 
in Islamic constitutional practice, the caliph was formally above any local 
or ethnic identity in a way no previous suzerain had been; and in recognition 
of the otherworldly source of his authority, the role of caliph was to be 
demonstrably different from that of previous rulers - without ceremony or 
ritualization, without ostentatious wealth. 
W h e n S h a y k h ' U t h m a n dan Fodio died in April 1817, the lands of the 
caliph hadülreäcTy been divided up and administered in two main blocs. 
7. For a recent study of 'Abdullah dan Fodio's ideas and their context, see A . A . A . 
H a m i d , 1980. For a general study of caliphal policies and practice, see M . M . Tukur , 1977. 
M a n y of the traditional, pre-djihad titles were later introduced, including in some emirates, 
titles for important w o m e n of the ruling family (e.g. madaki in K a n o , inna at Sokoto). T h e 
study of women's roles and organizations in the nineteenth century is only just beginning: 
cf. J. Boyd, 1982. 
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T h e division into quadrants is c o m m o n enough: Wadai and Borno had 
probably used it and the symbolic maps of Hausa towns employ a similar 
conception. T h e fourfold division resolves into two pairs, each with a senior 
and two junior partners. With Bello's succession in 1817 to the office of 
caliph, the pattern was changed. Before 1817 the caliph Shaykh ' U t h m ä n 
had two officials to w h o m he delegated all responsibility - Tus brother 
'Abdullah as vizier, and his son M u h a m m a d Bello as amir al-Sûdân ÇAmlr 
of the Blacks'). After 1817 the caliph (now M u h a m m a d Bello) left full 
responsibility for the western emirates delegated as before to his uncle 
'Abdullah, n o w k n o w n simply as 'the amir'; but he kept for himself full 
responsibility for the eastern emirates, delegating only executive duties to 
his friend and servant Gidado, w h o was n o w to be known as the vizier. 
As responsibility included retaining the taxes derived from the area, it 
was appropriate that the richer emirates should fall within the caliph's 
sphere. For the eastern emirates, particularly K a n o and Zaria in the early 
period, were able to underwrite the caliphal economy. Without these 
payments it would have been difficult to develop the caliphal capital and 
its hinterland, or even maintain an appropriate level of generosity for 
visitors. Captives as well as clothes and other items were sent regularly, 
but captives in particular were crucial both for expanding the area under 
cultivation around Sokoto and its outlying villages (for the area had not 
been a centre of cultivation before), and for putting up adequate defences 
such as high m u d walls and flat-roofed, fireproof houses and building 
permanent mosques for the new settlements.8 
T h e relationship between Sokoto and G w a n d u is too complex to detail 
here, and in part depended on the personal characters of the amirs at any 
given time. But there was something of the dual organization so c o m m o n 
in West Africa, by which G w a n d u had the role of uncle and represented 
ritual authority (the amirs of G w a n d u were notable for their piety) while 
at Sokoto the caliph had the role of the active nephew, in charge of affairs 
with ultimate political authority. Such a relationship seems to have held 
between 'Abdullah and Bello, and between Khafil and 'All; it forestalled any 
conflict and justified G w a n d u ' s relative lack of interest in expanding its 
control over its subordinate emirates. 
T h e relationship between the other amirs and the caliph during the 
period 1820-45 was imbued more with the equality of former comrades-
in-arms and fellow students than with the formality of superior and inferior. 
In particular, Yakubu of Bauchi, a veteran of the early community and not 
a Fulbe like the others, had a special, almost avuncular, link with the 
caliphs after Bello's death. There was inevitably a considerable degree of 
autonomy as each amir consolidated his territorial position; but it is hard 
8. T h e date when the remittances to Sokoto started, and their value, is not precisely 
known. In r.1850 the amount demanded was sharply increased. Cf. M . G . Smith, i960, 
PP-154, 157-
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to be sure if certain appointments within an emirate (such as K a n o ) were 
not being vetted or recommended by the caliph in the same way as Shaykh 
' U t h m a n had carefully controlled appointments during the djihäd by tïïë 
strict allocation of flags. 
T h e caliphal administration 
With M u h a m m a d Bello n o w acting in three capacities, as caliph, as head 
of the eastern emirates and as head of the Sokoto hinterland, it was 
necessary to establish a caliphal administration. In the first of these capacit-
ies, M u h a m m a d Bello was engaged in writing books and letters of advice, 
while in his role as local commander-in-chief he took charge of the military 
defence of Sokoto. Furthermore, the caliph did not usually travel beyond 
Sokoto or Zamfara. T h e caliphal administration was largely responsible, 
then, for the supervision of the eastern emirates, and in particular for 
maintaining the revenue on which the caliphate depended. 
For his administration, the caliph could call on five groups: his household 
retainers, mostly slaves or eunuchs, whose duties included for example 
looking after the stables; his erstwhile companions-in-arms, w h o n o w acted 
as advisers and special messengers; the immediate family and kin of his 
father the Shaykh; the leaders of local Fulbe clans; and finally the families 
w h o comprised his father's old community and formed the scholar class in 
the capital. These last were given judicial or religious responsibilities in 
the n e w administration or were allocated minor territorial posts, while the 
major territorial responsibilities within Sokoto fell to the clan leaders and 
the caliph's kinsmen. T h e caliph's advisers, given titles like waziri, magajin 
gari, magajin rafi, galadima, were the caliph's links with the emirates, the 
majority of which came under the waziri's office. These officials themselves 
had private household officials of their o w n and occupied distinct quarters 
in the town, but initially they had a relatively minor role in the territorial 
administration of the Sokoto hinterland or in Sokoto local politics. T h e y 
were overshadowed by the sarkin yaki or the scholarly relatives and 
descendants of the Shaykh. But in the course of the century, as they became 
large and wealthy lineages in their o w n right, they played an increasingly 
central role in Sokoto politics and particularly in the election of the caliph. 
A major task of the caliphal administration was to appoint or sanction 
the appointment of the amirs, and to resolve any disputes over succession. 
T h e caliph's delegate (such as the waziri) installed the n e w amir, having 
the appropriate letter with the caliphal seal ready and the space for the 
amir's n a m e left blank. T h e following year, the n e w amir would c o m e in 
person to Sokoto to salute the caliph. A s interregna were apt to be periods 
of licensed lawlessness, it was important that there be less than a week's 
delay in appointing a legitimate ruler. T h e caliph's delegates therefore in 
some instances had considerable responsibility. Extending out of this 
capacity to appoint (or dismiss), the caliph and his delegates acted as 
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mediators in the event of a major dispute involving an amir: they were the 
last court of appeal. Inevitably, as the office of the vizierate grew, the range 
of problems that came into the wazirfs orbit increased particularly as the 
waziri, with his o w n personal delegates permanently resident in the two 
major emirates of K a n o and Zaria, was the sole travelling delegate of the 
caliph.9 
A further function of the caliphal administration was to receive or collect 
the gifts, tax or tribute that was destined for the treasury at Sokoto. 
Payments were m a d e at least twice a year, coinciding with the two festivals 
of the Musl im year, though collection undoubtedly occurred in the emirates 
after the harvest irrespective of the date on which the festivals fell. W h a t 
percentage of the total revenue collected in an emirate went to Sokoto is 
not known. In addition, the caliph was an heir to part of an amir's wealth 
on his death; and received a present on an amir's accession. T h e caliph 
also received a share of the booty from a campaign in any of the emirates, 
though the amount seems to have depended on the local ruler and on h o w 
strongly the caliph's delegate pressed for it. Given the informal nature of 
m u c h of these payments, it is not surprising that the caliphal administration 
was often seen as grasping. A s the political connections and importance of 
the vizierate itself increased, so did the waziri require more presents to 
redistribute in order to maintain his place in the system. In the course of 
the century, w h e n the waziri took on a greater role in Sokoto's internal 
politics, the vizierate had to build up its o w n economic base comparable 
to the resources of the other notables w h o , unlike the waziri, had territories 
to administer directly. Equally, the caliph's requirements increased as the 
century wore on and the international standing of the caliphate developed. 
T h e relative poverty of the Sokoto hinterland, its higher than average 
population of scholars and students, few farmers, m a n y pastoralists - all 
of w h o m escaped any taxation other than zakat (alms) - m a d e Sokoto a 
burden on the other emirates. Originally, it had seemed beneficial that the 
new community grew up in a virtual no-man's-land, where the temptations 
of materialism were largely absent. But it m a d e the caliph dependent on 
the continued good will of the emirates, and on the ability of the caliphal 
administration to ensure that goodwill. 
O n e problem was the very size of the caliphate and the time taken in 
travelling the great distances involved. O n e contemporary calculated the 
caliphate as four months' journey from west to east and two months' 
journey from north to south. Although it was possible for a runner to take 
a message the six hundred and fifty kilometres from Sokoto to Bauchi in 
eight days, the normal travelling speed of officials like the vizier was some 
twenty-five kilometres a day. Another factor was the relative lack of military 
coercion involved. 
9. For a detailed study of the vizierate, see M . Last, 1967a. 
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Military and diplomatic activities 
T h e caliphate did not maintain a standing army. Indeed compared with 
states of similar size the Sokoto caliphate was in no sense a military 
machine.10 Its annual mobilization was often little more than an exercise 
to demonstrate loyalty, to threaten opposition and police the frontier. After 
the initial campaigns to set up a frontier, the caliphate never acted in 
concert to conquer more territory; nor indeed were there any plans or 
ambitions for doing so. T h e area under caliphal rule did indeed expand 
piecemeal through the initiative of individual amirs and freelance c o m -
manders, particularly in the south and east, but this expansion was as 
m u c h a product of local emirate politics as caliphal policy. Apart from an 
ideological commitment to djihad, the only permanent caliphal requirement 
which might prompt military action in the emirates was the need to meet 
the continual deficit in the Sokoto budget. Thus , though the caliph was 
often involved in campaigns within the Sokoto-Zamfara region, he did not 
campaign outside it. For the occasional major campaigns in the eastern 
emirates the vizier (or on two occasions the amir of Bauchi) led the Sokoto 
forces. 
T h e army was not a professional force, nor was it based on squads of 
slave soldiers. Levies were drawn by each official from his household and 
from villages under his jurisdiction. Weapons and mounts were not usually 
provided by the state, nor were soldiers recompensed except by a share of 
the booty. It was a duty to serve, but not usually compulsory, though 
doubtless there were as m a n y perils in staying behind to defend the village 
against marauders and wild animals. Campaigns were fought in the dry 
season, usually about harvest time at the earliest (though volunteers would 
be short then), with the aim of destroying the enemies' crops. In practice 
rainy season warfare was impracticable, not only because of pressure from 
other work or the nature of the terrain, but also because rain on leather 
shields or b o w strings was disastrous. Late dry-season campaigning was 
restricted by shortages of water for horses and m e n , but surprise atttacks 
by small bands were feasible any time. 
Regiments were variously armed, with a few m e n mounted on horses or 
camels; the majority were armed with spears, bows and swords. Certain 
peoples specialized in archery, particularly with arrows poisoned to make 
up for the lack of penetrating power; others specialized in barbed spears. 
Swords were less c o m m o n and, unless m a d e of particularly good local iron 
io. Specific studies on military affairs are: J. P . Smaldone, 1977; R . C . C . L a w , 1980 
(but cf. R . Harris, 1982, pp. 81-5). T h e outline presented here, particularly in putting less 
emphasis on the military's role, differs somewhat from the analysis in these two books. J. 
Boyd has kindly drawn m y attention to the formation of a special caliphal bodyguard first 
formed f.1850 as m u c h , it seems, for external as for internal security (Alhaji Junaidu, 1957, 
p. 54). N o study has been m a d e of strictly palace formations and security, though references 
are frequent. ' ' . ' • . . . . 
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or of imported steel, were seen as a potential liability. G u n s did not become 
available in any significant quantity until towards the end of the period; 
then they tended to be the weapon of privately maintained, semi-pro-
fessional (and therefore slave) forces, but their comparative lack of practice 
prevented them from being formidable. A s in the eighteenth-century states, 
the most effective weapon of the caliphate was its cavalry. Initially the 
reformers in the djihad had lacked horses or camels and were thus at a 
disadvantage against the Tuareg or the forces of the Gobir states. But 
cavalry had little success, not merely against the determined soldiery of 
the djihad, but also against walled towns or mountainous strongholds. T h e 
history of the caliphate's major campaigns records m a n y defeats as well as 
victories, and smaller, wholly mounted contingents were probably m u c h 
more effective. There was, therefore, a tactic quite distinct from the set-
pieces battles k n o w n as daga and which resulted in high casualties — the 
c o m m o n raid, hari, on the civilian population. Given the heterogeneous, 
highly mobile character of Hausa society, with its traders, slaves and 
refugees, it was easy to plant spies and infiltrators in an unwary community 
and take the place by surprise. 
In short, the caliphate did not introduce any n e w strategy or military 
technology, nor did it possess any overwhelming advantage beyond the 
size of its potential resources; and these were never mobilized all at once. 
Guerrilla warfare, brought about by the displacement of peoples after the 
djihäd, by food shortages due to the dislocation of agriculture, or simply 
by the profits to be m a d e from the sale of captives, plagued the caliphate 
for m u c h of the century. T o o m u c h can be m a d e of the insecurity, but at 
least in some areas the expectation of becoming a slave at some period in 
one's life was high.11 Ransoms could be arranged, prisoners freed, a captive 
might even escape, but if, as often happened, the whole family or village 
was broken up in a raid, there was little to return to. Trade was seemingly 
not m u c h affected by warfare, though certain areas might get cut off. 
Trading expeditions were armed, while for some traders their staple was 
to supply armies with horses and weapons in return for prisoners to take 
away and resell at some distance from their h o m e . 
Given the military limitations, diplomacy was an important aspect of 
caliphal policy.12 T h e caliphs appear to have handled most of the diplomatic 
correspondence themselves. N o state visits by the caliph took place, nor 
was any senior m e m b e r of the caliph's staff sent on embassies overseas. 
Instead passing scholars, pilgrims and traders acted as bearers of messages, 
and brought news of political developments abroad. Correspondence was 
ii. A vivid, personal account of one such capture (¿.1850), is in A . H . M . Kirk-Greene 
and P. N e w m a n (eds), 1971, pp. 29-101. 
12. For general accounts of diplomacy, see R . A . Adeleye, 1970; M . Minna, 1982. Belief 
in the imminent ending of the world is likely to have m a d e diplomatic relations with other 
states appear of secondary importance, and this m a y account for the paucity of diplomatic 
records in the Sokoto archives. 
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exchanged with Morocco, Tripoli and Britain, and was preserved: but no 
doubt m u c h more important exchanges were conveyed orally or have been 
lost. But M u h a m m a d Bello's interest in external relations was as m u c h 
intellectual as commercial or political. Keen and able to keep up with 
developments, ideas and inventions in North Africa and the world beyond, 
he was concerned to bring the caliphate more fully into the metropolitan 
Musl im world. At the same time, with his concern for the world's approach-
ing end and the possibility of having to migrate east to Mecca, he tried to 
ensure that the road be kept open, and appointed a distant kinsman of the 
Shaykh to oversee the Baghirmi section of the route. 
Diplomacy was also important in the caliphate's relations in the north and 
west. O n the northern front, relations with the Tuareg were as ambiguous as 
the political situation was fluid. T h e sultan of Agades was an early ally, 
with his claims over the settled if not the n o m a d population of the area. 
There were allies, too, among the various shaykhs and traders; one shaykh 
in particular, M u h a m m a d Djailani, attempted to raise a dßhäd, an attempt 
that seems to have been temporarily more successful than Djibrïl b. ' U m a r ' s 
in the late eighteenth century.13 But the noble segments of Tuareg clans 
(particularly the Ulemiden), with their vassals, proved strong enough to 
prevent the formation of a powerful Musl im specialist class. In consequence 
the caliphate had no organized network of shaykhs similar to that of the 
Kunta at Timbuktu on which to draw for help. T h e attempt by the caliph 
at Sokoto to organize such a network a m o n g the Tuareg and to take on the 
role of mediator in Tuareg affairs met with only limited success. Instead 
Tuareg scholars and their supporters could take refuge at Sokoto. 
Relations with the Kunta shaykhs at Timbuktu, however, were cordial. 
A s the leading Musl im centre in~the west, the Sokoto scholars tended to 
look more in that direction than to Borno. Poems and visits were exchanged; 
the Sokoto scholars took their Kâdirï wird and some salasil from the Kunta, 
and in the controversy over the Tijâniyya, the Kunta at Timbuktu were 
the bastion of Kâdirï orthodoxy.14 
T h e n e w caliphate at Massina, however, posed problems both for the 
Kunta shaykhs and for Sokoto. T h e exact details and sequence of Sokoto-
Massinärelätions is not yet clear, but it is difficult not to see it as inextricably 
bound up with the more local problems of Kunta-Massina hostilities.15 
Although the Sokoto caliphate could claim the allegiance of areas up to the 
borders of Massina beyond Liptako, G w a n d u had no effective presence 
with which to claim Massina itself. T h e major obstacle to an effective 
western policy was the evident uncontrollability of the A r g u n g u - M a u r i -
13. O n the djihad of M u h a m m a d Djailani, see H . T . Norris, 1975, ch. 11; cf. D . Hamani 
in Y . B . Usman (ed.), 1979, pp. 392-407. 
14. O n the Kunta, see A . Zebadia, 1974. 
15. O n Massina, see W . A . Brown, 1969; and C . C . Stewart in Y . B . Usman (ed.), 1979, 
pp. 408-29. 
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Zaberma axis; but an equal obstacle was perhaps G w a n d u ' s unwillingness 
to organize itself militarily. Unlike Sokoto, it had little regular support 
from Yauri, N u p e or Ilorin, all of which suffered a degree of civil dis-
turbance lacking in the eastern emirates. T h e amir at G w a n d u might 
mediate and advise; indeed the amir even went in person to N u p e , but 
neither the base for an effective force nor the means of sustaining it were 
available to G w a n d u , at least not until late in the nineteenth century. 
Finally, on the frontier with Borno, whose western territories had become 
the embryo emirates of Hadejia, Katagum, Missau and G o m b e , the initial 
failure to reach a compromise (in the celebrated correspondence between 
M u h a m m a d Bello and Shaykh al-Kanëmi during the djihäd) set the tone 
for the rest of the century. Mediation was rejected during the three years 
of Borno invasions into eastern K a n o between 1824 and 1826, and no 
formal, public peace was m a d e between the two states. Organized hostilities 
simply lapsed, without diplomacy or a decisive victory. In consequence 
no 'gifts', the crucial symbol of international relations, passed in either 
direction. 
M o r e successful was the mixture of diplomacy and force that resulted 
in truces (for example with Kebbi: the Lafiyar Togo 1866-74) o r treaties 
with smaller neighbouring communities to which the caliphate offered 
protection (amana) in return for a tax. In some areas the tax, assessed 
collectively, stipulated captives as well as goods such as mats, and so was 
similar to the contributions of some emirates. But w e do not know h o w 
the rate per head differed from the rate of tax on Muslims within the 
caliphate. 
But diplomacy and warfare aside, the commonest instrument of policy 
in inter-state relations was economic. Military destruction of crops or grain 
stores was only one aspect. Particular groups, such as the Tuareg, might 
be refused access to markets, to certain commodities (like grain) or to wells. 
Given the local annual variations in rainfall, such bans could be very 
effective. Less effective were embargoes on the export or import of items 
such as horses, weapons, salt or types of cloth, while an indiscriminate 
blockade of towns or areas was difficult to sustain, not least because 
smuggling offered high profits. But the disruption in the normal flow of 
caliphal trade caused for example by Ningi and M b u t a w a raids was serious 
enough to require a remedy. Indeed their o w n experience of severe food 
shortages and the interruption of the grain trade during the djifiàd had 
m a d e m e n like M u h a m m a d Bello acutely aware of the importance of 
encouraging traders by keeping roads open, establishing markets and 
enforcing the laws regulating fair trading. In consequence, as the caliphal 
economy became relatively more efficient and neighbouring peoples 
depended more heavily on caliphal trade and traders, economic policy was 
increasingly a more effective instrument of power than warfare. 
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T h e emirates: political structure 
T o consider the development of each emirate separately is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Here I will compare the emirates in order to show 
the basic differences, and then offer some generalizations on society in the 
emirates. 
Despite the initially very wide criteria of eligibility, all emirates but one 
normally had amirs appointed on principles of heredity and seniority from 
a single lineage; but in some, appointments eventually alternated between 
two or more branches of a 'royal' lineage. Only in Zaria did the office of 
amir rotate round three totally distinct lineages. 
T h e role and distribution of offices under the amir did not follow a single 
pattern, but broadly the political structures of the emirates fell into two 
types, each of which consisted of two sub-types: • 
(i) Those emirates that were established with the support of large 
cohesive groups; some of the major government functions and terri-
tories were distributed a m o n g m e m b e r s of these groups or a m o n g 
those associated with them, and the descendants of the early office-
holders maintained their rights in the office and in the property 
associated with it. These emirates ('lineage-based') divide into two 
sub-types: . 
(ia) those such as Zaria and K a n o where the major office-holders 
(including the amir's kin) reside in the capital and form the 
amir's council while using delegates of their o w n to control 
the territories allocated to the office, 
(ib) those such as Sokoto and K a t a g u m where the office-holders 
with territorial responsibilities (including the amir's kin) 
reside outside the capital; the amir's council consists of 
advisers appointed personally and not linked particularly to 
specific pressure groups; these advisers act as intermediaries 
between the amir and the powerful office-holders outside the 
capital. 
(2) Those emirates (and they form a small minority) which were not 
established with the support of one or more large groups but relied 
instead on a heterogeneous band of individuals attached to the amir 
either as friends or as slaves. N o office-holding dynasties developed, 
nor therefore did permanent offices with official property (with the 
exception, of course, of the amir's). These emirates ('clientage-
based') subdivide into two: 
(2a) an emirate such as Hadejia where power was concentrated 
in the amir at the capital, with usually a large slave c o m -
ponent in the administration; the amir's council was informal 
with no balance of power between separate interest groups. 
(2b) an emirate such as Ilorin, N u p e or al-Kanëmi's admin-
istration in the state of Borno, where there was, however 
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short-lived, a dyarchy in which the traditional ruler main-
tained his court at the same time as the 'Mallam' (in N u p e 
and llorín) and the 'Shaykh' (in Borno) ran a centralized, 
client-based administration of his o w n . 
T h e emirates of type 2 usually experienced civil war. Those with a 
dyarchy eliminated early the traditional ruler, in Ilorin and N u p e by the 
1830s, in Borno by 1846. But peace did not necessarily follow. Civil war 
between claimants within theawjïr's dynasty broke out in N u p e , Hadejia 
and Borno, and neither N u p e nor Hadejia established stable governments 
until ci860. N u p e then developed a political structure of type ia (like 
Zaria, but with the office of amir rotating round related lineages), while 
Hadejia and Borno continued to maintain a client-based government depen-
dent on an amir wielding supreme power and backed by a large body of 
royal slaves. 
T h e emirates of type 1 are more numerous and so more varied. C e n -
tralized or decentralized residence is a quick but superficial criterion for 
distinguishing between these emirates. Decentralized residence implies a 
category of intermediaries at the capital, w h o at the outset might be seen 
as 'clients' of the amir. But they, given the lineage idiom of the political 
system, developed lineages of their own; in consequence, the amir created 
a further category of clients from those unable to develop lineages, namely 
palace slaves, but they played a minor role. Centralized residence, in 
contrast, implied no such category of intermediaries between office-holder 
and amir, but in time the amir developed a palace slave retinue to act as 
his personal agents, and they played an important role in government. 
Centralized residence also implied that the office-holder could have charge 
of a number of widely dispersed towns, villages or peoples (thus preventing 
any territorial blocs of power), whereas decentralized residence usually 
meant that the office-holder's headquarters were within an area that owed 
allegiance to him as a whole, with only a few, if any, villages likely to owe 
extra-territorial allegiance to another office. 
Residence as a criterion cannot be applied too strictly. M a n y emirates 
modified their residence rules for various offices in the course of the century 
(for example, the office of M a d a k i of Bauchi was transferred back to the 
capital from W a s e early in the century); m a n y offices had more than one 
residence and the exact allocation of time spent in which place is not 
k n o w n , nor is it k n o w n h o w often an office-holder outside the capital might 
ride in for important meetings. Finally, the relative importance of offices 
could change, so that in an emirate like Bauchi, power under the amir 
seems in the course of the century to have oscillated between offices at the 
centre and offices in some of the territories. But residence does reflect 
conditions early in the history of each emirate, and draws attention to 
important economic and political differences between the emirates. 
Politically emirates of type ib (that is, with territorial office-holders 
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residing outside the capital) were responding to the basic requirement of 
the d¿ihad, which was to establish and maintain frontier posts within which 
the new emirate's economy might be rebuilt. Lacking their o w n towns, 
and lacking concentrated, settled populations on which to base themselves, 
these emirates were militarily very precarious. M u c h of the manpower and 
time in the early decades went in constructing strongholds (the classical 
Islamic term, ribät, was used for these, whose occupants were k n o w n as 
muräbitün) and in organizing adequate agriculture in the face of attacks or 
threats of attack. In addition, w h e n pastoralists had to be settled or some 
non-Muslim group was to be incorporated into the emirate, these had to 
be helped in reorienting themselves to the occupations and rules of Mus l im 
life in the ribats. T h e problems encountered are vividly recorded in the 
books and letters sent by the reform leaders to each other. 
Economically these emirates were chronically short of labour. Trade 
routes were not yet well established and protected; and the risk of attack 
from displaced or hostile populations m a d e for a shortage of land safe for 
farming. In s u m , the precariousness of some emirates in the early period 
should not be underestimated; nor, therefore, should one overestimate the 
formal nature of government or political organization. Given this basic 
fluidity, the danger both initially and throughout the century was that a 
powerful office-holder would seek complete autonomy and appeal to Sokoto 
for recognition as an independent emirate. In such cases diplomacy was 
not always able to prevent armed conflict breaking out. 
In the course of the century, the trend was for offices at the capital to 
become more powerful than all but one or two territorially based offices. 
In consequence those office-holders outside w h o sought to maintain their 
position (especially members of the amir's o w n lineage with claims to 
inherit) tended to reside more in the capital. T h e trend is associated with 
the growing population and security of the frontiers, with the gradual 
absorption of previously distinct groups into the more homogeneous society 
of the caliphate and with the formalization of the office of amir as the sole 
source of power in the emirate. 
Emirates of type ia, with office-holders resident at the capital, had 
markedly different experiences in the early period of the caliphate. Only 
in K a n o and Zaria were conditions favourable for a large urban 'court' 
since not only was the city ready built, but so was the economy, with 
agricultural production and trade networks well established. Defence too 
was less of a problem. Existing towns might be renamed ribäts but the 
large settled population was not in itself rebellious while the deposed kings 
of K a n o and Zaria posed little threat from their distant places of exile. 
T h e economic strength of these emirates m a d e them indispensable to 
the caliphate's finances, and, if the amir gained sole control in any of them, 
it might possibly tempt him to rival the caliph. In consequence, the aim 
both of the caliphal administration and of the groups excluded from the 
office of amir, was to prevent an excessive concentration of power. In Zaria 
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the problem was solved by rotating the office of amir and other positions 
round three distinct lineages, by the caliph's readiness to depose an amir, 
and finally by relatively short periods in office (the longest period, fourteen 
years, was enjoyed by only two amirs). T h e cost of this solution was a 
sometimes ineffective amir. In K a n o , by contrast, a protracted civil war 
which followed the accession of the second amir, Ibrâhïm D a b o , and the 
amir's long reign of 27 years (1819-46) both ruled out rotation of offices 
as a remedy for undue concentration of power. Instead, the territorial 
strength of the major office-holders and their independence as councillors 
and 'kingmakers' were guaranteed - but only with partial success, since a 
second 27-year reign (by Dabo's son, the fourth amir 'Abdullah) resulted in 
a further concentration of offices and resources in his family. Sokoto had no 
adequate reason nor possibly the ability to depose the amir in K a n o . There 
was, then, a rapid narrowing d o w n of those eligible for office (since 
eligibility to hold office depended on one's father having held office); and 
the cost of being excluded from office was the relative impoverishment and 
loss of status for oneself, one's descendants and dependents. Competition 
amongst m e m b e r s of the 'royal' lineage therefore was serious, and gave rise 
to two years of bitter civil war in 1893-5. T h e concentration of office-
holders at the capital not only increased the costs of maintaining there a 
rapidly growing, aristocratic ruling class (a cost that perhaps only K a n o or 
Zaria could initially have afforded), but also heightened the risk of eventual 
conflict at the centre of the emirate. In contrast, the civil wars at the end 
of the century in emirates of type ib - G o m b e , K atagum - were centrifugal. 
Paradoxically, in Bauchi decentralization was necessary again in order to 
forestall centrifugal revolts, but by further diminishing the value of offices 
available to the amir's kin at the centre (where after a period of centralization 
the palace administration with its personal advisers and slave officials had 
grown relatively strong), decentralization only heightened competition for 
the sole remaining, really important office, that of amir. T h e consequence 
was a disastrous war within and around the capital Í \ I 8 8 I - 2 . 
In the case of Katsina, the original, rather limited lineage-based cen-
tralization gave way, in the face of militarism, to an increasingly autocratic 
palace government. These changes occurred without civil strife, in 
part because there had always been considerable autonomy in outlying 
districts, the growing prosperity of which m a d e office at the capital less 
important. 
So far only the upper levels of the administrative system have been 
discussed. Administration at the 'grass roots' was more uniform (and similar 
to that found elsewhere in West Africa). T h e smallest units, households or 
camps, were grouped into larger units, defined by a territory or by kinship. 
Generally pastoralists, Tuareg or Fulbe, were more organized through 
links of kinship than were agriculturalists, and in consequence retained 
their o w n ardo'en or tambura as leaders. Their cohesion gave them a political 
strength that the more fragmented agriculturalists did not have, but this 
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superior strength relative to the rest of the population did not last into the 
second half of the century. 
In larger, long-settled towns and villages ward representatives could be 
co-ordinated by one of their number , k n o w n as the mai gari, magaji, dagaci 
or mukoshi. T h e links between these representatives of the local population 
and the upper levels of the administration were in the hands ofjakadu, 
servants or agents of the office-holder allocated the responsibility for that 
section of the population. Similarly, messengers linked the office-holder to 
his amir. T h e function of the administration was primarily tax collection, 
but this was as m u c h a political as an economic act; to pay was also a 
symbolic act of submission, to refuse payment was a token of rebellion. A s 
a necessary part of tax collection, the administration gathered political 
information, ratified appointments; collected shares of inheritance, took 
charge of and dispatched the property of strangers w h o died en route; 
organized the arrest of a criminal or a runaway slave, forwarded defendants 
in civil cases, arranged the release of someone wrongfully detained or 
someone to be ransomed; took intractable cases for mediation by the office-
holder or themselves answered charges of oppression by complainants at 
the amir's personal court; and in time of war organized the recruitment of 
people for campaigns. S o m e indication of the administrative work in the 
late nineteenth century has been preserved in the correspondence which 
has been kept by descendants of officials in Sokoto, G o m b e and Bauchi. 
Social structure 
Society in the caliphate broadly divided into two: the office-oriented, 
comprising the title-holders, their kinsmen, scholars, clients and their 
household slaves; and those w h o were not office-oriented, but were occupied 
in farming, trading and all the various craft occupations that characterized 
the complex, productive economy of the caliphate, along with their slaves. 
T h e boundary between the two was never clear-cut, and allowed for 
movement both ways. In particular, scholars and slaves could be associated 
with either category. But attitudes of scholars, for example, were by no 
means uniformly in favour of the office-oriented, resulting in an ideal of 
office-shunning piety that drew its inspiration from the founder of the 
caliphate, the Shaykh ' U t h m a n dan Fodio. 
A distinctiveTeature oTthe office-oriented was their relative immobility. 
If they left the emirate where they had rights to office, these rights were 
not transferred to their place of exile, though they might retain their title 
as a courtesy. B y comparison, ordinary people were free to m o v e from 
emirate to emirate, and did so if they felt excessively oppressed. A s slaves 
could not easily m o v e of their o w n accord without being taken as runaways, 
free commoners (talakawa) dominated trade, transport and all crafts requir-
ing journeymen, if necessary taking their slaves with them as assistants or 
porters. 
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A further distinctive feature of the office-oriented was their concern for 
genealogies, for dynastic marriage alliances and relatively strict rules of 
patrilineal inheritance. By contrast, commoners maintained a generalized 
identity with a particular area or ethnic group by facial marks and distinctive 
traditions but they ignored the minute detail of genealogy. T h o u g h c o m -
moners usually continued in their father's occupations, there was no rigid 
caste-like system as elsewhere in West Africa. Furthermore, whereas wives 
of the major office-holders were kept in purdah, dominating large poly-
gynous households staffed with concubines and servants, the wives of 
others were not so restricted and, in most parts of the caliphate, participated 
in trade, in producing goods for sale and in agriculture. 
T h e proportion of the population that could be categorized as 'office-
oriented' cannot be realistically estimated. Estimates have, however, been 
m a d e of the proportion of slaves to free m e n - ranging from 1:4 to 1:2 -
but it is not clear h o w these proportions were calculated. T h e number of 
slaves within the office-oriented segment of society probably increased 
overall as the century wore on; certainly the importance of the position 
which some of them held increased, as the value was recognized of having 
personally loyal, politically non-competitive officials in the amir's govern-
ment. In the countryside, however, the changes in the proportion of slaves 
to free are not k n o w n but the n u m b e r of slaves probably grew in the course 
of the century. Captives were seen as a solution to the chronic shortage of 
manpower , particularly in underpopulated areas like Sokoto where the 
emirate was founded in an area marginal to the old states of the region. 
Similarly, areas of great plains, such as Bauchi, had need of m e n to work 
the land. T h e percentage of captives re-exported for sale on the Atlantic 
coast or in North Africa is not k n o w n ; but restrictions were in force over 
w h o m one could sell for export, and the trade itself declined in the second 
half of the century.16 
Slaves were allowed to o w n property and to have time to work for 
themselves, and could expect to have the chance of redeeming themselves. 
Owners did not always have enough work for them to do, and were prepared 
to let slaves rent back their o w n labour. In addition, there was the possibility 
that an owner would emancipate a slave for services rendered or to celebrate 
an occasion or some success for which Allah was to be thanked. Again, the 
number of freedmen, let alone the variable rate of their emancipation, is 
not known. 
W o m e n slaves could marry other slaves, and their children tended to 
become part of their owner's household, though still of slave status. But 
16. N o detailed study of slavery in all its different forms in the Sokoto caliphate has so 
far been published, but several studies examine the problem for a particular place and 
period. For example, on Kano, see P . Hill, 1977, ch. XIII; on Zaria, J. S. Hogendorn, 
1977; on A d a m a w a , P . Burnham, in J. L . Watson (ed.), 1980; and on the trade generally, 
D . C. Tambo, 1976. 
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w o m e n slaves could also have children by free m e n , in which case their 
children were free and they themselves would be free on their owner's 
death. As m e n of royal households before they formally married commonly 
took concubines, m a n y eldest sons were sons of concubines. Islamic law 
does not recognize, as for example Fulbe pastoral practice did, a distinction 
between sons of free wives and sons of concubines for purposes of inherit-
ance. Consequently a number of amirs were sons of concubines: indeed a 
concubine mother was seen to be a necessary qualification for a 'real' amir, 
presumably because the amir could not be influenced by maternal kin. 
Islamic law also does not recognize the c o m m o n West African distinction 
between slaves born in captivity and those born free, by which the former, 
as children of slaves, were not normally sold away from their natal h o m e . 
Although in certain areas or amongst certain classes the distinction 
remained valid (the Hausa term, cucenama, is the same as that used in 
Borno and Fezzän where it is equivalent to Haratin), the only formal ban 
the reformers of the djihad appear to have recognized was on the export of 
these Muslim slaves, particularly to Christian states. That is, the slaves 
were by birth members not of a particular lineage but of Muslim society. 
But the change also implies that slaves had become more marketable and 
so more widely distributed. 
Slaves did not pay tax. But like sons or wives working in gandu (that is, 
for the head of their household), alongside w h o m slaves usually worked, 
they contributed about three-quarters of their working time to their owner; 
but unlike sons, they could not expect to inherit and become in their turn 
the head of a household - they were forever 'sons'; in slave villages, owned 
either by the state or by families, slaves had their o w n households and 
worked under their headman; superficially such settlements were no differ-
ent from free villages. 
If slaves paid no tax, nor did m a n y of their owners. Exactly w h o did 
pay what at a particular time is not known. Sokoto, for example, was 
exempt from Kurdin kasa, the general land tax also known as haraji 
(Kharadj). Fulani pastoralists paid a tax (jangali) on their herds (though 
foFsome it was officially referred to as djizya, for others it was zakät, alms). 
Hausa farmers each paid about 2500 cowries per a n n u m , £-.1850, in K a n o , 
while in Zaria a hoe tax was levied (presumably because w o m e n played a 
larger part in farming there); a higher rate of tax was paid by M a g u z a w a 
(non-Muslim Hausa) in K a n o possibly for the same reason. Otherwise 
higher rates applied to all non-Muslim communities as part of their 
tributary status within the Muslim state. Traders, certain crafts (such as 
dyers) and certain luxury crops paid taxes, a levy in effect on dry-season 
work. In addition, there would be annual gifts to pay on occasions of 
celebration or mourning; there would be alms; and doubtless some requi-
sitioning of food whenever an army went by. It is obviously impossible to 
calculate tax rates, which will in any case have varied very widely. But, to 
risk a guess and a generalization, the percentage of annual income taken in 
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the basic agricultural tax seems relatively low, equivalent in labour time to 
contributing perhaps rather less than a day's work a week throughout the 
farming season. 
Office-holders paid m u c h of their tax in the form of inheritance levies, 
in taxes on their accession to office and in a series of gifts due on the 
appointment of an amir or caliph. Their o w n income was derived from a 
share of the taxes they collected, from a share of the booty and from gifts, 
but their maintenance was probably provided largely by surpluses from 
farms m a n n e d by slaves and belonging some to the office, s o m e to the 
lineage. 
Consumption by the office-oriented segment of society was , compared 
to some states, not very conspicuous. Apart from horses and clothes, the 
most obvious signs of wealth were the n u m b e r of m e n in attendance 'doing 
nothing' and the amount of charity dispensed. Food was therefore needed 
in large quantities but apart from extra spices, meat, honey and kola, the 
food was not particularly elaborate. N o r were there expensive accoutre-
ments of office, even for the caliph - no thrones or stools of gold, no crowns 
or precious jewels, not even an extravagance like Asante cloth (instead, 
plain white was the approved symbol of high office). 
There were, however, large variations in wealth, not only between official 
households and commoners but also between commoners . A n obvious 
indicator is the w a y slaves were distributed throughout the population, 
with some farmers (and s o m e slaves) owning a hundred or more; but prices 
were low enough for most households probably to o w n one or two. Pastoral 
Fulbe, for example, used them for help in herding; M a g u z a w a absorbed 
them into their families. But wealth was not a very permanent asset: a 
ransom payment plus the escape of one's slaves might ruin a farming 
family, like that of Baba of K a r o , within a few years.17 So , too, could the 
loss of a caravan. Furthermore, with wealth divided between all a m a n ' s 
sons and with wealthy m e n tending to have m o r e wives and consequently 
more sons, fortunes a m o n g c o m m o n e r s were rarely preserved over gen-
erations. Finally the ethos of the caliphate, as shown in the writings of its 
founders and in the popular, vernacular poetry of its scholars, was sceptical 
about the ultimate value of great wealth and its consumption. 
I would suggest, therefore, that: 
(i) T h e level of tax generally on free m e n was acceptably low; and 
the levy on slaves' production, while very m u c h higher, was not 
insupportable, being probably not more than what a son would 
contribute to his father's gandu. 
(2) T h e level of consumption by official households was relatively low, 
even though in some areas, such as Sokoto, the n u m b e r of consumers 
m a y have been high. 
(3) D u e to the comparatively high population density of the caliphate 
17. M . Smith, 1954. Baba is of course referring to events that happened after 1880. 
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(in contrast, say, to earlier centuries), the ratio of tax receivers to 
taxpayers overall remained sufficiently low that a little tax paid by a 
large number added up to a substantial s u m , a s u m quite adequate 
not only to support the administrative machinery but also to finance 
the kinds of conspicuous consumption that m a d e for social dis-
tinctions in the caliphate. 
(4) Finally, though profits from long-distance trade were not the main 
source of revenue, there was the potentially considerable income 
derived from the export of captives with which to m a k e up for any 
shortfall in revenue. But the exporters' demand for captives did not 
prevent the settlement of captives in large numbers within the 
caliphate. Otherwise, the caliphate lacked the sort of monopolies 
other states had, over gold or salt mines for example, or over specific 
crops like kola or oil palms; it lacked, too, a monopoly over licences 
to trade, over transport, over a sole 'port of entry'. It lacked, I 
suggest, even a monopoly of force. If this general analysis of the 
caliphate's economy - characterized by a low degree of exploitation 
and control - is correct, then it suggests enough of a potential surplus 
in wealth and labour-time to create the b o o m in the caliphate's trade 
and production in the second half of the nineteenth century 
T h e economic foundation for this expansion lay in the agricultural 
infrastructure built up under the caliphate. It was m a d e possible by a 
considerable investment in labour, initially largely imported in the form of 
captives. Land was cleared and its fertility increased over the years by 
careful drainage, crop rotation and manuring by the herds already in the 
possession of the n e w settlers. Cattle tracks were fenced; wells were built 
to save water-carrying; the ribäts, newly walled, gave greater protection. 
But it also seems probable that agriculture became relatively more efficient, 
as the sophisticated division of labour-time and the provision of incentives 
for private production became the n o r m , and as iron became plentiful 
enough for agricultural tools to be designed and widely used for specific 
tasks. In Sokoto, irrigation with the shaduf was introduced, while another 
technical innovation was a small sugar plantation and refinery, on, it seems, 
a Brazilian model. I suggest that the improved output from agriculture 
m a d e possible an increase in the acreage under such cash crops as cotton, 
onions, groundnuts (processed, for example, into snacks) and this in turn 
resulted in a gradual expansion of activity not only by craftsmen but also 
by farmers doubling as transporters and traders. T h o u g h the evidence and 
dating for some of these improvements is still uncertain, the general 
agricultural investment in the early caliphate is too considerable to be 
overlooked. 
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Changes in the Sokoto caliphate, 1820—80 
At a number of points in this chapter, trends and developments have been 
mentioned. At this stage, it might be useful to summarize the changes, 
dividing the period 1820-80 into three phases: the first - 1820-45 - a 
period of establishment; the second - 1845-55 ~~ a decade of transition and 
disquiet; the third - 1855-80 - a period of economic expansion. 
1820-45 
T w o requirements dominated this period. First, the need for military 
security against attacks by peoples defeated or displaced in the course of 
establishing the caliphate. Second, the need not merely to rebuild an 
agricultural economy dislocated by war and brigandage but also to establish 
from scratch agricultural and military settlements manned by people for 
m a n y of w h o m such a settlement was a n e w experience. 
T o achieve success required leaders of considerable charisma, as well as 
an esprit de corps derived for some from their c o m m o n faith as Muslims, 
for others from a c o m m o n pride in being Fulbe. There was, too, an urgency, 
arising in part from expectations that the world's end was imminent, in 
part from the very precariousness of life in some of the emirates in this 
period. 
T h e history of the period, then, is often a chronicle of campaigns, of the 
foundation of this ribät or the submission of that town, accompanied by 
reports of deaths or the number of prisoners taken. It is a period free of 
famine, in contrast to the epidemics, locusts and starvation which marked 
the djihad. It is a period, too, of internal political stability, with embryonic 
administrations and posts (usually given the old Hausa titles) allocated to 
m e n whose exact biographies and characters are scarcely known. 
K a n o , Zaria and Katsina stand out as exceptions in this period, carrying 
over intact the developed infrastructure of the former Hausa states. Their 
trade was, however, affected by hostilities with Borno and with the Tuareg 
and Hausa to the north. Both K a n o and Zaria had a change of amir, K a n o 
in 1819, Zaria in 1821, which resulted in political reorganization. In Zaria, 
despite threats of violence, it was carried out peacefully. In K a n o the amir 
had to put d o w n a widespread revolt led by his o w n galadima; in addition 
he had to drive out the Muslim leader D a n T u n k u , the eventual amir of 
Kazaure. 
Towards the end of the period, most emirates were securely established, 
the most notable exception being N u p e . Capitals had been built (with the 
further exception of Hadejia), and trade, according to European reports on 
the Niger, was well established, despite the uncertainties in N u p e and some 
inflation. T h e caliphal administration had been active, intervening in Zaria 
to determine appointments within the emirate, while on the frontiers, by 
f.1840, threat of invasion had greatly diminished. 
T h e intellectual history of this period is to be found in the continuing 
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stream of books, poetry and letters written by the caliph M u h a m m a d Bello 
in Arabic on a wide range of subjects, from constitutional advice to 
mysticism and medicine. But he was not alone in writing: there were 
histories by his vizier Gidado, poetry by his sister A s m a ' , and numbers of 
other works by the family or students of the Shaykh. There were visits and 
exchanges of letters and poems, stressing the Kâdîrî links, from the Kunta 
shaykhs at Timbuktu and from K a m r al-Din. There was the visit too of 
aT-Hü3jdj ' U m a r , who introduced instead the Tijäni wird and w o n over 
some scholars in Sokoto and elsewhere during his stay of some eight years. 
Throughout the period the inspiration of the djihâd continued to sustain 
scholarship, and scholars continued to take important roles in the govern-
ment of most emirates. Typical, perhaps, was the amir of Kano , Ibrahim 
Dabo , w h o found time to write a book on the practice of mysticism and 
yet was pragmatic enough to reinstitute, with the caliph M u h a m m a d Bello's 
permission, some pre-dßhäd Hausa symbols and practices in order to make 
himself an effective ruler of Hausa subjects. But above all there was the 
expansion of education in both towns and villages. N o figures for the 
nineteenth century are available, though there were reckoned to be some 
40000 mallams in 1920 (almost certainly more, therefore, in 1900 before 
the emigration), and we know that large numbers of scholars and students 
died in the djihad, their deaths due not only to war but also 
to disease and starvation.18 If one factor making the expansion possible was 
the contribution made in the primary stages of Kur'anic education by 
w o m e n teachers in the large households, another was the widespread 
copying of textbooks now made possible by a seemingly better supply and 
lower cost of paper. 
1845-55 
These ten years were an interlude of great change; they mark a watershed, 
but one in which the efforts to build up a stable state on Islamic principles 
were called temporarily into question. A principal cause for these changes 
was simply old age. The reformers w h o had led the djihäd were old m e n 
by the 1840s, and one by one they died or retired after some thirty years 
of leadership. Buba Yero of G o m b e , 1841; Atiku in Sokoto, 1842; Yakubu 
of Bauchi, 1845; Sambo of Hadejia, 1845; D a n K a w a of Katagum, 1846; 
Ibrahim Dabo of Kano, 1846; A d a m a of A d a m a w a (Fombina), 1848. T h e 
eastern emirates were particularly affected, but in the west the amir's 
authority was successfully overthrown in Yauri 1844-8, and replaced by a 
mercenary general in Nupe , 1847-56. 
Militarily there were renewed dangers and setbacks. Between 1843 and 
1844 there was a major revolt in western Katsina, led from Maradi by 
18. T h e 1921 census counted some 34903 mallams as 'teachers', but classified some 
46000 as being occupied in the profession of mallam - the two categories being recognized, 
of course, as overlapping. T h e figures must naturally be treated with caution. C . K . M e e k , 
1925, Vol. 2, pp. 218, 226, 256-7. 
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refugee Katsinawa, but it was defeated by combined forces from six 
emirates; the rebel area was so severely punished by the amir of Katsina 
that the caliph had to remove him from office. M u c h more serious were 
the Zaberma-Kebbi-Gobir uprisings that threatened Sokoto and G w a n d u 
for some six years between 1849 an(^ T^54> a n d the rebellion in Hadejia by 
Bukhari in which the Sokoto forces were defeated. T h e autonomy of 
Hadejia, which lasted some fifteen years (1848-63), resulted in devastation 
and famine over wide areas, and whole populations were enslaved. T h e 
first famine for some decades in Kano had occurred in 1847, so that the 
effect of Bukhari's wars was to prolong starvation in eastern K a n o for 
several years. 
Finally, there were intellectual and religious movements that set off 
emigrations during this decade. T h e publication of al-Hadjd) 'Umar's book 
in 1845 added fuel to the controversy over the Tijâniyya brotherhood, and 
in particular over the caliph M u h a m m a d Bello's interest in it - a point 
which brought lengthy rebuttals from the viziers of Sokoto.19 But the amir 
of G w a n d u ' s chief minister and a distinguished scholar from the days of 
the djihâd, Modibbo Raji, resigned his post f.1850 and, announcing openly 
his previously covert allegiance to the Tijâniyya, emigrated east to 
A d a m a w a . Others joined him from K a n o , while Zaria too became a centre 
for Tijâni scholars. O n e 'royal' lineage, the Mallawa, became identified 
with the Tijâniyya but the only nineteenth-century Tijâniyya amir of Zaria, 
Sidi ' A b d al-Kadïr, was deposed after nine months, in December 1854. 
Possibly connected (or confused) with this movement , Mallam H a m z a and 
fifteen scholars withdrew from Kano in protest, finally settling in Ningi 
whence they were later to organize a state to raid very effectively into K a n o 
and Bauchi. In still another incident, linked in part, no doubt, to the 
economic conditions in eastern Kano , a certain Ibrâhïm Sharïf al-Dïn, 
f. 1855 gathered large numbers from K a n o and the eastern emirates for a 
popular Mahdist emigration east, only to be massacred in Baghirmi. 
Despite this list of changes there were of course stable points. Indeed it 
is the stability of the system that is perhaps more remarkable. Throughout 
the period the two senior caliphal leaders, the amir of G w a n d u Khalïl 
(1833—58, but he retired from campaigning in 1849) a n d the caliph7~the 
young 'Ali b. Bello (1842-59), remained in office, as did a number of the 
young new appointments in the eastern emirates. W e know an unusual 
amount about the general conditions of this decade from the journals of 
the traveller Heinrich Barth, w h o was in the area for some four years 
(1851-5). H e reports a sense of insecurity, but nothing in his account 
suggests the sort of disorder that might be inferred from the list of changes 
I gave above. But Barth's Hausa servant Dorugu, w h o was enslaved on the 
19. ' U m a r al-Futi, 1845. O n the controversy, see M . Last, 1967a, pp. 215-19. For 
somewhat divergent accounts of the career of al-Hadjd j ' U m a r , see J. R . Willis, 1970, and 
O , Jah, 1973. 
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borders of Daura and D a m a g a r a m at this time, provides an eyewitness 
account of the effects of raids and famines on the lives of farmers and their 
families.20 
It is perhaps simplistic to speak of the interlude as marking the handing 
over of power from one generation to the next, not only within the caliphate 
but also in the states opposed to the caliphate, such as Borno or Maradi. 
But most of those on either side of the frontier w h o were amirs in f.1855 
had a further 15-20 years in office, and together they effectively constituted 
a n e w generation. It is worth noting that of other states dramatically 
reformed at the turn of the century the caliphate and its neighbours were 
not alone in experiencing a critical period f.1850: Egypt, France, Austria, 
Germany , Italy are obvious examples. As in these countries, so in the 
caliphate. I think the most important feature of the decade was the intel-
lectual disquiet which seemed to question the validity of the state in the 
state's o w n , spiritual terms. Exactly w h y the disquiet became open, and 
exactly what was the reaction of the caliphal scholarly establishment has 
still to be researched in detail; but the nature of the dispute and the 
disputants has ensured the survival of at least some documentary evidence. 
I suspect that these years marked a parting of the ways for the community 
of scholars, some to opt out of government for ever, others to try and 
maintain an Islamic administration. Fifty years later, on the arrival of 
Christian colonial over-rule, a similar problem caused a similar parting — 
but the issues were clearer then. 
1855-80 
T h e most notable result of the previous decade was to make a m o d u s 
vivendi an "acceptable policy both for the caliphate and for m a n y of its 
opponents. B y 1863, w h e n the rebel amir Bukhari died, Hadejia auto-
matically returned to the caliphate. Even the N u p e civil wars were resolved 
by 1859. T h o u g h N u p e became for the first time a stable political entity, 
it was at the expense of the area to the north where a n e w emirate, 
Kontagora, was being carved out of the borderlands of Yauri, N u p e and 
Zaria. Kontagora attracted the footloose adventurers, m a n y of'royal' blood, 
whose ambitions could not be met within the framework of the established 
emirates. Other areas attracted such m e n , most notably the southern Zaria-
Bauchi borders and the semi-autonomous emirates of A d a m a w a in the east. 
Not all emigrants were pilgrims; but nor were they all warriors. T h e 
floating population of the caliphate, drawn both from within and across 
the frontiers, turned its hand n o w not only to soldiering but also to 
porterage and trade, to hunting for ivory or, later, to rubber-tapping. All 
such m e n , whatever their origin, tend to be labelled 'Hausa', a term that 
n o w signified that they belonged not to an ethnic group but to the wider 
20. H . Barth, 1857. The autobiography of Dorugu is reprinted in A . H . M . Kirk-Greene 
and P. N e w m a n (eds), 1971, pp. 29-101. 
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society of the caliphate, with its diffuse, complex economy and its lingua 
franca.21 
T w o features of this period stand out in the histories of the emirates. 
First is the relative peace and stability of the region. Raids and attacks 
continued, but they were not invasions that might seriously endanger, let 
alone topple, the caliphate. Similarly campaigns by the amirs continued, 
but the situation was effectively a stalemate. T h e opponents of the caliphate 
had themselves by n o w established stable political systems. After 1880, 
however, the crises were to recur again. 
T h e second important feature is the economic expansion of the caliphate. 
T h e evidence for this is (1) the settlement of n e w areas of land, the 
establishment of n e w villages and the continuing immigration of labour, 
free or captive; (2) the increasing number of Hausa-based traders and 
transporters on the main trade routes and in the main items of trade, thus 
implying a shift of traders into Hausa towns from elsewhere; (3) the 
expansion of 'Hausa' traders into new areas far beyond the caliphate's 
frontiers and concomitantly the extension of the cowrie as currency to n e w 
areas; (4) the increasing exports of finished cloth and other goods to other 
areas of the Western Sudan, as well as exports of materials such as ivory 
or shea-butter oil to Europe; and increasing imports of popular luxuries 
such as kola, and a range of European products. T h e added demand for 
labour, not merely in production but in transporting and packing, was 
seemingly easily met: for example, Michael M a s o n calculates that it 
required 1500 pots to hold a mere 25 tons of shea oil, yet Nupe's exports 
of oil were able to rise during the eight years 1871-8 from 120 tons to 
1 5 0 0 tons.22 
Inflation accompanied the economic expansion. Not only, however, do 
the social effects of inflation elude precision, but the actual details, let alone 
the local variations, are hard to discover. Exchange rates tabled by Marion 
Johnson suggest that the cowrie was devalued from 2500 to the silver dollar 
¿•.1855 to 5000 ir.1890.23 Taxes rose, it seems, from figures given by M . G . 
Smith, at approximately the same rate, while on the basis of prices given 
by Barth and later travellers the cost of living at least for the well-to-do 
rose twice as fast.24 If the general trend is correct, the implication is that 
the middle income 'gentry' without access to state revenue, to the export 
21. O n the Hausa diaspora, see M . A d a m u , 1978. 
22. M . Mason, 1970, ch. 3. O n cloth, see P. Shea, 1974/77. 
23. M . Johnson, 1970. 
24. Any assessment of the rise in the cost of living for particular groups is very difficult 
indeed. Whereas it is possible from the data in H . Barth, 1857, to reconstruct the prices of 
a 'basket' of goods, travellers' accounts in the 1880s and 1890s are less comprehensive and 
less precise: cf. for example, P. Staudinger, 1889; P. L . Monteil, 1895; C . H . Robinson, 
1896. Sharp local and seasonal fluctuations, heightened perhaps in Monteil's case by the 
size of the traveller's entourage itself or, in Robinson's case, by the Kano civil war, are 
further complications. For Kano, cf. M . G . Smith (forthcoming). 
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of captives or to specialized long-distance trade, will have gradually seen
their standard of living fall closer to that ofprimary producers - the farmers
and craftsmen, slave or free, who probably benefited a little from the
inflation. Such a development would both increase competition for office
and add fuel to millenarian ideas always smouldering in the caliphate,
enough to prompt the emigrations and civil conflicts that marked the last
two decades of the century. These crises emphasized a fundamental
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problem of the later caliphate - the danger that the increase, in numbers 
or expectations, of the officials, their kin and their dependents would 
continue despite any recession in the economy. 
Intellectually the significant development of this period was the increas-
ing use of Hausa instead of Arabic or Fulfulde in books and poetry. 
Translations were m a d e by m e m b e r s of the Shaykh's family of some of the 
early djihad poetry, which suggests that there was seen to be a demand for 
the ideas and records of the djihäd reformers a m o n g a wider public for 
w h o m Hausa in Arabic script was more accessible than Arabic.25 Original 
compositions were fewer than in previous periods, or at least less has 
survived. Otherwise, there is some indication of tension between govern-
ment and scholars in A d a m a w a , where there was an attempt to control 
what books scholars might teach - the ban was presumably aimed at the 
Tijâni scholars - but this was rescinded under the next amir, Sanda, w h o 
included scholars in his council. A s the thirteenth Islamic century came to 
a close ( A H 1300 = 1883), there m a y well have been millenarian expectations, 
but these did not have political expression till c.1883, in K a n o under L i m a n 
Y a m u s a , on the Borno frontier under Djibril Gaini, and under Hayatu, a 
great-grandson of the Shaykh, in A d a m a w a . Elsewhere it was quiet, as 
presumably individuals in the west migrated to join these eastern foci, 
ready for the projected final pilgrimage. But this was not in fact to occur 
until 1903. 
Borno, 1820-80 
T h e history of the Sokoto caliphate and that of its opponents and neigh-
bours are inextricably linked. T h e effect of the caliphate on its smaller 
neighbours was to m a k e them adopt political institutions that could cope 
with the pressures from outside; and these institutions often mirrored those 
of the Muslim states. Chiefs or 'big m e n ' arose in societies where previously 
there had been no unified organization, but the histories of the m a n y 
different peoples involved has not yet been analysed, and m a y never be. 
T h e seismic shock wave, with the caliphate as the epicentre, was felt in 
areas quite remote from the frontiers, as the need to pay the agreed 
indemnities resulted in raids or payments exacted in turn from the tri-
butary's weaker neighbours. But the relationship was not simply one of 
war. Trade had been organized for centuries despite the small scale of the 
peoples and economies involved. T h e caliphate's trade simply permeated, 
expanded and shifted these trade routes, as had the trade of other dominant 
states before, irrespective of frontiers. 
Indeed 'frontiers' is a difficult term to use; it applied, it seems, more to 
rights of taxation than to any limitation on movement . ' E n e m y ' is another 
such difficult term. It was possible, for example, for Siddiku, the amir of 
25. O n this movement, see B . Sa'id, 1978. 
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Katsina, to defeat an invasion from Maradi; then, on being deposed by 
Sokoto because of the severity of his punishment of Maradi's allies, himself 
to seek refuge in Maradi and with them to invade Sokoto's dependents in 
Zamfara; finally he returned to Sokoto to retire. It was normal, too, for a 
rebel against an emirate to take refuge in a neighbouring emirate without 
causing friction between the two. It was not unusual for Hausa traders to 
supply the enemy in a war, and to follow behind any raiding army, ready 
to buy up its captives and to sell weapons and horses in return. 
In short, identities based on local nationalism or on ethnic origin served, 
when relevant, to order relations between groups, not to isolate them. T h e 
caliphate and the surrounding states and peoples therefore formed a social 
and economic region in which, not surprisingly, political events in one 
state could be almost immediately echoed in another and in which the 
broad direction and timing of these events were similar. 
T h e history of Borno provides an example of this interdependence. 
Borno was the most important opponent and neighbour of the caliphate, 
and the state whose hegemony the caliphate took over; political develop-
ments in one state were of great significance for the other. At the same 
time, Borno stands in strong contrast to the caliphate, representing an 
alternative solution that Shaykh ' U t h m a n had once been ready to try. 
T h e details of Shaykh ' U t h m a n dan Fodio's djihäd and its immediate 
effects on Borno are outside the scope of this chapter.26 Suffice it to say 
that the state of Borno opposed the attacks m a d e against its peoples and as 
a result temporarily lost its capital to the mudjahidïin, and lost permanently a 
large area of its territory. In order to turn back both the ideological and 
military attack, the mai of Borno sought weapons similar to those of Sokoto: 
the shaykh he employed (al-Hadjdj M u h a m m a d al-Amïn al-Kânâmï) was 
a scHolar of some note, acquainted with the politics of the Mediterranean 
world and with connections in the Fezzän; locally he had links with S h u w a 
Arab pastoralists as well as a more personal following of K a n ë m b u . In 
short, he could represent the established international order in opposition 
to the 'Fellata' reformers. 
After al-Känämfs military victories, the mai appointed him as a semi-
autonomous chief, resident locally at Ngurno, in the manner of a viceroy 
like the traditional galadima at Nguru . H e was given or accepted no formal 
Borno title; though waziri is what he was called in one later account, such 
a title could imply not only his acceptance of the political system, but also 
his subordination within it.27 Furthermore, his role was larger, combining 
military c o m m a n d and territorial control, than any office before him. H e 
took more personal charge of his territory than could the mai in his; al-
26. For some of the details of the djihäd, see L . Brenner, 1973, pp. 26-47. T h e main 
contemporary text is that of M . Bello, 1951 or 1964. 
27. Cf, the document translated by H . R . Palmer, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 119; the occasion is 
the restoration of D u n a m a as mai and the 'deposition' of Ngileroma. 
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K â n â m ï appointed his o w n slaves to govern towns; he expanded his 
chiefdom at the same time by absorbing under his direct rule the previously 
semi-autonomous chiefdoms that lay within his general sphere. Further-
more, he maintained a standing army of K a n ë m b u spearmen beside his 
headquarters, while on the frontier he posted slave commanders rather in 
the manner of Sokoto's murábitün. His council consisted of some six 
friends, some of w h o m he had k n o w n since childhood. Having at first a 
comparatively small and thinly populated area under his control and 
consequently little revenue, he depended more on trade and the export of 
captives than on fiefs, into which he encouraged different groups to immi-
grate. H e did not maintain a large court; instead slave officials, lacking 
extended families of their o w n , not only gave him undivided loyalty but 
also absorbed less revenue. 
B y contrast the mai, w h o still had his court, had a m u c h reduced territory 
with which to maintain and reward them; in addition he could not, or did 
not, take over a semi-autonomous chiefdom such as Marte which was in 
his sphere. But he did have the traditional authority derived from his 
dynasty's right to the throne and from the stability and sense of identity 
that such continuity represented. 
T h e first period: 1 8 2 0 - 4 5 , t n e Borno dyarchy 
In 1820, the state of Borno effectively had two sometimes overlapping 
political zones dividing the country: Shaykh al-Kânâmï and his councillors 
(now at Kukawa) , extending their territory to the south, east and west; and 
the mai and his courtiers at Birni Kafela, in charge of the rest of Borno. 
Al-Känärnfs position had in the year 1820 been greatly strengthened if 
not formalized. M a i D u n a m a had died in battle against Baghirmi and al-
K â n â m ï had supervised the accession of D u n a m a ' s young son Ibrâhïm. 
F r o m this time al-Kânâmï took the title Shaykh; and on his seal he used 
A H 1235 (i.e. 1819-20 of the Christian era) as the year of his o w n accession 
to power, or at least as the year he wished to commemorate. 
Conventionally, the history of Borno is narrated as if al-Kânâmï had 
supreme power from this time on. T h e conventional view m a y well be 
correct, but the evidence is not conclusive: it derives in part from eye-
witness accounts of two British envoys, D e n h a m and Clapperton.28 Their 
reports are so biased in favour of al-Kânâmï and against the mai Ibrâhïm 
that they can scarcely be taken seriously as objective political analyses.29 
A s a guest of al-Kânâmï, as a friend of the North African traders frequenting 
28. D . D e n h a m and H . Clapperton, 1826. 
29. L . Brenner 1973, pp. 21-2, 46-7, quote D e n h a m and Clapperton's passages about 
al-Kânâmï and mai Ibrahim and makes clear their bias. Most of the data in this section are 
derived from Brenner's study and from J. E . La vers, 1977, Vol. 7, pp. 45-71. I a m very 
grateful to Lavers for his comments on this section; he does not, of course, agree with all 
the interpretation suggested here. 
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al-Kânâmfs court and travelling under the protection of a Tripoli envoy
who negotiated with al-Kânâmï, Denham shows considerable prejudice
against the mat, whose court he rarely visited and scarcely understood.
Retrospectively, al-Känämfs accession to sole power may well seem to
have occurred from an early period. But at the time it was probably not as
clear-cut. Mai Ibrahim still had a considerable court: 260-300 were in
attendance at the morning levée when Denham was there, and many of
these will have been fief-holders with their own followings. Al-Kânâmï
himself had to forward, as would any fiefholder, a proportion of the revenue
he received from his fiefs - half, Denham says. Among those who continued
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to support the mai were groups w h o particularly resented the newcomers -
for example, the Sugurti K a n ë m b u , the Black Shuwa, already established 
scholars like M . 'Abdullah of Yale Garua or M . Fanami of the M a n g a . It 
was also to be expected that traditional title-holders like the galadima or 
the martema would oppose an extension of al-Känärnfs power. T o these 
one might add the Kanuri clans, each with their chima jilibe, but it is 
impossible, from the published histories, to work out the extent to which, 
in the early period, these clan leaders were still being appointed by the 
mai, or even remained loyal to him. N o r is it clear h o w rapidly the territorial 
leaders (chima chidibe) came to be appointed by al-Kânâmï, though the 
later complaints at the extension of 'Shuwa rule' (to Gazir province by 
1842) suggest it was not necessarily very rapid nor complete. Indeed the 
division of authority between territorial and associational officials could 
easily be adapted to the kind of dyarchy I suggest. Therefore while w e do 
not k n o w in detail which chimas stayed at the mat's court in Birni Kafela, 
I think the assumption must be that the majority of the 'Kanuri aristocracy' 
were there - even if at the same time they m a y have kept a younger kinsman 
in K u k a w a as well. 
If w e assume that mai Ibrahim was not the farcical figure Denharri 
depicts, but rather the head of a still powerful court, then the activities of 
al-Kânâmï make better sense. As a kind of isuper-galadima\ or viceroy, he 
was given charge of frontier areas not only in the south-west (the galadima 
had charge of the west), but also in the south. H e had the right to raise an 
army; he also had the charge of North Africans in Borno and the conduct 
of foreign relations that that implied. His western policy (1824-30) was 
concerned less with an attack on the caliphate itself than with the re-
establishment in Nguderi of a western Borno to which the galadima had 
no claim. Al-Känämfs western Borno was probably intended to include 
some of the eastern emirates (if not K a n o ) but in this he failed. H e did, 
however, drive out M u h a m m a d M a n g a (who followed Sokoto's leadership), 
and by penetrating as far as K a n o demonstrated the military capability of 
Borno in the frontier area. H e furthermore helped to re-establish G u m e l 
as a client state of his, winning over the M a n g a after defeating them. T h e 
galadima, thus encircled, fled to Sokoto but returned to submit to al-
K â n â m ï and accepted from him a very m u c h reduced territory. B y 1830, 
then, al-Kânâmï had his o w n state of western Borno, governed by slave 
kachellas and containing a variety of peoples without any marked loyalty 
to the mai. 
This western 'sub-state' was supplemented by a similar area in the south, 
consisting mainly of Kotoko towns and the marches of Baghirmi, and again 
ruled by slaves. Initially, 1818-24, al-Kânâmï had tried with North African 
help to establish a large south-eastern protectorate over K a n ë m with 
Baghirmi as a vassal, but this proved impossible. T h e frontier wars that 
enabled this expansion certainly drew a free army of cavalry from Birni 
Kafela, m e n w h o responded to the same sort of opportunities that attracted 
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freelance volunteers from Sokoto for campaigns in Zaria or Bauchi. M e a n -
while the bulk of Borno proper, east of Lake Chad, still followed the 
traditional Kanuri authorities, owing allegiance to the mai. 
There is no reason to suppose the arrangement did not work well; the 
mai commanding the majority of Kanuri Borno and drawing revenue from 
it; al-Kânâmï commanding the frontier zones to the west and south, 
employing Borno cavalry and sending on to the mai the ma?s share of the 
revenue. Al -Kânâmï m a d e no attempt to outshine the mafs court. Indeed 
in some respects they were following the ancient pattern of a traditional 
royal city separated by some miles from the strictly Muslim trading town, 
with its residences for foreigners. A n d for foreigners like D e n h a m and his 
friends, all the activity seemed to take place in K u k a w a . 
Very little has been recorded of the activities of mai Ibrahim's court, 
not least because few survived the dynasty's destruction in 1846. Al-Hadjdj 
' U m a r , during his visit to Borno, did convert one notable m e m b e r of the 
mafs family to the Tijäniyya and so incurred the enmity of either the mat 
or al-Kânâmï - we do not know which, but conventionally it is assumed 
to be the latter.30 
O n e reason, I believe, for the success of the arrangement between the 
mai and al-Kânâmï was al-KânâmPs notable lack of dogmatism or ambition. 
Al-Kânâmï does not seem to have had a vision of a new Borno. There are 
no books or letters by him in which reforms are proposed. H e did not share 
the millenarian expectations or the urgent commitment of the Sokoto 
leaders, nor did he attract around him m e n with a similar sense of mission. 
H e himself is diffident about his reasons for staying on in Borno; his 
interests were not parochial and his loyalties were not 'tribalistic'. T h e lack 
of ideology, and the lack of the confidence and dynamism that an ideology 
can inspire, is in strong contrast to Sokoto. There was no poetry in praise 
of 'martyrs' in Borno. In so far as he was breaking the monopoly the mai 
had of loyalty, al-Kânâmï offered little to replace it beyond a personal 
loyalty to himself, a c o m m o n opposition to the 'Fellata' (Fulbe) of Sokoto 
and a commitment to the wider Islamic world of which he felt himself a 
part. Al -Kânâmï could use the maps authority as an institution around 
which to rally Borno and which was larger than mere sectional interests; 
similarly the mai could use al-Kânâmï precisely because al-Kânâmï did not 
share the reformist zeal that would have destroyed traditional Borno. Even 
had he so wished, al-Kânâmï probably did not have enough support to 
overthrow the mai, nor could he push through any fundamental reforms 
so long as he relied on the mai for Borno unity. His embassy, in the 1830s, 
to the Ottoman Porte (which implies that he repudiated the ma?s traditional 
claim to be caliph) seems to have m a d e no difference at the time. T h e 
problem for Borno came when the state had neither the overarching 
traditional institutions nor a strong ideological commitment; at this point 
30. U . al-Naqar, 1972, pp. 72-4, 144. 
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(but not, I suggest, before), analysis of Borno politics can use the language 
of patron-client relations and speak of personal advantage as the main 
motivation. 
T h e interdependence between mai Ibrahim and al-Kânâmï proved per-
sonal to them. O n al-KänärnFs death in 1837, the relationship between mai 
and Shaykh came up for renegotiation, and the evidence suggests that it 
was al-KänärnFs three S h u w a advisers rather than his son ' U m a r w h o not 
so m u c h negotiated as dictated terms to the mai. T h e mai quite properly, 
I suggest, ordered ' U m a r to come and be installed in his father's place; the 
K u k a w a advisers instead threatened to attack Birni Kafela if the mai did 
not pay homage to the n e w Shaykh. There is no report of such a visit by 
the mai to K u k a w a before, and the symbolic importance of this act cannot 
be underestimated. As a natural consequence, the new Shaykh added injury 
to insult and forwarded less revenue to the mai than Eid his father. T h u s 
'Umar's councillors jeopardized some twenty years of co-operation with the 
mai, and lost their o w n lives as a result. Furthermore, it cost the life of al-
K ä n ä m T s oldest councillor, al-Hadjdj Sudani, w h o m a y have wished to 
support 'Umar's brother ' A b d al-Rahmân for the office of Shaykh. T h e 
accession then divided not only Shaykh_ ' U m a r against mai Ibrâhïm, but 
also, eventually, Shaykh ' U m a r against his brother. 
Borno 1845—55: a period of transition 
If the years 1845-55 were difficult for the Sokoto caliphate, Borno by 
comparison suffered considerably more, not only by way of invasion, civil 
war and execution, but also in fundamental changes to the political system. 
T h e office of mai was abolished, his court disbanded; the separate, unos-
tentatious court of the Shaykh with its special international connections 
disappeared too. B y amalgamating the two offices, mai and Shaykh, ' U m a r 
established a new style of politics that distinguished it not only "From the 
preceding regimes in Borno but also from the Sokoto caliphate. 
Briefly what happened in this decade was this. With his traditional 
authority so seriously called into question, in 1846 mai Ibrâhïm encouraged 
the Sultan of Wadai to invade Borno. In this he repeated the error his 
father had m a d e twenty-seven years before, when D u n a m a had called in 
the Sultan of Baghirmi to destroy al-Kânâmï and had lost his o w n life 
instead. In the invasion two of 'Umar's chief councillors, M . Tirab and 
A h m e d Gonimi, were killed in battle against the Wadai army; ' U m a r 
executed mai Ibrâhïm after the battle and subsequently defeated and killed 
his successor mai 'AIï. 
T h e new vizier, al-Hadjdj Bashir, became Shaykh 'Umar's favourite at 
the expense of'Abd al-Rahmân. In 1853 ' A b d al-Rahmân forced the depo-
sition of ' U m a r and Bashir was killed; the following year 'Abd al-Rahmân 
was deposed in his turn, and executed. ' U m a r , reinstated, then continued 
to rule for the next twenty-six years, until his death in 1881. 
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It is not, I suggest, merely a coincidence that the same decade proved 
critical for both the Sokoto caliphate and Borno. In general terms, of 
course, the djihâd in which both states were involved brought into power 
m e n of approximately similar ages; in which case problems of succession 
were likely to affect both states simultaneously. But, in addition, the 
pressure on Borno from the caliphate had diminished: ideologically the 
concerns of the 1840s were more about millenarian pilgrimages and the 
Tijäniyya than about djihâd, while militarily there was detente despite 
occasional limited campaigns along the frontiers. O n e could argue that the 
very lack of tension allowed internal rivalries to surface: the court at 
K u k a w a no longer needed the mai as a symbol of Borno unity; there was 
even no need for unity within K u k a w a itself. This set off a chain reaction: 
civil war in Borno encouraged Bukhari's rebellion against Sokoto; the 
confusion on Borno's western frontier led Bashir to overreach himself and 
c A b d al-Rahmän to risk deposing ' U m a r . O n a popular level, the effect of 
the events of this decade was shown by the support given to the millenarian 
leader Ibrahim Sharif al-Dïn as he passed through Borno on his way 
east in 1856. But a striking aspect of these events was the inability, or 
unwillingness, of either state to take advantage of the other's disorders, 
and the rapid return to normality after 1855. 
T h e second period, 1855-80: the B o r n o S h a y k h d o m 
T h e second period saw Borno as a unitary state. ' U m a r , though retaining 
the title shaykh_ and his headquarters at K u k a w a , took on a more formal, 
distant role as head of state, with an enlarged court. As part of the n e w 
formality, he had a first minister to w h o m he gave considerable authority, 
but the shaykh_ had all power centralized in his hands and delegated it to 
whomever he chose. A s before, the court consisted of members of the 
shayWs family, free notables and slave officials (even the names of al-
KänärriTs councillors were preserved as new titles), but the slave c o m p o n -
ent, which included a royal slave army of c.3000 m e n , was more powerful 
than previously, though still dependent for office solely on the favour of 
the shaykh. Sons of slaves did occasionally inherit their father's position, 
but Slaves had no lineages with claims to particular office or to wealth. 
Therefore an increase in the slave component in government affected the 
process of selection a m o n g the free candidates for office: for a free notable 
an inherited title did not necessarily carry with it specific functions or 
power. In consequence there was no formal 'balance of power' maintained 
over time, and there were no traditionally powerful lineages with bases of 
their o w n ; in m a n y cases the most influential m e n had no formal titles. 
Advancement was through clientage within a hierarchy of patron-client 
relations headed by the shaykh. B y comparison with Sokoto, competition 
was open, unrestricted by rights of birth or rank. 
If this analysis of Borno politics in terms of patron-clientage is correct 
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(and it is the analysis of R . Cohen and L . Brenner), such a system had its 
origins in al-Kânâmrs use of slaves and a few friends to run his early 
administration.31 Because of the country's divided loyalty, with the older 
lineages probably following the mat, the Shaykh^ did not take over a 
hereditary administration; and the deaths of äEtCänärnfs councillors in the 
disorders of 1846-54 cut short any development in that direction. M e m b e r s 
of the man's administration too were discredited after 1846. It is difficult 
to see, then, what other form of political recruitment Shaykh ' U m a r could 
have used at the time. It m a y however be an anachronism to treat patron-
clientage as the traditional Borno system, or even as the dominant system 
in the early nineteenth century. Al -Känämfs councillors primarily were 
not his clients but his partners, with a considerable degree of inde-
pendence - thus their crucial role in the events following al-Känämfs 
death. Ministerial dynasties were then still a possible development. I would 
suggest, after all, that there was a marked political change after the period 
1845—55, D u t o n e m a d e easier by simply extending over the whole political 
spectrum the principle al-Kânâmï used in his appointment of slave officials. 
A s important as these political trends were the changes in the economy 
which had to support the political structure. A s suggested earlier, the 
salient fact of the period is the expansion of both the trade and the 
production of the Sokoto caliphate, with vacant land being settled within 
the frontiers and 'Hausa' traders pushing into areas far beyond. In such 
conditions not only did the Hausa-based traders come into Borno, but 
Borno-based traders increasingly moved their centre of operation to H a u -
saland. T h e political and ideological détente between the two states per-
mitted this; indeed the embargoes of the early part of the nineteenth 
century were exceptional w h e n seen against the long tradition of Borno's 
western trade. But it does seem that Borno, in competition with the trade 
centres of the caliphate, had increasingly less to offer. A n old staple like 
natron (sodium carbonate) was still exported, though it probably faced 
greater competition from other kinds of salt from elsewhere. Another staple 
export, captives, seems gradually to have declined; though it is possible 
that captives were increasingly used for work in Borno, the productive base 
of the Borno economy does not appear to have expanded at the rate the 
caliphate's expanded. Other exports or re-exports mentioned, like hides, 
skins, ivory or ostrich feathers, also passed along Hausa trade routes, and 
n e w sources of supply - e.g., ivory from A d a m a w a - were explored under 
the protection of the caliphate. In brief, it seems that Borno was being 
drawn into the caliphate's economy as a supplier of raw materials and as a 
consumer of luxuries, with less profit accruing to those in power than 
before. O n e symbol of this shift is the fact that Borno had at last become 
part of the west African cowrie currency zone by 1850; another is the 
difficulty traders had in collecting debts in the capital - perhaps the volume 
31. L . Brenner and R . Cohen, 1974, pp. 109-10; 1988. 
596 
The Sokoto caliphate and Borno
m
plate 22.5 Embroidered Borno woman's blouse made in the 1870s
of trade could no longer carry such overheads - and North African traders
became wary ofcoming to Borno. The Saharan trade had been an important
element in al-Kânâmfs policies, and to this end Borno had regained control
in the 1840s of Zinder, a major port of entry. But this advantage was no
longer a sufficient weapon in the economic competition with the caliphate.
If these factors are added up - the increase in numbers, slaves and free,
at court; the inflation in prices of luxury goods; an inadequate base in
production for export; the diminishing role of Borno as the major trade
centre - it is less surprising that trade debts proved harder to repay, or
that, in 1883, it would become necessary to levy a tax expropriating half
of every taxpayer's property. If the expropriation reflects taxpayers' regular
inability to pay the annual tax, one might infer that the countryside by
now was producing little surplus. We know, however, nothing in detail of
what was happening in rural areas between 1855 and 1880, except that no
farmers' revolts occurred until the millenarian movements of the 1880s.
It may be true that Borno was stagnating under Shaykh_'Umar's inad¬
equate leadership, but a deeper reason may be Borno's relation to the
caliphate's expanding economy. If this is the case, Borno provides an
interesting instance of the effects of the caliphate on a peripheral state, and
a model for comparing the experiences of other states on the economic
periphery. Politically, the alternatives open to Shaykh_ 'Umar and his
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administration seem limited in hindsight: opportunities for real territorial 
expansion were limited in the west and south by the caliphate's o w n 
expansion and in the east by Baghirmi and Wadai; even D a m a g a r a m on 
the north-west proved difficult to keep under Borno control. Another 
solution might have been to reduce the numbers at court and to decentralize 
the administration, but this would have been to reverse the trend of decades 
and undermine the politics of clientage; it also involved territorial expansion 
or migration. In the event the stability under Shaykh_'Umar gave way to a 
third solution - political violence and the elimination of rivals; but this lies 
outside the scope of this chapter. 
Conclusion 
Despite the obvious, gross differences in area and population, the c o m -
parison of Borno with the Sokoto caliphate illuminates the factors making 
for the different histories of the two states. In the simplest, most personal 
terms, the initial contrast can be summarised as follows: 
(i) Al -Kânâmï had a ritually important, if not militarily strong, mai 
with w h o m to share power; Sokoto under M u h a m m a d Bello had no 
such alternative traditional ruler. 
(2) Al -Kânâmï had not the same widespread or numerous family and 
clan connections to give him the powerful support which M u h a m -
m a d Bello had. 
(3) In consequence al-Kânâmï relied on slaves and friends, centralizing 
control in his o w n hands; M u h a m m a d Bello had to delegate authority 
and decentralize power to his fellow mudjahidun and muräbitün, w h o 
tended to form lineages or local interest groups. 
(4) In order to unite Borno after its defeats, al-Kânâmï had to rely on 
traditional loyalty to the mai, on his o w n charisma, on self-interest 
and shared opposition to Tellata', whereas M u h a m m a d Bello, after 
the spectacular success of the djihäd, had the strong, millenarian 
commitment to Islam with whichto unite his widely dispersed amirs. 
(5) T o make up for its curtailed revenue, Borno depended on the export 
of captives, a trade stimulated in part by Borno's special North 
African connections: for Sokoto, with its wider sources of revenue, 
the demand was to import captives, a demand stimulated by the 
various lineages and gentry requiring labour for farm and craft 
production - in the long run to the great advantage of the Sokoto 
economy. 
T h e tension between the two states in the first period was a further, 
potent factor in dictating the ideological and political responses of the two 
states. Conversely the relative relaxation of tension contributed indirectly 
to the disorders of 1845-55 and their containment. 
In the second period, w h e n competition was economic rather than 
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political, Borno tended to develop a political system in which clientage and 
individual advancement were important principles, whereas the Sokoto 
government developed groups with corporate interests and kept an Islamic, 
if no longer strongly millenarian, commitment with which to limit those 
interests and provide a moral yardstick. T h e relative dynamism and the 
greater natural wealth of the caliphate tended to drain Borno economically, 
though the detente m a y also have opened greater opportunities for Borno 
farmers and traders to supply the expanding market of the caliphate. 
Whereas in Borno it was the people in the capital w h o were most affected 
by the economic decline, in Sokoto the pious 'gentry' seem to have been 
pressured most by the changing nature of the caliphate. 
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Massina 
As indicated in Chapters 21 and 22 above, the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries were marked all over West Africa by the emergence of 
a social category hitherto dominated by sedentarized peoples, the nomadic 
Fulbe (Fulani, Peul). Their numbers had increased constantly since the 
fifteenth century as a result of successive waves of migration and, at the 
same time, their economic importance had been growing continuously 
since gold had ceased to be the motor of the West African economy. 
O n e after the other, in Futa Jallon and Futa Toro, inspired by the 
Islamic ideas of justice and equality, they shook off the rule of the seden-
tarized peoples. In the early nineteenth century, the movement spread to 
Hausaland and from there to Liptako and Massina. Already, in the closing 
years of the eighteenth century, in the reign of the F a m a of Segu, Ngolo 
Jara (Diarra) (1766-90), a first attempt by the Fulbe in the inland Niger 
delta to free themselves had ended in failure.1 But Bambara pressure in 
the inland Niger delta reached its height in the early nineteenth century, 
under D a M o n z ó n (1808-27), making life for the Fulbe very insecure. 
T h e M u s l i m revolution in Massina: the reign of Seku A h m a d u 
(Shaykh A h m a d L o b b o ) 
The insecure situation of the Fulbe in the inland Niger delta just before the 
outbreak of the revolution 
T h e power of Segu had been constantly expanding over all the neigh-
bouring countries since the reign of Ngolo Zara. Under M o n z ó n Jara 
i. Ngola Zara waged a merciless war on the Fulbe for eight years. M a n y of them took 
refuge in Wasulu; see E . M a g e , 1868, p. 401. See also L . Tauxier, 1942, p. 90. For the 
regnal dates of the F a m a of Segu we have generally adopted those suggested by Tauxier, 
w h o made a critical and comparative study of the question. W e are aware that these dates 
are only very approximate. 
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(Diarra) (1790-1808), it extended as far as Bundu in the west and the 
Dogon country in the east.2 Under D a M o n z ó n , the exactions of the Segu 
tonzons in the Fulbe encampments were constantly increasing. At the same 
time, in Muslim centres such as Jenne, Islam, having adapted itself to 
customary practices and the demands of trade, had lost all its vitality.3 But 
since the second half of the eighteenth century, the successes of the Muslim-
Fulbe revolutions in Futa Jallon and Futa Toro had opened up new 
prospects for the whole of the Islamic community in West Africa. Not far 
away from Massina, in Sokoto and Liptako, the traditional chieftaincies 
had just been overthrown, between 1804 and 1810. M a n y Fulbe from the 
inland Niger delta had taken part in this movement. O n their return h o m e , 
they helped spread the new revolutionary ideas. 
The beginnings of the Muslim revolution in the inland Niger delta 
Between 1815 and 1818, several marabouts endeavoured to exploit the 
revolutionary atmosphere prevailing in the delta area to shake off the 
Bambara yoke. T h e first to do so was a mallam w h o had come from Sokoto 
in 1815, Ibn Said, w h o succeeded in winning over the whole of the province 
of Gimballa but failed to win over the other Fulbe and above all the 
Tuareg. At the very same time, in Farimake, another marabout, A h m a d u 
Alfaka Kujajo, was preaching the holy war. All of them claimed allegiance 
to ' U t h m a n dan Fodio (Usman dan Fodio).4 But the two aspirants w h o had 
most success were A h m a d u H a m m a d i Bubu Sangare of Runde Siru and 
al-Husayn Koita from the province of Fittuga.5 T h e former finally emerged 
as the leader of the djihäd in Massina. 
Seku Ahmadu (Shaykh Ahmad Lobbo), founder of the dina of Massina 
Born in about 1773 at Malangal in the province of Massina, Seku A h m a d u 
(Shaykh A h m a d Lobbo) was noted for his piety, honesty and humility, all 
qualitîëi that made him a first-rate leader of m e n . H e was from a modest 
social background and he had received a rather ordinary theological train-
ing.6 It was not until he was aged about 22 that he began to study deeply 
at the feet of a leading mystic in Jenne, Kabara Farma. His reputation for 
holiness and his preaching in favour of a return to pure Islam rapidly 
attracted round him a host of talibs (followers) already convinced by the 
ideas emanating from Sokoto. In 1816, he pledged allegiance to 'Uthman 
2. L . Tauxier, 1942, p. 101. In 1796, all the countries between the Niger, Kaarta and 
Bundu were devastated, while the nearest countries (Beledugu, Dedugu, Fuladugu) were 
subjugated. 
3. C . Monteil, 1932, pp. 52-4. 
4. H . Diallo, 1979, p. 138 and F . B . S. Diarah, 1982, pp. 97-8. 
5. H . Diallo, 1979, p. 140. 
6. F . B . S. Diarah, 1982, p. 84. 
601 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s
¿ItflcplLutätf *sô «fix: O Ll*&Ô
(s^JiifisiAiá; us au /t^iio
plate 23.1 T'Ai opening pages o/al-Idtirar said to be the only book written by Seku Ahmadu
(Shaykh Ahmad Lobbo)
dan Fodio who sent him a flag and awarded him the title of Shaykh.7 At
the same time he received several books on Muslim law from Sokoto.8
The movement broke out in 18 18 in the shape of a revolt organized by
Seku Ahmadu against the exactions of the dynasty of the Ardo'en and their
Segu allies.9 The Fama ofSegu, underestimating the scale ofthe movement,
requested one of his columns that was going into Gimballa for a police
operation to 'punish the marabout and his supporters on his way through'.10
7. In West African languages this word becomes Shehu, Seku or Sheku, whence Seku
Ahmadu, Sheku 'Umar.
8. According to some sources, he received four books dealing with government, the
behaviour of princes and teachings on the subject of justice and on difficult passages in the
Ku'ran; see H. Diallo, 1979, p. 138. In addition to this allegiance to the leader of the Sokoto
djihâd, at least in its early stages, Seku Ahmadu was strongly helped by his manipulation
of the Ta'rikh al-Fattash to pass himself off as the twelfth caliph, whose coming had been
predicted töAskiya Muhammad at the time of his pilgrimage to Mecca (see M. Ly-Tall,
1972). The belief of the oppressed peoples of the nineteenth century in a Madhi had already
been skilfully exploited by 'Uthman dan Fodio in Hausaland.
9. See A. H. Ba, and J. Daget, 1962, pp. 29-31.
10. C. Monteil, 1932, p. 103.
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T h e defeat of the Segu army at N u k u m a precipitated a coming together 
of the majority of Fulbe around the m a n w h o henceforth appeared as their 
protector against Bambara tyranny. At the same time, the Jenne marabouts, 
w h o had from the first demonstrated great hostility to Seku A h m a d u , were 
put d o w n in 1819 after a long siege. T h e Fulbe were converted en masse, 
and, thanks to a remarkable spirit of organization, Massina rapidly estab-
lished itself as a powerful Muslim state at the very gates of Segu. There 
was implacable war between the two neighbours during the reign of D a 
Monzón . It was still raging quite strongly in March 1828 when René Caillé 
reached Jenne and reported that 'Seku A h m a d u , the chief of the land of 
Jenne, is still waging a fierce war against the Bambara of Segu w h o m he 
wants to win over to the banner of the Prophet. But these Bambara are 
warlike and are resisting him'.11 It only ended long after the French traveller 
had left, when the combatants were exhausted after a terrible famine in 
the area.12 T h e Bambara finally came to terms with reality and accepted 
the presence of a Muslim state on their borders. 
But Seku A h m a d u had to face up to resistance from another quarter, of 
a more insidious kind, from the Fulbe of Fittuga where another marabout, 
al-Husayn Koita, was leading a movement which also had the aim of 
launching a djihad in the inland Niger delta area. Fittuga was situated on 
the route linking Timbuktu to G w a n d u and was a vitally important trading 
centre for the Kunta and Sokoto. M u h a m m a d Bello, Shaykh 'Uthman's 
successor, gave all the more support to al-Husayn Koita^s" movement 
because Seku A h m a d u had taken advantage of the succession crisis that 
broke out after the death of Shaykh 'U thmän to renounce his allegiance to 
Sokoto. Backed by the Kunta and by M u h a m m a d Bello, Fittuga held out 
against Seku A h m a d u until 1823, when it was subjugated and its leader 
executed.13 The way was now open for the conquest of Timbuktu. 
Since the break-up of the Songhay empire, no durable political authority 
had been able to establish itself in Timbuktu. Sometimes, under the 
influence of the A r m a , sometimes under that of the Bambara or the Tuareg, 
Timbuktu had succeeded in maintaining the prosperity of its trade thanks 
to the protection of the Kunta, a 'Moorish tribe' that had imposed its 
authority there in the second half of the eighteenth century. They were 
skilful traders, and had become the protectors of all the routes linking the 
various regions of the Sahara to Timbuktu. At the same time, they enjoyed 
great religious authority throughout the region since one of them, Shaykh 
al-Mukhtär al-Kunti (1729/30-1811), had introduced the Kàdirïyya 
brotherhood there at the beginning of the nineteenth century. His grandson, 
al-Mukhtär al-Saghir, responded to the appeal from the traders and political 
11. R . Caillé, 1830, Vol. 2, p . 214. 
12. L . Faidherbe, 1863, p. 11. 
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leaders of Timbuktu and in 1826 went to the help of the famous city 
besieged by the troops of Massina: 
In 1826, the Fulbe of Massina seized Timbuktu and almost ruined 
its trade forever, the exactions of the conquerors extending not only 
to the idolatrous peoples (Mande, Mossi, Songhay) but also to their 
merchant coreligionist in T w ä t and Ghadâmès . These latter, finding 
themselves oppressed, called in ShaykH al-Mukhtär from Azuad: he 
was the elder brother of al-Bekkai, of the Kunta tribe, a highly 
influential m a n among the Berber peoples, and they entrusted their 
interests to him.14 
T h e Kunta leader failed to prevent the taking of the town and its 
occupation by a military garrison until the death of Seku A h m a d u . 1 5 
W h e n this happened in 1845, Massina's authority extended from Jenne to 
Timbuktu and from the region of Napala to D o g o n country.16 In a reign 
lasting twenty-seven years, Seku A h m a d u had also provided the new 
theocratic state, called the dina (religion), with firmly based religious and 
administrative structures. 
The institutions of the dina 
A s in the Islamic states of Futa Jallon, Futa Toro and the Sokoto caliphate, 
all areas of the life of the state were henceforth to be governed by Muslim 
law. A grand council of forty members appointed by Seku A h m a d u assisted 
him in all areas of the exercise of power. T o be a m e m b e r of this illustrious 
assembly it was necessary to be married, to lead a blameless life, to boast 
a good education and to be 40 years old. T w o of the grand councillors at 
the same time constituted Seku A h m a d u ' s privy council and with him 
considered all state business before submitting it to the grand council. 
Justice in the first instance was everywhere dispensed by kâdis. T h e 
supreme judicial body was in theory the grand council; but after the early 
years, when he did not always manage to impose his views on some old 
marabouts more learned than himself,17 Seku A h m a d u eventually got the 
grand council to accept all his opinions. Several stories reported by A . H . 
B â and J. Daget tend to show that Seku A h m a d u did not always respect 
the relatively democratic institutions he had himself set up. T h u s he set 
his face against the grand council's decision to abolish castes: 
T h e marabouts on the Grand Council, on the strength of the verse 
in the Ku'ran: 'all believers are brothers', had proposed the abolition 
of castes. Next day Seku A h m a d u had lizards, frogs, fish, chickens 
and mutton cooked all together, offered the dish to the marabouts and 
14. J. Ancelle, 1887, p. 114; see also H . Barth, 1863, Vol. 4 , pp. 32-3, P . Marty, 1920-
1, Vol. 1, p. 75; A . Raffenel, 1856, Vol. 2, pp. 352-3. 
15. L . Faidherbe, 1863, p. n ; M . Delafosse, 1972, Vol. 2, pp. 236-9. 
16. M . Delafosse, 1972, Vol. 2, pp. 236-7; see also L . Faidherbe, 1966, p. 51. 
17. A . H . Ba and J. Daget, 1962, p. 62. 
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invited them to eat. 'What , ' they cried, 'would you have us eat such 
a mixture?' 'Is a single one of all these meats forbidden by the Ku'ran?' 
retorted Seku A h m a d u . ' N o , but although the Book m a y not forbid 
it, it disgusts us to eat lizard and frog and mix these meats with those 
we are used to eating.' 'Likewise, although the Book does not forbid 
it, it disgusts m e to mix together nobles and caste people and abolish 
the barrier by which we customarily separate them."8 
Punishments were very severe. A h m a d u H a m m a d i Samba Bubakari, 
known as Hambarbe Samata, w h o acted as public prosecutor, was extremely 
strict; 'he always had within reach his law book, his Ku'rän, his sword and 
a whip. Throughout all the time the dina was at N u k u m a he dispensed 
justice on the spot, and himself carried out the sentence then and there.'19 
Taxes and levies were collected with the same stringency by officials 
w h o were paid partly out of the fruits of their labour. In addition to the 
ordinary dues provided for by Islam (zakât, mudu and usuru), the grand 
council introduced the pabé or war-contribution for those w h o could not 
physically take part, and for the non-Islamized countries.20 In addition, 
large estates were cultivated by captives on behalf of the dina. T h e province 
of Massina produced large quantities of rice, millet and various vegetables.21 
O n the other hand, trade suffered severely from the constant state of war 
with the neighbouring Bambara. Jenne, the great trading centre of the area, 
was no longer in contact with Bure, and its markets were no longer 
frequented by the Moors: 
This war is doing a great deal of harm to Jenne's trade because it cuts 
off any sort of communication with Yamina and Sansanding, B a m a k o 
and Bure, from where the gold that is traded throughout the interior 
comes . . . T h e traders and merchants of Jenne are suffering greatly 
from this war; but they are afraid to complain openly. I think myself 
that they would gain little from doing so anyway. Several blacks have 
told m e that since it has broken out the Moors had been leaving this 
trade centre to go to Sansanding.22 
Administratively the country was divided into five military provinces 
entrusted to relatives or faithful disciples of Seku A h m a d u . In Jenne, 
' U t h m â n Bukhari H a m m a d u n Sangaré, his first disciple, watched trade on 
the Niger and the border area between the Niger and the Bani; he bore 
the title of Amiru Mangal.2 3 F r o m Tenenku, the chief of Massina province, 
Bori Hamsala, a nephew of Seku A h m a d u , watched the western border. 
18. A . H . Ba and J. Daget, 1962, pp. 67-8. O n the often personal nature of Seku 
Ahmadu ' s power, see also C . Monteil, 1932, pp. 108, 112-13. 
19. A . H . Ba and Daget, J. 1962, p. 65. 
20. ibid., 67 and 280. 
21. R . Caillé, 1830, Vol. 2, pp. 217-18. 
22. R . Caillé, 1830, Vol. 2, pp. 214-15. 
23. H e was the commander-in-chief of the army. 
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The chief of Fakala, Alfa Samba Futa, was responsible for watching the
right bank of the Bani. Finally, the chiefs of Hayré, Nabbé and Dundé
watched, respectively, the eastern border and the lake area.
Hamdallahi, the new capital established f.1820, was the seat of the
central government. Nukuma, in the middle of the floodplain, was too
vulnerable at times of high water. Seku Ahmadu preferred a more easily
defended site 25km south-, south-east of the present town of Mopti, in a
contact zone between the areas liable to flooding and the areas above the
flood line. Building work took three years. The mosque, built by masons
from Jenne, and Seku Ahmadu's palace were the most impressive buildings
in the city. The residential area, which had about eighteen districts, was
surrounded by a protective wall pierced by four gates. Policing was carried
out by seven marabouts assisted by a large number of mounted men who
criss-crossed the districts in small groups. The town was said to be very
tidy.24
plate 23.2 Ruins ofa defensive tower ofthe tata (fortress) at Hamdallahi
Life at Hamdallahi was governed by extreme austerity. There were strict
rules about how the various classes of society spent their time. Anyone
found on the streets after the evening prayer, for example, had to establish
his identity and, ifmarried, was taken to court; in town, people on horseback
might not, on pain of severe penalties, glance into the compounds they
24. A.H. Ba and J. Daget, 1962, pp. 43-50; see also F.B. S. Diarah, 1982, pp. 122-
39 ff.
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were passing; both the young and elderly widows had to be kept in seclusion
so that old men should not be reminded of their youth; and so on.
But Seku Ahmadu's prime achievement was unquestionably his cam¬
paign to sedentarize the Fulbe. In addition to laying out Hamdallahi, he
had many farming and stock-breeding villages built. This latter activity
naturally attracted the organizers' full attention. Grazing areas and trans¬
humance were meticulously regulated, here again by a sort of paramilitary
organization.25 All these institutions only bore fruit under Seku Ahmadu's
son, Ahmadu Seku.
The reign of Ahmadu Seku (1845-53)
Ahmadu Seku's reign is regarded in Massina as the most peaceful and
prosperous, in contradistinction to his father's wartorn one and Ahmadu's
Seku's own son's, which was deeply marked by the war with al-Hadjdj
'Umar.26 But the beginning was not easy. The first difficulties arose at the
time of the succession. Seku Ahmadu died on 19 March 1845, and according
to Massina traditions, the only criteria for the appointment of a new head
of the dina were supposed to be learning and piety. Though the supporters
of dynastic succession by Seku Ahmadu's family managed to appease the
ambitions of his nephew Balobbo by giving him the post of commander-
in-chief of the army, there remained other persons such as Alfa Nuhum
25. A. H. Ba and J. Daget, 1962, pp. 81-103; see a's0 N. Wai'galo, 1977, pp. 8-9.
26. I. Barry, 1975, pp. 24-5.
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Tayru and al-Hadjdj M o d y Seydu w h o were not of the dead leader's family 
but met the required conditions better than his eldest son.27 A h m a d u 
Seku's nomination thus led to some discontent. 
A m o n g the youth the strictness of the dina was becoming increasingly 
unbearable. So when the n e w leader m a d e known his intention to pursue his 
father's policy unchanged, lampoons were recited throughout Hamdallahi 
against 'these old turbanned marabouts, ever ready to enforce Islamic laws 
strictly and without the slightest concession'.28 
In addition to these domestic difficulties, when Seku A h m a d u ' s death 
was announced the Saro Bambara and the Tuareg of the Timbuktu area 
rose in revolt: ' W h e n Seku A h m a d u ' s death was announced, Massina was 
overcome with grief; but drums of joy resounded in Bambara country, and 
the same Tuareg [i.e. those of Lake Gossi], at once organized feasts to 
thank heaven for ridding them of their most powerful enemy'.2 9 While 
repression in Saro, Balobbo's mother's homeland, was never very violent, 
it was most energetically prosecuted against the Tuareg by the same 
Balobbo, w h o was said to be anxious to take the opportunity to show the 
grand council h o w wrong it had been to prefer his cousin to himself as 
successor to Seku A h m a d u . 3 0 
Taking advantage of the succession crisis at Hamdallahi, the Tuareg of 
the Timbuktu area had got rid of Sansirfi, the representative of the central 
power there, and proclaimed their independence. At the beginning of 1846 
Balobbo marched against them. Taken by surprise, they were cut down by 
the Fulbe lancers near Lake Gossi. They then asked the Kunta family to 
intercede on their behalf. Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtär having died shortly after 
Seku A h m a d u , his brotheFShaykh Sidi al-Bekkai started negotiations with 
Massina. Promoted illegally to thT title of Shaykh al-Kunti, Sidi al-Bekkai 
was determined to do everything he could to gain effective control of affairs 
in Timbuktu.31 Despite the opposition of the leaders in Hamdallahi, he 
went there in 1847; he secured the disbandment of the military garrison in 
Timbuktu but failed to prevent Sansirfi taking up his post again. After the 
Tuareg, the M o n i m p e Bambara were the second great target of Hamdallahi 
under A h m a d u Seku. But the closing years of his reign were fairly peaceful 
and, by and large, Seku A h m a d u ' s successor, combining firmness and 
diplomacy, managed to maintain the frontiers of the kingdom intact and 
re-establish a certain entente in the interior. O n his death in February 
27. ibid., p. 15. 
28. I. Barry, 1975, p. 21; see also A . H . Ba and J. Daget, 1962, p. 259. 
29. I. Barry, 1975, p. 21. 
30. A . H . B a and J. Daget, 1962, pp. 258, 266-7. 
31. H e had just ousted his elder brother Shaykh_ Sidi H a m m a d a from the title of Shaykh 
al-Kunti, which was his by right. Barth, albeit his friend, mentioned among his character 
traits that of stopping at nothing to gain his ends (H. Barth, 1863, Vol. 4, pp. 86-7). See 
also A . H . Ba and J. Daget, 1962, p. 274. 
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1853, however, both the domestic and the foreign difficulties arose again 
in heightened form. 
A h m a d u m o A h m a d u , last ruler of Massina (1853-62) 
A h m a d u m o Ahmadu' s reign began with a major succession crisis, involving 
the various members of Seku A h m a d u ' s family. T h e custom had already 
been established of selecting the head of the dina from among the descend-
ants of Seku A h m a d u . Balobbo, admittedly a prestigious military leader, 
knew that he did not meet all the requirements, particularly that of learning, 
to be chosen. So he intrigued with the young A h m a d u m o A h m a d u , the 
dead ruler's son,32 and managed to get him nominated as ruler, hoping of 
course to keep him in leading reins,33 thus sowing the seeds of discord in 
Massina. T h e candidate w h o met all the requirements for election, A b d u -
laye Seku, the dead ruler's brother, did not admit defeat: 
H e decided with the support of the Kunta and the armies of Kunari 
and Haïré to march on Hamdallahi, to which he laid siege. T h e capital 
was split between supporters of A h m a d u m o A h m a d u and Abdulaye 
Seku. Feelings ran high, and the collision could come at any time; 
but the worst was avoided thanks to the aged Adya's intervention with 
her son, Abdulaye Seku.34 But from then on Massina was split into 
hostile camps, which waged cold war on each other.35 
A h m a d u m o A h m a d u ' s reign only deepened these divisions. H e lacked 
both the education and the political breadth of his predecessors. W h e n he 
came to power he made radical changes in the very foundations of the dina: 
the venerable marabouts were replaced by young m e n of his o w n age and 
liberalized outlook.36 Forty years after the foundation of the dina, Ibrahima 
Barry tells us, enthusiasm had declined; 'rivalries, intrigues and self-seeking 
got the upper hand again';37 and the same author reports an anecdote which 
is indicative of the atmosphere that prevailed among the Massina ruling 
class. O n e of the members of Balobbo's conspiracy, w h o had been arrested 
by al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , said one day to his gaoler, w h o was making fun of 
him, 'Whatever punishment I suffer [he was to be shot], I prefer it to being 
ruled by the baby'. T h e baby was A h m a d u m o A h m a d u . 3 8 
32. Different informants put his age between 18 and 24. 
33. I. Barry, 1975, pp. 29-30; N . Wai'galo, 1977, pp. 1-2; see also A . H . Ba and J. Daget, 
1962, p. 286. 
34. She was also the deceased's mother and A h m a d u m o Ahmadu's grandmother. She 
was said to have a soft spot for her grandson. 
35. N . Wai'galo, 1977, p. 2. 
36. I. Barry, 1975, pp. 32, 36, 38-41; N . Wai'galo, 1970, p. 34. See also F. B . S. Diarah, 
1982, pp. 321-32. 
37. I.Barry, 1975^.42. 
38. ibid. O n the internal divisions within Massina during A h m a d u m o Ahmadu's reign, 
see also E . M a g e , 1868, p. 263, and al-Hadjdj ' U m a r Tal, 1983, pp. 52-3. 
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It is easy to understand that Massina, sapped by these internal divisions, 
could not put up effective resistance to al-Hadjdj 'Umar ' s movement. 
The Torodbe (Tukuloor) empire 
In both the Western and the Central Sudan the slave trade, by upsetting 
the traditional foundations of society, had created a situation of permanent 
crisis and helped states to spring up on all sides whose viability depended 
on a continuation of the trade. In Futa Jallon, Futa Toro, Sokoto and 
Massina, where there was a sizeable Muslim community, Islam's reaction 
to this situation took the form of a national revolution led by the most 
oppressed people of the age, the Fulbe. Slavery was not abolished, but was 
governed by legal provisions, namely the Ku'rän. West of the Niger, 
between Massina, Futa Jallon and Futa Toro, a myriad of little states more 
or less dependent on Segu or Kaarta still escaped Muslim law. Disunited 
and a prey to internal divisions, they were to fail to offer effective resistance 
to the militant proselytism of an infant Muslim sect, the Tijäniyya.39 
Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r ' s j///Aä J and the birth of the M u s l i m empire of 
Segu (1852-62) 
After the successes of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Isla-
mization was marking time on all sides. T h e new theocracies were also 
riven by succession crises; and in the case of the Western Sudan there was 
also the danger posed by French power, a resolute enemy of the Muslim 
religion. T h u s in Futa Toro, in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
Islam was threatened from within, from the east and from the west. Al-
Hadjd) 'Umar's movement was a reaction to this situation. 
Outline of'Umar Saidu's life 
' U m a r Saidu (al-Hadjd) ' U m a r ) was born in about 179640 at Hal war, in 
Toro, the province closest to the French colony of Saint-Louis. H e came 
from a family that had played an active part in the great Muslim revolution 
of the late eighteenth century, and his whole childhood was steeped in 
Islamic culture. Through his exceptional intelligence and perspicacity he 
39. F r o m the name of its founder, A h m a d al-Tijâni (1737-1815). This brotherhood was 
born in southern Algeria in about 1782. It spread rapidly throughout North Africa and 
especially in Morocco, where the zhwiya of Fez became the biggest centre. It was relatively 
more liberal in nature and its basic principles were more simple than those of the other 
brotherhoods. It was first introduced south of the Sahara by the Ida or ' A H but it only 
became widespread there through Sheku ' U m a r . 
40. According to Futa traditions he was born on the eve of the battle of Bungowi, which 
Almami Abdul Kadri fought in 1796 to convert the Darnel of Kajor, Amari Ngone Ndella, 
to Islam. It was 'Umar's imminent birth that stopped his father, Saidu 'Uthmän, a disciple 
of Sulaymän Bal, taking part in that battle. See, among others, M . Kamara, 1975, p. 154, 
and F . D u m o n t , 1974, p. 4. 
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very early assimilated and mastered all the Islamic sciences. H e soon 
rejected the old Kâdirïyya sect,41 under cover of which what can only be 
described as fiefs controlled by marabouts had grown up all over Sene-
gambia. After initiation into the infant Tijâni sect he left Futa in 1826 to 
go and master the principles of the n e w brotherhood at its source. H e was 
not to return to his native village until early 1847.42 
Twenty years of travelling, including three in the Holy Places of Islam, 
gave him knowledge unique in black Africa at that time and great experience 
both of the Muslim countries visited and of the non-Islamized states. H e 
came back with the title of Grand Caliph of the Tijäniyya,43 with the 
mission of completing the Islamization of black Africa. 
In Sokoto, where he stayed from 1830 to 1838,44 he studied the principles 
of the holy war at the feet of M u h a m m a d Bello. His vast learning and 
strong personality made him one of the leading figures in the Muslim state 
of Sokoto. In 1838, recalled by his o w n people, he started homewards. 
Futa Toro, weakened by the increasingly frequent incursions of the periodic 
raids of the Massassi into its eastern provinces, could no longer be a firm 
base for the launching of a djihäd. Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r accordingly settled 
d o w n in Futa Jallon, where the Tijäniyya had m a n y adherents and where 
(within the Kâdirïyya itself), he knew that he could count on the support 
of the Alfaya, w h o were keen supporters of militant Islam.45 Despite the 
hostility of the Soriyya party in power, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r m a d e Jugunku his 
prime operational base from which recruitment and the purchase of arms 
were stepped up. At the same time in his most famous book, the Rimah, 
he perfected the ideological instrument of his campaign.46 O n his return 
from the campaign of exposition and recruitment in Futa Toro in 1847, 
he speeded up the preparations and transferred his capital to Dinguiraye 
in Jalonkadugu, whose ruler, G i m b a Sacko, was soon to regret having 
given him asylum. Convinced nevertheless of his military superiority, 
41. T h e Kâdirïyya is one of the oldest brotherhoods south of the Sahara, where it was 
introduced by the Kunta. 
42. F . Carrère and P. Holle, 1855, p. 194. 
43. That is, supreme head of the brotherhood in the land of the blacks. 
44. These are the dates accepted by the historians of A h m a d u Bello University, Zaria, 
Nigeria, according to a letter dated 24 December 1981 from the then head of the department, 
M a d h ï A d a m u . 
45. See al-Hadjdj ' U m a r Tal, nd (b), p. 9; T . Diallo, 1972, pp. 37, 38, 148-50. O n the 
other hand the Soriyya, descended from the military leader Ibrahima Sori M a w d o (who 
owed his enthronement solely to the continual pressure brought to bear on the new state 
by the Djalonke and Fulbe), were political rather than religious. 
46. In it, using simple language that brought it within the reach of his compatriots, he 
developed the main theses of the Tijäniyya, enriched by his personal experience and 
comments by many scholars of this new brotherhood. Reproduced in quantity, it was 
circulated throughout all of sub-Saharan Africa and even beyond. F . D u m o n t , 1974, pp. 6 4 -
5, tells us that the Rimah is to this day 'the book par excellence of literate Tijâni, from the 
lowliest marabout to the most exalted guide'. 
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G i m b a Sacko launched his troops against Dinguiraye. H e was driven 
back and, after several successes over small neighbouring villages, the 
mudjahidtin'1 captured the redoubtable fortress of T a m b a , capital of Jalon-
kadugu in 1852. 
The launching of the djihäd 
Between the middle of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth 
centuries, the Massassi coming from Segu country had established in 
Kaarta a state whose influence was felt from Bakhunu to Gajaga. Its power 
rested on a formidable professional army, m a d e up essentially of crown 
captives wholly devoted to their masters. They were always in the forefront, 
and it was they w h o took the responsibility for making breaches in the 
enemy camps. Their leader played a prominent role at the court of the 
fama,4S especially at succession times. H e ran the country's affairs between 
the death of a fama and the enthronement of the heir-presumptive.49 T h e 
second factor which added to the strength of the Kaarta forces was their 
cavalry, almost entirely composed of Massassi. Finally, a degree of mastery 
of the making of gunpowder m a d e this army one of the most feared in the 
Upper Senegal area. 
Power was organized into a sort of absolute monarchy in which succession 
was collateral in the Kurubari (Kulibali) family. Speedy and strict justice 
enabled this state to intervene very effectively, while a judiciously deployed 
system of endogamy enabled the Massassi to strengthen their power 
through carefully chosen marriage alliances. They had rapidly become the 
main arbiters of all the wars in Senegambia.50 Their support was often 
sought to settle disputes between one country and another, which gave 
them the opportunity to make profitable raids. Being far better trained in 
the art of war than their neighbours, they also exacted a heavy tribute for 
these services. T h u s , one by one, all the small chieftaincies of the area, 
B u n d u , Xaso, Gajaga, were destabilized. Their pressure was felt as far 
away as the eastern provinces of Futa Toro.51 
This was the position until the civil war which erupted in Kaarta in 
1843 between the Massassi and the Jawara (Diawara). After the Massassi 
had reached the country in the middle of the eighteenth century, they had 
acted as the protectors of the Jawara, w h o m they found settled there. But, 
once in control of the country, they soon began to behave as veritable 
masters and to drive the Jawara southwards; the Jawara were henceforth 
47. N a m e given in Islam to fighters for the faith. 
48. T h e title of the Bambara kings. 
49. A . Raffenel, 1856, Vol. 2, p. 387. 
50. A . Ba, recording of 10 and 11 February 1982. See also F . Carrère and P. Holle, 
1855, p. 181 and E . M a g e , 1868, p. 97. 
51. T h e slaves obtained in these wars and raids were sold to the authorities in Saint-
Louis or the Gambia of which they had become the main suppliers. 
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subjected to heavy taxes and all sorts of harassments.52 In 1843, the Jawara, 
driven out of Nioro, their capital, rose in revolt, plunging Kaarta into a 
civil war which was to last seven years. T h e Massassi w o n the war in 1850, 
but they were henceforth weakened and divided.53 
T h e western Massassi (those in the Koniakary area) had been unwilling 
to take part in the war against the Jawara which, according to them, had 
been declared by M a m a d i Kandia, the last Kurubari king, for personal 
reasons.54 T h e latter, to revenge himself, left them to face the Muslim army 
alone. After the capture of Koniakary, the Massassi assembled at Yeliman 
to defend the old royal capital, but in vain: it was destroyed in February 
1855, which led to the surrender of M a m a d i Kandia and all the Kaarta 
chiefs (those of the Jawara, the Kagoro and the Bakhunu Fulbe). O n 11 
April 1855, the tnudjahidun m a d e their triumphal entry into Nioro, and the 
Massassi were subjected to the rules of Islam. 
These produced such upheavals in their everyday life that revolts soon 
broke out on all sides, keeping the Muslim troops on the alert until 1856. 
T h e repression was extremely violent: M a m a d i Kandia and a great m a n y 
Massassi were put to death. Those w h o escaped withdrew towards the 
borders of Segu. 
Al-Hadjd) ' U m a r left Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Bayla in charge of the province 
and went towards Khasso, which the French had withdrawn from his 
sphere of influence by setting up a confederation there headed by their 
friend Diuka Sambala of Medina (Médine). Besieging this town in the 
spring of 1857 w a s t n e m o s t difficult action the Muslim army had to 
undertake. Despite being menaced by French artillery fire, the Muslims 
fought with a determination that compelled the admiration of their adver-
saries. M u c h was at stake: for the Futanke, the wiping out of m a n y years 
of humiliation and annoyance imposed by the n e w French policy in Senegal. 
It was no accident that the general w h o attracted most notice at Medina 
was M a m a d u Kuro , the headman of Ngano, a village that had been 
destroyed in 1854 by French troops. 
T h e whole ideological base of the djihad rested on Divine protection: 
thus it is understandable that the disciples of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , M u h a m a d u 
Aliu T y a m and Thierno Abdul,55 tried to explain the failure at Medina by 
the indiscipline of the tatibs or on the grounds that it was not their 
master's mission to fight the whites. T h e length of the siege, the successive 
reinforcements sent to Medina and the fury with which the mudjahidun 
52. A . Raffenel, 1846, pp. 298-301; 1856, Vol 1, p. 337. 
53. A . Ba, recordings of 10, 11 and 15 February 1982; F . Carrère and P . Holle, 1855, 
P-i84-
54. T h e excuse for the war was the assassination of a Jawara prince by M a m a d i Kandia's 
son; but the underlying reason was that the Jawara had had enough of Bambara rule, which 
with its arrogance and exorbitant tributes and, to crown it all, expulsion from Nioro had 
become unbearable, according to the Bambara dieli as reported by D . S. Diallo, 1977, p. 10. 
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fought certainly show that ' U m a r agreed. Moreover in the earliest reports 
w e have on the battle there is no mention of these reservations ofal-Hadjdj 
' U m a r about the outbreak of the fighting. O n the other hand we know that 
M u h a m a d u Aliu T y a m throughout his book was at pains to explain away 
all the defeats of the Muslim army by referring to the indiscipline of the 
talïbs.56 T h e siege lasted three months, and the situation of the besieged 
was almost desperate when an unexpected rise in the water level allowed 
Governor Faidherbe himself to come and relieve the fort on 18 July 1857. 
Futa lost m a n y of its children at Medina, and some of the best. It had 
just been demonstrated that the French had become masters of Senegambia. 
In order to rebuild his strength, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r continued his march 
towards Bundu and Futa. Everywhere he exhorted the inhabitants to refuse 
to live with the whites by emigrating to the new Muslim state he had just 
founded to the east. From then on it was war to the bitter end against the 
French, at Ndium-in-Ferlo (February 1858), M a t a m (April 1859) and 
Arundu and G e m u (October 1859). 
With a following put at at least 40 000, he returned from Futa in July 
1859.57 There is no doubt that the fight against the French was not the 
primary task that al-Hadjdj'Umar had set himself; but although thoroughly 
aware of the superiority of their weaponry he fought them tenaciously at 
Medina, G e m u , N d i u m and M a t a m . 5 8 
The march on Segu 
T h e Bambara of Beledugu and Segu were even more resistant to Islam 
than those of Kaarta. T h e Segu Bambara, in particular, had resisted several 
centuries of proselytism by Marka, Bozo and S o m o n o marabouts and the 
djihad by the Massina dina. T h e Segu fanga, or state, established in the 
first half of the eighteenth century in the political vacuum created by the 
break-up of the Mali and Songhay empires, flourished under Ngolo Jara 
(Diarra) (1766-90) from M a n d e to Timbuktu. Garrisons of tonjons (crown 
slaves) stationed at various strategic points ensured the country's security, 
while the rest of the army supplied the markets at Kangaba and Sansanding 
with slaves from regular raids into neighbouring areas. This was the 
principal source of revenue of the fama and the tonjons. Administratively, 
the country was divided into five provinces, each headed by a son of the 
fama. 
Under M o n z ó n , Ngolo Jara's son and successor (1790-1808), Segu's 
strength was displayed as far as Senegambia. In 1796, the whole area 
between the Niger, Kaarta and Bundu was ravaged by his armies; the 
56. M o d e r n traditions, for the same reasons, merely repeat this version. 
57. According to accounts collected by E . M a g e at Segu in 1864, m a n y contingents had 
already preceded him to Nioro. But these figures are not to be taken literally. 
58. Everywhere in West Africa it was the French w h o were the aggressors, not the ones 
being attacked. They took the initiative of fighting chiefs w h o were hampering their 
economic interests. 
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immediate neighbours, Beledugu, Dedugu and Fuladugu, were sub-
jugated.59 
With the reign of D a M o n z ó n (1808-27), a long decline began, marked 
in particular by the emancipation of the Fulbe and the birth on the eastern 
borders of Segu of an increasingly threatening Muslim state, the dina of 
Hamdallahi. Thus , when al-Hadjdj ' U m a r visited it in about 1839, on his 
return from Mecca, it was a country in crisis. T h e reigning yam«, Cefolo, 
was very ill, almost dying. T h e power struggle was already under way 
within the royal family. O n e of the claimants to the throne, Torokoro Mari, 
even agreed to be converted by the Tukuloor marabout in prison, in 
exchange for his blessings and prayers.60 A n alliance sealed between them 
was to enable Segu to be peacefully Islamized when the time was ripe. 
But in 1859, Torokoro Mari, whose prayers had been heard and w h o 
had been reigning for six years, was denounced and put to death by the 
tonjons.61 Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , w h o returned from Futa in September 1859, 
decided to march on the Bambara capital. H e left Nioro on 12 September 
1859 and went towards Segu, preaching and converting as he went. In 
Beledugu, on 20 November 1859, the redoubtable citadel of Merkoia in 
which all the fugitives from Kaarta had taken refuge put up a ferocious 
resistance to this advance of Islam; and for the first time the mudjahidun 
were obliged to use the two cannon captured from the French In 1858. 
F r o m then on his progress slowed down. O n 25 M a y i860 he reached the 
Niger at Niamina. From there on the Muslim army was in Segu territory. 
In the Bambara capital 'All M o n z ó n Jara had in 1859 replaced Torokoro 
Mari, w h o was regarded as too favourable to the Muslims; he was invested 
only after swearing to defend Segu against any intrusion by Islam.62 Hence 
(despite his Muslim first name) he could not have sincerely embraced this 
religion, as the leaders of Massina were later to argue. H e gathered a 
powerful army together at Wo'itala, under the c o m m a n d of his o w n son. 
T h e battle that was joined in this village is said to have been one of the 
bloodiest of the djihäd. It was only on 9 September 1859, after four days 
of fighting, that this stronghold was taken, opening the way for the march 
on Segu. 
T h e only salvation remaining for 'AIT M o n z ó n was alliance with his 
erstwhile enemies, the leaders of Massina. Since the Islamic revolution in 
this country, Hamadallahi and Segu had always been at war. All attempts 
by the various leaders of Massina to subjugate Segu had ended in failure.63 
Taking advantage even of the succession crises in Massina, the Bambara 
had several times carried the war there.64 T h e leader of Hamdallahi, like 
59. L . Tauxier, 1942, p. 101. 
60. A . Koné , 1978, p. 62. 
61. ibid.; see also E . M a g e , 1868, pp. 234-46. 
62. E . M a g e , 1868, p. 246. 
63. E . Delafosse, 1972, Vol. 2 , p. 293. 
64. I.Barry, 1975^ .27 . 
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that of Segu, was all the more inclined to let bygones be bygones because 
al-Hadjd) ' U m a r , by his presence in the Niger basin, was challenging both 
his political and his religious hegemony. But in the throes of deep-seated 
crises neither of them was able to offer effective resistance to 'Umar's better-
organized and better-equipped army. O n 9 March 1861, the Muslim army 
entered Segu. 'All Jara was forewarned, and had just enough time to save 
his skin by taking refuge in Massina. 
The war with Massina 
F r o m Sokoto to Jugunku the Tukuloor pilgrim, with this impressive 
retinue, his m a n y belongings and his scarcely veiled intention to wage war 
against the infidels, certainly perturbed the existing rulers, both tra-
ditionalist and otherwise. T h e Muslims were split between three main 
areas of influence: Futa Toro in the north-west, Futa Jallon in the south-
west, and Massina in the east. Inside this triangle, except for B u n d u , 
was a mass of traditionalist societies, into which, when conditions were 
propitious, the Muslims sent expeditions ostensibly directed towards holy 
war, but whose ulterior motive was often in fact to obtain slaves.65 Never-
theless the Muslim rulers, after the successes of the early years, were 
everywhere somewhat on the defensive. This was particularly so in the case 
of the ruler of Massina in his relations with his non-Muslim neighbours. 
Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r was inevitably perceived as a dangerous rival. After his 
victory over the Massassi in April 1855, he announced the 'good news' to 
a number of Muslim rulers, including that of Massina; the latter's reply, 
calling on him to go back h o m e , certainly did not augur well for future 
relations between the two Muslim leaders of the Western Sudan.66 In the 
following year, in August 1856, a Massina army moved to confront al-
Hadjdj ' U m a r . T h e battle of Kasakary marks the outbreak of a war that 
was to last until 1864. 
Nevertheless the two Muslim leaders were to try by means of several 
letters to find a solution to their differences. But it was virtually a dialogue 
of the deaf; ' U m a r relied on his wide Islamic learning to demonstrate to 
the ruler of Massina that so far from opposing him he should combine 
with him to fight against the infidels; A h m a d u m o A h m a d u for his part 
countered with arguments that were more political in nature, drawing 
attention to the fact that the whole area from Segu to Kaarta came under 
his influence.67 
After 'Umar's army had entered Sansanding in October i860, the c o m -
65. This phenomenon occurred also in Hausaland, where the Muslim rulers took care 
not to Islamize everyone so as not to deprive themselves of reservoirs of slaves. 
66. A h m a d u m o A h m a d u of Massina considered that all the non-Muslim countries 
between the Niger and Kaarta were in his sphere of influence. 
67. O n this exchange of letters between ' U m a r and A h m a d u m o A h m a d u , see the recent 
translation and annotation in al-Hadjdj ' U m a r Tal, 1983; there is also interesting information 
in F . D u m o n t , 1974, F . B . S. Diarah, 1982, and M . al-Hafiz al-Tidjäni, 1983. 
618 
Massina and the Torodbe empire until 1878 
bined forces of Segu and Massina came and pitched camp before this town. 
This confrontation lasted two months, neither of the parties being willing 
to be the first to start fighting. But in this very tense atmosphere a small 
incident in February i860 was enough to bring about the clash.68 
Thus w e see that until the last m o m e n t ' U m a r does not seem to have 
wanted war.69 After all, he had himself condemned in very violent terms 
the armed conflict between the rulers of Borno and Sokoto. T h e suggestion 
he made to the ruler of Massina, w h o had not succeeded in converting the 
Bambara of Segu,70 that he should combine with him, must have been 
quite sincere. But it was also difficult for A h m a d u m o A h m a d u to agree to 
this suggestion, as this would have meant acknowledging his supremacy. 
Despite the exhange of m a n y letters, war was thus almost inevitable, given 
that both sides dug in their heels.71 T h e alliance between Massina and 
Segu gave ' U m a r the legal grounds for fighting A h m a d u m o A h m a d u . 
After a stay of a year in the Bambara capital, ' U m a r marched on Massina 
in April 1862. Hamdallahi was occupied in the following month. A h m a d u 
m o A h m a d u died from wounds sustained during the battle of Tyayawal 
(10 M a y 1862).72 Balobbo, w h o had never renounced the throne of Massina, 
surrendered fairly readily, hoping in this way to achieve his o w n ends. But 
' U m a r never left those w h o had fought against him in power. Believing that 
with A h m a d u m o Ahmadu's death he had achieved the m u c h desired unity 
with Massina, he left all the country's high officials in post;73 but in January 
68. According to F . D u m o n t , 1974, p. 126, the Massinanke fired at supporters of ' U m a r 
while they were bathing. According to M a g e , shots were exchanged between the fishermen 
of the two camps. By the time ' U m a r had been told, and tried to restrain his troops, they 
had already begun to cross the river: E . M a g e , 1868, p. 106. 
69. According to all our informants in Futa he did not want it: O . Bâ, nd., p. 109, verso; 
Tapsiru A h m a d u Abdul Niagane, recording of 3 M a y 1981; Al-Hajj A h m a d u Ibrahima 
Datt, recording of 4 M a y 1981. W h e n the great ¿jihad was launched in June 1854, Kaarta 
and Segu were the only objectives al-Hadjdj ' U m a r was aiming at, according to M . A . 
T y a m , 1935, p. 45. Likewise as regards Massina traditions, N . Waigalo, 1977, p. 6, tells us 
that the purpose of A h m a d u Ha'imut of Hayre's mission was to avoid war and seek the 
support of the ruler of Massina in the pursuit of the djihad towards Mossi country. 
70. O n Sheku 'Umar's approach some well-timed conversions were made, but did not 
affect the basic problem: the Bambara of Segu remained deeply attached to their religion. 
T h e m a n y idols found in Segu were to be put on display at Hamdallahi: M . A . T y a m , 
1935, pp. 183-4. O n t n e religion of the Bambara before 'Umar's djihad, see E . M a g e , 1988; 
M . Delafosse, 1972; L . Tauxier, 1942; C . Monteil, 1977; and al-Hadjdj ' U m a r Tal, 1983. 
71. For details of these letters, see F . D u m o n t , 1974, pp. 141-82 and al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
Tal, 1983. 
72. Tyayawal is a wood in a marshy area near Sofara. It was there that the last great 
clash between the armies of A h m a d u m o A h m a d u and ' U m a r took place. T h e Massinanke 
defended themselves stubbornly, but some military chiefs of Massina are said to have 
deliberately avoided being at Tyayawal (N. Waigalo, 1977, p. 32). Above all, 'Umar's army 
excelled that of Massina both in armaments and in organization. Individual acts of valour 
were unduly important among the Fulbe. 
73. N . Waigalo, 1977, p. 33. 
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1863 he placed it under his son A h m a d u , intending himself to 'continue 
operations against the infidels at the head of his troops, swollen by the 
addition of those of Massina'.74 Disappointed, Balobbo turned towards 
Timbuktu in March 1863; he knew that in Sïdî A h m a d al-Bekkai he would 
find a resolute opponent of ' U m a r . W h e n he learned of this, ' U m a r had him 
arrested, together with m a n y of his followers. 
The Timbuktu-Massina coalition and the end ofal-Hadjdj 'Umar 
W e have seen that Timbuktu nominally came under Hamdallahi. In actual 
fact power there was in the hands of the Kunta, whose chief, Sïdï A h m a d 
al-Bekkai, was especially jealous of the degree of religious supremacy that 
he enjoyed throughout the Niger basin. T h e advance of 'Umar's army was 
bound to worry him. In i860 he made contact with the Bambara and 
offered them his moral support.75 T w o years later, in 1862, while he was 
making peace proposals to c U m a r , he was simultaneously offering to help 
the revolt that was simmering at Hamdallahi.76 Balobbo and his supporters, 
w h o had escaped, organized the revolt with his help. First at Mani M a n i 
and then in Kunari the coalition partners inflicted severe defeats on 'Umar's 
army; it lost its best generals, Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Bayla and Alfa 'Uthman , 
in M a y and June 1863.77 After an eight months' siege, the rest of the army 
attempted a break-out on 7 February 1864. ' U m a r was pursued and took 
refuge in the cave at Degembere, where he died on 14 February 1864 a 
few hours before the arrival of reinforcements under his nephew, Tijäni 
Alfa. T h e latter, furiously angry, pursued the struggle relentlessly against 
the coalition partners, w h o were no longer in agreement (each wanting 
power for himself). O n e by one, they were all defeated. In February 186578 
the moving spirit of the coalition, Sïdï al-Bekkai, was killed in a clash at 
Sare Dina, in Sebera. Tijäni became the master of Massina and Timbuktu. 
This was to become the most important province of the empire, after 
Kaarta and Segu. 
T h e political, economic and social structure of the Torodbe 
(Tukuloor) empire 
Al-Hadjdj 'Umar and the army of the mudjahidün 
With the occupation of Massina al-Hadjdj 'Umar's empire reached its 
m a x i m u m extent, stretching from Gidimaka to Timbuktu and from Ding-
uiraye to the Sahara.79 This vast territory took the form not so m u c h of a 
74. E . M a g e , 1868, p. 268. 
75. In i860, he sent a letter to this effect to 'All Monzón; C . Gerresch, 1976, p. 894. 
76. C . Gerresch, 1976, p. 895. Not all the Kunta family shared Sidi A h m a d al-Bekkai's 
views: a large part of it preferred al-Hadjdj ' U m a r (C. Gerresch, 1976, p. 893). 
77. M . A . T y a m , 1935, pp. 190-2, notes 1092 and m o . 
78. E . M a g e , 1868, p. 450. 
79. E . M a g e , 1868, p. 113, gives Medina and Tengrela as the western borders; Ding-
uiraye and Gidimaka seem nearer to the facts. 
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centralized state as of a set of strong points, from which a political-cum-
religious administration went out to consolidate the spread of Islam. Al-
Hadjdj ' U m a r , on whose prestige this whole edifice rested, saw himself only 
as a mudjahld, a fighter for the faith. H e did not concern himself m u c h 
with organization or administration, but contented himself with appointing 
talibs in each of the newly converted places, choosing them in general 
according to the criterion of education and morality.80 These talibs were 
responsible for the task of organization. ' U m a r himself was first and foremost 
a mystic,81 convinced that he had been entrusted with a Divine mission, 
namely to complete the Islamization of the blacks. In the execution of this 
task nothing stopped him, neither the hostility of Muslim rulers nor the 
fierce resistance of some non-Muslim rulers. Like the Prophet, whose heir 
he was convinced he was, obstacles in his path, far from discouraging 
him, strengthened him in his determination: 'the heir inherits everything 
possessed by him whose heir he is'.82 
In physical terms the only eyewitness description w e have of him is that 
of Paul Holle, w h o says that he saw him in August 1847 at Bakel: he 
describes him as 'a m a n with a striking face, on which were depicted a 
lively intelligence and an impression of meditation and calculation'.83 H e 
was brilliantly seconded by the greatest of his generals, Alfa ' U m a r Thierno 
Bayla W a n , with w h o m he used to say he always had a complete identity 
of views.84 T h e second closest person to him was Abdulaye Hausa, w h o 
had followed him from Sokoto. Generally speaking, despite the personal 
ascendancy he had over his companions (which was reinforced by Tijâniyya 
doctrine about relations between the Shaykh and his disciples), he associ-
ated the talibs with all major decisions. Moreover it could not have been 
otherwise in these Torodbe-dominated circles, where everyone was full of 
his o w n importance. It was during his spiritual retreats that he perfected 
most of his plans, drawing extensively on the experience of the Prophet 
M u h a m m a d and of the Apostles of Islam w h o had preceded him. T h e n he 
would submit them for approval to the council of the talibs.*5 After all, it 
was very important for the success of the djihâd to have the continuous 
support of these disciples, w h o had left their families and homeland to 
80. As F . D u m o n t , 1974, p. 121, so well shows, he was an anti-Sultan. It is significant 
that it should have been an Islamicist w h o first stressed this fundamental feature of 'Umar's . 
It is a pity that the latter's m a n y writings have not yet been translated. 
81. H e was often in Khalwa. All his major decisions were taken after one of his spiritual 
retreats. 
82. al-Hadjdj "Umar Tal, nd (b). 
83. F . Carrère and P. Holle, 1855, pp. 191-2. 
84. Tapsiru A h m a d u Abdul Niagane, recording of 3 M a y 1981. 
85. M . A . T y a m shows us him often in Khalwa. This same author tells us of several 
cases of disobedience by the talibs, but always to explain a failure. So w e do not know h o w 
m u c h credence to give to these various accounts; their very number is enough to suggest 
that some of them are true. 
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follow him. So he spared no effort to keep them attached to him, both by 
demonstrations of his supernatural powers and by distribution of goods. 
Traditions have preserved the image of him as a very generous m a n . 8 6 H e 
paid particular attention to the upkeep of the army. 
It was in Hausaland that al-Hadjdj ' U m a r recruited the first members of 
this army, and it continued to grow from Sokoto to Dinguiraye. It was 
multi-ethnic, and included contingents from Futa Toro, Hausaland, Futa 
Jallon, Khasso, Kaarta and Segu. T h e first-named were far the most 
numerous: from Jugunku until the departure from Nioro in 1859 Futa 
Toro continued to supply the army of the djihM with manpower.8 7 
T h e djihad army comprised four battahons, each organized around a 
contingent from Futa: the Toro battalion included Toro, B u n d u , Gidimaka 
and part of Futa Jallon; the Yirlabe battalion included the Yirlabe, the 
Habbiyabe, Khasso, Diafunu, Bakhunu and the Wolarbe Fulbe; the Ngenar 
battalion included the Ngenar, the Bosseyabe, the Jawara and the Massassi; 
and lastly the Murgula battalion included the Madinka and part of Futa 
Jallon. Al-Hadjdj 'Umar's guard was provided by a large predominantly 
Hausa group.88 Each battalion had its o w n flag (black for the Yirlabe, red 
and white for the Torodbe). 
T h e armaments consisted mainly of trade rifles and swords; a few 
privileged individuals had double-barrelled rifles. A large party of black-
smiths followed the army and kept it supplied with ball.89 In July 1858, at 
Ndium-in-Ferlo, followers of ' U m a r captured two out-of-order mountain 
guns from the fleeing Captain Cornu, and they were repaired by the army 
engineer, Samba Ndiaye. They were to play an important part in the 
Beledugu and Segu campaigns. But what gave the mudjahidun their strength 
was above all their faith and a well-thought out strategy. Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
regularly told them about the promises of enjoyment in this world and the 
next held out to fighters for the faith.90 O n the eve of difficult battles w e 
see him redoubling his activity. Drawing on the Ku'ran and the main 
writings about the life of the Prophet M u h a m m a d and his Caliphs, he 
urged his m e n to brave all difficulties. Thus at Yagine: 
86. Goods were distributed at Nioro before leaving for Medina, and at Segu before 
leaving for Massina. 
87. Every time he needed to rebuild his army it was to Futa Toro that he sent his 
emissaries; in 1849 to prepare the attack on T a m b a , in 1853 before the great djihàd and in 
1855 after the very costly battle of Yeliman: M . A . T y a m , 1935, pp.43, 44, 47. T h e trend 
was to continue under his son A h m a d u . H e himself carried out a big tour there in 1858-9 
before marching on Segu, and brought back from it more than 40 000 people counting both 
civilians and soldiers. 
88. O . Ba, nd, p. 78 verso. W e note that the Sofa did not yet exist as a battalion. 
89. E . M a g e has given us details of Ahmadu's munitions on the eve of the battle of 
Toghu: 4200kg of local powder, i5~2okg of European powder, nine large bags of gun flints 
and 150000 ball: E . M a g e , 1868, p. 415. 
90. According to the traditions he preached every night; see O . Ba, nd, p. 86. 
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the Differentiator ordered the criers to s u m m o n the army; the army 
formed up; the Shaykh harangued, the learned one w h o is not wrong 
. . . There the o n e and Only overjoyed the talîbs; he drew their 
attention to the promises of reward and the threats of eternal pun-
ishment; the traditions about the Prophet and the sayings were 
expounded. H e preached, and filled their hearts with aspirations for 
the next world; so m u c h so that he pricked this world for them like a 
bubble, and the next world became their goal.91 
Likewise during the siege of Medina w e see him pouring forth inexhaust-
ible energy to improve the morale of his troops and to assure them of 
divine protection and paradise. A n d when, to denigrate him, Paul Holle 
said to a very young tatib w h o was dying: 'Poor boy, w h y was not your Al 
Aghi the first into the attack this morning?', the dying boy, giving Holle a 
look of profound pity, cried out ' M y G o d , M y G o d , I thank you. I die! I 
see paradise . . . ' 
This fanatical army often faced a disunited enemy. This was so in 
B a m b u k , Kaarta, Segu and Massina. It was also clearly superior in military 
strategy: e.g. diversionary manoeuvres, encirclement of the enemy, rapidity 
of movement and all the military techniques that had enabled the Prophet 
and his caliphs in a few short years to conquer vast territories. Even terror 
became a strategic weapon: the massacre of m e n and the enslavement of 
w o m e n and children92 broke the morale of threatened countries and led 
some to surrender without a fight. W h e n approaching a country, the 
procedure was always the same: emissaries were sent to the chief to invite 
him to convert; if he acquiesced, his head was shaved and he was handed 
a string of prayer beads (satala) and taught the elementary rules of Islam. 
T h e procedure was the same for his subjects. A taUb and a small garrison 
were left to consolidate this conversion. This recourse to peaceful con-
version saved them m a n y battles, some of which could have been difficult. 
T h u s the redoubtable citadel of Farabana was invested without m u c h 
resistance in 1854. In 1856, too, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r showed himself very 
conciliatory towards the people of Farabugu, w h o had revolted; and after 
the capture of Dyangunte in the same year he did not hesitate to negotiate 
with the Kamori to get them to conform to the Muslim rules about the 
possessions of the defeated.93 It was only when people refused to embrace 
Islam that battle was joined. Unfortunately this was what most often 
happened. 
T h e commanding general of this army was Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Bayla 
W a n . O n e day a dispute arose as to w h o was the more attached to Al-
91. M . A . T y a m , 1935, pp. 56-7. 
92. Muslim law allows the killing in battle only of those capable of bearing arms. W o m e n 
and, by analogy, children under 15, were spared. 
93. M . A . Tyam, 1935, pp. 81, 82, 98, 100, 124-6. H e was to show the same spirit in 
Gidimaka and Diafunu. 
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Hadjdj ' U m a r , Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Bayla or Abdulaye Hausa. S o m e said 
the former, others the latter. T o settle the matter the two parties went to 
' U m a r himself, w h o said to them, 'If someone came along with a sword 
and offered a choice between cutting off his head or 'Umar's , Abdulaye 
Hausa would choose his own. If I have something very important to 
undertake, you will find that whatever I have decided Alfa ' U m a r is of the 
same opinion as m e ' . 9 4 Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Bayla was the linchpin of the 
djihäd; Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r could be said to have been only its brain. 
Other military leaders have remained very famous in the m e m o r y of the 
Futanke; for instance, Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Molle Ly, one of the first 
companions, w h o died at Merko'ia; Alfa ' U t h m ä n , w h o died in Massina; 
and M a m a d u H a m a t Kuro W a n , one of the bravest. T h e latter came from 
the village of Ngano (near Kanel), which had suffered particularly under 
the exactions of the new interventionist policy of the authorities at Saint-
Louis; he joined al-Hadjdj ' U m a r with his whole village at Farabana in 
1854. H e was one of the fiercest opponents of the French. It was he, 
braving the cannon balls, w h o managed to scale the fort at Medina and 
plant the Muslim flag on it. H e was cut down by a machine-gun immediately 
afterwards. 
Despite its courage and organization this army was not i m m u n e from 
the great failing of all African armies of the time, that of being dependent 
on war booty. While Muslim law did admittedly introduce some order into 
its distribution, the fact remained that booty occupied too important a 
place in the fighting not to influence the way it was conducted. Al-Hadjdj 
'Umar's personality, and the care he took to share out booty regularly and 
fairly, maintained the cohesion of the army until his death. T h e same was 
no longer true under A h m a d u . But the army played a very important role 
in the system; in particular, the allegiance of the various provinces of the 
empire depended on it. 
The administration of the provinces: a decentralized administration 
T h e provinces, as w e have seen, were dotted with fortified centres from 
which Islam was to radiate outwards. T h e most important were Dinguiraye, 
Kundian, Nioro, Koniakary, Dyangunte, Diala, Farabugu, Murgula and 
Segu. Dinguiraye, Nioro, Koniakary and Segu were effectively regional 
capitals. 
O n the borders of Futa Jallon and the M a n d e countries, Dinguiraye was 
the first historic province of the empire. It was long to shelter all al-
Hadjdj 'Umar's family, under the headship of his son M o h a m m a d u Habibu 
(grandson of M u h a m m a d Bello). T h e fortress of Kundian in B a m b u k also 
theoretically came under it. Built in 1858 under the direct supervision of 
94. Tapsiru A h m a d u Abdul Niagane, recording of 3 M a y 1981. 
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al-Hadjdj ' U m a r himself, this fort was to keep all the M a n d e countries in 
order.95 M a g e was impressed by it, and tells us 'that it would present great 
difficulties to an attacking regular force'. T h e administration there was 
under the dual control of a Django freedman assisted by a taUb Racine 
Tall, a cousin of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r . 
Nioro was the biggest province under al-Hadjdj ' U m a r . It had m a n y 
fortresses, the most important being those of Farabugu, Dyangunte and 
Nioro itself. A big Fulbe and Torodbe colony occupied most of the villages 
from which the Massassi had been driven out. A s the colonial power 
became more oppressive, the influx of immigrants from Futa increased. 
T h e temporary administration set up in 1857 under the general direction 
of Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Bayla was noticeably remodelled in 1859 t 0 meet 
the needs of the Segu campaign.96 Massassi resistance having been finally 
broken, Sheku left Nioro with m a n y district chiefs. All that remained in 
Kaarta were civilians protected by small garrisons. At Dyangunte, Thierno 
Bubacar Sire L y replaced Abdulaye Hausa; at Farabugu and Nioro the 
freedmen Dandangura and Mustafa succeeded Khalidu Elimane D e m b a 
and Alfa ' U m a r Thierno Bayla. 
Diombokho was the province nearest to Medina and Bakel. T h e tata 
(fortress) of Koniakary97 built in January 1857, was to protect Diombokho 
against both the French and their ally Diuka S a m bala. In 1866 the head 
of the talibs Thierno Musa , 9 8 the instigator of the local convention signed 
in i860 with the commander of Bakel, gave M a g e a warm welcome; 
the military governor, San M o d y , on the other hand, did not hide his 
hostility. 
Nioro was too near the French; and w e know that al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
particularly hated living with them. This is certainly the explanation of the 
importance thatSegu took on in the Torodbe empire, whose capital it was 
to be under A h m a d u . Before 1864 it was a provincial capital like the others, 
governed from April 1862 by 'Umar's eldest son. H e was assisted by certain 
of his father's old companions, such as Thierno Abdul Segu, Thierno 
A h m a d u and Samba Ndiaye, the chief engineer of most of the fortifications 
in the empire.99 But the most influential people at court were undoubtedly 
95. E . M a g e , w h o was at Kundian in 1863, describes the fort as 'a square of 60 metres, 
four to eight metres high and 1.50 metres thick at the base, flanked by 16 towers', 1868, 
pp. 82-3. 
96. T h e following is h o w this administration stood in 1857 according to ' O m a r Ba, nd, 
p. 96, verso: Thierno Djubairu Bubu Haruna in Diafunu, Thierno A h m a d u Umakala in 
Kaniarene, Modi M a m a d u Pakao at Niogomera, Sulayman Baba Raki at Diala, Kalidu 
Elimane D e m a at Farabugu, ' U m a r M a m a d u Lamine at Gemukura, Abdulaye Hausa at 
Dyangunte and Abdulaye 'Alîin Bakhunu. See also B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1972, p. 92. 
97. Built entirely of stone, it was two metres thick and several metres high; the remains, 
which withstood Archinard's artillery, are impressive to this day. 
98. H e succeeded Thierno Djibi in this post in 1859. 
99. E . M a g e , 1868, p. 222. 
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Baba Ulibo and Bobbo, respectively viceroy and diplomatic adviser.100 For 
the defence of the town and its environs, when ' U m a r left for Massina, he 
had only 1500 tarés and a contingent of Jawara and Massassi sofas under 
the overall c o m m a n d of Thierno Alassane Bâ. A h m a d u thus had to organize 
everything in this province, where, like everywhere else, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
had done no more than pass through.101 In February 1863 this vast territory 
was theoretically enlarged by the addition of Massina. But the revolt that 
broke out there in the following month stopped this being put into effect 
at all: and w h e n after ' U m a r ' s death, Tijäni Alfa reconquered Massina, it 
was for his o w n benefit. 
In all these Muslim fortresses in newly converted areas, where hostility 
to Islam was overt, the administration was always dual, with a religious 
head to continue Islamization under the protection of a military governor. 
In each of them ' U m a r had a house, and part of his family lived there. 
Thus he did not think of himself as having a fixed residence like temporal 
rulers. 
As in Futo Toro, each of the provinces was organized as an independent 
unit: al-Hadjdj ' U m a r was merely the spiritual head of the whole empire. 
T h e system was very efficient if w e are to believe the testimony of M a g e , 
w h o visited most of the provinces between 1863 and 1866. Despite the 
existence of some areas of dissidence (it could hardly have been otherwise, 
considering the amount of upheaval the new government brought about in 
the ancestral habits of the peoples involved), the French traveller was 
struck by the order and security that reigned throughout.102 
In all the provinces justice was dispensed according to Ku'ranic law by 
¡çadïs in the case of civil offences; crimes and political offences were brought 
before the religious head of the provincial capital. T h u s at Segu, M a g e 
tells us that the two great judicial authorities were the kadi and A h m a d u 
himself, and there was no appeal against their judgements. Punishments 
were the same as in all the Muslim countries: floggings were the commonest, 
and spared nobody, not even high officials of the empire.103 
100. T h e latter was from Hausaland, and played a very important role in the negotiations 
between M a g e and A h m a d u . H e was the most anti-French of Ahmadu's associates. T h e 
former was the son of Ulibo Bâ , w h o had followed ' U m a r from Nioro; he, on the other 
hand, was pro-French. 
101. H e stayed a year at Segu, using the time mainly to write his book, the Bayân 
Mawaka. 
102. H e could not resist comparing this situation with the one that prevailed, for 
instance, in Khasso: it was characterized, according to him, by complete disorder and 
insecurity, due to the repeated raids organized by Diuku Sambala into the neighbouring 
countries: E . M a g e , 1868, p. 86. 
103. ibid., p. 344. 
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The economy and finances of the empire 
T h e objective al-Hadjdj ' U m a r set himself left little room for the economic 
development of the conquered territories. T h e wealth accumulated since 
Sokoto and the war booty taken from the vanquished peoples was more 
than enough to keep the war machine going, and it was only to stop with 
his death. T h e economic demands of constant warfare thus rebounded 
upon the provincial authorities. 
T h e consequences of a decade of wars were particularly disastrous for 
the economies of the conquered countries. But not all the provinces were 
affected in the same way. Agriculture, which had suffered most from the 
djihad, seems to have picked up in 1863-4. T h e Madinka countries that 
M a g e travelled through were especially rich in cotton. In the province of 
Kita, the villages were surrounded by fields of tobacco, vegetables, water 
melons and shea trees.104 At Guettala, in Bague, the Kagoro, freed from 
the excessive pressure of the Massassi, had begun to work m u c h harder: 
'[They] told m e that they were happy, that they were not being pillaged 
any more, that the country was peaceful, that everyone was working because 
the marabout al-Hadjdj ' U m a r had ordered it to be so'.105 
In Kaarta and Dyangunte, M a g e spoke of a veritable plenty (a good 
millet harvest at Bambara M u n t a n and Madiaga). But it was above all the 
village of Dyangunte itself that impressed the French traveller with its 
abundance of rice, millet, maize, groundnuts, cotton, beans, tomatoes, 
onions and tobacco: 'At night m y m e n were given plenty of couscous, and 
I was given about six litres of milk; w e ate all the better because Fahmara 
was being given presents'.106 
Even cattle, which had constituted a large part of the booty of the djihad, 
were still plentiful in Kaarta.107 T h e province of Segu itself was no less 
prosperous: agriculture there was quite diversified108 and m a n y herds of 
livestock supplied the traditional trade towards Bure. 
In the Central Sudan, the state of war had never completely halted trade, 
since all the belligerents got something out of it. T h e main caravan routes 
linking the Central Sudan to the north and the south remained busy. M a n y 
caravans transported salt and livestock from Nioro to Bure, whence they 
would bring back gold and slaves.109 Nioro, Koniakary, Kita, Banamba , 
Niamina and Segu were major staging-posts for this trade, which ended 
traditionally at Bakel, Medina, Freetown, Bathurst or a m o n g the Moors . 
But since the war with the French, links between Medina and Bakel had 
104. E . M a g e , 1868, pp. 89-100. 
105. ibid., p. 116. 
106. ibid., pp. 137-8. 
107. ibid., p. 123. 
108. ibid., pp. 148, 156, 161, 165. 
109. ibid., pp. 105-23. 
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been suspended.110 O n e of the aims of Mage's journey was to negotiate the 
re-establishment of this trade. But since the theocratic revolution in 
Massina, towns such as Niamina and Sansanding had gone into decline. 
Sansanding, Timbuktu's entrepôt, had also been the leading slave market 
in the region. T h e kings of Segu and the Cisse chiefs of the town had 
grown very rich on this slave trade.111 W h e n he occupied it in September 
i860, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r suppressed the various taxes paid to one or other of 
them (thus turning B u b u Cisse into an implacable opponent) and replaced 
them with Muslim taxes. But in March 1863, just w h e n Sïdï A h m a d al-
Bekkai's emissaries were endeavouring to raise the whole of Segu and 
Massina, A h m a d u was unwise enough to impose a special tax on the town. 
T h e wealthy Soninke city joined the rebellion and rapidly became its nerve 
centre. 
After each victory all the possessions of the vanquished were seized and 
divided into five parts, one of which went to the state and the other four 
to the fighters. Considerable reserves of gold, livestock and goods of all 
kinds were built up at Dinguiraye, Nioro and Segu. Al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
periodically carried out a substantial distribution from them to his talibs,iu 
he himself lived entirely off his o w n possessions. T h e zakât, or tithe, was 
levied in kind on Muslims only; it went to meet the m a n y demands for 
hospitality, and to help the needy and orphans.113 T h e mudu, or annual 
alms, was required of every Muslim on the feast of R a m a d a n ; it went to 
the ecclesiastical officials (imams, kadis, lawyers and Ku'ran readers) and 
also to the needy. T h e usuru was initially paid only by caravans, at the rate 
of one-tenth of the value of the merchandise; later it was extended to 
stockbreeders, at the rate of one head of cattle for every thirty.114 
While the arrangements for and destination of these various kinds of 
revenue were always fully observed under the leader of the djihäd, under 
A h m a d u they were a frequent cause of revolts.115 There was also muted 
opposition from the talibs, w h o reproached al-Hadjdj 'Umar's successor 
with being less generous than his father. 
A society dominated by the talibs 
Al-Hadjdj 'Umar's talibs were of all races and from all countries.115 They 
came from the most varied social backgrounds. Princes as well as former 
n o . ibid., p. 120. 
in . ibid., p.526. 
112. This happened when leaving Nioro in 1859, and when leaving Segu in 1862. 
113. A considerable proportion went towards the maintenance of families of soldiers 
killed in the djihäd. 
114. B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1972, p. 177. 
115. Such as that of the Soninke community of Sansanding in 1863 which, according 
to E . M a g e , 1868, p. 275, was caused by the levying of too heavy a special contribution. 
116. E . Mage, 1868, pp. 78-344. 
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slaves were to be met a m o n g the closest companions. W e have seen that 
one of ' U m a r ' s objectives was to democratize society by resisting the 
domination of the traditional aristocracy. 
Hence throughout the empire the old aristocracy of birth was supplanted 
by a n e w political-cum-religious elite, recruited on the basis of its k n o w -
ledge and practice of Islam. In all the provincial capitals and all the large 
villages this n e w elite was present in greater or lesser numbers to help the 
newly converted inhabitants to familiarize themselves with the rites of their 
n e w religion. T h u s at Dyangunte in February 1864 there were 540 of them, 
from all walks of life: some even spoke a little French, which would suggest 
that they c a m e from Saint-Louis. U n d e r the direction of Thierno Bubacar 
Sire L y they spent m u c h of their time in a shed near the m o s q u e , reading, 
writing or teaching the Ku'ran . ' 1 7 T h e y monopolized all the senior posts in 
the empire. T h u s under A h m a d u they were soon to elevate themselves into 
a fractious aristocracy. A h m a d u , w h o had neither the religious nor the 
military stature of ' U m a r , found it difficult to assert his authority over his 
father's former companions; and this quite naturally led him to rely on the 
sofas. . 
This social category, whose functions were m o r e military than religious, 
consisted of the mass of the conquered peoples, enrolled in the army of the 
djihäd. N e w l y converted to Islam, they had but a rudimentary knowledge 
of it.118 U n d e r ' U m a r they formed part of the Ngenar battalion; but after 
the bulk of the army had left for Massina, A h m a d u himself had to build 
u p an army: the immigrants from Futa preferred to remain in Kaarta, 
which was nearer to their o w n country, and all that was left for him were 
the volunteers from the subjugated countries. T h e y were organized in an 
independent battalion; and A h m a d u even gave them some junior posts in 
the administration, in order to reduce the influence of the talibs. This 
rivalry between the talibs and the sofas was one of the difficulties ' U m a r ' s 
successor was to face throughout his reign. 
T h e problems of the succession to al-Hadjdj ' U m a r : A h m a d u ' s 
attempts to continue his father's w o r k 
A difficult succession: the first years of Ahmadu s government (1862—g) 
After the disaster at Degembere , A h m a d u , the eldest of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r ' s 
sons, found himself at the head of an enormous and very decentralized 
empire organized around four provinces as different as Dinguiraye, headed 
by M o h a m a d u Habibu Thierno M u s a , and Segu, which he himself headed. 
Each of these provincial heads had periodically to account to h i m for his 
117. E . M a g e , 1868, p. 141. 
118. The difference between the sofas and the talibs was largely one of level of education. 
Well-educated former slaves became talibs. 
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plate 23.4 Entrance ofAhmadu's palace in Segu-Sikoro
stewardship.119 But while the first year of his installation at Segu went off
without problems, in 1863 a plot was discovered simultaneously at Segu
and Hamdallahi. The cutting of communications with Massina at the end
of May put Ahmadu in a difficult situation, isolated with a handful of men
(1,500 tatibs) in a hostile country. To cope with this situation he had special
taxes levied, which only increased the unrest. The rich Soninke city of
Sansanding broke into open rebellion in December 1863; and despite
reinforcements of more than 2000 men sent from Nioro, Ahmadu did not
succeed in re-establishing his authority in Sansanding. It is true that this
new contingent of Torodbe immigrants recently arrived in Nioro had left
Futa more to escape French power than to wage the djihad. Not being
among those who had been carefully indoctrinated by al-Hadjdj 'Umar
himself, they were more interested in worldly goods. When They were
masters of Sansanding, thirst for booty lost them their victory.120
Ahmadu thus found himself at the head of two kinds of talibs: his father's
former companions, who were motivated more by faith but regarded him
119. It is beyond doubt that 'Umar left the entire succession to his eldest son. E. Mage,
1868, p. 113, gathered this information at Segu barely a year after final confirmation of this
nomination, when it was uncertain whether even Ahmadu was aware of his death. B. O.
Oloruntimehin's hypothesis casting doubt on 'Umar's decision is therefore unacceptable.
120. See E. Mage, 1868, p. 279.
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as a child,121 and the new talibs, less disinterested and less well-disciplined. 
Unfortunately for him, he played a third card, that of the volunteers from 
the subjugated countries, the sofas}11 
A h m a d u , w h o was highly educated, had been trained by al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
himself w h o , M o h a m a d u Aliu T y a m says, gave him everything. But in 
spite of outstanding intelligence and greaty piety he never managed to 
assert himself as his father had done. H e was less energetic, as M a g e 
describes him: 
At first sight I thought A h m a d u was nineteen or twenty; in fact he 
was thirty. Seated, he looked small; actually he is tall and well built. 
His face is very sweet, his expression calm, and he looks intelligent. 
H e held a string of beads in his hand, which he told, muttering, 
during breaks in the conversation. In front of him on his goatskin 
were an Arabic book and his sandals, and also his sword.123 
T h e first years of his reign were somewhat difficult. Despite a large 
garrison stationed at Niamina to maintain communications with Nioro, 
and another at Tenengu, revolt rumbled throughout the region. Until 
1866, victories were indecisive: the most stubborn resistance came from 
Beledugu. At times the road to Nioro was even cut. T h e revolt by Beledugu, 
together with that by Sansanding, supported by Mari Jara (Diarra), kept 
people on edge until 1869. Agriculture and even trade suffered greatly from 
the revolts. Villages such as Tombula, whose prosperity had struck M a g e 
in 1863, were nothing but ruins two years later. But the situation was far 
from desperate. In 1866, the French emissary, w h o m no weakness in the 
Segu regime escaped, thought that A h m a d u would eventually re-establish 
his authority, if not over the whole empire, at least over the whole of Segu 
province. This in fact happened in 1869. 
But while he was struggling with Bambara resistance, A h m a d u was less 
able to concern himself with the other parts of the empire. T h o u g h Mustafa, 
from Nioro, accounted to him fairly regularly for his stewardship (many 
emissaries from Nioro came to Segu while M a g e was there), the same 
was not true of his cousin Tijáni Alfa, w h o after subjugating Massina 
administered it in an entirely independent fashion. H e said that he too was 
'Umar's legitimate successor, and exhibited some relics of him to justify 
his statement. H e managed to play cleverly on the hatred the Habe nursed 
towards their former Fulbe masters. A great military leader as well as 
a great religious leader, he perpetuated his uncle's religious fervour at 
Bandiagara, his new capital: 'At Bandiagara the day is spent in prayers, 
and the town is like a great monastery, with Tijâni as the abbot. N o 
shouting, no singing, no music or dancing'.124 
121. E . M a g e , 1868, p. 318. 
122. O n Ahmadu's difficulties with his father's talibs, see ibid., pp. 222-305. 
123. ibid., p. 214. 
124. Report by Lieutenant-Commander Caron, quoted in Y . Saint-Martin, 1970, p. 103. 
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But the fiercest opposition to A h m a d u came from his brother M o h a m -
m a d u Habibu, w h o had kept his distance since their father's death.125 
Another brother, Mukhtâr, had set himself up in Koniakary on his o w n 
initiative, and by agreement with Habibu aspired to replace Mustafa (who 
had remained loyal to A h m a d u ) at Nioro. B y 1869, peace having returned 
to the Segu region, A h m a d u left his brother Ajibu there and started for 
Kaarta, whence Mustafa had just warned him of the threat to Nioro fron» 
his brothers M o h a m m a d u Habibu and Mukhtâr, where m a n y talibs had 
already been w o n over to their side. Both grandsons of M u h a m m a d Bello 
through their mother, they added to this illustrious maternal ancestry great 
intelligence and considerable generosity and savoir-faire.126 
Ahmadu strengthens his authority (1869-78) 
A h m a d u for his part could not let a hostile chief establish himself in Nioro, 
which was vital to Segu. In late 1869 he arrived in Kaarta. Around the 
same time a Moroccan shaft/of the Alawite dynasty conferred on him the 
important religious title ofamir al-mu'miritn, i.e. commander of the faithful. 
Henceforth he could assert himself over all his other brothers. For four 
years, he carried on a bitter struggle against all those w h o had stayed in 
Kaarta and supported Habibu and Mukhtâr in their demand for the sharing 
of their father's inheritance. At the same time he strengthened his authority 
in Gidimaka and the Khassonke territory of Logo1 2 7 and suppressed some 
Bambara and Soninke centres of rebellion. 
In 1874 he was at the height of his power.128 But though he emerged 
victorious from this fratricidal war, unrest was to persist for a long time in 
Kaarta. T h e talibs disapproved of the chaining up of Habibu and Mukhtâr. 
A h m a d u was therefore compelled to behave with more conciliation towards 
his other brothers, and to take more account of their demands for a share 
in the administration of the empire created by the father of them all. Thus 
Mustafa was confirmed in the c o m m a n d of Nioro, to which A h m a d u had 
appointed him in March 1873. H e became the ruler of the whole of Kaarta, 
having under him his brothers Seidu at Dinguiraye, Bassiru at Koniakary, 
Daye at Diala and Nuru in Diafunu. Once a year, on the feast of tabaski, 
they were all to meet at Segu and agree among themselves.129 At Segu itself 
A h m a d u strengthened his administration. His informal council, which 
125. Relations between the two brothers seemed good before Habibu learned that his 
father had left everything to A h m a d u . Thus in February 1864 Mage travelled in the 
company of some Soninke traders one of w h o m had been entrusted by Habibu with lavish 
presents to take to A h m a d u : E . M a g e , 1868, p. 108. 
126. B . O . Oloruntimehin, 1972, p. 179. 
127. The chiefs of Logo never accepted the French-imposed suzerainty of Diuka 
Sambala. 
128. Y . Saint-Martin, 1967, p. 150. 
129. This system never worked properly, and in 1884 A h m a d u went back again to 
Kaarta to oppose his dissident brothers. 
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PLATE 23.5 Ahmadu receiving visitors in the palace court
included religious and military figures such as Thierno Alassane Bâ,
Thierno Abdul Khadri Bâ, Baba Ulibo and Bobbo, was enlarged by the
inclusion of some of his relatives such as Seidu Jeliya and Muhammad
Jeliya. In the cantons the system of administration was in general main¬
tained: Ahmadu merely replaced the recalcitrant chiefs with their more
well-disposed relatives and appointed supervisory staff for them. Fortified
Torodbe villages set up on all sides reinforced security in these subjugated
areas
130
Together with the resumption of the traditional commercial exchanges
with the French trading posts of the upper Senegal,131 trade developed
with the English trading posts, leading to some diversification of the
economy.132 The Hausa trade and the kola-nut trade also expanded. Freed
from interference from the French, who since 1866 had concerned them¬
selves rather with the Southern Rivers, a new balance thus took shape in
the Central Sudan. But the process was abruptly halted in 1878 by the
French intervention in Logo.
130. Archives of ex-French West Africa, Notice sur le cercle du Ségou, 1 G320/I 1904,
pp. 15-16.
131. Ahmadu had suspended trading relations throughout his struggle with his brothers.
132. B. O. Oloruntimehin, 1972, p. 207, notes the despatch of an English mission under
the Governor of the Gambia himself to Segu in May 1876.
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Conclusion 
B y 1878 A h m a d u had overcome all the obstacles that had faced him after 
his father's death. Admittedly the Bambara, especially those of Beledugu, 
had not yet given up defending their ancestral beliefs. But they no longer 
represented a serious danger to the consolidation of the empire.133 T h e 
m a n y garrisons, formidable for the period, and the universal vocation of 
Islam, would eventually have brought about national cohesion in this large 
grouping. T h e policy of co-operation with all races and social categories 
initiated by al-Hadjdj ' U m a r himself was in general continued by his 
children and all the Torodbe, thus creating the conditions for cultural 
integration. It is significant in this connection that the former French 
" colonial territory of Soudan which covered the former Torodbe empire, 
was one of the West African states that had very few problems of ethnic 
rivalry. Granted that peoples conditioned by several centuries of belief in 
their traditional religions were obviously put off by the violence with which 
Islam was imposed, nevertheless the ground was already prepared for 
more peaceful methods of proselytization. Both in Senegambia (which the 
colonial power believed it had cleansed of his influence) and in the Central 
Sudan, most of the great religious leaders to emerge after al-Hadjdj ' U m a r 
were in one way or another to lay claim to his mantle. 
133. Y . Saint-Martin, 1970, p. 119. 
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States and peoples of 
Senegambia and Upper 
Guinea 
Y. P E R S O N * 
Whether there is a unity running through the history of the peoples of the 
west coast of Africa from the Senegal to the Bandama 1 seems doubtful, 
although in the prelude to the colonial period from the legal ending of the 
slave trade at the beginning of the century to the eve of the great colonial 
conquest, the history of the region does have a certain homogeneity. T h e 
region thus defined covers very different culture areas. T h e only obvious 
unifying factor is European influence all along the coast, and the formation 
of the earliest colonial enclaves, which is dealt with elsewhere. This chapter 
must necessarily be conceived from the viewpoint of the African peoples 
and it will therefore, be arranged geographically to deal in turn with the 
major cultural areas: that is Senegambia, Upper Guinea and the Futa 
Jallon, the K r u country, the southern M a n d e and, lastly, the M a n d e from 
the upper Niger to the B a n d a m a . 
Senegambia 
Senegambia2 is the only region where the old Western Sudanic cultural 
area (characterized by large states with a substantial Musl im minority) 
m a d e contact with the Atlantic coast, that is, a zone where the corrosive 
power of Europe had been at work for centuries, mainly through the slave 
trade to the Americas. T h e Sudanese and Muslim character of these 
societies m a d e them more stable than those of the Gulf of Guinea, but 
they were nevertheless deeply affected by changes in the external demand 
for their products and people. T h e slave trade from this region had been 
declining since the 1760s, with a brief increase in the 1780s. Neither 
the legal abolition of the British slave trade in 1808 nor the effective en-
forcement of the French anti-slave-trade legislation in 1831 niade m u c h 
1. Upper Guinea proper runs from the Gambia to Cape Palmas. But the ethnic boundary 
between two profoundly contrasting worlds, that of the Kru and the Akan, lies farther east 
on the Bandama. This is the one adopted here. 
2. For the Wolof, see O . Ba, 1976; B . Barry, 1972; L . G . Colvin, 1981, 1982, and V . 
Monteil, 1966. For the Sereer, pending the theses of J. Boulegue and M . Gueye, see M . A . 
Klein, 1968. For Gambia see C . A . Quinn, 1972. 
* deceased in December 1982. 
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fig. 24.1 States and populations ofSenegambia and Upper Guinea (after Y. Person)
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difference to a trade that was already declining but nevertheless continued 
in a small way in various disguised or illegal forms until the 1850s. T h e 
more important economic change was the enormous increases in the prices 
offered for Senegambian products. B y the 1830s, the annual average value 
of g u m exports was already more than five times the value of slave 
exports at their peak, and alongside the revived g u m trade were remarkable 
increases in the export of gold, hides, ivory, and beeswax, with the ground-
nuts that were to be the major export by mid-century also beginning to 
m a k e an appearance.3 
These changes in foreign trade m a d e enormous differences in the local 
economies as well, shifting income from those w h o had once profited from 
the slave trade to new groups w h o were in a position to profit from the 
n e w production. F r o m the late eighteenth century, and for reasons that 
were at least partially independent of the European factor, Islam began to 
gain a new dynamism; T h e peasantry began to convert en masse, partly as 
a form of protest against the aristocracy that was seeking to profit from the 
n e w economic currents by raiding the peasantry rather than protecting it. 
Senegambian societies thus found themselves caught between two new 
forces, a newly aggressive Islam and the new economic influences of a 
world economy being overturned and remade by the forces of indus-
trialization. T h e old political and social structures, failing to reform, were 
to find themselves incapable of dealing with the serious crisis that overtook 
them. T h e resulting political disorders were to last until the European 
conquests brought a new order. 
This was especially the case in the north, with the Wolof and Sereer 
kingdoms, and these two nationalities had a distinct historical tradition and 
unity. 
T h e crushing defeat of A lmami Abdul Kädir K a n of Futa Toro by the 
Darnel of Kayor (Cayor), Amari Ngone , in 1786, re-established the powers 
of the aristocracy in that country and in Waalo. But, while the princes 
moved toward a more and more overt traditionalist religion, the masses 
speeded their o w n conversion to Islam. 
Waalo was also damaged by the proximity of the French trading post at 
Saint-Louis, which fell into British hands between 1809 and 1817. It was 
also under direct pressure from the Trarza Moors , to w h o m it had been 
forced to cede the right bank of the river and whose frequent incursions it 
was unable to resist. This was the weakened, disturbed country in which 
the new relationships with Europe uneasily took shape. T h e clandestine 
slave trade was not important further north than Portuguese Guinea. W h e n 
the French re-occupied Saint-Louis and Gorée (1817), a new basis for 
commercial relationships had to be found. G u m , hides, and beeswax were 
commodities which any peasant could produce. T h e French on the Senegal, 
however, like the British further south in Sierra Leone, wanted to set up 
3. P . D . Curtin, 1975, 1981. 
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European-run plantations as a substitute for the West Indian plantations. 
This was the aim of the great agricultural colonization scheme based mainly 
on cotton and sponsored by Governor Schmaltz and Baron Roger at the 
expense of Waalo from 1819 to 1827. T h e enterprise failed because of 
technical mistakes, shortage of manpower, opposition from traders and the 
hostility of the Africans. Thereafter, a purely commercial policy was 
adopted in which the Saint-Louis merchants had to adapt to the growing 
influence of the great export houses, above all those of Bordeaux. During 
the high-water season on the Senegal river, the traders went to the landing 
places on both banks of the river, the Mauritanian and the Senegalese, and 
upstream as far as Bakel, in Gadiaga. 
For a time, the French increased 'customs' paid to the Wolof aristocracy, 
but this only aggravated the succession wars normal in this political system. 
F r o m 1827 to 1840, strife was continual between the Tejek (Teedyekk) 
and Jos (Dyoos) matrilineages, represented mainly by Brak Fara Penda 
A d a m Salt (1827-40), and Brak Xerfi Xari Daaro (1830-5). But the ordinary 
people did not support either. In 1830, when the whole system seemed on 
the point of collapse, a m a n of caste, the blacksmith, Diile of Kayor, became 
head of the Muslim opposition to the aristocracy. In a few weeks, he 
conquered the whole country in the name of an egalitarian Islam, and the 
traditional system seemed to have been destroyed, but the French governor 
of Saint-Louis intervened militarily, defeated Diile, seized him and had 
him publicly hanged. 
After this, the French refused to intervene again in the factional struggle, 
though the Trarza did regularly cross the river and ravage Waalo. Weary 
of war, some leading figures formed a Moorish party, and in 1833 married 
the young leader Njambot (Ndyömböt) of the Tejek clan, to M u h a m m a d 
al-Habïb, atnlr of the Trarza. This did not restore peace; the governor of 
Saint-Louis, furious at finding himself surrounded by the Moors, hence-
forth gave all his support to the Jos. T h e Tejek (Teedyekk) w o n the day, 
however, and on the death of Njambot in 1846, control of the country 
passed to her sister, Ndate Yalla, under cover of a phantom Brak, M o 
M b o j Maalik (1840-55). 
This disorder on the outskirts of Saint-Louis became intolerable, once 
France adopted an imperialist stance. Governor Faidherbe's first act was 
the complete annexation of Waalo in three military campaigns from January 
to June 1855. T h e country was divided into five cantons, but despite the 
depopulation the ending of the old kingdom was unpopular. T h e French 
tried in vain to use Leon Jop Sidia, the French-educated heir of the Braks, 
as a figurehead and they ended by deporting him to Gabon. It was in this 
country, however, from 1855 to 1880, that the French were to perfect the 
methods of administration and conquest that were to prove their worth a 
little later throughout West Africa. 
Kayor, which was m u c h richer and more populous than Waalo, and 
further from Saint-Louis, at first put up stiffer resistance. F r o m the middle 
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of the eighteenth century, moreover, until 1855, it was connected by a 
personal link to the half-Sereer kingdom of Bawol (Baol). Here, too, the 
upsurge of Islam around the centre of Koki threatened the traditional 
aristocracy. Despite the royal victory in 1786, m a n y Muslims fled to Cape 
Verde, where they set up a Musl im Lebu 'republic'. T h e Darnels had no 
outlet to the coast other than the difficult port of Rufisque. T h e neigh-
bouring province of Jaander (Diander) was thoroughly Islamized and 
therefore not reliable. But, after the suppression of the northern Muslims 
in 1837, the reign of Maisa Tneda Joor (1832-55) was peaceful. 
T h e n the final crisis began. T h e French, previously cooped up on the 
island of Gorée, occupied Dakar in 1857, and soon took steps to link it to 
Saint-Louis by telegraph. K a y or was thus caught in a pincer movement, 
and sank into disorder during the short reigns of M a k o d u (1859-Ó1) and 
Majoojoo (1861-4). But in 1862, the party of resistance to the Darnel got 
the young Laat Joor Ngone Latir Jop (Lat-Dior) elected. Driven out by 
the French, he took refuge with M a b a , the Islamic leader of Salum, and 
went over to Islam in its Tijäni form. This, the brotherhood of Al-Hadjdj 
' U m a r Tal, and various associated Islamic paths, was to spread very rapidly 
in a country which had previously known only the Kâdirïyya. This diversity 
was the precursor of the marabout phenomenon, which was to characterize 
the region in the colonial period, and to become a feature of African 
resistance. T h e European crisis of 1867, and still more the disaster of 1870, 
led France to retrench overseas. Laat Joor, back in Kayor as the cantonal 
head, took the title of Darnel, and at once set about completing the 
Islamization of the country in order to restore unity between the aristocracy 
and the people. H e prevaricated with France, determined not to give 
ground on essentials. In 1875, with French assistance, he drove the T u k u -
loor Marabout A m a d u Sheku out of Jolof and installed his relative Albury 
Njay there. 
A s early as 1850, the cultivation of groundnuts had been spreading 
throughout Senegambia, which was thus m a d e dependent on the world 
economy. This situation was to be reinforced in 1879 by the plan for a 
railway line from Dakar to Saint-Louis to which Laat Joor agreed in 
principle. H e realized, however, that he was losing his country; and, in 
1881, he made an about-turn and prohibited the project, preferring hopeless 
resistance to submission. His death in 1886, after a long guerrilla war, 
marked the end of the kingdom and the establishment of the colonial order. 
Jolof, also faced with the upsurge of Islam, did not so directly experience 
the impact of Europe, being poor and isolated in the hinterland. Its history 
goes hand in hand with that of Kayor, but Albury managed to prolong 
his resistance, n o w active, n o w passive, until 1890. Refusing to accept 
submission, he then joined up with A h m a d u of Segu, son of al-Hadjdj 
c U m a r , and went with him to the borders of Sokoto, where, about 1900, he 
met his death in one of the last areas of free Africa. 
T h e Sereer had had stable kingdoms from the fourteenth century 
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onward, with a social organization very similar to that of the Wolof, in 
spite of a different language (much nearer to Fulfulde than to Wolof) 
and with their own remarkable mixed agricultural-pastoral system of 
agriculture. Siin (Sine), purely Sereer, was untouched by Islam until the 
time of French rule. Salum, while more powerful, was less homogeneous. 
In the eighteenth century it was expanded militarily, extending its territory 
as far as the Gambia. But these eastern lands were peopled mainly by 
Wolof and Mandinka. T h e Buur of Salum expanded to the south into the 
old Mandinka kingdoms of N y u m i and Baadibu (Rip). Minority Islam was 
everywhere present in either its Wolof-Tukuloor form or its Mandinka 
form. T h e only purely Sereer traditionalist area was the province around 
the capital, Kahane, near Kaolak. 
T h e cultivation of groundnuts started very early here, exported both 
through the Gambia and the Petite Côte (Joal, Portudal), where Catholic 
missions appeared very early, in 1849. They hoped to take advantage of 
the absence of Islam and the presence of a long-established Portuguese-
African community which had only just then given up using Portuguese 
Creole. 
As on the lower Senegal, the traditionalist aristocracy, both Sereer and 
Mandinka, were in a difficult situation, caught between the demands of 
the Europeans and a rebellious Islam which organized the peasants and the 
minorities against them. T h e dynamism of the Tijäniyya was an additional 
factor, al-Hadjdj ' U m a r having visited the country in about 1847, before 
starting his o w n war. O n e of his disciples, Maaba Jaaxu (Maba), a Tukuloor 
marabout settled among the Wolof communities of Baadibu, was to over-
throw the old order. H e called his house, Nioro, in honour of his master. 
A similar 'Marabout W a r ' had already been raging since 1845 in K o m b o , 
around Banjul, south of the river. In 1859, Faidherbe and the Governor 
of the Gambia, Benjamin d'Arcy, launched a converging drive against 
Salum and Baadibu, occupying Kaolak. In 1861, M a b a rallied the Muslims 
of Baadibu, which he soon mastered. H e then entered the N y u m i civil war, 
in a limited way, so as not to displease the British. Having rallied the 
Muslims of eastern Salum, he launched an attack on that state in 1862, 
and the Buur, Samba Laobe Fal, could not stand against him in spite of 
French support. From there, in 1865, with the support of Laat Joor, he 
conquered part of Bawol and the whole of Jolof. Kayor, threatening the 
French, reacted by burning down Nioro, in Baadibu, after an indecisive 
battle. 
T h e end came, however, from another quarter. In July 1867, M a b a 
invaded Siin, but in this homogeneous country without Muslims he came 
up against a real national resistance from the Sereer. H e was defeated and 
killed by the Bur K u m b a Ndofen Juuf (Diouf) (1853-71). 
Maba's disunited empire was soon weakened in quarrels among his 
successors, making possible a reconstruction of Salum, where the inter-
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N a m u r Ndari, M a b a ' s successor, extended his influence over Niani and 
Wuli, further up the Gambia, though his interventions south of the river 
were unsuccessful. T h e French had no difficulty in occupying the region 
in 1887. 
Upper Guinea and Futa Jallon 
T h e Gambia river, navigable over hundreds of kilometres, had for centuries 
provided the outlet to the sea for the gold mines in the Joola countries of 
the upper Senegal and upper Niger. Further south it was a different world, 
that of Upper Guinea, where decentralized farming peoples, speaking 
mostly West Atlantic languages, had long occupied the sea coast. F r o m 
Monrovia to the Gambia , the Sudanic zone only began to have contacts 
with the sea coast in the eighteenth century. This region was also one of 
the earliest centres of European influence in Guinea-Bissau, h o m e of Creole 
culture, and later Sierra Leone and Liberia. Like Senegambia, this region 
was important for the slave trade in the sixteenth century, though, in the 
eighteenth century, its role declined. 
Outside the coastal area, the two most important peoples were the 
Mandinka and the Fulbe (Fulani, Peul). T h e Mandinka empire of K a a b u 
(Gabu) dated back to the thirteenth century and had been independent of 
old Mali since the sixteenth. T h e Fulbe had been in the area since at least 
the fifteenth century but had founded the Muslim state of Futa Jallon only 
after 1727. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Portuguese influence was in 
decline, but the clandestine slave trade was to continue for quite a time on 
both sides of the anti-slavery centre of Sierra Leone. Mandinka K a a b u had 
trouble maintaining its influence as far as the southern shores of the 
Gambia , and failed altogether with its former vassals the Ba'inuk, on the 
coast. T h e Foa (Balanta), non-centralized peasants, destroyed the Ba'inuk 
capital in 1830, and most of the survivors joined the Mandinka or else the 
Joola (Dyula), the hardy 'anarchic' traditionalist rice-growers w h o occupied 
the whole coastal area to the north. In the east, the Fulbe of Futa Jallon 
dominated the Mandinka as far as the Gambia in Kantora. In K a a b u and 
its dependencies, a Fulbe minority was growing increasingly impatient 
with its subordinate position. 
At this period, the French set up trading posts in the Casamance, at 
Karabane in 1836 and then at Seeju (Sediou) in 1838. T h e groundnut trade 
soon grew, with predictable economic and social consequences.4 
But the overthrow of the old order began in 1859, when Futa Jallon, 
and in particular the great Alfa M o Labe, Yaya M a u d o , began a decisive 
4. For the Casamance, see C . Roche, 1976; F . A . Leary, 1969. For Guinea-Bissau and 
Kaabu, A . Teixeira da Mota, 1954; M . M a n e , 1974-5; A . Carreira, 1947; J. Vêliez Caroço, 
1948. 
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struggle against Kaabu, whose king, Yargi Sayon, was killed. T h e old 
empire collapsed in 1867 with the fall of Kansala in what was to be 
Portuguese Guinea, the Almami U m a r u of T i m b o having come to reinforce 
Alfa M o Labe. A m o n g the Mandinka vassal kingdoms, Brasu soon suc-
cumbed at the hands of Alfa Moola, but Oio kept its freedom until the 
Portuguese conquest in 1905. 
T h e fall of Kaabu had major repercussions; the Fulbe rebelled against 
their Mandinka masters as far as the banks of the Gambia. In 1869, Alfa 
Moolo, a person of obscure origins, organized the kingdom of Fuladugu, 
from Kolda to Velingara, upstream from Seeju. H e vaguely recognized the 
authority of T i m b o , and set in train a policy of systematic Fulanization of 
his subjects. Until his death in 1881, this neo-Muslim ruler was the scourge 
of the Mandinka. 
T h e Mandinka tried to rally near Seeju, under Sunkari Kamara, whose 
opposition to trade soon set the French against him. His revolt against 
French influence in 1873, since the Balanba and M u s a Moola's Fulbe 
joined against him, was doomed to failure. Sunkari had to submit but, in 
1882, flung himself into a last vain revolt that marked the end of his career. 
T h e Mandinka on the banks of the Gambia regrouped more effectively 
around a religious leader of Jaxaanke (Dyakhanke) origin from the upper 
Senegal, the famous Fode Kaba D u m b u y a . Starting in 1875, he turned 
himself into a war leader, to resist Alfa Moola, with the support of Maba's 
people. Alfa Moola, however, drove him back westwards, and from 1878 
onwards Fode Kaba maintained himself by dominating the Joola (Dyula) 
of Fonyi, w h o m he partly converted to Islam. 
T h e resistance of the Mandinka in the Casamance, caught between the 
Fulbe and the French, was effective in the end, for they succeeded in 
preserving their nationality by turning en masse to Islam under the influence 
of Sunkari and Fode Kaba. But when M u s a Moolo, son of Alfa Moolo, 
went over to the French side in 1883, this gave the Fulbe a certain 
advantage. Playing on Anglo-French rivalries, Fode Kaba managed to 
maintain his position on the frontier of the Gambia until he was eliminated 
in 1901. T h e armed resistance of'anarchists' like the Joola was to continue 
until 1913, and even after the First World W a r . 
F r o m the Gambia to Sierra Leone, the history of the whole area was 
dominated from the beginning of the eighteenth century on by the develop-
ment of the great Fulbe state of Futa Jallon.5 Thanks to it, long-distance 
trade carrying Sudanic influences found its way to the coast and there 
linked up with the Europeans. Until the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, trade had percolated through a world of decentralized societies 
only with difficulty. N o w , regular caravan routes came d o w n from the 
5. O n Futa Jallon, see the thesis by T . Diallo, 1973. T h e major texts in Fulbe have been 
published by A . I. S o w , 1966, 1968. A summary of this information, made in 1966, can be 
found in Y . Person, 1974. O n the Fulbe, see J. Mendes Moreira, 1948; W . Derman, 1973. 
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upper Niger across the High Plateau of the Futa to the Portuguese trading 
posts on the Rio G e b a (Bissau and Buba) , to the Rio Nunez and the Rio 
Pongos, where the French built Boke in 1866 and Boffa in 1867, and finally 
to Sierra Leone. There, too, groundnuts appeared, although at the limit 
of their natural habitat. This was the famous 'Côte des Rivières' of the 
nineteenth-century French travellers. T h e English called it 'the northern 
rivers' on account of its position relative to Sierra Leone. Because of its 
deep indentations and inaccessible anchorages it was also one of the regions 
where the clandestine slave trade continued until the middle of the century. 
This persistence is also explained by the proximity of Futa Jallon. This 
great Fulbe state, very greedy for slaves, raided for them, and imported a 
large number from the hinterland or took them from among the coastal 
minority peoples. S o m e were then m a d e available for export. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Fulbe society in Futa Jallon 
seemed relatively stable. T h e victors in the holy war had set up a new 
aristocracy, which had established itself at the head of an extremely rigid 
and hierarchical society. At the level both of the state, of the nine largely 
independent provinces (diwal) that composed it, and of the 'parishes' 
(missidi, each comprising a 'noble' village and m a n y farming hamlets), a 
haughty, self-confident class was in c o m m a n d . T h e defeated subjects, 
especially former Jallonke (Yalunka), had been oppressed to the point of 
losing their language, and their ranks had been swollen by imported slaves. 
Making up at least three-quarters of the population, they were closely 
supervised and harshly exploited. Between the strata of this harsh society, 
there were marginals, outcasts virtually without the law: in particular, poor 
Fulbe lineages that had not managed to seize estates during the war eked 
out their existence on meagre herds in the gaps between missidi. O n the 
credit side, there was a remarkable spread of Islamic culture, accompanied by 
(as was rare in sub-Saharan Africa) frequent use of Fulfulde in written form. 
T h o u g h highly cultured, the aristocracy marked itself off by stockbreed-
ing and warfare and also by certain forms of adventurous trade. T h e cultural 
tradition that underlay the political structure remained alive, and was local-
ized in the diwal of F u g u m b a , whose marabouts decided political disputes 
by consecrating the almamis ('imams' - successive rulers of the state). 
But the Fulbe did not monopolize religion; they even entrusted a 
prestigious role to outsiders regarded as neutral. These were an ethnic 
minority with w h o m w e are already familiar, namely the Jaxaanke (Dyak-
hanke), w h o had, since the sixteenth century, covered first the G a m b i a and 
then the Futa and the Rivers with their commercial ventures. These 
western Joola (Dyula) were first and foremost m e n of religion, and in 
principle non-violent. In the Futa, in addition to long-distance trade, they 
had become the masters of religious culture since founding T u b a , near 
Labe, in about 1810. T h e aristocracy encouraged them because of their 
political neutrality, and their influence extended from Kankan in the upper 
Niger basin to the European trading posts of Sierra Leone. 
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The power of Futa Jallon rested on military force, on the hordes of
white-robed horsemen that came down from the high sandstone plateau to
raid and then return. But this force depended on the political unity of the
state, and the conflicts of the late eighteenth century almost ended it. In
order to survive, in 1799, the aristocracy limited the damage by compro¬
mise. The two great families, Alfaya and Soriya, would each designate an
almami at the same time, and the two would reign, in rotation, at Timbo,
plate 24.2 View of Timbo, capital ofthe Futa Jallon, c. 1815.
alternating every two years. This famous compromise obviously did not
always work well and led to countless conflicts, but in the main it was
effective. Civil wars were, in fact, a built-in feature and a normal way of
achieving power, and the rules merely limited the amount of violence. This
itself avoided the break-up of the kingdom: the split between the two
parties was reproduced at the level of every diwal and missidi. Thus,
although the great northern diwal ofLabe, dominated by the Jallo (Diallo),
was alone more powerful than all the rest of the Futa it never occurred to
it to break away.
These divisions were deep for all that, and limited the Fulbe's ability to
pursue aggressive policies. Indeed, the territory of the Futa as constituted
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, never extended further, the
great exception being Labe. Those of the Jallonke who had not been
enslaved reorganized themselves in the east and south with their backs to
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the Mandinka, whose culture they increasingly assimilated. T h e result was 
the kingdom of T a m b a , which closed the Niger route and dominated the 
Bouré gold mines; and thus too Solimana was organized around the fortress 
of Falaba and closed the route to the south for the Fulbe. This route was 
blocked also by Farana, set up by the Mandinka of Sankaran astride the 
Niger fords. 
T h e only exception to this freezing of frontiers at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was Labe, which at the beginning of the century did 
not extend northwards beyond the upper reaches of the Rio Grande. In 
1810-20, however, it thrust beyond and soon reached the upper Gambia, 
where it dominated the Mandinka of Kantora. This expansion, which 
meant actual genocide for various traditionalist groups of people of the 
Tanda or Badiar family (Chapi, Pakesi and Bassari), was the work of the 
powerful Alfa Molabe, reinforced by the almamis themselves, w h o called 
the whole Futa to arms as for a crusade. This was the case particularly 
with U m a r u , the Soriya almami from 1840 until his death in 1869, w h o 
made up for his defeats at the hands of the H u b b u by wars in the north. 
W e have seen that this expansion finally triumphed with the destruction 
in 1867 of the Mandinka empire of Kaabu and, at least temporarily, the 
adherence of Alfa Moolo's new Fulbe state of Fuladugu. 
While Labe was developing in the north, the factional war around T i m b o 
was only a sterile, bloody game for the first half of the century. T h e details 
are well known, and it is pointless to go over them again here. After the 
interminable war at the beginning of the century between Abdulay 
Babemba (Alfaya) and Abdul Gadiri (Soriya), Abdulay's son, Bubakar 
M a u d o , remained in power for twelve years (1827-39) in violation of the 
rule of rotation. T h e civil war was in full swing in 1844 when al-Hadjdj 
' U m a r , returning from his famous pilgrimage, came to live near Futa. F r o m 
then on, the system was to work more or less properly, but this cannot be 
explained solely by the prestige of the Tijâniyya marabout, w h o in any 
case left the Futa in about 1847. T h e fact is that in the middle of the 
century, the Futa aristocracy put its quarrels aside, for it had to face a new 
danger: the revolt of the H u b b u . 
Hubbu rassul allâh, those who love G o d , seems to have been a religious 
sect of extremist puritan members of the Kâdirïyya w h o split off from the 
Fulbe aristocracy, which mainly joined the Tijâniyya under the influence 
of al-Hadjdj ' U m a r , though the Fulbe also feared TJmar's radicalism and 
ordered him to leave the country. This was certainly h o w the H u b b u 
founder, M o d i M a m a d u Jue (Dyue), a noted scholar w h o had studied in 
Mauritania under Shaykh Sidia, saw things. Although the basic research 
has not been done, the hypothesis can be put forward that this religious 
upsurge allowed outcasts from Fulbe society to organize their protests. 
T h e H u b b u seem to have comprised marginal Fulbe, excluded from the 
partition, and serfs of Jallonke origin or recently imported slaves. T h e 
movement broke out all over the Futa in 1849; but it was mostly suppressed. 
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T h e rebels took refuge in the outlying areas, in the coastal zone or towards 
the upper Niger. They then entrenched themselves in Fitaba under the 
personal leadership of Jue and then of his son Abal and thenceforth 
constituted a serious threat which the almamis never succeeded in elim-
inating. Despite their small numbers, they attracted marginal elements 
from all quarters and created in their fortress, Boketto, an atmosphere of 
feverish mysticism. They were formidable fighters, and must have aroused 
some response in the Fulbe conscience, for the almamis had difficulty in 
mobilizing forces against them. T h e H u b b u twice burnt T i m b o and all 
attacks launched against Boketto failed. In 1871, the Alfaya almami, 
Ibrahim Sori Dara, met his death trying to take Boketto. Eventually the 
Fulbe had to appeal to Samori - whose march to the sea the H u b b u were 
obstructing - before this focus of opposition was crushed in 1884. 
T h e alliance with Samori, w h o arrived on their borders in 1879, was to 
prove profitable for the Fulbe of Futa, w h o sold him cattle in exchange for 
slaves. Even with the H u b b u threat diminished, this society could still only 
maintain its divided balance, and it offered but weak resistance to the 
colonial conquest. 
B y superseding a fragmented political structure, the formation of Futa 
Jallon had opened up a huge area for Sudanic trade to reach the sea coast, 
even though security remained only relative and the Fulbe aristocracy had 
odd ideas about the protection of caravans. René Caillé, w h o crossed the 
country from Boke to the Niger, bore witness to this in 1827. 
T h e opening up of the coast to Sudanic influences was radically to 
change the civilization of the lowland peoples, especially since m a n y of 
them had to accept the political authority of Futa Jallon.6 
T o the north-west the Fulbe dominated m u c h of what is n o w Guinea-
Bissau, and this domain was further extended after the fall of Kansala 
(1867). Further south they controlled the upper navigable point on the Rio 
Nunez by imposing their sway on the L a n d u m a n of Boke through w h o m 
contact was m a d e with the Europeans. Although they had massacred Fulbe 
traders in 1840, the L a n d u m a n were unable to free themselves, and fell 
into a long civil war from 1844 to 1849. In 1856, Faidherbe brought them 
into the colonial era prematurely by building a fort. 
O n the sea, the Beafade in Guinea-Bissau and the Nalu on the Rio 
Nunez escaped the authority of the Fulbe in their marshy lands, but hardly 
interfered with trade with the Europeans. T h e Nalu lineage of the Tawela 
claims Mandinka origin, although their culture shows nothing of Mandinka 
6. T h e history of the coastal area has been very unevenly studied, what is now the 
Republic of Guinea being neglected. T h e confused old book by W . Arcin, 1911, is still 
used. For Sierra Leone, see C . Fyfe, 1962; O . Goerg, 1980; J. S. Trimingham, and C . Fyfe, 
i960; A . M . Howard, 1976. For the period preceding our own there is a very interesting 
summary by W . Rodney, 1970, reviewed by Y . Person, 1971. See also Unesco, General 
History of Africa, Vols 3 and 4. 
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influence. They distinguished themselves by King Dina Salifu's ambivalent 
resistance to French authority. 
Further south, on the Rio Pongos, among the Susu w h o bordered on 
Bona, the authority of T i m b o was strongest. Close relations of the 
Mandinka, the Susu then had a culture strongly marked by the coastal and 
forest area influences, especially from the Baga, relatives of the T e m n e , 
w h o m they had assimilated. They had suffered heavily from the slave trade, 
and European influences show among them in m a n y racially mixed families 
descended from American and British slave-traders. Thanks to them, the 
clandestine slave trade did not readily die out. Situated as they were at the 
border line from Futa Jallon, however, the Susu were infiltrated by Islam; 
and their culture was Sudanized at an increasing rate during the colonial 
period. Those on the Rio Pongos constituted the kingdom of Tya , which 
was dominated by the D a m b a (Kati) clan. T h e 'mulatto war' that began 
in 1865 ended in the defeat of the pro-slavery, pro-Fulbe party: some 
Lightburn T i m b o had just resigned themselves to this when the French 
occupation took place in 1868. 
Further south, the authority of the Futa did not extend as far as the sea, 
but Sudanic influence was nonetheless profound. Since the mid-eighteenth 
century, Morea (Melakori) had been dominated by a lineage of the Ture 
clan, which had come from Kankan as traders and been linguistically 
assimilated to the Susu whilst still remaining strictly Muslim.7 T h e almamis 
of this small state maintained their sway with the help of the Jallonke of 
Solimana. F r o m 1865 onwards, they were rent by interminable civil war 
between the pro-Islamic party of Altnatni Bokari and the 'Maliguistes' of 
Maliki Gheli. T h e establishment of the French not far away at Benty in 
1869 did not improve the situation, for the conflict was to become a feature 
of Anglo-French frontier rivalry. It provoked the intervention of the 
T e m n e of Satan Lahay and the Susu of Karimu, chief of Tambaxa and a 
great enemy of the English. Samori himself joined in after 1884, and the 
matter was only settled after the Anglo-French boundary delimitation of 
1889. 
T h e case of Morea well illustrates the socio-cultural phenomenon that 
had been at work on the Rivers Coast since the eighteenth century. Peoples 
speaking various languages and living in coastal agricultural civilizations 
had in the sixteenth century been subjected to northern influence through 
the agency of the S o m b a invasion, but had absorbed it. Thereafter, with 
the arrival of Sudanic traders on the coast, these old cultures were radically 
changed. Mandinka and Fulbe lineages settled everywhere, became pol-
itically dominant and introduced new ideas of politics. Egalitarian, rela-
tively unstratified societies thus came to accept organization into warrior 
chiefdoms and semi-centralized states. These peoples nevertheless retained 
7. For the southern Susu, and particularly the Morea crisis, see Y . Person, 1965-^75, 
Vol 2. 
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their cultural identities: the newcomers, few in number, were completely 
assimilated linguistically. This phenomenon covered essentially southern 
Susu country and the domains of the Limba, Loko, and T e m n e . It stopped 
short abruptly at Sierra Leone, that is, on the verge of the forest lands of 
the south, which had mainly stayed closed to the Sudanic trade routes. But 
major social effects extended well beyond that. Thus , from the T e m n e to 
the Kpelle of Liberia social and political life was dominated by great 
initiation societies, the best known of which, that for m e n , was often called 
Poron (compare the Poro of the Senufo).8 Hence, this was a basic social 
phenomenon transcending the borders of the historical areas just defined. 
T h e Loko, the advance guard of the M e n d e , were isolated between the 
T e m n e and the L imba with their backs to the sea. They managed to survive 
under the rule of a lineage of Mandinka origin which gave them a great 
leader, Pa-Koba, ally of Samori.9 
After 1787, the T e m n e , speaking a West Atlantic language close to Baga 
and L a n d u m a n , had to give up Sierra Leone to the British colony which 
served as base for the anti-slavery patrol and where the Creole (Krio) 
ethnicity soon came into being. Their main centre was Port Loko, terminus 
of the caravans from the Futa and upper Niger, where the Susu had taken 
power at the end of the eighteenth century. In 1818, Islamized T e m n e 
drove out the Susu, and their leader, the alkali, in 1825, m a d e an alliance 
with the British. T h e north of T e m n e country was dominated by Kambia , 
where the Satan Lahay family reigned; despite its complete assimilation it 
claimed descent from the Ture of Bate (Kankan). South of the Rokel, the 
Yoni, w h o formed the advance guard of the T e m n e , felt themselves isolated 
as the Freetown trade grew around them, while the expansion of the K p a 
M e n d e closed the south to them. They flung themselves into long wars to 
free themselves, and the problem was resolved by the British army in 1886. 
South of the Rokel, however, w e are in a different region, where the 
thickness of the forest had prevented the maintenance of links with the 
Sudan, though such links had been initiated in the sixteenth century. T h e 
slave trade, on the other hand, had been keenly pursued on the coast and 
survived in its clandestine form until 1845 despite the proximity of Free-
town and Monrovia. T h e history of the interior only becomes structured 
and clear to us in the middle of the century, when a trading network run 
by Sierra Leone Creoles made its way there and began to integrate the 
region into the world market: but the network did not link up with the 
termini of the tracks to the Sudan, as in the northern sector. This new 
field of force led to an increase in local conflicts, and gave them n e w 
directions. 
South of the T e m n e , the eighteenth century saw a great southern M a n d e 
8. See K . Little, 1954, 1965,1966. 
9. For the Loko and some of the T e m n e , see Y . Person, 1968-75, Vol. 2. For the Mende , 
see K . Little, 1954. 
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people, the M e n d e , near kin of the T o m a , strongly resume their expansion. 
They got closer to the sea by absorbing the Bulom, w h o were thus separated 
for good from the Kissi. T h e M e n d e formed great warrior chiefdoms, 
relatively centralized, and their w o m e n played an exceptional political role. 
Their advance guard, the K p a M e n d e w h o , because of their war with the 
Yoni, went into alliance with the British, were governed about 1880 by the 
famous M a d a m Yoko. In the extreme east of the M e n d e domain the great 
L u a w a chiefdom was, at the end of the century, the domain of a powerful 
conqueror of Kissi origin, Kai-Lundu, whose army of mercenaries faced 
up to the advance guards of Samori and raided deep into Kpelle and T o m a 
country in what is n o w Liberia.10 
T h e advance of the M e n d e separated two closely related M a n d e peoples, 
the K o n o , h e m m e d in in the then unprospected diamond-bearing m o u n -
tains of the interior, and the Vai, established on the coast on what is n o w 
the Sierra Leone-Liberia border since the mid-fifteenth century at the 
latest. T h e latter maintained quite sizable chiefdoms derived from the 
S o m b a 'empire' of the sixteenth century, and played an active part in the 
growth of the slave trade that characterized the area in the eighteenth 
century. It is therefore not surprising that they should have helped the 
clandestine slave trade, whose most prominent representative in their 
area was the Spaniard Pedro Blanco, until about 1845. These dubious 
relationships with the outside world caused the Vai culture to change 
considerably but they also brought out the Vai's creative initiative. In 
about 1818, just h o w is not clear, they invented one of the few typically 
African scripts.11 
But since the eighteenth century, the Vai and their eastern neighbours, 
the D e of Monrovia, w h o are Kru-speaking, had been bottled up on the 
coast by the extremely vigorous expansion of a people from the interior,12 
the Gola, speakers of a West Atlantic language like the Kissi. Under 
pressure in the north from the M e n d e and their kinsmen, they left their 
homeland of Kongaba and fanned out towards the sea. At the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, their advance guard came into contact with the 
Kpelle and interposed themselves between the coastal peoples and the 
route to the Sudan. 
W e have reached the line of the Saint-Paul river, which links the coast 
of Monrovia to the Konyan highlands and marks the boundary of the 
10. For the career of Kai-Lundu and his mercenaries the Tyogbufey, see Y . Person 
1968-75, Vol. 2, which contained a bibliography complete up to 1970. K . C . Wylie, 
1970-1 needs to be added. 
ii. For another view, see A . Jones, 1981; Y . Person, 1982. O n the Vai script, see P. 
Hair, 1963. 
12. T h e historical bibliography of the Liberian state is not given here. For the Gola, 
see the remarkable articles by W . L . Azevedo, 1969-71. O n the Kpelle, see most recently 
R . M . Fulton, 1968. For a general account, see G . Schwab and G . W . Harley, 1947 (with 
bibliography to that date). 
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Sudanic world of the Mandinka of the region. In general, the forest barrier 
was unbroken south of the Rokel (and the Futa Jallon link of the upper 
Niger to the coast at Sierra Leone), as far as the Bandama or even the 
C o m o é river, m u c h further east. Here at the Saint-Paul, however, we find 
an isolated opening between the savanna and the sea, which determined 
the location of the Vai and the subsequent siting of Monrovia. It was 
opened up by the great S o m b a invasion in the sixteenth century, but then 
fell into disuse. In the eighteenth century, when the slave trade finally 
developed from Sierra Leone to the K r u coast, this outlet for slaves from 
the interior saw renewed activity. Thus , at the end of the century, an influx 
of Mandinka coming d o w n from Konyan gave rise to the warrior state of 
K o n d o around the chiefdom of Bopolu. Determined to keep the route 
open, the Bopolu chiefs organized a confederacy of T o m a (Loma) , Kpelle 
(Guerze), Vai, D e , and Gola chiefdoms on the lower Saint-Paul. Soon after 
1820, Bopolu, became the capital of Sau Boso, the famous soldier of 
fortune, w h o , like the Vai, became an ally of the founders of Liberia. After 
1830, however, his power was threatened by the Gola chief, Jenkins, and, 
after his death in 1836, the hegemony of K o n d o collapsed.13 T h e Liberians 
had to deal with the hostile but n o w dominant Gola, and it was this in 
particular that lay behind Anderson's journey as far as Konyan in 1869. 
T h e Samorians stepped in to re-open the route after 1885, and it was not 
until 1898 that part of the Gola rallied to the Monrovia government. 
The Kru bloc 
T h e last coastal sector w e have to consider, that from Monrovia to the 
Bandama, forms the frontage to the vast forest mass inhabited by the 
peoples of the K r u family.14 Forest farmers, hunters, but also remarkable 
seamen, the K r u are distinguished by their physical anthropology (absence 
of sickle-cells) and the tone languages they speak, which are so singular 
that they cannot be classified with any known group. 
At this time, no communication was possible between the sea and the 
savanna west of the Bandama, whose valley had in any case been closed by 
the Baule at the beginning of the eighteenth century. T h e rivers were 
hardly navigable. In this overgrown country, communities had no tradition 
of political centralization or long-distance trade, only a relay trade passing 
goods between contiguous peoples. Hence, this country's history is one of 
small groups continually splitting up to occupy the ground, of their cultural 
and technical interchanges, and of their relationships with Europe's sea-
borne trade during recent centuries. T h e n a m e K r u seems to be a corruption 
13. O n Bopolu and Kondo, see S. E . Holsoe, 1967. 
14. The Kru coast is beginning to be rather more studied, see G . E . Brooks, 1972; C . 
Behrens, 1974; R . W . Davis, 1976. For the interior the situation is improving, see G . 
Schroeder and D . Siebel, 1974; A . Schwartz, 1973: Schwartz's thesis on the 'Kru' of the 
Tabu area (Ivory Coast) is expected; E . Terray, 1969. 
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plate 24.3 Kru canoemen plate 24.4 Kru houses
of Krawi, the name of one of the coastal ethnicities in the western group
between the Bassa and the Grebo. This name was extended to the whole
of the language family whose best-known member it was. Despite the great
homogeneity of the Kru, two sub-families can be distinguished, one on
each side of the Sassandra, the Bete-Dida group to the east and the Bakwe
group to the west. We shall be concerned primarily with the latter.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, an east-west movement of
Wenyon lineages (Kran and Gere) had been going on for centuries in the
sparsely inhabited lands of the interior. Having fanned out from the
Sassandra to the Cavally across the Guiglo and Toulepleu plateau, it came
to an end about the middle of the century when its advance guard came
up against the Gio (Dan), solidly established on the upper Cestos, while,
on their left, those who called themselves the Sapo moved towards the sea
near the mouth of the Sina, cutting the Krawi almost in two. Groups from
the same area, settled downstream on the Cavally, became integrated with
the Grebo, whose coastal section had come from the east by sea and been
stabilized since at least 1701.
The most spectacular and best-known changes, however, took place on
the sea coast. The distinction between peasants and sailors, or 'bushmen'
and 'fishmen' was of long standing; but the volume of the slave trade in
the eighteenth century in this hitherto relatively spared area stengthened
the position of the 'bushmen'. However, the famous group of 'five Kru
towns' which seem to have come fairly recently (about the sixteenth
century) from the interior, played a special role in the slave trade. Among
them, the two communities - peasants and sailors - were closely integrated.
This district round the Setta-Kru, which formed the heart of Krawi
country, forged special links with Sierra Leone, which brought a new
»S3
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impetus for culture change. It seems that, from the 1780s onwards, m a n y 
boats used to take on 'fishmen' as interpreters or deckhands before going 
on into the Gulf of Guinea. This movement, interrupted by the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars , started again strongly after 1815, 
when the clandestine slave trade co-existed with the incipient legitimate 
trade. T h e K r u soon established themselves in large numbers in Freetown 
and then in Monrovia as labourers and woodcutters. They remained 
cohesive, but adopted aspects of Creole culture as well. T h e coastal lineages 
('fishmen' or 'Krumen' ) used their connections with the interior to mobilize 
labour. Throughout the nineteenth century, ships rarely sailed east along 
the coast without taking on ' K r u m e n ' , and this activity gradually spread 
as far as the Sassandra. It changed somewhat in nature but not in extent 
after 1850, when steam largely replaced sail. 
European activity became integrated with the ancient community of 
coastal fishermen which stretched from the Krawi east to the Gold Coast; 
it was symbolized by the worship of the famous 'Big Devil' of Hedie, near 
the mouth of the Cavally, which drew people from as far as the Alladian 
country on the Ivory Coast. Sailing ships usually dropped south away from 
the coast on their westward, return voyages to avoid contrary winds and 
current, but this caused no problem for the K r u m e n , w h o landed far to 
the east with their pay. They found little difficulty in returning h o m e . T h e 
problem did not arise at all in the time of the steamships, since these came 
back the same way along the coast. 
After 1821, the coastal fringe came more or less under the authority of 
the government of Liberia. This is outside the scope of this chapter. But 
it is worth noting that the culture change begun at Freetown was to become 
more pronounced in some areas under the influence of Protestant missions, 
especially among the Grebo, w h o began writing their language and came 
close to achieving national consciousness. In 1871, having heard of the 
Fante Confederation on the Gold Coast, they set up a constitution for a 
'Kingdom of the Grebo' which the Liberians were unable to reduce 
militarily until 1910. O n e of the inspirers of Grebo nationalism was the 
future Prophet Harris, famous on the Ivory Coast.15 
Beyond the Sassandra, concentrations of people in K r u territory were 
to be found among the Bete of Gagnoa and some of the Dida, in areas that 
had been somewhat compressed by the northward expansion of forest-
fringe peoples like some southern M a n d e , the Guro, or the Baule, whose 
political structures beyond the Bandama had been strengthened by an Akan 
minority in the eighteenth century. This pressure, and the establishment 
of other Akan - the Avikam - the advance guard of the Nnajan (Alladian), 
at the mouth of the Bandama, had h e m m e d in the Dida, and settled Baule 
lineages among them. 
At the same time, the line of the Sassandra remained within K r u 
15. O n Harris, see G . M . Haliburton, 1971. 
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domains: some boats moved on its reaches, and the east-west movement 
of lineages from Soubré or Gagnoa to the sea coast indicates that the 
influence of European trade was spreading. These lineages reinforced the 
N e y o people at the mouth of the river, whose culture began to change 
through contact with European ships, especially ones from Liverpool. 
Violent incidents, however, showed that these coastal people were the 
descendants of those w h o had long ago earned the area the name 'Côte des 
Males Gens'. 
The world of the southern Mande 
Between the savannas of Guinea and the coastal peoples lay the belt of 
southern M a n d e peoples: M e n d e , T o m a , Kpelle (Guerze), D a n (Yakouba) 
and K w e n u (Guro), to mention only the main ones.16 Living in the savanna 
bordering on the forest, or in the depths of the great forest itself, they put 
out their advance guards towards the Atlantic coast. Though they came 
from the borders of the savanna, these peoples' culture nevertheless had 
m a n y traits in c o m m o n with that of the Rivers, and even with the K r u . In 
the absence of centralized state structure, their political life was dominated 
by secret initiation societies, which, among other things, produced striking 
masks. 
T h e history of these transitional peoples is inseparable from that of the 
coastal peoples, with w h o m they always mixed. But it cannot be tackled 
without taking account of the southern Mandinka w h o bordered them to 
the north and had for centuries driven them back and infiltrated their 
populations and influenced their cultures, unaware of the distant kinship 
between all M a n d e languages. 
T h e southern Mandinka (leaving aside the K o n o and Vai) were those of 
the upper Niger, stretching from the borders of Futa Jallon to the Bandama, 
where they met the Senufo and Baule. They clearly belonged to the Sudanic 
world of the savanna country. This southern part of the savanna was never 
part of the empire of Mali; but at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
the southern Mandinka (who had centuries earlier ousted or assimilated 
southern M e n d e or Voltaics there), covered the area with a loose fabric of 
peasantry whose economic life was articulated by a long-distance trade 
network which conveyed the kola nuts of the southern forests towards the 
line of the Niger. These east-west routes inevitably ended in an area of 
large broker villages in contact with the 'forest people'. Thanks to their 
regular contacts with these 'barbarians', peddlers and caravans had an 
16. For the southern Mandinka as a whole, I venture to refer to m y thesis, which 
contains a virtually complete bibliography up to 1970, and even a little beyond: Y . Person, 
1968-75, Vols 2 and 3. T h e general index is in Volume 3. This piece of work set out to 
give a general account of the area in the nineteenth century, not merely a view of Samori. 
For the latter's career, there is a full account in Y . Person, 1972. T o place Samori's early 
days in a wider context, see Y . Person, 1974. 
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assured supply of kola. Major crafts, particularly weaving, were connected 
with these activities. 
F r o m east to west, each sector of the forest fringe was linked with a 
staging area farther north: the Sankaran and Kuranko were in contact with 
the Kissi, the Toron and Konyan of Beyla with the T o m a and Kpelle, 
Odienne country (Kabadugu) and the M a u of Touba with the D a n and, 
lastly, the Worodugu of Seguela and the Koyara of M o n k o n o with the 
Guro. René Caillé has given a good description of this remarkably specu-
lative trade; for kola nuts do not keep long, and their price fluctuates wildly. 
In this generally traditionalist society dominated by a warrior aristocracy, 
Islam was a necessary and ubiquitous minority, naturally connected with 
this trading network. In the south, however, the network ran up against 
the impenetrable wall of the forest from which the kola came. Indeed, the 
remarkable feature of the area until the colonial conquest was its isolation 
from the sea, accessible only in the west, from the upper Niger to Futa 
Jallon and the Rivers or Sierra Leone, and to a lesser extent from Konyan 
to Cape M o u n t (Monrovia area). Even these routes had only become 
important in the eighteenth century, with the expansion of the slave trade. 
In the east, the Bandama had once provided an outlet for Worodugu, and, 
further away, for the K o n g area; but this outlet had been closed by the 
Baule in about 1720, and from then on it meant going to the C o m o e or to 
Kumasi to find an outlet to the sea. T h e country of the southern Mandinka 
was thus a dead end, and it traditionally looked towards the Niger and the 
Sudan from which its culture came. 
In the eighteenth century in the far west of this region, the village of 
Kankan on the Milo developed into a major trading centre, taking advantage 
of the Futa Jallon outlet to the sea, thus becoming a counterpart of K o n g 
on the C o m o é . Kankan was admirably situated at the upstream end of the 
navigable reach to Bamako, and at the meeting point of the shortest routes 
from the forest in Kissi country and from the sea through Futa Jallon or 
Sierra Leone. It was the centre for the famous Maninka Mori, or Muslim 
Mandinka, whose culture permeated the whole world of the Joola (Dyula) 
from poor peddlers to rich merchants w h o worked the southern routes. 
T h e Kaba w h o dominated Kankan were a political, religious, and c o m -
mercial family all at the same time, although in the religious field they had 
competition from the Sherifu. M a m a d u Sanusi Kaba, w h o was in charge 
of the town for a long time (roughly from 1810 to 1850) had kept up the 
alliance with T i m b o and done relatively little fighting, except against the 
Jallonke of T a m b a , w h o several times closed the Segu route to trade. But 
al-Hadjdj ' U m a r had visited the town in about 1845 on his return from 
Mecca, and the K a b a he had converted helped him, in 1851, at the 
beginning of his Holy W a r , to destroy the Jallonke kingdom of T a m b a . 
Alfa M a m a d u K a b a next sought to impose control over his traditionalist 
neighbours by armed force, but Kankan, isolated as it was, was not strong 
enough. T h e K a b a met serious reverses, and the town suffered a commercial 
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blockade. This explains why, in 1874, they appealed for help from the new 
Muslim conqueror w h o was organizing the southern lands, Samori Ture. 
Actually the disruption of the old order among the southern Mandinka 
had started south of Kankan, in Toron and Konyan, before al-Hadjdj 
'Umar's visit. T h e most likely explanation is that the opening up in the 
eighteenth century of the routes to the Côte des Rivières had increased the 
size and importance of the Muslim trader element. T h e export of slaves 
produced by local wars was to continue until the middle of the nineteenth 
century for the clandestine export trade, and until the colonial conquest 
for use in Futa Jallon. Next, the need to import cloth and European arms 
became well-established. Essential as it was to society as a whole, the 
growing Joola minority became aware, through Islam, of the holy wars and 
Muslim theocracies in the north. T h e influence of the Futa came in through 
Kankan, and the kola-nut caravans went up as far as Shehu Ahmadu's 
Massina. T h e time came when the Joola and Muslim elements would no 
longer accept the place assigned them by society as a whole, while the 
society, ossified by tradition, was unable to reform. There followed a series 
of localized conflicts, from the north-western Ivory Coast to the upper 
Niger. But the resistance remained insurmountable. W h a t was needed if 
the movement was to become general was the emergence of a local m a n 
obviously anxious to change, without destroying, the society from which 
he came, but sufficiently open to the outside world to promote new methods. 
This is what Samori did; and I have suggested calling the movement as a 
whole the Joola Revolution. It would, however, be the second such revo-
lution, if the same name is used for the rise of the empire of K o n g at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. 
T h e first movement began in about 1835, far to the south, on the borders 
of Toron and Konyan, and not far from the T o m a producers of kola. T h e 
person responsible was Moriule Sise, a religious m a n from the Kankan 
area but brought up in Futa, w h o gathered around him adventurers from all 
quarters in the new town of Madina (Toron). After a period of destructive 
radicalism, he was killed in 1845, and his state almost collapsed.When it 
was reconstructed by his sons, Sere-Burlay (Abdulaye) (1845-59) and Sere 
Brema (Ibrahima) (1859-81), the need for compromise with the local 
people and some respect for their institutions had become clearer to all. 
But their role still remained precarious and unstable. Though at one time 
they greatly extended their authority to the south across the Upper Konyan 
as far as the forest fringes of Kpelle country, they never managed to link 
up with Kankan to the north. Here, in Sabadugu, a great traditionalist 
war leader, Nantenen-Famudu K u r u m a , organized resistance to the two 
Muslim powers, and placed himself between them (Lower Toron). 
But in the upper valley of the Milo straddling Toron and Konyan, 
another Joola lineage stock, the Berete, organized a local hegemony which 
closed the west to the Sise in the n a m e of the Konate traditionalists. T h e 
Sise twice defeated them, but this only paved the way for Samori. 
657 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
Moriule had been killed by Vakaba Ture, a young Joola from the 
Odienne area w h o had initially fought under him but had come to defend 
his mother's village. T h e Odienne area had been occupied since the 
eighteenth century by a traditionalist military state, Nafana, which had 
driven back the Senufo to protect the Joola. Vakaba managed to mobilize 
the Muslims and get himself accepted by m a n y traditionalists and so he 
destroyed Nafana and built Kabadugu (or Kabasarana) on its ruins. Better 
based, this new kingdom turned out to be m u c h stronger and more stable 
than the Sise domain. It extended in particular along the east-west kola 
trade routes to the gates of Touba. Vakaba died in 1857; his son, Vamuktar 
(1858-75), was the most warlike sovereign of the family. H e twice encour-
aged his cousin, B u n u Mameri , to carve out a new kingdom for the Ture 
on the northern routes in the area of Wasulu on Bougouni (Mali) (1868— 
70 and 1873-5). T h e intervention of the Sise and the reaction of the 
Wasulunke thwarted this grand design, which ended in Vamuktar's death. 
Kabadugu then underwent a serious crisis; m a n y of the vassal cantons 
revolted on the accession of Vakaba's last son, M a n g b e A m a d u (1875-94). 
O n e of his chief generals, Vakuru B a m b a , seceded and established a small 
military state towards Touba, which he was later to extend towards Seguela 
and M a n k o n o . A m a d u spent several years imposing his authority by force 
of arms, and it is understandable that a weakened Kabadugu unhesitatingly 
joined Samori when he appeared on its frontiers in 1881. This submission 
was sealed by marriages, and turned out to be sincere and lasting. 
Space does not permit us here to deal with secondary 'Joola' movements 
like those of Fode D r a m e Sulemani Savane on the forest fringes in Kissi 
country, or Hedi Mori in the Koyara of M a n k o n o (Ivory Coast). All were 
connected in various ways with Islam and the world of trade. Despite their 
diversity, they clearly demonstrate that this minority no longer accepted 
the place it traditionally occupied and was capable of disrupting society as 
a whole. They provide the framework needed for understanding Samori, 
w h o brought this movement to its peak by eliminating or winning over all 
his rivals, and particularly by making the disruption he imposed acceptable 
or even desirable to the Mandinka as a whole, including the traditionalists 
with w h o m he had close connections. 
Samori Ture came from lower Konyan, that is, from the upper Milo 
valley on the borders of Toron. His ancestors were Muslim peddlers from 
the Kankan area. Isolated in a traditionalist environment into which they 
married, they had gradually reverted to traditional religious practices as 
they settled d o w n as weavers, cultivators, and stockbreeders. Samori, 
born about 1830 at Manyambaladugu, counted among his ancestors more 
Kamara or Konate - traditionalist peasants - than Muslim traders. 
Reverting to trade to escape from his father's authority, Samori found 
his vocation as a warrior when he joined the Sise to free his mother, w h o 
had been captured during the war with the Berete (1848). T h e Berete then 
called upon his talents when he fell out with the masters of Madina (1859-
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61). But eventually, in 1861, Samori found himself alone and hunted, and 
thus had to begin his personal career utterly on his own. 
There is no need to give a further account of these events, which have 
recently been the subject of several publications. Samori succeeded in 
winning over the traditionalists of lower Toron, his relations on his mother's 
side. They felt helpless in the face of the Muslim conquerors w h o were 
rising up on all sides, and appealed to the military talents of this brilliant 
'nephew'. H e was, in fact, to protect them until the French invasion, 
whilst also eroding their freedom somewhat. In return, they gave him the 
wherewithal to conquer his first domain. His style of leadership, with the 
changes he imposed on Mandinka society by ending the internal conflicts, 
opening the trade routes and emancipating the Joola Muslims without 
enslaving the traditionalists, soon brought a rush of followers and support. 
T h e p u m p being thus primed, expansion proceeded with increasing speed 
from 1871 to 1881, and was near its peak when the unforeseen invasion by 
the French changed the character of the movement. 
Supported by most of the Kamara, and subjugating the others, Samori, 
with his base at Sanankoro, first m a d e himself master of the upper Milo, 
accepted as such by the Sise w h o m he soon called in against the Berete. 
T h e Berete having been eliminated, Sere-Brema became concerned about 
the new power; but Samori avoided conflict by taking refuge in the forest 
among the T o m a . H e came back in 1867 with new forces, taking advantage 
of the Sise's involvement in Wasulu, where they were exhausting their 
strength against the Ture. 
Samori then carefully organized and armed his forces, abandoning upper 
Konyan to the traditionalist Kamara of Saxajiigi, w h o m he did not fight, 
he claimed, because they were his kin. In 1871, he marched due north, 
eliminating the hegemony of traditionalist Nantenen-Famudu, against 
which the Sise had finally failed. There, in newly conquered territory at 
Bissandugu, he set up his capital, to show that he was creating his o w n 
empire independently of his relations and the country of his birth. 
T h e Sise dared not react, and Samori then m a d e an alliance with Kankan, 
in the n a m e of Islam, whose commercial blockade he had broken, retaining 
for himself authority over the defeated. H e made himself master of the 
rich upper Niger valley from the frontiers of Futa Jallon and Kurussa to 
Siguiri and the Bure, and thus suddenly found himself at the head of an 
empire definitely larger than those of his predecessors and neighbours. Its 
size was already creating organizational problems, which he tackled by 
modelling his administration on the Tukuloor empire, whose neighbour 
he n o w was but towards which he soon conceived a muted hostility. It was 
foreseeable that he would have to try to eliminate it if he wished to continue 
his expansion in the north. 
But this over-rapid expansion soon provoked a serious crisis. In 1878, 
the Sise drove Samori out of Sankaran and set out to reconquer the west 
as far as Sierra Leone in order to encircle and circumscribe the conqueror's 
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domains. Kankan, under the influence of the Tukuloor, broke away from 
him. Then, in 1879, Samori turned on his two Muslim neighbours sim-
ultaneously. Taking advantage of their scattered forces, he eliminated 
them in two brilliant campaigns (December 1879 to April 1881). Kankan 
eventually submitted again, some of the Kaba fleeing to Segu whence they 
were to come back with the French. T h e Sise were n o w prisoners and 
Madina destroyed, its population being transferred to Bissandugu. Odienne 
also came over, opening the way to the upper Ivory Coast (modern Côte 
d'Ivoire). 
It was there at Gbèlèba that Samori spent the rainy season of 1881, 
when the Senegalese lieutenant Alakamessa came to bring him the challenge 
of the French, then marching towards the Niger. T h e French commander 
of Kita ordered Samori not to attack Kenyeran, where the Kankan were 
holding out. T h e military confrontation which was to begin in early 1882 
lasted with intervals of peace until 1896, but cannot be pursued here since 
it is outside the scope of this volume, both chronologically and from the 
point of view of subject matter. 
B y 1881, Samori's empire was established. It was a military hegemony 
that changed Mandinka society without destroying it. T h e Muslim traders 
had a more important place, but the traditionalists kept their freedom. T h e 
sovereign w h o , in about 1868, took the title oifaatna connoting a military 
leader, adopted that of almami on the model of Futa Jallon only in 1884. 
This shows the growth of Muslim influence after the annexation of Kankan; 
but the identity crisis which resulted from it cannot be dealt with here. It 
was connected with the beginning of the war with France. 
In 1880-1, the new empire, though run by an Islamized military class, 
could not be regarded as a Muslim state. Samori was not a cultured Muslim, 
though he belatedly m a d e remarkable efforts to educate himself. H e had 
set up a system of military control of the territory, sometimes modelling 
himself on some of the achievements of the Fulbe and Tukuloor, but 
without their religious emphasis. Samori, w h o was a brilliant empiricist, 
had managed in twenty years to give this society a new equilibrium more 
favourable to the Joola, thus solving the crisis it had been going through 
for half a century. Here w e leave him, at the m o m e n t when, his triumph 
achieved, he found himself suddenly confronted by the French invasion 
that was to give a new direction to the end of his career. It was no longer 
a question of rebuilding an African society on African lines in response to 
an African crisis, but of trying to repel the foreign invasion, and, insofar 
as that was impossible, of surviving as long as he could. 
Conclusion 
T h e only factor c o m m o n to the area in question during the period preceding 
the colonial conquest of Africa was really the advance of European influ-
ence. T h e latter was, of course, strong on the coast. T h e clandestine slave 
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trade persisted there until the middle of the century; but the major fact 
was the appearance of new African products, palm oil and groundnuts, 
which allowed European products hitherto reserved for the aristocracy to 
spread among the masses. T h e coastal area thus became part of the world 
market, and economically dependent, long before military conquest and 
political domination became realities. 
These influences were m u c h weaker in the interior, where Sudanic 
tradition linked to Islam persisted. But it was the growth of trade with the 
outside world that explains the Joola revolution. Without knowing it, it 
was to some extent in response to the impact of the outside world that 
Samori built the empire that was to succeed in delaying the coming of the 
colonial conquest for twenty years. 
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T h e nineteenth century was undoubtedly a period of major upheavals of 
various kinds for the countries of the Niger Bend and the Volta. Political 
and institutional disintegration affected the centralized state systems in 
particular, and more specifically those that constituted empires such as 
Asante (Ashanti), K o n g , and the Mossi and Bambara kingdoms. W h a t is 
more, this disruption stemmed from internal tensions, but also, increas-
ingly, from external causes, particularly notable changes in trade flows. 
Peoples migrated, especially non-centralized groups. These 'Völ-
kerwanderungen' have in m a n y cases given shape to the ethnic distribution 
m a p as it still stands today. There were economic changes that marked the 
end of one era and heralded another, the colonial period. These changes 
were often the cause and sometimes the result of the political changes. 
T h e Islamic and Christian religions spread rapidly, fostered by Islamic 
hegemonies at work in the Sahel or by the advance of European colon-
ization. All these processes contributed to the vigorous reshaping of the 
physiognomy of this region, weakening it and facilitating or even bringing 
about the establishment of the colonial system. 
Political and institutional upheavals 
During the eighteenth century, the countries of the basin of the Volta and 
the Niger Bend were seats of political power extending beyond the region, 
supplanting the vast empire of G a o , which fell in the late sixteenth century, 
or trying to exploit the n e w economic and political conditions brought 
about on the Gold Coast by the slave trade. However, during the nineteenth 
century, n e w conditions led to the disintegration of the great kingdoms 
and gave rise to migratory movements a m o n g the peoples not integrated 
by centralized powers. 
T h e Asante system: its rise and decline 
In the eighteenth century the Asante dynasties carved a vast empire for 
themselves in the heart of the forest and south of the Black Volta river 
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bend.1 Thanks to Osei Tutu, the founder, Opoku W a r e and Osei Kodjo, 
this kingdom was highly integrated, with its nucleus around Kumasi and 
the Golden Stool (sikadwa). It wielded undisputed economic and political 
power over the coast and over the dependent kingdoms to the north. 
Towards the centre, kingdoms associated with the Oyoko clan from Kumasi 
gradually became subjugated and tributary on account of structural reforms 
carried out by Osei Kodjo, first, in the kingdom of Kumasi, and then at the 
expense of the neighbouring Akan kingdoms: M a m p o n g , Nsuta, D w a b e n , 
Bekwai, Kokofu, Bono, as also Denkyira, Ahafo, Sefwi, Adansi, etc. In this 
region, the Kumasihene (king of Kumasi) became the Asantehene. F r o m 
this base, the Asante dynasty held political and economic sway over the 
coastal kingdoms (Wassa, Nzima, Twifu, A k w a m u , A k y e m , Akuapem, G a 
and Adangbe), and more especially the coastal strip of the Fante chief-
taincies. Similarly, to the north, the kingdoms of G y a m a n , Gonja, D a g o m b a 
and Mamprusi came under the sway of Asante, sanctioned by a yearly 
tribute (ayibuade) of two thousand slaves, especially after the 1794 treaty. 
T h e nineteenth century was to start with the reign of one of the greatest 
of the Asantehenes, Osei Bonsu (1801-24), whose victorious armies pushed 
through to the coast in a series of campaigns (1807, 1811 and 1814). T h e 
British, w h o at the time were caught up in the Napoleonic Wars and had 
no clear policy for their Gold Coast settlements, could not but recognize, 
through the President of the Council of Merchants, Colonel Torrane, and 
his successors, the reality of the suzerainty, or even sovereignty, of Asante 
over all the coastal peoples. 
Asante took advantage of this acquiescence to put down a Gonja 
rebellion, and then the G y a m a n (Abron) rebellion, in the north. However, 
after gaining time by transferring responsibility for the trading posts to the 
London Company of Merchants and by sending envoys to the Asantehene's 
court (Bowdich and Dupuis) with draft treaties which remained practically 
a dead letter, the British Crown took direct responsibility for the forts in 
1821, putting them under the authority of the Governor of Sierra Leone, 
Sir Charles MacCarthy. During a bold drive on Kumasi , disaster befell 
Sir Charles at Nsamanku (1824), where he fell to Asante forces.2 Spurred 
on by this exploit, the Asante resumed their drive towards the coast but 
were crushed at D o d o w a (1826) by a broad coalition of coastal peoples 
under the aegis of the British. T h e bell had tolled for the power of Asante. 
T h e following period (1826-74) was marked by a few indecisive victories 
of the Asante troops and, above all, by peaceful administration on the coast 
under Governor George Maclean (1830-43) and the remarkable attempts 
of the Fante and other coastal peoples to acquire true autonomy in the face 
of Kumasi threats and European encroachments. 
1. See Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. 5, ch. 12. 
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plate 25.1 The Golden Stool ofAsante
Maclean's career3 blossomed after the new retreat of the British govern¬
ment, which, caught up between its embarrassing allies on the coast and
the fighting spirit of Asante, felt that the Gold Coast was too expensive in
terms of money and human lives despite the British victory at Dodowa.
Maclean, President of the Council of Merchants that provided the local
administration of the forts, could therefore give free reign to his business
3. For Maclean's career, see G.E. Metcalfe, 1962.
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acumen and knowledge of people, often disregarding official instructions 
from London, where a committee of merchants once again had charge of 
the forts. H e had a twofold objective: to keep Asante at bay and to bring 
the coastal peoples under his control. H e therefore had a tripartite Fante— 
British-Asante treaty signed whereby the parties recognized the inde-
pendence of the coastal countries south of the Pra river, agreed to bring 
any conflict before the British party and undertook to keep trade routes 
open. Maclean tried gradually to acquaint the Fante with English legal 
principles through a hierarchy of courts ranging from the chiefs' courts to 
those over which he himself presided. Local militias posted at the chiefs' 
courts helped to apply the n e w laws, whilst the introduction of cowries for 
minor transactions and the encouragement of the production of palm oil 
started to change the economic structure. 
However, the British government decided to resume direct control of 
the coastal settlements in 1843 and to govern them by a legal convention 
a m o n g the chiefs recognizing British law (the Bond of 1844).4 In 1858 the 
administration of the Gold Coast, which, apart from the forts, was a 
protectorate rather than a colony, was separated from Sierra Leone. T h e 
Gold Coast was granted its o w n governor, w h o presided over the legislative 
and executive councils. 
In accordance with the general principle that local populations should 
defray the costs of measures calculated to enhance their material, social 
and intellectual progress, a poll tax of one shilling per head was instituted 
in 1852 and generally accepted, though only very briefly.5 In fact, resistance 
to the tax soon became very strong, not so m u c h because the officials 
responsible for tax collection were supplanting the chiefs, but because only 
8 per cent of the revenue was used for schools and roads, most of it being 
used to pay the host of civil servants on administrative duties. Despite 
subsequent attempts at reform and punitive expeditions, Governor Pine 
was forced to abandon the tax in 1864. 
This was the first resistance movement of a purely social and national, 
that is to say non-ethnic, character. It was very quickly followed, moreover, 
by an action6 of m u c h greater scope since it was political in nature. A s 
early as 1864, the chiefs on the Gold Coast sent a register of grievances to 
Governor Pine to protest against encroachments on their rights and inter-
ests, giving specific examples, such as imprisonment by mere civil servants, 
to show h o w their dignity had been flouted.7 Shortly afterwards, Aggrey, 
the 'king' of Cape Coast, went even further. O n the advice of a talented 
lawyer, Charles Bannerman, he protested against the fact that the inhabi-
4. Lord Stanley to Lt Governor H . W . Hill, 16 December 1843, document no. 124 in 
G . E . Metcalfe (ed.), 1964. 
5. Poll Tax Ordinance, 19 April 1852, document no. 181 in G.E.Metcalfe (ed.), 1964. 
6. Cf. A . A . Boahen, 1974, p. 239. 
7. Document no. 243 in G . E . Metcalfe (ed.), 1964. 
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tants of his territory were treated as British subjects, demanded that the 
relationships between the chiefs and the governor be clarified and queried 
the fact that he received no share of the fiscal revenue.8 Lastly, Aggrey 
threatened to raise a local militia to ensure the security of his territory. H e 
was deported to Sierra Leone. 
However, the movement gained m o m e n t u m , inspired by African intel-
lectuals w h o m the Colonial Office described even in 1855 as a half-civilized 
intermediary class with ideas acquired from missionaries and others. They 
pressed for emancipation, telling the Africans: ' Y o u are not British subjects, 
therefore you are not bound to obedience. Y o u have a right to share power 
in your o w n country. Only by uniting will you gain access to your rights'. 
Such were the ideas of James Africanus Horton, a Sierra Leonean, Joseph 
Smith, Henry Barnes, T . Hughes, F . L . Grant and R . J. Ghartey. Under 
the circumstances the coastal chiefs were very open to such arguments. 
T h e y dreaded being attacked again by the Asante and were determined to 
contribute to their o w n defence, but they disapproved of the flabby attitude 
of the Dutch to Kumasi and its coastal ally, Elmina. They therefore 
opposed the exchange of forts that the British contemplated with the Dutch 
in order to make their respective territories homogeneous. However, they 
were also afraid of being abandoned by the British, w h o pressed them to 
unite against Asante in defence of the coast, but did not intend to give 
them the means to do so. T w o experiments in self-government were 
therefore tried on the western and the eastern parts of the coast. 
In the west, the Mankessim assembly, comprising Fante chiefs but 
also delegates from Denkyira, Wassa , Twifu and Assin, drafted three 
constitutions in succession.9 T h e first came in 1868; the second, signed and 
sealed by thirty-one chiefs and kings in November 1871, instituted a king-
president elected by his peers to preside over the national assembly m a d e 
up of the chiefs. T h e representative assembly, for its part, m a d e up of 
delegations of two members (a chief and a learned person) from each 
kingdom, was presided over by the vice-president, w h o also presided over 
the executive council. In 1872, however, this constitution was amended in 
order to make the legitimacy of the confederation subject to recognition 
by the British government, which was further required to provide half 
of the budget of the confederation and, failing that, to assume all its 
responsibilities by converting the Gold Coast into a colony. T h e con-
federation had of course become operational in three years, raising an army 
of 15 000 m e n , setting up institutions and officials, including the supreme 
court, and levying a tax of which two-thirds went to the confederation and 
one-third to the m e m b e r chieftaincies. 
T o the east, around Accra, it inspired a similar confederation, but a very 
8. Carnavon to Blackhall, 23 February 1867, document no. 258, in ibid. 
9. Quassie (Kwassi); Edoo et al to Sir A . F . Kennedy, 24 November 1871, document 
no. 278 in ibid. 
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timid one in the face of the power of the chiefs in that region. Moreover 
the autonomist movement in the west was already dying out by 1872, for 
in that year the Dutch finally sold their forts and left the Gold Coast, thus 
removing one reason for fear on the part of the confederated chiefs - whose 
army, incidentally, was not successful in forcing a decision against Fort 
Elmina, and whose financial resources remained inadequate. Above all, 
however, the British did their utmost to repress intellectuals and divide 
the chiefs until the Fante Confederation collapsed. 
Although short-lived, the Fante Confederation was of great significance. 
It was the last gasp of protest on the Gold Coast against creeping colon-
ialism. It attempted to recapture the Fante unity that had been destroyed 
by the decisive influences of the European presence. It foreshadowed the 
role that the educated elite would in future assume in the affairs of the 
Gold Coast: that of providing guidance for the non-literate traditional 
leaders of the peoples. It thus indicated the w a y in which the colonial 
situation, in providing education, was also providing the instrument of its 
o w n ultimate destruction. This was the basis of the antagonism that the 
colonial governments thereafter showed to the educated elite. 
In 1872 the Asante sent an invasion force south to enforce what they 
regarded as their ancient right to Elmina and to revive their claims to 
Assin, Denkyira and A k y e m . Having suppressed the Confederation and 
bought out the Dutch in 1872, the British decided to organize a response 
that would settle the Asante question once and for all. In 1874 they 
despatched a strong army under General Wolseley which captured and 
burnt Kumasi . In the same year, the Treaty of F o m e n a , under which 
Asante definitively renounced all its rights on the Gold Coast was imposed 
on the Asantehene, Kofi Karikari. 
Asante was further weakened in 1875 by its war with D w a b e n , which 
was defeated, its inhabitants seeking refuge in the British protectorate. 
N o w D w a b e n was one of the most valiant and faithful central Asante 
towns. After its defeat, anarchy took over in Kumas i and in the tributary 
countries to the north despite the policy of consolidation followed by 
Asantehene K w a k u D w a III, called Prempeh (the Fat). H e was arrested 
by ruse in 1896 at the time of the rush for colonial territory and deported. 
T h e unrivalled power of Asante during the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries had of course been ultimately due to its favourable inter-
mediary position between two poles, that is, the Niger Bend and the 
coast of the Gulf of Guinea, but also to its leaders' skill in political and 
administrative organization.10 During the early nineteenth century, this 
system reached a high degree of perfection and efficiency, which alone 
justified its growing expansion until it engulfed the Fante states. T h e great 
Asante kingdom then comprised three types of territorial unit. 
First, there was the central group of Asante chiefdoms, long united 
10. See Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. 5. 
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under the authority of the Asantehene by the same language, geographical 
contiguity, a vast network of family ties and affinities, a century of c o m m o n 
military activities and pride in their spectacular achievements. In addition, 
and fundamentally, there was the mystical bond of belief in the protecting 
power of the Golden Stool of the Asante and the spirits of the Asantehene's 
ancestors.11 Membership in the union took the following tangible forms: 
participation by chiefs of m e m b e r states in the enthronement of the head 
of state of Kumas i , the Asante sovereign, and the swearing of an oath of 
allegiance to him; attendance at the general assembly (nhyiamu) of chiefs 
at which major political matters (such as war, peace and treaties) were 
discussed, and acceptance of the great Asante oath as the supreme instru-
ment of justice for all of the Asantehene's territories.12 
These integrative institutions constituted the fundamental bases of the 
state machinery. They were to be found in all the Akan states as well as in 
Asante, which meant that the idea of the legitimacy of power through 
conquest had replaced that of political identity established through kinship 
and religion. T h e second category of states in this vast empire was therefore 
the Akan states bordering Asante territory. T h e peoples of these states 
understood the meaning of these institutions. T h e y were expected to live 
under the Asantehene's authority so as to derive the same benefits from 
these institutions as the Asante peoples. 
T h e third category of states included geographically and culturally 
distant peoples such as the D a g o m b a , the M a m p r u s i and the Gonja. They 
were viewed by the Asante authorities primarily as having to contribute to 
the economic development of the metropolis. These non-Akan states to 
the north were subjected to military and political control because of their 
economic resources. They also supplied, in the form of tribute, a large part 
of the m a n p o w e r used in Asante wars and agriculture.13 This significant 
distinction has been contested on the grounds that economic and political 
motivations existed in all the Asante wars. In a similar vein, references 
have been m a d e to the presence of Asante representatives in all types of 
states and also to the introduction of substantial Asante features into the 
D a g o m b a army or interventions by the Asantehene in Gonja and D a g o m b a 
succession disputes.14 
It is obvious nevertheless that the mandates of the Asante regional 
commissioners varied according to the situation. In the Akan regions they 
had to ensure that disputes were settled by enforcing observance of the 
Asantehene's oath so as to emphasize his sovereignty over these territories. 
T h e collection of taxes in these regions, seen by contemporary European 
ii. Cf. R . S . Rattray, 1929, pp. 398-409; K . A . Busia, 1951; I. Wilks, 1975, ch. 2. 
12. I. Wilks, 1975; J . M . Sarbah, 1906; K . A . Busia, 1951, p. 78; R . S . Rattray, 1929, 
pp. 388-9. 
13. T . E . Bowdich, 1819, pp. 320-1. 
14. J. K . Fynn, 1974.1. Wilks, 1975, pp. 42-60, rejects this classification. 
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observers as a form of exploitation, was no problem for the Asantehene,
since Asante states themselves had to bear the same burdens.15 The real
problem was territorial sovereignty. In non-Akan regions, the com¬
missioners strove to strengthen the terms of the 'treaty' between the
Asantehene and the Dagomba, for example,16 concerning the tribute. On
the other hand, we have no evidence confirming the presence of Gonja or
Dagomba contingents in the Asante army or ofpayment by these countries
of the Asante war tax (apeatoo). The settlement of the Gonja and Dagomba
succession disputes must therefore be considered as a political act with
economic motives: peace in these territories guaranteed payment of the
tribute, as well as the introduction ofAsante institutions into the Dagomba
army. An old Asante source declared on this subject: Na yene wonom nko
nhyiamu ('We did not hold council with them').
plate 25.2 The Exchequer Court, Kumasi, ¡817
However, with the Akan states the problem was essentially one of
sovereignty. There is no doubt about the economic aspect of the Asante
conquests in the south but it is clear that, in the early nineteenth century,
the Asante were mainly interested in political domination over the other
Akan peoples on whom they sought to impose their own central institutions.
First of all, the tribute extorted from the vanquished peoples gradually
15. B. Cruickshank, 1853, Vol. 2, p. 143.
16. T.E. Bowdich, 1819, p. 235.
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became a war tax (apealoo)}1 Then, the great Asante oath, the Ntam Kesie,
deemed to be the supreme instrument of justice, was instituted among the
other Akan peoples and their own local oaths were subordinated to it.18 At
a later stage, the main Akan leaders in the surrounding areas were required
to attend the annual ceremony of the Odwira, at which they had to pay
homage to their suzerain, the Asantehene.19 Lastly, contingents from all
the Akan states fought as Asante forces in Asante wars inside and outside
the empire. The problem of sovereignty led to frequent clashes between
the Asante and the other Akan, or the Europeans. The closing of the trade
routes leading to Accra, decreed by the Akyem and the Akuapem was the
cause of wars with the Asantehene since he considered it mainly as an act
of rebellion and a rejection of the political domination of the Asante.
Asante attacks on the Fante were inspired by this same desire for political
hegemony.
plate 25.3 The first day of the Odwira festival in Kumasi, 1817
As proof of sovereignty, the Asantehene referred to documents binding
the signatories to pay rent for Cape Coast Castle and Fort Anomabo, which
he said he had acquired during the conquest of Fante territory in 1807.20
After the defeat of Gyaman in 1818, the Asantehene declared that the
people of Kommenda and Cape Coast should pay the aseda, a levy of
gratitude, to express joy at the victory of their lord and master.21 In 1822,
the Asantehene's commissioners went so far as to demand the trial and
punishment of a police sergeant at Fort Anomabo because he did not react
17. T. E. Bowdich, 1819, p. 320.
18. Cf. Major Chisholm to Sir Charles MacCarthy, 30 September 1822, document no.
56 in G.E. Metcalfe (ed.), 1964.
19. J. M. Sarbah, 1906.
20. T. E. Bowdich, 1819, pp. 47, 68.
21. The Governor and the Council to the African Committee, 11 January 18 19, docu¬
ment no. 39 in G.E. Metcalfe (ed.), 1964; see also the Governor and the Council to the
committee, 22 March 1819, document no. no in ibid.
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properly when an Asante tradesman uttered the Asantehene's oath before 
him.22 
T h e Mossi states 
T h e Mossi territory, which had undergone remarkable development since 
the sixteenth century, reaching its zenith in the eighteenth,23 was by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century in a state of decomposition leading to 
paralysis from within and disintegration from without of the two main 
kingdoms of Wagadugu and Yatenga. Only the B u s u m a kingdom benefited 
from this débâcle, extending and consolidating its influence. 
T w o examples will suffice to illustrate the gravity of the decadence into 
which the powerful kingdom of Wagadugu had fallen: the Busuma war 
and the Lallé war. 
T h e expanding B u s u m a kingdom clashed at the beginning of the century 
with the kingdom of Wagadugu, then headed by M o g h o Naaba Dulugu. 
It was by intervening in the internal disputes of Salmatenga (in the Kaya 
region) that Naaba Piga of Busuma succeeded in gaining control over this 
chieftaincy. But when he gave refuge to an exile from the kingdom of 
Wagadugu, he was invaded by Naaba Dulugu's forces and had to seek 
refuge at M a n e , which was itself at war with the chief of Zitenga, under 
the protection of Wagadugu. It was therefore a circular war in the course 
of which many princes, unhappy about the campaign against M a n e , 
defected and Naaba Dulugu of Wagadugu was mortally wounded. Naaba 
Piga's successor, feeling that the chief of M a n e was responsible for Naaba 
Dulugu's death, forced the Naaba of M a n e to poison himself, while 
Dulugu's successor, Naaba Sawadogho, forced the chief of Zitenga, his 
o w n brother, w h o had dared to contest his throne, to commit suicide. 
Fifty years later, Wagadugu, allied with Boulsa, was again to attack 
Busuma, allied with Pisila. Although harassed, Naaba Ligidi of B u s u m a 
was nevertheless to make a successful raid with his cavalry on the capital 
of the M o g h o Naaba, at Wagadugu, causing considerable material damage 
and loss of life.24 
Moreover, the wars between B u s u m a and the kingdom of Riziam enabled 
Busuma, not without difficulty, to annex the chieftaincies of Salmatenga 
22. See document no. 63, in ibid. K . A . Busia, 1951, p. 78, defines an oath as a stereotyped 
expression with a very obscure allusion to a tragic event in the history of the political 
community to which the oath refers, the chief of which is said to possess the oath. B y 
recalling the event in question, the oath is supposed to disturb the spirits of the dead 
ancestors of the royal line, w h o must then be appeased by sacrifices. This is w h y an oath 
must be uttered only according to the prescribed rules as a legal instrument binding a party 
in a conflict to appear before the court of the leader to w h o m the oath was m a d e , or as a 
means of appealing to a higher court; cf. R . S . Rattray, 1929, pp. 76, 102-4, 315 ff. 
23. See Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. 5, ch. 12. 
24. Y . Tiendrebeogo, 1964, pp. 57-8. 
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and Pikutenga. In these operations, Naaba Koabgha of Riziam enlisted the 
assistance of a Fulbe (Fulani, Peul) chief in Jelgoji. 
In 1881, Naaba Ligidi of B u s u m a launched an expedition against Koala, 
to the north of the Gulmancé territory, bordering the Fulbe kingdom of 
Dori and the Mossi territory. T h e B u s u m a troops took the fortified village 
of Koala with great difficulty. T h e amîr of Dori was awaiting its defeat in 
order to seize it, but Naaba Ligidi did not help the Fulbe in this aim.25 At 
his death in 1890, Naaba Ligidi had extended the B u s u m a kingdom to the 
utmost. At the price of many clashes, he had m a d e it preponderant on the 
border of the Fulbe and Gulmancé country. 
Whereas to the east of Wagadugu , Busuma was taking the land, to the 
west the ruler of Lallé, a powerful chieftaincy adjacent to Gurunsi territory, 
was also in open rebellion. This war, which was to smoulder for a long 
time and flare up fifty years later, was to draw an increasing number of 
peoples into the maelstrom until the French conquest. 
It started under Naaba Karfo (1842-9) of Wagadugu , sparked off by a 
trivial incident, which illustrates the degree of decay of the Mossi system 
at the time. T h e situation was considerably worsened by the fact that the 
Naaba of Wagadugu was opposed by one of his most powerful vassals, 
allied with his principal 'minister', the Widi Naba. 2 6 This was a formidable 
coalition since it brought together two generally antagonistic social groups: 
a nobleman at the head of territorial troops and the most eminent rep-
resentative of the 'bureaucratic' caste, a commoner by birth, but a m e m b e r 
of the sovereign's entourage w h o handled major affairs of state. During 
this civil war, which spelt the end of the kingdom of Wagadugu, Naaba 
W o b g h o of Lallé, whose territory to the east ran too far into loyalist 
territories, increasingly sought support from the western areas mainly 
inhabited by the Gurunsi, whose services were heavily called upon, whilst 
the M o g h o Naaba succeeded by ruse in securing the death of his rebel 
'minister'. 
Under M o g h o Naaba Sanem of Wagadugu (1871-89), however, the 
conflict with Naaba W o b g h o of Lallé was resumed with greater vigour. It 
continued under the next M o g h o Naaba of Wagadugu, also called W o b g h o , 
(1889-97). In the first battle the royalist forces were routed. War-weary, 
the M o g h o Naaba, unable to put d o w n the rebellion, turned to Z a m b e r m a 
(Zabarima) mercenaries in order to win the battle decisively. 
T h e Zamberma had left their country (present-day Niger) to escape the 
exactions of the Fulbe.27 They entered the services of the Y a N a (the king 
of Yendi), N a Abdulai, as slave-hunters. They marched under the orders 
of Alfa Hano , later under Gazari, and, finally, under Babato. Having fallen 
out with the Ya N a , they set about gaining control of the relatively highly 
25. P . Delmond, 1953, p . 39. 
26. Y . Tiendrebeogo, 1964, pp. 48-9. 
27. M . Izard, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 183 fr. 
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populated and fertile Gurunsi country, which they exploited. W h e n M o g h o 
Naaba W o b g h o recruited them against Lallé, they advanced into Mossi 
territory, giving no quarter to anyone. T h e 'chiefs' faithful to the M o g h o 
Naaba opposed them and blocked their passage, as at Saponé, where they 
were crushed, and as at Kayao. T h e M o g h o Naaba's army itself inflicted 
heavy losses on them, and the tapsoba (general-in-chief ) only allowed them 
to pass, unwillingly, after receiving orders from Wagadugu. It was after 
m a n y bloody clashes that the Z a m b e r m a , weakened, reached the rebellious 
province of Lallé, where they were pushed back into the marshes and cut 
down. Only remnants of this intervention party were to reach Leo.2 8 By a 
macabre quirk of fate the European conquest forced the M o g h o Naaba of 
Wagadugu to flee from the French into British territory in 1897, whilst his 
vassal and namesake W o b g b o of Lallé was defeated by the French and 
executed at Wagadugu. 
In the northern Mossi lands, the preponderance of Yatenga was patent 
but, during the nineteenth century, decadence was also obvious. Apart 
from a few operations for the purposes of extension and integration, as in 
the kingdoms of Yako and Tatenga (Riziam), Yatenga interventions during 
this period were reactions to external threats, a typical example being the 
Jelgoji operations, and an unending civil war among the pretenders to 
the throne, most of w h o m were not to survive long enough even to be 
enthroned. 
T h e two main attempts at integration by conquest were those of the 
Naaba Tuguri (1806-22) against Yako.29 However, the overlord of that 
kingdom, situated between the M o g h o Naaba of Wagadugu and the Naaba 
of Yatenga, was more under the influence of the former. Naaba Silem of 
Yako, deposed by Naaba Tuguri of Yatenga, regained control a year later, 
undoubtedly with the assistance of his great neighbour in Wagadugu. 
T h e action against Riziam could not but yield results. In fact that 
kingdom, whose capital Sabcé was not in the centre but in the southern 
region, had brought all its efforts to bear on that side, particularly against 
the powerful B u s u m a Naabas. T h e north, which was connected to the 
southern region solely via a narrow sparsely populated corridor was no 
longer closely related to the southern base of the kingdom. O n the other 
hand, from the reign of Naaba Kango onwards this northern region was 
under the influence and pressure of Yatenga. T h e campaigns of Naaba 
Totebalbo (1834-50) and Naaba Y e m d e (1850-77) led to the outright 
annexation of the Titao and Toulfé territory, which further isolated the 
R u m b a chiefdom of Mengao from the Toulfé chiefdom. A warlord, orig-
inally a slave, was posted at Titao. Under the surveillance of the chief of 
Kosouka, the master of Zitenga in Tikaré was under strict control, which 
28. Y . Tiendrebeogo, 1964, pp. 70-1. 
29. See D . Nacanabo, 1982. 
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was to make him draw closer to his 'brother', the Naaba of Datenga, and 
even to the king of Riziam. 
Moreover, the extremely hard campaigns in Riziam, a rugged country, 
had cost Yatenga dearly, including the life of Naaba Totebalbo. Gains in 
the campaigns against Jelgoji were also quite costly. T h e frontier with the 
Massina empire was by then more clearly defined of course, but the Mossi 
interventions had strengthened the will of Jelgoji to be independent of 
Yatenga.30 
T h e seeds of anarchy and civil war had already been sown in the election 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century of Naaba Tuguri against the 
will of his numerous brothers. Rivals frequently replaced each other in 
quick succession, ruling alternately or even simultaneously, each with his 
o w n clan and capital. Such was the case of Naaba W o b g h o and Naaba 
N y a m b e m o g h o on the one hand, and Naaba Korogho and Naaba Ragongo 
on the other. T h e princes raised their troops from a m o n g the San (Samo) 
people in G o m b o r o (archers) and/or the Fulbe in Tiou (horsemen) in order 
to dictate political decisions through force of arms.31 
All in all, Yatenga's historical development tended in the direction of 
the outside world in the nineteenth century, as it did in the eighteenth, 
except that the challenges and dangers became m u c h more serious. Under 
Naaba Baogho (1885-94), supported by the sons of Sagha (except the 
Tuguri clan), fratricide struggles broke out. T h e sons of Sagha were 
splitting up in turn into the Totebalbo clan and the Y e m d e clan. They 
finally agreed to install Naaba Baogho, but this was immediately challenged 
by the sons of Tuguri, an ideal opportunity for French intervention.32 
T h e western and southern Volta plateaux 
In this region, lineage groups and clans that for the most part lacked 
centralized power stood up rather well to the upheavals of the time. T h e 
area had witnessed for centuries the penetration of the Joola (Dyula) and 
the Marka w h o , through intermarriage with the indigenous peoples, had 
evolved new cultural, social and economic groups, one prototype being the 
Bobo-Joola people. A purely theoretical line should not, however, be 
drawn between peoples with centralized power and the others. In fact, 
centralization can take non-political forms, such as the poro society of the 
Senufo, a very large-scale religious community that determined social 
hierarchy. It is therefore in no way surprising that peoples with little 
political hierarchy should have weathered the turmoil of the nineteenth 
century differently from societies with more elaborate political structures. 
Such observations help us to understand the turbulent history of the 
30. M . Izard, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 350. 
31. ibid., pp. 331-3. 
32. J. Ki-Zerbo, 1953. T h e fratricidal wars between 'sons of Tuguri' and the 'sons of 
Sagha' provided the occasion for French intervention. 
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Voltaic groups in this region during the nineteenth-century: invasions, 
preventive attacks, resistance, adaptation and intermarriage. Generally, 
while more or less vigorously rejecting attempts at domination on the part 
of the M a n d e , Mossi, Zerma, Marka and Fulbe groups, the more sedentary, 
indigenous peoples became used to their presence and economic activity, 
moving w h e n political pressure or economic exaction became too great. 
W e can only give a few examples here. 
Gwiriko and Kenedugu are both offshoots of the power of the K o n g 
Wattara.33 Towards the end of the nineteenth century they were to be 
replaced as a result of the eastward drift of another Joola empire, that of 
Samori Ture.3 4 Gwiriko,35 formed in the eighteenth century around Bobo 
Diulasso and the northern loop of the Black Volta, flourished by dint of 
quelled revolts between the successive hegemonies of the Niger Bend 
(Segu, Massina, the Tukuloor empire) and the kingdoms of the Central 
Mossi plateau. But after M a g h a n Ulé Wattara (i 749-1809) and his son, 
Diori Wattara, the empire collapsed on all sides, on account of secession-
ist resistance by subjected peoples or the emigration of small 
groups also trying their luck. Tiéfo, B o b o Joola, Bolón, etc., shook off 
the yoke. Bako M o r u (1839-51) halted the débâcle for a time by forming 
an alliance with Tiéfo and Bobo Joola to crush the Kenedugu forces 
at Uléni where the future king, Tieba, was to be captured and sold as a 
slave. 
After him, decadence set in again and a family of Marka marabouts from 
Jenne built up a fiefdom for themselves around Boromo under the orders 
of M a m a d u Karantao, bringing together the Marka, Mossi and Dagari-
Joola. T h e indigenous K o were driven out of Boromo. Then , in defiance 
of the authority of the Wattara, he moved on to conquer B w a m u (territory 
of the Bwaba) and founded W a h a b u . His son, Karamoko Moktar, continued 
his work in B w a m u and in the Dagari and Wiile territory, though not 
without difficulties and some failures. 
W h a t Karamoko Moktar tried to do from southern Gwiriko, the K e n e -
dugu did from the north. They were a distant K o n g offshoot under the 
Traoré, a Joola-influenced, that is, Islamized, Senufo group which became 
organized in the eighteenth century around Sikasso. Between 1850 and 
i860, Laula founded the power of the Traoré on the small Senufo chief-
taincies. Their authority was to be confirmed from 1875 onwards by King 
Tieba, an ally of the French. After drawing closer to the Kiembagha of 
Korogho and victoriously repelling a siege laid by Samori against his 
strongly built fortress at Sikasso, Tieba too suffered defeat in 1890 at 
Sinematiali. 
33. For the development of the empire of K o n g , see Unesco, General History of Africa, 
Vol. 5, ch. 12. 
34. See C h . 24, above. 
35. See Unesco, General History of Africa, Vol. 5, ch. 12. 
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T h e peoples to the south-west of what is n o w Burkina Faso lived through 
this period under a similar climate of pressure, instability and conflict. 
Ethnic migrations were the rule in this region. T h e P w a , Sissala, G a n , 
D y a n , Birifor, Dagara and Dagara-Joola followed, jostled and repelled 
one another, intermarried, gathered together and separated in this area, 
especially during the first decades of the nineteenth century. 
O f course these were not h u m a n tidal waves.36 M . Père, quoting her oral 
sources, mentions small groups, sometimes comprising several units, setting 
out as scouts 'to see if the place is good', to be joined by others on 'seeing 
that it was good'. T h e remarkable point here is that the closest family ties 
were maintained among these ethnic groups despite their diversity in the 
strictest sense of the term. For example, they all belonged to the four great 
matriarchies and bore matronymics.37 T h e y all spoke Voltaic languages 
that were frequently very close to each other. They had the same cultural, 
funerary, matrimonial and initiation customs, dispersed settlement 
patterns, similar social structures, identical agricultural methods (intensive 
on alluvial or domestic soils, extensive elsewhere), etc. Yet, there were 
enough differences in all these respects to make each group cling fiercely 
to its o w n identity. 
T h e Kulango, Teese, G a n , P w a and D y a n were already there at the 
dawn of the nineteenth century. T h e n came the Lobi, by far the most 
numerous. They came over the Black Volta from present-day Ghana in 
two groups at the end of the eighteenth century. T o the north were the 
Nako (Lobi plainsmen) and, to the south, Lobi mountain-dwellers. T h e y 
pushed out the D y a n , G a n and Teese without major clashes, through the 
continuous arrival of pioneer migrants from overpopulated areas w h o 
settled at the expense of the scattered peoples, although there were some 
localized conflicts in marginal areas of friction. T h e n came the Birifor, 
from the same origin, along three main routes, settling between the Dagara-
Wiile and Lobi, between the D y a n and the P w a , and in the heart of Lobi 
country. They constitute the prototype of the mixed breed, akin to the 
Lobi in terms of culture and to the Dagara in terms of language, and 
frequently trilingual. Finally, the Dagara in turn crossed the Black Volta 
from east (left bank) to west (right bank). They can be divided into two 
groups: the Dagara Wiile, w h o settled in the north-west, and the Dagara 
Lobir, w h o settled along the river banks. All these peoples were to spend 
most of their time establishing themselves or defending themselves, not so 
m u c h from their immediate neighbours, but from Joola contingents from 
all quarters, w h o held them to ransom without succeeding in subjugating 
them. 
36. Cf. H . Guilhem and J. Hébert, 1961, pp. 87 fr. 
37. M . Père, 1982. T h e matronymics were Hien/Da/Kambou-Kambiré/Sib-Sou-Palé. 
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Other peoples 
These remarks also apply to other non-centralized Voltaic peoples such as 
the Gurunsi, the Bisa and the S a m o (Sanan) in the nineteenth century. W e 
have already seen h o w the Z a m b e r m a pillaged the Gurunsi, w h o , even 
under normal circumstances, paid a heavy tribute to the neighbouring 
Mossi kingdoms while markedly merging with them over the centuries. 
T h e Bisa not only maintained their positions to the south-west of the 
M o a g a bloc, but seem to have spread further afield during this period. 'Far 
from being pushed back by the Mossi, the Bisa seem . . . to have gained 
ground at the expense of their neighbours. This would make the Bisa 
chiefdom of Garango very recent.'38 
A s for the San (Samo) country to the north, bordering Yatenga, far 
from being conquered, it was repeatedly used as a withdrawal base and 
'sanctuary' in the course of Yatenga's unending dynastic struggles during 
the period under study. These and other peoples were to be reckoned with, 
as were the recently settled Marka (Dafing) chiefdoms, such as Lanfiera. 
In short, the achievements of non-centralized peoples at the end of the 
nineteenth century were not negligible. In 1885, a coalition comprising the 
Bwaga, K o and Gurunsi, similar to coalitions which rose elsewhere against 
K o n g , Bobo or Sikasso, inflicted a resounding defeat on the Z a m b e r m a . 
These African village democracies, which practised traditional religion, 
were endowed with remarkable vitality, which was to be brilliantly asserted 
against the colonizers but has not been sufficiently stressed by historians 
to date. 
T h e eastern regions of the Volta plateaux 
Here in the north, Jelgoji and Liptako constituted a border region between 
the new powers of Massina and Sokoto on one side and the ageing Yatenga 
on the other. Liptako did best out of this situation, pushing the formerly 
dominant Gulmanceba further south. 
Early in the century Fulbe groups and camps were to be found there, 
under the domination of the Fulbe ardo in the Niger Bend, or of the 
Gulmanceba chiefs further soutL In Jelgoji, at the same time, the Jelgobe 
Fulbe were subjects of the Jallube, w h o m they served as herdsmen, in a 
region inhabited by K u r u m b a , w h o in turn were tributaries of the Jallube. 
T h e Jelgobe revolted against the latter, and ultimately succeeded in becom-
ing independent of them, perhaps with the support of Yatenga. They 
simultaneously shook off the yoke of the indigenous inhabitants led by the 
Konfe aristocracy under the ayo (king) of L u r u m , whose capital was 
Mengao , and founded the principalities of Jiibo and Barbulle. In Liptako, 
the Ferrobe Fulbe, w h o also had come from Massina, had settled in W e e d u 
under the leadership of Birmali Sala Paté and lived there as subjects of the 
38. M . Izard, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 226. 
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Gulmanceba of Kaola until about 1810. But then the success of the djihâd 
in Sokoto came to be perceived by these Fulbe as significant for both Islam 
and the Fulbe and they rose in an ethnic and religious revolt against 
their Gulmanceba masters, w h o had retained their traditional religion.39 
Accordingly, Brahima Saidu Diandikko sent a delegation to Sokoto to seek 
Shaykh 'Uthman's blessing. H e returned with a standard that conferred 
legitimacy on his struggle against the Gulmanceba. Harassment and extor-
tion on the part of the Gulmanceba overlords provided the Fulbe with a 
casus belli. Heifers had been killed, milk had been wantonly spilled or given 
to dogs to drink, a Fulbe w o m a n had been bound, her head shaven, legacies 
had been confiscated; all these actions were contrary to Islam and the 
'Fulbe way'. 
Brahima Saidu, w h o had been nothing more than the jooro (village 
headman) of W e e d u , a post to which he had been appointed by the 
Gulmancé chief of Kaola, became an atniiru (atnlr) and launched a holy 
war, which ended with the Gulmanceba being pushed southward, although 
extensive regions of mixed population remained. However, the other Fulbe 
clans (the Tukuloor and the W a a k a m b e ) objected to the growing power of 
Brahima Saidu. T h e y sent a delegation to complain to Shaykh ' U t h m â n , 
w h o replied that while it was undoubtedly 'preferable to leave power to 
him to w h o m G o d has destined it', he did not see w h y they themselves 
had not declared a holy war, inasmuch as they had been established in that 
'pagan' environment longer than had the Ferrobe.40 Sokoto always put its 
political and religious influence behind the new dynasty and intervened on 
occasions, as for example in 1890, to settle disputes between rival claimants 
to the emirate. In return, the amir of Dori provided Sokoto with little 
enough: no military assistance was sent, and the yearly tribute in kind 
(grain, livestock, slaves and cloth) could not be supplied, as often as not, 
because of the unsafe condition of the roads, especially after the empire 
was divided up and Dori became subject to the rule of G w a n d u . Specifically, 
the Kebbi rising, and subsequently Arewa and the Z a m b e r m a , constituted 
a formidable barrier. T h e djihad of Massina on the other hand, had little 
impact on the chieftaincies of Jiibo and Barbulle, where the influence of 
the traditional religions prevailed. In addition, although Jiibo and Barbulle 
paid tribute to Hamdallahi until 1858, they did not regard themselves as 
subject to the rule of Massina,41 perhaps because the latter had no local 
representative. In practice, at any rate, they enjoyed autonomy. T h e tribute 
thus represented an act of deference. It m a y also have been intended to 
anticipate any possible attempt at conquest. F r o m the standpoint of 
Massina, the tribute was presumably the practical expression of its suzer-
ainty, which it would have liked to strengthen. A n opportunity presented 
39. H . Diallo, 1979, p. 97 ff. 
40. ibid., p. 107. 
41. ibid., p. 118. 
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itself in 1858,42 in connection with a dispute over the succession in Barbulle. 
Hamdallahi sent out a force under the c o m m a n d of al-Hadjdj M o d i to 
intervene in the issue, and the forces of Jiibo, Barbulle and Tongomayel, 
which had finally reconciled their difference, were crushed. Yatenga and 
Datenga, becoming uneasy, responded to the appeal of Jelgoji. At Pobé 
M e n g a o they combined to inflict a stinging defeat on the Massinankobé. 
T h e latter returned in force with B a L o b b o . In the meantime, however, 
the grasping and arrogant behaviour of the Mossi victors had exasperated 
the Fulbe to such an extent that they had risen in revolt, massacred the 
Mossi and gone back to being on good terms with Massina. 
In point of fact, both in Jiibo and in Barbulle several families were 
locked in a struggle for power, and as a result tended to seek the support 
of Yatenga whenever their rivals were allied with Massina. Another factor 
was the internal struggle between local chiefs and the simmering resistance 
of the indigenous K u r u m b a . By the end of the century the latter, under 
the principality of Aribinda, had become enough of a threat to provoke a 
coalition between Jelgoji and Liptako. 
T h e Tuareg also had to be reckoned with. A s early as 1804 the Udallan 
Tuareg had settled in the region that bears their name and began exacting 
tribute from the Gulmaceba and the Songhay. Both Sori H a m m a (1832-
61) and subsequently Bokar Sori (1890-2) were defeated at their hands 
and had to fortify Dori with palisades. T h e Tuareg had been pushed 
eastward as a result of the consolidation of the empire of Massina, and had 
settled along the Béli river. 
T h e political organization of Liptako represented an attempt to maintain 
a balance between the clans, and this was reflected in its very structures. 
Power was transmitted through patrilineal descent from Saidu, the father 
of that Brahima w h o had led the djihäd. However, the Ferrobe eventually 
decided or agreed that their antagonists, the Torodbe, should constitute 
the electoral college that designated the amir. T h e college investigated each 
candidate's personal qualities, such as justice and piety, as well as the 
services he had rendered, the extent of his matrimonial alliances, and the 
like, and finally gave a decision. B y means of this participation, the 
Torodbe, even though they were debarred from wielding power themselves, 
were placed in a position where they could in a sense decide among the 
Ferrobe claimants, and this served to integrate them into the system.43 
Once the new amir had been tentatively selected, he was subjected to an 
interview and asked trick questions. T h e n animals were sacrificed to the 
genii and to a sacred snake. A new traditional drum was made , to be 
included among the symbols of power granted by the Sokoto council.44 
T h e new amir's head was swathed in a turban by one of the Torodbe in 
42. A . H . Ba and J. Daget, 1962; M . Izard, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 334 fr. 
43. H . Diallo, 1979, pp. 155 ff. 
44. ibid., p. 161. 
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the presence of the chief imam and the kadi, and facing the standard he 
swore to respect the customs and principles of Islam and to maintain the 
welfare of his people. This was a ritual of political and religious renewal 
of cosmic dimensions, designed to appease supernatural forces of all 
descriptions. T h e religious authorities were appointed by the kadi of Dori 
and were invested with judicial power as courts of appeal. In addition, 
there was a network of village imams, headed by the chief imam of Dori. 
T h e local power structure was also designed to provide a place for the 
older Fulbe clans which could not aspire to the office of amir: the jooro 
(village headmen) were selected from the ranks of the heads of families of 
more ancient lineage. Jelgoji had a similar system for incorporating all 
clans within a single structure: the chief was elected by an electoral college 
m a d e up of aged notables of Sadaabé descent, i.e. representatives of the 
people w h o had been dominant in the region before the arrival of the 
Jelgobé, whereas only a m e m b e r of the latter could actually be chief. In 
practice, the chief was invariably a m e m b e r of the Nyorgo family. T h e 
insignia of the office was a staff (symbolizing stock-breeding) hung with 
various kinds of agricultural products. Here again, the material prosperity 
of the new chiefs reign was secured by means of sacrifices carried out by 
the indigenous K u r u m b a . 
T h e B a m b a r a kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta 
After reaching their full flowering in the course of the eighteenth century, 
the kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta lingered on in a way that exhibited the 
most negative aspects of their policies: acts of aggression that were regarded 
as acts of bravery, raids carried out with no attempt at organization, 
fratricidal warfare between kingdoms and within individual kingdoms. For 
example, the Massassi of Kaarta, w h o were of royal blood, regarded the 
rulers of Segu, at any rate from the time of the successors of Denkoro, son 
of Biton Kurubari (Kulibali), as military chiefs of slave origin, in other 
words as mere professional warriors. T h e more populous kingdom of Segu 
was the stronger of the two, and the kings of Segu hated the Massassi, w h o 
treated them with utter contempt. This situation accounts for the persistent 
assaults carried out by Segu against Kaarta. T h e latter was usually defeated 
but never conquered.45 
This period was also characterized by the increasing prominence of the 
tonjons (a nation of freedmen w h o had become notable warriors) as they 
took advantage of their strength. For example, in the course of a war 
between Torokoro Mari (1854-6) and his brother Kégué Mari before 
Massala, the tonjons w h o had been enlisted by both brothers decided to 
use blank ammunition.46 W h e n Torokoro expressed astonishment that no 
one had been hurt among the ranks of either besiegers or besieged, one of 
45. L . Tauxier, 1942, p. 143. 
46. ibid., p. 99. 
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tonjons told him bluntly, 'We have had enough of your fratricidal wars.
They must cease!' The action was broken off forthwith.
In the kingdom of Segu, Monzón Jara (Diarra) (c 1 790-1 808) won
renown by his campaigns against not only Kaarta and Massina but also
against the Dogon and the Mossi. Da Monzón (1808-27), his successor,
was defeated by Seku Ahmadu Barri of Massina while coming to the
assistance of his own vassal, the ardo Dicko, who was a non-Muslim Fulbe.
This experience taught him that the main enemy was not the 'fellow'
kingdom of Kaarta. Da Monzón was a fierce and unscrupulous man.47
His successor, Tyefolo (1827-39), made the mistake of having a pilgrim
returning from Mecca put in chains: he proved to be no ordinary pilgrim,
but al-Hadjdj 'Umar, who was never to forget his humiliation, even though
he was released at the instance of Muslim notables, including the Torodbe,
Thierno Abdul.
plate 25.6 Bambara house types, i88j
The years of anarchy that followed Tyefolo's reign were marked by the
epic and legendary figure of Bakari Dyan, a chief of the Ferrobe Fulbe
('Fulbe' freed to serve the state, though they were not all Fulbe by any
means). Bakari Dyan not only successfully resisted the attacks launched by
47. In this connection, cf. the episode of Mama Dyetoura, 'the most handsome of men'
in the opinion of Da Monzon's wives. Da Monzón, mad with jealousy, succeeded in
eliminating Mama Dyetoura by treachery. See V. Monteil, 1977, pp. 92 ff.
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Massina, killing the redoubtable Blissi himself, but captured m a n y villages, 
to the gratification of the people of Segu. His successors were unremarkable, 
until 'All M o n z ó n Jara, w h o was defeated and slain by al-Hadjdj ' U m a r . 
However, Bambara resistance continued under elected chiefs operating 
from Bani on the right bank. 
T h e kingdom of Kaarta's centre of gravity shifted between the Senegal 
and Niger basins. Whereas Desse Koro, early in the century, took advantage 
of unsettled conditions in Segu to seize Ñyamina, Mussa Kura B o , his 
successor, allied himself with B u n d u against ' A b d al-Kâdir of Futa Toro, 
w h o was to be defeated and killed in 1807. Moussa Koura B o also operated 
against the Kagoro of Beledugu and against the Mandinka. Under Bodian 
Moriba the Great (1815-38) an alliance was entered into with Upper Galam 
against the almami of Bundu, allied with Khasso. T h e Khaartanke w o n a 
decisive victory in that area in 1818, while Moriba's son ravaged Fuladuu 
in the Kita region. 
In the face of Fulbe and Tukuloor expansionism, Naniemiba (1839-41) 
and Kirango Bâ (1841-44) of Segu finally negotiated a reconciliation with 
Nyaralen Gran (1832-43) and M a m a d i Kandia (1843-54), w h o in any case 
had their hands full with their war against the Jawara (Diawara). It was 
too late: all of them, including Massina's Fulbe adversary, were to be swept 
away in the djihäd led by al-Hadjdj ' U m a r . 
S u m m a r y 
Thus, in the centre and the north of the region covered in this chapter, 
existing political structures went into in a state of increasingly rapid decline 
in the nineteenth century and in some cases came to be dominated by new 
forces which had arisen mainly as a result of the Sokoto djihäd. These took 
advantage of the internal decay of the existing structures to establish 
themselves, before being swept away in their turn by foreign powers that 
were even more formidable. 
There can be no single explanation for this kind of decline, such as 
might be offered if it were seen solely in terms of external influences, or as 
part of a predisposition towards colonization. There is no doubt that, as a 
result of processes which had come into operation some time before, 
kingdoms and peoples that had not adopted centralized systems of govern-
ment were about to reach a turning point in their history as regards both 
their internal affairs and the external influences to which they were subject. 
In turn, the Mossi, Bambara and Joola kingdoms had attempted to gain 
control of an area including both the fringes of the desert and the edges of 
the forest. Although none of them achieved this on any lasting basis, in 
each case the high point of their power coincided with their m a x i m u m 
north-south extension, even though the nucleus of the Bambara empire of 
Segu kept more closely to its west-east axis of the- valley of the Niger. 
However, during the nineteenth century, political instability and popu-
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lation movements were widespread. Brutal massacres and secessionist 
movements were led by the very people w h o were supposed to represent 
authority, such as the Tondyon of Segu and the ministers of the court of 
W a g a d u g u . S o m e notable exceptions notwithstanding, the frequency and 
extent of these conflicts grew and the tendency towards social dislocation 
was undoubtedly linked with the growing opportunities available to the 
peripheral powers and the rebels to obtain arms and use them to challenge 
the reigning chiefs. 
In addition, the captives which these kingdoms needed as a form of 
currency with which to buy rare goods and the instruments of war were 
being carried off at a rate which was becoming less and less compatible 
with the survival of the societies concerned, especially w h e n they were 
seized from peoples already subject to tribute, since that depleted the 
reserves of the dominant powers. D u e to a by no means unusual time-lag, 
European decisions to abolish the slave trade did not prevent it from 
reaching a paroxysm in the course of the nineteenth century in a number 
of countries on the Niger Bend and in the upper basin of the various 
affluents of the Volta. Emancipation by the state and reintegration into 
lineage groups did little to reduce the destructive effects of this scourge, 
which was not to abate until the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, 
those countries whose economies had been kept going by the 'ports of the 
desert' at the end of the caravan routes were n o w enclosed and isolated, 
being separated from the coast by other states, at a time w h e n basic trading 
patterns were collapsing. In such circumstances they were bound, slowly 
but inexorably, to fall into decline. 
In these circumstances, as often happens in periods of crisis, social 
divisions were exacerbated, transforming the relatively egalitarian struc-
tures that had been characteristic of the societies of the Sahel during their 
period of ascendancy. Another factor was the evolution of the religious 
movements which, after the tolerance towards traditional cults shown 
during the preceding centuries, had adopted a more intransigent attitude 
as a result of the djihad, which had triumphed in Liptako and had swept 
through the Bambara states. Even the Yarsé of the Mossi country, pre-
viously so flexible in both religious and political affairs, began to take up 
m u c h more rigid positions and engaged in proselytism. However, the 
Islamic successor states were themselves ephemeral, for they were victims 
of the same objective conditions that had already doomed the autonomous 
development of the African states. 
However, it should not be forgotten that, behind the disruption and 
dislocation of external state structures during this period, m a n y peoples, 
throughout all these upheavals, which sometimes involved tragic m o v e -
ments of population, were tenaciously continuing to work and ensure the 
survival of society. This reminds us that, despite the convulsions of the 
societies to which they belonged, whether endogenous or caused by external 
factors, the ordinary people were far from prostrate, as is shown by their 
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remarkable ability to rise to the major challenges of the period, such as the 
intrusion of colonialism. 
Socio-economic tensions 
Production and trade 
During this period, to an even greater extent than is the case today, the 
basis of economic activity was agriculture. While statistics are lacking, w e 
m a y safely estimate that 99 per cent of the population of the region in 
question was engaged in agriculture, especially the sedentary indigenous 
peoples. T h e small minority engaged in trade, apart from artisans, consisted 
mainly of groups sprung from peoples for w h o m commerce was a w a y of 
life, or peoples interested in conquest; some peoples, like the Joola, c o m -
bined the two activities. In general terms, w e m a y say that the coastal 
regions essentially imported gold and slaves and supplied European prod-
ucts, while the Sahel imported kola nuts and obtained weapons from the 
coast and exported, for the most part, salt, livestock and slaves. Between 
the coast and the Sahel there were intermediate savanna regions that 
supplied slaves and livestock, including donkeys for trade and horses for 
war and for princely courts, but also cereals and gold. 
T h e abolition of the slave trade by Britain in 1807 introduced an element 
of structural imbalance into this situation, especially in the south, where 
surveillance was instituted earliest and maintained most strictly, although 
domestic slavery was tolerated.48 During the second half of the nineteenth 
century slavery expanded very substantially, especially in the Niger bend. 
This was because the cost of weapons increased steadily, so that pro-
gressively greater numbers of slaves had to be offered in exchange. It is 
not surprising, then, to find entire groups, such as the Z a m b e r m a , spe-
cializing in the extraction of this 'black ore'. T h e main sources of supply, 
however, were not only the great djihäd conducted by the Musl im leaders 
of the north and the conflicts in Mossi territory. T h e trade was also fed 
from a host of channels that sluiced off slaves from peoples belonging to 
hundreds of chieftaincies, from the territories of the Tuareg to the areas 
bordering the trading posts on the coast. During the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, war broke out in virtually every decade and in virtually 
every region, and war meant captives. These victims were for the most 
part from sedentary agricultural communities, which served as a veritable 
breeding stock for the trade. Hence the underpopulated areas to be found 
in regions that were literally drained of their inhabitants. Tribute exacted 
in the form of captives was extremely heavy in m a n y instances. W h e n 
indigenous peoples took action to organize their o w n defence, they were 
frequently used as mercenaries in wars elsewhere, as in the case of some 
48. A . A . Boahen, 1974, p. 179. 
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of the Gurunsi w h o fought in the ranks of the Zamberma, and the S a m o 
(Sanan) w h o took part in the dynastic wars of Yatenga. 
Trade channels 
T h e southern part of the region with which w e are here concerned was, as 
w e have observed, the scene of a desperate struggle by the Asante to control 
the European trading posts on the coast, which were of crucial importance 
to its survival: only if it held them could it maintain control of both ends 
of the trade channel. T h e abolition of the slave trade, which accounted for 
nine-tenths of the Gold Coast's exports at the beginning of the century, 
abruptly altered the economic situation. By 1840, however, palm oil had 
already succeeded the slave trade as the coast's leading export product, a 
development that was largely due to Maclean's policy. Palm oil was followed 
in the 1870s and 1880s by rubber, and both laid the foundations of 
structural changes in the economies of the southern Gold Coast. 
While Asante and Voltaic gold moved southward for the most part, kola 
nuts moved northward. T h e more westerly routes through K o n g and Buna, 
however, were steadily abandoned in favour of the north-eastern routes 
through the D a g o m b a and Hausa country, as T h o m a s Bowdich reports. 
Trade in the north was further stimulated by the abolition of the slave 
trade on the coast, the fact that the routes to the Fante country were closed 
from time to time, and the political stability of Hausaland and Borno after 
the djihad led by 'Uthmän dan Fodio. Thus it came about that luxury 
products from Europe moved d o w n through North Africa, the Fezzän and 
the Hausa country, or even on occasion up via the D a h o m e y coast to Kano 
and onward to the Niger Bend. Silks and carpets from Turkey and Tripoli, 
natron from Borno, and Hausa textiles, were exchanged for kola nuts, 
gold, cotton materials from D a g o m b a , Mossi and M a n d e , shea butter and 
livestock from the Sudanese Sahel. 
This accounts for the tremendous expansion of Salaga in the state of 
Gonja during this period.49 That city assumed the role formerly played by 
Gbuipe in Gonja. Salaga was the point of departure for Yendi, Sansanne 
M a n g o and beyond, as far as the Volta, Hausa or Yoruba territories. Dupuis 
tells us that Salaga was twice the size of Kumasi , with a population of 
400 000. Its prosperity was to continue until the collapse of Asante power, 
w h e n the trade routes shifted towards Kintampo. As far as transactions 
were concerned, barter was the general rule, although gold dust might be 
used for larger deals, and also cowries, which Maclean decreed should be 
legal tender on the coast. At Logofiela, J. B . Kietegha discovered heaps of 
cowries side by side with fragments of earthenware jars, which it has proved 
49. K . Arhin, 1979, ch. 3. 
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feasible to reconstitute, and which have been dug out of sites in the Pura
region.50
Besides the Asante and Lobi gold, the left bank of the upper Black
Volta witnessed, especially in the nineteenth century, an extraordinary
concentration of gold diggers of various origins: Dyan, Dagara, Bobo-
Joola, Bwaba and Mossi, in addition to the indigenous Gurunsi. Using
only crude implements (picks, hoes, earthenware jars, calabashes and pans),
they extracted the gold. As only men could 'see the gold and kill it', the
system of division of labour in force assigned men the tasks of prospecting,
digging, and crushing quartz, while women were responsible for ore-
carrying and washing operations. By the end of the century, the proportion
of slaves among such communities was substantial (sixty per family in the
village of Pura).51 The noteworthy feature here is that these were family
plate 25.8 Salaga in 1888
or individual enterprises, unrelated to any centralized state. The Zamberma
invasion led the peasantry in some villages in the gold-bearing district to
conceal their implements in the hills and go on to a war footing; captured
men were sold for 100 000 cowries, and women captives for double that
sum. In some respects, evidently, gold production and slave-hunting were
50. Small cowries, which were preferred to large ones, were exchanged for the latter at
the rate of 10 000 small to 11 000 large. This led to the appearance of currency exchange
operators, who made a profit of 10 per cent; cf. J. B. Kietegha, 1983, p. 185.
51. ibid.
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incompatible. A r m e d raiding groups, however, naturally preferred slaves, 
since they were m u c h more profitable52 and in addition were also used in 
washing the gold. During the first half of the nineteenth century, as m u c h 
as 50 kg of gold may have been produced annually in the Pura region 
alone." 
Whereas this gold was carried mainly to the Sahara and Morocco, gold 
from Lobi went out to the Gold Coast or Liberia. Part of the gold was 
hoarded in the form of dust or nuggets in bamboo stalks or pieces of cloth, 
hidden in attics, or buried in earthenware pots. It was carried via local and 
regional trade routes, sometimes to Bobo, San, Jenne and Mopti, sometimes 
to K o n g and Asante, sometimes to Gaoua (Lobi) or Salaga via Wessa and 
W a , and sometimes to Wagadugu and onward to Puytenga, Tenkodogo 
and Salaga. In local trade it was used to purchase salt, kola nuts, boubous 
(loose ankle-length robes), slaves, livestock and grain. According to L . G . 
Binger, bar salt from the desert was m u c h more highly regarded than other 
kinds. It came from Taoudeni by way of Timbuktu, Mopti, Jenne, Bla 
and San, subsequently being distributed throughout the Sahel and the 
savanna country. The same was true of the salt that reached Segu by way 
of Adrar and Tichit. Sea salt from the coast and salt collected from the 
river saltpan at Daboya was carried as far as K o n g . In the Volta region of 
the Sahel, the chiefs of Jiibo developed a cunning technique for accumu-
lating slaves. If a slave killed someone and then gave himself up to the 
chief, he would be acquitted and would become the property of the latter; 
in cases of theft, if the thief was rich the chief would strip him of his 
wealth.54 B y the end of the century, the population of Dori included 50000 
free m e n and 50000 captives. Yet the careful and observant traveller, 
Heinrich Barth, w h o passed through the region in 1853, says nothing about 
slaves in his account. This points to a substantial increase in slave-trading 
in the region during the second half of the century. 
T h e network of routes spreading out from Dori is enough in itself to 
convey some idea of h o w open the Sahel was to trade from all sides. As 
the legislation of the empire of Massina, with its heavy taxes and its ban 
on tobacco, was very burdensome for Timbuktu, the merchants diverted 
their trade to G a o , controlled as it was by the Moors and Tuareg of w h o m 
there were so m a n y in Dori. While the route from Kayes to Dori by way 
of Bamako and Bandiagara was held by the Joola, the route from Sokoto 
to Dori by way of Sansanne M a n g o was dominated by the Hausa, and the 
one from Wahiguya to Dori via Yako and Kaya, or from Wagadugu to 
Dori via Zitenga and Puytenga, was used by the Mossi. Goods imported 
into Dori included tobacco, matting, livestock and salt from the north, 
52. T o the slave-dealers, slaves are said to have been ninety times as profitable as gold, 
according to V . Kachinsky, quoted in ibid., p. 155. 
53. J. Sagatzky, 1940, folio 5. 
54. H . Diallo, 1979, p. 169. 
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which were exchanged for lengths of cotton, Hausa turbans and European 
manufactured products. Loincloths and boubous came from the Hausa 
country to be traded for livestock and salt. T h e slaves, lengths of cloth, 
worked copper and donkeys of Mossi country were exchanged for kola 
nuts from Asante, salt, and livestock. In return for their Guinea cloth and 
hardware, traders from the Joola lands took h o m e salt and livestock. In 
Jiibo, which was full to overflowing with Yarse traders from Wahiguya, 
barter was the universal rule, whereas cowries were used in Dori. In the 
latter town, as a result of their activity, traders found themselves associated 
with the aristocratic clans, with which in some instances they were also 
allied by marriage. However, they inhabited their o w n quarters of the 
town, and were kept out of political life. 
In the aggregate, while the activity of the traders was marginal in relation 
to the economy as a whole, it had a strong qualitative influence on the lives 
of all. T o realize this, w e need only recall the importance of border 
communities such as Begho, Kafaba, Kintampo and Atebubu, in which 
composite societies rapidly grew up. Gonja, Joola, Hausa, D a g o m b a , 
Asante, Fulbe, Yoruba, Dendi, Borno, Bariba, Kulango, Gurunsi and 
others flocked into Salaga.55 T h e place became a true microcosm, in which 
the division of labour was carried further than was the case in the more 
homogeneous indigenous society: there were landowners, tenants, brokers 
and a variety of craftsmen.56 
Social change 
Social change arises naturally in periods of upheaval. This was true of the 
lands lying in the Niger Bend and the Volta basin in the nineteenth century. 
While w e have few documents on this aspect of the historical process, it 
appears that social changes were greater in centralized states than in 
societies in which administration was decentralized, greater in the coastal 
regions than in the lands of the interior, and greater in Islamized areas 
than elsewhere. While sedentary societies that did not have a centralized 
power structure were the most affected by the convulsions of the time, 
they took refuge in fidelity to their traditional code of life as an antidote 
to their trials. 
T h e situation of slaves and caste members was m u c h worse in centralized 
states. T h e most radical upheaval was undoubtedly the one that occurred 
in the Fulbe groups: originally nomads under the domination of the 
Gulmanceba, within a few years after the djiKäd they in turn had become 
overlords ruling indigenous peoples, or peoples w h o m they had reduced 
to the level of commoners, captives and serfs (bellah or remaibe), condemned 
to the tasks of cultivation and herding. In addition, there were artisans and 
griots. It was a meticulously stratified society in which every individual had 
55. L . G . Binger, quoted in M . Johnson, nd, S A L / 1 9 / 1 . 
56. K . Arhin, 1979, ch. 3. 
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and knew his place. Over and above one-fifth of all plunder taken in raids,57 
the amir of Liptako received gifts and a tribute on harvests that was known 
as the zakat. Similarly, the chiefs of Jiibo received gifts at 'salutations' and 
levied a tax on salt for which traders were liable. Aristocrats were sometimes 
attended by hundreds of dependants. While the conditions of slaves 
improved with seniority (rimaibe could o w n property), the status of captives 
was to raise problems in Liptako. ' U t h m a n dan Fodio himself advised the 
amir to free slaves w h o had taken part in the struggle against the G u l m a n -
ceba. Furthermore in 1861 the Amïr Seeku Saalu was confronted by a slave 
uprising touched off by the marabout Abdul Kadiri, w h o aspired to seize 
power. T h e amir was able to retrieve the situation only by agreeing to 
manumissions. 
Artisans were denied the rights enjoyed by freemen and nobles, and 
were reduced to endogamy. While a noble could marry slave girls, he could 
not marry a blacksmith's daughter.58 A n d yet, like the griot, whose verbal 
magic consolidated the power of the rulers and even gave him a very small 
share of it, the blacksmith was feared because of the magical nature of his 
work. H e was also a mediator in conflicts between individuals and families. 
However, there was no shortage of subjects of tension.59 
In the Mossi kingdom of W a g a d u g u , slaves were made into eunuchs in 
sufficiently large numbers for it to be feasible to export them northward. 
In Asante, the quantity of h u m a n livestock obtained by the payment of 
tribute was so great that w h e n the slave trade was abolished, the Asantehene 
stated that he could not feed the 20 000 captives w h o m he had on his hands, 
adding, 'unless I kill or sell them, they will grow strong and kill m y 
people'.60 
It appears, however, that social relations between slaves and their owners 
were marked by less hostility in societies not having a central power 
structure. W e are told that in the village of Pura, slaves were fed 'just like 
everyone else'. M . Père tells us that in the Lobi country, each submatriclan 
was divided into two groups: the true-born W e y a , and the Dea , w h o were 
of captive origin. T h e latter category included people w h o had been adopted 
because they had been found at the door one morning, seeking refuge from 
famine or raiding. Both categories, however, were fully integrated within 
57. According to strict orthodoxy, it was the Cadi w h o should have received this; cf. H . 
Diallo, 1979, p. 274. 
58. This continued to be the case in Yatenga until well into the twentieth century. 
59. It is related that if a village headman was ordered to supply a horse and for the 
purpose took a horse belonging to a blacksmith, all the blacksmiths of Liptako, with one 
accord, would bring their anvils and set them d o w n before the amiiru, saying, 'The land 
is yours, but our iron belongs to us. W e shall make no more hoes, picks or lances. If the 
people wish, let them farm no more'. Eventually the amiiru would come to an agreement 
with the blacksmiths and give them back their horse, whereupon they would return to their 
villages. H . Diallo, 1979, p. 186. 
60. J. Dupuis, quoted in A . Boahen, 1974, p. 179. 
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the social structure as sources of production and progeny. Accordingly, a 
slave lived in the same hut as his master, w h o m he addressed as 'father'; 
he was a m e m b e r of the same kin group as the latter and was subject to 
the same rituals and taboos and engaged in the same work; his owner gave 
him a wife, he possessed a field, and was entitled to accumulate cowries to 
the point of buying his freedom or purchasing another m a n to replace him. 
W h a t was required of him was that he remain in the same village as his 
master.61 Here w e see a clear indication of a deliberate policy of using 
slavery as a means of strengthening clan or territorial groups. 
Other types of tension became more accentuated in the centralized states 
during this period, namely Asante, the Bambara kingdoms, Yatenga, the 
kingdom of Wagadugu and Gwiriko: all of these witnessed rivalry between 
the lordly or noble class and the ruler. Such a rivalry occurred in the 
kingdom of Wagadugu , where M o g h o Naaba Karfo (1842-9) decided to 
distribute to the poor among the c o m m o n people the property that he had 
confiscated from the wealthy. In dispensing justice, he was accessible to 
noble and commoner alike. It is highly likely that this social policy was a 
factor in the great rebellion of the princes that broke out in his reign at the 
instigation of the most important of his ministers, the Widi Naaba. 
Lastly, we m a y mention the coastal lands, where the driving forces of 
trade and education were producing a qualitatively new type of social 
stratification. Once the basis of commercial activity had shifted from the 
slave trade to the exchange of palm oil, rubber, ivory and gold for European 
products, a new merchant class emerged, operating with stocks of trade 
goods advanced by European companies, whose agents they actually were. 
T h u s began the careers of a number of great merchants with establishments 
in the coastal centres. At a lower level, swarms of petty dealers w h o played 
the role of door-to-door salesmen to the suppliers gravitated around the 
great merchants, on w h o m they were dependent.62 T h e Asante merchants 
w h o , for their part, controlled the supply of products from the interior of 
Africa, namely the akonkofo, also constituted a factor to be reckoned with.63 
In m u c h the same way, in the field of education n e w categories, or even 
entire social classes, came into being along the coast. At the top of the 
hierarchy stood the descendants of the great merchant families, such as the 
Bannermans of the Gold Coast w h o , since the early years of the century, 
had been educated in Europe or at Fourah Bay College (founded in 1827) 
in Sierra Leone. These people were regarded as 'English gentlemen', and 
behaved accordingly. They were accepted in European circles and rose to 
positions of responsibility as magistrates, commanders of forts and the like. 
At the other end of the scale were the great mass of persons known ironically 
as 'Cape Coast scholars', w h o had received only rudimentary education. 
61. M . Père, 1982, pp. 214 et seq. 
62. B . Cruickshank, 1853, Vol. 2, pp. 30-94. 
63. I. Wilks, 1975, pp. 699--705. 
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They were employed as clerks at wretched wages or, unemployed, were 
reduced to travelling about through the bush as brokers for English or 
African merchants. They were regarded with contempt as caricatures of 
English civilization, living as parasites on illiterate chiefs and their peoples. 
Between these two extremes stood those Africans w h o , without becoming 
highly learned, had nevertheless received a sufficiently good education to 
be able to become independent merchants or managers in the coastal 
towns.64 In this way the bases for subsequent social contradictions were 
laid. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it was the cooperation between 
the educated entrepreneurial class that m a d e the Fante Confederation 
possible. 
Religious change 
In this region the nineteenth century was a period of rapid advance for 
Islam in the north and centre, while Christianity was reintroduced in the 
south. M o r e than ever these two religions were associated with the prestige 
of education, in the form of the ability to write, and with a m u c h wider 
world than the one bounded by local horizons. 
In the northern part of the region the wide influence of the djihâds led 
by eminent m e n ('Uthmän D a n Fodio of Sokoto, Seku A h m a d u of Massina 
and al-Hadjdj ' U m a r Tal) produced powerful and lasting effects, as, for 
example, the djihad and the emirate of Liptako. 
Even the Bambara and Mossi kingdoms were carried along in the wake 
of this uprush of Islamic proselytizing activity, or at any rate influenced 
by it. T h e Bambara and the Mossi have usually been termed 'ramparts 
against the expansion of Islam', but if this cliché was ever true, it certainly 
was not so in the nineteenth century, w h e n Islam was a powerful force not 
only at the top of the social order in these kingdoms, but in every part of 
society. W e need look no further than the kingdom of Segu under M o n z ó n 
Jara early in the century; here, the ruler's mother, Makoro , made use of 
the services of marabouts from Segu Sikoro and Tegu to bring about a 
reconciliation between the king and his brother Nyanakoro D a . M o n z ó n 
Jara's successor asked a learned marabout w h o was a friend of his for a 
talisman that would bring him victory. Torokoro Mari (1854-6) turned 
over one of his sons to al-Hadjdj ' U m a r and asked the latter to bring him 
up; to be sure, this induced the monarch's warriors to abandon their 
allegiance and drown him, explaining to his successor, ' W e killed your 
brother because he wanted to compel us to become Muslims, and because 
he was squandering the state's resources by showering gifts on marabouts'.65 
In the Mossi kingdoms, the only Muslims up to that point had been the 
Yarsé, but early in the nineteenth century the M o g h o - N a a b a openly 
64. P . Foster, 1965, pp. 68-9. 
65. V . Monteil, 1977, p. 100. 
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embraced the Islamic faith and in their turn these established nuclei of 
missionary activity. 
Naaba Dulugu of Wagadugu erected a mosque and treated the imam as 
an important person at his court. Nevertheless, as though seeking to avoid 
an excessively abrupt change, he exiled his son, the future Naaba Sawadogo, 
and deposed Pwanda, the headman of Kombissiri. These two zealots then 
retired to Basan-Warga and turned it into a religious base. W h e n Naaba 
Sawadogo acceded to the throne, he reinstated the headman of Kombissiri, 
which in its turn became a hotbed of the faith, and sent his o w n son to the 
Ku'ran school in Sarabatenga Yarsé. 
Under Naaba Karfo, the rebel Naaba W o b g h o of Lallé went to the imam 
of Wagadugu and asked him to intercede on his behalf with the king. Lastly, 
Naaba Kutu had received an authentic Ku'rânic education. Abandoning the 
attempt to reconcile his religion with traditional ritual, he turned the 
practice of the latter over to his ministers, along with the administration 
of customary justice. H e built a mosque at the eastern gate of his palace 
(the gate which was for w o m e n and prisoners of war), performed the duties 
prescribed by Islam and sent one of his sons to the Ku'rän school. O n the 
other hand, he helped Naaba Peogho of Bulsa to suppress a rebellion of 
Muslim origin that had been fomented by the Fulbe Modibo M a m a d u from 
Futa Jallon. T h e latter, w h o bore the title oí wait (or saint), disappointed at 
the Naaba's attitude to his efforts to make converts, unhesitatingly stirred 
up an insurrection, which was supported by Yarsé, Maransé (Sonrai) and 
Fulbe in particular. H e was compelled to flee and his tatibs (followers) were 
slaughtered.66 In point of fact, as the Mossi engaged in trade in ever-
growing numbers, they inevitably found themselves caught up in the 
process of Islamization as well. That process had been under way for a 
long time in the western part of the Volta basin and was continuing under 
the auspices of K o n g , Gwiriko, Bobo Diulasso, and subsequently, for a 
short time, Samori Ture. T h e religion spread in the rather unreceptive 
B w a , San, Gurunsi or Lobi environments thanks to Joola traders or Marka 
(Dafing) marabouts such as those of W a h a b u and Lanfiera. 
In the centre of the region under consideration, it was in the nineteenth 
century that Islam became the leading religion of D a g o m b a and Mamprusi , 
as also in Sansanne M a n g o . Imams were religious and political figures. In 
Asante, Osei K w a m e (1777-1801) was sympathetic to Islam; conceivably 
he m a y have been deposed for that reason. Osei Bonsu, for his part, 
declared, 'the book [Ku'ran] is strong and I like it, because it is the book 
of the great G o d ' . Bowdich speaks of a thousand or so Muslims in Kumasi 
under the leadership of M u h a m m a d al-Ghamba, known as Baba, w h o was 
the son of the imam of Mamprusi and made good use of his position as a 
m e m b e r of the royal council. Muslim traders from the Arab world, of 
course, flocked into the capital, and amulets prepared by marabouts, 
66. Cf. G . Chéron, 1924, p. 653; J. Withers-Gill, 1924; N . Levtzion, 1968, p. 170. 
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especially battle tunics, sold for high prices.67 Undoubtedly it is important 
not to exaggerate the impact of Islam on the traditional religious system 
of the Asante empire, which in practice was largely identified with the 
political structure. Nevertheless, its influence was at work, and it did its 
utmost to keep princes from succumbing to the Christian religion and its 
missionaries, as was also the case in Buganda at almost the same period. 
While Christianity was to m a k e its appearance in Timbuktu only at the 
end of the century with the arrival of the White Fathers, it had returned 
to the Gold Coast in the southern part of the region long before. T h e 
evangelical Basel Mission, followed by the B r e m e n Mission, were estab-
lished by 1828 throughout the entire south-eastern part of the Gold Coast 
(on the Akuapim scarp, in Accra, A k y e m , A d a , and the Ewe-speaking 
Keta and Peki areas). They opened model farms and technical schools.68 
Methodist missionaries, under the leadership of George Maclean, con-
centrated their efforts on the western coast, with Cape Coast as a base. 
T h o m a s Birch Freeman, a m a n of great ability, strove tirelessly to found 
Methodist schools throughout the interior as far as the Asante country and 
along the coast as far as Yorubaland.69 
Freeman was inspired by the ideals of the Society for the Abolition of 
the Slave Trade and for the Civilization of Africa, the objectives of which 
included studying the leading languages and reducing the most important 
of them to writing; introducing the printing press and local paper m a n u -
facture; investigating the climates of different districts; introducing the 
science of medicine; building roads and canals for transport and an effective 
drainage system for the sake of sanitation; sharing with the Africans the 
most up-to-date agricultural knowledge; providing them with equipment 
and seed of good quality, and also advising on the best crops to produce 
for the world market.70 Like the Basel Mission, they established model 
farms in the Cape Coast district. They admitted girls w h o often numbered 
up to three out of ten in their schools.71 Even more impressively, with a 
view to removing the language barrier to evangelization, as early as the 
eighteenth century they had translated the basic works of Christianity into 
G a . In 1875 the Reverend J. G . Christaller published a T w i grammar, and 
his dictionary of the Akan languages, first published in 1881, is still the 
best available.72 
Despite the efforts of Christianity and Islam in the region, traditional 
religion continued to c o m m a n d the allegiance of a large majority of the 
67. Cf. A . Boahen, 1974, pp. 191-4. 
68. H . W . Debrunner, 1967, chs 6 and 7. 
69. S e e T . B . Freeman, 1843. 
70. H . W . Debrunner, 1967, p. 104. 
71. Testimony of the Reverend J. Beecham, Proceedings of the Special Committee on 
D r Madden's report, 1842, in G . Metcalfe (ed.), 1964, p. 176. 
72. J . G . Christaller, 1875, 1933. 
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plate 25.9 A Basel mission carpentry workshop in Christiansborg (Accra). Engraving from
a photographic original, probably ca. 1870
population, and in many instances survived within the new religions as
well.
Conclusion
On the whole, the peoples of the lands of the Niger Bend and the Volta
basin, thanks to their fratricidal internecine conflicts throughout the entire
nineteenth century, paved the way for aggression from without; indeed,
they invited such intervention on occasion to settle their differences. It
may be suggested, however, that the seeds of that process were present in
the economic contradictions touched offcenturies earlier by the slave trade.
Migrations and the settlement ofnew population groups, social tensions and
even political and religious expansion are intelligible only with reference to
this major phenomenon that had dominated the preceding centuries and
of which the nineteenth century was at once the paroxysm and the cul¬
mination. In that sense, here as elsewhere in Africa the nineteenth century
does indeed mark the end of a very long period.
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A.I .ASIWAJU 
The Mono-Niger area as the unit of analysis 
T h e area covered by this chapter is the region bounded in the west by the 
M o n o river (the present-day Benin-Togo border), in the east and north 
by the Niger and in the south by the Bight of Benin (Atlantic Ocean). It 
is mostly an undulating plain with a general rise from the coast towards 
the interior, where the highest altitudes are in the Atacora and Kukuru 
hills. T h e vegetation is, on the whole, open. T h e really dense rain-forest 
types are encountered principally in the south-east - that is in the area of 
the ancient Benin kingdom, n o w embraced within the Bendel state of 
Nigeria and to a lesser extent along the main river valleys. 
T h e area includes a substantial part of the famous 'gap' described in 
West African geography: the extension of the savanna belt of the western 
and central Sudanic zone through the forest zone to communicate directly 
with the sea. T h e whole of the ancient Fon kingdom of D a h o m e y and the 
western half of Yorubaland as well as Borgu are located within this 'gap'. 
Drainage is assured by several rivers, among them the Niger, the Benin, 
the Q w e n a , Osun, O g u n , Yewa, Werne (Ouémé on French maps), the 
Opara, the Zou and the M o n o . 
There are four main distinct, though evidently interrelated culture areas, 
comprising the Aja in the west, the Yoruba in the centre, the Borgu 
(pronounced Bohu) in the north and the E d o in the east. As is to be 
expected, each of these main culture areas is subdivided in terms of such 
sub-cultural traits as dialect, ecology and specific occupation. T h e Aja-
speaking peoples1 are in three principal sub-groups, made up of the Fon 
w h o dominated the ancient kingdom of Dahomey; the G u n of the Werne 
river valley and the Porto Novo-Badagry region astride the southern end 
of the present-day border between Nigeria and the People's Republic of 
Benin (former French Dahomey); and the E w e between the Cufo and 
M o n o rivers in the south-western parts of the Benin Republic with the 
bulk of their kinsmen in the adjacent areas of southern Togo and south-
i. A . I . Asiwaju, 1979. 
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eastern Ghana. North and east of the Fon, concentrated on the A g b o m e 
(Abomey) plateau are the M a h i in Paouignan, Savalu, Wese , Dassa-zoume, 
Jaluku and K o v e (Cové). This group also shares observable Aja sub-
cultural traits and memories of ancestral interconnections. 
T h e Yoruba (Nago in French ethnographic literature) culture area is by 
far the most extensive in the Mono-Niger region.2 It embraces the area of 
the present-day O g u n , Lagos Q y o , and O n d o states of Nigeria and nearly 
a half of Kwara State, as well as the adjacent parts of the eastern Benin 
Republic and central Togo further west. There are numerous sub-groups 
ranging from the small-size category, illustrated by the Ife, organized into 
a single kingdom, or the Ekiti type organized into several autonomous 
monarchies. Within the Nigerian region, the main Yoruba sub-groups are 
the Q y o (the most numerous single sub-group, with land and people shared 
between the O y o and Kwara states); Ibarapa astride the boundary between 
the O y o and O g u n states; the Ife and Ijesa located within O y o State; the 
Ijebu shared between the O g u n and Lagos states, the Egba and Egbado in 
O g u n State; the O n d o , Ikale, Ekiti, O w o and Akoko in O n d o State; and 
the Awori and related Egbado sub-groups in Lagos State. Straddling the 
Nigeria-Benin international boundary are, from north to south, the Sabe 
(Save), the Ketu, the Ohori (Holli), the Ifonyin and the Anago sub-groups. 
T o this already long list must be added the A n a , Fe (Ife) and Mayinbiri 
(Manigri) in the middle latitudes of the Benin Republic and the Atakpame 
area of Togo. 
Like Yorubaland, Borgu is today an internationally partitioned culture 
area.3 Busa and Illo (two of the three main traditional power centres) are 
situated mostly in the area of the present-day Borgu local government area 
of Kwara State and adjacent parts of the Sokoto State of Nigeria, 
while Nikki, the third and territorially the largest traditional state, was split 
by the present-day Nigeria-Benin border such that Nikki and the western 
half of the traditional state were located on the Benin side of the border 
and the rest of the area of the kingdom on what became the Nigerian side 
of the border. 
T h e sub-cultural divisions more or less reflect the traditional socio-
political sub-groupings and levels of differentiation. As Marjorie Stewart 
has correctly observed, Borgu emerged, presumably late in the fifteenth 
century, as a conglomerate of politically independent states with the main 
power centres in Busa, Nikki and Illo. T h e early formation of these states 
would appear to have resulted from the merger of an incoming group, most 
probably Mande-speaking from Mali, and some pre-existing people to 
form a new state and distinctive culture. This view has some support in 
the traditions of origin of the Borgu states and appears borne out by the 
fact that there are two major languages spoken in Borgu: Batonu (also 
2. D . Forde, 1951; J. Bertho, 1949; E . G . Parrinder, 1947, 1955; P. Mercier, 1950. 
3. O . Bagodo, 1979; M . Stewart, forthcoming 
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referred to variously as B a m b a , Bariba, Barba), a Voltaic language spoken 
by the vast majority of the masses, and Boko (also called Zugwenu) , a 
south-eastern division of the M a n d e languages spoken by the ruling class, 
or the Wasqngari. 
Each of these two main languages is divided into several distinct dialects. 
Boko, for example, is spoken in four main dialects; Boko-Busa (Bisagwe), 
spoken at Busa and W a w a ; Boko-Nikki in Nikki, Segbana and Kandi in the 
Benin Republic and Nikki-related chiefdoms such as Yeshikera, Kaiama, 
Sandiru, Ilesa Bariba, Aliyara and Okuta in Nigeria; and Tienga or Kienga 
spoken in Illo, Dekala and northern Aliyara District. T h e linguistic unity 
of Borgu is achieved through bilingualism, which bridges the gap between 
the masses and their traditional ruling classes. T h e cultural unity, indicated 
in language use, is cemented by the traditions of c o m m o n origin of the 
kingdoms and the c o m m o n acknowledgement of Busa as the ancestral h o m e 
of all Borgu rulers. 
T h e fourth major culture area of the region is that of the Edo-speaking 
people of the Benin kingdom.4 These include not only the E d o of Benin 
City and metropolitan area. There are also the linguistically and historically 
related Ishan (Esan) Ivbiosakan and Akoko E d o in the north and the 
Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko to the south and south-east. 
These four major culture areas were not isolated zones. Indeed, by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the extent of the cultural or ethnic 
interpénétrations had been such as to indicate the evolution of a single 
discernible culture complex of which the Yoruba, the Aja, the Borgu and 
the E d o can be regarded as sub-systems. Quite apart from the ideology of 
unity, emphasized in traditions of c o m m o n origin, which seeks to link at 
least the traditional ruling classes in the four cultural sub-units, there were 
observable linguistic and other cultural as well as economic and political 
factors of inter-group relations in the region concerned. These linkages, 
emphasized in several studies,5 point to successive migrations and resultant 
population movements and counter-movements which continued into the 
nineteenth century until formally discouraged by the establishment of 
territorially structured European colonial states characterized by exclusive 
borders. T h e history of the region from the M o n o to the Niger is therefore 
best conceived as an account of the interpénétration, not only between and 
a m o n g the Aja, the Yoruba, the Bariba and the E d o , but also between them 
individually and severally and such neighbours as the N u p e , the Jukun, 
the Kanuri, the Gbari, the Hausa and the Fulbe (Fulani) to the north; the 
E w e , the G a , the Adangbe, the Krobo and the Fante to the west; and the 
4. R . E . Bradbury, 1957; A . F . C . Ryder, 1969. 
5. T h e Kisra traditions of origin link the Yoruba with Borgu, Ife is the accepted ancestral 
home of all Yoruba and Benin monarchs, and the Aja also claim remote origin from Ife. 
See F . de Medeiros, 1984; I. A . Akinjogbin and G . O . Ekemode (eds), 1976. 
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Ijo, the Itsekiri, the Isoko, the Urhobo, the western Igbo, the Igala, the 
Igbira and the Basa to the east. 
The collapse of Old Oyó 
In c. 1800, the most important single power and the one that held sway 
over most of the lands and peoples of the Mono-Niger region was the Old 
O y o empire.6 While the core area of this renowned Yoruba state hardly 
extended beyond localities situated between the Osun and O g u n river 
basins, the territory from within which tribute came and over which 
discernible military, political, economic and cultural influence or control 
of varying degrees was exercised was approximately the western half of the 
area covered by this chapter. 
In the extreme west, the Aja state of D a h o m e y was reduced to tributary 
status in 1748 after a series of O y o attacks from c. 1740, and it remained 
so until the early 1820s; Porto N o v o had been similarly reduced w h e n it 
was secured by O y o as its main port for the export trade in slaves.7 T h e 
route linking this port and O y o ran through the areas of the Egba and 
Egbado sub-groups of the Yoruba w h o had to be controlled by O y o imperial 
authorities through the posting of O y o state officials (ajele) to such strategic 
Egbado settlements as Ilaro and, later, Ijanna. Culturally and economically, 
the Egba and Egbado areas were also intensely penetrated by the O y o : there 
were O y o settler colonies and O y o traders actively engaged in commercial 
activities in the area.8 Ketu and Sabe, two other major Yoruba sub-groups 
and states in the west, preserved traditions of political autonomy, but they 
also maintained cordial relations with O y o and benefited from the overall 
protective influence of the empire. Eastern Borgu, like the south-western 
parts of N u p e , equally acknowledged the authority of the alafin (king and 
emperor) of O y o . In all of these areas, which fell within the geographical 
'gap' mentioned above, O y o cavalry could operate because of the relatively 
open country, and O y o agents evidently enjoyed relatively easy access and 
communication. 
T h e rest of our area, the eastern half, was located within the tropical 
forest region. In part this comprised the remainder of the Yoruba culture 
area, the Ife and Ijesa in the centre; the Ekiti, O n d o , Akoko and O w o in 
the east; the Ijebu, Ikale, Okiti-pupa and Awori to the south. There was 
also, however, Benin kingdom, the other major African state in the area 
under study, which rivalled O y o in terms of the extent of its hegemony 
and sheer splendour. But, even here, evidence of vital connections with 
O y o is substantial. 
There are indications of a more or less continuous involvement of O y o 
6. R. C . C . Law, 1977. 
7. P . Morton-Williams, 1964. 
8. H . Clapperton, 1829; R . Lander, 1830. 
704 
Dahomey, Yorubaland, Borgu and Benin
plate 26.2 The Gateway of the Ijebu Yoruba town of Ipara, c. 1855. (Church mission of
Gleaver 1855)
in the history of Ife, Ijesa, Ekiti, Ondo and Ijebu. In addition to traditions
recorded by Samuel Johnson,9 there is the view expressed by S. A. Akintoye
that 'at various times and to varying degrees, the Ekiti, Ijesa and Igbomina
also came under Oyo influence'.10 While there is no evidence to support
Peter Morton-Williams's suggestion that the Ekiti, Ijesa and Akoko might
have served as 'slave reservoirs' for the Oyo empire,11 there are convincing
proofs of Oyo military pressures on the Ijesa which the Ijesa successfully
repulsed. The foundation of Ede by Oyo and of Osogbo by the Ijesa has
been explained in terms of the need for the two Yoruba states to establish
military outposts to keep a watch on each other. The subsequent relations
between these two neighbouring communities constituted a measure of the
eventual interpénétration of the two Yoruba sub-cultures.
Oyo-Benin relations are even more impressively recorded.12 The ruling
dynasties in both claim common origin not only from Ife but even from
the same founder, Oranyan. Both, therefore, maintained ritual links with
Ife. This fraternal feeling would appear to have been sustained by the
minimal opportunities for friction between the two states; Oyo power was
9. S. Johnson, 1921.
10. S.A. Akintoye, 1971, pp. 29-30.
11. ibid., P. Morton-Williams, 1964.
12. J. F. A. Ajayi in J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds), 1974.
70S
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
based on cavalry forces and confined more or less to the relatively open 
country to the west and north-west of the area under study, while Benin 
military tactics were only suited to operations in the proverbial 'evergreen 
forest' of the eastern half. Because of this difference in ecology, the trading 
activities of the two states were also complementary. 
T h e main point of outlining these details is to make it clear that Old 
O y o was so m u c h at the centre of the history of the entire region from the 
M o n o to the Niger that its collapse in the third decade of the nineteenth 
century was bound to produce socio-political vibrations not just in 
Yorubaland but also in D a h o m e y , Borgu and in the area of the Benin king-
d o m . As J. F . A . Ajayi put it, the 'collapse of the Old O y o empire . . . 
had important consequences for the Aja-speaking peoples to the west as 
well as for the Benin empire to the east.'13 It marked the beginning of a 
more or less continuous period of warfare and generalized insecurity in the 
region under review. T h e inevitable adverse effects on European trade along 
the coast of the Bight of Benin created local conditions favourable to 
rival interventions by Britain, France and, eventually, G e r m a n y in the 
politics of the region. 
It is impossible and perhaps unnecessary14 to recount here details of the 
collapse of the O y o empire. Suffice it to point out that as in the case of 
other similarly well-established and long-lived states, this was not a sudden 
affair. T h e signs of decline were already visible in the eighteenth century; 
and they steadily intensified in the first two decades of the nineteenth. 
Internal factors which manifested themselves so clearly in the struggle 
for power between successive alafins and the lineage chiefs, beginning in 
the second half of the eighteenth century, became progressively complicated 
by the effects of externally based stimuli deriving from the decline of the 
overseas slave trade and, more significantly,the southward extension of the 
djihäd of ' U t h m a n dan Fodio. 
Already m the eighteenth century, paradoxically also the era of Qyo's 
greatest expansion and the zenith of its power, the empire had begun to 
show itself to be a deteriorating structure and militarily and territorially 
vulnerable. T h e rebellion which the Egba successfully staged under Lisabi, 
their legendary hero, in c. 1774, was followed by the defeat of the O y o 
army by Borgu and N u p e in 1783 and 1791 respectively. T h e collapse of 
the empire in c. 1835 followed a period of complete deterioration of the 
internal political situation featuring a series of short-lived and largely 
unsuccessful alafins including Aole and M a k u and ending in a protracted 
interregnum of close to two decades. 
T h e revolt of Afonja, the are-qna-hakanfo, or commander-in-chief of 
13. J. F . A . Ajayi, p. 129. 
14. For further details see J . F . A . Ajayi, 1974; R . L a w , 1977; J .F . A . Ajayi and S . A . 
Akintoye, 1980; I .A. Akinjogbin, 1965. 
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the O y o army, w h o with the assistance of the Muslims among the O y o 
Yoruba tried to declare himself an independent ruler at llorín, ushered in 
the last phase. T h e Djama'a, the troops that Afonja's Yoruba Muslim 
supporters gathered in his support soon became a force beyond his o w n 
control. Al-Sälih Alimi, the Fulbe itinerant Muslim teacher and mystic 
w h o m Afonja had allied with to prosecute his successful revolt against the 
alafin's authority, gained control of the Djama'a and Afonja was eventually 
liquidated by the force. It was Alimi's son and successor, Abdul Salaam, 
w h o established Ilorin's independence vis-à-vis Q y o . After he had obtained 
the blessing of the Sokoto caliphate and become the first amir of llorín, he 
turned llorín from its former status as 'a rebellious province of O y o into 
a frontier post of the Fulani jihad.'15 
T h e effects of the collapse of Oyo were felt most sharply in the western 
half of the area, where the impact of the empire had been greatest and 
most direct. In the main there was a situation of generalized warfare and 
attendant insecurity for more or less the whole of the remainder of the 
century. This had the ultimate effect of disrupting trade on the coast and 
encouraging the intervention of Europeans in the politics of the interior. 
Here again, this is an aspect of history that has been well researched and 
for which there are readily available publications. W h a t is required here, 
therefore, is a summary. 
T h e djihâd of ' U t h m a n dan Fodio, which was extended to llorín as a 
result ofthe crisis in Old Q y o , spread in other directions, including Borgu 
and the closely related north-western Yoruba state of Sabe and the adjacent 
Aja-speaking area.16 There are also indications of raiding activities in 
northern Egbado communities by elements locally perceived as supporters 
of the Fulbe djihad}1 T h e Fulbe menace produced a situation in which 
the Borgu states characteristically closed ranks against c o m m o n external 
enemies. A n alliance between Borgu and O y o resulted in a desperate but 
ill-fated attempt to confront the Fulbe in the Eleduwe W a r of 1836. 
T h e threat of continued expansion of the Sokoto caliphate into central 
Yorubaland south of llorín was not stemmed until its decisive defeat at 
Osogbo in 1840. 
More devastating, however, than these djihâd wars were the ones that 
the Yoruba fought among themselves. These m a y be subdivided into three 
major phases; the O w u W a r off. 1820-5, trie Ijaye W a r of 1860-5, and the 
sixteen-year Ekitiparapo or Kiriji W a r of 1877-93.18 T h e O w u W a r was 
principally a conflict over the control of A p o m u market between the Ife 
allied with Ijebu on the one hand and the O w u allegedly supported by 
their Egba neighbours on the other. T h e Ife-Ijebu allies were assisted by 
15. J. F . A . Ajayi, 1974, p. 144. 
16. D . Ross, 1967. 
17. A . I. Asiwaju, 1976. 
18. J. F . A . Ajayi and R . S. Smith, 1964; S. A . Akintoye, 1971; B . A w e , 1964. 
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Oyo warriors who formed part of the large number of refugees who had
been moving southwards following the troubles in Old Oyo.
The Owu war led to the destruction of Owu and the displacement of
the entire original Egba communities from the historical Egba forest to
plate 26.3 A view oflbadan in 1854 with the Church Missionary Society compound in the
foreground
territories to the south and west. The foundation of Ibadan as a camp
dominated by the victorious warriors at Owu in c. 1829 and of Abeokuta
as an Egba refugee camp in c. 1830 has been credited to the aftermath of this
war. The establishment of Ijaye under Kurumi and the re-establishment of
the Oyo empire with a new capital at Agp-Oja (the present-day Oyo, some
50 km north oflbadan) by Alafin Atiba were also events of the late 1820s
and early 1830s. The new settlements rapidly grew into new power bases
in Yorubaland, each vying for recognition and succession to the political
leadership which had been rendered vacant, as it were, by the disappearance
of Old Oyo. The Ijaye War, a contest mainly between Ijaye allied with
Abeokuta on the one hand and Ibadan on the other is best understood as
a major example of this struggle for leadership. Although the destruction
of Ijaye in 1862 marked the climax, the ripple effects continued until the
final battles in Ikorodu in 1865.19 The Ekitiparapo, as the name denotes,
was a grand anti-Ibadan alliance of the Ekiti, the Ijesa and the Igbomina,
whom Ibadan had conquered and integrated into its emergent empire
following the victory over Ijaye.20
19. J. F. A. Ajayi and R. S. Smith, 1964, p. 120.
20. B. Awe, 1964.
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T h e rise of D a h o m e y as an autonomous kingdom in the early 1820s and, 
thereafter, its frequent incursions into Yorubaland in the remaining years 
of the nineteenth century up to the French conquest in 1892 were all direct 
effects of the disappearance of Old Qyo . 2 1 With an area of jurisdiction 
extending from the Werne river in the east to the Cufo river in the west 
and from the Atlantic Ocean to latitude 7°N, the kingdom of D a h o m e y in 
c. 1800 approximated to the southern third of the present-day People's 
Republic of Benin. 
Although independence from O y o had been the policy of all D a h o m e y 
monarchs, beginning with Kpengla (1774-89), it was not until the opening 
years of the reign of Gezo (1818-58) that the O y o imperial yoke was 
repudiated. In spite of occasional disruptions and violence in the A g b o m e 
court, as can be illustrated by the regicide of Agonglo (Kpengla's son and 
successor) in 1797 and the deposition of Adandozan (1797-1818) in favour 
of Gezo (his junior brother), D a h o m e y in contrast to Old O y o in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was remarkable for the appreciably 
long reigns of its kings. 
Political stability was further guaranteed by the successful operation of 
the highly centralized administration for which the kingdom is well known. 
T h e European anti-slave trade movement hit the state's economy, based 
as it was almost solely on the slave trade. However, Gezo's economic policy 
was to continue to respond to the demand for slaves from Portuguese 
dealers while at the same time responding to the stimulus of the export 
trade in palm oil as the ultimate substitute for slave exports.22 These signs 
of the relative political and economic strength of D a h o m e y were becoming 
visible at the same time as symptoms of advanced decline were becoming 
increasingly apparent in Old Q y o . It was the combination of these factors 
that ostensibly encouraged Gezo to stage a unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence in the early 1820s. 
It has been customary to state that O y o responded to this development 
by sending an expeditionary force under one Balogun Ajanaku but that the 
O y o army was routed by D a h o m e y . T h e truth, rather, seems to be that 
Q y o in the 1820s was hardly in any position to send any worthwhile army 
to deal with a rebellion in a place as distant as D a h o m e y . Research has, in 
fact, shown that rather than being an official O y o army, the force that 
Ajanaku led against D a h o m e y in the early 1820s was more probably a joint 
Sabe-Ketu affair.23 It was m a d e up of Yoruba and M a h i troops and Ajanaku 
himself, although often described as a balogun (warlord) of Q y o , has been 
more reliably reported by local F o n traditions to have been an indigene of 
Sabe. This military initiative fell within the familiar pattern of military 
21. D . Ross, 1967; K . Folayan, 1967; S . O . Biobaku, 1957. 
22. For a recent study of the economic policy of the autonomous kingdom of Dahomey, 
see E . Soumoni, 1983. 
23. D . Ross, 1967, pp. 37-40. 
709 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
alliances which Yoruba and related communities, w h o had enjoyed the 
protection of Old O y o vis-à-vis D a h o m e y , came to form to defend them-
selves and conduct pre-emptive attacks against their c o m m o n enemy once 
O y o was no more.2 4 In any case, Ajanaku's m e n were defeated and he 
himself was captured and executed by Gezo. 
Thus began the series of systematic invasions of Yorubaland by D a h o m e y . 
Motivated by considerations of state security and by the insatiable demand 
for slaves for export, for labour for both cash crop and subsistence agri-
culture for the state and for the purpose of h u m a n sacrifice at the well-
known annual customs, the invasion affected not only the Yoruba west of 
the O g u n river. Equally affected were the Aja and M a n h i communities and 
states east of the Werne river, including Porto Novo. 2 5 
While the invasion of the Mahi immediately north of A g b o m e and of 
Porto Novo in the south-east was carried out in the 1820s, in the 1830s 
the concentration was on such Egbado towns as Ijanna and Refurefu, which 
were razed to the ground in 1831 and 1836 respectively. Ijanna, as noted 
above, was the residence of the O y o imperial agent and the main centre 
for collecting and forwarding tributes from the Egbado and neighbouring 
area. In the 1840s and again in the 1880s, Okeodan and Sabe were ravaged. 
Also in the latter decade, the kingdom of Ketu, which began to be harassed 
in the late 1870s, was finally destroyed in 1886, four years after Imeko, the 
one other major town within the kingdom, had been burnt down. 
In the 1850s and 1860s, an important target was the new Egba-Yoruba 
state of Abeokuta whose rise was viewed in A g b o m e as a threat to the 
independence of D a h o m e y . This danger became real with Egba military 
activities and associated political expansion into the areas of western Yoru-
baland where D a h o m e y was also conducting its raids. T h e clash between 
the two in the Awori town of A d o - O d o in 1844 and the eventual defeat of 
D a h o m e y , sowed the seeds of future acrimony between the two. Although 
the two direct attacks that D a h o m e y conducted against Abeokuta in 1851 
and 1864 met with resounding failure, the punitive expedition against 
Egbado allies of the Egba led to the destruction of Isaga in 1862 and the 
attendant devastation of the surrounding area. Dahomeyan raids against 
the Yoruba in the upper reaches of the O g u n river continued into the late 
i88os and early 1890s and were, in fact, not terminated until the defeat of 
the Fon kingdom by the French in 1892. 
T h e D a h o m e y wars of the nineteenth century, like the other wars of the 
period, were not necessarily inter-ethnic conflicts. This point is easily 
proved not only by the D a h o m e y invasion of Aja communities in the Werne 
river valley but also by the devastating war against Porto Novo in the late 
1880s and early 1890s following the breakdown of an accord that was 
24. Other similar alliances in the nineteenth century included the one between Ketu 
and Ohori, and between Okeodan and Ipokia. See A.I . Asiwaju, 1976. 
25. A . I. Asiwaju, 1979; T . Moulero, 1966. 
71O 
Dahomey, Yorubaland, Borgu and Benin 
reached shortly after the invasions of the 1820s and that had for decades 
thereafter guaranteed peaceful relations between the two Aja states and 
their satellites. 
T h e nineteenth-century wars in the western half of the area from the 
M o n o to the Niger produced far-reaching population shifts and d e m o -
graphic changes. First was the massive enslavement and shipment of 
Yoruba and related Aja populations to the Americas and, when intercepted 
by anti-slavery squadrons, Sierra Leone. Within the affected West African 
localities themselves, socio-political changes of revolutionary character also 
took place, occasioned by the massive movements of population.26 In 
Yorubaland, the wars led to large-scale destruction of pre-nineteenth 
century settlements, the foundation of a whole series of new towns and 
considerable enlargement of existing ones. In the area of Old Q y o , which 
exemplified the huge loss of population involved, established towns includ-
ing the ancient O y o city itself, Igboho, Ikoyi, Igbon, Iresa and Oje were 
destroyed. Beyond that, other Yoruba towns destroyed included Sabe, 
Ketu, O w u and a whole series of Egba and related R e m o communities. 
This created the phenomenon of 'ruined cities' noted by travellers in 
nineteenth-century Yorubaland. There was a general movement of popu-
lation from the troubled interior in the north towards the south. N e w 
settlements included Ibadan, Abeokuta, Sagamu, O k e - O d a n and Aiyede. 
T h e coast and its immediate hinterland, which in c. 1800 was generally 
sparsely populated, became an area of teeming population at the close of 
the period. 
In the Aja-speaking area, the general direction of population movement 
was south-eastward. In the nineteenth century, Aja refugees from the 
Werne river valley and the Porto N o v o region swelled the ranks of related 
communities that had earlier settled in the adjacent parts of the present-
day Lagos State and O g u n State of Nigeria following the D a h o m e y a n 
conquest of the coastal Aja states of Aliada and W h y d a h in 1724 and 1727 
respectively.27 This extension of the Aja culture area eastwards was a 
significant contribution of the nineteenth-century wars to ethnic inter-
penetration in the area under study. 
T h e wars and their social effects culminated in the development of a 
n e w society; and this gave rise to the need to fashion new methods and 
styles of government. T h e new situation m a d e for the emergence of warriors 
as the dominant class and the eclipsing of the pre-existing monarchical 
class. This is particularly true of the Yoruba area where the obas lost control 
to the baloguns or warlords. T h e experiments with military dictatorship in 
Ijaiye under K u r u m i , federalism in Abeokuta under Sodeke and con-
stitutional monarchy in Epe under Kosoko illustrate the efforts in nine-
teenth-century Yorubaland to fashion n ew constitutions appropriate for 
26. P . Verger, 1955, pp. 3-11; C . Fyfe, 1962, pp. 292-3. 
27. A . I. Asiwaju, 1979. 
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the political management of the new society generated by the wars.28 T h e 
eventual adoption in the twentieth century of the Yoruba-style gba-ship 
institution by some of the Aja communities within the Nigerian region 
exemplified the continuing nature of this cultural adaptation process.29 
The decline of the Benin kingdom 
Because of the unique strength of its monarchy and the resistance of its 
centralized institutions, Benin was spared the Q y o experience of actual 
collapse before the era of European conquest. However, the kingdom could 
not be said to have escaped the destructive influences of the nineteenth 
century.30 
B y c. 1800 the kingdom consisted of the area approximating more or less 
to the eastern half of the Mono-Niger region east of a line drawn north-
south from Otun in Ekiti to the coast. T h e area embraced the eastern 
Yoruba states of Ekiti, O n d o and Q w o , the western Igbo communities west 
of the Niger delta; the Urhobo, Itsekiri and the Ijo in the south. Although 
the E d o of Benin City and the metropolitan area constituted the core of 
the kingdom, the other Edo-speaking peoples such as the Esan and the 
northern E d o in the north-east and the Urhobo and Isoko to the south-
east m a y be considered the immediate outer ring of the area of jurisdiction 
of the Bini monarch. Further afield, Benin influence, if not suzerainty, was 
acknowledged all along the Atlantic coast as far west as Lagos and beyond. 
A s with the Itsekiri, there was a widely acknowledged dynastic relationship 
between Benin and the ruling elites in most Awori-Yoruba and related 
Anago chiefdoms where (as in Ekiti, O w o and O n d o ) there is still visible 
evidence of the Benin impact on titles and court ceremonials.31 
Benin is usually portrayed as having been in continuous decline in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, while recent research has 
shown that this decline was far from being continuous and was often 
punctuated by periods of revival and territorial expansion, there seems 
little doubt that in the three or four decades immediately preceding the 
loss of independence, the Benin kingdom underwent radical contraction 
because of a three-sided assault on its territory. T h e Fulbe djihad, which 
had knocked Old O y o off its feet, also penetrated the northern and north-
eastern part of the Benin kingdom. While the Fulbe, based in N u p e , forced 
such northern E d o groups as the Esan and Ivbiosakon to pay tribute to 
the emir of Bida and to be accessible for Islamic proselytization, the 
Djama'a from llorín raided into the northern Ekiti states. T h e Fulbe 
menace was aggravated by the eastward expansion of Ibadan, whose wars 
of conquest were again carried into the Benin domains in eastern Yoru-
28. G . O . Oguntomisin, 1979; J. A . Atanda, 1984. 
29. A . I . Asiwaju, 1979, pp.22-3. 
30. R . E . Bradbury, 1967; O . Ikime, 1980b. 
31. A . I. Asiwaju, 1976, pp. 18-19. 
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plate 26.4 Shrine altar in the king's compound, Benin
baland. The fact that Benin was unable to send assistance to these harassed
vassal states was demonstration enough of the evil days that had beset this
famous West African forest state.
Finally, there was the menace posed by European penetration, both
through Lagos, the most important centre in the area of Benin influence
along the coast, and up the Niger river in the south-east. The Benin
kingdom began to feel the embarrassment of this development when its
trading privileges in the coastal trade, especially its control over the com¬
merce on the Benin river in the western Niger delta, came to be challenged
by European traders, mostly British, and the African middlemen, especially
the Itsekiri and the Ijo. The eclipse of the Benin port of Ughoton dem¬
onstrated quite painfully to Benin that the days of its near monopoly of
coastal trade had ended.
The coastal trade encouraged the spirit of political autonomy among the
Itsekiri. This eventually led to a situation of war between the Olu of Warri
and the qba of Benin, and the new wealth also nourished political conflicts
within the Warri kingdom itself. There was, for example, so much rivalry
and acrimony, so many succession disputes, protest migrations and the
setting up of autonomous and rival power centres that for the rest of the
century no generally acceptable successor could be found for the stool of
the Olu of Warri when Akengbua, the incumbent from 1809, died in 1848.
As with the Itsekiri kingdom, Agbor, whose monarchy had also been
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organized on the Benin model and operated as a Benin dependency, grew
steadily into an autonomous state again largely under the influence of the
new coastal trade. Ovonramwen, the last Oba of independent Benin,
was determined to reinvigorate the kingdom and this policy included an
expedition against Agbor with a view to re-asserting Benin authority there.
The effort was, however, belated; the Benin expeditionary force against
Agbor was just taking position at Obadan when the British expeditionary
force against Benin itself was reported to be nearing the gate of the capital
in 1897.32
plate 26.5 A view ofBenin city at the time of the British invasion, 1897
While the kingdom faced assaults from outside, the metropolis itself was
far from calm. The obaship experienced considerable instability largely as
a result of succession disputes. Although Oba Osemwede, who died in
1 85 1, was succeeded by Adolo, this was not before the eruption of a violent
succession scuffle. The intensification of human sacrifice in Benin City
from the late 1880s has been interpreted by some as evidence of the
desperation of the rulers seeking ritual solution to the political problem of
an imminent collapse. Oba Ovonranwen is reported to have faced the active
opposition of Orokhorho, his own brother, and such leading chiefs as the
Eriko, Oburaye, Obazelu and Osia. These chiefs had to be executed as part
of the oba's determination to strengthen his own position and achieve a
revival of the kingdom. The anti-European mood in Benin in the 1890s
32. O. Ikime, 1980b.
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before the British conquest must be measured against this desperate internal 
situation. 
T h e growth of European interest 
In discussing the growth of European interest in the area of West Africa 
under review, it is useful to distinguish between two phases: that of freedom 
of movement for the European powers involved up to 1861 w h e n Lagos 
was annexed to the British C r o w n , and the succeeding era of international 
rivalry between France and Britain with G e r m a n y entering the competition 
in the 1880s. This latter phase terminated only with the partition of the 
area between Britain and France in 1889. In all this, however, the point to 
emphasize is that the pattern of European activities at any particular time 
in the region was as m u c h in response to the European metropolitan 
demands as to the stimulus of the local situation. 
In the earlier phase European traders, explorers or travellers and Chris-
tian missionaries operated in Africa without m u c h concern for the national 
identities of the individual agents. A famous G e r m a n explorer like Heinrich 
Barth served 'an official British expedition', while a British explorer of the 
calibre of H . M . Stanley was in the service of King Leopold of Belgium. 
Major Christian missionary bodies such as the Church Missionary Society 
( C M S ) of the Church of England and the Lyons-based Société des Missions 
Africaines ( S M A ) of the R o m a n Catholic Church each employed a mix of 
European nationals. Father Boghero, w h o led the S M A in an effort to re-
introduce R o m a n Catholic Christianity to West Africa in the nineteenth 
century, was an Italian. T h e pioneer S M A Fathers in most parts of the 
area which became Nigeria were French, just as it was such British 
missionaries as T h o m a s Birch Freeman of the Methodists and Samuel 
Ajayi Crowther of the C M S w h o pioneered the work of Christian missions 
in what was to become French D a h o m e y (present-day People's Republic of 
Benin).33 British, French, G e r m a n and Portuguese traders set up businesses 
adjacent to one another and, as the case of Badagry clearly demonstrated, 
there were residential quarters for diverse European nationals in the major 
ports all along the coast of the Bight of Benin. 
Traders moved back and forth between the coastal ports in search of the 
most favourable terms of trade, and according to the varying fortunes of 
the ports and the states whose economies came to depend increasingly on 
the coastal trade. 
This flexibility in the composition and activities of the different categories 
of Europeans harmonized with a similar flexibility in the pre-existing local 
African situation characterized, as w e have seen, more by a historically and 
culturally interlocking pattern and networks than by any rigidly structured 
33. A. O . Makozi and G . J. A . Ojo, 1982; E . G . Parrinder, 1967. 
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differentiations. T h e movement of European traders, travellers and 
missionaries was dictated largely by the abolitionist movement. 
It was realized that the slave trade could only be effectively stopped at 
the source of supply in the African interior. European exploration of 
the interior, illustrated in the area under study by the works of M u n g o 
Park, H u g h Clapperton and the Lander brothers, was aimed at collecting 
both scientific and intelligence information primarily for the use of 
the abolitionist movement. Missionaries normally followed or accom-
panied the explorers for the same reason. O f course, the n e w trend was 
also influenced by the ambition of European traders to reach interior 
markets directly rather than continue to treat with the middlemen along 
the coast. 
All these European activities had to reckon with the local African 
situation in which they operated. T h e European explorers, missionaries 
and traders were obliged to operate within the pre-existing transportation 
and communication systems, and the pattern of geographical and eth-
nographical inter-relationships. M u n g o Park met his death in a canoe 
accident on the Niger, an age-old traditional transportation system, on the 
rapids at a point near Busa in Borgu. In their search for the source of the 
Niger river H u g h Clapperton and the Landers used an ancient overland 
route that connected different sub-groups of the Yoruba and their Aja-
speaking neighbours. This route also linked Yorubaland with Borgu, H a u -
saland, Borno and beyond. T h e Christian missionary journeys across the 
wide expanse of Yorubaland from north to south and east to west and 
between Yorubaland and D a h o m e y were m a d e possible because the necess-
ary interconnecting routes already existed. 
Because the lands and peoples were so interwoven, developments in 
one part always had effects and implications in other parts. European 
abolitionists found, for example, that to stop the slave trade and the wars 
in the interior, they had to reckon not just with the coastal rulers but also 
with the different power bases in the interior. Both British and French 
abolitionist missions from different parts of the Lower Guinea coast 
commonly had to visit D a h o m e y kings at A g b o m e in the first half of 
the century. T o mediate in the D a h o m e y - Y o r u b a wars, visits had 
to be arranged to both Abeokuta and A g b o m e . Similarly, British peace-
makers involved in resolving aspects of nineteenth-century Yoruba warfare 
had to travel virtually throughout the length and breadth of the culture 
area. 
Unfortunately, the European approach was divisive, tending towards 
politically structured differentiation. This was already noticeable in the late 
1840s and early 1850s. T h e appointment in 1849 of John Beecroft as British 
Consul for the Bights of Benin and Bonny (formerly Biafra) signalled the 
d a w n of a new era. British interests came to be specifically protected vis-
à-vis the interest of other European nationals; British interests were also 
advanced against those of Africans. W e have already drawn attention to 
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the penetration of the Benin kingdom from the Niger delta and the resultant 
whittling d o w n of Benin's trading hinterland to the extent of the eventual 
abandonment of Ughoton, Benin's traditional port. Further west, suspicion 
of British political intentions grew in 1851 when Lagos was bombarded by 
the anti-slave trade squadron. 
T h e events that marked the real turning point, however, were the formal 
annexation of Lagos to the British C r o w n in 1861 and a British naval action 
against Porto N o v o later the same year.34 These two British actions naturally 
sensitized the French, w h o had considerable commercial interests in 
W h y d a h and Porto N o v o . Encouraged by Porto N o v o itself, a French 
protectorate was declared over this coastal Aja state in 1863 to check further 
British advance along the coast to the west. Both the British and the French 
soon discovered the obvious: that the real value of Lagos or Porto N o v o 
was to be measured in terms of the trade with the hinterland in the Yoruba 
and Aja interior which the two ports shared. This involvement of both 
Britain and France in the trade and politics of Lagos and Porto N o v o 
respectively sparked off a spell of dramatic rivalry between the two powers 
in a bid to control Yorubaland, especially the western parts, and the 
adjacent Aja-speaking communities. In this Anglo-French rivalry, western 
Yorubaland became the main theatre because of the positive response of 
the local peoples, w h o saw in the European interventions the solution to 
the problem of the continuous invasion of their area by their more powerful 
neighbours. 
T h u s as early as the 1860s, at a time when the French and British 
governments were generally opposed to colonial acquisitions in Africa, the 
special circumstances of this particular African locality had already involved 
the two most active European nations in a struggle for territorial possession. 
T h e Anglo-French convention of August 1863 actually agreed on a partition 
of the area between the two powers, with the Y e w a river, about 20 k m west 
of what became the border in 1889, as the agreed boundary. T h e French 
and British declarations of protectorates in the area between 1862 and 1863 
did not enjoy official ratification and had to be abandoned in the 1870s. 
But the struggle was resumed again in the 1880s, partly because of the 
entry of Germany into the race and partly because of renewed invasions 
by D a h o m e y which increased the determination of the rulers of Porto N o v o 
and the states of western Yorubaland to seek protection from the French 
or the British. T h e French conquest of D a h o m e y in 1892, the Anglo-
French Partition of Borgu in 1895, the extension of British rule over the 
rest of Yorubaland and their conquest of Benin in 1897 must be seen as 
the logical conclusion of the Anglo-French rivalry of the 1860s, itself 
provoked by the pre-existing unities of the hinterland of the ports the 
European powers tried to control on the coast. 
34. C . W . Newbury, 1961; A . I. Asiwaju, 1976. 
717 
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s 
Socio-economic change and institutional adaptation 
In spite of their dramatic character, the wars of the nineteenth century and 
the resultant European intervention in the politics of the Mono-Niger 
region must not be stressed at the expense of the more far-reaching though 
subtle changes going on within the societies themselves. First were the 
effects of the massive population movements, both within and beyond the 
region, to which w e have drawn attention. T h e forced migrations furthered 
the interpénétration and mixing of the ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. They 
led to the growth of new settlements within the region as well as an 
increased influx of slaves and the resultant rise in the population of Africans 
in the Americas notably in Bahia in Brazil. This influx of slaves from this 
region into the N e w World eventually became an important factor in 
modernizing the Mono-Niger area when the 'Saros' and 'Amaros' (Bra-
zilians) returned and Christian missionaries arrived. 
A s noted above, there was a marked west-east trend in the migration of 
Aja-speaking peoples, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century 
when D a h o m e y renewed its invasion of G u n and Yoruba states and 
communities east of the Werne river valley. This led not only to an increase 
in the size of existing eastern Aja settlements such as Badagry, Ajido and 
Koga; it also brought about the creation of numerous new settlements in 
the western and south-western parts of the area of the present-day Lagos 
State and O g u n State of Nigeria.35 
A similar colonization movement was in evidence further east. In Yoru-
baland, for example, there was a remarkable interpénétration and mixing 
of the several sub-ethnic groups. Here the most spectacular effect was 
produced by the O y o , whose diaspora began in the first two decades of the 
century when the forces of instability were unleashed on the capital of the 
old empire. B y 1830, the main centres in which O y o migrants settled 
had included Ibadan, Ijaye and present-day O y o town, north of Ibadan. 
However, it was Ibadan imperialist expansion between the 1840s and 1860s 
that led to the full flowering of the O y o diaspora. As a result, several O y o 
communities moving in from the north-west were established among the 
Igbomina, Ijesa, Ekiti, Akoko, O n d o , Ikale and Ilaje sub-culture areas of 
eastern and south-eastern Yorubaland.36 Conversely, eastern Yoruba 
groups such as the Ekiti and Ijeça came as captives or freedmen to Ibadan 
and several other settlements in Osun, Ijebu and the Egba areas in the west 
and south. In Borgu the Fulbe djihäd brought about a population movement 
southwards into the Yoruba culture area comparable with that of the late 
sixteenth century when the fall of Songhay caused a similar pressure by 
the M a n d e from the north.37 T h e nineteenth-century movements streng-
35. A . I. Asiwaju, 1979. 
36. S . A . Akintoye, 1971, pp. 213fr. 
37. T . Moulero, 1964; A . I. Asiwaju, 1973. 
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thened the existing network of interpénétration between Borgu and such 
north-western Yoruba communities as the O y ó , Sabe and Ketu. 
T h e mixing of ethnic and sub-ethnic groups resulted in considerable 
mutual exchange of ideas and material culture. W e have already observed 
that the twentieth-century development that allowed the Aja in the area of 
the present-day Badagry local government area of Lagos State in Nigeria 
to adopt the Yoruba oba-ship institution must be traced to the nineteenth-
century and pre-nineteenth century migrations and resultant adoption of 
Yoruba institutions by the Aja. Similarly, O y o cultural influences found 
in eastern Yorubaland — worship of Sango, the spread of the men's loom, 
shoulder sling drums — must be considered not so m u c h as evidence of 
O y o hegemony before 1800 as of the nineteenth-century diaspora of the 
O y o following the fall of the empire.38 
A similar influence from Benin, especially on court ceremonials, regalia 
and chieftaincy titles in Q w o , Ekiti, Akoko , O n d o , Ijesa - as among 
the Awori astride the present-day Nigeria-Benin border - showed the 
widespread effect of the theme of inter-group penetration and c o m -
mensurate institutional adaptation. That such Benin cultural influence on 
the Yoruba has its demographic dimension is clearly reflected in traditions 
of Benin settlements in the Yoruba areas in question. T h e socio-political 
impact of Benin on other Edo-speaking peoples as well as the Itsekiri, the 
Urhobo, and the Isoko to the east and north of Benin has been m u c h more 
systematically studied.39 
Above all, the nineteenth century witnessed the foundation of the modern 
settlement pattern in which location along or close to the coast conferred 
great advantages: witness, for example, the heightened status of Warri vis-
à-vis Benin, Lagos vis-à-vis the rest of Yorubaland, Porto N o v o , W h y d a h 
and, most spectacular of all, Cotonou on the Aja coast. T h e period also 
anticipated the new society of the later colonial and post-colonial period, 
characterized by a closer association, if not integration, within the Western 
European economy and culture. 
T h e n e w changes resulted from a combination of factors, including the 
nineteenth-century wars which, as in Yorubaland, had the effect of ren-
dering the coastal areas relatively safe and attractive to migration from the 
hinterlands in which most of the fighting took place; the sea-borne trade 
which was rendered permanent by the transition from slave to 'legitimate' 
trade, thereby conferring a definite economic advantage on the coastal 
regions; and the steady growth of European interest, which enlarged the 
traditional role of selected coastal towns such as Lagos, Porto N o v o and 
eventually Cotonou to take on new and increasing responsibilities not only 
as ports but also as political capitals of emergent colonial states and their 
independent African successors. 
38. J . F . A . Ajayi, 1974. 
39. S . A . Akintoye, 1969; A . I. Asiwaju, 1976. 
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In all these changes, however, the economic factor would appear to 
have been the most dominant, especially with reference to the European 
presence. Trade, above all, brought the European to Africa and has 
remained the most important consideration for his continued stay. T h e 
nineteenth century was especially critical because of the change in the 
established pattern brought about by the abolition of the export trade in 
slaves, which had dominated transactions for over three centuries. K n o w n 
in European records of the pre-abolition era as 'the Slave Coast', this area 
of West Africa was among those most involved in the slave trade; and the 
relatively smooth transition to 'legitimate' trade must ultimately be credited 
to the adaptive capacity of the indigenous societies. 
In this regard, there is, perhaps, no better illustration than the case of 
D a h o m e y , traditionally considered to be the most persistent slave-raiding 
and slave-trading state in West Africa. Although the British anti-slave 
trade squadron had succeeded in stamping out the overseas trade in slaves 
along the coast of Porto N o v o by 1851, W h y d a h , the D a h o m e y port, did 
not really cease to export slaves until the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 
1888.40 This D a h o m e y indulgence turned the Aja coast, especially the 
stretch between the Werne and the M o n o into favourable spots for the 
settlement of Portuguese (mostly Brazilian) slavers, w h o had been chased 
out of such ports as Lagos and Badagry where the British anti-slave trade 
measures took effect m u c h earlier. D a h o m e y continued with the slave trade 
for as long as there were customers. 
Indeed, the D a h o m e y authorities could not appreciate the demand which 
several British and French abolitionist delegations m a d e on them to stop 
the trade, given the willingness of the Brazil-based Portuguese dealers to 
continue transacting the business in D a h o m e y ports. 
Nevertheless, D a h o m e y realized that changes were taking place. Its 
adjustment to changing times was noticeable from the mid-century w h e n , 
under the influence of a French trading firm, Victor Régis, King Gezo 
(c. 1818-58) of D a h o m e y was persuaded to intensify the trade in palm oil, 
first as a supplement to the export of slaves and eventually as the dominant 
factor in the state's export economy.41 T h e transition from slave to 'legi-
timate' trade meant a corresponding increase in the need to retain war 
captives as labour for the maintenance and expansion of the palm oil 
industry. Slaves also came to be used more for transporting goods from 
the interior to the coast and vice-versa than as commodities for export. B y 
the time of the French conquest of 1892-4, the foundation of Dahomey' s 
new economy - the monoculture of palm produce - had already been laid. 
Developments in D a h o m e y mirrored those in other parts of the M o n o -
Niger region where, as in Yorubaland, war captives w h o otherwise would 
40. E . Soumoni, 1983; P . Verger, 1976. 
41. E . Soumoni, 1983. 
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have been sold for export overseas came to be used extensively as labour
on farm plantations, or for transporting trade goods to and from the coast.
The abolitionist movement produced other far-reaching consequences
for the area; of these, perhaps the most significant were those concerned
with the modernization process. In this regard, obviously the most import¬
ant single factor was the return of liberated slaves, 'Saros' from Sierra
Leone and the 'Amaros' or 'Brazilians' mostly from Bahia but also from
Cuba and other parts of the West Indies. Apart from being the factor that
originally attracted European Christian missionaries, whose role in the
Gulf of Guinea as modernizers is well known,42 the liberated Africans
initially played the critical role of the first-generation middle class. Having
been subjected to what has been described as 'the hard school of slavery',43
the liberated Africans returning from Sierra Leone were 'already fashioned
42. J.E.A. Ajayi, 1965; E. A. Ayandele, 1966.
43. A.B. Aderibigbe, 1959, p. 174.
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elites' with a considerable attachment to cultural models of contemporary 
Victorian England, while among their Brazilian counterparts were artisans, 
traders, mechanics and 'trained cultivators of the soil'. A m o n g them were 
pioneers not only in the Christian ministry, as illustrated by such celebrities 
as Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther and Reverend James Johnson (otherwise 
k n o w n as Holy Johnson) in the Nigerian region, but also m a n y other less 
famous individuals w h o worked on African languages, printing, publishing, 
building and other occupations. 
Although they first settled along the coast in such locations as W h y d a h , 
A g w e , Porto N o v o , Badagry and Lagos, their influence and impact spread 
far into the Yoruba and Aja hinterlands and beyond. Indeed in Yorubaland, 
Abeokuta rather than Lagos was the centre for the diaspora of the 'Saros', 
and Brazilian architecture, a major feature of the Brazilian presence in 
nineteenth century Lagos, was k n o w n to have spread also to Ijebu O d e , 
Ibadan and Ilesa. There was no formal division or partition between Saros 
and Brazilians as to where either or both could settle on the Gulf of Benin: 
some Saros lived and worked in Porto N o v o and further west44 while in the 
Lagos Colony British policy especially under Alfred Moloney (Governor on 
several occasions between 1878 and 1890) was expressly favourable to 
the settlement of 'Brazilians'. Nevertheless, cultural and historical factors 
dictated a differentiation with regards to areas of actual concentration and 
overall impact. T h u s , the predominantly Protestant anglophone Saros came 
to be more characteristic of the area east of the Werne river valley which, 
by the close of our period, had emerged as the zone of Anglo-Saxon colonial 
influence and eventual control. 
In the west, the predominantly Catholic and lusophone Brazilian 
Africans initially found a more congenial cultural environment in Porto 
N o v o and W h y d a h , where they had been preceded by an older 'Brazilian' 
community founded by Brazilian Portuguese slavers w h o had to withdraw 
entirely to the Aja coast in consequence of the British anti-slave trade naval 
action further east. T h e eventual substitution of French for Portuguese 
control of the area of the Gulf of Benin west of the Werne still left a residue 
of Latin culture sufficient to m a k e Brazilians prefer this to the eastern 
coast, where Latin cultural influence was destined for eventual extinction. 
Consequently, it was in the area that eventually became French D a h o m e y — 
that is the western parts of the region under discussion - that Brazilian 
Africans made their greatest impact. Not only did they co-operate with the 
French in the latter's successful bid to conquer D a h o m e y and create their 
new colony: Brazilians also ranked first and foremost in the colony in taking 
full advantage of French colonial education, thus making them a crucial 
factor in the growth of D a h o m e y as the 'Quartier Latin of French West 
Africa'.45 
44. P. Verger, 1976, pp. 536-7. 
45. D . d'Almeida, 1973, Chs 1 and 2. 
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However, this dichotomy in the locational focus of the impact of Saros 
and Brazilians must not be interpreted as contradictory to the overall 
development of the M o n o - N i g e r region as an integral whole. Strong 
feelings of community based on specific kinship ties and general historical 
and cultural affinities a m o n g descendants of the da Silvas, the d'Almeidas, 
the D o s Regos, the de Souzas, the Pedros, the Martins, the Pereiras and 
so on, whether in Lagos, W h y d a h , A g w e or Porto N o v o , warn against such 
interpretations. Indeed, the continuous recognition to this day of the 
relationship between West African Brazilian families and their original 
Brazilian bases, particularly those in the state of Bahia, makes the Brazilian 
connection an illustrious example of the essential unity not only of the 
history of Africa but also of the vital communication between the continent 
and the black diaspora. 
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Introduction 
This study deals with that portion of coastland in the Bight of Benin and 
the Bight of B o n n y , formerly called Biafra, lying between the estuary of 
the Benin river on the west and the estuary of the O g o w e basin to the east. 
T h e greater part of the coastal region from the west comprising the creeks 
and swamplands of the Niger delta, is occupied by the Ijo, although the 
small Itsekiri kingdom in the western extremity of the Niger delta also 
exercised influence over wide areas of the delta. T o the immediate western 
hinterland of this region was the dominating polity of Benin and various 
groups related to that kingdom by political or cultural affiliation. T h e great 
Igbo hinterland lies astride the north of the Niger delta, spreading across 
both shores of the Niger river on its lower course. Igboland is most 
extensive to the east of the Niger, spreading to the northern reaches of the 
Cross river basin. 
East of the Niger delta lies the Cross river, whose estuary was dominated 
in the nineteenth century by the Efik state of Calabar. T h e rest of the 
Cross river valley was and is populated mostly by various Ibibio groups, 
and in the northern sectors by various Bantu-related groups. T h e fourth 
sub-region is that of the C a m e r o o n coast and its hinterland to the east of 
the Cross river valley. T h e fifth sub-region is the basin of the O g o w e and 
the surrounding regions of Equatorial Guinea and G a b o n . 
All the peoples of the region were related from prehistoric times, being 
all m e m b e r s of the Niger-Congo linguistic family.1 T h e Igbo and other 
peoples of the Niger delta periphery were of the K w a sub-family, while 
the peoples of the Cross river valley and most of the peoples of what is 
n o w C a m e r o o n and Equatorial Guinea belonged together to the Bantu. 
T h e Ijo of the Niger delta formed a distinct sub-family. 
Early relationships evidenced by linguistic similarities and attested by 
traditions of origin and migrations were reinforced by contact through 
1 
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trade in the nineteenth century.2 Trade routes established before the 
nineteenth century traversed the Niger delta from east to west, and to the 
hinterland, to join other routes stretching to the north. Both the Niger, 
the Cross river and other major rivers of the region were arteries of trade 
linking peoples along their courses, and receiving goods brought d o w n to 
them from inland routes such as those passing from the Cross river valley 
to the Cameroon hinterland and south to the coast. 
European traders along the coast, and gradually up the rivers, m a d e use 
of the long-established centres of trade on the coast, and received goods 
brought d o w n from the hinterland. Accordingly, the European presence 
on the coast became another unifying factor in the history of the region, 
presenting c o m m o n problems and stimuli to change. T h u s , each of the 
communities in the region underwent changes or adaptations in their social, 
political or cultural structures in the face of the external influences and 
challenge of European intrusion. T h e factors of European activity included: 
(i) the slave trade and the effects of its abolition in the nineteenth century; 
(2) the change to trade in local produce in place of slaves, sometimes 
referred to as legitimate trade; (3) the entry of Christian missionaries into 
the region, and (4) the onset of European imperialism and colonial conquest. 
These factors then, must be analysed in the study of each of the sub-
regions in order to obtain a general idea of the history of the whole region 
in the nineteenth century. 
The Niger delta 
T h e western delta 
T h e Itsekiri kingdom of Warri (Ode Itsekiri) was the most important 
political and commercial centre within the western delta from the fifteenth 
century to the early nineteenth century. T h e more numerous Ijo to the 
east and west of the Itsekiri did not develop centralized polities of a size 
to offer effective competition. In the immediate hinterland, the Urhobo 
and Isoko were also largely organized in decentralized communities, and 
served as the producers and suppliers of slaves and, later, palm oil and 
palm kernels to the Itsekiri middlemen. However, up to the nineteenth 
century, the Itsekiri kingdom itself was k n o w n to the European visitors as 
merely a 'principality' of the Benin kingdom. Accordingly, early traders to 
the western delta usually went up the Benin river to the port of G w a t o 
(Ughoton) where they dealt with the agents of the qba of Benin. 
F r o m about the late seventeenth century, direct Benin influence began 
to fade in the western delta, and European traders began to use ports within 
the Niger delta on the Benin, Escravos, and Forcados estuaries. B y the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, several Itsekiri chiefs had moved from 
2. E.J. Alagoa, 1970; R . Harris, 1972; E . M . Chilver, 1961. 
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Warri (Ode Itsekiri) to establish trading posts on the Benin estuary, and
soon the Benin port of Gwato (Ughoton) ceased to be a centre of the
overseas trade. Throughout the nineteenth century, then, the Itsekiri were
the effective leaders in the trade of the western delta, and Benin had to
receive supplies of European goods through them.3 Benin tried to maintain
political dominance over the Itsekiri kingdom, and demanded a form of
tribute in trade goods from the Olu of Warri, on pain of the closure of the
hinterland trade routes. However, Olu Akengbuwa was able to defy the
oba of Benin, to the extent of giving asylum to a dissident Benin chief. But
when Akengbuwa died in 1848, his subjects believed him a victim of the
qba's curse, which was also thought to have kept the Itsekiri without a
ruler from 1848 to 1936.
Olu Akengbuwa used agents called 'Governors of the River' stationed
at the estuary of the Benin river to collect duties from the European traders,
and fix prices for produce. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
most senior chiefs such as the iyatsere (war captain) and the uwangue (chief
spokesman and custodian of the regalia) served as governors of the river.
But in the 1840s, Akengbuwa appointed his own sons. Accordingly, after
1848, there was no clear procedure for appointment to this office and the
British consuls and traders intervened in the numerous disputes. Thus
they installed Diare in 1851, and removed his successor, Tsanomi in 1879
for his attempts to force the British traders to pay fair prices for palm oil.
3. P.C. Lloyd, 1963; O. Ikime, 1968; A. F. C. Ryder, 1961.
727
Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s
Nana Olomu, the last and best known governor of the Benin river (1884-
94) had to fight a violent war with British marines before being captured
and exiled to Calabar in 1894 as one of the victims of the British imperial
conquest of Nigeria.
plate 27.2 Nana Olomu ofItsekiri
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T h e Ijo of the western delta were in control of most of the waterways. 
Since they could not gain direct contact with the visiting European traders, 
they resorted to piracy and harassment of Itsekiri and European vessels. 
But some Ijo communities carried on internal trade with the Itsekiri and 
others. T h e Itsekiri supplied clay pots to such Ijo communities as the 
Gbaramatu and Bassan, and also sold salt to traders from the eastern delta 
w h o took it up the Niger. T h e E g b e m a and Olodiama Ijo in the forest 
region on the upper reaches of the Benin river also m a d e canoes and 
collected dyewoods for sale in the lagoon areas to the west in the Ijebu 
country, and as far as Lagos (Eko). They obtained local cloth in exchange 
from the Ijebu. Other Ijo exchanged dried fish and salt, which was m a n u -
factured by the Itsekiri, with the Urhobo, Isoko, and Igbo groups along 
the periphery of the Niger delta and along the lower Niger. 
In the nineteenth century, the western delta did not become as important 
as the eastern delta as a centre for the overseas trade in slaves, palm oil 
and palm kernels. T h u s , in the 1840s there were only two British firms 
trading at the ports of Bobi and Jakpa followed by three others in the 
following decade. T h e first British consul to the Bights of Benin and Bonny 
in 1849, John Beecroft, settled at Fernando Po, close to the Cameroon 
coast and the eastern Niger delta. It was only in 1891 that a vice-consul 
was sent to the inland port of Sapele in the western delta to monitor the 
penetration of the Nigerian hinterland in this area. B y this time, the 
scramble for African territories had started, and Nana O l o m u had to fight 
to try to stop them. T h e missionaries followed the flag in the western delta. 
T h e eastern delta 
T h e Ijo groups in the eastern delta developed state institutions based on a 
number of cities or population centres, such as N e m b e , Bonny, Elem 
Kalahari, and Okrika.4 These states, n a m e d city-states by K . O . Dike,5 
had developed their peculiar institutions from a c o m m o n model of the 
decentralized Ijo communities of the western and central delta in response 
to a variety of challenges: (1) different ecological conditions of the mangrove 
swamps of the eastern delta; (2) the long-distance trade with the Igbo 
hinterland, exchanging fish and salt for yams , slaves and other produce; 
and (3) trade with the western delta in salt, pottery, cassava products and 
canoes. 
In these states, the operation of the internal long-distance trade as well 
as the Atlantic slave trade was in the hands of the political leaders, the 
kings or amanyanabo, and the House Heads (leaders of the lineage-type 
political units or wari, of which the cities were composed). T h e open criteria 
for advancement within the House system m a d e for easy recruitment of 
new members from slaves or refugees. 
4. R . Horton, 1969; E.J. Alagoa, 1971a. 
5. K . O . Dike, 1956. 
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This pre-nineteenth-century baseline of the eastern delta states is 
important for a proper understanding of the effects on them of the increas-
ing impact of European influence and intervention in the nineteenth 
century. It is the differences in the baseline that determined the differences 
in the effects of the similar external influences on the delta states and on 
Calabar and the Cameroon coast. 
T h e decision to abolish the slave trade by Britain in 1807 was an 
important factor for change. Efforts to effect stoppage of the trade led to 
n e w activities by British traders, consuls, and naval officers, resulting in 
n e w relationships with the delta states. First, it led to an increased British 
presence in the Bight of Bonny . For example, in 1827 a naval squadron 
was stationed at Fernando P o , and in 1849, t n e &TSt British consul, John 
Beecroft, was appointed for the entire territories of the Bights of Benin 
and Bonny. T h e Court of M i x e d Commissions was also set up at Freetown, 
Sierra Leone, to try the captains of captured slave ships, and to set free 
the slaves of condemned slavers. For the delta states, these developments 
meant the demonstration of British power in their waters, bringing the era 
of gunboat diplomacy in which the British consuls used naval power 
to negotiate favourable conditions for British traders, missionaries, and 
explorers. In practice, the consuls, especially after 1850, continued and 
stepped up a policy started in the 1830s by Edward Nicolls, Governor of 
Fernando Po , of signing treaties with the local chiefs.6 These treaties 
stipulated the stoppage of the slave trade by the rulers; the adoption of 
'legitimate trade', that is, trade in goods other than slaves; laid d o w n 
regulations for the conduct of legitimate trade; specified the sums of 
customs duties or comey to be paid by the traders, as well as subsidies that 
the British government was to pay the local rulers for their agreement to 
give up the slave trade. 
These British activities on the coast gradually eroded the power of the 
local rulers, especially w h e n the consuls and naval officers assisted the 
British traders to set up their o w n judicial systems over and above the law 
of the local states, the so-called Courts of Equity, composed mainly of 
British traders with the participation of a few local House Heads or chiefs. 
These courts were, naturally, under the control of the British, and not of 
the local rulers. 
In addition to the British consuls and naval officers on the coast, British 
traders and missionaries tried to get into the hinterland, for example, by 
sponsoring voyages of exploration. M a n y decades of British efforts to 
discover the course and sources of the Niger river were crowned with 
success w h e n Richard and John Lander were brought from A b o h to N e m b e 
(Brass) by its ruler, King B o y Amain , in 1830. Once the estuaries of the 
m a n y rivers of the Niger delta were shown to be the entrance to the great 
Niger river, British interest was greatly increased in the area as a highway 
6. G . I. Jones, 1963, pp. 221-42: E.J . Alagoa and A . F o m b o , 1972, pp. 90-121. 
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into the rich interior of Nigeria and West Africa. British traders, such as 
Macgregor Laird, as well as humanitarians and missionaries tried to m o v e 
up the delta into the hinterland between the 1830s and 1850s. 
In the eastern delta itself, the Church Missionary Society under the 
leadership of the Nigerian ex-slave, Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther, estab-
lished missions at Bonny in 1864, at Twon-Brass in the N e m b e kingdom 
in 1868, at Elem Kalahari ( N e w Calabar in the documents) in 1874, and 
at Okrika in 1880. Both at Bonny and N e m b e , the rulers invited the 
missionaries for a number of reasons. S o m e wished to have the missionaries 
establish schools in which their children could learn to read, write and 
speak English in order to carry on their commercial relations with British 
firms. It was also believed that permission for the missionaries would lead 
to better relations with the British government, represented by the consuls 
and naval officers, and serve to strengthen them against neighbouring states 
in internal power struggles. These same reasons sometimes led to the 
missionaries being rejected in other parts of the eastern delta. T h u s , once 
the Church Missionary Society was established at Bonny, Jaja of O p o b o , 
w h o had broken away from Bonny in 1869 to form his state of O p o b o , 
would have nothing to do with that mission. T h e establishment of Christian 
missions was, however, resisted by powerful interests within each of the 
delta states, and Christianity constituted a factor of social instability in the 
nineteenth century. Dike considered that Christianity turned the slaves 
into revolutionaries w h o created upheavals in these states; but recent 
research has discovered other social and political factors to explain the 
problems of the delta states in the nineteenth century.7 
T h e roots of the social problems in the delta states m a y be traced to the 
difficulties the ruling groups faced in changing from an economy based on 
the slave trade to one based on palm produce. Those settlements established 
during the slave trade were unaware of the strength of the external forces 
behind the abolitionist movement , and could not wholly commit themselves 
to a new and difficult trade commodity. A switch meant changing old trade 
habits and methods, and dealing with a n e w set of white traders. Internally 
too, it was more difficult to process palm oil, and to crack the palm nuts 
to obtain the kernels than to organize slave supply. For the delta merchants, 
it meant having to penetrate deeper into the hinterland to the centres of 
production, and the use of a larger labour force and canoes. It was a 
situation with the potential for making the old established leaders bankrupt, 
and encouraging the rise of n e w enterprising ones. Three major develop-
ments flowed from this: first, the new trade led to an increase in the internal 
slave trade to supply the m a n p o w e r requirements of the delta states; second, 
the growth of n e w Houses and Heads resulted in the disturbance of the 
7. K . O . Dike, 1956, especially ch. V , pp. 153-65; E . J . Alagoa, 1971b; G . I. Jones, 1963, 
pp. 121-32, 160-1. 
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internal political balance (Dike's slave revolts) and, third, competition for
the hinterland markets led to several wars between the delta states.
The introduction of slaves into the delta communities had begun long
before the nineteenth century, and each of the states already had procedures
for integrating the new recruits into the community. The numbers required
to be integrated increased in the nineteenth century but, in most of the
states, new and more drastic methods were used to acculturate purchased
slaves. In almost every delta state, a new slave had his hair ritually shaved,
in the manner of a new-born baby, to symbolize his rebirth into the
community. From thenceforth, he became the child of a senior member of
the purchasing chief's household. Such a slave thus acquired the full rights
of membership of a House unit, and could rise in the hierarchy according
to his ability, even to be its Head. Membership of the mask-dancing society
of Ekine or Sekiapu quickly acculturated such men in the folklore and
language. In some states, such as Elem Kalahari, there were vigilante groups
known as Koronogbo, which terrorized persons who did not acculturate fully
or quickly. In such circumstances, slaves did not have the corporate and
separate identity or suffer such discrimination as to dispose them to seek
to revolt, or to be able to do so successfully.
However, the recruitment of slave manpower for the palm-oil trade
swelled the households of minor chiefs, who eventually broke off from
their parent Houses. The expansion of some Houses by the formation of
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branches was sometimes at the expense of older Houses whose members 
passed over to more prosperous Houses through debts and other means. 
This situation of competition for trade and manpower produced rapid 
changes in the local balance of wealth and political power. Even within the 
older Houses, the leadership changed. Thus , in the crucial decades of the 
1860s and 1870s, the two royal factions of A n n a Pepple and Manilla Pepple 
in the kingdom of Bonny were led by Jaja and O k o J u m b o , both of slave 
origin. It was the struggle for power within the state of Bonny in the 1860s 
that resulted in the foundation of the new state of O p o b o in 1869 with Jaja 
as its amanyanabo or king. It m a y be noted also that the reigning king of 
Bonny, George Pepple (1866-88) was unable to stop the factions drifting 
to war. 
T h e crisis in Elem Kalahari in 1882-84 was similar to that at Bonny. 
T w o factions, both derived from the royal line, struggled for leadership. 
T h e Amakiri faction won, and the Barboy or Will Braide group were 
obliged to move to the new town of Bakana. But even the victorious group 
had to move out of Elem Kalahari, whose location was dangerously close 
to the rival state of Bonny. T w o additional towns were founded from the 
dispersal of Elem Kalahari: B u g u m a where Amakiri, the paramount ruler 
of the Kalahari resided, and Abonnema, both closer to the hinterland 
markets. 
In the other two eastern delta states of N e m b e and Okrika, no major 
disruptions of the political system occurred. T h e only recorded internal 
disturbance of the nineteenth century at N e m b e was at the funeral of King 
Ockiya in 1879, when the Christians and the traditionalists fought over 
w h o should conduct rites over his body. A compromise was reached, and 
each group performed their rites separately. There was no division into 
factions of slaves and free. In north N e m b e and Okrika, major political 
crises had occurred in the eighteenth century in which new dynasties had 
come into power, the Mingi in N e m b e , and the A d o in Okrika. They were 
still in control in the nineteenth century, and no powerful opposition 
developed. It m a y be noted also that these two states did not carry on the 
overseas trade at the same high level as Bonny and Elem Kalahari. 
T h e kingdom of Elem Kalahari tended to be the pivot of the balance of 
power in the eastern Niger delta. It fought against N e m b e to its west, 
Bonny to its south-east, and Okrika to the east in the mid and late nineteenth 
century. These other states tended to form alliances from time to time, 
although Okrika appears to have resented a position of apparent dependence 
on Bonny through whose coastal port Okrika exported its produce. Elem 
Kalahari, however, had an ally, at least against Bonny, after Jaja established 
himself at Opobo , in 1869. For the rest of the century, Opobo tried to keep 
Bonny out of its traditional markets in the I m o river valley. This made it 
even more urgent for Bonny to seek other markets up the N e w Calabar 
river in the Obiatubo area claimed by Elem Kalahari, and through Kalahari 
territory to the lower Niger north of N e m b e . T h e Kalahari also moved up 
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the Engenni and Orashi rivers in territory previously under the control of 
N e m b e . 
T h e British consuls on the coast tried to use these inter-state wars as a 
lever to obtain an opening for their o w n traders and missionaries to m o v e 
into the hinterland. T h e consuls served as mediators between the states in 
the making of peace treaties. Thus , consular-mediated treaties were signed 
between Bonny and Elem Kalahari (New Calabar) in 1871, O p o b o and 
Bonny in 1873, Bonny and Elem Kalahari in 1879, Elem Kalahari and 
Okrika in 1871, N e m b e and Elem Kalahari in 1871. T h e inter-state wars 
did not weaken the resolve of each of the states to keep European traders 
from encroaching on their spheres of trade or in the maintenance of their 
sovereignty. T h e British had clashed with King William Pepple of Bonny 
as early as 1854, when they exiled him to Fernando Po, Ascension, Sierra 
Leone and London. They used disturbances caused by local feuds as an 
excuse. In 1887 they could find no such excuse when they removed Jaja 
of O p o b o for his opposition to direct British trade in the Imo river valley. 
T h e rulers of N e m b e (Brass), lying on the main N u n estuary of the Niger, 
were involved in quarrels between exploring and trading British expeditions 
and local peoples from the 1830s when British citizens got killed or shot 
at. T h e final showdown came in 1895, when the N e m b e attacked the major 
depot of the Royal Niger C o m p a n y at the port of Akassa and destroyed it. 
This was in protest against the Company's attempt to establish monopoly 
trade all the way up from Akassa in the delta to Lokoja at the Niger-Benue 
confluence. Also in 1898, King Ibanichuka of Okrika was seized by the 
British consul for his refusal to take orders from the new British Protectorate 
government of Southern Nigeria. King K o k o of N e m b e managed to escape 
capture by hiding in remote villages in his kingdom. 
B y the end of the nineteenth century, then, the British had taken over 
political control of the eastern Niger delta and, for the first two or three 
decades of the twentieth century, the states could not crown new kings. 
However, the loss of sovereignty did not mean the final dissolution of these 
states or their basic cultural and social structures and values. 
T h e Igbo hinterland 
Igboland would appear to have been characterized for a long time by 
its comparatively dense population, and its organization into small-scale 
political units. These characteristics made it particularly vulnerable to the 
destructive effects of the slave trade, since there were no large states able 
to protect their citizens. Rather, the various Igbo communities would 
appear to have engaged in inter-group wars, raids, and kidnappings for 
slaves to sell to the delta states and the Efik of Calabar, w h o served as 
middlemen. That is, although Igboland provided most of the slaves sold 
at the ports of Bonny, and Elem Kalahari, in the Niger delta, and at Calabar 
on the Cross river estuary, the Igbo did not come into direct contact with 
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the Europeans before the nineteenth century. Also, the Igbo country was 
not reached by visiting Europeans until the closing years of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century. A n d these initial 
contacts took place along such river routes as the Niger, the I m o , and the 
Cross river. Thus the communities at the market centres on the rivers at 
which the coastal middlemen met hinterland traders became better known 
than others. T h e Aro w h o controlled the internal trade routes and some of 
the markets at which the coastal middlemen purchased slaves and, later, 
palm oil and palm kernels became notorious for their abilities both as 
traders and as the operators of a well-reputed oracle. Similarly, the Ndoki 
towns of Akwette and Ohombele on the I m o river served as the markets 
for Bonny and O p o b o . O n the Niger, the states of A b o h , Osomari, Oguta, 
Asaba, and Onitsha provided market centres which were the foci for 
external influences and contacts. 
Although the Atlantic slave trade was formally abolished by the British 
in 1807, it lingered on on the coast till about 1850. A n d for the rest of the 
century, the internal trade for slaves among the coastal peoples increased 
because of the demands of the palm-oil trade. Similar demands for m a n -
power in the production of palm oil and palm kernels, as for crop farming 
and ritual services, encouraged the continuance of the internal slave trade 
within Igboland.8 Accordingly, the slave trade and slavery must be con-
sidered an important factor for social change in Igboland for most of the 
nineteenth century. 
T h e predominantly disruptive character of the slave trade m a y be shown 
in different ways. First, the manner in which slaves were procured tended 
to destroy social and political structures. Social outcasts, offenders against 
the law, were sold into slavery. A few persons were sold in times of famine 
or for debt. But the majority of slaves were apparently taken by kidnapping, 
raiding and wars. T h e oracle of the Aro is also k n o w n to have sold persons 
it adjudged guilty. But the Aro trade network throughout most of Igboland 
also obtained m a n y of its slaves through the raids of its mercenary allies, 
the A b a m , Ohaffia, Abiriba, and Edda. Accordingly, the extensive influence 
exercised by the Aro over Igboland through its oracle did not become an 
integrative force.9 T h e element of violence inherent in Aro addiction to the 
slave trade thus distinguished their influence from the earlier ritual influ-
ence of the Nri people over wide areas of Igboland. 
In the economic sphere also, the disruption to normal agricultural 
activities must have been considerable. In addition, as was the case in the 
trade between the coastal middlemen and the Europeans, what the Igbo 
obtained for the slaves taken out was never commensurate with the total 
loss sustained as a result of the slave trade. Slaves were paid for with salt, 
fish, spirits, firearms, hats and beads, as well as iron, copper, and brass 
8. W . R . G . Horton, 1954; E . Isichei, 1973. 
9. F . I. Ekejiuba, 1972; S. Ottenberg, 1958. 
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bars. T h e metal bars were turned into pewters, ritual bells, state swords, 
leg-rings, and other ornaments. But these supplies replaced local industries, 
and the A w k a smiths turned their backs on local sources of metal. Import-
ation of salt and cloth also undermined local industries. 
T h e first direct reports of the Igbo hinterland were taken to Europe by 
Richard and John Lander in 1830, when they passed through Onitsha, 
Asaba, and A b o h to the Niger delta. They were followed by other British 
explorers and traders and missionaries in 1841 and 1854. In 1856, M a c -
gregor Laird established the first trading station at Onitsha, and in 1879, 
the United African C o m p a n y was formed out of the m a n y rival British 
firms attempting to trade along the Niger valley. It received a royal charter 
in 1886 as the Royal Niger C o m p a n y with powers of government. It 
established one of its main depots in Igboland at Asaba, complete with 
constabulary and trading station. Missionary activities a m o n g the Niger 
Igbo had been started as early as 1856 at Onitsha under the leadership of 
Ajayi Crowther and other freed slaves from Sierra Leone, some of them 
of Igbo origin, and belonging to the Church Missionary Society. However, 
the Catholic Society of African Missions ( S M A ) , from Lyons, established 
rival stations on the west bank of the Niger from the 1880s; first at Asaba, 
and later at Isele-Uku, and Ibusa. 
Thus , the first inroads into Igboland were m a d e by the traders and 
missionaries, along the Niger. These first intrusions were resisted by the 
Igbo.10 A m o n g the western Igbo, resistance took the form of violent 
outbreaks organized by the ekumeku secret societies between 1898 and 
1911. First, the Royal Niger C o m p a n y , and then the British Protectorate 
government after 1900, crushed every manifestation of resistance with 
brutal severity. T h e most spectacular effort by the British was the Aro 
Expedition of 1900 which covered 15 500 sq k m of Igbo territory, using 
four units from U n w a n a , Itu, Akwete, and Oguta, all converging on Bende 
and Arochuku. This represented the formal conquest of Igboland, and a 
sort of anti-climax, since the Aro system the British had come to confront 
militarily proved to be only a group of religious experts and traders working 
together. N o military force came out to oppose the British. T h e Aro 
challenge to British authority had been indirect, commercial and ideo-
logical. 
All current studies of the British conquest of Igboland through the 
defeat of the oracle-based structure of the Aro, and of the secret-society 
style opposition of the ekumuku, in the Asaba hinterland, suggest that, 
thereafter, Igbo society was left wide open to the entrance of foreign 
influences. For example, it is stated that conversion to Christianity became 
a 'mass movement' , and a 'dramatic' phenomenon. According to F . K . 
Ekechi, 'the most bewildering mass movement of the 1900s has been partly 
attributed to Igbo attempts to circumvent various forms of British overrule'; 
10. F . K . Ekechi, 1972; P. A . Igbafe, 1971. 
736 
The Niger delta and the Cameroon region 
while Simon Ottenberg believes that the Igbo have been particularly 
receptive to change because of their social structures, attitudes, and 
history.11 However, there is no evidence that the Igbo have, in fact, 
discarded their traditional culture and religion for Christianity to a m u c h 
greater extent than other comparable groups in Nigeria and the rest of 
Africa. 
The Cross river basin 
T h e Efik state of Calabar at the estuary of the Cross river dominated the 
trade along the Cross river basin. Along the coast, its trade area met that 
of the delta state of O p o b o in the Ibeno and Qua-Iboe river basins. 
However, the largest ethnic group in the basin was the Ibibio, w h o also 
constituted the majority of slaves exported from this part of the coast. 
Produce from the upper Cross river valley and from the Igbo country to 
the north-west reached the Efik traders through the Aro, w h o dominated 
the Ibibio market town of Itu. S o m e of the groups on the upper Cross 
river also tried to share in the proceeds of the trade with the Efik, through 
their ability to disrupt trade or charge tolls. T h u s the Itu, U m o n , and 
Akunakuna, among others, always had some quarrel or other with the 
trading houses of Calabar. S o m e of the groups in the upper Cross river 
also carried on direct trade contacts with peoples of the northern Cameroon 
region. Ikom was one such centre of trade with the Cameroon as well as 
with the Igbo to the west and Calabar to the south. 
Although the trade of Calabar was similar to that of the delta states in 
slaves and later in palm oil and palm kernels, its history was different 
because of its different environment and social structures. T h e two major 
communities of D u k e T o w n and Creek T o w n of which the Efik state was 
composed, were based on firm land as against the delta s w a m p environment 
of their western neighbours. Accordingly, Calabar had farm settlements of 
slaves w h o supplied some of its agricultural needs, and even some export 
commodities such as palm oil. T h e social structure of Calabar also did not 
encourage the integration of slaves into the political system. Although the 
domestic or city slaves took part in the overseas trade and sometimes 
became rich and influential, the Ekpe secret society of Calabar kept them 
out of the higher grades in which lay the power of the state. This contrasted 
with the open Ekine or Sekiapu society of the delta states which was a 
positive agent of acculturation and integration of slaves into the culture 
and full life of the community. 
T h e external agents of change represented by the European traders, 
consuls, and missionaries exercised greater influence in Calabar. T h e 
traders were, at first, not permitted to establish stations on land, and had 
to live in hulks (roofed-over ships) moored permanently on the river as 
ii. F . K . Ekechi, 1972, p. xiii; S. Ottenberg, 1959. 
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houseboats and offices. T h e y tried to exercise some influence through the 
trusts or credits they gave to Efik traders; and sometimes used economic 
sanctions by collectively suspending trade with any defaulting Efik 
merchant. But when, in the nineteenth century, the Efik began to quarrel 
among themselves, the traders came in as arbitrators and kingmakers. 
Missionaries of the Church of Scotland Mission reached Calabar in 
1846. They formed a little self-governing colony of five to six white 
missionaries, teachers, staff, and converts, at D u k e T o w n and Creek T o w n . 
T h e mission station served as a sanctuary for refugees from the community. 
But the missionaries also watched the local scene, and reported develop-
ments to the British consul, or tried to exercise moral influence and to 
intervene in other ways. 
Since the Cross river estuary was so accessible to the British Preventive 
Naval Squadron at Fernando Po, it was comparatively easy to stop the 
slave trade at Calabar. In 1842, an abolition treaty was signed and an 
annual subsidy was agreed to be paid to the rulers of Calabar. F r o m 
1842, British influence in Calabar gradually increased until 1891 when a 
Protectorate administration was established there.12 y 
T h e obong of Calabar 
O n e reason for British intervention in Calabar was the weakness of the 
obong, king of Calabar, deriving from the comparative newness of the 
institution of kingship in Calabar. Eighteenth-century visitors to the Niger 
delta and the Cross river mention single kings for the delta states, but 
referred to 'kings' for Calabar. S o m e of these political leaders were possibly 
lineage heads, or Ekpe titleholders. T h e position of obong or king only 
began to be established from the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
D u k e Ephraim (Efiom) (c. 1800-34) emerged first as paramount leader in 
D u k e T o w n , and the most powerful ruler on the Cross river. Eyo Honesty 
I of Creek T o w n (d. 1820), occupied a similar position in Creek T o w n . 
Both m e n established their position over others of similar lineage con-
nections because of their superior wealth acquired from the overseas trade. 
There were a number of other elements of weakness in the monarchical 
institutions in Calabar in addition to its newness. First was the presence 
of two competing kings at D u k e T o w n and Creek T o w n . Second was the 
competition for the office between several political leaders and members 
of the Ekpe society. Such competition led to arbitration by the British 
consul, traders, or missionaries. Third, and most serious, the office oí obong 
became identified in the nineteenth century with the external trade. H e 
had few traditional functions or authority, all his activities being concerned 
with the external trade. T h u s , the obong collected the comey dues from the 
foreign traders, granted rights of mooring and trade to the supercargoes, 
and set in motion the traditional judicial processes when approached. T h e 
12. D . Forde (ed.), 1956; A . J . H . Latham, 1973; K . K . Nair, 1972. 
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internal powers of making laws and enforcing them lay with the leaders of 
the Ekpe secret society. Accordingly, the main function of the obong in the 
nineteenth century was to stand between the local communities and the 
whitemen, w h o were therefore interested in w h o was appointed to the 
office. 
T h e relative powers of the kings of Duke T o w n and Creek T o w n 
fluctuated in the first half of the nineteenth century. Duke Ephraim of 
D u k e T o w n (1800-34) w a s n o t onty t n e richest chief on the river, but also 
held the highest Ekpe title of Eyamba. H e received the largest share of 
comey, dividing the remainder among the other chiefs. After the death of 
D u k e Ephraim, Eyo Honesty II of Creek T o w n (1836-58) became the 
most influential trader. B y 1852 he was receiving two-thirds of the comey, 
while the ruler of Duke T o w n received only a third. In spite of wealth and 
trade, the kings of Duke T o w n generally succeeded in keeping the most 
important Ekpe title of eyamba outside the reach of the leaders of Creek 
T o w n , w h o held the second highest title of obunko. 
Succession disputes for the leadership of Duke T o w n and Creek T o w n 
presented a serious problem for the political system on the Cross river. 
T h e Eyo lineage achieved an early dominance in Creek T o w n that it 
maintained for the rest of the century. T h e rival lineage of A k a b o m 
migrated to found the settlement of C o b h a m T o w n . The position was 
different in D u k e T o w n . W h e n Duke Ephraim died in 1834, he was 
succeeded, not by his son or a member of his lineage, but by Eyamba V , 
that is, the fifth holder of the eyamba title of the Ekpe society. At the death 
of Eyamba V in 1847, there was a dispute between the lineages of Eyamba 
and Duke Ephraim. The British set up a third candidate, Archibong I. At 
the death of Archibong I in 1852, the traders and the consul recognized 
Ephraim Duke . Thenceforward, disputes arose between the Duke , 
Eyamba, and Archibong lineages. Accordingly, each used various means 
including the techniques of witchcraft accusations and trial by ordeal using 
esere bean poison against its rivals.13 
T h e Ekpe society and the B loodmen 
T h e Ekpe society of Calabar was an adaptation of a cult of the leopard 
present among many forest groups in the Cross river valley and in parts 
of the Cameroon. It was played as a masquerade by the young m e n , wearing 
hooded raffia costumes, while w o m e n and non-members shut themselves 
up in their houses. But the main function of the members was to hold 
weekly meetings at which social questions were discussed. 
T h e Ekpe society, which, in the hinterland village communities, c o m -
prised all elders, became an exclusive secret organization in the large 
commercial community of Calabar. It also became increasingly stratified 
into grades, rising from five recorded in 1828 to ten in 1840 and eleven in 
13. A . J . H . Latham, 1972. 
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1858. Slaves were originally excluded from Ekpe, but third-generation 
slaves born within the homes of members came to be admitted into the 
lower grades. But since the grades were attained by payment of prescribed 
fees, the highest grades were monopolized by the rich free nobility, the 
highest two by the political heads of D u k e T o w n and Creek T o w n . 
Ekpe was the effective law-making and enforcing authority in Calabar 
in the nineteenth century, and was utilized for the purpose by the foreign 
visitors as well. T h u s , in 1850, the missionaries, supercargoes, and consul 
pressed the leaders of Calabar to enact an Ekpe law against h u m a n sacrifice 
at the deaths of rulers. Ekpe m a y be considered to have been an asset in 
the political system of Calabar in that it united all the free m e n of wealth 
and influence in a c o m m o n organization. But its discrimination against the 
large body of m e n of slave origin and the poor led to the social disturbances 
of the mid-nineteenth century, which Dike has referred to as slave revolts. 
T h e association of plantation slaves k n o w n as the Bloodmen came into 
being specifically as a pressure group to prevent the sacrifice of slaves at 
the deaths of kings and lineage heads. Such an organization of slaves on a 
blood oath was possible in Calabar because of their concentration in 
plantations, and because of the c o m m o n disabilities they suffered. However, 
the association did not become a revolt for the emancipation of slaves, or 
even for the seizure of political power from the Ekpe. All the association 
achieved was to come into Calabar from the plantations in a body each 
time a notable m a n was ill or died, and there was danger of slaves being 
sacrificed or m a d e to take poison ordeal. Their agitation led to the 
1850-1 Ekpe law against h u m a n sacrifice, and King Archibong I considered 
it necessary to secure their support in the faction fights over the office 
of obong. 
T h e social and political history of Calabar, then, was similar to that of 
the delta states in the types of external pressures to which the system was 
subject, but different in the specific internal resolution of the problems. 
Ekpe, the position of the monarchy, and the Bloodmen, were unique 
phenomena in the situation at Calabar. 
T h e Cameroon coast and its hinterland14 
T h e Cameroon coast, including a number of rocky offshore islands, is 
generally characterized by a maze of mangrove s w a m p s , creeks and inlets, 
immediately behind which lies the tropical rain forest. It is inhabited by 
three main clusters of the north-western Bantu, namely, the K p e - M b o k o , 
the Duala-Limba, and the Tanga-Yasa,15 with numerous clans and sub-
clans. These peoples, whose traditions suggest c o m m o n origins and affini-
14. This section is the summary of a contribution by D r Lovett Z . Elango of the History 
Department, University of Yaounde, Cameroon. 
15. E . Ardener, 1956, p. 39. 
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ties, are basically agriculturists, fishermen, and hunters. They bartered fish 
for food at markets. They were generally organized under autonomous 
villages, but sometimes as among the Bubi, Duala, and Isuwu, there were 
petty paramount chiefs. A m o n g the Duala, Isuwu, and others, the most 
prestigious secret society was the Jfengu, based on the veneration of water 
spirits.16 
A s in the case of the Niger delta peoples, these north-western Bantu 
communities were subjected to pressure in the nineteenth century from 
Christian missionaries, European traders and imperialists. T h e greatest 
pressure came from the abolitionists17 because, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, each of the communities included a lower class of 
slaves and the attempt to abolish the institution of slavery created for them 
a critical economic problem in terms both of finding substitute products 
such as palm oil and palm kernels in place of slaves and of finding adequate 
labour to produce and transport these products. 
T h e Duala of the Cameroon were probably on the coast from as early 
as the sixteenth century, but established themselves as a centralized state 
when they conquered and absorbed other Bantu groups from about 1706 
onwards.18 They had a paramount chief, but as early as 1792 English 
traders on the Cameroon river intervened in a succession dispute. They 
imposed on the Duala the candidate of the junior lineage, known as King 
Bell. In 1814 A k w a , the more popular candidate of the senior lineage, 
declared his independence. For most of the nineteenth century, therefore, 
the Duala were divided into two main groups, the Bell and A k w a , and 
Duala politics revolved around Kings Bell and A k w a . These rival groups 
were each further subdivided into 'towns' or wards. But in order to pre-
serve their ethnic solidarity in the face of this tendency to fission, the 
Duala created the n e w institution of ngondo. This was a council of Duala 
notables, comprising representatives of all the councils of the various Duala 
villages.19 
Located on the western spur of M o u n t Cameroon and on the Bimbia 
river, a tributary of the Cameroon river, was the Isuwu trading polity of 
Bimbia. Bimbia, composed of three villages ruled by lineage heads assisted 
by a council of chiefs, had been known as a minor trading centre from at 
least the mid-seventeenth century. T h e power and prestige of these m e n , 
as of Bimbia itself, resided in their middleman position in the overseas 
trade. T h e leading chiefs of Bimbia also derived status and support from 
their membership of jfengu. 
T h e richest and best known of the Bimbia merchant princes was Bile, 
known to the Europeans as King William. His mother was of the Bimbia 
16. R . Bureau, 1962, pp. 107-38. 
17. L . Z . Elango, 1974. 
18. E . Mveng, 1963. 
19. V . T . Levine, 1971. 
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ruling family, but Bile had lived in the home of his Duala father in the
Cameroon river in his childhood. Driven to Bimbia by his paternal kinsmen,
he attached himself to his senior maternal uncle, who employed him as his
emissary in his dealings with the Europeans because of his previous
experience from the Cameroon river. Bile acquired wealth, new experience,
and influence, and was chosen as the logical successor to his uncle. In 1833,
Bile was able to convince the British representative in Fernando Po, Colonel
Nicolls, to recognize him as king of the entire coastal region from Bimbia
to Rio del Rey, including its offshore Bubi islands, in return for ceding the
same region to Britain as a protectorate. Although the British rejected the
voluntary cession, Bile retained the title of king until his death in 1879.
The separate polities of Duala and Bimbia thus developed ties in the
nineteenth century. Cultural ties were reinforced by Jengu solidarity, as
well as by King William's part-Duala ancestry. In commerce, Bimbia and
Bell Town traders co-operated in developing the trade of the Rio del Rey
area. They developed two major routes. First was the coastal route through
the creeks linking the two areas, much as is still the case today. Some
Bimbia and Duala traders resided at different villages along the route to
receive goods for exchange with the local people. Second was the overland
route which served as an alternative when stormy weather and rough seas
made the creek route unsafe. This route round Mount Cameroon also
tapped the resources of ivory. The network of internal trade routes of the
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hinterland Bimbia and Bell T o w n trade zones overlapped with that of the 
Efik traders of Calabar and the Cross river around Rio del Rey. 
T h e commercial unity of the Cameroon-Bimbia-Rio del Rey region was 
further enhanced by the links established by each of the sub-sections of 
the region with the B a m e n d a grasslands in the interior.20 Thus , m a n y of 
the slaves reaching the coast between 1820 and the 1840s came from the 
Bamenda 'grassfields' and reached Bimbia and the Cameroon river via the 
Rio del Rey region. But by the mid-nineteenth century, Bell T o w n and 
Bimbia traders, working together, had begun to compete successfully 
though peacefully with the leading traders of the Rio del Rey. 
T h e slaves w h o arrived at the coast in the 1840s, mostly captives from 
the Bali-Chamba raids in the Bamenda grasslands, represented a critical 
element in the transition of coastal societies from slave-trading to legitimate 
commerce. In the Cameroon river and Bimbia, as in Calabar and the Niger 
delta, slaves were used in producing palm oil and palm kernels and other 
commodities of legitimate commerce. At Bimbia and the Cameroon river, 
an important variation was the well-organized system by which Kings 
William and Bell hired out some of their slaves to the West African 
C o m p a n y at Fernando Po . T h e system assumed the nature of indenture, 
and provided an additional source of wealth for both monarchs. But the 
system was open to abuses, and led to British parliamentary investigation. 
King William was moved to protest not only against the company's failure 
to pay his m e n but also their maltreatment. 
British interest in the abolition of the slave trade and the establishment 
of legitimate trade led to treaties and the gradual loss of the sovereignty of 
the local rulers. Although the treaty of 1833 between Nicolls and King 
William was rejected, British agents concluded treaties between 1840 and 
1844 that provided them with the legal basis for intervention in local 
politics. Such interventions often involved the use of British gunboats to 
bully chiefs w h o violated the terms of these treaties, or to collect trade 
debts owed to Europeans. In 1852 John Beecroft even presided at the 
election of a new chief of A k w a T o w n . Sometimes British intervention and 
arbitration was invited by local rulers: for example, by King William to 
establish his authority over Bimbia and Rio del Rey. But the more frequent 
excuse for British intervention arose from the disputes between European 
and local traders over the repayment of credit or 'trust'. In 1856, the system 
of arbitration and settlement of disputes between Africans and Europeans 
was institutionalized in a Court of Equity established at Duala. 
T h e missionaries represented an important element of foreign influence. 
In 1843, Joseph Merrick, a West Indian mulatto, was sent to Fernando P o 
by the British Baptist Mission Society. In the same year he established a 
mission at Bell T o w n , and in 1844, at Bimbia.21 H e and his colleagues 
20. E . M . Chilver, 1961. 
21. S.N. Gwei, 1966. 
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gradually built churches, schools, carpenters' workshops and, at Bimbia, a 
printing press. Local opposition was soon aroused by efforts at mass 
conversion. Conflicts with the missionaries became intensified in the 1850s 
because of smallpox epidemics, inter-ethnic wars and famines, and the 
British had to intervene to protect the missionaries and their converts. 
W h e n the Spanish governor proclaimed Catholicism as the official religion 
of Fernando Po in 1858, the position of the Baptists became untenable at 
Clarence. Accordingly, Alfred Saker built a new settlement at A m b a s Bay 
which he named Victoria, in June 1858. But local opposition to the Baptists 
continued to be high, especially as m a n y of the Anglo-West Indian settlers 
at Victoria also traded in competition with the Bimbia population. 
In the 1860s and 1870s there was a decline in the trade of the Cameroon 
coast which produced a feeling of insecurity among the rulers and restless 
insubordination among the sub-chiefs. This led to appeals to Queen Vic-
toria for protection. It was in these circumstances that the Germans 
annexed the Cameroon in July 1884. Resistance to G e r m a n annexation 
broke out almost immediately, with some measure of British support 
locally. T h e resistance stiffened even more when the chiefs realized that 
the Germans were determined to push inland, thereby destroying their 
middleman monopoly. T h e resistance and attempts at pacification ended 
only with the outbreak of the First World W a r . 2 2 T h e British, for their 
part, were unable to reverse the situation. Only Victoria remained a British 
foothold, but even here, the missionaries were unable to withstand G e r m a n 
harassment. Victoria was formally transferred to G e r m a n y on 28 March 
1887. T h e Germans wasted no time in moving up into the Bamenda 
grasslands to secure control of the hinterland trade, and divert it from 
going on to Calabar as it had begun to do. 
T h e O g o w e basin and surrounding regions23 
T o the south of Cameroon, the O g o w e basin and surrounding regions (the 
Woleu, N o y a and C o m o basins to the north and the Nyanga basin to the 
south) correspond more or less to the modern territories of Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon. Covered largely by equatorial forest, this vast area, 
bordering on the Congo basin to the south and east, has been inhabited by 
m a n since time immemorial, as testified by the remains of stone tools 
discovered during archaeological excavations conducted at various sites in 
Gabon some twenty years ago. 
As yet, however, w e k n o w nothing about the physical characteristics or 
the mores and way of life of these first inhabitants of the region. They m a y 
have been the ancestors of the Pygmies, w h o are found scattered today in 
small groups in the forest, where they live by hunting and fishing, using 
22. R . Joseph, 1974; H . R . Rudin, 1938. 
23. This section is based on a contribution by Nicolas Metegue N ' N a h , Head of the 
Department of History, University of Libreville. 
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their catch to trade by barter with the neighbouring Bantu-speaking 
peoples. 
These Bantu-speaking peoples had by the nineteenth century formed a 
large number of political entities of varying sizes: village-states (Fang, 
Kele, Seke, Benga); confederations ( M p o n g w e , Gisir, Punu, O b a m b a ) ; and 
kingdoms (Nkomi, Orungu, Galwa from i860 on).24 Within these political 
entities, the different peoples engaged in a range of activities, nomadic 
agriculture, hunting, fishing and crafts. These crafts were distinguished 
above all by the quality of the goods produced, as for example the ironware 
manufactured by the Fang, w h o were considered by European travellers 
in the nineteenth century to be the best ironsmiths of the region, and the 
fabrics woven by the peoples of the Upper Ngunyi (Gisir, Apindji and 
Mitsogo in particular). T h e products of these economic activities served 
as the basis for extensive trading a m o n g the different communities. For 
example, a vigorous trade in cassava flour and dried fish was carried on 
between the M p o n g w e confederation, in the C o m o estuary, and the Orungu 
kingdom in the O g o w e delta; the famous bongo cloth produced by the 
weavers in the hinterland was transported from the upper Ngunyi to 
the coast by way of the O g o w e and the R e m b o - N k o m i ; finally, from the 
Atlantic seaboard convoys laden with bales of locally produced salt set out 
regularly for the interior. After the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast 
in 1471, trading was intensified to the point of becoming the main activity of 
the coastal peoples in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
cheap European goods — guns, alcoholic beverages, fabrics, cheap glassware, 
trinkets — being bartered for slaves, ivory, palm oil, rubber, ebony and 
redwood. 
This development of commercial activity on the coast had major conse-
quences. First, it triggered off the migration of certain peoples such as the 
Fang w h o , preceded by the Kele, moved away from the area embracing 
northern Gabon, southern Cameroon and the eastern region of Equatorial 
Guinea, where they had long been settled, towards the coast, and pushed 
on to Eliva N k o m i (Fernán-Vaz lagoon), which they reached at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Second, this was the root cause of a profound 
transformation of indigenous societies. T h e old social structure, char-
acterized by blood ties and by the emergence in each clan of three social 
classes, namely, pure-bloods (futnu in Punu, awo-ntche in O m y e n e , atem 
bo bayong in Fang), half-castes (awoga in O m y e n e , mintobe in Fang) and 
slaves, began to be replaced by another social stratification based on wealth 
in which, alongside a middle and a lower class, a merchant upper middle 
class or bourgeoisie composed essentially of chiefs and notables, w h o 
exercised a monopoly on big business, featured prominently. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, this social evolution, which 
24. Cf. N . Metegue N ' N a h , 1979. N . B . It should be pointed out that, until the 
seventeenth century, the T y o and Vili kingdoms included vast areas of present-day Gabon. 
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plate 27.5 The Ogowe River Trader, Ouassengo, with ivory tusks and female members of
his household
was not very noticeable among the peoples of the interior, was more
pronounced on the coast. There, commencing in 1839,25 treaties were
signed which led to the establishment of the French trading post of Gabon,
of which Libreville, founded in 1849 at the mouth of the Como, became
the chief town. A large number of missions of exploration set off from this
station, extending French territorial claims far into the interior of the
country and making Gabon the European gateway to Central Africa.
Journeys were undertaken by Paul Belloni du Chaillu (1856-0 and 1863-
5), Serval and Griffon du Bellay (1862), Aymes (1867), Alfred Marche and
the Marquis de Compiègne (1873-4), Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza (1875
8, 1879-82 and 1883-5), Paul Crampel (1888-9), and Fourneau and Dolisie
(1889). To the north, the French fell foul of the Spanish, who launched
several expeditions from Fernando Po into Rio Muni, notably those led by
Nicolas Manterola and Guillemar de Aragon (1845), Manuel Iradier,
Ossorio and Montes de Oca (1884).
While the exploration of the country by Europeans progressed, and
25. N.B. The first treaty authorizing colonial occupation to be signed in the region in
question was concluded on 9 February 1839 by Bouet-Willaumez and Antchuwe Kowe
Rapontyombo, alias 'King Denis'.
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plate 27.6 Antchuwe Kowe Rapontyombo ('King Denis'), an Ogowe river ruler, with his
senior wife
despite the resistance which the indigenous peoples put up, treaties were
concluded with certain chiefs, and European traders and missionaries
settled in the different regions. By 1882 there were in the Ogowe basin and
surrounding regions over ninety commercial establishments belonging
largely to English companies (John Holt, Hatton and Cookson), German
companies (Woermann, Schulze, Lübke, Küderling), a Spanish company
(Transatlántica) and a French company (Dubarry Frères). In addition,
there were over twenty missionary stations and about the same number of
denominational schools.
However, despite the deep inroads made by Western influences, the
indigenous societies were able to retain their identity. For it must be
pointed out that, towards the end of the nineteenth century, vast regions
were still all but unaffected by these alien influences. Even where, as on
the coast, such influences were already very powerful, they ran up against
various forms ofdiehard opposition from the local cultures. Thus the large-
scale effort to evangelize the local populations had to contend with such
widespread indigenous cults as Bwiti, Bieri and Ombwiri, and social customs
such as polygamy.
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Conclusion 
T h e nineteenth century, then, saw the gradual infiltration of British influ-
ence over m u c h of the region, with French and eventually also, G e r m a n 
influence in the Cameroons region. However, it is clear that the hinterland 
parts of the region were outside the direct influence of Europe to the end 
of our period. But even the coastal areas, which were in direct contact with 
European traders long before the nineteenth century, were not easily 
conquered, and their internal history was determined by local factors, and 
often by relations with other neighbouring polities. T h u s , although all the 
coastal communities in the region took part in the same overseas trade, each 
developed different institutions to contain its impact, deriving solutions to 
similar problems from separate internal histories and cultures. T h e wart 
or House institution of the delta states was not the same as that of the Efik 
of the Cross river, w h o also adapted the Ekpe of hinterland groups to 
n e w functions. In similar circumstances, the Cameroon coastal groups 
developed Jfengu, which differed from the Ekpe secret society of the Efik, 
as well as from the open Ekine or Sekiapu masquerade society of the delta 
states, or the Bwiti, Bieri and Ombwiri of the O g o w e basin and G a b o n . 
Further, important as was the overseas trade in slaves and later palm oil 
and palm kernels to the development of these communities, it must be 
borne in mind that the internal trade routes and exchange of local produce 
between groups constituted the basic economic mainstay of the majority 
of the people throughout the nineteenth century. In political developments 
even along the coast, internal cultural factors were still pre-eminent: the 
Itsekiri of the western delta still considered the curse of the oba of Benin 
a potent determinant of history, in spite of the practical sovereignty and 
great success in the overseas trade w o n by the kingdom of Warri by the 
nineteenth century. 
In s u m then, the great attention given to the external factors of European 
overseas trade, Christian missionary activities and colonial conquest should 
not obscure the essential primacy of internal factors in the historical 
development of the peoples between the Niger delta and the O g o w e basin 
in the nineteenth century. T h e effects of the external factors were by no 
means immediately overwhelming, and the communities continued to enjoy 
autonomy in most aspects of their life. This essential autonomy from 
the burgeoning impact of the external Western world was to continue 
throughout the colonial period so that these communities did not get all 
the elements of their culture, institutions and identity completely swept 
away. 
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F . W . K N I G H T with contributions by 
Y. TALIB and P . D . CURTIN 
Introduction 
T h e remarkable mass migration of Africans to the Americas, the Middle 
East and Europe under the aegis of the trans-Atlantic and other branches 
of the slave trade constitutes one of the major events of African and 
world history.1 This emigration, largely involuntary on the part of the 
participants, lasted for centuries, leaving residual communities of varying 
sizes scattered about in Europe, the Middle East and the Americas.2 
T h e exodus into Asia Minor and the Levantine Mediterranean world is 
the oldest sector of the African diaspora and lasted longest. It probably 
began several centuries before the Christian era, and reached its apogee 
during the period of Muslim ascendancy after the seventh century. Most 
Africans arrived via the trans-Saharan slave routes, but a number also 
migrated as free individuals, scholars, teachers, traders and pilgrims to the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Since the Mediterranean world did not 
practise an extensive plantation economy, the volume of sub-Saharan 
Africans fed into the system remained relatively low, probably not exceed-
ing several hundreds per year. Within the Ottoman empire large numbers 
of Africans were employed as soldiers and sailors, eunuchs, concubines, 
administrators and, in cases such as Abü'1-Misk Käfür of Egypt (d. 968), 
could even become the effective ruler of the state. Within Muslim states, 
Africans did not inherit their status as slaves, and in some cases could 
maintain a cohesive culture interacting with that of their hosts. 
. 1. J. M . McPherson, L . B . Holland et al., 1971, provides a good starting-point for any 
study of the African diaspora. Since its publication, there has been a veritable explosion of 
excellent monographs, especially on the Afro-American theme, e.g., D . B . Davis, 1975; 
R . W . Fogel and S. L . Engerman, 1974; H . G . Gutman, 1975; E . D . Genovese, 1974; S. L . 
Engerman and E . D . Genovese (eds), 1975; G . M . Hall, 1971; D . W . Cohen and J.P. 
Greene (eds), 1972; H . Hoetink, 1973; R . Anstey, 1975; J. Palacios Preciados, 1973; R . 
Sheridan, 1973; R . S . D u n n , 1972; C . A . Palmer, 1976, 1981; R . Bean, 1975; H . Klein, 
1978; L . Rout, 1976; F . P . Bowser, J974; W . Dean, 1976; B . W . Higman, 1976; M . Craton, 
1978; O . Patterson, 1982; T . Berlin and R . Hoffman (eds), 1983; P . D . Curtin, 1979. 
2. See R . David, 1970, pp. 33-50; L . Bugner, 1980; M . Moreno Fraginals, 1977. 
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Africans followed the spread of Islam by land and sea into India and
the Far East. As late as the 1520s and 1530s, some 5000 African soldiers
served with the troops of Sultan Bahadur of Gujerat, while additional
Africans served in his navy. More Africans were found in the armies and
administration of the Sultan of Delhi, as well as in Bengal and the Deccan.
Indeed, the expansion of the Ottoman empire into south-eastern Europe
brought Africans along with it to serve as soldiers and bureaucrats.
The African contact with Europe was a continuation of Mediterranean
commercial and military activity. By the fifteenth century a small trade in
PLATE 28.1 Figure ofa negroid man with an Indonesian kris at his back waistband, probably
from what is now Vietnam and probably datingfrom the seventeenth century
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African slaves flourished in the Mediterranean and substantial numbers of 
Africans were found in Sicily, Cyprus and Crete, as well as on the southern 
Iberian coast. Seville had a black population of about five thousand in the 
early sixteenth century, and substantial numbers of Africans lived in 
Málaga, Huelva, Cadiz and Lisbon. Direct maritime links between Europe 
and Africa increased the black populations and, by the late eighteenth 
century, France had a black population of approximately 2000, and England 
nearly 15 000. T h o u g h minuscule compared with the flood of Africans 
imported to the Americas at that time, these small concentrations were 
sufficient to warrant official concern in both countries. A royal decree in 
France banned inter-racial marriages in 1777; while the celebrated M a n s -
field Judgement in England in 1772 declared that Africans could not be 
enslaved in England. 
It was, however, in the Americas that the African diaspora was most 
pronounced. Africans and their descendants, generally called Afro-
Americans, played a prominent part in the development of every society in 
the N e w World, from the discovery of the region by the Europeans in the late 
fifteenth century until modern times. Regardless of the number of Africans 
that arrived in any particular country, the overall impact of Africa remained 
inescapable and profound. 
Africans and Afro-Americans, both as slaves and as free persons, helped 
subdue the vast wildernesses everywhere throughout the Americas from 
Alaska to Argentina. They crossed the mighty rivers with the first explorers 
of the N e w World. T h e y helped conquer and subordinate the indigenous 
inhabitants and the sophisticated civilizations of Mexico and Peru. T h e y 
actively participated in forging the new communities which formed the 
bases for the later heterogenous and polyphonous societies. They helped 
build the new cities of the Iberians - Santo D o m i n g o in 1496; Mexico City 
and Havana in 1522; Pernambuco and L i m a in 1535; Buenos Aires and 
Valparaiso in 1536; Bahia in 1549; and Rio de Janeiro in 1565. They also 
helped build the port cities of the English settlers in the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries: Boston, N e w York, Philadelphia, Jamestown 
and Charleston. 
Like all the other immigrant groups - largely free persons - that came 
to the Americas between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the 
Africans performed every type of task, and fulfilled every social role. They 
were pioneers and conquistadors, pirates and bucaneers, gauchos, llaneros, 
bandeirantes, slave-owners, merchants, servants and slaves. They featured 
more prominently in some occupations than in others, and they were legally 
excluded from those of highest social status. After the seventeenth century, 
however, Africans constituted the only legal slaves in the Americas, thus 
rendering an enduring social stigma to the African population in American 
societies.3 Before the final abolition of the slave system in Brazil in 1888, 
3. D . B . Davis, 1966, pp. 223-61. 
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the majority of Africans in the Americas were slaves, performing the greater 
proportion of manual and physically demanding, often debilitating, tasks 
without which the colonies, possessions, and nations could not have been 
an economic success. 
T h e long, important and varied association with the evolution of the 
modern American societies enabled the Africans to make an indelible 
imprint on the languages, cultures, economies, and ethnic composition of 
almost every community in the N e w World.4 T h e greatest impact occurred 
in the plantation zones, among those communities that developed along 
the Atlantic and Caribbean coastlands from the south-eastern U S A to the 
north-eastern part of Brazil, and along the Pacific coastlands of Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru. 
T h e Middle East and south-east Asia5 
Ethiopians were highly prized in Arabia and India on account of their 
intelligence and appearance. T h e slaves exported from Ethiopia in the 
nineteenth century to various parts of Asia were mostly children, ranging 
in age from 8 to 16 years. S o m e were captives taken in the wars waged by 
the southern Ethiopian kingdom of Shoa on the O r o m o ('Galla') peoples 
along its borders. T h e slaves were carried in caravans of several hundreds 
and transported to the Ethiopian coast for shipment at the ports of Berbera, 
Zeila, Tajura, Assab, Obock and Massawa, from where they were ferried 
across the Red Sea to the ports of Jeddah, M o c h a , and Hoideida. Buyers 
came from several towns in the Y e m e n and the Hidjâz. There were also 
seaborne traders from the Hadramawt, Zanzibar, O m a n , India and the 
Persian Gulf. This trade was largely in Arab hands backed by Indian 
financiers from the Gujarat (Banians).6 
T h e major source of supply of slaves to Asia was, however, eastern 
Africa. As pointed out by J. B . Kelly,7 the slave trade from Zanzibar was 
virtually a monopoly of the Muscat Arabs and their rulers w h o derived 
their revenue mostly from the custom duties levied on the trade. In the 
early nineteenth century, Muscat was the greatest clearing house of the 
traffic to the Gulf, Persia, Irak and India, but as the century wore on its 
dominance was to be challenged by the port of Sur to the southward. T h e 
majority of the slaves landed at Muscat were sold within O m a n itself. T h e 
4. Special number oí Daedalus {Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), 
103, 2, 1974 entitled 'Slavery, Colonialism and Racism'; S . W . Mintz, 1971; B . Nunez, 
1980; R . M . Levine, 1980; N . Sánchez-Albornoz, 1974. 
5. The need for further work has already been pointed out by B . A . Ogot, 1979, 
p. 175. For Turkish archives see C . Orhanlu, 1972 and 1976-7, pp. 145-56. For early 
anthropological work, see R . Skene, 1917; G . Pésente, 1912, 1929; D . C . Philliot and R . F . 
Azoo, 1906-7. 
6. R . H . K . Darkwah, 1975, p. 168; J. B . Kelly, 1968, pp. 417-18. 
7. J .B. Kelly, 1968, pp. 413-14. 
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plate 28.2 The slave trade from East Africa in the 1850s, as seen by Sir Richard Burton
rest were bought by agents from the Trucial Coast, notably the Kawâsim,
for resale on the coast or in the markets of Persia, Irak, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Hasa and Nadj. From Muscat and Sur, slaves were also conveyed to the
ports ofSindhTKutch, Kathiawar and the Bombay Presidency, in Bahraini,
Kuwaiti and Indian bottoms. Those intended for the Persian market were
landed at Bushire as well as brought across the Gulf to Lingah from
Sharjah. It is important to note that, in the early nineteenth century, slaves
were rarely brought all the way across Arabia from the Red Sea for sale
on the Gulf Coast. Basra was the chief market for slaves carried up the
Gulf.
British and Dutch slavers also participated in this lucrative trade. Slaves
largely from the island ofMadagascar - 'Kafirs'8 as they were called - were
imported into the Bombay and Madras Presidencies as well as the infant
British settlements on the west coast of Sumatra to meet the labour needs
oftheir respective factories.9 It must be emphasized here that the nineteenth
century witnessed not only population movements of Africans, but also of
Malays, Indians, and Chinese, either as slaves or indentured labourers
8. Kafir in Arabic means infidel, impious wretch, one who does not recognize the
blessings of God. It also means to cover up, to conceal, deny. It has become an appellation
usually applied by Arabs to all non-Muslims and hence to particular groups of people. It
was widely used in India and the Malay Archipelago to describe non-Christian and non-
Muslim African slaves. See H. Yule and A.C. Burnell, 1886, pp. 141-2.
9. H. Dodwell (ed.), 1920, pp. 100, 104, 135, 159-60, 188, 202, 223; F.W. Mees (ed.),
1928, p. 76.
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throughout the Indian Ocean area. This interaction of peoples of varied 
backgrounds merits further study.10 
T h e annual pilgrimage to Mecca also played an important, albeit a 
seasonal, role in the involuntary and voluntary movements of Africans to 
the Middle East. M a n y West African pilgrims reached Mecca via the Cairo 
caravan or by way of the Red Sea ports of Suäkin and Massawa, thereby 
constituting small diaspora communities." Ever since the time of the 
great Malian King, M a n s a M ü s ä , such wealthy African pilgrims were 
'accompanied by a number of slaves, some of w h o m [they sell] on the way 
as a kind of traveller's cheque - to pay the expenses of [their] journey'.12 
Therefore it was no accident that Mecca emerged as the chief market in 
the Arabian peninsula. Not only African slaves were brought thither for 
resale, but also Circassians, Malays, Indians and Central Asians. They 
were then distributed by individual buyers throughout the Muslim world.13 
A small number of Africans stayed back in the holy cities of western 
Arabia in pursuit of higher religious studies. West Africans of the Mälikite 
school of law predominated.14 Those from East Africa sat at the feet of 
their Shafi'ite professors in the North Yemeni towns of Zabid and Beit al-
Fakih and the celebrated religious centres of the Hadramawt - Tarim, 
'Ainat, Seiwun and Gaidun.15 
A s in previous centuries African slave labour was indispensable in the 
social, economic and political spheres of m a n y Asian societies. In areas 
dominated by British and Dutch colonial powers, especially in India and 
the Malay archipelago, slaves, including Africans, provided the base of a 
plantation economy similar to that found in the Americas. In the Middle 
East, especially in Arabia, a large number of African slaves were variously 
employed in domestic capacities as chambermaids, sailors, soldiers, admin-
istrators, shop assistants and the like. In the rural areas they worked as 
agricultural labourers, water carriers, camel drivers and shepherds. A s 
mentioned above, Ethiopians, as contrasted to Nubians, Sudanese and East 
Africans, were m u c h favoured and did lighter work.16 J. L . Burckhardt, 
the Victorian traveller, observed that, alongside their bonded compatriots, 
io. Not all members of these diaspora communities were slaves, a number were political 
exiles. Leaders of abortive anti-colonial revolts in Indonesia, for example, were sent to the 
Dutch penal settlement on Sri Lanka and to the Cape Colony. O n estimates of the number 
of slaves that were shipped to Asia see B . A . Ogot, 1979, p. 177. For varying figures see 
J. B . Kelly, 1968, pp. 414-16; W . Wilburn, 1813, Vol. 1, pp. 35, 60. 
11. For recent studies on West African pilgrims see U . al-Naqar, 1972, and J. S. Berks, 
1978. 
12. B . Lewis, 1971, p. 37. 
13. For details on the Mecca slave market see C . S. Hurgronje, 1970, pp. 14-15; 
R . Burton, 1964, Vol. 1, p. 252. O n the redistribution of African slaves see R . Winstedt, 
1958, p. S3, W . Ochsenwald, 1980, pp. 115-26. 
14. C . S. Hurgronje, 1970, p. 182. 
15. See Majalah al-Rabitah al-Alawi, 1350 A H , Vol. 4, pp. 30-1. 
16. C S . Hurgronje, 1970, pp. 11,13. 
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poor African pilgrims largely from West Africa - k n o w n locally as 'Tekrou-
rys' - served during their sojourn as porters, dockers, streetsweepers, 
firewood-fetchers, makers of pots, mats and baskets, and brewers of an 
intoxicating drink called 'bouza'.17 
In India, the African slave undertook a number of menial tasks which 
Indians either could not (because of caste restrictions) or would not 
perform, or for which the British deemed themselves to be unsuited. In the 
princely states, slaves, especially Africans, served primarily as domestics — 
concubines, eunuchs, water carriers, barbers, personal guards, stableboys, 
etc. W e are informed that the king of O u d h (in what is n o w Uttar Pradesh) 
was supplied in the early nineteenth century with m a n y Ethiopian male 
and female slaves and paid princely sums for them. U p o n purchase they 
were all converted to Islam. W e are also told that 'the rich and aristocratic 
Muslims, especially those w h o lived in cities like Patna and Calcutta, used 
to o w n besides male and female slaves, a large number of Habshi [Ethiopian] 
eunuchs'.18 A s in earlier periods, African slaves were considered to be 
luxury and prestige commodities. A n owner's social status was measured 
by the number of his slaves, w h o constituted an important part of his 
retinue and an ostentatious way of displaying wealth and power. 
In the Bengal, B o m b a y and Madras Presidencies, in addition to carrying 
out obvious domestic tasks slaves, notably from Madagascar, also played 
vital economic and military roles in the development of these infant British 
colonies. British East India C o m p a n y records for the late eighteenth and 
early nineteeenth centuries testify to the arduous work they carried out in 
the building of fortifications (eg. Fort St David in South India) as soldiers, 
sailors, dockers, and agricultural labourers.19 
In the Malay Archipelago, especially on the west coast of Sumatra, such 
as the British settlement of Benkulen,20 African slaves worked in a variety 
of ways as soldiers, trained mechanics, masons and carpenters, in addition 
to gathering and transporting pepper. T h e least-favoured were those w h o 
laboured under atrocious conditions in the Dutch gold mines, especially 
at Salida.21 
T h e assimilation of peoples of African origin into the local Asian popu-
lations was not as widespread as is often assumed, despite the time-
honoured custom of concubinage.22 Traits of a 'closed m o d e of slavery' 
17. J . L . Burckhardt, 1829, pp. 258-75, 382. 
18. A . K . Chattopadhyay, 1977, pp. 29, 40-1. 
19. H . Dodwell (ed.), 1920, pp. 104, 135. 
20. W . F . Mees (ed.), 1920 (Court to Fort Marlborough, 25 February 1773). Slaves also 
laboured in the sugar and arrack industry. 
21. See J. Paulus (ed.), 1917-21, Vol. 1, pp. 806-11. 
22. See the propaganda line summed up in C . Doughty, 1926, Vol. 1, pp. 554-5, 'In 
those Africans there is no resentment that they have been made slaves - they are often 
captives of their own wars - even though cruel men-stealers rent them from their parentage. 
T h e patrons w h o paid their price have adopted them into their households, the males are 
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similar to those of the slave systems in the Americas were often visible. It 
was inconceivable, for example, that an African, either as a slave or a freed 
m a n , would be accepted into the kinship system of his owner. Africans 
were 'maintained as separate ethnic groups that reproduced themselves 
either by natural processes or by constant recruitments'. Formidable social 
barriers were erected to prevent them entering the mainstream of society. 
Not only were they not assimilated but were 'kept at arm's length by virtue 
of the stigma attached to their status of slave'.23 
In the valleys and towns of south-western Arabia are still to be found 
m a n y diverse groups of peoples of African origin - the A k h d a m , Subyan, 
Hujür and the Gabart.24 T h e y do the most menial of jobs as scavengers 
and sweepers, work considered polluting and unclean by the Arab inhabi-
tants. They are virtually considered as outcasts and obliged to live in their 
separate quarters. T h e lot of poor African pilgrims in the Hidjäz was hardly 
any better. It was reported that most of them were found living together 
in some of the huts of the public place called 'El M e n a k h ' in the holy city 
of Medina.25 According to H . R . Dickson,26 no true Arab would marry a 
freed slave w o m a n , as it constituted a blot on the badge of honour and 
blood of the group. M a n y Sidis were reported in B o m b a y as living in their 
o w n quarter near the city prison.27 T h e British East India C o m p a n y slaves 
on the island of Sumatra were forced to inhabit 'a small village near the 
sea' away from the Malay settlements and the fort.28 
circumcised and — that which enfranchises their souls, even in the long passion of h o m e -
sickness - G o d has visited them in their mishap, they can say, "it was His Grace" since 
they are thereby entered into the saving religion. This therefore, they think is the better 
country'. Contrast the picture of cruelty, discrimination, escapes and revolts so apparent 
in the documents; see D . Lombardi, 1971, P-237; A . K . Chattopadhyay, 1977, pp. 42, 45, 
53; C . Colomb, 1873, pp. 101-2; H . R . Dickson, 1941, p. 502, on Arab attitudes on the 
handling of domestic slaves; and D . C . Philliot and R . F . Azoo, 1906-7, pp. 431, 434, on 
prejudices shown against Africans in the Hadramawt. O n the islands of Negrais, at the 
mouth of the Bassein river in Lower Burma, a settlement established by the Government 
of Fort St George in India, owing to the 'unconciliating and perverse disposition' of its 
superintendent, a state of unceasing fervent prevailed. 'Caffre slaves w h o had been intro-
duced for the purpose of cultivating the land rose against their masters, and seizing on the 
boats belonging to the island effected their escape.' See M . Symes, 1800, p. 10. 
23. See the analysis in M . Finley, 1976, pp. 819-21. 
24. R . B . Serjeant, 1966, pp. 28-33. 
25. J. L . Burckhardt, 1829, p. 382. 
26. H . R . Dickson, 1941, p. 503. 
27. T h e Gazeteer of Bombay City and Island, 1910, Vol. 2, p. 262. 
28. J. Bastin, 1965, p. 43. In the British Indian Empire the slaveowner was by law given 
full power over his property. It was held quite proper to seek to recover fugitive slaves. It 
was illegal on the part of anyone to 'harbour such runaways as knowingly to receive any 
stolen property'. T h e slave w h o absconded was open to punishment, usually by flogging. 
M a n y advertisements appeared in the Indian press of the period offering rewards for the 
return of runaways and warnings against their employment. See A . K . Chattopadhyay, 
1977, p. 57. In the Middle East, cases of runaway slaves were c o m m o n , and dated back as 
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It is interesting to note that these disparate African diaspora communities 
were well organized, and kept alive their o w n national traditions. C . S . 
Hurgronje29 observed that the Nubians of Mecca were superficial Muslims 
and spoke little Arabic and 'from Thursday afternoon to Friday morning 
they hold festival, regaling themselves with their national music with song 
and dance. Each community of such Negroes has its o w n Shaykh w h o 
settles disputes by his judicial sentences, and by his side stands an officer 
called nagib with a stick to carry out sentences.' 
The diaspora in Europe 
Although the African diaspora took place mainly through the slave trade, 
Africans also found their way into the outer world as free people inde-
pendent of the slave trade, or as a n e w phase of life after a period of slavery 
in the tropical Americas. Indeed, Africans had been present in Western 
Europe from Classical Antiquity onwards, though the numbers only 
became substantial from about the fifteenth century on, w h e n black 
Africans, first as slaves and then as freedmen, began to appear in southern 
Spain and Portugal, arriving at first by way of the trans-Saharan trade to 
North Africa. T h e n , as the direct maritime trade from Europe began to 
open in the second half of the century, still larger numbers of Africans 
appeared in Europe.30 
M a n y were slaves at first, especially in Portugal, the only significant 
slave-trading European power till nearly the middle of the seventeenth 
century. Over time, however, m a n y found their way into the broader 
European society, though often at the bottom of the social hierarchy, since 
their social condition was assimilated to that of their fellow Africans w h o 
did most of the physical labour in the tropical colonies. Their legal status 
was also ambiguous. T h e law, in northern Europe generally, no longer 
recognized the status of slave, though European colonial laws did. F r o m 
1685, residence in France was held to confer freedom, and the same was 
true of England after the notable judicial decision of Lord Mansfield in 
1772 already noted. In both situations, however, slaves from the colonies 
were still slaves de facto; in m a n y instances until the European powers 
abolished slavery in the colonies themselves, in 1834 for Britain, 1848 for 
France, and 1888 for Brazil. 
In spite of their ambiguous legal status, free Africans were present in 
Western Europe in considerable numbers from at least the mid-eighteenth 
century on. Estimates vary, but by 1800 they would have numbered several 
thousand in each of Spain, Portugal, France, or Britain; and in Spain or 
Portugal they would have been more numerous in an earlier period. T h e 
far as it has been ascertained to tenth-century Iraq. For details see C . Pellat, 1953, pp. 
233-4. F ° r Sumatra see J. Bastin. op. cit., p. 89. 
29. C . S. Hurgronje, 1970, pp. 11-12. See also M . b. Hashim, 1350 A H , pp. 42-3. 
30. A . C . de C . M . Saunders, 1982. 
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numbers were small in any case, compared with total European populations, 
but the African immigrants tended to be concentrated in the main cities, 
particularly in the port towns, so that their presence was more visible than 
their numbers would suggest.31 It goes without saying that, for any period 
before the 1840s, far more people of tropical African descent would have 
been found in Europe than Europeans in tropical Africa. 
This community of Africans in Europe was also concentrated in certain 
occupations, especially domestic service, this being partly a carry-over from 
the occupational status of Africans w h o came by way of West Indian 
slavery, partly a reflection of the European fad for exotic servants. African 
sailors were also c o m m o n by this time in the merchant service, though 
more so in Portugal than in France or Britain. Another significant, if 
smaller, group was m a d e up of students, w h o began to arrive in Europe in 
significant numbers by the middle of the eighteenth century and, in 
increasing numbers, throughout the nineteenth century. In an era in which 
commercial contact between Europe and Africa was increasing, it was an 
obvious advantage to African traders to be literate in a Western language 
and to have some acquaintance with European accounting practices. M a n y 
of these students therefore came to Europe through the good offices of 
European slave-traders operating in Africa and studied under their care in 
the principal slave-trade ports like Liverpool or Nantes. 
Still another peculiarity of the African communities in Europe was the 
fact that they were overwhelmingly male. This fact had two important 
implications. T h e African community was not self-sustaining. It had to 
be, and was, constantly replenished from overseas. This is not to say that 
the Africans had no sexual relations with European w o m e n , but the 
products of these relationships tended to be culturally European rather 
than African. After a few generations, the African physical appearance 
tended to disappear into the general European genetic pool. 
S o m e Africans also found their way into Eastern Europe, in spite of a 
more attenuated maritime contact with tropical Africa itself. There, the 
main line of entry was by way of the Ottoman slave trade, which was not 
mainly a trade in North Africans, but included sub-Saharan Africans drawn 
across the Sahara to Ottoman-associated ports like Tripoli, or brought 
north d o w n the Nile from what is n o w the southern Sudan.32 In a few 
instances, small pockets of African culture persisted in parts of the Ottoman 
empire into the twentieth century, such as a small Hausa-speaking c o m -
munity in what is n o w Yugoslavia. 
31. P . D . Curtin, 1967, esp. pp. 3-16; W . Rodney, 1975; W . B . Cohen, 1980, especially 
pp. 110-52. 
32. E . R . Toledano, 1982. 
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T h e western diaspora: background to the nineteenth 
century 
Compared with Europe and Asia, the African diaspora in the Americas 
was enormous. T h e Afro-American population at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, including both the free and the enslaved, has been 
estimated at approximately 8.5 million. O f this number more than 2 million, 
or nearly 25 per cent, lived in the U S A , the majority by far living in the 
so-called 'Slave States' along the Atlantic seaboard from Delaware to 
Florida, with small concentrations throughout the northern and interior 
states east of the Mississippi river, especially in large cities like N e w York, 
Boston and Philadelphia. In 1810, about 2 million Africans and Afro-
Americans were in the Antillean islands of the Caribbean Sea. Slightly 
more than 1 million were in the English Caribbean islands of Jamaica, St 
Kitts, Antigua, Nevis, Anguilla, St Lucia, St Vincent, Barbados, Grenada 
and Trinidad. Haiti, formerly the flourishing French sugar colony of Saint-
Domingue, had about 450 000. Cuba had 400 000; Puerto Rico, 280 000. 
Brazil had 2.5 million, and mainland Spanish America had a combined 
total of about 1.3 million. Most Afro-Americans in Puerto Rico were free, 
as were the great majority of the 400000 in Mexico; 400000 in Venezuela; 
200000 in Colombia; 50000 in Ecuador; and 30000 each in Chile and 
Argentina.33 
T h e general conditions in which the African and Afro-American popu-
lation found itself during the nineteenth century, therefore, depended on 
a large number of factors. T h e proportion of the non-white population in 
the society was one factor. T h e ratio of slave to free was another. T h e 
profile of the trade, the way each colony developed and socio-economic 
changes from time to time also affected the black experience in the 
Americas. This black experience throughout the Americas varied con-
siderably, and should not be considered to be a single, undeviating c o m m o n 
form for all colonies and all places. Afro-American society responded to 
local conditions everywhere, although patterns can be traced which illus-
trate a uniformity or basic similarity from the U S A to Brazil.34 
T h e basic divisions in Afro-American society and culture stemmed less 
from the imperial boundaries which affected the evolution of the American 
societies than from their fortuitous circumstances of location, crop culture 
and socio-economic structures. Throughout the Americas, Africans - slaves 
as well as free — living and working in cities seemed to enjoy a wider contact, 
33. The population figures, rounded and adjusted in some cases, are taken from J. H . 
Franklin, 1969, pp. 120,145-9,17I1 !74> '86; F. Tannenbaum, 1946, pp. 8-14; R . Conrad, 
1972, p. 283; J. V . Lombardi, 1971, p. 35; P. D . Curtin, 1969, p. 22; G . Aguirre de Beitran, 
1972, pp. 233-4; F . P . Bowser, 1974, p. 333; D . W . Cohen and J.P. Greene, 1972, pp. 4, 
10,14. 
34. M . Harris, 1964; H . Hoetink, 1973; R . B . Toplin (ed.), 1974, and 1981; P . Villiers, 
1982. 
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more opportunities for upward social mobility and greater opportunities for 
liberty than those held in large gangs on rural plantations, haciendas, and 
ingenios. A n d this generalization seemed valid across the conventional 
imperial divisions. Also, with the exception of the U S A , life expectancy 
under slavery was considerably less than in the free society, with the 
consequence that all the American slave societies south of the Rio Bravo 
(called the Rio Grande in the U S A ) suffered an absolute decline a m o n g 
the non-free sector of the population.35 
Latin Americans had a longer social experience with the institution of 
slavery and its concomitant social effects than their fellow colonists in 
British or French America. Apart from their Iberian frontier experience, 
Spanish and Portuguese colonists used Africans as slaves for more than a 
hundred years before the English and French established their slave col-
onies in Barbados, Jamaica, Plymouth, Virginia, the Carolinas, Louisiana 
and Saint-Domingue.36 
Yet, by the nineteenth century, the differences between the slave systems 
in the western hemisphere were more differences of degree than funda-
mental differences of kind. In all systems manumission from the status of 
slavery was relatively rare; w o m e n benefited more from the laws than m e n ; 
family integrity remained fragile; and colour and origin constituted major 
factors in status considerations. 
O n e dismal reflection of the general condition of the Afro-American 
population during its centuries of the American experience can be deduced 
from the astonishing fact that the overall population of 8.5 million Africans 
and Afro-Americans existing in the Americas at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century almost certainly represented less than the number of 
Africans transported to the Americas after 1600.37 
T h e single largest American importer of African slaves was Brazil. 
During the course of the slave trade, Brazil received approximately 38 per 
cent of all Africans introduced to the N e w World. T h e region which today 
comprises Latin America and the Caribbean altogether absorbed 86 per 
cent of the trade; with 36 per cent ending up in the Caribbean islands. But 
the history of the African in the N e w World cannot be appreciated merely 
by considering the gross figures for the trade, like some bulk cargo carried 
and left in the various states of the Americas. A more meaningful sense of 
the varying impact and varied possibilities for social development is gleaned 
35. P . D . Curtin, 1969; S. L . Engerirían and E . D . Genovese (eds), 1975. 
36. L . Hanke, 1970; M . Crahan and F . W . Knight (eds), 1979. 
37. Estimates of the number of Africans who came to the Americas by way of the slave 
trade vary from as low as 3.5 million to a high of 25 million. P. D . Curtin, 1969, gives the 
best overall profile of volume flow, suggesting almost 10 million. Curtin's figures have been 
modified somewhat by a recent synthesis using the very large amount of new data that have 
appeared since 1969, yielding an addition of 2 to 3 per cent. See, J. E . Inikori, 1976a; E . 
Vila Vilar, 1977a, pp. 267-80; S. L . Engerman and E . D . Genovese (eds), 1975, pp. 3-128; 
H . A . Gemery and J. S. Hogendorn (eds), 1979, and, especially, P. E . Lovejoy, 1982. 
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by looking at the relative participation of these various regions century by 
century. Differences in the date of entry into the trans-Atlantic trade, 
and fluctuations in the volume of acceptances played some part in the 
demographic and cultural forms which eventually emerged in the Americas 
by the late nineteenth century. 
Before 1600, the Americas were truly the hegemonic preserve of the 
Iberians, and so the Spanish and the Portuguese divided the Africans w h o 
came to the N e w World during that time, with the Spanish getting about 
60 per cent, or more than 125 ooo.38 Those Africans helped maintain social 
viability, while the new diseases introduced by the incoming Europeans 
and Africans decimated the local indigenous Indian populations, especially 
in the highlands of Mexico and Peru.39 Considering the later history of the 
African in the N e w World, it is interesting to note that at the end of the 
sixteenth century, Africans in general considered themselves superior to 
the local Indians, and treated them with the same arrogance and con-
descension that their fellow Spanish did in Spanish America.40 
About a million and a half Africans came to the Americas during the 
seventeenth century. O f this number , 41 per cent went to Brazil, 35 per 
cent went to the fledgling British, Dutch and French colonies (mainly in 
the circum-Caribbean region), and 22 per cent went to Spanish America. 
This was the period in which the fully organized, highly capitalized trans-
Atlantic slave trade began. T h e annual average importation rate rose from 
about 1800 Africans during the sixteenth century, to more than 17 000. T h e 
declining relative participation of the Spanish reflected the demographic 
recovery of the mainland Indian populations. But the slack in the Spanish 
sector was more than compensated for by the increasing demand for 
labourers in the expanding Brazilian sugar zones of the north-east, and the 
developing socio-economic complex based on sugar production in the 
eastern Caribbean islands. 
T h e eighteenth century constituted the apogee of the African migration 
to the Americas. Both the plantation societies in the Americas and the slave 
trade which supplied the manpower needs reached their fullest maturity. 
Between 1700 and 1810 more than half of all the Africans ever to come to 
the N e w World arrived: perhaps far more than 6 million Africans. In 
demographic terms, it was probably the period of the greatest reciprocal 
impact between Africa and the wider world, with established commercial 
contacts across the Indian Ocean as well as with Europe and the Americas. 
O f the staggering number of eighteenth-century imports, Brazil received 
31.3 per cent, or more than 1.8 million Africans. T h e British Caribbean 
got 23.2 per cent — about 1.4 million slaves - with more than 600 000 going 
38. P . D . Curtin, 1969; E . Vila Vilar, 1973, 1977b; J. Palacios Preciados, 1973. 
39. W . M . Denevan, 1976; E . Wolf, 1959, pp. 194-6; C . Gibson, 1967, pp. 140-59; 
A . W . Crosby, 1972. 
40. J. Lockhart, 1968, pp. 171-98. 
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to the principal sugar-producing island of Jamaica. T h e French Antilles 
received 22.3 per cent, or m o r e than 1.3 million, with their premier 
plantation colony of S a i n t - D o m i n g u e o n the western part of Hispaniola 
getting nearly 800 000 slaves. Spanish Amer ica imported 9.6 per cent, or 
m o r e than 6 0 0 0 0 0 , with the majority going to their Caribbean islands of 
C u b a a n d Puerto Rico a n d the eastern part of Hispaniola, their coastal 
colonies o n the northern fringe of South America , and the interior of Peru 
via the R i o de la Plata region. T h e D u t c h and the D a n i s h Caribbean got 
5.8 per cent, or approximately 4 5 0 0 0 0 ; a n d the U S A - which until 1776 
comprised the colonies of British N o r t h America - took in about 5.8 per 
cent, or s o m e w h a t less than 400 000 Africans.41 
T A B L E 28.1 Slave imports, ijoo-1810 
Region Approximate percentage Approximate number 





Dutch and Danish Antilles 
British North A m e r i c a - U S A 
TOTAL 
* Does not add up to 100 per cent because of rounding off of figures. 
T h e eighteenth century, then, represented the period par excellence of 
the growth of the plantation slave society in the N e w W o r l d . T h e classical 
examples were the sugar, indigo, coffee and spice plantations of the Carib-
bean region and Brazil, a n d the rice a n d cotton plantations b o o m i n g in the 
southern and south-western part of the U S A after 1790. T h e agricultural 
revolution in the Americas flourished during the period and the local 
export economies expanded and stabilized.42 Besides, the local societies h a d 
attained b y the end of the century a form of rigidity, self-assurance a n d 
maturity which were to influence their attitudes and w a y s of life in the 
later nineteenth century. T h e s e attitudes fashioned the pattern of inclusion 
or exclusion of all later immigrants to the Americas, as well as definitively 
freezing the profile of all groups in the local societies. N o t surprisingly, the 
very time w h e n the A m e r i c a n colonies of the Europeans were breaking 
41. These figures are based on adjustments of those published in P . D . Curtin, 1969, 
1976. 
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away from their métropoles in the n a m e of freedom, they were busily 
circumscribing ever more sharply the freedom, expectations and legal 
privileges of their non-white population. With the eighteenth century 
began the most dismal period of depression and exploitation of the Africans 
in the N e w World.4 3 
T h e abolitionist period 
Nevertheless, by 1810 the tide had begun to change inexorably for the 
American slave society. T h e institutions of slavery slowly crumbled from 
within and without. T h e curious combination of political freedom which 
gave white Americans a greater voice in their internal affairs, economic self-
interest, humanitarianism, imperial incompatibility, and the unquenchable 
thirst for liberty on the part of the enslaved, ultimately destroyed the 
American slave system.44 T h e political independence of the U S A after 
1776, Haiti after 1804, the mainland Spanish colonies after 1825, and Brazil 
after 1822, gave a different complexion to the political dimension of the 
system of slavery and the slave trade, and had repercussions outside the 
parochial boundaries of each empire, colony and state. 
T h e loss of the British North American colonies in 1783 and the 
termination of the British slave trade in 1808 affected slavery and the 
African in profound ways. T h e largest and most efficient supplier removed 
itself from the market, and began an intensive campaign to persuade other 
European states to follow its example. T h e British anti-slavery campaign 
sharply reduced the number of Africans taken to the Americas during the 
nineteenth century, although the total remains high. Before the trade ended 
in 1870, the pattern returned to that which prevailed during its first 
century.45 T h e Spanish and Portuguese colonies again became the major 
importers. O f the nearly 2 million Africans w h o arrived in the N e w World 
during this period, more than 1.1 million (or about 60 per cent) went to 
Brazil. M o r e than 600000 (about 31.9 per cent) went to the Spanish 
Antilles, with the greater proportion by far going to Cuba . T h e rest went 
to the French Caribbean, with a small number entering the U S A . 
T h e trans-Atlantic slave trade, and therefore the migration of Africans, 
responded to the expanding demands for a labour force to develop the 
agricultural potential of the new-found lands as well as the supply con-
ditions for Africans in Africa.46 Most Africans consequently entered plan-
tation agricultural complexes in the Americas. 
But since the plantation complex varied throughout the Americas the 
socializing forces within which the Africans and their descendants would 
43. F . W . Knight, 1974; R . B . Toplin (ed.), 1974. 
44. I. Berlin and R . Hoffman (eds), 1983. 
45. H . Hoetink, 1979, pp. 20-40. 
46. H . S . Klein (ed.), 1978, pp. 239-45; S. Miers and I. Kopytoff (eds), 1977, pp. 3 -
78. 
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mould their o w n American culture likewise varied. Throughout the A m e r -
icas, therefore, the amalgam of cultures would demonstrate great variety. 
Certainly this can be seen in the modifications which took place in the 
worship of Shango, perhaps the most widely distributed African religious 
form in the N e w World.47 While the Nigerian - more specifically, the 
Yoruba - origin was never in doubt, the forms of Shango varied con-
siderably from C u b a , to Trinidad, to Haiti, to Brazil. In Cuba , in particular, 
the cult became quite Catholicized, and the originally male African Shango 
became female, while other forms of the ritual as well as the symbols were 
transposed and, in some cases, transformed. W h a t held true for the worship 
of Shango also followed in other aspects of community life and organization. 
It became increasingly more difficult for creóle Africans to maintain their 
original social forms in the N e w World, however great their numbers, 
owing to the development of a structure which had stabilized by the 
nineteenth century, and to which they were forced to become a part, and 
to m a k e necessary adaption. 
T h e inescapable reality for Africans coming to the N e w World in the 
nineteenth century meant that at the very time w h e n they were affecting 
the pattern of cultural transmission - as they had always done - they 
themselves were enormously affected by the profound changes that slavery 
and the slave trade had wrought on Africa, the Americas, and Europe. 
These changes naturally affected, in turn, the culture of these three areas, 
and contributed to a sharper distinction and discrimination of each region's 
peculiar culture.48 
Part of this reality, of course, was the bewildering variation in the 
situation in which an arriving African could find himself. In the Caribbean, 
the Africans formed the majority of the population. T h e phenotype was 
self-evidently black. In the U S A on the other hand, black phenotypes were 
a minority of the national population, however concentrated they might 
have been in some individual states. In parts of Latin America such 
as Ecuador, Chile and Argentina, the blacks had virtually disappeared 
genetically a m o n g the American Indian and European groups, illustrating 
a broad spectrum of biological intermixture.49 
N o r did the demographic evolution of the regions follow the logical 
pattern of relative participation in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. T h e Afro-
American components of American societies did not necessarily correspond 
to the proportion of Africans imported during the centuries of the slave 
trade. Brazil, for example, imported about 4 million slaves during the 
course of the trade, a figure which, as w e have noted, was approximately 
47. W . R . Bascom, 1972; R . G . Hamilton, 1970, pp. 356-73; M . Schüler, 1980, pp. 30-
44; G . E . Simpson, 1978, pp. 75-82, and 190-2. 
48. H . L . Shapiro, 1953. 
49. G . R . Andrews, 1980. 
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38 per cent of the trans-Atlantic trade.50 At the end of slavery in 1890, Brazil 
had an Afro-American population of about 4 million, which comprised 33 
per cent of the local Brazilian population and about 36 per cent of the total 
Afro-American population of the western hemisphere. T h e Caribbean 
region imported approximately 5 million slaves, or 43 per cent of the trade, 
and w h e n the last Caribbean island to abolish slavery - C u b a - did so in 
1886, the region had a mere 3 million Afro-Americans, which, while they 
averaged about 60 per cent of the local regional population, accounted for 
only 18 per cent of the total Afro-Americans in the hemisphere. T h e U S A 
received about 0.5 million Africans from the trade, or about 4.5 per cent, 
but had an Afro-American population of about 4.5 million at the end of 
slavery there in 1865. This group formed only 7.0 per cent of the local 
population, but was 40.5 per cent of all the Afro-Americans in the western 
hemisphere. 
T A B L E 28.2 Slave imports and nineteenth-century populations 
Region Slaves Percentage Afro-American Percentages of 
(millions) of trade population population 
(millions) Local Hemisphere 
Brazil 4.0 38.0 4.0(1890) 33.0 36.0 
Caribbean 5.0 43.0 2.2 (1886) 60.0 18.0 
USA 05 4jj 4-5 (1865) 7-Q 4°-° 
T h e figures in Table 28.2 demonstrate quite unequivocally a marked 
variation in the ability of regional black populations to expand during the 
period of the slave trade and slavery. In general, with the exception of the 
U S A , Afro-American populations either stagnated, or failed to expand 
naturally. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the slave populations 
declined at the astonishing rate of 2.0 to 4.0 per cent per a n n u m , resulting 
in an overall slave population at the end of slavery which was far less than 
the total n u m b e r of slaves imported to the colonies, a decline which could 
not be m a d e up by the normal healthy growth of the free population. 
A few examples illustrate the general pattern. During the eighteenth 
century alone, Jamaica imported m o r e than 600000 slaves. In 1838, at the 
end of slavery, the slave population was less than 250 000 and the entire 
black population under 350000. Saint-Domingue imported more than 
800000 slaves during the eighteenth century, yet the slave population 
numbered a mere 480000 in 1790 on the eve of the revolution there. T h e 
total non-white population numbered half a million. Between 1810 and 
1870 C u b a imported about 600000 African slaves. In 1810, the free n o n -
white population of C u b a numbered about 114 000 individuals. B y 1880 the 
50. Slave importation figures based on P. D . Curtin, 1969; Afro-American populations 
derived from D . W . Cohen and J. P. Greene (eds), 1972, pp. 4-14. 
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slave population was estimated at merely 200 000 and the free non-white 
population slightly more than 269 000 persons. 
T h e drastic decline of the American slave populations (except in the 
case of the U S A ) provides the most serious indictment of the system of 
slavery which failed dismally either to create an inherently viable and self-
reproducing society or to provide an efficient and reliable labour supply. 
Moreover, the legacies of slavery permanently retarded the abilities of 
the Afro-American population to compete effectively in those political, 
economic and social structures where they did not form the overwhelming 
majority of the population. 
The impact of Africa 
W h e n the American slave systems disintegrated during the nineteenth 
century, the basic institutional forms and social attitudes of the societies 
had already been established. In general American societies were hostile to 
Africans and African culture. 
Nevertheless, the impact of Africa was inescapable in m a n y aspects 
of American society: phenotype, language, music, religion, cuisine, art, 
agriculture and architecture. In some cases, the influences from Africa were 
strong enough and pervasive enough to forge a genuine Afro-American 
culture competing with, and sometimes complementing the European-
derived culture. 
In the U S A the political-structure imposed a rigid dichotomy between 
black and white in the population, relegating any individual with any degree 
of African ancestry to the category of black.51 B y contrast, throughout the 
rest of the hemisphere a three-tiered social categorization prevailed, corres-
ponding to the dominant groups of black, mixed, and white. T h e relatively 
small number of white persons at the top of the social pyramid in most 
societies afforded the dominant African majorities the opportunity to 
impose their values and their cultures on the rest of the society. 
Within the three-tiered structure each caste had its o w n set of legal 
rights and social privileges based on a combination of wealth, colour and 
occupation. In the sugar and plantation-based economic zones of Brazil, 
the Caribbean, and the lowlands of Mexico, Colombia and Peru, the rights 
of slaves as well as free persons of colour tended to be circumscribed in 
direct proportion to the overall demands of their labour. In the coffee, 
cattle and fishing areas of south-eastern Brazil, Puerto Rico, eastern C u b a , 
and the interior provinces of Venezuela and Argentina, social mobility 
tended to be greater, social distances shorter, and internal class and caste 
distinctions more relaxed and less formal than in the plantation zones. 
Meanwhile, in the towns and cities like Buenos Aires, L ima , Sào Paulo, 
Caracas, Havana, Vera Cruz, Puebla and Mexico City, Africans enjoyed 
51. L . Foner, 1970; W . Jordan, 1968; P . Mason, 1970. 
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considerable freedom from restraint, and often competed for some of the 
occupations performed by other free members of the society/These social 
arrangements affected but did not determine the relationship between Afro-
Americans and the rest of the population in the later nineteenth century 
and the twentieth century. 
While slavery persisted, the majority of Africans and Afro-Americans 
served either as agricultural field hands, or in domestic service. Never-
theless, about 20 per cent were sailors, curers, artisans, muleteers, nurse-
maids, wetnurses, merchants, property owners (including property in 
slaves), shopkeepers, mining and sugar experts, and vendors of fish, con-
diments and ground provisions. Indeed, in the later eighteenth century 
Edward L o n g was complaining that a substantial proportion of the currency 
in Jamaica was in the hands of this sector of the population, and that they 
monopolized the transportation systems overland as well as along the coast.52 
This situation did not change very m u c h after slavery was abolished, 
although the number of peasant farmers of African descent increased 
sharply in the Caribbean. Occupation and biological heritage could and 
did increase class and caste mobility both during and after slavery. A n 
individual or a family could work their way outward and often upward 
from slavery to freedom, or from free black to mulatto (especially in 
Brazil and Spanish America), or from mulatto to white (an exceptional 
achievement requiring a considerable amount of money) w h e n the indices 
of race were more strongly cultural than biological. B y the later eighteenth 
century some Spanish American planters and merchants, doubtful of their 
status, bought certificates from the Crown, called limpieza de sangre, which 
certified that they had no Moorish or Jewish ancestors in at least the 
preceding four generations. Ultimately, however, internal social mobility 
and the general quality of life depended on the immediate circumstances 
of the community: on factors of demography, economy, law, social and 
political philosophy, and degree of cultural pluralism. For the less stable 
or mature the society, the more the Africans and Afro-Americans influenced 
the structure and carved a niche for themselves and their descendants. 
Where they could - and where they had no other recourse — Africans 
and Afro-Americans adjusted to the conditions in which they found them-
selves. In a milieu of cultural symbiosis, Africans contributed almost as 
m u c h to the rest of the society as they accepted from it. O f course, the 
more they needed and the less they found, the more they became creative -
as the patois speech pattern of the previously French eastern Caribbean 
islands and the papiamento of the previously Dutch Antilles reveal. Cre-
ativity became especially necessary where a small number of Europeans 
lived among a large number of Africans as was the case in m a n y colonies 
of exploitation such as Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Saint-Domingue. 
W h e r e the European population failed to comprise a critical mass, the 
52. E. Long, 1774. 
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Africans had to build a society from a diverse collectivity of individuals 
w h o had little more in c o m m o n than their skin colour and their servility. 
T h e adoption of their customs and behaviour by the non-African sector 
indicated the measure of their success. 
Africans did not always conform to the society into which they were 
thrust. For centuries marronage, or the flight from the slave system, existed 
as an integral aspect of slavery.53 In Brazil, the north-east witnessed the 
establishment of the quilombo of Palmares which lasted almost a century 
and which was eliminated only with the largest military force ever mounted 
in the Americas by the Portuguese and Brazilians. Maroon towns existed 
for equally long periods in Esmeraldas in Ecuador and in parts of the Blue 
Mountains and the Cockpit Country of Jamaica. Marronage manifested 
not only the wish to be free, it was an eloquent and visible condemnation 
of the system of slavery by Africans. 
B y the time African slavery was eliminated in the Americas, the position 
of the African sector had worsened dramatically from what it had been a 
century before. T h e political and economic reconstruction that followed 
the Civil W a r in the U S A accompanied a movement of legal discrimination 
and social and economic exclusion of the non-white sector, characterized 
by segregated institutions, lynchings, and overtly racist societies and organ-
izations, which combined until the middle of the twentieth century.54 T h e 
general conditions experienced by black Americans then compared with 
those prevailing today in a more extreme way in South Africa. 
In the U S A Afro-Americans formed a small minority, relatively power-
less in political terms. By contrast, in Haiti they controlled the state after 
the revolution of 1789, and, throughout the nineteenth century, African 
cultural revival became the strongest social cement for that impoverished, 
isolated country, especially exemplified in the syncretic religious practice 
of vodun. Elsewhere, in places like Cuba , Jamaica, Barbados, and Brazil, a 
small number of Afro-Americans attained positions of social prestige and 
political power. T h e long, bitter and difficult wars in Cuba between 1868 
and 1898 m a d e Afro-Cubans such as Antonio M a c e o and M á x i m o G o m e z 
national heroes and international figures in the struggle for political inde-
pendence. Nevertheless, as late as 1912 Cuba still experienced a major racial 
war, and hostility to Afro-Cubans did not diminish until the Revolution led 
by Fidel Castro in 1959. 
Afro-American accomplishments both at the individual and at the col-
lective level were outstanding during the nineteenth century. Despite the 
diverging paths of Africa and the Americas, despite their monumental legal 
and social disabilities, despite their enormous economic handicaps, despite 
the aggressive antagonism of white Americans, the Africans created suc-
cessful communities throughout the Americas. They established edu-
53. Y . Debbasch, 1961-2; M . Schüler, 1970; R . Price, 1973. 
54. G . Myrdal, 1944. 
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plate 28.4 Toussaint L'Ouverture, leader of the Saint-Domingue revolution and father of
independent Haiti
cational institutions such as the Mico Colleges in Antigua and Jamaica,
Codrington College in Barbados, and a number of colleges in the USA:
Virginia Union University (1864), Atlanta University and Fisk University
(1865) and the Hampton Institute and Howard University in 1867. Afro-
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Americans have played a significant role in American technological inno-
vation. Benjamin Banneker, from Maryland, a mathematician and almanac 
publisher, assisted in the surveying of the District of Columbia. Between 
1835 and 1836, Henry Blair, a slave from Maryland, patented two corn 
harvesters. In the 1850s Benjamin Montgomery, a slave owned by Jefferson 
Davis, the President of the Confederate States of the South, invented a 
propeller for boats. Norbert Rilleux, born in N e w Orleans and educated 
in Paris, invented in 1846 the vacuum evaporation pan which considerably 
advanced the process of sugar refining. In 1852, Elijah M c K o y invented 
the cup which allowed machines to be lubricated while in operation. Jan 
Matzeliger, born in Dutch Guiana, invented the lasting machine which 
revolutionized the shoe industry of N e w England. George Washington 
Carver, the agricultural chemist from Tuskegee Institute, invented more 
than three hundred products from the peanut, thereby reinvigorating the 
agricultural economy of m a n y parts of the South.55 
T h e diaspora was cruel and difficult for the transported Africans. Invol-
untarily dislocated and transferred to strange lands, placed in the most 
onerous servility, and often associated with hostile people, these Africans 
demonstrated heroic patience, perseverance, adaptability and creativity. 
Eventually they became an unavoidable part of most American societies. 
Through civil and international wars, through prosperity and depression, 
and all types of political change, Africans worked, fought, and eventually 
established themselves within the several nations in the Americas as well 
as Europe. 
The diaspora and Africa 
But the thought of Africa remained a constant theme, pursued with varying 
degrees of seriousness by both white and black Americans. In the U S A , 
the idea of the repatriation of Africans had been mentioned occasionally 
throughout the eighteenth century, most notably in 1777, when T h o m a s 
Jefferson sponsored a report in a committee of the Virginia legislature. 
Repatriation began in earnest after 1815, however, when a small group of 
thirty-eight black Americans led by Paul Cuffe returned to Africa. By 1830, 
Liberia had become the focus for a general colony of repatriated Africans, 
mostly ex-slaves, sponsored by the American Colonization Society with 
the financial support of the Federal as well as m a n y State governments. B y 
i860, only about 15000 settlers had returned to Africa. After the Civil 
W a r , less than 2000 settlers made the trip, despite the rapid deterioration 
of the conditions of life for Afro-Americans in the U S A . 
T w o other sources provided returning immigrants. T h e first came from 
the unknown number of maroons and Africans taken from confiscated slave 
ships during the nineteenth century, and shipped back to Africa by the 
55. J . H . Franklin, 1969, p. 197. 
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British in their zealous attempt to terminate the trade in slaves and replace 
it by 'legitimate' trade. T h e second source of African returnees came from 
an even smaller number of missionaries recruited in the Caribbean and 
southern states of the U S A , principally by the Moravians and Presby-
terians, to assist in the propagation of the Christian Gospel in West 
Africa. T h e most well-known example of this is perhaps the Basel Mission 
enterprise a m o n g the A k w a p i m hills of Ghana in the 1830s and 1840s, and 
their decision in 1843 to use Jamaicans as substitutes for G e r m a n and 
Swiss missionaries whose mortality in the field proved too high for evan-
gelical efficacy. 
While Africans w h o came to the N e w World can be numbered in 
millions, their descendants w h o returned to Africa amounted to only a few 
thousands.56 M a n y reasons account for this, not the least of which was the 
significant lack of support to establish the type of transportation system 
which had previously facilitated the westward trans-Atlantic flow. Repatri-
ation during the nineteenth century offered few material rewards for 
Europeans or non-Europeans. But by 1900, the divergence between Africa 
and the Americas had become too great. Persons of African descent became 
caught up in the self-consciousness of the age which produced the type of 
xenophobic nationalism that all but destroyed the appeal of Africa. M o r e -
over, the interest in Africa after the end of the slave trade grew from 
national lusts for power and wealth - and Afro-Americans lacked both 
political power and the wealth needed to stimulate their o w n interest, or 
influence those w h o were partitioning Africa into colonial spheres. T h e 
Afro-American view became focused more on the new developments within 
their hemisphere. Internal and inter-regional migrations and the quest to 
establish the good life against new deleterious challenges absorbed their 
attention. T h e African connection faded, but did not die. T h e return-to-
Africa movement found individual promoters w h o could occasionally infuse 
the movement with new appeal. In 1897, Henry Sylvester Williams, a 
Trinidadian-born lawyer living in London, founded the Pan-African 
Association, whose later membership would include George Padmore, 
K w a m e N k r u m a h and C . L . R . James. In the 1920s Marcus Garvey 
founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association, a movement 
designed to spur African decolonization and unite all Africans wherever 
they were found. Garvey's organization had branches in Canada, the U S A , 
the Caribbean, Latin America and Africa.57 B y the time that Garvey's 
organization collapsed in 1927, Africa, and especially the Ethiopian 
question, had already begun to assume paramount importance in world 
affairs. 
56. T . Shick, 1980. 
57. T . Martin, 1976; E . D . Cronon, 1962; R . A . Hill (ed.), 1983. 
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T h e aim of this concluding chapter is to highlight the main trends of 
African historical evolution at the end of the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century, particularly in the decade 1875-85, which saw the rising tide of 
European interest culminate in a scramble for territory, the Berlin West 
African Conference, the partition and the eventual conquest of Africa. A 
panoramic view of Africa on the eve of the European conquest suggests 
discernible, predominant trends in spite of the diverse varieties of states, 
peoples and polities, and seemingly divergent tendencies. A predominant 
trend would appear to have been the determined effort on the part of 
various African leaders to strengthen their power and their capacity to 
defend African territories and interests. These efforts were, however, 
systematically undermined and eventually subverted by the European 
presence. 
A s the chapters in this volume have shown, the nineteenth century in 
Africa was a period of rapid and sometimes contradictory changes. U p to 
the third quarter of the century, the most far-reaching and widespread of 
the changes had their origin in internal factors. Other changes were m u c h 
affected or even initiated by European commercial, missionary or consular 
activities operating on the coast and, especially after 1850, increasingly 
penetrating into the interior. S o m e of the movements for change, such as 
the efforts of some rulers to unify Ethiopia and reform its institutions, were 
local in their impact. Others, like the activities of the ambitious khédives 
of Egypt in the Nile valley had repercussions throughout a whole region. 
T h e Mfecane had begun as a local affair, but soon spread over the whole 
of Southern, Central and parts of East Africa and, even on the eve of 
the European conquest, the history of these areas was still largely the 
history of the states that had resulted from it or were very m u c h affected 
by it.1 
T h e djihäd movements of Islamic reformation covered the whole of the 
2 
1. See Chapter 10, above. 
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Sudanic zone of West Africa, and the eastern Sahara up to Cyrenaica, and 
spread south to the borders of the forest region as their impact reached 
Senegambia and the Voltaic regions, the southern Mandinka, northern 
Yoruba and the Edo-speaking peoples. A s the European d e m a n d for palm 
oil, peanuts, ivory, sisal and rubber grew and the internal network of long-
distance trade routes responded to these demands, trade became a major 
factor affecting access to firearms and the acquisition of wealth, and hence 
the rise and fall of states over wide areas of Africa. As a consequence of 
this expanding European trade and the activities of European and American 
missionaries, Christianity and European ideas of social and political organ-
ization also became factors of change over a wide area stretching from 
Sierra Leone to Southern Africa and Madagascar. 
W h a t stands out most prominently in these different movements is the 
efforts of various African leaders in the nineteenth century in different 
parts of the continent to reform their societies. S o m e of the efforts were 
inspired by the heritage of cultures in Africa, others by reformist ideas in 
Islam. In most cases, the leaders were only too ready to take advantage of 
opportunities offered by the expanding scope of trade and the activities of 
Europeans, whether traders or missionaries, hunters of game or hunters of 
concessions. Another feature that stands out just as prominently was 
h o w these efforts of African leaders to reform were systematically being 
undermined by the very activities of European traders, missionaries and 
hunters that African leaders tried to exploit. 
It is remarkable h o w little attention so far has been paid to this feature 
of the nineteenth century: of internal efforts at reform systematically 
being aborted by external intervention. Because of the assumption that 
colonialism and integration into the world economy were necessary con-
ditions of modernization, most historians have failed to notice h o w m u c h 
the nineteenth century represented an African effort at self-development 
and to what extent European conquest and colonialism was a subversion 
of that effort. 
Political structures 
This effort at self-development was perhaps most prominent in the realm 
of political structures and state power. T h e grand lesson of the slave trade 
era long driven h o m e in West and Central Africa, and being learnt in East 
Africa in the course of the nineteenth century, was that the w a y to survive 
and perhaps even profit from the slave trade was to strengthen the structures 
and military basis of state power. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as w e have noted in most 
parts of Africa, 'the political and economic structures . . . seemed to have 
a certain fragility about them. There appears to have been a perpetual ebb 
and flow in the frontiers of the state systems, and in the rise and fall of 
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administrative centres.'2 T h e state m a d e m i n i m u m demands on people in 
the payment of homage, tribute and military service in return for protection. 
In most cases, the day-to-day life of the people largely revolved around a 
network of kinship, religious, judicial and economic institutions that often 
cut across state frontiers. Only in the Maghrib and Egypt had the operation 
of Islamic law over several centuries produced political structures with an 
appreciable level of durability. Elsewhere in Africa, tremendous effort had 
to be invested in the nineteenth century to evolve n e w and potentially more 
durable political structures. In the intense political rivalries that resulted, 
some of the effort was no doubt counterproductive and in some places the 
first visible result was disintegration of empires and decentralization, if not 
fragmentation, of authority. In the words of K . Arhin and J. Ki-Zerbo 
describing the Voltaic regions: 
During the nineteenth century, political instability and population 
movements were widespread. Brutal massacres and secessionist m o v e -
ments were led by the very people w h o were supposed to represent 
authority... S o m e notable exceptions notwithstanding, the frequency 
and extent of these conflicts grew and the tendency towards social 
dislocation was undoubtedly linked with the growing opportunities 
available to the peripheral powers and the rebels to obtain arms and 
use them to challenge the reigning chiefs.3 
Notable examples of this tendency were the initial impact of the Mfecane, 
and the impact of trade and the C h o k w e and O v i m b u n d u expansion on 
the Luba and L u n d a state systems.4 Several states and empires disappeared. 
A n d yet even more noticeable were the m a n y new centres of power 
that emerged, experimenting with new administrative structures, generally 
tending towards a more effective exercise of power by the ruler, clearer 
definition of his jurisdiction, greater control of officials w h o owed their 
positions to his favour rather than their o w n hereditary rights, improved 
tax systems and the like.5 
S o m e historians have described these reformist movements as the activi-
ties of African 'proto-nationalists and empire builders' engaged in a kind 
of African Scramble which in part provoked, or at least helps to explain, 
the European Scramble.6 In fact, these reformist activities were not a 
sudden or fitful movement in any way comparable with the European 
Scramble. T h e search for more stable political structures had been going 
on throughout the nineteenth century and indeed before then as part of 
the general evolution of the peoples. Perhaps there was a quickening of the 
pace, and changes hitherto associated with the rise of states like Old O y o 
2. See Chapter i, p.5, above. 
3. See Chapter 25, pp. 684-5, above. 
4. Chapters 4 , 5 and 11 above. 
5. S e e T . C . McCaskie, 1980. 
6. See for example R . Robinson, 1985. 
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in the seventeenth century or Asante, D a h o m e y , Futa Jallon, Futa Toro 
and Bondu in the eighteenth century became more general in the nineteenth 
century. Certainly there seems to have been a more determined effort to 
institutionalize political change in more permanent structures sustained by 
n e w military, social and economic systems. 
O f the major states that survived from the eighteenth century, few could 
have done so without major internal reform. This was because the intense 
political rivalry and the need to control the expanding scope of commercial 
relations created such n e w challenges that each state either tried to reform 
and expand at the expense of its neighbours or faced disintegration and 
fragmentation. F e w were allowed, like Benin, to merely contract and 
survive.7 Most, like, for example, Asante, D a h o m e y and Buganda, had 
constantly to maintain and even improve on their efficiency largely in terms 
of the ability of the ruler to centralize power, weaken subordinates, extract 
more and more surpluses from them; monopolize major economic and 
stragetic resources; institutionalize a hierarchy of officials dependent on the 
ruler for appointment, advancement and discipline; and sustain these 
powers by the establishment and control of a standing military force, 
c o m m a n d e d by officials similarly dependent on the ruler. This veritable 
revolution was sometimes achieved without an obvious change of political 
system; sometimes, as in the case of Borno, it necessitated a change of 
dynasty.8 Often there was a compromise as 'new m e n ' were appointed to 
old chieftaincies and m a d e to function in new bureaucratic ways, or n e w 
offices came to acquire something of the ethos of older traditional titles. 
T h e Mfecane spread far and wide a new model of the northern Nguni 
state as revolutionized by Shaka. T h e new state involved basically the 
adaptation of the age-grade system to create what was virtually a standing 
army. This ranged far and wide to recruit young m e n into the army and 
w o m e n as wives, all at the disposal of the king to w h o m all resources 
belonged, including cattle and agricultural produce with which to sustain 
the army and an expanding court. It also involved acculturation of con-
quered peoples into the dominant culture, and an entirely n e w conception 
of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.9 T h e personality of the 
ruler and the quality of his leadership still seemed to have mattered more 
than the structures of the state, and the state was often rent apart by the 
family feuds of the royal lineage. But there is no doubt that for all 
the initial devastation and confusion created, the Mfecane succeeded in 
establishing several larger, more efficient and stronger states, with more 
durable structures than had existed previously. T h e n e w states also had 
more-clearly defined frontiers, if only because they m a d e such demands 
on the ruled that there could be little doubt about the extent or limits of 
7. See Chapter 26, above. 
8. See Chapter 22, above. 
9. See Chapter 5, above. 
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jurisdiction. T h e ruler might still exploit his headship of different religious 
cults but, increasingly, he was ceasing to be merely a ritual leader. His 
managerial, administrative and military capabilities as effective and execu-
tive head of the state machine became more important than the network 
of kinship and ritual connections, though in some cases these continued to 
be important as ideology and source of legitimization. 
In the case of Ethiopia, the aim of reform was not to create a new state 
or strengthen an existing one, but to revive an ancient one, an ancient 
Coptic Christian-dominated empire that had disintegrated into several 
competing chieftaincies under pressure from both the Muslim O r o m o 
and European Christians. T h e struggle was for one or the other of the 
competitors to claim and assert the authority of the emperor, re-establish 
its alliance with the Church, reform and equip it and use it to bring other 
rival powers, Christian and Muslim alike, under obedience to the emperor. 
T h e historic traditions of the empire and the number and relative strengths 
of the competitors left no wide margin for the emperors, Téwodros II and 
Yohannes IV, to manoeuvre in creating the revived state. A n d the task of 
creating n e w structures could not even begin until military superiority had 
been achieved. T h e two emperors succeeded to a considerable extent, one 
after the other, enough to revive national consciousness but not enough to 
monopolize economic or strategic resources, or totally curb the ambitions 
of subordinate powers wishing to collaborate with enemies from Egypt in 
the north or European invaders from the coast.10 
There was a similar factor of nostalgia in the effort of the khédives of 
Egypt to consolidate their rule into a strong national hereditary monarchy 
and to expand the powers of Egypt in the Nile valley and revive, or át least 
rival, the ancient glories of the pharaohs or of the Egypt of the Fätimid 
caliphs. M u h a m m a d 'Airs aim was to decimate and undermine the 
M a m l u k s , establish a n e w hierarchy of officials and councils, reform agric-
ulture and redistribute land so as to strengthen the ruler's control over 
land and agriculture, extract more surpluses so as to have funds to build a 
modern industrial economy, support a reformed army, and buy autonomy 
from the Ottomans. 
Khedive Ismail revived and advanced this spirit of reform, employing 
Europeans to supervise abolitionist and commercial ventures in the Sudan, 
completing the cutting of the Suez Canal and constructing other canals 
and irrigation works, railways, communication systems and the like. His 
aim was, within the limitations of Ottoman overlordship, which European 
powers exploited to impose unfair treaties to entrench their interests, to buy 
European technology to modernize Egyptian structures and institutions.11 
Ostensibly, the aim of the djiKäi movements was to recreate classical 
Islamic institutions of the time of the orthodox caliphs. In more practical 
io. See Chapter 15, above. See above R . A . Caulk, 1972. 
11. See Chapter 13, above. 
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terms, it was to create Islamic theocratic states in place of traditional 
societies ruled by Muslims and traditionalists. It was to instal rulers chosen 
for their learning and piety and dedicated to running the affairs of the 
state on the principles of the Ku'ran and Islamic laws, and committed to 
establishing truly Islamic institutions. B y the 1870s, the successors of the 
founders in Sokoto had achieved a fair measure of success. Under the 
overall supervision of the caliph, the individual amirs had certainly achieved 
more durable political structures than the Hausa rulers they had displaced. 
It is true that in m a n y respects the rulers and the aristocratic classes 
around them had re-absorbed m a n y of the Hausa nobility and privileges of 
fiefholders and merchant princes. However, the relative degree of peace 
that the caliphate enjoyed, the attention to markets, industries, crafts and 
trade routes, the power of judges and other officials and the control of 
amirs over the officials, all ensured a higher degree of executive authority 
in the state. 
Seku A h m a d u , w h o had succeeded al-Hadjdj ' U m a r Tal shortly after 
Massina had been incorporated into the empire, had to battle both with 
internal dynastic rivalries and the hostility of the French, which further 
encouraged dissident groups from within. In spite of such difficulties and 
limitations, the empire had provided an overall framework of state, legal 
principles and administrative structures that united a wide range of peoples 
over the vast empire. State structures apart, the Tijáni order provided a 
faith and way of life that acted as a further bond of unity and loyalty to 
the ruler. T h e example of the Dinguiraye revolution encouraged m a n y 
religious leaders to extend the djihad into other areas, to replace secular-
minded Muslims and traditionalists with clerics seeking to establish Islamic 
theocracies. T h u s , in the disintegrated empire of Jolof, the states of Kayor 
(Cayor) and Wolo f came under the rule of clerics, and began to extend 
Islam as a factor of reform in Senegambia. A m o n g the southern Mandinka 
where Muslims were in a minority, Samori Ture, a Joola (Dyula) warrior 
with a commercial background, sought to use Islam to unify his peoples 
irrespective of whether they were previously Musl im or traditionalists.12 
W e find Islam serving the same purpose in N u p e and Ilorin, where rulers 
embraced Islam with its tradition of literacy and pattern of political and 
social institutions not only to convert a traditional ritual kingship into an 
executive theocratic state, but also as a factor of conversion to facilitate 
expansion a m o n g non-Musl im peoples. 
Christianity served a similar purpose, providing a cultural framework 
for creating a Creole society out of disparate groups of peoples settled in 
Freetown and surrounding villages, as in various settlements on the Lib-
erian coast, or in Libreville, Freretown, and other freed slave settlements. 
In various places, missionaries seeking converts often received a w a r m 
welcome from African rulers w h o , although very jealous of their inde-
12. See Chapter 24, above. 
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pendence and not keen to have their people converted, saw in missionary 
activities a possible access route to European education which might teach 
literacy and technical skills such as carpentry, printing and, if possible, 
also the manufacture of guns and gunpowder. T h e rulers of Madagascar 
tried to balance British Protestants and French Catholics, then rejected 
both and sought to ban their religious activities, and ended up getting the 
court and the bureaucratic elite to become Protestant while Catholicism 
m a d e significant progress in some of the provinces. T h e rulers tried to use 
European ideas in diplomacy, judicial reforms, military reorganization and 
in establishing a constitutional monarchy.13 Similarly, beleaguered as they 
were by aggressive white racialism, a number of the n e w states in Southern 
Africa such as Moshoeshoe's kingdom of the Basuto accepted missionaries 
as their advisers and external champions, protected them and even p r o m -
ulgated laws to assist them in their work of conversion.14 In the Fante 
states on the Gold Coast and at other important missionary centres, notably 
Abeokuta in south-western Yorubaland, a number of Western-educated 
African leaders used their literacy and European contacts to get reforms 
carried out in the traditional state structures. These included the creation 
of chancelleries to be managed by literate Africans to control diplomatic 
relations with Europeans and guide the external relations of the states; the 
reform of tax systems by the introduction of regulated taxes in place of 
tolls and tribute; and the improvement of the judicial system by the 
introduction of record-keeping and putting enacted laws into writing.15 
Military systems 
Ultimately, the durability of political structures depended on the military. 
This was never more so than in the nineteenth century. Hitherto the 
network of kinship and cultic relationships probably mattered more than 
the military system. As long as the bulk of the army consisted of occasional 
levies of the mass of the population w h o brought their o w n arms and 
provisions to defend their villages w h e n attacked, for short periods of the 
dry season, in between normal agricultural life, the army mattered more 
in relation to neighbours than in the structure of power within the state. 
Raising the levies depended on the political acumen of the ruler and he 
could rarely claim a monopoly of that. T h e emergence of a cavalry force 
created an elite in the army and generally also reflected the emergence of 
an aristocratic group whose m e m b e r s shared with the ruler access to the 
resources to buy and equip horses, and recruit and maintain horsemen and 
cavalry forces. 
It is n o w clear that the barrel-loaded musket or the various types of 
13. See Chapter 16, above. 
14. See Chapter 7, above. 
15. See A . Pallinder-Law, 1974; see also Chapter 3, above. 
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trade guns, D a n e guns, etc., whether imported or locally manufactured 
had, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, m a d e little difference to 
and the structures of the state in Africa. It could succeed for a while in the 
hands of disciplined troops against people unused to firearms: such as the 
Egyptian soldiers in the southern Sudan in the 1840s. It was, however, no 
match for a disciplined cavalry force armed with spears or poisoned arrows, 
which could withstand the first volley and rush the musketeers before they 
could reload. Shaka's impis showed the superiority of the short stabbing 
spear in the hands of such disciplined soldiers. Egba warriors in Abeokuta 
acquired European armaments, including some cannons, which helped in 
resisting the D a h o m e y invasions, but they were no match in the 1860s for 
the better-disciplined Ibadan soldiers w h o fought mostly with locally 
manufactured weapons. Similarly Téwodros w o n victories over those with 
advantages of musket firepower through surprise attacks and forced 
marches with troops travelling light.16 
T h e major revolution of the nineteenth century in warfare was the rise 
of the professional warrior. T h e intense political rivalries and the frequency 
of wars left a few people more or less permanently under arms and the 
professional warrior emerged as a regular part of society. Usually, there 
was no large standing army as such. W a r was a kind of enterprise, or a 
feature of the enterprise in search of political power and control of economic 
resources. T h e warrior was often an entrepreneur w h o , having amassed 
some wealth from trading, was in a position to attract followers or to recruit 
or capture slaves to serve in his private army. With this he pursued his 
interest in search of political and economic power, either independently or 
as part of the resources available for the use of a state. If successful, he 
thus acquired title to an office which he used to integrate himself into a 
political system. Sometimes, a ruler like Moshoeshoe was himself the most 
successful entrepreneur in amassing the necessary resources to organize 
clients and recruits into an army, thus leaving other lesser entrepreneurs 
little choice but to accept integration on his o w n terms.17 
Shaka established the model of the king as war leader. H e alone con-
stituted the age regiments and organized their training, discipline, pro-
visioning, and equipment as professional warriors. H e redesigned the war 
implements, and depended on local manufactures for such equipment. T h e 
army became the core of the state. M a n y a general seceded with portions 
of the army under his c o m m a n d , roamed over wide expanses of territory 
as he recruited more followers, acquired cattle and w o m e n , and eventually 
used his troops to impose his rule over different communities of people, 
thus creating a kingdom. T h e main advantage of such professional warriors 
16. See the discussions in two special numbers of the Journal of African History (Vol. 
12, nos. 2 and 4, 1971) entitled 'Papers on firearms in sub-Saharan Africa'. See also J. P. 
Smaldone, 1972; R . A . Caulk, 1972. 
17. B . A w e , 1973; Chapter 5, above. 
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was not so m u c h their armament as discipline, training and provisioning. 
Even where they had to live off the field, the requisitioning was organized 
and did not degenerate into looting. T h e most successful of such standing 
armies in Africa in the nineteenth century depended on local resources for 
their training, equipment and generalship. This was in contrast with those 
that sought to model themselves on European armies in terms of uniforms, 
barrack life, drilling and titles. In the case of Madagascar, reforms even 
went as far as the purchase of rank, and other early nineteenth-century 
European practices. 
Because of the powerful example of European armies, European muskets 
spread in Africa and many of the new armies began to adopt them, some 
because of their firepower (e.g. Enfield rifles), others because of their noise 
and the effectiveness of a row of musketeers making enough loud reports 
to frighten an approaching line of cavalry into confusion. M a n y an African 
ruler sought after cannons and artillery. However, on account of the weight 
and amount of gunpowder these weapons consumed, rulers tried to get 
them manufactured locally, with very indifferent success. B y the 1870s 
more-sophisticated guns began to be imported: breechloaders, repeater 
rifles, machine guns, and artillery, the ultimate development being the 
M a x i m gun, which Europeans managed to monopolize. S o m e African 
rulers, like the Egba chiefs, used European cannon more for psychological 
warfare than for genuinely military purposes. T h e argument here is that 
the importation of European guns had been considered desirable by m a n y 
rulers even before the nineteenth century. It was, however, not clear until 
the third quarter of the century, when more effective guns began to be 
imported, that European armaments could be said to be making a significant 
difference to warfare in Africa. Imported European guns were by then 
establishing an undisputed superiority and their importation became a 
critical factor in war. Consequently also, the search for their acquisition 
became an essential feature of commerce, diplomacy and statecraft. 
T h e revolution created by the growing importance of European arma-
ments can be illustrated by the difference in the experience of emperors 
Téwodros and Yohannes in Ethiopia. Téwodros tried to get European 
technicians to manufacture cannons and gunpowder locally, but he proved 
that, even without such armaments, he could defeat armies better equipped 
with muskets. Yohannes and, to an even greater degree, Menelik after him, 
realized that the emperor would succeed in his task of subjugating his 
enemies in Tigre and the coastal plains only to the extent that he could 
use his position to acquire m o r e and better European guns than they had. 
Similarly, rulers not only in North Africa but also in the Sahara and the 
Sudan, through trade and diplomacy, began to stockpile European guns, 
mostly from North Africa but also from the trade to the coast both of West 
and East Africa. T h e rulers of Madagascar did the same. In Central and 
East Africa, commerce was dominated by the hunt for ivory, which further 
encouraged the importation of firearms and the militarization of society. 
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O n e major effect of this growing importance of European firearms was 
the relative decline of cavalry as the elite and striking force in areas where 
it had been important and its replacement by a European-style armed 
infantry. In the forest areas and in places influenced by Nguni warfare, the 
traditional elite was already the infantry. Here the main trends of the 
nineteenth century were the training and increasing professionalism and 
subsequent introduction of European armaments to this infantry. In the 
widespread movement of peoples, such as followed the Mfecane or the 
collapse of the Old O y o empire, sometimes a people in a scrubland area 
hitherto depending on cavalry moved into a more forested area where 
cavalry warfare was difficult, and this further encouraged the decline of 
cavalries. S o m e of the states in direct confrontation with European settlers, 
having a tradition of mounted riflemen, bred ponies for fast m o v e m e n t , 
organized importation of European arms and created n e w armies that for 
a while had the balance of power on their side. In m u c h of the rest of 
Africa and especially the Sudan, where for centuries the cavalry had been 
the core and the elite of the armies, trained, professional foot soldiers armed 
with rifles rose to become the elite force. T h e cavalry was beginning to be 
relegated to the second line of defence and reserve. This sharpened the 
revolution in the military systems in Africa and had important social and 
economic implications that all helped to strengthen the ruler as the chief 
executive of the state. 
Social and economic transformation 
Evidence has been accumulated to show that the nineteenth century wit-
nessed major social transformations in Africa, especially in the nature of 
slavery and through the rise of both a warrior class and a politically 
powerful merchant class. These facilitated, partly caused, and were also in 
part the result of the changes w e have noted above in the political structures 
and military systems. M o r e than that, there was a growing d e m a n d for 
labour outside the customary bounds of the household unit, the village 
community or age grade associations. While the various societies remained 
resistant to freemen selling their labour, the predominant tendency in the 
nineteenth century was towards expansion of the scale of slave labour, an 
increase in the areas in which enforced labour was used, and a greater use 
of migrant labour. T h e general trend in the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century was for increased slaveholding in general, even in rural areas, an 
increase in the number of slaves held within each household, and an 
increase in the use of slaves in production under quasi-capitalist conditions, 
thus making their lives harsher than ever before.18 
With the intensification of political rivalries from the very beginning of 
the century, it became usual to press disputes over land, cattle, and even 
18. G . M . McSheffrey, 1983. 
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doctrinal differences to the point of completely destroying the enemy as an 
identifiable entity. W h o l e communities were incorporated into existing 
polities or dispersed and the bulk of the young m e n and w o m e n taken away 
as captives. Such captives were used to satisfy the increasing demand for 
labour in agriculture, craft production and mining and also as warriors 
in the emerging professional armies. T h e n e w state structures and military 
systems diminished the importance of the old aristocracies, whose members 
had depended on the accumulation of wives and extended families for 
their social, economic and political support, but they also created n e w 
bureaucratic groups that needed to be freed from normal agricultural 
duties. These new aristocracies depended not on large kinship groups as 
such, but on large households of clients and captives w h o maintained 
increasingly large farms to provision the household as well as groups of 
warriors at the battlefront. They were also deployed to produce goods for 
the local markets and for long-distance trade, so as to acquire the wealth 
necessary to attract more clients and buy imported arms and ammunition. 
With the effective end of the Atlantic slave trade and the increased 
demand for gold, palm oil, palm kernels and peanuts from western Africa, 
sugar cane from Mauritius, Réunion and the Mascarene Islands in the 
Indian Ocean, as well as ivory and cloves from East and Central Africa, 
there was an increased demand for captives not only to produce these 
goods, but also to transport them by headload or by canoes d o w n to the 
coast. Plantation slavery emerged, either in the form of slave settlements 
in the rural areas managed according to customary law on the Guinea coast, 
or Islamic law in the Muslim areas, or approximating to American-type 
plantations in the Indian Ocean islands. With the increased use of people 
of slave origin as warriors and in administrative positions at various courts, 
it has been estimated that in m a n y parts of Africa slave populations could 
range between 25 and 50 per cent of the total population.19 Although there 
were examples of slave revolts, and the particular example of the Lozi w h o 
threw off their Kololo overlords,20 generally the slave populations did not 
form a distinct class. T h e bulk performed menial jobs, largely as agricultural 
labourers. However the substantial groups of warriors and domestic slaves, 
and the significant few w h o rose to positions of trust and power as successful 
warriors, traders or administrators, and the variations in their fortunes and 
life styles, m a d e combination as a class of slaves very difficult. Only in 
places like Old Calabar, where the slaves were permanently alienated, with 
little inclination to integrate them culturally, and with a tradition of 
competition a m o n g the ruling elite to show off wealth by the number of 
slaves killed in funeral ceremonies,21 did the slaves in the agricultural 
villages combine in a secret cult to d e m a n d improved conditions. Elsewhere, 
19. See also Chapter 25, above. 
20. W . G . Clarence-Smith, 1979b. 
21. K . K . Nair, 1972, p. 48. See also Chapter 27, above. 
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the prevalent ethos was acculturation and integration into the society 
through individual households. While the degree of integration was clearly 
limited - as witnessed by the number anxious to be redeemed or, having 
been emancipated by colonial laws, w h o were anxious to return to their 
original homes - it was real enough to suggest that the dynamics of change 
in most of the African communities was the tension of age and sex within 
each household, and of status and competition for power between the 
lineages and kinship groups, rather than between broad classes in society. 
It is not so easy to define the effects of the expanding scope of commercial 
activities on social formations in quantitative terms. That the number and 
the importance of merchants increased cannot be doubted. W h a t is not 
clear is the extent to which a merchant or capitalist class m a y be said to 
have emerged. T h e tradition of long-distance trading with caravan centres 
and organization for security, provisioning, credit facilities, transportation 
and so on was already well established in North and West Africa and was 
developing rapidly in Central and East Africa in the nineteenth century. 
These developments occurred in Islamic areas where book-keeping was in 
Arabic, as well as in the old slave-trading parts of West Africa where the 
languages of commerce were European languages, and in areas of East 
Africa where Swahili was expanding as the language of commerce. There 
is evidence that in parts of the coastal areas of West Africa slave labour 
was beginning to be supplemented by expanding older forms of enforced 
labour, where m o n e y is loaned in return for a 'hostage' whose labour served 
partly as interest on the loan and partly as a guarantee that the loan would 
eventually be repaid. It was indicative of the increasing importance of the 
groups of merchants and of banking services that this type of enforced 
labour was greatly expanded in scope. It is said that by the 1870s on the 
Gold Coast, the system began to rival slave labour in significance, slavery 
being the method of recruiting labour from outside the immediate c o m -
munity, and the system of 'hostages' for recruiting labour from within the 
community itself.22 Yet, outside of the North African coastal cities, a 
distinct merchant class was slow in evolving. In the areas influenced by 
Christianity and European ideas, a group of merchants similar to the 
Victorian middle class began to emerge. But even in those places, apart 
from Sierra Leone and Liberia, such merchants seeking influence and 
power within the traditional states did so largely by obtaining chieftaincy 
titles within the evolving state structures. In m a n y parts of the Sudan and 
Senegambia, the dominant merchants were closely connected with Muslim 
religious leaders, and there was not a distinct merchant class but rather a 
clerical merchant class. In other places there was no clear division between 
the merchants and the warriors and the ruling elite. M a n y of those w h o 
started life by going on trading ventures as young m e n , grew prosperous 
enough to organize others to go on such ventures and with such wealth 
22. G . M . McSheffrey, 1983. 
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bought rights to traditional decision-making offices while they managed 
their farms, supervised their cattle and other property, and organized their 
paramilitary body of clients and supporters. 
Already by the 1870s, in Southern Africa the demand of the commercial 
farmers, mostly Boers but also a few Britons, was creating an insatiable 
demand for labour. While the Cape Colony had relied on emancipated 
slaves, 'apprentices' and migrants such as the Mfengu fleeing from the 
Mfecane, white farmers in Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal relied 
more on neighbouring Africans rendered landless and restricted in m o v e -
ment by the Pass Laws . B y the time the diamond fields of Griqualand 
West had added their o w n demands for labour, it had become necessary 
also to organize migrant labour from further afield. Although officially 
there was no slavery or 'hostage' system in South Africa, the basis of a 
worse system of proletarianization was already laid: African states were 
deliberately deprived of the best land, creating landless peoples w h o had 
no choice but to work under harsh conditions set by their ruthless rivals. 
T h u s the grim struggle between the white colonies and the African states 
with the partisan arbitration of the British overlords was no longer only 
about land and cattle but also about the total supremacy that would confer 
power to extract labour by force. It was a struggle that could not be 
resolved by federation in an 'informal empire'. However, while this became 
increasingly clear to all the groups of Europeans — settlers, colonial officials 
and imperial overlords - the leaders of the different African states failed 
to appreciate h o w m u c h the rules of the g a m e were changing by the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century. 
The changing balance of power 
T h e 1870s saw major changes not only in the internal structures of African 
states, but also in the roles and capabilities of Europeans in Africa. B y 
1870, the effects of the Industrial Revolution on state structures and warfare 
in Europe were becoming manifest. It was becoming clear h o w rapidly the 
gap in the relative balance of power between European nations and African 
states was widening. In that year, G e r m a n y and Italy emerged as unified 
and fortified states and their citizens were soon demanding more effective 
involvement in the competition for African resources. In 1870-1, Bismarck 
sealed the unification of G e r m a n y by defeating France in a war that 
introduced n e w military technologies, especially in improved armaments 
and new standards of training and tactics. These developments were soon 
making their impact felt in Africa, especially in the importation of improved 
guns. Following their defeat, the French promoted a strategy for revival 
that involved seeking an empire in Africa either for its intrinsic value, to 
boost morale, or both. T h e y developed a n e w policy of aggressively extend-
ing and defending French interests in Africa generally, through commercial 
and missionary agents and, specifically, by consolidating their positions in 
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Algeria and Senegambia. T h e revolt in Kabylia was fiercely suppressed. 
T h e opportunity was taken to confiscate m a n y hectares of Arab agricultural 
and grazing land, distributing these to European settlers and forcing the 
landless Arabs to provide cheap labour. T h e settlers — French, Spanish, 
Italian, Maltese and Greek, Christian and Jew - were designated French 
citizens and were therefore in a privileged position over the Arabs, w h o 
were deemed to be French subjects. 
T h e general effect of these developments was to intensify the competition 
a m o n g the Europeans. Partly in response to the French forward policy, 
the British showed no less eagerness to consolidate and defend their 
positions. T h e discovery of diamonds in 1869-70 in Griqualand West in 
South Africa, and the prospects of finding gold in large quantities, began 
to raise the fever of competition and alter the basis of the relationship 
between Europeans in Africa and between them and the Africans. Various 
European activities, hitherto pursued seemingly for their o w n sake or for 
humanitarian purposes, began to be re-evaluated from the point of view 
of their contribution to various European national interests. Explorers were 
no longer expected merely to satisfy scientific curiosity but were also 
encouraged to gather strategic intelligence and trade secrets. Missionaries 
were not just individual servants of G o d obeying a divine call to evangelize 
but were regarded as organized national agents of acculturation, part of 
whose objective was to weaken the cultural and commercial exclusivity of 
their hosts. Traders were not just seeking profit, but were preparing the 
way for their o w n nations to establish control. T h u s the widespread 
collaboration between Africans and Europeans, seemingly to utilize Euro-
pean ideas and European technologies for nation-building in the rev-
olutionary situation of the nineteenth century began to be seen as 
subversive, contributing directly to the systematic abortion of the efforts 
of African leaders to reform and modernize their societies. 
In the same vein, African rulers generally viewed the activities of 
abolitionists as negative. In m a n y cases, with the ending of the Atlantic 
slave trade, and after resisting and stalling, they began to co-operate to the 
extent that alternative trade in agricultural produce, gold, ivory and other 
commodities came to replace the slave trade and there was no interference 
with the holding of slaves and other sources of enforced labour. There was 
thus a basis for co-operation. As noted above, increased use of slaves was 
the basis of that co-operation. T h e Europeans recognized this, but in the 
1870s, while not abandoning that position, began to use emancipation as a 
potential factor for weakening the economic base of African states. It 
should be specifically noted in this connection that most of the armies the 
Europeans were raising were manned by emancipated African slaves loyal 
to their redeemers, w h o armed and c o m m a n d e d them. 
Similarly, most African leaders were very suspicious of European 
missionaries. Eventually m a n y welcomed missionaries if they played d o w n 
the factor of conversion and emphasized education. M a n y rulers welcomed 
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the opportunity for some of their slaves, or even their sons, to acquire the 
skills of reading and writing as a key to the white man's knowledge, and 
as a basis of commercial relations. T h e missionaries were even more 
welcome w h e n they taught new technologies such as the printing of books, 
house-building, mechanized farming, vaccination, and the like. They were 
also sometimes called upon to teach techniques for making guns, gun-
powder and other strategic goods, or at least to assist with their importation. 
By the 1870s, it was becoming clearer that the process of acculturation was 
weakening the identity of the host states, and their resolve to maintain 
their independence. Missionary activities also became a factor of division 
conditioning some African states to support particular European nationals 
and others to oppose. 
Perhaps the most subversive of the European activities was trade. Trade 
provided a basis for co-operation between Africans and Europeans, as both 
had a mutual interest in promoting its expansion. African rulers had to 
regulate trade for strategic reasons and to ensure that the African state and 
African merchants derived as m u c h advantage from it as possible. European 
traders, of course, also owed it to themselves to negotiate for trading terms 
that allowed them to m a k e as m u c h profit as possible. In North Africa, 
they had exploited the weaknesses of the Ottoman emperor to secure 
excessive privileges for European nationals by treaty, in return for help-
ing to prop up the Ottoman overlordship, thus weakening the ability of 
North African rulers to regulate trade in their o w n domains. T h e Euro-
peans also reserved the right to help themselves to parts of the Otto-
m a n empire whenever it suited the concert of European powers: France 
defeated the Bey of Algiers in 1830 and laid claims to the whole bey-
lik, and in 1878 claimed Tunisia, just as Britain was to claim Egypt in 
1882. 
In the 1870s, free trade was the slogan by which Europeans fought 
against the right of African rulers to regulate trade.23 In the n a m e of free 
trade, they sought more and more privileges for European traders. They 
encouraged African rulers to borrow heavily from European banks and 
dubious European adventurers. T h e y manipulated servicing of the loans 
to acquire rights to the produce and to customs duties years in advance. 
They signed one-sided agreements for the collection of debts and enforced 
these and other privileges of European traders to weaken the economies of 
the states and even more the control of the rulers over the economy. In 
Egypt and Tunisia, they forced on the rulers international debt c o m -
missions which greatly undermined the autonomy of the rulers, provoked 
riots, hindered reform and directly led to the loss of independence with 
little or no fighting involved. But free trade was only a slogan to give the 
23. T h e clearest statement of this was in the General Act of the Berlin Conference where 
free trade was proclaimed on the Congo and the Niger as a prelude to the monopolistic 
policies of Leopold's International African Association and of the Royal Niger C o m p a n y . 
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European traders control of the economy so that they could begin to 
exclude not only African traders but also other European nationals. 
T h e reason for the n e w confidence and aggressiveness of the Europeans 
from the 1870s onwards was to be found in the maturing phase of capitalism 
as manifested in new guns which tilted the balance of power in favour of 
European-led armies. T h e change was not sudden, and the Europeans 
themselves did not exaggerate their advantage. U p to 1871, perhaps largely 
because of its proximity to France, the French engaged as m a n y as n o 000 
troops in the war in Algeria. With the notable exception of the Anglo-Boer 
W a r of 1899—1902 in which the British committed an even larger force, no 
other power could afford so large a force in Africa. T h e British employed 
as m a n y as 12000, mostly Indian troops, in the invasion of Ethiopia in 
1868 but only 2500 British troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley w h e n Asante 
was invaded and Kumasi sacked. Thereafter, the Europeans preferred to 
depend more on recruiting and training emancipated slaves. Several African 
armies - such as the Zulu itnpis, the D a h o m e a n Amazons , and the Zanzibari 
baluchis — were well k n o w n for their training and discipline. There were 
also African generals w h o could match European generalship and often 
had the advantage of better knowledge of the terrain. Europeans always 
managed to recruit not only enough African troops of their o w n but also 
allies. T h e military intelligence and information gathered from traders and 
missionaries always provided a basis for recruiting such allies. However, 
the critical factor that bred the new confidence and kept the morale of 
European officers and their African rank-and-file high was the knowledge 
that as long as they retained superiority both in the quality and quantity 
of arms, though they might lose a battle or two, they would ultimately win 
the war. 
The legacy of wars 
W e m a y conclude that by the 1870s the efforts at fundamental recon-
struction of society in different parts of the continent had produced major 
changes which, for all the divergent tendencies, m a y be said on the whole 
to have strengthened the capacity of Africans to defend themselves and 
their interests. It is clear also that at the same time the European presence 
was undermining those structures and constituted a grave threat to African 
security. This was the more so because the success of the African leaders 
had been achieved at the cost of what m a y be called the legacy of wars. 
There had emerged larger, stronger states with a tendency towards the 
concentration of executive power in individuals and specific title holders 
directly responsible to the ruler, and officials gaining office more by merit, 
achievement and favour of the ruler than by hereditary rights. In the 
process of achieving such stronger states with a more effective concentration 
of executive power, weaker states had disappeared. Various groups in 
danger of losing power and various vested interests adversely affected had 
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fought back and wars had become endemic. T h e more the Europeans 
perceived this growth of African state power, the more they were deter-
mined to frustrate it, and they were able to exploit this legacy of wars to 
create divisions and provide opportunities for intervention. 
T h e states that emerged had evolved more durable political institutions 
that were generally more effective than ever before in exacting the demands 
of the ruler on the ruled. This, as w e have noted above, implied a clearer 
delimitation of jurisdiction and a clearer definition of frontiers. Perhaps it 
also heightened the consciousness of the value of land. At any rate, wars 
became more ruthless and more total than hitherto. They were usually 
fought not merely to establish the relative authorities of competing rulers, 
but affected the fortunes of society as a whole: the victor not infrequently 
took the bulk of able-bodied persons a m o n g the vanquished as captives, 
seized land and cattle and sometimes annexed the whole community with 
a subsequent loss of their identity. 
It should be emphasized that, to a considerable extent, the nineteenth-
century wars, while strengthening state power, did so at the expense of 
other forms of solidarity. T h e intensity of political rivalries and economic 
competition involved in the wars was such that little respect was shown 
for what w e would n o w call ethnicity: cultural affinities in sharing a c o m m o n 
language, c o m m o n myths of origin and the network of kinship and religious 
interrelationships which in the past had usually transcended the frontiers 
of state power. While this decline of ethnicity was probably not n e w , it 
became more general than ever before in the nineteenth century. In the 
conflicts and processes of state formation associated with the Mfecane or 
the Yoruba, Asante, or Maasai wars of the nineteenth century, it is clear 
that the factor of state power was far more important than that of ethnicity. 
Indeed, w h e n w e consider the extent of the wars, the diverse movements 
of people associated with the slave trade and the processes of state formation 
and state reconstruction going on, it is ironic that the old anthropological 
notion of the 'tribe' as a static biological organism was ever thought to 
apply to African peoples on the eve of the colonial conquest. O n the 
contrary, the n e w state structures, which were not based on ethnicity, had 
become more important than ethnic solidarity in determining the response 
of various African peoples to the European challenge. 
T h e European strategy towards growing state power in Africa, was 
initially to emphasize strong national interests. European missionaries, 
traders, explorers and consular agents, w h o had previously tended to act 
separately and often at loggerheads, began to consolidate behind national 
interests. T h e situation early in the century w h e n G e r m a n explorers and 
missionaries were sponsored by British institutions, or French and British 
traders co-operated at the court of Zanzibar, became increasingly difficult 
in the 1870s. This strategy was, however, ineffective, as African rulers 
began to realize that all European nationals ultimately served the same 
interests, whether missionaries or traders or explorers. W h a t was more, 
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they were also quite adept at playing off one European power against 
another. It was this that dictated the n e w tactics of the Europeans. 
A s noted above, the critical factor in the changing balance of power in 
Africa in the 1870s was not the troops, nor their training and discipline or 
generalship, but the quality and quantity of the guns available to the 
respective sides. T h e ultimate answer in the contest for power in Africa 
therefore depended on the monopolization of arms and ammunition. This 
was not easy to achieve as long as Europeans pursued national interests 
and African rulers could play off one power against another. Moreover, in 
the essential search for allies, Europeans had to use the supply of quality 
guns to bargain for treaties, concessions, neutrality or active participation 
in wars against rival African states. It therefore became essential to regulate 
their Scramble on the basis of international agreements and, in particular, 
to limit the supply of arms and ammunition. T h e most intense rivalry was 
between the British and the French. T h e British tried to secure their 
interests by also playing the role of protectors of Portuguese interests. This 
gave Bismarck the opportunity to play the role of an interested broker by 
convening an International Conference in Berlin. This Conference in turn 
gave King Leopold his chance to seek for international support for his 
ambitions on the Congo by proclaiming free trade and humanitarian anti-
slavery ambitions.24 This prepared the way for the Brussels Act which 
banned the supply of arms to African rulers in the n a m e of an anti-slavery 
campaign. 
T h e truth was that by linking the limitation of arms with the anti-slavery 
campaign, the British were able to exempt the 'self-governing' settlers in 
South Africa from the operations of the Brussels Act. B y this device also, 
while constantly fighting African states and negotiating various treaties and 
conventions with African rulers, they could pretend that, by owning slaves 
and dealing in slaves, African states enjoyed no recognition in international 
law. It was thus possible to pretend in the General Act of the Berlin 
Conference of 1885 and the Brussels Act of 1889 that in international law 
Africa was a terra nullius and only European powers and settlers had 
interests there that had to be protected. 
In other words, while European powers were dealing with individual 
African states, recognizing them, befriending some and fighting others in 
Africa, in Europe they closed ranks along racial lines and formed a cartel 
to regulate the flow of essential arms to the Africans. African leaders had 
no answer to this strategy. T h e competition for power in Africa had been 
drawn into the international politics of the Concert of Europe where African 
diplomatic skills were at a grave disadvantage. It is doubtful whether 
African leaders realized until too late h o w great was the danger that 
threatened them. T h e y were used to thinking that the European base was 
far away and that, in the final analysis, they had the advantage of numbers. 
24. See the General Act of the Berlin Conference, and also S. Miers, 1971. 
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Conclusion: Africa on the eve of the European conquest 
T h e y continued to act as if they could play off one European power against 
another. In South Africa, they even believed that they could appeal to 
the Q u e e n of England and her direct representatives to carry out treaty 
obligations against the wishes of Anglo-Boer settlers and fortune seekers. 
Far from any notion of forging a pan-African solidarity similar to that 
pursued by the Europeans, each African state acted as seemed best in its 
o w n individual interest. 
It appears that, if any factor is to be singled out, the basic explanation 
for this was to be found not only in the diplomatic abilities of the European 
strategists, but also in the legacy of wars that was part of the revolutionary 
situation of nineteenth-century Africa. It was the intensity of the rivalries 
and the bitterness of the wars that m a d e African rulers slow to realize that 
tackling the European threat should have taken precedence over their inter-
state rivalries, and that they should have united to face it. 
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Volta, 664, 689; Niger delta and 
Cameroons, 725; North Africa, 318, 
481; Senegambia and Upper 
Guinea, 637; slave trade, 72; Sokoto 
and Borno, 556; South Africa, 145; 
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75. 79. 692, 699-722, 765, 779, 789 
Yugoslavia, 759 
Yünis bin Yünis, Hadjdj, 453 
Yüsuf, Sultan A h m e d , 387 
Yüsuf Ali, 411 
Yusuf M o h a m m e d , 387 
Zaberma, 583 
Zabid, 754 
Zaire, 237, 240; see also Congo Basin; 
Great Lakes 
zakat, 482, 492, 567, 578, 606, 629 
Zamberma, 571,673-4,679,680,686-
7, 690 
Zambezi basin, 24,117,118,179-210, 
254, 266; eve of 19th century, 179-
85; slave trade and incorporation 
into world economy, 185-98; Nguni 
and Kokolo invasions, 199-208; eve 
of'Scramble', 208-10 
Zambia, 46, 237,256; see also Zambezi 
basin 
Zamfara, 557, 566, 568, 588 
Zande, 300, 306 
Zansi, 109 
Zanzibar, 5, 33, 87, 788-9; 1800-45, 
211-12, 214-15, 218-21, 225-6, 
229-31; 1845-80, 234-5, 237-8, 
240-1, 250, 262-3, 265, 267, 269; 
Congo Basin and Angola, 306, 322; 
and diaspora, 752; and Ethiopia and 
Somalia, 386-7, 411; and Great 
Lakes, 290; and Madagascar, 444; 
and Zambezi basin, 186-7 
Zaramo, 240 
Zaria, 533, 557, 562, 565-7, 572, 574-
5. 578. 581. 583-4. 593 
Zarwaliyya, 484 
Zawdé, Dajazmach, 381 
zäwiya, 463, 478, 480, 483-4, 523, 
525-6, 536, 545 
Zeila, 381, 385, 386, 406, 408, 752 
zeriba, 306, 364, 368 
Zerma, 677 
Zichy, Count, 406 
Zigula, 241, 243, 248 
Zimbabwe, 109, 119, 167, 186, 199, 
201, 256 
Zinder, 524, 534, 597 
Zitenga, 674, 691 
Zizi, 121, 138 
Zou river, 699 
Zoutpansberg/Zoutpansbergers, 158, 
160, 164 
al-Zubayr Rahama Mansür, 371 
Zugwenu (Boko) language, 702 
Zulla, 384, 397, 400, 405 
Zulu/Zululand, 19, 33, 48, 144, 167-
8, 171-4, 178, 254, 256, 788; and 
Mfecane, 90, 96, 98, 100-9 passim, 
120-1; in Cape Colony, 130-1, 
I32n, 136—7,142; proto- see Nguni, 
northern, in Zambezi basin, 199-
201 
Z u m b o , 183, 189 
Zuwaya, 519, 526 
Zwangendaba, 104, 107-8, 119, 123, 
199-203, 206, 208, 254, 255, 256 
Zwara, 472 
Zwide, 97-106, 119, 130-1 
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